The Book of Stratagems Tactics For Triumph and Survival

H A R R VON SENEiEF!
EDITED AND TRANSL

U.S. $24.95
Canada $35.00
With The Book of Stratagems Swiss

sinologist
Harro von Senger brings together
an invaluable
guidebook for the West, revealing for
the first
time the traditional strategic rules
and survival
schemes used by the Chinese to triumph
overtheir
enemies— no matter what the situation. Sun Tzu,
the great Chinese military theorist
and author of
the classic text Art of War, used
these stratagems
in the fifth century b.c.; Mao Zedong employed
these selfsame stratagems during
the Peoples
Revolution; and, most recently the U.S. Marines
effectively adapted them against the Iraqi army in
the Gulf War.
First systematically catalogued at the end

of the Ming Dynasty and kept secret until recent
times, these ancient stratagems
represent the
crystallization of more than 2,000 years of Chinese
experience in the "art of cunning." In this intriguing
and far-reaching book, Professor von
Senger
demonstrates how
stratagems have long been a
mainstay of Chinese politicians,
businessmen,
lawmakers, intellectuals, generals, and
foot sol-
diers alike. And as the sensational sales for The
Book of Stratagems in Germany, France, Italy,
and
the Netherlands suggest, these
stratagems can
be equally effective for their counterparts
in the
board- and briefing-rooms of the West.
(Because
an in-depth study of the wisdom of the
stratagems
had never before been published even
in China
the recent Chinese-language
itself,
translation of
von Senger's volume immediately hit the
Shanghai
bestseller list, where some 200,000 copies were
sold in only five months.)
Drawing on years of research in the Far

East, Professor von Senger has selected the eigh-
teen most important stratagems, explicating
them
(Continued on back flap)
1291
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Benger, Harro von.
The book of stratagems
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# 52f%
N
T H E
BOOK OF
STRATAGEMS
T H E
BOOK OF
TRATAGEMS
Tactics jor Triumph and Survival
HARRO VON SENG.ER

Edited and translated by
Myron B. Gubitz
s*\*Wff//j
VIKING
VIKING
Published by the Penguin Group
Viking Penguin, a division of Penguin Books USA Inc.,
375 Hudson Street, New York, New York 10014, U.S.A.
Penguin Books Ltd, 27 Wrights Lane,
London W8 5TZ, England
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Penguin Books Ltd, Registered Offices:

Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England
First published in 1991 by Viking Penguin,

a division of Penguin Books USA Inc.
Wen County ftMfclilr*|

m 1 3 579 108 64 2
Translation copyright © Viking Penguin,

a division of Penguin Books USA Inc., 1991
All rights reserved
Originally published in Switzerland

as Strategeme by Scherz Verlag.
© 1988 Scherz Verlag, Bern, Munchen, Wien.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING IN PUBLICATION DATA

Senger, Harro von.
[Strategeme. English]
The book of stratagems/ Harro von Senger; edited and translated
by Myron B. Gubitz.
p. cm.
Translation of: Strategeme.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-670-83962-0
1. Strategy. I. Gubitz, Myron B. II. Title.
U162.S4313 1991
355.4— dc20 91-50174
Printed in the United States of America

Set in Sabon
Designed by Ruth Kolbert
Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above,

no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored
in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted,
in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission
of both the copyright owner and the above publisher of this book.
TRANSLATOR S
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
In a project such as this, there are always a few people who

play a crucial role. I would like to offer special thanks to Dr.
Susan Cherniak, professor of Chinese at Smith College, Mas-
sachusetts, who served as our "resident expert" on Chinese
language, history, and literature; Paul DeAngelis, an out-
standing editor who started the ball rolling;and last, but far
from least, my wife, Carole, my toughest and most discerning
editor and proofreader. —
M.B.G.
Contents
A Prologue in Two Tales ix

Introduction i
STRATAGEM No. 1
Fool the Emperor and Cross the Sea 13
STRATAGEM No. 2
Besiege Wei to Rescue Zhao 33
STRATAGEM No. 3
Kill with a Borrowed Knife 41
STRATAGEM No. 4
Await the Exhausted Enemy at Your Ease 59
STRATAGEM No. 5
Loot a Burning House 67
STRATAGEM No. 6
Clamor in the East, Attack in the West yj
STRATAGEM No. 7
Create Something from Nothing 85
viii •
Contents
STRATAGEM No. 8
Openly Repair the Walkway, Secretly March

to Chencang 109
STRATAGEM No. 9
Observe the Fire on the Opposite Shore 123
STRATAGEM No. 10
A. Hide Your Dagger Behind a Smile 135
B. Honey in the Mouth, a Sword in the Belt 13 j
STRATAGEM No. 11
Let the Plum Tree Wither in Place of the Peach 147

STRATAGEM No. 12
Seize the Opportunity to Lead the Sheep Away 171
STRATAGEM No. 13
Beat the Grass to Startle the Snake 185
STRATAGEM No. 14
Borrow a Corpse for the Soul's Return 215
STRATAGEM No. 15
Lure the Tiger Down from the Mountain 233
STRATAGEM No. 16
To Catch Something, First Let It Go 253
STRATAGEM No. 17
Toss Out a Brick to Attract Jade 295
STRATAGEM No. 18
To Catch the Bandits, First Capture Their Leader 331
Appendices
a. place names 353
B. CHINESE STRATAGEM BOOKS 357
C. HISTORICAL FIGURES 359
D. MAJOR CHINESE DYNASTIES AND PERIODS 367
E. THE 36 STRATAGEMS 3^9
Notes 37 l
Index 385
a Prologue
in Two TAles
THE OPEN CITY GATES
Accompanied by 5,000 troops, Prime Minister Zhuge Liang of

the kingdom of Shu went to the city of Xicheng to oversee the
transfer of supplies from there to Hanzhong. Suddenly a succes-
sion of messengers arrived on swift horses. They reported that
General Sima Yi, of the hostile kingdom of Wei, was marching
on Xicheng with a vast army of 150,000 men. At that point
Zhuge Liang did not have a single general with him, only a staff
of civil officials. Half of his 5,000 troops had already left Xi-
cheng bearing supplies; only 2,500 soldiers remained in the city.
When the officials in his entourage heard the news, they grew
pale with fright. Zhuge Liang went up on the city walls to
reconnoiter. Sure enough, along the horizon huge dust clouds
were swirling toward the heavens as wave upon wave of General
Sima Yi's troops advanced.
Zhuge Liang gave these orders: "Take all flags and banners
down from the city walls and hide them. Every soldier to his
post! Anyone leaving his post without orders will be beheaded.
Open the four city gates wide. At each gate twenty soldiers,
disguised as commoners, are to be set sweeping the streets. When
x •
A Prologue in Two Tales
Sima Yi's army approaches, no one is to take any independent

action. I have a particular stratagem in mind."
Thereupon Zhuge Liang shrouded himself in a cloak of crane
feathers, placed a jaunty silk hat on his head, took up a zither,
and, accompanied by two pages, went out onto the city wall
again. There he sat down on an observation tower up front near
the parapet, lit a few sticks of incense, and began to play the
zither.
When General Sima Yi's advance scouts reached the city walls
and saw all this, they hurried back to report to their commander.
Sima Yi laughed in disbelief. He ordered his troops to halt their
advance, then mounted a swift horse and rode on to take a
closer look at the city. Sure enough, there was Zhuge Liang
seated atop the observation tower, a cheerful smile on his face,
playing the zither as wisps of smoke rose from the joss sticks.
To his left young page grasping a precious sword with
was a
both hands, to his right another page holding a fan. Near the
entrance to the city's main gate, twenty commoners were calmly
sweeping the streets, their heads bowed over their brooms.
Seeing all this, Sima Yi began to have grave misgivings. He
returned to his troops, ordered his vanguard and rear guard to
reverse their positions,and marched his men back toward the
mountains north of the city. Along the way, his son Sima Zhao
said, "Father, why are you pulling our troops back? Zhuge Liang
probably set up this scene because he has no soldiers."
Sima Yi replied, "Zhuge Liang is usually cautious and delib-
erate in his actions. He has never done anything daring. The
gates to the city were wide open today. That is a sure sign of a
trap. If my troops had entered the city, they would certainly

have prey to some stratagem. Believe me! A quick retreat
fallen
was most appropriate move."

the
So Sima Yi's entire army moved off. Prime Minister Zhuge
Liang saw the enemy troops disappear in the distance, and he
clapped his hands and laughed with delight. The officials in his
party were amazed and said, "Sima Yi is a famous general of
the kingdom of Wei. Today he came here at the head of 150,000
crack troops. Yet when he saw you, O Minister of Shu, he beat
a hasty retreat. Why?"
A Prologue in Two Tales •
x i
Zhuge Liang answered, "He based his thinking on the fact

that am usually cautious and deliberate and never make bold
I
moves. When he saw this scene, he assumed that our troops

had set an ambush. So he withdrew. Normally I do avoid risky
undertakings, but this time I resorted to a daring ploy because
there was no other choice."
The officials bowed their headsawe and exclaimed, 'The
in
stratagems of our Prime Minister would fool even the spirits of

our ancestors. Had we had our way, we would have abandoned
the city and fled."
Zhuge Liang said, "I only had 2,500 soldiers. If we had aban-
doned the city and fled, we would not have gotten very far.
Sima Yi would surely have captured us."
In a later period, this third-century event was celebrated in a
poem:
A three-foot zither, inlaid with jade, overcame the elite

troops, back when Zhuge Liang got the enemy to retreat
from Xicheng. To this day the locals still point to the spot:
"Here 150,000 men turned their horses around."
SURVEYING THE LAND AND WINNING A CONCUBINE
A young boy lost both his parents and came to live with
clever
his aunt and uncle. One day he noticed his uncle's sad expression
and asked him what was wrong. His uncle replied that he was
unhappy because he had no son. He would have liked to take
a concubine into the house to insure himself a male heir, but
his wife forbade what was troubling him.
it. This is
The young boy thought for a while and then said, "Don't
worry, Uncle. I see a way to get Auntie to agree."
The older man was incredulous. "There's nothing you can
do," he replied.
Early the next morning the boy took a tailor's rule and began
to measure the ground in front of the entrance to his uncle's
house. He made his actions very ostentatious, so that his aunt
would be lured outside.
Xll A Prologue in Two Tales
"What you doing here?" she inquired.

are
"I'm surveying the property," the boy responded coolly, and
continued his measurements.
"What? Surveying?" asked his aunt. "What has our property
got to do with you?"
With a self-confident air, the lad replied, "It has a great deal
to do with me, Auntie. I'm making preparations for the future.
You and Uncle are no longer so young. And you have no son.
So one day this house will surely be mine. I'm taking measure-
ments now, because when that day comes I'll want to make
some changes here."
At this, his aunt trembled with fury. Saying not another word,
she ran into the house, woke her husband, and urged him to
take a concubine as quickly as he could.
T H E
BOOK OF
STRATAGEMS
Introduction
Stratagems are used everywhere, by people in all walks of life.
But Western civilization has never produced anything remotely

resembling the highly condensed catalog of devious tactics
known as the "36 Stratagems." The entire catalog consists of
a mere 138 Chinese characters. Yet into these terse 36 Strata-
gems the Chinese have compressed much of their thousands of
years of experience in dealing with enemies (both internal and
external) and overcoming difficult and dangerous situations.
The Oxford English Dictionary (vol. 10, Oxford, 1933) de-
fines the word stratagem as follows:
1. a. An operation or act of generalship; usually an artifice
or trick designed to outwit or surprise the enemy.

1. b. In generalized sense: Military artifice.
2. a. Any artifice or trick; a device or scheme for obtaining
an advantage.
2. b. In generalized sense: Skill in devising expedients; ar-
tifice, cunning.
2- The Book of Stratagems
The Chinese language, in which individual written characters

may have several meanings depending on the context in which
they appear, has several characters which have been used from
ancient times to modern days to designate the concept of
stratagem:
— modern Mandarin pronunciation zhao

— modern Mandarin pronunciation mou
— modern Mandarin pronunciation ce
=Jr — modern Mandarin pronunciation ji
There are others as well. But the most commonly used is the
last of those listed: ji. The written character — XX — is built up
of two parts:
=~ — pronounced ydn in Mandarin, with the meaning of "to

speak, say, tell," and
~| — pronounced shi, and standing for "ten."
Taken together, the two parts mean "count to ten," or in a

more generalized sense, "to count, to calculate" (in both mean-
ings of the English word), and as a noun, "calculation, plan."
In certain contexts, ji and the other characters have two very
distinct and closely related meanings:
1. a tactic or ruse of war;

2. artifice in political and/or private life.
There isone more written character worthy of special men-

tion: the one that appears as the decorative element on the dust
Introduction •
3
jacket and title page of this volume. It is pronounced zhi. In

most Western dictionaries of the Chinese language it is rendered
as "wisdom, knowledge," etc. But in many Chinese texts, both
old and new, it is frequently used in the sense of "trick" or, —
in a more value-neutral formulation, "stratagem," typical of the
manner in which wisdom and cunning are integrated in Chinese.

The first mention of the 36 Stratagems appears in the Nan
Qi shu (History of the Southern Qi). The Southern Qi Dynasty
lasted from a.d. 479 to 502; its history was compiled soon after
by Xiao Zixian (a.d. 489-537). Included in the chronicle is a
biography of the political figure Wang Jingze, who is reported
to have once mentioned the "36 stratagems [sanshiliu ce] of
Master Tan."
This Master Tan was the renowned General Tan Daoji (d.
a.d. 436), who served the Southern Song Dynasty. The "Bi-
ography of Tan Daoji" contained in chapter 15 of the Nan shi
(History of the Southern Dynasties) includes the following
episode:
As commander of the [Song] expeditionary force, Tan

Daoji marched northward and fought his way to the Ji
River. [But] the Wei army was very powerful, [so] he sub-
sequently took [the city of] Huatai [instead of standing to
fight at the Ji River]. He fought more than thirty battles
against the forces of Wei and won most of them. When his
army reached Licheng, its supply lines were cut and he
ordered a retreat. From
defectors, the enemy learned of the
Song army's shortage of supplies, of the unrest in its ranks
and its declining morale. One night Tan Daoji had his
soldiers weigh sand, call out the weighed quantities, and
sprinkle the little remaining rice over the [piles of sand].
In the dawn's light the Wei troops thought that Tan Daoji's
army had an ample supply of rice after all and halted their
pursuit. Thinking the defectors were liars, [the Wei soldiers]
beheaded them. But panic broke out among Tan Daoji's
troops, who were numerically inferior to their enemy and
also profoundly exhausted. So Tan Daoji ordered his sol-
diers to put on their armor. And he slowly rode around his
camp in a battle chariot. When the Wei troops saw this,
they feared an ambush, did not dare approach [the Song

—
The Book of Stratagems
encampment], and withdrew. Although Tan Daoji had not

succeeded in conquering the region south of the Yellow
River, he returned home with his army unscathed. His fame
as a hero spread everywhere, and the state of Wei feared
him greatly.
This report makes it clear that Tan Daoji succeeded'in saving

his army from destruction through the use of various tactical
devices. Whether he actually had at his disposal a catalog of 36
stratagems is not revealed by the chronicles in question. But
"36" need not be taken literally, since the Chinese have a pen-
chant for using numerical expressions in a figurative sense. In
mentioning the "36 stratagems of Master Tan," Wang Jingze
may have used the figure simply to mean "numerous," just as
trente-six is sometimes used in French colloquial speech to mean

an indefinite high number.
In the oldest known document on the 36 Stratagems (about
which more shortly), the number 36 is interpreted on the basis
of the / Ching (Book of Changes), a volume of oracles the central
content of which dates from between the tenth and eighth cen-
turies B.C. [Note: The Pinyin system of transcription generally
used work, The Book of Stratagems, would or-
in this present
dinarily require that the Chinese title of the Book of Changes

be rendered Yijing, but since the form J Ching is more familiar
to American readers, it will be used throughout. ed.] Accord-
ing to the oldest commentary on the J Ching, which dates from

about the middle of the first millennium B.C., the underlying
concept of the work is the dualism of yin and yang, two opposing
forces. In broad terms, yang might be said to represent the
"masculine" principle, rationality, clarity, brightness, while yin
is seen as the "feminine" principle, emotion, ambiguity, shadow.
By extension, yin also embraces that which is neither sharp nor
straight, deviousness, hence tricks. According to the / Ching,
the principle of yin is represented numerically by 6. Thus 36

may be seen as the yin element squared, symbolizing a plenitude
of tricks or stratagems.
The meaning ascribed to ft — or "stratagem," in the Chinese
Introduction •
5
sense — ranges from a simple trick or a spontaneous action based

on sheer presence of mind to complex, carefully planned be-
havior that may be schematically outlined as follows:
• a situation is perceived as precarious, but it precludes direct

action;
• the situation involves another party, an "enemy" or
opponent;
• the other party is drawn in, tricked, deceived in some
fashion;
• the deception is secretly sponsored and/or perpetrated by
the beneficiary of the stratagem, though it is sometimes
staged to make it look as if the sponsor or perpetrator
were not involved;
• the stratagem is used to achieve a specific goal or purpose,
which always seems "good" or positive to its sponsor;
• that goal may be, but is not necessarily, negative for the
other party.
Among the chief general goals of stratagems are: masking

something which is true, pretending something which is untrue,
gaining the initiative or advantage, gaining a prize, encirclement,
enticement, and flight.
As has already been noted, the stratagems are permeated with

the spirit of the ancient Chinese concept of yin and yang as
complementary polarities, interacting cosmic principles. This
can be most readily seen as the ever-present tension between
the "bright" or visible (yang) and that which is planned and
acted out in the shadow of secrecy (yin). Some stratagems are
rooted in Daoist concepts, such as wu wei, or nonintervention.
Others bear the spiritual legacy of the ancient School of Legal-
ism, which preached to Chinese rulers the importance of sbu
(the techniques of power), fa (the primacy of the law as an
instrument of rule), and shi (personal position as the foundation
of power and influence). Many instances of applied stratagems
also demonstrate the School of Legalism's insistence on "reasons
—
6 -
of state," the priority of state interests over Confucian ethical

norms.
A Crystallization of Millennia
The Chinese word ji, which I translate in this work as "strat-

agem," appears in the world's oldest treatise on military theory,
The Art of War, by Sunzi, a contemporary of Confucius. [Note:
In contemporary American usage the name Sunzi is more com-
monly written as Sun Tzu, which is the form that shall be used
hereafter in this book. ed.] The word ji is part of the title of
chapter 1, in which the art of war is characterized as "the art
of deception." And in chapter 3, the title of which has been
translated by British sinologist Lionel Giles as "Attack by Strat-
agem," the following passage appears: "Therefore one who is
good at martial arts overcomes others' forces without battle,

conquers others' cities without siege. ..." According to Sun
Tzu, military victory over the enemy ranks merely third in the
value scale of the martial arts. Second place is given to victory

by diplomatic means, and first place to victory by stratagem.
Clearly, stratagems have been considered significant in China
since ancient times. Over the course of centuries, there gradually
crystallized abody of idiomatic expressions, colorful metaphoric
phrases that describe a whole range of stratagems. These idioms
were fashioned in part by popular speech and in part by military
theorists, philosophers, historians, and literary figures. Among
the stratagem-metaphors, some expressions refer to historic
events of two thousand years ago and earlier; others are rooted
in popular folktales; some phrases merely allude to tactics, oth-
ers indicate the specific steps to be taken in carrying out a

particular stratagem. In terms of style, the catalog of the 36
Stratagems is for the most part a list of maxims.
The verbal dress in which the stratagems are clad is very
scanty. The entire list, as has been noted, consists of only 138
Chinese characters; most of the idioms are expressed by 4 writ-

Introduction •
7
ten characters, some by only 3. But this linguistic spareness
leaves a great deal of latitude for interpretation and illustration.
Indeed, interpretation and illustration are essential, since the

maxims by themselves would be largely incomprehensible as
stratagems without explanation and example.
Until relatively recently, the catalog of 36 Stratagems, taken
as a whole, was treated as a more or less esoteric body of
—
knowledge though many of the individual idioms were fa-
miliar to most Chinese from childhood on. The great popularity
of the stratagems is due largely to Chinese popular literature.
The classic novels and novellas known to almost every Chinese
frequently include tales involving stratagems. Prominent among
them is Sanguo yanyi (The Romance of the
the historical novel
Three Kingdoms), which might almost be characterized as a
stratagem textbook. There is hardly a trick of war the planning
and execution of which is not described in its pages, sometimes
in great detail. There is even an old Chinese saying: "He who
has read The Romance of the Three Kingdoms knows how to

apply stratagems."
Today, China's mass media help keep familiarity with the
stratagemsalive. The aphoristic formulas crop up in reports on
domestic political developments (e.g., editorial comments on

behavior of officials considered "harmful to the people") and
analyses of foreign developments of which China's leaders do
not approve. Comic strips also help to popularize the strata-
gems. Typical examples are the six-part series titled The 36
Stratagems, published in 1981 in Jilin Province, with a print run
and the twelve-part comic-strip series
of close to 1.15 million,
A Collection on the Art of War Based on the 36 Stratagems,
published in 1982 in Guangxi with a print run of 400,000.
The Blossoming of Stratagem Literature in China
The Hongmen Secret Society was founded around a.d. 1674 to

break the rule of the Manchurian Qing Dynasty (1644-1911)
and restore the native Chinese Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) to

the throne. Until a few years ago it was generally believed that
the Hongmen Society had been the first to collate assorted ma-
terials into a coherent guidebook on the artifices of war. Entitled
Hongmen zhexue (Hongmen Philosophy), this work was
thought to be the source of all versions of the 36 Stratagems
now in circulation. But in 1941 a somewhat older source text

was discovered.
In 1962 the Archive of the Political Institute of the People's
Liberation Army issued, for internal use and without comment,
a treatise of apparently unknown 36
origin dealing with the
Stratagems. This proved to be a reprint of an older document
which had been purchased by chance in 1941 at a roadside
bookstall in Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province, by a man
named Shu He. On its cover, this older publication bore in large
characters the "The 36 Stratagems," and next to it in smaller
title
letters, "Secret Book of the Art of War" (in Chinese, Sanshiliu
ji miben bingfa). Published by Xinghua Press of Chengdu and
printed on handmade paper, the pamphlet contained a note

identifying the source of the text as a manuscript which had
been discovered that same year in a bookstore in Binzhou,
Shaanxi Province.
The treatise discovered in 1941 was made available to the
general public for the first time in 1979, in an edition published
in Jilin; a new, illustrated edition was issued in March 1987, a
second printing of which appeared in March 1989. In the Jilin
version, the original (1941) treatise was reprinted in classical
Chinese, with a modern Chinese translation accompanied by

notes and explanations.
The foreword to the 1979 Jilin edition contains speculations
on the manuscript's origin. According to the editors, its many
references to the / Ching indicate that the treatise's author may
have been influenced by Zhao Benxue or one of his disciples.
(Zhao Benxue, a military theorist of the Ming period, lived from

1465 to 1557 and was the first to systematically analyze warfare
in terms of the / Ching. Applying the idea of the constant in-
terplay of yin and yang to the dialectics of warfare, he examined

—
Introduction •
9
such pairs of opposites as reality and appearance, superior and

inferior numbers, strength and weakness, frontal attack and
ambush, unconventional and conventional methods, and ad-
vance and retreat.) The Jilin editors conclude that the manu-
script discovered in 1941 may date from the late Ming or early
Qing period and thus may predate the Hongmen Secret Society's
compilation.
Another monograph on the 36 Stratagems was published in
1981 by the Soldiers' Press (Zhanshi Chubanshe) in Beijing
(which changed its name in the mid-1980s to the People's Lib-
eration Army Press Jiefangjun Chubanshe). This work was
titled The 36 Stratagems: A Modern Version. Based on the older
stratagem treatise, it also incorporates modern examples of
stratagem application, some from other countries as well as
China (the ninth printing of this book appeared in March 1991,
with a printing of more than 1.5 million copies).
In recent years, numerous monographs on the stratagems have
appeared elsewhere in the Far East. In Taiwan, The Secret Book
of the 36 Stratagems, with Explanations was first issued in 1982,
based largely on the 1979 Jilin treatise. A booklet titled Wisdom
in Struggle, with the subtitle The 36 Stratagems, went into nine-
teen editions in Taiwan between 1976 and 1985. Its contents
are virtually identical to those of a Hong Kong book published
in 1969 under the title The 36 Stratagems, with Examples from
Times Fast and Present. (For the original titles and other bib-
liographic information on these Chinese-language works, see
the book list in Appendix B.)
While traveling in September 1987, 1 purchased three Korean
books about the Chinese stratagems in Seoul and five Japanese
works on the same subject in Tokyo, the earliest of the latter
dating from 1981. As to the present work, to my knowledge its
original German-language version (1988) was the first book to
appear on this subject in a Western language.
•
io The Book of Stratagems
The World of the Stratagems
When Chinese-language publications about the 36 Stratagems

are compared, becomes evident that the emphasis in the Peo-
it
ple's Republic is on their application to foreign affairs and mil-
itary matters. The books from Taiwan and Hong Kong, on the
other hand, supplement the military dimension by highlighting
how the stratagems may be applied in civilian life.
The following passage appears in the foreword to the seventh

edition (1989) of The 36 Stratagems: A Modern Version:
This publication arises from the need to know and use

stratagems in military conflict. The traditional material [of
the stratagems] has been subjected to appropriate review
Marxist military theory and is used [in this
in the light of
book] as the basis for developing modern military appli-
cations. [The] theory of stratagems is an important
. . .
component of military theory. If a military commander

wants to take the initiative, muchdepend on whether
will
he can . . . prove himself superior to his opponent through
the skillful use of stratagems. This enables him to transform
an unfavorable situation into a favorable one, to defeat a
number of troops, indeed, some-
superior force with a small
times even to bring his opponent down without using mil-
itary force at With scientific and technological
all. . . .
progress, the stratagems must sometimes be applied by new

means and sometimes imbued with new content, yet their
fundamental contours remain relatively stable.
The foreword to the Jilin editions of the 36 Stratagems (1979,

1987, 1989) likewise emphasizes their military character:
The on the 36 Stratagems belongs to the realm of

treatise
so-calledunorthodox (or unconventional) warfare. It is an
encyclopedia of what Chinese military theorists since Sun/i
[Sun Tzu] have characterized as guidao (the way of de-
ceiving the enemy).
Introduction •
i i
The literature from the People's Republic also contains some

cautionary remarks, such as this from the Jilin edition:
Reactionary feudalistic chaff also lies rotting beneath the

36 Stratagems, specifically in those which aim at gaining
booty. A critical attitude is therefore necessary.
Taiwanese and Hong Kong publications take a somewhat

broader view of the stratagems, as indicated by these lines from
the foreword to the nineteenth edition of Tricks in Combat:
The 36 Stratagems (Taipei, 1985):
The stratagems are like invisible knives, which are hidden

in the mind of man and flash out only when they are put
to use. They are used by the military, but also by politicians,
businessmen and academics. He who is versed in the ap-
plication of stratagems can plunge an orderly world into
chaos or bring order to a chaotic world; he can produce
thunder and lightning from a clear sky, can transform pov-
erty into riches, insignificance into prestige, the most hope-
less situation into a promising one. Human life is struggle,
and one needs stratagems. Everyone stands in
in struggle
the line of combat: a brief moment of inattention, and
someone may grab something of yours. But he who un-
derstands how to use stratagems will always hold the ini-
tiative in his own hand. Whether in palaces or shanties,
stratagems are applicable everywhere.
In the Chinese view, the stratagems do not serve only to help

"evil" outwit the "good." There are many situations in which
a "good" person, pursuing an honorable goal but finding himself
or herself in a weak position, can achieve that goal only through
the use of stratagems. This was notably true in classical China,
where laws were not designed to protect the individual and there
was no independent judiciary to safeguard the individual's
rights. In such circumstances, practical knowledge of the artifices
and tricks which could help one survive in life's struggle was
essential.
Nonetheless, there is an inevitable question of the relation

i2- The Book of Stratagems
between stratagems and traditional Chinese ethics, particularly
the norms of Confucianism. The stratagem books published in

the People's Republic do not deal with this matter. But the
volume published in Hong Kong in 1969 has something to say
about it:
Stratagems are the exact opposite of "Confucian" human-

ityand virtue. But he who treats his enemy with humanity
and virtue only harms himself. . . . Using the rhetoric of
virtue to maintain a pretense to others ... is acceptable.
But you must not fool yourself [with such rhetoric], at least
not when engaged in combat, whether with the weapons
of reason or of force Our age boasts of being civilized.
. . .
Yet the more civilized a society, the more rampant are lies
and deception. In such an environment, the 36 Stratagems

means of offense and defense. They consti-
are the perfect
tute abody of practical knowledge which is far more val-
uable than empty moralistic phrases.
For Westerners, knowledge of the 36 Stratagems can provide a

key to much of Chinese thinking. But sinology, the study of
Chinese culture, is not just a narrow academic field of interest
only to a few specialists; it is also of global significance, pro-
viding new insights into human nature in general. Hence, study
of the stratagems can also be invaluable in illuminating many
aspects of Western life and culture. Of the traditional catalog
of 36 Stratagems, 18 are fully documented in this volume, with
the remainder to follow in Volume 2.
One last thought: when immersing oneself in the world of
the stratagems, it is well to bear in mind the admonition of
Chinese sage Hong Zicheng: "A heart hostile to others is inex-
cusable. But a heart wary of others is indispensable. " Or, in the

words of the Gospel, "Be wary as serpents, innocent as doves."
STRATAGEM N O
7ool the Emperor

and Cross the Sea
The Chinese
characters a$ * #
Modern man tian guo hai
Mandarin
pronunciation
Meaning of fool Emperor cross sea

each character (or deceive) (or Heaven)
Interpretation Trick the Emperor into sailing across the sea by

with reference to inviting him into a seaside house which is, in
the oldest known reality, a camouflaged ship.
case
Applications Conceal the real objective; disguise the course

being pursued; camouflage the real purpose.
The coram publico stratagem.
The history of this stratagem goes back to a military campaign
mounted by the seventh-century Tang Emperor Taizong against
Koguryo, across the Yellow Sea on the Korean Peninsula. There
are two known versions of the story. But before we examine
them, it might be helpful to explain how I first got on the trail
of the stratagems.
For purposes of study and research, I spent 1971-73 in Taipei,
1973-75 in in Beijing. At the Mandarin
Tokyo, and 1975-77
Training Center of Normal Taiwan University in Taipei, I first
heard Professor Bai Zhengshi make passing mention of the "36
Stratagems." As it turned out, he knew little about them. So I
asked my fellow students — and soon I had a list of 36 rather
cryptic-seeming phrases. Surprisingly, even my Chinese col-
leagues found some of them puzzling. But my interest had been
kindled, and from then on it never wavered.
First I tried to figure out the meaning of the key phrases,
which consist sometimes of three, but usually of four written
characters. It was no simple undertaking. Initially neither my
professors nor my fellow students could explain the deeper sig-
nificance of Stratagem No. 1, for example. They all translated
i5
—
i6 •
the second character with its obvious meaning of "Heaven"

rather than that of "Emperor." The result was a rendition
still the more widely accepted one in the People's Republic and
Taiwan — which states, "Fool the Heavens and cross the sea."
In 1976 a professor at Beijing University told me of the earliest
known case history and its source: the biography of General
Xue Rengui (a.d.614—683) in the Encyclopedia of the Yongle
Reign [a.d. 1403-24], one of the world's oldest and largest
encyclopedias. Some years later I found confirmation for this in
The 36 Stratagems: Secret Book of the Art of War, published

and The Secret Book of the 36 Stratagems, with Ex-
in Jilin,
planations, issued in Taipei.
So much for the first version (given below in Section 1.1,
"Crossing the Sea in a House"). It took me a long time to track
down the second version (Section 1.2, "The Wooden City in
the Sea") after finding a reference to it in an article in a social
science journal. 1 The author of the article, Wu Gu, cited a sen-

tence involving Stratagem No. 1 in the fantastic historical novel
Shuo Tang (Tales from the Tang Period). But I could not trace
the quote in any editions of the novel currently available in
Taiwan or the People's Republic, all of which are based on a
bowdlerized and abridged version dating from the nineteenth
century.
Finally, in 1986, I located a 1736 edition of the novel in a
Beijing library. And there I found the second version of the case
history, which I have shortened slightly and recounted in Section
1.2. The stratagem is cited verbatim in the title of the relevant

chapter of the novel: Man tian ji Taizongguo hai (The Stratagem
of Fooling the Emperor Brings Emperor Taizong Across the Sea).
1.1 Crossing the Sea in a House
Arriving at the shore of the Yellow Sea with an army of 300,000

men, the Emperor hesitates. Water, nothing but endless water.
Koguryo is a thousand miles away. Why has he not listened to
Fool the Emperor and Cross the Sea •
i 7
those advisers who warned him against undertaking this cam-

paign? Plagued by doubt, he turns to his military commanders
for suggestions as to the next step. His generals ask for time to
consider.
Fearing that the Emperor might decide to pull his forces back,
the military leaders ask the advice of the resourceful General
Xue Rengui, who proposes a clever way to get the Emperor and
all his men swiftly across the waters. "How would it be," he
Emperor could embark

asks, "if the as calmly as if he were on
dry land?" The General undertakes to make all the necessary
arrangements.
The next day the military men inform the Emperor that a
wealthy farmer, who lives directly on the waterfront, has vol-
unteered to provide the food supplies for the overseas journey
and would like to speak with His Majesty. Delighted, the Em-
peror leads his entourage down to the shore. But he gets no
glimpse of the sea itself, because a clever arrangement of 10,000
canvases hides it from his view.
The wealthy farmer Emperor into his

respectfully invites the
house. Colorful tapestries cover the walls, and the floors are
thick with precious carpets. The Emperor and his advisers are
seated and drink some wine. After a while it seems to the mon-
arch as if the wind is whistling on every side and there is a
sound like the pounding of waves; beakers and candelabra sway
back and forth. Astonished, the Emperor orders an official to
—
open the curtains and sees the black, endless sea. "Where are
we?" he roars. One of his advisers explains, "We and the entire
army are on the open sea, heading for Koguryo." Faced with
this fait accompli, the Emperor regains his decisiveness and
bravely sails on for the eastern shore.
1.2 The Wooden City in the Sea
According to the second version of the story, the Emperor does

not hesitate but embarks directly, without the assistance of a
i8* The Book of Stratagems
camouflaged ship. His entire army of 100,000 warriors, horses,

and riders is accommodated on a fleet of 1,300 craft, with the
Emperor and his closest advisers sailing on the dragon flagship.
After three days on the water, a great storm comes up. The
waves rise monstrously into the air, many fathoms high. The
Emperor is so frightened that his face turns ashen. Soldiers and
warhorses are tossed about wildly and regain their footing only
to be dashed downEven the Emperor, the Son of Heaven
again.
himself, is thrown to the deck. Everyone is seasick. Finally the
frightened Emperor groans, "Gentlemen, I shall not continue
this campaign to the east. Let our enemy come and attack us!"
And so, despite warnings by some advisers that the Koreans

will attack China unless the crossing is continued, the imperial
fleet Dengzhou (in Shandong), landing
turns and sails back to
there three days later. The Emperor and his entourage enter the
port city, where his adviser Xu Maogong addresses him. "The
campaign against the Eastern Kingdom is an affair of state. How
can Your Majesty return to the imperial capital?"
The Emperor replies, "The storm at sea is frightful. Rather
than sail on, I prefer to return to our capital at Chang'an."
Xu Maogong responds, "Do not worry, Majesty. After a few
days the storm will play itself out. In the period of calm that
follows, we can cross the sea to subjugate the Eastern Kingdom."
"If that is the case," says the Emperor, "let us wait."
That night Xu Maogong goes to the army camp. "What
brings you here in the middle of the night?" asks General Jingde.
"It seems that His Majesty is losing his taste for this cam-
paign," replies the imperial adviser. "We shall conquer the East-
ern Kingdom only if we find a stratagem with which to fool the
Emperor into crossing the sea. Go to Zhang Huan and demand

that hework out such a stratagem for us."
Jingde goes to Zhang Huan and says, "The Emperor fears
wind and wave. He is unwilling to reembark. Find us a stratagem
by which we can fool the Emperor into making the crossing.
His Majesty must not feel the mighty power of the sea. He must
reach the eastern coast in a state of calm." And the General
adds, "I'm going to have a ditch dug. If you fail to come up
i 9
with an appropriate stratagem by morning, I'll have you put

down into it one fathom deep. If you cannot produce the strat-
agem by noon, two fathoms deep you'll go, and if not by eve-
ning, three fathoms. After that, if you cannot produce a
stratagem, I'll have you buried alive."
With a few companions, Zhang Huan hatches this plan: Sev-

eral hundred huge tree trunks are to be purchased and carpenters
hired to create a floating wooden "city." A few houses are to
be built before and behind the city wall. The ground near the
houses is to be covered with sand and
and flowers and
earth,
grass planted there. Streets must down. Soldiers are
also be laid
to masquerade as well-disciplined townsmen. In the midst of
the city, the three-story Pavilion of Calm is to be built to ac-
commodate the Emperor, and in it Buddhist monks are to be
set praying. This wooden city is to be launched into the sea first.
When a storm comes up, it will be "discovered" and serve the

Emperor as a refuge from the forces of nature. The Emperor
will step "ashore," rest himself in the Pavilion of Calm, see the
storm and the waves no more, and no longer vacillate about
the Korean campaign. Once the storm has passed, the Emperor
can be encouraged to return to his flagship.
Zhang Huan's stratagem is approved and carried out. After
three months, the wooden city is declared seaworthy and it is
launched. Soon beyond the horizon. Three days later Xu
it sails
Maogong says to the Emperor, "Your Majesty, I have calculated

the play of yin-yang forces for the time ahead. During the next
half year the wind will drop. Would this not be a favorable time
to board our ships and cross the sea?"
The Emperor agrees and gives the command to embark. After
three days the fleet begins to sway perilously once more. The
Emperor "That is
says, the sign of an approaching storm.
I
prefer to sail back to Shandong again."

Says Xu Maogong, "Majesty, do not concern yourself. There
is a place up ahead where we can drop anchor."
General Jingde pretends to peer long and hard into the dis-
tance. Suddenly he says, "Majesty, I see a city. We can anchor
there and find protection from the storm."
20 •
The Emperor asks, "What city is that? Is it under my rule?"

Xu Maogong replies, "Majesty, I have checked the map. It
is a citadel built for shelter from the storm. And it is under your
imperial jurisdiction. Your Majesty can go ashore there and
thus avoid the storm and the waves."
"Very well," says the Emperor.
So the dragon flagship and the rest of the fleet drop anchor
off thewooden island. The Emperor and his entourage disem-
bark. The "townsmen" make their obeisance before the Son of
Heaven and welcome him to their city. The Emperor asks, "Is
there a place here where one can enjoy peace and quiet for a
while?"
The well-prepared inhabitants of the floating island lead the
Emperor to the Pavilion of Calm, where he finds a perfect setting
for rest and relaxation that helps him forget the stress of his
overseas endeavor.
In this way the Emperor is fooled and manipulated into cross-
ing the sea.
1.3 The Marriage Vow
In "The Open City Gates" as related in our Prologue, we found

Zhuge Liang (a.d. 181-234) seated on a city wall, using a
stratagem to trick the approaching enemy into retreating while
playing his zither.
At twenty-six, Zhuge Liang was still unmarried an ad- —
vanced age for bachelorhood in those days. Each day he studied
hard and spent some time playing the zither. Though he thor-
oughly enjoyed his life, his elder brother and his sister-in-law
kept trying to find a wife for him. But Zhuge Liang had already
rejected seven candidates.
One day his sister-in-law made a scene about Zhuge Liang
it.
attempted to calm her. "I'm afraid to sleep in the same bed with
another person but to dream different dreams," he said. His
sister-in-law insisted, "Marriage is a heavenly dispensation. You
Fool the Emperor and Cross the Sea 2 1
cannot be as choosy about it as you are when buying an ass or

a horse. Really! I have already proposed seven maidens, each
as lovely as a fairy. But you've turned them all down. Do you
really want to wait until the 'Right One' is born for your
benefit?"
Zhuge Liang knew how much his brother and sister-in-law
wanted him to start a family. So he was obliged to say, "Wife
of My Brother, please keep looking."
She replied, "I'm thinking of the eighth daughter of the Zhu
family, who live near the eastern gate of the city."
"What are her ideals and her talents?" asked Zhuge Liang.
"Ideals? Talents?" responded his sister-in-law harshly. "It is
a virtue when a woman is without education!" Seeing Zhuge

Liang shake his head wearily, she added, "This time I'll arrange
everything. No more excuses. And you won't leave this room
until you agree."
"If only My Brother's Wife would not place a beautiful face
above everything else," said Zhuge Liang.
His sister-in-law replied, "There's an old saying: 'Capable
man, beautiful wife.' You are a man of great talent. All the more
reason for you to have a beautiful wife. Or would you prefer
an ugly one?"
"She doesn't necessarily have to be ugly. But ... as a matter
of fact, someone does come to mind."
His sister-in-law wanted to know immediately of whom he
was thinking. Zhuge Liang said, "My old teacher Huang
Chengyan has a daughter. Her name is Huang Zhengying. I
have heard that she is extremely knowledgeable and noble-
minded .". .
His brother's wife interrupted. "What? Huang Zhengying?

Her nickname is 'Ugly.' She's looked terrible since she was a
baby. Her skin is as dark as a mudfish. I haven't seen her in
years. She's probably grown even nastier-looking in the
meantime."
Zhuge Liang listened to this tirade with a smile, but said
nothing at first. Then he commented, "As a maiden matures,
she changes eighteen times. Perhaps . .
."
Again his sister-in-law interrupted him. 'That one? The more

she's changed, the uglier she's probably become."
Zhuge Liang replied, "Brother's Wife, the ear is less reliable
than the eye. I have read her poems. Truly, she would be right
for me. Please, do go and see her."
Huang Zhengying was indeed no beauty. But she was intel-
ligent and energetic. Each day, after her sewing, she would
devote herself entirely to study. She was already twenty-four
years old, and no one had ever asked for her hand in marriage.
This was a source of considerable worry to her father, a cir-
cumstance which had not escaped her.
Zhuge Liang's sister-in-law made her appearance. With a
sanctimonious smile she said to Father Huang, "I have heard
that the flowers in your garden bloom with a special splendor.
May I see them?" The ingenuous Huang led her out into his
garden, where his homely daughter happened to be spending
some time with her pretty maid. The sister-in-law saw the two
young women from a distance, thought the pretty one was
Huang's daughter, and was secretly delighted at how she had
changed. She now revealed to Father Huang the true purpose
of her visit. His daughter, who had overheard their conversation
from behind a hedge, called out, "If your brother-in-law really
wants me as his wife, let him come here himself and see who I
am. The sooner the better!"

Still under an erroneous impression, the sister-in-law now
urged Zhuge Liang to leave his hut in the Longzhong Mountains
as soon as possible and pay a visit to the Huang family in
Xingliang. She went with him, whipping the horses to make
them hurry. As they approached the Huang family home, they
heard the daughter playing the zither within. The melody be-
spoke a noble sensibility which would not be defeated by ad-
versity. "What beautiful playing," declared Zhuge Liang. Father
Huang, recognizing his former pupil's voice, hurried out of the

house and conducted his visitors into the reception chamber.
Now Zhuge Liang wanted to meet the daughter. She was sent
for, but kept the others waiting a long time. Actually, she had
observed Zhuge Liang through the curtains. His expressive face

2 3
and imposing stature gladdened her heart. To test his nature,

she quickly wrote a poem and had it brought to him by her
maid. Zhuge Liang received it and read these lines:
Through the curtains I saw his face

But as yet I do not know his heart.
In the room of the four treasures
Would I gladly speak with him.
The four treasures refer to the four traditional implements of

the scholar: ink stone, ink, paper, and writing brush. Zhuge
Liang knew immediately that he had been summoned to the
study. There the two women awaited him, one pretty, the other
homely. They asked him to be seated.
First the pretty one asked his name, his age, and other mun-
dane details. Then the homely one said, "You are a man of
great abilities. How is it that, at your age, you have not yet
started a family?" Zhuge Liang replied courteously, "In these
restless times it is difficult to start a family. I am constantly
worried about the state of the empire and have not been able
to think a great deal about marriage."
The homely woman said, "From your answer, I gather that
you have high ambitions."
Zhuge Liang was astonished. How could she know of his far-
reaching plans? If the homely one had made that clever as-
sumption, then she, and not the pretty one, must be the daughter
of the house. "My brother's wife has made a mistake," he said
to himself.
Without any hesitation, he said, "Liu Bei, the Emperor's un-
cle, wants me to come down from the mountains and enter his
service, so that I can help in maintaining our threatened Han

Dynasty."
Huang Zhengying asked, "Are you still undecided?" This
question surprised Zhuge Liang once again. He replied, "Yes,
that is why I seek the advice of your father, my old teacher."
"What is your inclination?" Huang Zhengying inquired.
"These days the empire is torn," said Zhuge Liang. "Local
24* The Book of Stratagems
warlords have carved it up. Perhaps it is best to worry only

about oneself, to cultivate one's own field and enjoy a peaceful
life to the end."
The maid seemed delighted with this and said, "Yes,
pretty
that's it! Start a family and lead a peaceful, unobtrusive life,
without being drawn down from the mountains to the world
below."
Zhuge Liang turned to the homely girl and asked for her
opinion.
She replied, "You are a man uncommon abilities, already
of
known far and wide. The resurgence of the Han Dynasty that —
is what our people dream of. Liu Bei is able to recognize capable
men. He has already visited you in your thatched hut twice. I
assume he will come a third time." [See Section 16.13, "Three

Visits to the Thatched Hut."]
This estimate of the situation accorded exactly with Zhuge
Liang's own. The homely girl continued, "You have already
acquired a knowledge of literature and military science to help
you rescue our empire and its people. Now you should take
Jiang Taigong as your model. [See Section 17.7, "Angling for
a King."] He served the founder of the Zhou Dynasty. Under
no circumstance should shining pearls remain hidden in the
darkness of the earth."
Hearing these words, Zhuge Liang felt his admiration for the
homely girl increase. There and then he decided to come down
from the mountains to the world and prepared to return home
immediately. The pretty maid, however, held him back, saying,
"You came here to seek a bride!"
"I know my bride now," said Zhuge Liang. "She is the one
who spoke with me so nobly."
Huang Zhengying heard this with great joy. But she said,
"Think it over three times. Your sister-in-law . .
."
Zhuge Liang understood what she meant. He interrupted her

and said, "Do not worry. Brother's Wife only wants the best
for me."
"Are you not worried that people will talk?" she continued
to press him.
z 5
"Everyone is free to say what he will. My heart will not be

moved."
Now, at last, Huang Zhengying accepted his suit. Deeply
moved, she said, "It is Fate that our two hearts should be linked
from now on."
At that moment Zhuge Liang's sister-in-law stormed into
the room. She still thought that the pretty maid was Huang
Zhengying, pulled her near, and asked Zhuge Liang if he
had made up his mind. Embarrassed, the maid said,
"Mistress . .
."
"Mistress!" said the other. "Just call me Brother's Wife."

Then she saw how the homely girl looked at her, blushing,
and she realized the truth. In distress she said loudly, "Has a
decision been made?" Huang Zhengying hung her head and
kept silent. The sister-in-law looked at Huang Zhengying and
then at Zhuge Liang. She thought, "Really! They are not at all
a good match!" Then she pulled Zhuge Liang abruptly from his
seat and pushed him out of the room, muttering, "My foolish
young brother-in-law!"
Once back in the Longzhong Mountains, Zhuge Liang's sister-
in-law urged him to change his mind. But he said neither yes
nor no, merely smiling slyly, which drove her almost frantic.
One day Zhuge Liang's close friend Meng Gongwei came for
a visit, and the sister-in-law asked him to have a serious talk
with Zhuge Liang. But the latter refused to be drawn into a
discussion. The sister-in-law was desperate, fearing for her own
good reputation. People would blame her if her brother-in-law
chose such an ugly woman for his wife. So she gave Zhuge Liang
an ultimatum: "Unless you annul your betrothal, we are no
longer related and I want nothing more to do with you!"
Meng Gongwei said to his orphaned friend, "Your elder
brother's wife is like a mother to you. You should listen to what
she says."
What could Zhuge Liang do? He did not wish to alter his
decision. On the other hand, neither did he wish to bring ad-
versity down upon his sister-in-law. Suddenly he had an idea.
He immediately took up a brush and drafted a document. This
-
z6 The Book of Stratagems
he handed to Meng Gongwei, who found that it contained the

following poem:
Your face makes people laugh. How could you be a wife

of mine?
Yesterday I hoped to woo you. Today my heart is filled
with another decision!
Forgive me! Realize how inconstant Life is!
After all, what promise of marriage, merely uttered by the

lips, is irrevocable?
Pleased and satisfied by this declaration, Zhuge Liang's friend

placed the document in his sleeve, and the sister-in-law laughed
with relief. Meng Gongwei was prepared to act on his friend's
behalf and deliver the painful missive to the Huang family. When
Father Huang read the poem, he was overcome with sadness.
He immediately called his daughter to him. Though she did not
want to believe what her father told her, tears came to her eyes.
Meng Gongwei handed her the paper. But when she had read
the poem, her tears quickly gave way to a cheerful laugh. Meng
Gongwei stared at her in amazement. Had she lost her mind?
Since writing that document, Zhuge Liang seemed a changed
man. Whenever his sister-in-law would sing the praises of a new
prospective wife, he would visit her immediately insisting, —
however, that he go alone. Each time he returned home his
verdict was negative, but it was delivered with a radiant smile.

His sister-in-law was on tenterhooks, but she held her peace.
Suspicious, she asked her maid if her brother-in-law actually
visited each of the women she had recommended. "Yes," came
the reply, "but he hasn't liked any of them."
Patience is always rewarded, however. One day Zhuge Liang
announced to his sister-in-law that he had found the right
woman and would marry her in three days. His sister-in-law
was overjoyed, and said to herself, "Whomever he's chosen,
she's bound to be better than that ugly Huang." Preparations
for the wedding were begun immediately.
On the wedding day the flower wagon arrived bearing the
veiled bride. An expectant crowd stood at the house door to
27
greet her. When she had been conducted into the festively dec-
orated parlor, she slowly liftedwas the homely Huang
her veil. It
Zhengying! Zhuge Liang's sister-in-law and Meng Gongwei

were thunderstruck. The sister-in-law said in a biting voice,
"Didn't you deliver the message annulling the betrothal?" Meng
Gongwei looked imploringly at Zhuge Liang, who asked him,
"Can you still recall the poem I wrote?" Meng Gongwei re-
peated it by heart:
Your face makes people laugh. How could you be a wife

of mine*
Yesterday I hoped to woo you. Today my heart is filled
with another decision!
Forgive me! Realize how inconstant life is!
After all, what promise of marriage, merely uttered by the

lips, is irrevocable*
Having recited these lines, he suddenly shouted, "Hah! I fell
into your trap!"

The sister-in-law was utterly bewildered. Meng Gongwei said
to her, "Don't you see? The poem is an acrostic."
"What's that?" asked the woman.
"The last characters of each line of verse, taken together,
form a new sentence. The sentence reads: 'My decision is
"
irrevocable.'
Now Huang Zhengying faced the task of reconciling her in-
furiated sister-in-law to the facts. She spoke kindly to her, em-
phasized her deep bond with Zhuge Liang, and finally said, "He
used the stratagem known as 'Fool the emperor and cross the
sea.' Oh, my sister-in-law! Be generous now, and do not stand
in our way."
The pleading of Zhuge Liang and his bride finally had its
2
effect, and the sister-in-law was won over.
How did Zhuge Liang apply Stratagem No. 1 in this incident?

By composing the poem, which was read by all parties con-
cerned, he was able to spread two contradictory messages: that
he was dissolving his engagement and that he was determined

to stick to it. The second sense of it, of course, was understood
only by his clever fiancee, whom he also visited each time he
went out to inspect one of his sister-in-law's chosen candidates.
Together they made plans for the wedding day. While Zhuge
Liang never deviated from the pursuit of his initial marriage
goal, his sister-in-law and friend were deluded into thinking that
he was acceding to their wishes. He succeeded in making his
wedding plans under their very noses, and they never caught on
until it was too late.
—
Zhuge Liang "fooled the emperor" in this case, the people
closest to him, particularly his sister-in-law as an authority
figure — and at the same time he "crossed the sea" — i.e., he
managed to navigate the difficult time until his objective had
been achieved.
1.4 Target Practice at the City Gate
In the second century A.D., a certain city was surrounded by

enemy troops. How could outside relief be called in? Com-
mander Kong Rong turned to a certain Tai Shici for help.The
next day, to the astonishment of the enemy troops encamped a
short distance away, Tai and three other men rode out of the
encircled city's main gate. Tai Shici dismounted, set up a target
in front of the city wall, and he and his men proceeded to engage
in archery practice. When their arrows had all been shot, the
four men mounted their horses and rode back through the gate
into the city. The next day the target practice outside the city
wall was repeated. This time only a few enemy soldiers got up
to watch; the others remained at their ease, paying no attention.
When the procedure was repeated on the third day, no enemy
troops found the archery practice worthy of any notice. On the
fourth day, in the middle of the target practice, Tai Shici leaped
onto whipped it up, rode out like an arrow, and broke
his horse,
through the enemy lines. By the time the enemy soldiers had
29
recovered from their surprise, he was well out of sight and on

3
his way to bring help.
1.5 General He Ruobi's Troop Movements
In a.d. 589 the Sui ruler wanted to conquer the opposing state
of Chen, situated south of the Yangtze River. Before the start
commander, General He Ruobi, shifted the
of hostilities the Sui
position of his troops three times. At the first movement, the
Chen commanders thought the enemy was about to attack and

placed their troops in a state of maximum alert. The second
time they took the enemy troop movements a little less seriously.
By the third time, the alertness of the Chen troops had dimin-
ished so much that a sudden Sui attack met hardly any resistance
and ended in a complete victory. 4
1.6 Beneath the Colorful Cloak
In "Crossing the Sea in a House" (Section 1.1), the older of the

two original source tales given above, the Emperor is made to
think that he is being ushered into a house, although his steps
are actually taking him to a very different destination: a ship.
In the tale "Target Practice at the City Gate" (Section 1.4),
enemy soldiers are lulled into inattention by an apparently harm-
less training exercise. The hidden intent behind that spectacle
is to break through the enemy lines and spread the alarm to
friendly forces that will help to lift the siege of the city.
When Stratagem No. 1 is divested of its colorful cloak of
imagery, its general purpose becomes clear: to camouflage a
goal, a method, or a course of action. The true purpose is dis-

guised to look like something else, in extreme cases like its exact
opposite.
As the following few examples illustrate, Stratagem No. 1
3o- The Book of Stratagems
has repeatedly provided leaders in the People's Republic of

China with a perspective from which to view political devel-
opments, both domestic and foreign.
When he fell into disfavor in the mid-1970s, Deng Xiaoping
was accused of using Stratagem No. 1 in the sense of masking
his real purpose. The press at that time offered comments such
as this:
In order to realize his revisionist program, Deng Xiaoping

fabricated three poisonous documents: "On the General
Work Program of the Party and the Entire Nation," "Some
Questions Concerning Scientific and Technical Work," and
"Some Questions Concerning the Acceleration of Industrial
Development." Common to all those poisonous weeds is
the large number of quotes from the writings of our rev-

olutionary teachers. . . . This is typical of the technique of
paying lip service to Marxism while in reality deviating
from it.
In the late 1970s, reports in the Chinese press accused the Gang
of Four of having formulated policies designed to mask their
pursuit of purely personal ambitions. In a report dated February

26, 1978, Hua Guofeng, then chairman of the Chinese Com-
munist Party, characterized them in the following terms:
The Gang of Four is a clique of . . . the worst sort of

hypocrites, who were clever at disguising themselves. They
constantly waved the red flag in order to fight against the
red flag, carried the banner of the struggle against capitalist
restoration with the intent of restoring capitalism, and
loudly proclaimed antirevisionist slogans in order to divert
attention from their revisionist practices. Their "revolu-
tionary" behavior was meant to cloak their true nature.
What had previously been seen as proof of their passionate

dedication to Mao was reinterpreted in the light of Stratagem
No. 1 after their fall from favor. All the actions and statements
which formerly had been considered beyond reproach were now
damned as mere tricks to disguise policies aimed against genuine
3 1
socialism. Some press commentaries on the situation carried

explicit references to Stratagem No. 1. More frequently, how-
ever, the Chinese mass media used colorful, modern equivalents
of the stratagem, such as "wearing a red hat but having a black
heart" or the previously mentioned phrase "waving the red flag
in order to fight against the red flag."
In the foreign policy arena, Chinese press analyses based on
Stratagem No. 1 are common. During the long years of Sino-
Soviet estrangement, for example, Moscow was often accused
of using its loudly trumpeted antiracism to mask its desire for
the acquisition of strategic materials (notably in South Africa),
while its support for Third World liberation movements was
berated as mere camouflage for its true objective: securing a
strategic seaway as part of its encirclement of Europe. The fol-
lowing observations and phrases are drawn from Chinese press

comments during the years 1978—80:
Aggressors busily preparing to launch new attacks generally

blow the pipes of peace and disarmament very loudly.
. The music of peace [is meant to] drown out the thunder
. .
of cannon. Moscow's "support for the struggle of other

. . .
peoples to achieve freedom and progress" is in fact [ac-

cording to Chinese commentators] another way of saying
that the Soviet Union reserves the right to intervene any-
where in the world. [In this view of things] the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe was really a "con-
ference on insecurity in Europe" which the Kremlin used
to lull the West into a false sense of security.
It is not only the Soviets who have been viewed through the
lens of Stratagem 1982 both superpowers, the USSR
No. 1. In
and the U.S., were accused by the Chinese of "waving the peace
banner" while in reality engaging in an unprecedented arms
race. And in July 1983 the official Communist Party newspaper
Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) stated that Vietnam had raised
the specter of an alleged Chinese threat in order to mask its own
aggression against Cambodia.
Cartoons on foreign affairs also provide insight into how
deeply Stratagem No. 1 is rooted in Chinese thought. The fol-
lowing examples are taken from the People's Daily in 1978-

82: In one cartoon, the Soviet Union is pictured as a greedy
alligator, its fang-filled maw camouflaged by a cloth on which
are printed the words "Strictly Vegetarian." In another cartoon,
the USSR is represented as a shark whose gaping jaws, hidden

beneath the surface of the water, gobble one small fish after
another; the part of the shark's body which is above the water-
line is disguised as a black ship bearing the words "Peaceful
Cooperation." A third cartoon shows Soviet soldiers in a ditch,
digging their way from Afghanistan to the oil-rich countries of
the Middle East, with their operation masked by a protective
screen on which two doves of peace are painted.
The 1991 edition of The 36 Stratagems: A Modern Ver-
sion points up two twentieth-century applications of Stratagem
No. 1:
a. Early in World War II, the Germans postponed the

start of their French campaign twenty-nine times, dulling
France's vigilance so much that, when the actual attack
finallycame, the French did not initially recognize it for
what it was.
b. The Arabs made similar preparations for the Yom Kip-
pur War of 1973. After their defeat in the Six Day War of
1967, they held annual military maneuvers which involved

troop concentrations at the Suez Canal. Behind what
seemed like an annual exercise, they prepared for the real
attack that launched the Yom Kippur War.
A suitable close to our comments on Stratagem No. 1 is provided

by a quotation from The 36 Stratagems: Secret Book of the Art
of War:
That which seems fully open to public scrutiny too often

masks the deepest secrets.
S T R A T A G E M N O. 2
Besiege IVei
to Rescue Zhao
The Chinese
characters
Modern
HI
wei
ft
Wei
4Sfc
jiu
MZhao
Mandarin
pronunciation
Meaning of each besiege Wei rescue Zhao

character
Interpretation Rescue the state of Zhao by besieging the state

with reference to of Wei, whose troops are attacking Zhao.
the oldest known
case
Application Subdue the enemy indirectly by threatening one

of his unprotected weak spots. The "thrust into
the void" or "Achilles' heel" stratagem.
2.1 With the Army into the Void
The oldest recorded instance of this stratagem is an incident

recounted by the famous historian Sima Qian (second century
B.C.) in his work Shi ji (Records of the Historian), the first of
China's twenty-four dynastic histories. The tale is still told to
Chinese children today. 1
Sima Qian takes us back to pre-imperial China, to the period
between the fifth and third centuries B.C. At that time a great
many small states were jockeying for position, and wars were
the order of the day. In 354 B.C., the state of Wei attacked the
state of Zhao and laid siege to its capital, Handan. The ruler
of Zhao requested assistance from the 353 B.C.,
state of Qi. In
the King of Qi dispatched an army of eighty thousand men

under the command of General Tian Ji, with Sun Bin as his
adviser.
How was the Qi mount its attack? Tian Ji wanted
army to
Zhao for a head-on clash with
to launch his troops directly into
the Wei army. But Sun Bin was opposed to such a plan. He
35
said, "You do not untie a knot by forcibly pulling and tearing

at it. You do not separate fighting cocks from one another by
stepping between them yourself. If you wish to end the siege, it
is best to avoid the area of fullness [that is, the region where
the enemy troops are massed] and to advance instead into the
emptiness [the region left unprotected by the enemy]. All of
Wei's finest troops are in the state of Zhao. Wei itself is without
military guard. Therefore I propose that we attack Daliang, the
most important city in Wei. If we do so, the Wei army will
immediately break off its siege of Handan and hurry back to
protect its own territory."
Tian Ji followed Sun Bin's advice. As soon as news of the Qi
army's attack against Wei had spread, the Wei army halted its
siege of Zhao and began a forced march back to Wei. In the

meantime, the Qi army had laid an ambush at a carefully selected
spot near Guiling, which the Wei army would have to pass.
There the Qi troops waited at their ease until the time came to
inflict a bitter defeat on the army of Wei, which was actually
much stronger but now exhausted by its hurried march home-

ward. Thus the state of Zhao was saved. (For a more detailed
look at Sun Bin's tactics in this ambush, see Section 11.10,
"General Tian Ji's Battle Plan.") Offered here in a rather free

translation, this incident was written down by Sima Qian more
than two thousand years ago. But the earliestknown source to
actually use the four-character phrase wei Wei jiu Zhao is the
famous Ming-period novel The Romance of the Three Kingdoms
by Luo Guanzhong. In chapter 30 of that work, there is a
reference to "the stratagem of Sun Bin: Besiege Wei to rescue
Zhao."
The Sun Bin who planned that campaign was a descendant
of Sun Tzu [Sunzi], the author of the world's oldest military
1
treatise, The Art of War. So it is hardly surprising that Sun Bin
too composed a military treatise. Lost for nearly two thousand

years, that document was rediscovered in 1972, written on 232
small bamboo tablets which were dug up by archeologists in
Shandong Province and published under the title Sun Bin bingfa
(Sun Bin's Art of War).
Besiege Wei to Rescue Zhao •
-
j
2.2 Of Fullness and Emptiness
This stratagem may be expressed somewhat abstractly by the

phrases "avoid the fullness" (that is, the area occupied by the
enemy) and "advance into the emptiness" (i.e., the area vacated
by the enemy). "Emptiness" and "fullness" are two fundamental
concepts of traditional Chinese military theory mentioned in
Sun Tzu's The Art of War. In the sixth chapter of that work,
which deals with concepts of xu and shi (translated as "emp-
tiness" and "fullness" by Thomas Cleary, and as "weak points
and strong" in the James Clavell rendition), Sun Tzu writes:
Appear where they cannot go, head for where they least
expect you. When you want to do battle, even if the
. . .
opponent is deeply entrenched in a defensive position, he

will be unable to avoid fighting if you attack where he will
surely go to the rescue. 3
In a 1983 work titled Military Phraseology, this stratagem is
explained as follows:
Instead of directly rescuing a region threatened by the en-

emy, attack bases in the enemy's rear. In this way the enemy
is forced to withdraw his troops and rescue his own hin-
4
terland. The threatened region is thus relieved.
Stratagem No. 2 is also examined in A Selection of Philosophical

Parables and Tales from Ancient China, as follows:
All things are linked one to another. This is also true of

the mutual relationship between fullness and emptiness. If
one puts that linkage to good use, one can bring about a
fundamental shift in the balance of power with one's en-
emy, transform a precarious situation into a favorable one,
and achieve victory. 5
In his treatise Strategic Problems of the Partisan War Against

the Japanese Aggression, dating from May 1938, Mao Zedong
cites Stratagem No. 2 as follows:
If the enemy entrenches himself on our base territory, we

should leave part of our forces here to encircle the enemy.
At the same time we should use our main force to launch
an attack in the region from which the enemy has come;
there, we should step up our activities in order to force the
enemy to withdraw from our base territory and attack our
main forces. This is the technique of "Besiege Wei to rescue
Zhao." 6
2.3 From Pre-Confucian Times
The classic Confucian work Zuo zhuan (Zuo Commentary),

one of the oldest Chinese historical writings from the pre-
Christian era, contains accounts of the application of Stratagem
No. 2. The following two examples date from a period even
before the struggle between Zhao and Wei which provided the
traditional formulation of the tactic.
In the year 623 B.C., troops from the state of Chu besieged
the state of Jiang. An army from the state of Jin then invaded
Chu in order to relieve Jiang.
In 632 B.C., the state of Chu attacked the state of Song, which
requested aid from the state of Jin. But Duke Wen, ruler of Jin,
owed a debt of gratitude to the monarch of Chu, who had helped
him during his nineteen-year exile. How could he now make a
direct move against Chu? Hu Yan, one of the duke's advisers,

suggested a way out: Jin should attack Cao and Wei, two states
which had treated Duke Wen discourteously during his exile

and were allied to Chu through inheritance and marriage. Chu
would then withdraw its troops from Song and hasten to rescue
Cao and Wei. And that is precisely what happened. 7
Besiege Wei to Rescue Zhao •
3 9
2.4 Deng Xiaoping's Troops
The following incident is recounted in The 36 Stratagems: A

Modern Version, 8 as an illustration of Stratagem No. 2:
In August 1947, when Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-
shek was preparing a major offensive against the territory then
held by the Chinese Communist Party, troopscommanded by
Deng Xiaoping and Liu Bocheng left their own base territory
and hastened in forced marches more than one thousand miles
to the Dabie Mountains on the other side of the Yellow River,
inside the territory still dominated by Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang
was thus faced with an immediate threat to his power base. He
was compelled to defend it against a possible attack by the
People's Army and so was unable to launch his offensive against
the Red-held areas. This single stroke altered the entire course
of the war.
2.5 Modern Taiwanese Analyses of

Stratagem No. 2
The Secret Book of the 36 Stratagems, with Explanations, 9 by

Shu Han, gives some contemporary illustrations of Stratagem
No. 2. According to this source, when the People's Republic of
China invaded Vietnam in the spring of 1979, it was operating
on the principle of "Besiege Wei to rescue Zhao." By invading
Vietnam, the Chinese hoped to force the Vietnamese to with-
draw their troops from Cambodia in order to protect their own
territory. In this case, however, the trick did not work, because
the Chinese threat to Vietnam was not great enough. China,
says the author ofThe Secret Book, should have besieged Hanoi;
had it done so, the stratagem would have been successful.
Three further examples from this Taiwanese work on the
stratagems show how broadly No. 2 can be interpreted. Ac-
cording to Shu Han, the aircraft hijackings by terrorists that
•
40 The Book of Stratagems
repeatedly plague the free world are applications of this tactic,

as was the taking of American hostages in Teheran, which en-
abled Iran to play with the world's mightiest power as if it were
a toy. The same may be said about Washington's grain embargo
against the Soviet Union, imposed after the Kremlin's invasion
of Afghanistan.
Wherever the stratagems are studied, the following words of
Sun Tzu are considered of special relevance to No. 2:
Military formation is like water — the form of water is to

avoid the high and go to the low, the form of a military
force is to avoid the full and attack the empty. Water . . .
has no constant shape ... so a military force has no constant

formation: the ability to gain victory by changing and
10
adapting according to the opponent is called genius.
S T R A T A G E M N O. 3
"Kill with
a borrowed "Knife
The Chinese
characters
1ft 71 & A.
Modern jie dao sha ren
Mandarin
pronunciation
Meaning of each borrow knife kill person

character
Applications Eliminate an opponent using an outside agency

(the "strawman" stratagem); harm someone
else indirectly without exposing oneself ("alibi"
or "substitute" stratagem).
There is no original source tale to which the four written char-
acters of Stratagem No. 3 refer. The characters present the strat-
agem directly and graphically.
3.1 With the Sword of the Ammonites
The Old Testament contains a striking example of Stratagem

No. 3, but with a distinctly Biblical moral twist. The story is
related in chapters 11-12 of the Second Book of Samuel:
At the turn of the year, when kings take the field, David
sent Joab out with his other officers and all the Israelite
forces, and they ravaged Ammon and laid siege to Rabbah,
while David remained in Jerusalem. One evening David got
up from his couch and, as he walked about on the roof of
the palace, he saw from there a woman bathing, and she
was very beautiful. He sent to inquire who she was, and
the answer came, "It must be Bathsheba daughter of Eliam
and wife of Uriah the Hittite." . . .
43
David wrote a letter toJoab and sent Uriah with it. He

wrote in the letter: "Put Uriah opposite the enemy where
the righting is fiercest and then fall back, and leave him to
meet his death." Joab . . . stationed Uriah at a point where
he knew they would put up a stout fight. The men of the
city sallied out and engaged Joab, and some of David's
guards fell; Uriah the Hittite was also killed. Joab sent
David a dispatch with all the news of the battle. . . .
When was dead,

Uriah's wife heard that her husband
she mourned for him; and when the period of mourning
was over, David sent for her and brought her into his house.
She became his wife and bore him a son. 1
What is striking about the Old Testament tale is God's disap-

proval and punishment of this application of Stratagem No. 3.
Chapter 11 ends with the words: "But what David had done
was wrong in the eyes of the Lord." In Chapter 12 God uses
the prophet Nathan to level the accusation and pronounce the
punishment:
You have down Uriah the Hittite with the sword of

struck
the Ammonites; the man himself you murdered by the
sword of the Ammonites, and you have stolen his wife.
. Because in this you have shown your contempt for the
. .
Lord, the boy that will be born to you shall die.
And indeed David and Bathsheba's son dies.
The idea of divine retribution for unethical application of a

stratagem is rather alien to Chinese culture. However, in works
of Chinese literature, those who use stratagems with evil intent
often come bad end. Not infrequently, they are also left
to a
with a bad name, a foul reputation passed down through gen-
erations in works of literature or art, and such a negative legacy
was the most painful punishment for a Chinese of ancient times.
(See Section 7.12, "The Alleged Crime of Yue Fei," and Section
18.9, "Posthumous Fame through Brush and Ink.")
Kill with a Borrowed Knife •
4 5
3.2 Loki's Missile in Hother's Hand
The Norse god Balder was good and beautiful, shedding radi-
ance wherever he went. The son of the great god Odin and the
goddess Frigg, he was a favorite of the gods. The story of his
death is told in the Prose Edda and is recounted in Frazer's The
Golden Bough as follows:
Once on a time Balder dreamed heavy dreams which

seemed to forebode his death. Thereupon the gods held a
council and resolved to make him secure against every dan-
ger. So the goddess Frigg took an oath from fire and water,
iron and all metals, stones and earth, from trees, sicknesses
and poisons, and from all four-footed beasts, birds, and
creeping things, that they would not hurt Balder. When
this was done Balder was deemed invulnerable; so the gods
amused themselves by setting him in their midst, while some
shot at him, others hewed at him, and others threw stones
at him. But whatever they did, nothing could hurt him;
and at this they were all Only Loki, the mischief-
glad.
maker, was displeased, and he went in the guise of an old
woman to Frigg, who told him that the weapons of the
gods could not wound Balder, since she had made them all
swear not to hurt him. Then Loki asked, "Have all things
sworn to spare Balder?" She answered, "East of Walhalla
grows a plant called mistletoe; it seemed to me too young
to swear." So Loki went and pulled the mistletoe and took
it to the assembly of the gods. There he found the blind
god Hother standing at the outside of the circle. Loki asked

him, "Why do you not shoot at Balder?" Hother answered,
"Because I do not see where he stands; besides I have no
weapon." Then said Loki, "Do like the rest and show
Balder honor, as they all do. I will show you where he
stands, and do you shoot at him with this twig." Hother
took the mistletoe and threw it at Balder, as Loki directed
him. The mistletoe struck Balder and pierced him through
and through, and he fell down dead. 2
In this famous myth, Loki borrowed Hother's hand as the
"knife" with which to kill Balder.

46' The Book of Stratagems
3.3 Two Peaches Kill Three Knights
In the Spring and Autumn Period (722-468 B.C.), three bold

warriors served Duke Jing of the state of Qi: Gongsun Jie, Tian
Kaijiang, and Gu Yezi. No one was able to withstand their
daring and courage. Their strength enabled them to catch a tiger
with their bare hands.
One day Yanzi, Chief Minister of Qi, met the three knights.
None of the fighters rose from his seat in deference to the official.
Yanzi was furious at this violation of the ritual of respect. He
went to the Duke and reported the incident, which he regarded
as dangerous to the state. "Those three failed to pay proper
respect to their superior. Can we count on them to help put
down domestic unrest, if needed, or to take steps against our
external enemies? No! Hence I propose that the sooner they are
eliminated, the better."
Duke Jing sighed in embarrassment. "Those three are heroes.
We are unlikely to be able to capture or kill them. What should
we do?"
Yanzi thought for a while. Then he said, "I have an idea.
Send a messenger to the three men, bearing two peaches, with
this message: 'He who has performed the greatest deeds may
"
take a peach.'
Duke Jing sent the peaches. And the three knights began to
measure their deeds one against the other. Gongsun Jie spoke
first. "Once I killed a wild boar with my bare hands, and another
time I caught a tiger the same way. My deeds entitle me to a
peach." And he took one of the fruits.
Tian Kaijiang was the next to speak. "Twice I have routed a

whole army with nothing but my naked sword in my hand. That
deed certainly entitles me to a peach." And he too took a fruit.
When Gu Yezi saw that no peach was left for him, he said
bitterly, "Once, when I was crossing the Yellow River in my

lord's entourage, a giant turtle grabbed my horse and disap-
peared with it into the rushing waters. I dived to the bottom
and ran a hundred steps upstream and nine miles downstream.
4 7
Finally I found the turtle, killed it, and rescued my horse. When
I returned to the surface with the horse's hand
tail in my left
and the turtle's head in my right, the people along the bank
thought I was a river god. That deed is surely worthy of a peach.
Well, will neither of you give me his peach?"
With that, he drew his sword and rose up. When Gongsun
Jie and Tian Kaijiang saw the fury of their comrade, they were
overcome with a sense of guilt and they said, "Our bravery does
not equal yours, and our deeds do not match yours. By taking
the peaches ourselves and leaving none for you, we showed
excessive greed. It would be cowardly not to pay for such be-
havior with our lives." Both of them returned the peaches, drew
their swords, and slit their own throats.
Faced with the two corpses, Gu Yezi began to feel qualms of
conscience. He said, "It is monstrous that my two comrades
have died and I alone remain alive. It is a violation of duty to
shame others with one's words and boast of one's own prowess.
And it is cowardly to feel disgust at one's own deeds and not
to die. On the other hand, if only my two comrades had shared
a peach between them, they would have had what was coming
to them. And I would have been able to take the peach I
deserved."
With that, he dropped his peach and likewise cut his own
throat. The messenger returned to the palace and reported to
the Duke, "They are all three dead." Whereupon the ruler had
the men buried in accordance with knightly ritual.
I entered the city gate of Qi

and saw Tangyinli in the distance,
and in its midst three burial mounds,
one next to the other, like triplets.
I asked: Whose graves are those?
And was told in reply: Those of
Gongsun Jie, Tian Kaijiang
and Gu Yezi!
Their strength could move mountains,
and their distinction was incomparable.
But one morning they were defamed.

Then two peaches killed the three knights.
Who was capable of such a stratagem?
The Minister of Qi Yanzi? —
3.4 The Brave Little Tailor
In the wondrous storehouse of fairy tales collected by the Broth-

ers Grimm, there are many that could be cited as examples of
stratagem application. Particularly apt for Stratagem No. 3 is
the story known as "The Brave Little Tailor" (or sometimes as

"Seven at a Blow"). It tells of a clever little tailor who, irritated
by a bunch of flies landing on his jam, kills seven of the insects

with a single blow. Impressed with his own prowess, he decides
that the world must know of it too. He makes himself a girdle
embroidered with the words "Seven at a Blow" and goes out
into the world to seek his fortune. His first adventure involves
a giant, against whose great strength the tailor matches his own
guile — and emerges victorious, thanks to a combination of wit,
trickiness, and good luck. In the version given in The Blue Fairy
Book, the tale goes on:
The little tailor continued to follow his nose, and after he

had wandered about for a long time he came to the court-
yard of a royal palace, and feeling tired he lay down on
the grass and fell asleep. While he lay there the people came,
and looking him all over read on his girdle: "Seven at a
Blow." "Oh!" they said, "what can this great hero of a
hundred fights want in our peaceful land? He must indeed
be a mighty man of valor." They went and told the King
about him, and said what a weighty and useful man he'd
be in time of war, and that it would be well to secure him
at any price. This counsel pleased the King, and he sent
one of his courtiers down to the little tailor to offer him,
when he awoke, a commission in their army. "That's . . .
the very thing I came here for," he answered. "I am quite

ready to enter the King's service." So he was received with
49
all honor, and given a special house of his own to live in.
But the other officers resented the success of the little
tailor, and wished him a thousand miles away. ... So they
resolved to go in a body to the King, and all to send in

their papers. "We are not made," they said, "to hold out
against a man who kills seven at a blow." The King was
grieved at the thought of losing all his faithful servants for
the sake of one man, and he wished heartily that he had

never set eyes on him, or that he could get rid of him. But
he didn't dare to send him away, for he feared he might
kill him along with his people, and place himself on the
throne. He pondered long and deeply over the matter, and

finally came to a conclusion. He sent to the tailor and told
him that, seeing what a great and warlike hero he was, he
was about to make him an offer. In a certain wood of his
kingdom there dwelt two giants who did much harm by
the way they robbed, murdered, burned, and plundered
everything about them. "No one could approach them
without endangering his life. But if he could overcome and
kill these two giants he should have his only daughter for
a wife, and half his kingdom into the bargain; he might

have a hundred horsemen too, to back him up." "That's
the very thing for a man like me," thought the little tailor;
"one doesn't get the offer of a beautiful princess and half
a kingdom every day." "Done with you," he answered.
"I'll soon put an end to the giants. But I haven't the smallest
need of your hundred horsemen; a fellow who can slay

seven at a blow need not be afraid of two."
The little tailor set out, and the hundred horsemen fol-
lowed him. When he came to the outskirts of the wood he
said to his followers, "You wait here, I'll manage the giants
by myself." And he went on into the wood, casting his
sharp little eyes right and left about him. After a while he
spied the two giants lying asleep under a tree, and snoring
till the very boughs bent with the breeze. The little tailor
lost no time in filling his wallet with stones, and then

climbed up the tree under which they lay. When he got to
about the middle of it he slipped along a branch till he sat
just above the sleepers, when he threw down one stone
after the other on the nearest giant. The giant felt nothing
for a long time, but at last he woke up, and pinching his
companion said, "What did you strike me for?" "I didn't
strike you," said the other, "you must be dreaming." They
both lay down to sleep again, and the tailor threw down
a stone on the second giant, who sprang up and cried,
"What's that for? Why did you throw something at me?"
"I didn't throw anything," growled the first one. They
wrangled on for a time, till, as both were tired, they made
up the matter and fell asleep again. The little tailor began
his game once more, and flung the largest stone he could
find in his wallet with all his force, and hit the first giant
on the chest. "This is too much of a good thing!" he yelled,
and springing up like a madman, he knocked his compan-
ion against the tree till he trembled. He gave, however, as
good as he got, and they both became so enraged that they
tore up trees and beat each other with them, till they both
4
fell dead at once on the ground.
In this tale it is the King who first tries to apply Stratagem No.
3, wanting to be rid of the valiant little tailor but not daring to
confront him directly. Hoping that the giants will serve as his
"knife," the monarch masks his deadly intent as a seemingly
honorable commission with a princely reward attached to it.
The tailor also uses Stratagem No. 3. Throwing the stones,

he sows discord between the sleepy giants and gets them so
worked up that they do one another in. The tailor uses the
giants' own strength as the "knife" with which to kill them.
3.5 Duke Huan's Buried Document
In the late eighth century B.C., Duke Huan Zheng

of the state of
wanted to conquer the state of Kuai. He had document drawn
a
up, listing the names of all the capable ministers and generals
in Kuai, and proclaiming:
Should the state of Kuai fall, all ministers and generals of

the state of Kuai herein listed will be given official positions
in the state of Zheng. Moreover, all the land of the state
of Kuai will be divided among them.
5 1
As a second step, Duke Huan had a great altar built outside the
city walls and the document buried there. Finally, he ordered
that chickens and pigs be slaughtered and held a solemn cere-
mony in which he swore to Heaven that he would keep his
promise to the dignitaries of Kuai. When the ruler of Kuai heard

about all this, he suspected his civilian and military leaders of
treason; in an outburst of fury, he had them executed to the
last man. In this way Duke Huan used the ruler of Kuai as the
"knife" with which to eliminate the elite of Kuai — after which
5
it was an easy matter for him to conquer it.
3.6 Confucius Saves His Homeland
Even Confucius is said to have resorted to Stratagem No. 3. It
was at the time when the powerful state of Qi was preparing

to attack Confucius's homeland, the weak state of Lu. To pre-
vent this, Confucius sent his rhetorically gifted disciple Zigong
to the surrounding states. Zigong first persuaded the military
leaders of Qi to attack the state of Wu instead of attacking Lu.
He then went on to Wu
and persuaded its ruler to attack Qi in
order to protect Lu. Once war had broken out between Qi and
Wu, Zigong hurried to the state of Jin and persuaded its ruler
to declare war against Wu. In this way, Confucius succeeded in
saving his home state of Lu.

In this instance, the other states served as the "borrowed
knife" by which the danger to Lu was averted.
3.7 Old General Lian Po and the

Hothead Zhao Kuo
After conquering the Han state in the year 260 B.C., the state
of Qin (which was destined to unify all of China in 221 B.C.)

decided to attack the state of Zhao. The King of Zhao assigned
the elderly General Lian Po to conduct the defense. An expe-

rienced warrior, Lian Po chose to entrench his forces in Chang-
ping. The Qin troops attacked repeatedly, but Lian Po held the
line, refusing to be drawn into a direct clash with the strong
Qin army.
Now there lived in Zhao one Zhao Kuo, son of a deceased
general. This young man had a good deal of theoretical but little
practical military knowledge. Nonetheless he had risen high in

the ranks of Zhao's army. He was uncomfortable with Lian
Po's defensive tactics and accused him before the King of cow-
ardice. The ruler then commanded General Lian Po to move
aggressively against the Qin army. But the old General refused.
Qin spies learned of the differences of opinion causing friction
between the King of Zhao, Zhao Kuo, and Lian Po. Qin agents
bribed residents of the Zhao capital to spread the rumor that
Qin feared Zhao Kuo might be appointed general, and that Lian
Po was preparing to capitulate. The King of Zhao heard of this
rumor. He demoted Lian Po and appointed Zhao Kuo his suc-
cessor. The new general took the first opportunity to engage the
superior Qin army in direct combat, whereupon the Qin forces
immediately encircled the Zhao army and wiped it out. The
young General Zhao Kuo was among those who fell.
This was the beginning of the end for the state of Zhao, which
was annexed by Qin in 228 B.C.
3.8 Stalin and the Nazis: "Borrowed Knives"
According to the 1989 edition of The 36 Stratagems: A Modern

6
Version, the Germans forged documents in 1936 which made
Soviet Marshal Tukhachevski, whom they greatly feared, appear
to be a traitor.The documents were leaked to the Soviet secret
police. Stalin was convinced of their authenticity, and he had
—
Tukhachevski executed thus playing the role of the "borrowed
7
knife."
8
A Hong Kong book on the stratagems notes, however, that
5 3
in every other respect Stalin was unexcelled in the use of Strat-
agem No. 3. In 1944, say the Hong Kong authors, the forty-
thousand-man Polish underground army in Warsaw wanted to
exploit the Germans' difficult predicament following Stalingrad
and the Allied landing in Normandy, to prevent Warsaw from
becoming a battleground between the Germans and the Rus-
sians. On July 31, 1944, a forward Soviet tank unit reached the
outskirts of Warsaw, and the Polish underground army thought

the time ripe for an attack against the Germans in the city. The
offensive was planned for August 1. But as soon as the people
of Warsaw had begun armed uprising against the German
their
army, the Soviet advance suddenly ground to a halt and the

Soviets began pulling back. The Germans, seeing that there was
no longer any immediate threat from the Soviets, turned their
full force against the Polish underground organizations in War-
saw. Roosevelt and Churchill repeatedly cabled Stalin, asking

him to resume the Soviet advance and save Warsaw. But Stalin
refused; indeed, he even protested against American and British
air support for Warsaw, claiming that it violated Soviet airspace.
It was only on September 10, 1944, in the sixth week of the
Warsaw uprising, that the Soviet Union resumed its military

operations. Under protection of the Red Army, troops of the
Polish Communist Party penetrated the Warsaw suburbs. On
September 15 the Soviet forces again halted their advance, and
the Germans continued mopping up all nests of resistance, vir-
tually turning Warsaw into a ghost city. Only when the Polish
underground army had been virtually exterminated did the Red
Army choose to march into Warsaw.
The authors of the Hong Kong book on the stratagems, Ma
Senliang and Zhang Laiping, regard that incident as an appli-
cation of Strategy No. 3 by Stalin, who saw the Polish under-
ground in Warsaw as an obstacle to a Communist takeover and
"borrowed" the German army to eliminate the Polish enemy.
3.9 Wang Xifeng and the Two Concubines
The novel Hongloumeng (Dream of the Red Chamber), by Cao

Xueqin (d. ca. 1763), is one of the most famous literary works
of classical China. Chapter 69 of the work bears the title: "A
clever person kills with a borrowed sword, another feels com-
pelled to commit suicide by swallowing molten gold." The story
leading up to those events is as follows:
Jia Lian, the husband of Wang Xifeng, had long been fed up
with his wife, not only because she had failed to give him a male
heir but also because she had often been sick. He fell in love
with the beautiful Lady You, secretly took her as his concubine,
and set her up in a little house near the family compound.
Through a servant, Wang Xifeng learned about her husband's
mistress. One day, when he was on a journey, she visited Lady
You, pretending great sympathy, and invited her to move into
thecompound. During the move, Wang Xifeng managed to get
rid of Lady You's old servant and instead gave her one of her
own women, who had been primed with special instructions.
From that time on, Wang Xifeng directed unceasing harass-
ment against Lady You. Outwardly, she was friendliness and
warmth personified when she visited with Lady You once each
week. Lady You thus had no idea that, in the background, Wang
Xifeng was doing everything possible to make her life miserable.
In the meantime Jia Lian returned from his travels, and his
father gave him seventeen-year-old Qiu Tong as a gift. Jia Lian
now spent whole days and nights with his younger concubine.
Naturally enough, Wang Xifeng hated the young newcomer no
less than she hated the older one, but Qiu Tong served her as
a welcome tool for the elimination of Lady You. She was now
able to apply the stratagem "Kill with a borrowed knife" and
look on serenely from the heights as the two concubines fought
one another. Once Lady You had been dispatched by the sev-
enteen-year-old, Wang Xifeng said to herself, she would find it
easy enough to get rid of the girl.
And so Wang Xifeng constantly goaded Qiu Tong on against

5 5
Lady You. "You are young and inexperienced, and do not know
the danger you are in," she would whisper to the girl. "She
holds his heart in her hand. Even I must bow down before her.
But be careful. You'll destroy yourself if you are openly hostile
to her."
"I have no intention of bowing before her!" said Qiu Tong
rebelliously. "It's easy to see where your weakness and caution
have led — your authority has evaporated. Just let me be! I'll
who I am!"
deal with that whore. She'll learn
Qiu Tong deliberately spoke those words loudly enough so
that Lady You could not fail to hear. Beside herself at such
malice, Lady You spent the rest of the day weeping and could
not eat a bite.
Finally, with the aid of a bribed fortune-teller, Wang Xifeng

incited the younger concubine to such an extent that the girl
became bold enough to stand beneath the window of a nearby

pavilion in which Lady You was staying and let loose a stream
of invective against her. The unhappy Lady You broke down
utterly, and that night she committed suicide by swallowing
molten gold. 9
3.10 The Case of Durrenmatt
Friedrich Diirrenmatt'sThe Judge and His Hangman is perhaps

the most popular work of modern Swiss literature in the People's
Republic of China. Millions of copies have been printed in
comic-strip form.The following plot summary, taken from a

Durrenmatt picture book published in Guizhou Province, seems
to hint that the novel's popularity in China may be partly due
to its relevance to Stratagem No. 3:
The elderly Swiss police commissioner Barlach is an honest,

incorruptible man. But he can apply
in a capitalist society
the law only to commonplace, petty crimes. He is unable
to bring a serious criminal like Gastmann before the bar
$6- The Book of Stratagems
of justice, though Gastmann has every manner of evil deed

on his conscience. Barlach has gathered proof of Gast-
mann's crimes. But because Gastmann is in cahoots with
the political elite, with powerful capitalists and a foreign
ruling clique, it is extremely difficult to subject him to the
full force of the law. So Barlach must forgo legal prose-
cution. Instead, he manipulates the mind of a murderer

who is trying to blame someone else (i.e., Gastmann) for
his own crime, and he lets Gastmann be killed by the
murderer.
3.11 The Han Drummer
Toward the end of the Han period there lived a certain Mi

Heng, a man who was articulate and literate, skilled not only
in poetry but also in music, especially in playing the drums. But
he had a proud and unyielding nature. One time Cao Cao,
founder of the Wei Dynasty, one of the three realms depicted
in The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, wanted to meet Mi
Heng. But Mi Heng refused. So Cao Cao had him conscripted
into his army as a drummer. Later, Cao Cao held a great banquet
on an island in the Yangtze River, at which he hoped to hu-
miliate Mi Heng before all the guests. But Mi Heng turned the
tableson him, exposing Cao Cao to ridicule by writing a poem
about the parrots which the banquet guests had given as gifts
to Cao Cao. From then on, the place became known as Parrot
Island.
Said Cao Cao to Kong Rong, "Mi Heng has dared to ridicule
me. Yet he is a very capable man, and widely known. If I were
to kill him, I would be accused of small-mindedness. Now,
Commandant Liu Biao is a vicious and irritable fellow. I'll have
Mi Heng transferred to his command. Liu Biao will surely find
him unbearable and get rid of him in short order." So Cao Cao
had Mi Heng transferred to Liu Biao's service. And indeed,
before long the latter's lieutenant, Huang Zu, had killed Mi
Heng, who was only twenty-five years old.
5 7
The death of the youthful Mi Heng, a victim of Stratagem

No. 3, was still mourned in China almost fifteen hundred years
later. Visiting Mi Heng's grave on Parrot Island, the poet Song
Xiang (1756-1826) composed a poem describing the drummer's

tomb, comparing it to the unknown graves of Cao Cao and
Huang Zu:
For two days the ship has been anchored off Parrot Island.
Day after day the waves flow over buildings sunk beneath
the waters. Mi Heng's tragic drumbeat floats on the won-
drous wind, and the perfume of a sad parrot poem
streams from the sweet- smelling grass on the grave.
I visit your autumnal burial place. Do not reject my humble
offer of sacrificial wine. Who knows any longer where
Cao and Huang are buried, and who thinks of them?
3.12 Conclusion
According to the 1989 edition of the Beijing book on the strat-

10
agems, No. 3 was originally used in the continual power strug-
gles of officials in the thoroughly decadent feudal bureaucracy
of ancient China; to that extent it is to be condemned.
But in military matters, states the same work, it is important
to understand how to use the strength of others. You may, for
example, incite and exploit conflict enemy camp, using
in the
such conflict as the "borrowed knife." The borrowed "object"
may be any one of many things: You may borrow the enemy's
strength by leading him on to exhaust his energies, while you
yourself remain rested and finally overwhelm him (see Stratagem
No. 4). You may "borrow" the enemy's generals by inciting
conflict among them, so that they begin to fight one another.
You can borrow the enemy's stratagems, learning his in-
also
tentions and turning them against him.
According to a Taiwanese book on the stratagems, 11 military
theoreticians of ancient China felt that it was inglorious to rely
on the help of allies. The supreme art of war consisted, they

believed, in borrowing the military, economic, and intellectual
forces of enemies to defeat enemies. As it is stated in the Chinese
tract Bingfa yuanji (The Core of the Art of War):
If you are limited in own strength, then borrow the

your
strength of the enemy. you cannot neutralize an enemy,
If
borrow an enemy's knife to do so. If you have no generals,

borrow those of the enemy. In this way you need not be
active yourself, but can remain at rest. What you cannot
achieve yourself, you can achieve with the hand of the
enemy.
STRATAGEM N O
Await the Exhausted Enemy

at your Ease
The Chinese
characters
Modern
**
yi
A # *
yt dai lao
Mandarin
pronunciation
Meaning of each in ease await exhausted

character
Application Preserve your own strength while maneuvering

the enemy into exhausting himself.
The short formula for Stratagem No. 4 appears for the first
time in chapter 7 of the famous 2,500-year-old treatise by Sun

Tzu, The Art of War:
Standing your ground, awaiting those far away, awaiting

the weary in comfort, awaiting the hungry with full stom-
1
achs, is mastering strength.
In chapter 6 of the same work, the following passage appears:
Those who are first on the battlefield and await [their]

opponents are at ease; those who are last on the battlefield
and head into battle get worn out. Therefore good
. . .
warriors cause others to come to them, and do not go to

2
others.
4.1 The Trap at Guiling
As a situation evolves, especially in war, circumstances con-

stantly change. Accordingly, the use of one stratagem alone may
6i
6z -
not suffice. In such a case, two or even three stratagems may

be required as the situation changes.
For example, in the fourth century B.C., Sun Bin first applied
Stratagem No. 2, besieging Wei to rescue Zhao; he then applied
No. 4 by ambushing the Wei army, which had exhausted itself
in a forced march from Zhao, and defeating it. (See Section 2.1,
"With the Army into the Void.")

To "await the enemy" is not always to be construed in a
passive sense, according to Chinese sources, but frequently as
an active undertaking. Some action is often necessary to delib-
erately exhaust the enemy or to steer him in the desired direction,
in any case to "lure him into the depths of your own territory"
(you di shen ru), then take advantage of a favorable time to
engage in battle. Here the important thing is literally to lead
the enemy around by the nose and not permit him to set the
pace.
4.2 The Ambush at Maling
In 342 B.C., twelve years after Zhao was saved through the siege
of Wei, the state of Wei attacked the Han state. The Han ruler
called on the state of Qi for help. Tian Ji and Sun Bin, com-
manding the Qi army, immediately led it in an attack against
the Wei capital. As soon as he heard about this, Pang Juan,
commander of the Wei troops, pulled them back out of Han
territory. Sun Bin knew of General Pang Juan's arrogance and
his low opinion of the Qi troops. Faced with an advancing Wei
army, Sun Bin began an apparent retreat. On the first day his
troops left behind traces of 100,000 campfires; on the second
day 50,000, and on the third day only 30,000. Pang Juan, eager
for victory, concluded that the Qi army had been seriously weak-
ened by mass desertions. So he left the bulk of his infantry behind
and set out in pursuit with some lightly equipped troops. He
covered two days' worth of ground in a single day's march. Sun
Bin had calculated that Pang Juan would reach Maling at dusk.
Await the Exhausted Enemy at Your Ease •
6 3
He set an ambush there and waited. As planned, the Wei troops

arrived exhausted from their forced march, and Sun Bin's army
demolished them. General Pang Juan committed suicide on the
3
battlefield.
4.3 Mao's Sixteen Characters—

a Formula for Guerrilla Warfare
In his essay Strategic Problems of the Revolutionary War in

4
China, dated December 1936, Mao Zedong wrote:
Ifan attacking opponent is superior to our army in numbers

and firepower, we can alter the balance of power only when
the enemy has penetrated deep into the interior of our base
territory and there has drained the cup of bitterness to the
lees, so that "the fat grow lean and the lean exhaust them-
selves to death." At that point the enemy army, though still

strong, has been substantially weakened; its soldiers are
tired out and demoralized, and many of the enemy's weak-
nesses are revealed. The Red Army is still weak, but it has
been preserving its strength, storing its energies, and await-
ing the exhausted enemy at its ease. At this point it is
possible, as a rule, to strike a certain balance in the strength
of the two sides or to transform the enemy's absolute su-
periority into a merely relative superiority —
sometimes it
is even possible for us to gain the upper hand.
And in a telegram dated April 1947, detailing the course of
operations in the northwestern theater, Mao declared:
Our course is ... to harry . . . the enemy in this area for

some time yet, and then, when [his] exhaustion and [his]
food shortages have reached an extreme, to seek an op-

portunity to destroy him. Unless we fully weaken and
. . .
starve out the enemy, we cannot attain the final victory.

This method may be termed the exhaustion tactic: You tire
the enemy until he is totally exhausted, and then de-

stroy him.
In highly condensed form, Mao formulated the essence of Strat-

agem No. 4 in a sixteen-character poetic formula for guerrilla
warfare, 5 which translates as:
When the enemy comes, we go.

When the enemy rests, we disrupt.
When the enemy is exhausted, we fight.
When the enemy goes, we give chase.
AA From the Yom Kippur War
The 1989 edition of the Beijing book on the stratagems cites an

episode from early in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war as a
modern application of Stratagem No. 4. It involves the suc-
cessful use of Egyptian infantry against an Israeli tank unit. Early
in the conflict the Egyptian army, in a surprise move, broke
through the ring of defenses known as the Bar-Lev Line and
built a bridge across the Suez Canal. The Israeli army radioed
orders to a tank brigade for the bridge to be destroyed so that
a further Egyptian advance could be halted. The radio com-
munication was intercepted and decoded by the Egyptians, who
immediately ordered their Second Infantry Division to throw
up a line of defense across the direction of the Israeli tank attack
and then lie in ambush. At the same time a unit of Egyptian
engineers was commanded to build a second bridge across the
Suez Canal, near the first one, in order to fool the Israelis into
thinking that a massive Egyptian crossing was being planned.
In this way the Egyptians lured the Israelis in the desired direc-
tion. According to the Chinese report, the Israelis, full of self-
confidence and harboring a low opinion of the enemy's fighting

stormed forward blindly. The Egyptians ordered a van-
ability,
guard unit to put up some resistance but then to fall back and
so draw the Israelis into the ambush, where their tanks were
destroyed. Thus, by using Stratagem No. 4, an infantry unit
Await the Exhausted Enemy at Your Ease •
6 5
waiting at its ease in ambush was able to knock out an enemy

tank unit.
4.5 Keep Them Tense
Stratagem books published in Hong Kong and Taiwan point

out that Stratagem No. 4 can be applied to private life as well
as military operations. The idea is to make sure that your op-
ponent is kept constantly tense, occupied, and on the alert, so
that he exhausts himself, his courage flags, he misses favorable
opportunities for aggressive action, and you can bring him down
with a blow.
As it says in the original treatise 6 on the 36 Stratagems, as
reproduced in the Jilin volume: "A strong enemy must be weak-
ened by fatigue."
STRATAGEM N O
Loot a Burning J~louse
The Chinese
characters
4fc * *r u.
Modern chen hud da jie
Mandarin
pronunciation
Meaning of each exploit confla- commit robbery

character gration
Applications "Exploit a fire to commit a robbery" — exploit

another's troubles or crisis for your own
advantage; attack the enemy when he is in a
state of chaos. The "vulture" stratagem.
—
The No. 5 is to be found in Sun

basic concept of Stratagem
Tzu's The Art of War: "When the enemy is confused, you can
1
use this opportunity to take them."
5.1 The Radiant Robe
One of the oldest appearances of the short formula for this

stratagem is in the sixteenth-century novel Journey to the West,
by Wu Cheng'en. 2
The book recounts the adventures of the
monk Tripitaka and his companions as they travel westward
from the empire of the Tang Dynasty in search of sacred Bud-
dhist scriptures which they are to bring back to China. On this
odyssey, Tripitaka accompanied by Sun Wukong, the divine

is
Monkey King who is a master of magical arts, as well as Sha

the Sand Monk (nicknamed "Sandy" in some translations), and
Zhu Bajie, a pig ("Pigsy"). On their way, they encounter all
—
manner of threats demons, monsters, false priests, fiends
and must overcome a constant succession of dangers.
69
70 •
One evening during their travels, Tripitaka and the Monkey

King reach a temple in which there are more than seventy rooms
and 200 monks. There they ask permission to spend the night.
While they are being given tea from an elegant tea service, they
are asked by the abbot of the monastery whether Tripitaka has
in his possession any precious object which he could show him.
The Monkey King reminds Tripitaka of a certain robe in their
luggage. The monks laugh, pointing out that they own hundreds
of robes of the finest silk and splendid embroidery. The abbot
has these robes shown to his two guests. The Monkey King is
unimpressed and asks if he may show the robe they have
brought. Even as he unpacks it, a radiance shines through the
two layers of oiled paper in which it is wrapped. When Monkey
takes it out, a red radiance and a fragrant scent fill the room.
What a magnificent robe!
The abbot immediately begins to think evil thoughts. He
kneels before Tripitaka, complains that he cannot see the robe
in detail because of his poor eyesight, and asks to take it with
him to his cell so that he can examine it carefully overnight.
The robe is handed over. That night the abbot takes counsel
with his monks to determine how he can gain possession of the
splendid garment. A young monk by the name of Great Strat-
agem suggests that the Zen hall be set afire and the two guests
sleeping in it burned to death. Quickly the monks heap firewood
around the Zen hall. But the Monkey King is not asleep; with
half-closed eyes he is doing breathing exercises. He hears the
sound of running feet outside the hall and the creaking of fire-
wood in the wind. Suspicious, he gets up. In order not to wake

the sleeping Tripitaka he changes himself into a bee, flies out,
and sees the firewood. He decides to catch the monks in their
own trap. Changed back into his usual form, he quickly flies
up to the southern gate of Heaven, where he obtains a fire-
fighting blanket from Devaraja, King of Heaven. He brings the

blanket back to the Zen hall and wraps Tripitaka in it, so that
he is safe. From the ridge of the roof he watches the monks
lighting the wood. He speaks a magic incantation and then
blows out mightily. A strong wind comes up and fans the flames,
Loot a Burning House •
7 1
which gradually envelop the entire monastery. Only the Zen

hall with Tripitaka in remains unharmed. So the monks suffer
it
the fate they had planned for their guests.

All the animals and demons in the surrounding mountains
awaken, including the Mountain Demon in the Cave of the Black
Wind, twenty miles south of the monastery. Hastening to help
the monks, the Mountain Demon flies on a cloud and sees that
the front and back halls of the monastery are completely empty,
while the fire rages through the corridors on both sides. The
demon runs into the hall, and in the abbot's room it sees some-
thing wrapped in blue, from which a multicolored radiance
emanates. It opens the package and discovers the precious robe,
a rare Buddhist treasure. Forgetting all its good intentions, the
demon wraps up the robe, exploiting the fire to commit a rob-
bery, and quickly flies back to its mountain cave with its booty.
5.2 Q\ Holds Back
At the start of the Warring States period (475-221 B.C.), there

were about twenty separate states on Chinese territory. Among
them were Chu, Han, Qi, Qin, Wei, Yan, and Zhao.
Qi and Han were allies. They wanted to conquer Yan but did
not dare invade because of Zhao and Chu. Suddenly Qin and
its ally Wei attacked the state of Han. The ruler of Qi was eager
to help his Han ally, but his adviser Tian Chensi warned, "The
destruction of Han would threaten the very existence of Zhao
and Chu. So those two will give aid to Han as quickly as
possible."
As Qi did not intervene in the fighting. But Zhao
a result,
and Chu behaved exactly as Tian Chensi had predicted. Sud-
denly Qin, Wei, Zhao, and Chu were all embroiled in a war
over Han. The seemingly neutral state of Qi took advantage of
that moment, when war was raging on every side, to mount an
attack against the state of Yan, which had also kept out of the
fighting. In the year 270 B.C., Qi conquered Yan.
5.3 Unequal Treaties and Lost Territory
In more recent times, foreign powers have often taken advantage

of China's backwardness, in conjunction with dire conditions
in the country, to apply Stratagem No. 5.
After losing the First Opium War (1840-42), China was ex-
hausted and demoralized. Britain and the USA exploited the
situation to conclude one-sided agreements favorable to them
(present-day Chinese refer to these as the "unequal treaties").
The French, rubbing their hands with glee, so to speak, saw an
opportunity for great August 1844, "exploiting a fire
profit. In
to commit a robbery," the French government, which had main-

tained hardly any relations with the Middle Kingdom prior to
the Opium War, Marie Melchior Joseph Theodore de La-
sent
grene as a special emissary to China. Within weeks he concluded
the Treaty of Huangpu, which could not have been more fa-
vorable to France. 3
Another historical gloss was offered by the Beijing Daily on
November 14, 1981. The typically verbose title of the article
was "Czarist Russia exploits a fire to commit a robbery, in order
to slice off a piece of our territory." The article commemorated
the Sino-Russian Treaty of Beijing signed 120 years earlier.
When British and French troops attacked Beijing in 1860, plun-
dering and burning the Summer Palace, Czarist Russia took the
opportunity to exploit China's weakness and applied massive
pressure to get the government to sign the Treaty of Beijing
which, according to the Beijing Daily article, enabled Russia to
"annex some 400,000 square kilometers of Chinese territory
east of the Ussuri."
5.4 Esau Exhausted
The first major episode in the Biblical saga of Jacob and Esau
is told in Genesis 25:29-34:
Loot a Burning House •
7 3
One day Jacob prepared a broth and when Esau came in

from the country, exhausted, he said to Jacob, "I am ex-
hausted; me swallow some of that red broth."
let Jacob . . .
said, "Not till you sell me your rights as the firstborn."

Esau replied, "I am at death's door; what use is my birth-
me?" Jacob said, "Not till you swear!"; so he swore
right to
an oath and sold his birthright to Jacob. Then Jacob gave
Esau bread and the lentil broth, and he ate and drank and
went away without more ado. 4
The Bible adds one more sentence to this brief episode: "Thus
Esau showed how little he valued his birthright." From the
standpoint of Chinese stratagem mentality, however, something
is still missing: an evaluation of Jacob's behavior. It might read
like this: "With great presence of mind he took advantage of
his brother Esau's exhausted state and maneuvered him into
relinquishing his birthright as the firstborn for a dish of lentil
broth."
5.5 The Illiterate Korean
Korea, about 1930: Honest and industrious, filled with respect

for his parents, loving kindness for his wife, and deep concern
for his siblings, the peasant Ho Tal-su works hard every day.
But he consumed by one worry: His only child, his daughter
is
Phoenix, has gone off to North China to search for her husband,
who was abducted by the invading Japanese. Many months have
passed since her departure, and there has been no news of her.
Eventually an itinerant kerosene peddler brings a letter from
Phoenix. Ho Tal-su is not at home when the peddler comes, so
the man leaves the letter in front of the door and moves on.
Returning home, the illiterate peasant thinks that the letter is
just some piece of paper the peddler has thrown away. He tears
a piece of it off and uses it to roll himself a cigarette. With the

rest he plugs a hole in his window.
A few days later news spreads about a catastrophic flood in
the part of China to which Ho's daughter has gone. The peas-
ant's family is troubled and they decide to borrow money from
their landlord so that Ho's wife can go in search of their daugh-
ter. Just as she is about to depart on her journey, the peddler
happens by again and asks Ho Tal-su whether he had received
his daughter's letter. Ho recalls that he had plugged the window
with it. With the torn letter in hand, Ho and his wife run in
every direction, searching for someone who can read it to them.
Desperate, they meet a young man who pretends that he can
read. When he stares at the scrap of paper helplessly, Ho and
his wife assume that the letter contains bad news about their
daughter. That night the family members cry bitterly. But finally
the peasant finds someone who really can read, his own niece.
She brings her teacher along, just to be sure. The fragment of

the letter reveals that their daughter Phoenix is well; in fact, she
has given birth to a son. Ho Tal-su's tears of grief are changed
into tears of joy. But a shock follows. His two readers also
him the contents of
reveal to the document which the landlord
had drawn up before lending Ho money, and to which Ho had
affixed his thumbprint. It states that the peasant has sold his
niece to the landowner for a mere twenty won!
This is a rough plot summary of The Daughter's Letter, a
play performed in 1987 by the National Theater Troupe of

North Korea. According to the Beijing newspaper Guangming
Daily, it was a new production of a play which "Comrade Kim
Il-sung wrote in the Chinese province of Jilin during the war of
resistance against Japan, and in the original performance of
which he played a role." The play's passionate message, wrote
Chinese theater critic Zhu Kechuan, is that "knowledge is
power." Every viewer leaves this play, remarked Zhu, realizing
that "the backward attitude that education and literacy are

useless to the working farmer does enormous harm."
In the context of stratagems, it is worth noting the behavior
of the landlord, which leads to the play's dramatic climax. He
exploits the peasant's difficulty (the "fire") to commit a "rob-
bery," tricking the ignorant farmer into selling him his niece for
a ridiculously small sum of money.
STRATAGEM N O
Clamor in the East,
Attack in the West
/ A
The Chinese
characters
* *
Modern sbeng dong ji XI
Mandarin
pronunciation
Meaning of each make East attack West

character noise
Applications Announce an attack to the east but carry it out

to the west; feint eastward but attack westward.
Diversionary maneuver to mask the real direc-
tion of an attack.
The short formula above goes back to the Tang historian and
government official Du You (a.d. 735-812), who wrote:
One announces an attack in the east, in order to really

1
mount an attack in the west.
The basic concept of Stratagem No. 6 is formulated in Sun Tzu's

The Art of War as:
Attack where there is no defense. ... If they are alert on

their eastern flank, strike on their western flank. 2
And in the work Huainanzi, composed under the aegis of

titled
Prince Liu An of Huainan (179-122 B.C.), the following passage

appears:
A bird wishing to peck something bends its head and

thus hides its beak. . . . The tiger and the leopard do not
show their claws. . . . The art of war thus consists in
pretending to be soft and weak, but when fighting breaks
out, meeting the enemy with hardness and strength, and in
77
yS -
pretending to pull in defensively, but at the appropriate

moment breaking loose. . . .
The 1989 edition of the Beijing book on the stratagems explains

No. 6 this way:
The goal is to disguise the direction of an attack. Through

agile operations you show your forces sometimes in the
west, then again in the east; strike suddenly, only to with-
draw with equal suddenness; pretend that an attack is im-
minent, but then do not carry it out; pretend peaceable
intent, when you really intend to attack; begin a course of
action which seems to imply a certain logical sequence, but
then suddenly break it off; let something happen seemingly
at random which in reality is quite deliberate; pretend to
be ready for action, when you are really incapable of it,
and vice versa. On the basis of what he perceives as

comprehensible phenomena, the enemy draws hasty con-
clusions and makes the wrong preparations, only to find
himself attacked and defeated at a place he had not
anticipated.
6.1 The Simulated Alliance
In the Warring States period, the states of Qi, Han, and Wei
attacked the state of Yan. To assist Yan, Jing Yang pretended
to lead an army from the state of Chu on a northward route,
but then mounted a surprise attack against an important city
in Wei, whereupon Qi, Han, and Wei broke off their attack
against Yan.
Having attained its goal of saving Yan, the Chu army wanted
to withdraw from the Wei city it had conquered. But the western
side of the city was suddenly besieged by the Han army and the
eastern side by the Qi army. The Chu forces were caught in a
pincers movement. What could be done?
Jing Yang decided to open the city's western gate, letting
chariots and soldiers ride in and out by day and keeping the
Clamor in the East, Attack in the West •
79
lamps burning at night. In this way he simulated lively traffic
between the Chu and Han armies. As expected, suspicion grew

in the ranks of the Qi forces that Han and Chu might be forming
an alliance for an attack on Qi. So the Qi army withdrew. Left

to itself, Han army feared an attack by the much stronger
the
forces of Chu. One dark and stormy night the Han troops de-
parted, and the army of Chu was able to return home in peace.
6.2 The Unexpected River Crossing
Having destroyed China's first centralized imperial government

in the year 206 B.C., Liu Bang, founder of the Han Dynasty,
had to continue fighting for years against local warlords who
had come to power during the years of the Qin Dynasty's de-
cline. One of Liu's opponents was Prince Bao of Wei.
To defend himself against an attack by the Han army, Prince

Bao ordered General Bo Zhi to use all the Wei forces in an
ambush on the eastern bank of the Yellow River, near Puban.
Bo Zhi blocked the crossing over the Yellow River, along with
all shipping on the river; he also had all the peasants' boats
hidden and set a mobile unit to constantly patrol the riverbank.

Convinced that the Han army had no other way to cross the
Yellow River except at Puban, he took only these precautions.
Han Xin, commander of the Han army, realized that a direct
attack at Puban would be unlikely to succeed. Nevertheless he
had the Han army's main camp set up opposite that of the Wei
army near Puban and saw to it that many flags were raised and
all the ships at his disposal anchored there. By day the Han
troops raised a racket and beat their drums, and at night torches
burned throughout the camp, where there was much lively ac-
Everything created the impression that a river crossing
tivity.
by the Han forces was imminent. Believing this, Bo Zhi paid

no attention at all to the upper reaches of the Yellow River.
In the meantime Han Xin secretly transferred his main fighting
8o •
force northward, where it crossed the Yellow River at Xiayang.

That move heralded the final defeat of Prince Bao of Wei. 3
6.3 Confusing the "Yellow Turbans"
Toward the end of the Eastern Han period (a.d. 25-220), Zhu
Jun besieged the city of Yuan, in which the "Yellow Turban"
rebels had entrenched themselves. To better scout the enemy
positions, he had an earth wall piled up outside the city walls.
He then had the war drums beaten and mounted a feint attack
against the western side of the city. When, watching from the
top of the earth wall, he saw that all the Yellow Turbans were
hurrying to defend the western side, he mounted a lightning
strike with his main force on the northeastern side and easily —
gained entry into the city.
6.4 The Trumpets of Jericho
"Jericho was bolted and barred against the Israelites; no one

went out, no one came in," says the Bible in chapter 6 of the
Book of Joshua. At God's command, Joshua tells the people his
plan for conquest. The Old Testament tale continues:
When Joshua had spoken to the army, the seven priests

carrying the seven trumpets of ram's horn before the Lord
passed on and blew the trumpets, with the Ark of the
Covenant of the Lord following them. The drafted men
marched in front of the priests who blew the trumpets, and
the rearguard followed the Ark. Thus [the Ark of the
. . .
Lord went] round the city, making the circuit of it once,

and then they went back to the camp and spent the night
there. . .This they did for six days. But on the seventh
.
day they rose at dawn and marched seven times round the
city in the same way. The seventh time the priests blew
. . .
8 i
the trumpets and Joshua said to the army, "Shout! The

Lord has given you the city. ." When the army heard
. .
the trumpet sound, they raised a great shout, and down

fell the walls. The army advanced on the city, every man
straight ahead, and they took it. 4
A student of modern military science has added the following

commentary:
For six days Joshua's trumpeters circled Jericho. On the

seventh, a segment of the city wall collapsed and the Is-
raelites concentrated their attack on that gap. It has been

suggested elsewhere that the sound of the trumpets served
to cover the noise of sappers, whose job it was to undermine
the city's fortifications from beneath by digging a passage-
way. And this undermining of the foundations caused that
segment of wall to cave in. 5
If this assumption is correct, the ''concert" by Joshua's trum-

peters may be seen as a typical diversionary maneuver very much
in keeping with Stratagem No. 6.
6.5 The Farsighted General
Under the Han Emperor Jing (reigned 157-141 B.C.), seven

feudal lords jointly rose in rebellion and attacked the loyal
troops who were firmly entrenched in a certain city and com-
manded by General Zhou Yafu. When the rebel troops attacked
the southeastern corner of the city, Zhou Yafu issued a com-
mand to reinforce the guard posts in the northwestern corner
of the city. Shortly thereafter, his enemies did indeed send their
main force to the northwestern corner, where, however, they
failed to make a breakthrough.
6.6 Zhu De's Surprise Move
On August 1, 1927, troops stationed in Nanchang, in Jiangxi

Province, rebelled against the Guomindang regime recently
formed by Chiang Kai-shek. These troops formed the nucleus
Red Army. Under pressure from the Guomindang
of the Chinese
forces, some of marched southward. There, with
the rebel units
the Jinggangshan Mountains as a base, eleven Communist base
areas were established by the year 1930, including one near the
city of When Guomindang troops attacked Yongxin,
Yongxin.
Zhu commandant of the fourth Revolutionary Peasant
De, then
Army, attacked Gaolong in Hunan Province to the west, to
create the impression that the Red forces were invading Hunan.
About half of the Red Army was then quickly withdrawn from
Gaolong and, covering 130 miles in a forced march, wiped out
an enemy regiment in Caoshi and captured Yongxin. According
to the People's Daily of August 2, 1982, Zhu De's operation
was a skillful application of the principle "Clamor in the east,
attack in the west."
6.7 Cambodia Instead of China
"Clamor in the north, but attack in the west" was the headline,
based on Stratagem No. 6, that appeared over an article in the
edition of the People's Daily dated October 26, 1 978. According

to the article,Vietnam at that time was constantly fuming about
a Chinese threat from the north and an imminent Chinese war
against Vietnam. In reality, wrote the Chinese correspondent,
the Vietnamese regime was simply trying to divert the attention
of its own people from the problems created by the Vietnamese
army's arms buildup and to divert the world's attention from
Hanoi's imminent invasion of Cambodia.
8 3
6.8 Clamor in the East, Clamor in the West
In thefamous novel Shuihu zhuan (Water Margin) 6 there is an ,
episode in which Stratagem No. 6 is combined with No. 4, in

order to gradually wear the enemy out. The tactic is used by a
band of robbers whose mountain headquarters were located on
the summit of the Mountain of Cool Winds. These robbers were
joined by some honorable men who had fled the authorities
because they had been falsely accused of various crimes and
could get no justice under ancient China's corrupt judicial sys-
tem. As the episode begins, the hotheaded General Qin Ming,
who has been ordered to destroy the robbers' nest, leads his
men in an attempt to storm the mountaintop. 7
With wild battle cries, the troops stormed up the moun-

tainside, foot soldiers in the lead. The path took them up
and down steep ravines, across dangerous rocky outcrop-
pings. Finally the vanguard of forty or fifty men neared the
crest and looked upward. Suddenly, with a noise like thun-
der, huge blocks of wood and stone came crashing down
from the boulders above, and the men were drenched in
veritable floods of hot lime and stinking slops. There could
be no retreat. They threw themselves on the ground and
lay there helpless. The units behind them quickly turned
tail and ran for safety.
Beside himself with fury, Qin Ming gathered about him
those troops who had managed to return and marched them
eastward along the foot of the mountain, looking for an-
other way up. Suddenly, from the western slope, there came
the sound of drums, and a group of robbers carrying red
flagscame out of the dense woods. Hastily Qin Ming led
his infantry and cavalry westward —
but then the drums
stopped and there were no more red flags to be seen. When
he took a closer look at the path on which the robbers had
come and gone, he found that it was no proper path at all,
merely a narrow track such as those used by firewood
gatherers —and it had been blocked with branches.
The soldiers had begun clearing the track, when a scout
reported that drums had been heard and red flags seen on
the eastern slope. Swift as the wind, Qin Ming gathered

his troops and hurried them eastward. But when they ar-
rived, the drums were silent, the flags had disappeared, and
the few paths leading upward had been blocked with felled
trees and tangled undergrowth.
Again a scout came running up: He had heard drums
and seen red flags on the western slope. Qin Ming galloped
—
back the same foolishness!
He gnashed his teeth in fury, as if to grind them into
dust. The troops that had hurried after him now stood
about exhausted. But listen! From the east came drawn-
out drumbeats. . . . About-face — ride — nothing to hear,
nothing to see. . . .
In this way General Qin Ming's forces were worn down so that
his defeat was inevitable.
6.9 Sky-High Ping-Pong Balls
In 1977, Chinese table tennis players successfully used Stratagem

No. 6 in a major tournament. When it was their service, they
would throw the ball very high in the air; their opponents fol-
lowed the ball with their eyes and were thus diverted from the
opposing players' preparations for the stroke. In this case, of
course, was not a matter of "east" and "west" but of up and

it
down. The east-west axis mentioned in the short formula

should, in any case, be understood figuratively rather than
literally.
STRATAGEM N O
Create Something
from J^Jothing
The Chinese
characters £ + a *
Modern wu zbong sheng you
Mandarin
pronunciation
Meaning of each non- in the create existent

character existent midst of
Applications The "creator" stratagem:

a. An apparition or illusion is deliberately
created in such a way that the enemy sees it
for what it is; his vigilance is thus lulled, so

that later he mistakes a real danger for the
illusion and falls victim to it without re-
sistance.
b. Gain an advantage, or create a change
of opinion or of reality, by conjuring an

illusion.
c. Make something up out of whole cloth;

present a falsehood as fact; fabricate rumors,
campaigns of lies and slander; make a
mountain out of a molehill. The stratagem
of disinformation.
The short formula given above is rooted in chapter 40 of the
Daodejing (or Tao-te-ching), the basic Daoist scripture ascribed
to sixth century B.C. Chinese philosopher Laozi (Lao-tze). The
relevant passage in that work reads:
Things in the world arise from Existence, and Existence

arises from Non-Existence.
That is to say, each thing before it came into existence was

nonexistent, and thus arises from Nothingness.
This is not the appropriate place for an excursion into
Daoism. But it is worth noting that, from the times of the Tang
Dynasty (a.d. 618-907) to the present, the Daodejing, which
in the West is generally treated as a profoundly philosophical
work, has often been regarded in China as a military tract. The
justification for this view is that about twenty of its eighty-one
chapters treat military issues in disguised, philosophical form,
and that the other chapters also show clear signs of a militarily
oriented, tactical, and strategic mentality. An edition of Laozi's
87
writings published in Shanghai in 1977 takes the position, some-

what controversial even in China, that the Daodejing "is a mil-
itary tract which generalizes from the wartime experiences of
the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period.
... It applies military philosophy to every aspect of nature and
society."
From a military perspective, Stratagem No. 7 is about linking
fiction and reality, and letting reality suddenly emerge from
fiction. The "Nothing" in this case is an illusion designed to
confuse the enemy; the "Something" is the true intent which is

hidden behind the illusion and suddenly emerges from it at a
moment when the enemy still believes he is confronted by an
illusion.
As indicated at the head of this chapter, Stratagem No. 7 can

be applied on three different levels.
7.1 Straw Dummies Instead of Soldiers
During the Tang Dynasty, in the year a.d. 755, the military
governor An Lushan rebelled. Among the rebels was General

Ling Huchao, who besieged the city of Yongqiu. Loyalist Gen-
eral Zhang Xun, who had to defend the city with only a small
number of troops and weapons, commanded his soldiers to
make about a thousand man-sized straw dummies dressed in
black clothing, to fasten them to lines and let them slide down
the outside of the city walls during the oncoming night. The
rebel soldiers besieging the city thought that opposing troops
were clambering down the city walls and let loose a hail of
arrows against them. Zhang Xun had the straw dolls drawn up
again and "captured" several thousand arrows.
A bit later General Zhang Xun had real soldiers climb down
the city walls. Ling Huchao and his troops thought that the
enemy was hoping to harvest more arrows with straw dummies.
So this time they laughed scornfully and made no preparations
for battle. Zhang Xun's five hundred volunteers mounted a
lightning strike against Ling Huchao's camp, set fire to its tents,
Create Something from Nothing •
8 9
killed some of the besieging rebels, and scattered the rest to the
four winds.
7.2 From the Korean War
The 1987 The 36 Stratagems: A Modern Version

edition of 1
offers the following example of No. 7:

During the Korean War, the battle on Sanggamryong Moun-
tain raged from October 8 to November 25, 1952. In a combat
zone of only 3.7 square kilometers Amer-
(1.3 square miles), the
icans used about sixty thousand troops and dropped thousands
of bombs, the explosive force of which reduced the height of
the mountain by 2 meters {6.6 feet). Finally, the Chinese troops
holding the peak were forced to pull back into tunnels, from
which the Americans tried to smoke them out and destroy them.
One night a company of Chinese soldiers exploited the Amer-
icans' fatigue. They threw empty cans and other noisy objects
in the direction in which they planned to attack. At first the
U.S. troops reacted alertly to every sound, immediately shooting
at the spot from which each noise came. The Chinese repeated
this tactic three times in a row. Finally the Americans' alertness
wore down. At that point a small Chinese unit quickly emerged
from the tunnel and blew up the American bunker located only
about 20 meters from the tunnel's mouth. By the time the Amer-
icans realized what was happening, the Chinese soldiers had
withdrawn back into their tunnel.
7.3 The Army of Zurich Women
On another level, Stratagem No. 7 can be used to actually "cre-

ate" something from the "nothing" of an illusion. This is illus-
trated by the following examples.

In the summer of 1292, Duke Albrecht of the Hapsburgs,
having dealt the people of Canton Zurich a serious defeat at
•
Winterthur, lay siege to the city of Zurich. (At stake was the
status of the Hapsburgs in the rebellious Swiss lands.) After a
serious attack against a major fortification, Zurich's capitulation

seemed only a matter of time. Suddenly the women of the city
sprang into the breach. Armed, they marched to the Lindenhof2
"with drum and fife" and took up positions to make it look as
though there were thousands of them. Albrecht, who had been
anticipating an easy victory over the seriously decimated Zur-
chers, was readily deceived and broke off his siege.
By cleverly positioning themselves on the Lindenhof, the city's

women created the illusion of tremendous defensive prepared-
ness. From this "nothing" — i.e., this illusion — they created a
"something," namely, the enemy withdrawal. The story may be
3
too good to be true, but se non e vero, e ben trovato!
7.4 Hannibal, Rommel and the Soviets
When Hannibal found himself drawn into an ambush in a deep

valley by the Roman General Fabius in 217 B.C., he broke out
by employing a fiery stratagem. In the night he had bundles of
brushwood tied to the horns of two thousand oxen and set
alight. The animals were driven toward the Roman troops, who
thought that the entire Carthaginian army was marching against

them. In the ensuing confusion, Hannibal and his troops were
4
able to get out of the trap.
More than two thousand years later, during the fighting in
North Africa in World War II, Germany's Field Marshal Rom-
mel fooled his opponents by mounting dummy tanks on Volks-
wagens and having a few vehicles drag heavy objects through
the desert sand to raise huge dust clouds, creating the illusion
that large mechanized forces were on the move.
During the Second World War a unit of Soviet engineers com-

manded by a Captain Gozeridse was ordered to quickly mine
9 1
a road along which a strong enemy unit was being supplied.

There were no mines left in the Soviet battalion at the time, and
to wait until some could be delivered would be to ignore the
need for haste.
Gozeridse ordered signs to be painted with the German mes-
sage Achtung, Minen! (Caution, mines!). During the night, the
Soviet engineers crept through the enemy lines and planted the
signs along the road. In the morning, Soviet observers watched
as the Nazis halted their vehicles, nervously read the signs, and
seemed clearly afraid to proceed. Traffic ground to a halt, and
a line of German vehicles backed up on the road. Then the
Soviet gunners, with whom Gozeridse had arranged everything
in advance, opened fire on the startled Nazis and inflicted heavy
losses on them.
Near Staraya Russiya, the main Soviet battle line ran along the
edge of a wood. In order to observe the enemy, Soviet soldiers
had to climb up into the pine trees. Because of the added weight
the pines began to sway back and forth, which made them
conspicuous against the background of stationary trees. The
Germans saw this, realized what was happening, and opened
fireon the moving pines. The Red soldiers tried to avoid shaking
the trees, but it was impossible. So the squadron commander
decided to fool the enemy. He ordered his men to fasten lines
to the tips of the pines at night, with the other ends of the lines
down in their trenches. The next morning the soldiers pulled
on the ropes and shook the trees. The Nazi troops fired machine
guns at the swaying pines. As soon as the fire would slacken,
the Soviet soldiers pulled on their lines again, and the German
fire resumed. This continued until midday. Only then did the
Nazis realize that they had been deceived and held their fire.
From then on the Soviet observers could use the pines without
danger, since the German soldiers no longer fired at them.
7.5 Vietnam's Floating Leaflets
The signal for Vietnam's ten-year war of resistance (a.d. 1418—

28) against Ming rule was the uprising at Lam Son, headed by
Le-Loi. His most important adviser was Nguyen Trai, whose
battle tract, Binh Ngo dai-cdo (Great Proclamation on the De-
feat of the Ngo [Ngo was a derogatory term for the Chinese]),
shows him to be an outstanding expert on ancient Chinese tac-
tical and strategic thinking. He regarded "winning the hearts
and minds" of the Vietnamese people as of equal importance

with conquering enemy positions, and ascribed great value to
propaganda and political agitation. Among his repertoire of
tactics was Stratagem No. 7, as the following anecdote shows:
Nguyen Trai ordered that the prophecy "Le-Loi shall be king,

and Nguyen Trai his minister" be inscribed, in delicate strokes,
on the leaves of trees. To convey this message required only a
few of the Chinese characters then in common use in Vietnam.
These were written on the leaves not with ink but with lard.
Ants gnawed at the fat-covered parts of the leaves, so that the
message was eaten out of their surface. The leaves were then
set floating in all directions on brooks and streams. When the
Vietnamese people found these inscribed leaves floating in the
water, they took the message for a heavenly sign of victory and
fought with heightened morale against the foreign occupying
troops, who were finally driven out in the year a.d. 1428. 5
7.6 The Journey to Jin
During the Warring States period there were numerous peri-

who traveled from state to state in China
patetic politicians,
declaiming their wisdom and looking for a ruler who would
take them into his service. Among those political pundits was
Zhang Yi, originally from the state of Wei. During his wan-
derings he came to the state of Chu, where he lived for a while
9 3
in great poverty. During that time his followers grew angry and
threatened to leave him. Zhang Yi said, "Wait till I've spoken
to the King." The ruler granted him an audience but did not
prove to be very gracious. At Zhang Yi's request, the King
permitted him to travel on to Jin.
Zhang Yi asked, "Does His Majesty wish anything from Jin?"
"There is gold, pearls, and ivory enough in Chu. I wish
nothing."
"Does His Majesty not like beautiful women?"
"How so?"
"Because the women there are as lovely as goddesses."
"Chu is a remote land. I have never seen its beautiful women.
But how could I not be interested?"
Requesting that Zhang Yi acquire a few such women for him,
the monarch gave him gifts of pearls and jade.
The King's two favorite wives learned of this (with Zhang
Yi's help, according to the Hong Kong book The 36 Stratagems,
with Examples from Times Past and Present), grew frightened,
and paid him a large quantity of gold in the hope that they
would be spared the ignominy of being supplanted by foreign
women.
Before his departure Zhang Yi requested permission to drink
a final farewell toast to his ruler. The King granted permission
and gave the politician his drink. After a while Zhang Yi re-
quested that those with whom the ruler normally ate be likewise
them as well.
called in, so that he could drink a farewell toast to
The King then had his two favorite wives summoned. When
Zhang Yi saw them, he threw himself to the ground before the
King and cried, "I lied to you and deserve to die."
"How so?" inquired the monarch.
"I have traveled throughout the kingdom and nowhere have
I seen women as beautiful as these. Thus, when I promised to
bring Your Majesty the most beautiful women of all, I lied."
"You are forgiven," said the King. "I have always been con-
vinced that these two women are the most beautiful under the
6
dome of Heaven."
Zhang Yi's projected journey to Jin and his pledge to acquire
divinely beautiful women there are empty promises; they are

the "nothing." The gifts of gold and jewels and the king's favor
are the "something" created out of that "nothing."
7.7 Killing the Dog: A Lesson for a Husband 7
Incited by two drinking companions against his younger brother

Sun Rong, Court Councillor Sun Hua chases his brother out of
his house. Sun Rong, an honorable man who lives only for his
studies, goes to live in a hut near an abandoned brickworks and
earns a miserable livelihood as a beggar. All the pleas of Sun
Hua's wife and their aged servant fail to persuade the official
that his brother is merely an innocent victim of slander by the
two tipplers.
Sun Hua's wife resorts No. 7. A neighbor woman
to Stratagem
has leased a piece of land from Sun Hua. Overcoming the neigh-
bor's strong reluctance, the councillor's wife persuades the
woman to kill her dog. The two women dress the bloody cadaver
in men's clothing and, that night, place the body in the doorway
of the councillor's house. Coming home tipsy from a drinking
bout with his two malicious drinking companions, Sun Hua
finds the bloody corpse in the dark. In his drunken state he
thinks it is ahuman body and is afraid that he will be accused

of murder. He immediately seeks out his two comrades, who
have sworn to stand by him under any and all circumstances,
and asks them to help drag the corpse away and bury it. But
the two tipplers make excuses, one claiming heart trouble and
the other a painful hip, and they slam the door in the face of
their pleading friend.
Returning home, the hapless Sun Hua is persuaded by his
wife to appeal to his younger brother for help. The couple go

to him together, and Sun Rong agrees to help. He drags the
presumed corpse out of the city in the middle of the night and
buries it in the sand of the riverbank. The councillor now realizes
the kind of men his drinking buddies are. He has a reconciliation
9 5
with his brother and invites him back into his house. When his
drinking companions try to win their way back into his favor,
Sun Hua rejects them, telling one he has a bad heart, the other
he has a painful hip. Furious, the two men accuse the councillor
and his brother of murder and of hiding the corpse. During the
trialSun Hua's wife appears as witness for the defense. The
presumed body is exhumed and the defendants' innocence thus
proven. But the two accusers are punished. The case is brought
to the attention of the throne, and Sun Rong is rewarded for
his fraternal loyalty with a government post.
7.8 Matricide: A Lesson for a Wife 8
In the Qingshan production brigade there lived a family of

four: Mother Wang, her son Mr. Wang, his wife Cassia Blossom,
and their little son. Mr. Wang worked in the district's farm
machine factory. The relationship between Mother Wang and
her daughter-in-law was like that between a positive and neg-
ative electrical charge in the sky. As soon as they would meet,
thunder roared, lightning struck, and rain poured down. There
were repeated confrontations, daily fights. It looked as though
theywould continue to butt heads even after death.
One day the little boy fell to the ground and began to scream.
Grandma Wang wanted to pick him up. She stretched out her
arms — but
then stopped. She recalled that, only a few days
before in a similar situation, Cassia Blossom had accused her
of pushing the child down. As Grandma Wang hesitated, unsure
what to do, Cassia Blossom appeared and barked, "The child
has fallen down and hurt himself, and you just stand there.
You'll only be happy when he kills himself!"
As soon as the daughter-in-law opened her mouth, the
mother-in-law responded in her own less-than-shy manner. And
things took their usual course. Lips became rifles, tongues turned
into swords, and everything came spewing out like rotten cab-
bage and spoiled turnips.

At that moment Mr. Wang returned from the city. He came

home as infrequently as possible because as soon as he entered
the house he felt like a man caught in a bellows, with wind
coming at him from both sides. On this occasion, the sight of
him was like oil poured on a fire. Both women ran to him.
Grandma Wang said, tears in her eyes and her nose running,
"You are my son. I want you to answer one question for me
right now: Shall I go on living?"
Cassia Blossom, her eyes and nose in an equally fluid state,
said, "You're your mother's son all right. Whatever happens,
I'm the outsider, the fifth wheel on the wagon. It would be best
if I divorce you."
Mr. Wang pressed his lips together and said not a word. He
knew that, under the circumstances, no statement could possibly
be productive. This was a case of "Less is better than more.
And nothing is best of all." So he played dumb. And the fight
between the two women went on all afternoon.
Only in the evening did Grandma Wang finally relent and go
to her room sobbing, after the neighbors had come by and
calmed her. Cassia Blossom thought, "This time I'm going to
go all the way. Once my husband toes the mark, the old woman
will have nothing more to say."
As soon as the neighbors had departed, she began to lament
to the Heavens again and to hit her head against the floor. She
did everything she could to force her husband to take sides. But
he just sat there, making not a sound. Finally he said, grinding
his teeth in fury, "All right. That's enough. This time I'm going
to settle things once and for all."
"How?"
"I've thought this over very carefully," said Mr. Wang. "My
mother is no longer young. I'm going to wait for an opportunity
to kill her. That'll put an end to this endless fighting."
When Cassia Blossom heard this, a cold shudder ran down

her back and her eyes bulged like two light bulbs. But her
husband continued, "Really, I've thought about it over and over
again. This is the only way to save our marriage."
Seeing that her husband was serious, Cassia Blossom thought,
9 7
"Fact is, the sooner the old woman dies, the better." But simply
to —
murder her that did not sit so well. She asked her husband,
"And what if you're found out?"
Mr. Wang nodded and replied, "Right. Your relations with
her are very bad these days. If we kill her now, suspicion will
naturally fall on us. If we want to avoid the notice of the gods
and spirits, we have to put on a show."
He now insisted that Cassia Blossom go to his mother early
next morning and apologize, and that from then on she treat
the old woman pleasantly, smile at her each time they met, and
greet her courteously. He also demanded that, no matter what
happened, she should in future and refrain
avoid all conflict
from any ridicule or underhanded mockery. Cassia Blossom said
nothing. Mr. Wang concluded his remarks by observing that he
would be leaving the next day for a business trip that would
keep him away for two months.
"I hope," he said, "that you'll do exactly as I've told you. It
is essential that you keep it up until I'm back. After that much
time has passed, all our neighbors will get the impression that
you and my mother are now living together in peace. When I
return simply kill her

I'll and no— one will suspect a thing."
As Mother Wang, she lay on her bed that night turning
to
this way and that, unable to sleep. Next morning, as dawn began
to break and she was about to get up, the door to her room
opened and someone came in. When she turned to look, the old
woman involuntarily flinched. It was Cassia Blossom. What did
she want? Mother Wang felt herself go goose bumps all over.
Then she heard a soft "Mama?" Cassia Blossom approached
her bed and spoke.
"I was wrong yesterday, and I made you angry. My husband
preached me a sermon last night, and I'm coming to you now
to admit my faults and ask for your forgiveness. Here, I've also
brought you a bowl of chicken soup. I just cooked it. Eat it
now, while it's still hot. It may help to soothe your anger. I'll
bring you your breakfast a little later, Mama."
With those words, Cassia Blossom left the room. How difficult
her first scene of make-believe had been! Her heart pounded
wildly, her face felt as if it were burning, she felt cold sweat all
over her body, and her legs were so weak that she almost
collapsed.
Mother Wang, for her part, thought she was dreaming. It
was only the second time since her son's marriage that she had
been called "Mama" by Cassia Blossom. The more usual forms
of address were "Old Lady" and "Crazy Old Woman." And
bringing her a treat besides! Yesterday she had been like a storm
witch; today she was more like Guanyin, the Buddhist goddess
of mercy. Had she merely put honey on her lips but kept arsenic
in her heart? Could she have poisoned the chicken soup? Was
she trying to kill her with it?
At first Mother Wang thought she would give the soup to the
dog. But after a while she said to herself, "I'm sixty-six years
old. Better to die right now than go on leading this miserable
life." So she swallowed the soup in one gulp and lay down on
the bed, dressed in her best clothes, waiting for stomach pains
and death.
She waited in vain. In fact, to her surprise she began feeling
a good deal better. Then Cassia Blossom returned, again greeted
her gently, using the word "Mama," and brought her a bowl
of rice porridge. Without hesitation, Mother Wang sat up, took
the food, ate it, and lay down again. She lay there the entire
morning with no pain, no attacks of dizziness. On the contrary,
she felt steadily better, more lively. And she began to wonder.
At noon Mother Wang got up and went into the kitchen. She
was astonished to see that her little cook stove had disappeared.
But freshly cooked rice and vegetables steamed temptingly on
the table. Cassia Blossomcame in and said, "Mama, until now
Ihaven't been good to you. I made you angry all the time. From
now on, let's be good to one another." So saying, she drew
Mother Wang down to the freshly set table.
And from then on it was "Mama" this and "Mama" that.
Cassia Blossom's mouth was sweet, and her hands were quick
and skillful in seeing to the comfort of her mother-in-law,
whose heart soon softened. To Cassia Blossom it was all a game.
But Mother Wang took it very seriously. She thought, "If my
daughter-i n-law treats me well, I'll be good to her too."
9 9
Now, when Cassia Blossom came home from her production

unit, the meals were all cooked, her little son was in fine fettle,
and the pigs had been As a rule Cassia Blossom had to get
fed.
up at four-thirty every morning to take care of her many house-

hold chores before going to work, and even then she was often
late. One evening Mother Wang secretly took the one alarm
clock in the house from Cassia Blossom's room and put it in

her own. The next morning, when Cassia Blossom awoke, the
sky was much lighter than usual and breakfast was already on
the table in the kitchen. Now it was her heart that softened,
and tears filled her eyes. This time when she called the older
woman "Mama" it really was sincere.
Late one night Cassia Blossom suddenly developed a high
fever. Mother Wang heard her groaning and quickly ran to her
room. First she took her grandson and made him comfortable
in her own bedroom, then she took care of Cassia Blossom, and
early the next morning she sent for the doctor. Thanks to his
treatment and Mother Wang's tender care, Cassia Blossom soon
recovered. But she still felt very weak. Mother Wang took the
pound of lichee nuts which someone had given her as a New
Year's gift and brought them to her daughter-in-law. But Cassia
Blossom refused to eat them, saying over and over, "I've never
bought you anything to eat. How could I have the effrontery
to eat your fruit now?"
Mother Wang replied, "What does 'mine' and 'yours' matter?
We're all family. Eat the fruit, it'll give you strength." Where-
upon she sat down beside Cassia Blossom's bed, opened one
lichee nut after another, and placed them in Cassia Blossom's
mouth. As she ate the fruit, the younger woman felt a succession
of emotions bombard her: sweet, sour, bitter, fiery. Involun-
tarily, tears came to her eyes. As soon as she had fully recovered,
she bought her mother-in-law a pound of lichee nuts and also

gave her coupons for five kilos of rice, along with five yuan,
and earnestly requested that she buy for herself whatever she
wanted to eat. Now it was Mother Wang's turn to be so deeply
touched that the tears came. She dried her eyes with the corner
of her skirt.
Daughter-in-law and mother-in-law proceeded to live to-
•
ioo The Book of Stratagems
gether in harmony. After two months Mr. Wang returned home.

Seeing the altered situation, he lost no time. After dinner he
took a vial from
his jacket pocket, shook it, poured its contents
into a glass,mixed it with warm water, and brought it to his

mother's room. Cassia Blossom, who was knitting a woolen
dress, had hardly paid any attention to what was going on.
When Mr. Wang came back, she asked him, "What did you
bring to your mother's room?"
"Poison!"
Cassia Blossom cried out, and her whole body shook. The
woolen dress fell to the floor. Mr. Wang clamped his hand over
her mouth and said, "Have you lost your senses? What's all the
noise about?"
As soon as he released Cassia Blossom, she tried to run out
and get a doctor. But Mr. Wang quickly blocked the door.
"What did we decide two months ago?" he demanded. "On the
way home I heard from the neighbors that you'd been getting
along beautifully with my mother. You've played the game well.
Now everything is ripe for poisoning my mother. No one will
suspect us."
Hearing this, Cassia Blossom began to cry, kneeled before
her husband, and implored him, "Please, please call the doctor
quickly. Your mother mustn't die. I was wrong. Your mother
is good person."
a
"Then why were things so terrible before?" asked Mr. Wang.
"I was stubborn," replied his wife, "and she was stubborn,
and we became more and more pigheaded. Then I was good to
her, and she became good too, and things got better and better.
Then, I don't know what happened, but suddenly I felt good
about her. And now I understand that having an older person
in the house all the time is something precious."
When Mr. Wang heard this, he helped his wife to stand up
and began to laugh. Then he revealed to Cassia Blossom that
he had really brought his mother some medicine. His murder
plan had only been a ruse, a stratagem he had devised to change
his wife's attitude toward his mother. He had hoped that, if
Cassia Blossom would be good to his mother, his mother would

i o i
also be good to her and that Cassia Blossom's simulated good-

ness would be transformed into the real thing.
Cassia Blossom felt as if she had awakened from a dream.
She pounded on her husband's shoulders and said, "You . . .
you scoundrel. You tricked me!"

"No, I didn't trick you," said Mr. Wang. "I taught you a
lesson. But my method was a little unorthodox."
They looked at each other and laughed.
In this example, the pretended matricide plan was the "noth-
ing" from which "something" arose —
the improved relationship
between a young wife and her mother-in-law.
7.9 Deng Xiaoping's Cloth Shoes for

Barefoot Doctors
The third level of application of Stratagem No. 7 involves dis-
information, the invention of lies, defamation, misleading ru-

mors, etc. In 1955 Mao Zedong condemned this use of the
stratagem by "representatives of all exploiter classes." During

the time of the Gang of Four, former Defense Minister Lin Biao
(Mao's designated successor, who, according to the official
Chinese version, was killed in an air crash in September 1971)
was also attacked for using No. 1982 the Gang of Four
7. In
was in turn charged 9

with having invented lies, crimes, and
accusations — in short, of having made a great deal out of
nothing.
One of those affected was Deng Xiaoping. In October 1974,
during a conversation with a medical delegation from a Third
World country, Deng spoke of China's "barefoot doctors"
(roughly, what the West would call paramedics). He praised
their value, and then remarked that the barefoot doctors spent
some of their time healing people and some doing manual labor.
At the outset, he said, they had little specialized knowledge and
could treat only the simplest ailments. A few years later, how-
ever, they were already able "to buy straw sandals" — i.e., they
io2- The Book of Stratagems
had improved their medical knowledge. In a few years, Deng

added, they would be able to wear "cloth shoes."
A year later, while the Cultural Revolution was still raging,
these remarks were turned against Deng. He was accused of
wishing that the barefoot doctors would no longer have to go
barefoot. An anti-Deng pamphlet continued in these words:
The incorrigible advocate of the capitalist path boldly sug-

gests that the barefoot doctors"wear straw shoes," or even
"cloth shoes." That means nothing less than that they put
on capitalist shoes and walk down the revisionist path. Such
hysterical and confused talk, aimed at revolt, is typical of
the restorers [of capitalism].
A commentary published after the Cultural Revolution, how-

ever, set the record straight. It pointed out that Deng's talk of
"straw sandals" and "cloth shoes" was meant to be understood
figuratively, as a metaphor for the growing medical knowledge
of the barefoot doctors.
Explicitly referring to Stratagem No. 7, the People's Daily of
December 25, 1976, pointed out how the Gang of Four had
created and disseminated "black material" (i.e., half-true, out-
of-context, or totally fabricated excerpts from conversations,

writings,and speeches) about Central Committee members and
high regional functionaries who had fallen into disfavor.
7.10 Trouble in Yunnan
According to subsequent revelations, during the Cultural Rev-

olution grisly events were repeatedly fabricated "out of nothing"
and then were used as a basis on which to fatally accuse certain
party officials of being renegades, agents of capitalism, coun-
terrevolutionaries, etc.
January 1968 there were armed clashes between large
In
groups of people in Yunnan Province, causing injuries and

Create Something from Nothing -103
deaths. One of the groups involved in the fighting was termed

the "West Yunnan Storm Brigade" by a local supporter of Lin
Biao. The group was accused of various crimes, branded as
counterrevolutionary, and its members ruthlessly persecuted.
During one military operation, eleven hundred members of the
group were killed. This action enabled the Lin Biao supporter
to achieve a certain position of power in Yunnan, which he then
further exploited to persecute so-called "supporters of the West
Yunnan Storm Brigade" in fifty-four districts of the province.
In a parallel case, Jiang Qing, wife of Mao Zedong, was

reported in January 1968 to have said to a party secretary of
Yunnan Province, "I have read the plan of the Yunnan network
of Guomindang agents, and also watched all your actions care-
fully. You have carried out that Guomindang plan." Lin Biao's
representative in Yunnan used that statement by Jiang Qing as

the basis on which to brand the Yunnan party secretary as a
renegade and "executor of the plan of the Yunnan network of
Guomindang agents" and subject him to merciless political
persecution. All supporters of that party secretary were also
subjected to the same treatment.
After the Cultural Revolution, the case was investigated. Ac-
cording to the People's Daily of September 26, 1978, no West

Yunnan Storm Brigade ever existed, and none of the crimes
ascribed to it ever actually took place. The "plan of the Yunnan
network of Guomindang agents" was something fabricated en-
tirely out of thin air, and the persecuted party secretary was
neither a renegade nor an agent. The accusations were launched

solely on the basis of Jiang Qing's statement.
7.11 China and the Pakistani Atomic Bomb
The Chinese press sometimes uses Stratagem No. 7 as an aid

to the interpretation of international events. Renmin Ribao (Peo-
ple's Daily)has pointed out, "The Soviet Union in particular

takes every opportunity to create something out of nothing
io4* The Book of Stratagems
against China." The following examples of Soviet statements

that, according to the Chinese, were pure fabrication are drawn
from issues of the People's Daily between 1978 and 1984:
China and Pakistan are planning a joint intervention in

Afghanistan.
China is working with Pakistan on developing nuclear
weapons.
There are Afghan rebel camps in Xinjiang.
Two Israeli officials visited China, which is about to forge

an alliance with Israel.
Chinese helicopters have penetrated Indian airspace.

Lee Harvey Oswald, who assassinated President John F.
Kennedy, maintained contacts with China.
China maintains contacts with the Italian terrorist group
Red Brigades.
7.12 The Alleged Crime of Yue Fei
Few heroes in Chinese history have enjoyed as much popularity

as the twelfth-century General Yue Fei. His loyalty to his nation
was considered exemplary. Favorite tales about him revolve
around his humble origins, the discipline of his troops, and his
concern for the common folk. Plays, operas, and a novel have
been written about him, and he has even been elevated to the
rank of a Daoist divinity.
Yue Fei's fame rests on his energetic defense of the Southern

Song Dynasty's territory. But he was made immortal by his death
in a.d. 1142, which was caused by the imperial court he had
so bravely defended.
The Jurchen, Tungus tribes from the far north, had overrun
Chinese territory north of the Yangtze River, and the Jin Dy-
nasty which they had founded (a.d. 1115-1234) was pushing
steadily farther south toward where the Chinese emperor had
fled. Yue Fei, who had worked for a landowner and risen to be
105
hisbodyguard, volunteered for military service and quickly de-

veloped into a capable officer. He formed a peasant army which
was renowned for its discipline. His words of instruction to his
troops became famous: "Do not tear houses down because you
need firewood, even if you are freezing; do not steal from the
people, even if you are hungry."
The Chinese army soon reconquered large areas from the
interlopers, and in the fall of the year 1140, Yue Fei's troops
dealt a serious defeat to the Jin forces in Henan Province. The
next task was to drive the Jurchen army back to its base head-
quarters in the northeast. Suddenly, Yue Fei and the other gen-
erals intent on liberating their country received imperial orders
to fall back.
According to the version most commonly accepted in China
today, the events leading up to Yue Fei's death were as follows:
The ruler of the Jin Dynasty, who regarded Yue Fei as an un-
beatable opponent, interpreted the orders commanding the
Chinese forces to pull back as a sign that the party favoring
appeasement of the invaders was gaining influence at China's
imperial court. He immediately had a letter delivered to Chief

Councillor Qin Kui, in which he demanded the elimination of
Yue Fei as a precondition for peace negotiations. Councillor
Qin Kui was among the wealthiest landowners of his time, and
his lands lay in the area of Nanking, which was a major de-
ployment zone, as well as the region from which most of the

soldiers for the battle against the Jin forces had been conscripted.
Having a vested interest in a swift peace settlement, he under-
took to fulfill the enemy's stipulated condition —with the aid of
Stratagem No. 7.
First, Qin Kui fabricated a false accusation against Yue Fei's
subordinate, General Zhang Xian, to the effect that he had

planned a rebellion against the imperial throne. Then he claimed
that Yue Fei and his son Yue Yun had written subversive letters
to Zhang Xian urging him to revolt. Based on this false accu-
sation, Qin Kui had Zhang Xian and Yue Yun imprisoned. Then
he ordered Yue Fei to come to Lin'an, the provisional capital,
on the pretext of wanting to question him. Unsuspecting, Yue
io6- The Book of Stratagems
Fei complied with the order, and immediately on his arrival in

the capital he was arrested and thrown in prison.
Qin Kui insisted on his story that Yue Fei, Yue Yun, and
Zhang Xian had been jointly planning a coup. According to the
official History of the Song Dynasty written in a.d. 1343-45,
he was challenged by General Han Shizhong. In response to the

challenge, Qin Kui gave an answer which has become notorious
in Chinese lore: The letters proving his assertion had been
burned, said the chief councillor, so that it was no longer pos-
sible to examine their contents —
but the criminal act itself had
"presumably occurred" {mo xu you).
(The phrase mo xu you is often used by the press in the
People's Republic as a euphemism for the application of Strat-
agem No. 7 by malicious slanderers, who are trying to brand
an innocent party as a villain through the assertion of an alleged
crime.)
Following atrial based on the false accusation, Yue Fei and
his two codefendants were executed in the Fengbo Pavilion in

Lin'an, on the eve of the Chinese New Year's celebration in the
year a.d. 1142. Yue Fei was only thirty-nine years old.
Because of his enormous popularity, Yue Fei's fate aroused
a wave of indignation throughout the realm. Twenty years later
a new emperor ascended the throne. To gain popular favor he
had the remains of the three executed men exhumed and those
of Yue Fei and his son Yue Yun ceremonially cremated on the
shore of Lin'an's West Lake. In the year 1221 a temple was
built on that spot to honor them. The structure still stands today.
During the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), Yue Fei's tomb
was destroyed, but it has since been reconstructed and decorated
with a new statue of the folk hero. On the tomb, four cast-iron
figures are shown kneeling before Yue Fei, as if to beg his par-
don. One of the figures represents Chief Councillor Qin Kui,
another his wife, and the remaining two are other accomplices
in the plot against Yue Fei. The statues clearly express the pop-
ular disgust at their evil deed.
Create Something from Nothing -107
7.13 Three Men Make a Tiger
During the Warring States period, the states of Wei and Zhao
concluded a treaty of friendship, part of which was an agreement
that the Prince of Wei would be sent to Zhao as a hostage. The
King of Wei entrusted his closest adviser, Minister Pang Cong,
with the task of escorting the Prince. Pang Cong foresaw that
during his absence certain courtiers would slander him to the
monarch. Before his departure he asked his ruler, "Your Maj-
esty, if someone were to report to you that a tiger is roaming
the streets of your capital, would you believe him?"
"No. How could such a thing be possible?"
"But if a second person came with the same report, would
Your Majesty then credit it?"
After a moment's thought the ruler said, "No, even two people
could not convince me."
"But if came and reported that he had seen a
a third person
would Your Majesty believe it?"
tiger in the streets,
"Of course I would believe it," replied the ruler. "If three
people say the same thing, it must be true."
To which Pang Cong responded, "I shall shortly depart for
Zhao to escort our Prince there. During my
the distant state of
absence, surelymore than three people will come and slander
me. I hope that Your Majesty will consider carefully before
coming to any conclusions."
The King nodded and said, "I know what you mean. You
may go."
Many courtiers indeed sought audience with the monarch and
slandered Pang Cong. At first the King paid no attention. But
as a steady stream of voices was raised to condemn Pang Cong,
the ruler grew suspicious, until he became convinced of his
adviser's wicked character. Upon his return Pang Cong quickly
—
saw that he had lost his ruler's favor simply because rumors,
repeated often enough, had come to be regarded as truth.
•
io8 The Book of Stratagems
7.14 Four Stages of Rumor
According to Chen Xiaochuan, there are four stages in the es-

calation of rumor against someone one wishes to harm or elim-
inate. If the individual in question is in fact blameless, the first
step is to try and blacken his name politically. If that does not
work, the second step is to attack him in the financial realm
and accuse him of dishonest dealings. If the person is still re-
garded as honorable, the next target should be his allegedly

immoral way of life. If that shot also misses its mark, his char-
acter should be blackened and he should be accused of such
traits as excessive pride. The damage begins when the person's
superiors start to believe the rumors.
In the Hong Kong publication The 36 Stratagems, with Ex-
amples from Times Past and Present, the following passage
appears:
Rumors are among the most fearsome things. With just a

few words, a hero can be made to lay down his weapons,
a man can even be made to take his own life. It is not
important how long the rumor has been in circulation, for
by the time its accuracy can be properly checked, its effects
have often become irreversible.
7.15 The End of Rumor
When Confucius was asked about the essence of clear vision, the
Master replied, "He who remains unimpressed by a long and
steady barrage of slander may be characterized as clear-sighted."
And in the book ascribed to the philosopher Xunzi it is written:
A rolling ball stops rolling when it falls into a hole. A

circulating rumor stops circulating when it comes up
against a wise man.
STRATAGEM NO. 8
Openly Repair the Walkway

Secretly\March to Chencang
The Chinese
characters
Modern
8fr
tf« da
A ft
Chen
^
Cdng
Mandarin
pronunciation
Meaning of each secretly march Chencang

character
[Eight-character alternate version]
The Chinese
characters tm&m, b£«-&
Modern ming zhdn an Chen
Mandarin xiu dao, dii Cdng
pronunciation
Meaning of each visibly wooden secretly Chencang

character repair path, march
Interpretation Openly (i.e., visibly) set to work repairing the

with reference to burned-out wooden pathway from Hanzhong
earliest known to Guanzhong. But before the repairs are fin-
case ished, secretly march troops to Guanzhong by
way of Chencang.
Applications a. The stratagem of the hidden route march, or
secret detour.
b. Hide your sophisticated intent behind an
apparently innocuous action; the "nor-
malcy"; stratagem — i.e., mask an un-
common (unorthodox, unconventional,
abnormal) intention behind commonplace
(orthodox, conventional, normal) deeds or
words.
8.1 The Burned-Out Wooden Path
In the year 207 B.C., Xiang Yu scored a decisive victory over

the Qin Dynasty in the battle of Yulu. This was followed by a
power struggle between him and other rebel leaders, notably
Liu Bang (also known as Peigong). In 206, Xiang Yu led 400,000
troops into Guanzhong, the fertile and strategically well-secured
Qin heartland, in order to attack its capital at Xianyang. Ar-
riving in the area, he discovered that Liu Bang, at the head of
100,000 men, had already conquered the city and claimed the
title King of Guanzhong. This was in accord with the wishes of
King Huai of Chu (see Section 14.2, "The Shepherd Xin Be-
comes King of Chu"), who in that transitional period was ac-
—
knowledged as the supreme authority though sometimes
only for the sake of appearances —
by the most influential of the
rebel leaders. King Huai had promised that the first rebel leader
to capture the city of Xianyang would be named ruler of
Guanzhong.
Xiang Yu was furious at Liu Bang's success. He marched his
iii
forces into Guanzhong, set up camp near Hongmen, and de-

clared that he would destroy Liu Bang. Far weaker militarily,
Liu could not have stood up to Xiang Yu at that time. So he
hastened to Hongmen to mollify the more powerful rebel leader.
Xiang Yu invited him to a feast, and Fan Zeng, Xiang Yu's
adviser, proposed that Xiang's brother, Xiang Zhuang, perform
a sword dance after the meal and kill Liu Bang during the
performance, since Fan Zeng contended that Liu Bang consti-
tuted a long-term threat to Xiang Yu. But Liu Bang managed
to escape before the meal was over, leaving the table with the
To this day the phrase "the
excuse of having to relieve himself.
Hongmen feast" (Hongmen yan) is known to educated Chinese,
as is the expression Xiang Zhuang wu jian, yi zai Peigong,
meaning "Xiang Zhuang dances with a sword, but his attention
is concentrated on Peigong [the other name for Liu Bang]."
Liu Bang subsequently ceded Xianyang and the territory of

Guanzhong Xiang Yu, who in 206 B.C. assumed the title
to
"Hegemon of Western Chu." As his personal realm he selected
parts of what are today the provinces of Jiangsu, Anhui, Shan-
dong, and Henan, with the capital at Pengcheng. In the rest of
China he established eighteen fiefdoms with a prince at the head
of each. Wishing to keep Liu Bang as far away as possible, he
rewarded him with Hanzhong, consisting of territories in the
easternand western sections of what is now Sichuan Province,
along with southern and western segments of today's Shaanxi
and Hubei provinces. He also appointed Liu Bang ruler of
Han — fromwhich the name and founding date of the Han
Dynasty are derived. To keep Liu Bang in his place, however,
Xiang Yu divided Guanzhong (which borders on Hanzhong)
into three parts, which he awarded as fiefdoms to three generals
from the now-defunct Qin empire who had gone over to his
side. Liu Bang's closest neighbor was the former Qin General
Zhang Dan, who now ruled in Chencang.
Having ceded Guanzhong to his victorious rival Xiang Yu,
Liu Bang was forced to leave the territory and march his troops
to Hanzhong, which had been assigned as his realm. En route,
he ordered that the wooden walkways and bridges through
several hundred miles of mountain gorges be burned. This had
Openly Repair the Walkway, Secretly March to Chencang -113
two purposes: first, to protect himself against surprise attacks

from Guanzhong and especially from his "neighbor" General
Zhang Dan; second, to establish the pretense that he himself
had no intention of ever returning eastward.
A little later, but still in the year 206 B.C., Tian Rong, who
had not been awarded any territory by Xiang Yu, launched a
rebellion against him in what had formerly been the territory
of the state of Qi. At that point Liu Bang ordered his General
Han Xin (d. 196 B.C.) to prepare for an eastern campaign. To
confuse the enemy, Han Xin sent a few troops to begin repair
work on wooden walkways in the gorges. In Chen-
the burned
cang, General Zhang Dan laughed at this, thinking that it would
take such a handful of workers many years to restore the walk-
ways and bridges. But General Han Xin never intended to use
that route. Shortly after the repair work had begun, he led Liu
Bang's main force on a secret march via a different route to
Chencang. General Zhang Dan was taken by surprise and badly
defeated, after which he committed suicide. For Liu Bang the
secret march to Chencang was the start of a victorious campaign
against Xiang Yu, which ended in 202 B.C. with the permanent
establishment of the Han Dynasty.
This popular episode in Chinese history has often been cited.
For example, in the prologue to a play of the Yuan period, 1 Liu

Bang Han Emperor declaims at great length, reviewing
as the
the events we have just examined, explaining how Xiang Yu
was unjustly crowned king of Guanzhong and how he assas-
sinated King Huai, who had crowned him, and finally declaring:
I used Han Xin's stratagem, "Openly Repair the Wooden

Path, Secretly March Chencang." I conquered the ter-
to
ritories of the three rebel Qin generals, and finally took
Pengcheng, Xiang Yu's capital.
this one from the Ming period, bears the

Another play, title
Supreme Commander Han Marches Secretly to Chencang.

ii4* The Book of Stratagems
8.2 Seeing the Obvious
This example is from the Period of the Three Kingdoms (a.d.

220-280). The three mutually contentious realms at that time
were Wei, Wu, and Shu. Wei's General Deng Ai and his troops
had set up their camp on
the northern bank of the White River.
Three days Shu General Jiang Wei commanded his
later, the
subordinate Liao Hua to position his troops on the southern

bank of the river, opposite Deng Ai's camp.
At this point General Deng Ai said to his commander, "Since
our forces are much weaker than his, if Jiang Wei had mounted
a surprise attack he would certainly have beaten us in the normal
course of things. But now there's no movement on his side of
the river. I assume that Jiang is trying to cut off our rear, and
that he had Liao Hua take up a position on the opposite bank
merely to pin us down. I'm sure that Jiang Wei will march
eastward with a large army to take our main base at Taocheng."
That same night Deng Ai ordered part of his forces to march
to Taocheng via a back route. They arrived just as Jiang Wei
was about to cross the river and occupy the city. But Deng Ai
prevented it, and Taocheng remained in his hands.
This is a case of an unsuccessful application of Stratagem No.
8. Deng Ai saw through the tactic, because Jiang Wei's deviation
—
from normal military procedure which in this case dictated an
immediate attack against Deng Ai's much weaker forces across
the river —was too obvious, and aroused Deng's suspicion.
8.3 Normandy Instead of Calais
According to the 1989 edition of the Beijing book The 36 Strat-
agems: A Modern Version, the Allied landing in Normandy in
June 1944 may be regarded march to Chencang"

as a "secret
with the aid of modern military technology. The natural cir-
cumstances, geography, and factors of transport and air support
Openly Repair the Walkway, Secretly March to Chencang •
115
would have made an operation from southeastern England to

the area around Calais more logical than a landing in Normandy
launched from southern England. The Germans were also of
that opinion, believing that the Allies would choose the shorter
route over the longer. They consequently concentrated their
main defenses around Calais. The Allies used a variety of de-
ceptive maneuvers to strengthen the Germans' mistaken belief.
In eastern England, across the Channel from Calais, the pre-
sence of a First U.S. Army Group, ostensibly commanded by
General Patton, was faked; in southern English ports and
along the Thames, fleets of dummy landing craft were set afloat.
At the same time, the Allies intensified their bombing raids over
the Calais area, while Normandy was subjected to only routine
bombardment. All of this reinforced the German belief that the
Allied landing was planned for Calais.

This Chinese view of the Normandy invasion is confirmed by
Western reports. The Great Atlas of World War II, published
in Munich in 1974, states:
The entire operation was coupled with the most perfect

diversionary maneuver of the entire war. The Allies made
every effort to persuade the Germans that the actual landing
would take place along the French coast of the Dover Strait.
For every sortie flown over the area west of Le Havre, two
were flown further to the north; for every ton of bombs
dropped over Normandy, two tons were dropped north of
Le Havre. In Britain's County Kent, the possible launching
area for an attack across the Strait of Dover, mock-ups of
headquarters buildings and railway installations were built.
8.4 China's Vietnam Campaign, 1979
In his classic treatise The Art of War, Sun Tzu writes:
Making the armies able to take on opponents without being

defeated is a matter of orthodox and unorthodox methods.
ii6- The Book of Stratagems
. . . Generally in military operations there is always the

orthodox and the unorthodox, or the straightforward and
the surprise. ... In battle, confrontation is done directly,
victory is gained by surprise. Therefore those skilled
. . .
at the unorthodox are infinite as heaven and earth, inex-

haustible as the great rivers. 2
Stratagem No. 8 involves outwardly executing a perfectly nor-

mal military operation while secretly carrying out an unusual
one. If Han Xin had not set some troops to visibly repairing the
wooden walkways through the ravines, the secret march of his
main force to Chencang would not have succeeded. According
to some Chinese authorities, militarily unusual moves should
always be coupled with apparently normal operations. The 1989
Beijing stratagem book cited earlier suggests that the terms "vis-
ibly" and "secretly" in the formula for No. 8 really stand for
"orthodox" and "unorthodox" or "normal" and "abnormal"
military means. In the ancient Chinese view, an absolutely nor-
mal military move should serve as the starting point for every
surprise tactic. Only when the enemy is misled to judge the
actions and intentions of his opponent in terms of normal or
orthodox warfare can the opponent's uncommon action lead to
success. In other words, in order to "march secretly to Chen-
cang" one must first direct the enemy's judgment into the
channels of normalcy by publicly "repairing the walkways."
The Beijing stratagem book notes that "normal" and "ab-
normal" can mean many things. For example, if a preventive
strike would be the normal thing, the abnormal (or unorthodox)
tactic would be to let the enemy make the first move, and only
then grab the initiative; if standard methods of warfare would

constitute the normal, then special methods such as guerrilla
tactics would be the unusual; if open confrontation would be
the orthodox thing, a surprise attack is the unorthodox; if a

direct frontal attackwould be the norm, a flanking maneuver
would be the unexpected. "Normal" and "abnormal" are, then,
linked opposites, and can under certain circumstances flow one
into the other.
—
The Beijing book cites an example drawn from the 1979

Chinese campaign against Vietnam. Because of the Chinese habit
of circumventing an enemy's flanks and attacking from behind
enemy lines, the Vietnamese had secretly reinforced their de-
fensive flanks with extra firepower and laid down protective

minefields. But their front lines directly facing the Chinese po-
sitions were relatively weak. Discovering this, the Chinese sud-
denly converted their flanking maneuver into a frontal attack,
taking the Vietnamese completely by surprise. In this context,
the Chinese flanking maneuver was "openly repairing the
wooden walkways" — i.e., the conventional Chinese tactic
while the sudden frontal onslaught was the "secret march to
Chencang," the unconventional military move.
8.5 Buddha's Tooth
In their chapters on "Secretly March to Chencang," stratagem

books published in Hong Kong and Taipei point to amorous
applications of this tactic as exemplified in two novels dating
from the Ming period: the famous erotic work The Plum in the
Golden Vase and the previously cited Water Margin.
In chapter 4 of The Plum in the Golden Vase, a woman named
Golden Lotus, wife of Wu Da, meets her lover in the house of
old Mother Wang, pretending to her husband that she is making
a robe and shoes for the old woman. Here the outwardly normal,
credible act is helping an old woman, while hidden behind it is
the abnormal thing (in the ancient Chinese view), a wife's ren-
dezvous with her lover.
The help for Mother Wang in Plum is analogous to the display
of a holy relic in Water Margin. But before recounting that
episode, a few background remarks are needed.
It is said that, after the death of the Buddha (variously given
between 487 and 477 B.C.), his bones were distributed to temples
all over the world. During the Tang period, a bone reputed to
be from Buddha's body found its way to China. And in June
•
n8 The Book of Stratagems
1987 the Chinese press reported that four bone fragments from
his fingers had been discovered in an underground room of the
seventeen-hundred-year-old Famen Temple, a hundred kilo-
meters (sixty-two miles) west of Xi'an in Shaanxi Province; the
fragments had been preserved in four reliquaries made of iron,
gold, silver, crystal, jade, and sandalwood.
Water Margin, the priest Haigong of the Temple of Grat-
In
itude becomes aware that Pan Qiaoyun, wife of the governor
of Jizhou, is rather interested in him. At one point Pan Qiaoyun
and her father come to the temple to say memorial prayers for
her late mother. Having completed the ceremony, father and
daughter are invited by Haigong into his private chambers,
where tea is served. Then the priest ushers his guests into a side
room for a delicious meal. Haigong has prepared an especially
strong wine for the father, and it is not long before the old man
is completely drunk. The priest has him brought to another room
and bedded down to sleep it off.

Pan Qiaoyun, the daughter, has also had some wine and is
in a playful mood. "Why is it so important to you that I keep
drinking?" she asks.
"Because I adore you," the priest whispers, smiling.
"I can't take any more," she replies.
"Please, come look at the tooth of the Buddha which I keep

hidden in another room," urges the priest.
"I'd love to see it," says Pan Qiaoyun.

Haigong shows her up to his bedroom, with its invitingly
arranged bed.
"What a pretty room," says the woman, "and how clean
it is."
"All it lacks is a young woman," replies the monk with a

smile.
"Why don't you find yourself one?"
"Where is the generous soul who will provide one for me?"
Says Pan Qiaoyun, "You were going to show me Buddha's
tooth?"
"Send your handmaiden away, and I'll bring it out."
"Ying'er," commands the woman, i4
go down and see if my
old father is awake yet."
The maid leaves the chamber, and the priest locks the bed-
room door.
8.6 The Match
In Ernii yingxiong zhuan (The Tale of the Gallant Maid), written

during the early nineteenth century by Manchurian author Wen-
kang, a young scholar named An Ji undertakes a long journey
in order to be at his father's side in time of trouble. Along the
way he takes shelter in a monastery where the monks are really

bandits in disguise. The novel's heroine, known as Thirteenth
Sister, rescues him at the last minute, at the same time freeing
the Zhang family from captivity. This family consists of Mr.
and Mrs. Zhang and their seventeen-year-old daughter Golden
Phoenix {Jinfeng). After all the excitement, when the elder
Zhangs and the young An Ji are in the monastery kitchen pre-
paring a meal, Thirteenth Sister draws Golden Phoenix aside
and asks about her marital status. Learning that the girl is not
engaged, Thirteenth Sister offers to serve as matchmaker for her,
with a particular view to An Ji. Inwardly, Golden Phoenix is
not at all averse to such a match, but she is plagued by certain

doubts and reservations.
Golden Phoenix remarks to herself that Thirteenth Sister is
previously unknown to her and her parents, a chance travel

acquaintance. And yet not only has she rescued them from dire
distress, perhaps from death, she is also offering to help her,
Golden Phoenix, to a lifetime with a handsome young man.
And, in her impulsive and energetic fashion, Thirteenth Sister
has insisted that Golden Phoenix commit herself and state that
she is willing to make such a match.
All of this, the young girl thinks, is quite extraordinary. What
was Thirteenth Sister's purposemaking such a generous but
in
totally unsolicited proposal? Golden Phoenix is a straightfor-

ward country girl, but to her mind it seems that there must be
some ulterior motive behind the proposition. She thinks, "Thir-
teenth Sister is a young girl like myself; in fact, she is very like
me in both age and looks. So she would have the same drives
and urges as I do. If that is the case, why does she put her own
interests aside and try to arrange such a fine match for me? Why
does she bring such a fine gift to me, a total stranger? Is that
not something to wonder at and think about? Has she some
ulterior motive for her generous offer? ... Of course! She wants
the same thing for herself. And since she dare not say so openly,
she is using me to go the long way around. Outwardly, she is
'repairing the wooden walkways,' but secretly she is 'marching

"
to Chencang.'
So Golden Phoenix concludes that the matchmaking proposed
by Thirteenth Sister — actually nothing unusual in itself — is
probably a ploy ("openly repairing the walkways") by means

of which Thirteenth Sister hopes to effect her own marriage to
An Ji as his second wife (the "march to Chencang"). Polygamy
was an accepted practice in ancient China. Anyone who receives
unexpected and unsolicited help is likely to wonder why. The
remarkable thing about this case is that Golden Phoenix im-
mediately goes one step farther and finds the answer in a strat-
agem which she ascribes to Thirteenth Sister: That young

woman, she assumes, is helping her to make a match so that,
at a later point, she and her parents will help Thirteenth Sister
to likewise make a match with the same man. Golden Phoenix
suspects — and it is a suspicion often shared by many others,
even in ordinary, everyday circumstances — that a basically nor-
mal and apparently harmless action really masks some stratagem
or ulterior motive.
8.7 Critique of Eclecticism
During the Cultural Revolution's "campaign to Con-

criticize
fucius," the writers' collective known as Luo Siding aimed es-

pecially sharp barbs at "eclecticism," a conciliatory philosophy
of "both this and that." Eclecticism has always been a thorn in
the side of orthodox Communist ideology, which accuses it of
Openly Repair the Walkway, Secretly March to Chencang • i z i
seeking peaceful solutions — i.e., seeing the positive aspects on

both sides of an issue — when confrontation and struggle should
be the order of the day.
When Luo Siding's writings were carefully analyzed, however,
it turned out that the accusations of "eclecticism" were invar-
iably aimed against imperial chancellors (or prime ministers) of
ancient China. A typical case cited was that of Tian Qianqiu,
a chancellor under the Han Dynasty. He was branded as guilty
of eclecticism because he had been skillful in smoothing re-

lations among diverse cliques and had avoided taking a clear
position on any issue. On closer examination, all the accusations
by the Luo Siding collective pointed to only one "imperial
chancellor" —
namely, to Premier Chou En-lai. As the People's
Daily later pointed out, explicitly referring to Stratagem No. 8,
the essentially unobjectionable criticism of eclecticism turned
out to be "visibly repairing the walkways," and the veiled at-
tacks against Chou En-lai constituted the "secret march to

Chencang."
From a loftier vantage point, as it were, the Beijing stratagem
book in its chapter on No. 8 alludes to the commentary on the
hexagram Yi (Increase) in the classic Chinese book of oracles,
the J Ching. The commentary speaks of the "flexibility of the
wind," which unexpectedly rushes in to fill a newly created void.
And according to a handbook of common Chinese idioms, 3
Stratagem No. 8 creates that void by performing an outward
action to divert people's attention, thus gaining for the perpe-
trator of the stratagem the latitude to pursue a totally different
intention.
STRATAGEM N O
Observe the 7ire

on the Opposite Shore
The Chinese
characters
Modern
% %
ge an
*&
guan
*
hud
Mandarin
pronunciation
Meaning of each opposite shore observe [re
character (watch)
Applications With seeming indifference, observe your op-

ponent as he finds himself in a crisis or a difficult
situation; refrain from any action —
either a
rescue operation or a premature attack —
until
the tide has turned in your favor, and then act
to reap the benefits. The stratagem of
nonintervention, delay, patient waiting.
The wording of this short formula is derived from a scene in
the famous Chinese novel The Romance of the Three King-
doms. The episode depicts Liu Bei, the future founder of one
of the three kingdoms, and his adviser Zhuge Liang as they
watch the smoldering fires of the Battle of Red Cliff from high
up on Fankou Mountain.
In fact, however, no book on the stratagems published in the
People's Republic, Hong Kong, or Taiwan provides an example
of No. 9 that literally involves a fire on an opposite shore. Oddly
enough, the source incident from The Three Kingdoms is never
cited. The terms of the formula are understood metaphorically.
The "fire" represents a crisis situation; the "opposite shore"
stands for the opponent affected by the crisis, and the act of
"observing" is understood to be done by a seemingly uninvolved
third party who hopes to benefit from the crisis.
12-5
•
n6 The Book of Stratagems
9.1 The Victorious Observer
The source incident drawn from The Romance of the Three

Kingdoms dates back to the year a.d. 208, when Zhuge Liang
succeeded in persuading Sun Quan, ruler of the state of Wu, to
join in a coalition against Cao Cao, ruler of northern China,
who was approaching with an army of more than 200,000
troops. Cao Cao and his army camped on the northern bank
of the Yangtze River, while General Zhou Yu and the Wu forces
camped on the southern bank. There, a mountain rises up
steeply, and at the spot where it begins sloping up from the
riverbank the two Chinese characters signifying "red cliff" were
carved into the rock. Thus the clash between the forces of Zhou
Yu and Cao Cao became known Red Cliff.
as the Battle of
Cao Cao was unacquainted with marine warfare. Through a
complex ruse, Zhou Yu had persuaded Cao Cao to tie his boats
together side by side so that his troops could walk across the
river as if on dry land. It was Zhou Yu's plan to set Cao Cao's
fleet afire, with the help of the southeast wind.
Up Zhuge Liang had accompanied Zhou Yu,
to this point
serving as his adviser. But just before the battle was joined, he
returned to his real master, Liu Bei, and the two men climbed
up Fankou Mountain to watch the fiery fight on the opposite
bank of the Yangtze. Liu Bei thus found himself in the enviable
position of being able to observe from a distance the battle
between the army of his ally Sun Quan and that of his archenemy
Cao Cao. Ultimately, through skillful tactics, Liu Bei was able
to exploit Sun Quan's victory in the Battle of Red Cliff to his
own advantage.
9.2 Flight into Death
The following historically based incident is also drawn from

The Romance of the Three Kingdoms.
Observe the Fire on the Opposite Shore '127
Yuan Shang and Yuan Xi were the sole surviving sons of the
family of Yuan Shao, who during his lifetime had been a rival
of Cao Cao. Pursued by the latter, the two brothers decided to
flee toLiaodong with a force of several thousand men, despite
the fact that Gongsun Kang, the governor of Liaodong, had
been one of their father's enemies. Yuan Shao, their father, had
tried repeatedly to conquer Liaodong. But because Liaodong
was remote from the scene of the power struggle between Cao
Cao and Yuan Shao, Gongsun Kang had not allied himself with
either ruler. And so the brothers hoped to find temporary asylum
with Gongsun Kang. Their long-term plan was to murder Gong-
sun Kang when an opportunity presented itself, so that Liaodong
could become the base from which they would finally eliminate
Cao Cao, who was then in the process of expanding his rule
over northern China.
The obvious move at this point was for Cao Cao to pursue
the treacherous Yuan brothers to Liaodong. But Cao Cao
heeded the advice of his confidant Guo Jia, who proposed that
for the time being he should leave Gongsun Kang and the Yuan
brothers to their own devices. It would not be long, he predicted,
before Gongsun Kang would eliminate them.

Not long Gongsun Kang had the
afterward, as predicted,
brothers beheaded and their heads brought to Cao Cao. When
his generals asked him how the Yuan brothers had been elim-
inated, Cao Cao offered the following explanation, according

to the oldest document on the 36 Stratagems as reproduced in
the 1979 Jilin edition:
On the one hand, Gongsun Kang feared the brothers' ob-

vious desire to annex Liaodong. Their appearance inevit-
ably aroused his suspicions. On the other hand, Gongsun
Kang also feared that [Cao Cao] would attack Liaodong.
I
If I had pursued the brothers, Gongsun Kang would have
joined forces with them against me. But I simply let things
run their course and refrained from marching on Liaodong.
It was my restraint that created the conditions under which
Gongsun Kang and the Yuan brothers turned against one

another.
Well aware of the deadly antagonism between the brothers and

the governor of Liaodong, Cao Cao achieved his ends simply
by playing the uninvolved observer.
9.3 The Conquest of Changchun, 1948
In June of 1948, during China's civilwar (1945-49), the Red

Army laid siege to Changchun. The
was defended by about
city
100,000 troops of Chiang Kai-shek's Guomindang regime, dug

in behind strong fortifications. But gradually the food supplies
in Changchun began to dwindle, and the Guomindang troops
began to fight among themselves for the limited food that could
be flown in.
The Red Army kept Changchun surrounded but did not attack
the city. Instead it permitted the enemy's "internal contradic-
tions" to ripen and divide the defenders. ("Contradiction" is
the term commonly used in the People's Republic for conflicts,
differences of opinion, and difficulties of every kind.) A pre-

mature attack on Changchun would have caused the Guom-
indang forces to close ranks once again and overlook their own
internal strife.
Just at that time, news arrived of a great Communist victory
in Jinzhou. Under the combined political and military pressures
exerted by theRed Army, Zeng Zesheng, commander of the
Yunnan elements of the Guomindang forces in Changchun, re-
fused to carry out Chiang Kai-shek's order to break through
the enemy's siege lines. On October 17, 1948, Zeng Zesheng's
troops rebelled, and other units of the Guomindang army in
Changchun followed their example.

way, remarks the Beijing stratagem book, the Red
In this
Army conquered Changchun without spilling a drop of blood

or even engaging in combat.
Observe the Fire on the Opposite Shore -129
9.4 Looking On with Folded Arms
In the April 18, 1981, issue of the Zhongguo qingnian bao

(Chinese Youth Journal), an article appeared analyzing the So-
viet Union's reaction to the Iran-Iraq war. The analysis con-
cluded that the Kremlin would have to content itself with
"observing the fire on the opposite shore." Here the phrase was
used not to depict a stratagem but to describe the allegedly
ticklish Soviet position regarding the Iran-Iraq conflict. If Mos-
cow were to openly support Iraq, the Chinese commentator
pointed out, it might drive Iran into the arms of the U.S.A. On
the other hand, if the Kremlin were to openly support Iran, it
would risk drawing the enmity of most Arab states. So all the
Soviets could do, the article concluded, was to "observe the fire
on the opposite shore" but "without pulling [anyone's] chest-
nuts out of the fire."
Another nonstratagem use of the formula for No. 9 was made
in 1927 by Lu Xun, perhaps the most revered twentieth-century
author in the People's Republic. He remarked in a lecture that
Chinese literature and art had formerly "observed the fire on
the opposite shore" —
that is, the arts had served as mere pas-
times, aimed at pleasure only, but not daring to confront vital
personal and social issues.
These days in the People's Republic 1 the phrase "observing
the fire" is often used negatively to criticize a superficial or overly
abstract analysis of difficulties or problems. In other contexts it
refers to a purely egotistical effort to remain uninvolved in any-
thing that does not concern oneself directly and to avoid ex-
posing oneself to danger or commitment for the common good.
This self-serving attitude is also frequently described with an
aphorism formulated by Feng Menglong (a.d. 1574-1646):
"Each person only sweeps the snow from his own doorstep,
taking no notice of the ice on his neighbor's roof."
i3o- The Book of Stratagems
9.5 Sit on the Mountain

and Watch the Tigers Fight
This is another formula for Stratagem No. 9:
The Chinese
characters £ Hi m * 4
Modern zub shan guan hu dbu
Mandarin
pronunciation
Meaning of each sit mountain watch tiger fight
character
The phrase goes back to an incident in the days of King Hui

of Qin (337-311 B.C.) as described in Sima Qian's Records of
the Historian.
The states of Han and Wei were at war. King Hui of Qin
wanted to intervene in the struggle, and took counsel with his
ministers. Some were in favor of intervention, others opposed.
The ruler couldn't make up his mind, so he asked Chen Zhen.
After lengthy thought, that worthy said:
"Does Your Majesty know the story of Bian Zhuangzi's tiger
hunt? One time Bian Zhuangzi saw two tigers feeding on the
body of a freshly killed steer. He drew his sword and was about
to launch himself at the tigers when his companion Guan Zhuzi
held his arm and said, 'The tigers have just begun feeding. Wait
until they become really maddened with gluttony; then they will
start to fight one another. The smaller tiger will be killed and
the larger tiger probably wounded in the battle. If you wait until
then, without much effort you'll be able to get two tigers with
a single blow.'
"Bian Zhuangzi was struck by this advice. So he hid behind
a rock and watched the tigers. After a while the beasts began
—
Observe the Fire on the Opposite Shore -131
to fight. The smaller one was wounded. Bian

killed, the larger
Zhuangzi then sprang out from behind the rock, drew his sword,
and stabbed the wounded animal. In that way he easily obtained
two tigers with minimum effort.
"Now," continued Chen Zhen, "Han and Wei are at war.
The battle has already lasted a year. There seems no chance of
mediation. Ultimately the more powerful Wei will annex the
smaller state of Han. But it will have been severely weakened
by the war. That will give Your Majesty the opportunity to
easily overpower Wei and thus absorb both states into your
kingdom."
And that is precisely what happened.
Mao Zedong often used to evaluate foreign and domestic de-

velopments in terms of Stratagem No. 9. On June 30, 1939,
Mao accused foreign powers of tolerating Japan's aggression
against China,
while themselves sitting on the mountain and watching the

tigers fight, waiting for a favorable moment in which to
engineer a so-called Pacific Mediation Conference in order
to secure for themselves the benefits of the laughing third
2
party.
With reference to the European theater, Mao remarked on Sep-

tember 1, 1939:
In recent years the international reactionary bourgeoisie

especially in England and France — has consistently pur-
sued a reactionary policy of "nonintervention" toward the
aggression of the German, Italian, and Japanese Fascists.
Their objective has been to tolerate wars of aggression in
order to secure advantages for themselves. . . . The policy
of "nonintervention" ... [is the equivalent] of "sitting on
the mountain and watching the tigers fight" — the purest
form of imperialist policy designed to secure benefits for
themselves at the cost of others. 3
On September 28, 1939, Mao wrote:
The governments of England, the U.S., and France had

absolutely no intention of preventing the outbreak of the
—
World War on the contrary, they accelerated it [Their
plan was] to drive Germany into a war against the Soviet
Union, while they themselves [i.e., England, the U.S., and
France] would on the mountain and watch the tigers

sit
fight, let the Soviet Union and Germany exhaust themselves
in mutual combat, and then step into the battleground and

settle things their own way. This conspiracy was foiled by
the Soviet-German nonaggression pact. When it came . . .
to Spain, China, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, these con-

spirators had not the slightest intention of halting the
aggression; on the contrary, they gave it free rein, fanned
the flames of war. . . . This they euphemistically termed
"nonintervention." In reality it amounted to "sitting on the
4
mountain and watching the tigers fight."
On April 24, 1945, Mao accused Chiang Kai-shek's Guomin-

dang regime of being passive in its conduct of the war against
Japan. It had, he said,
thrown the burden of combat on the liberated territories

[i.e., those regions ruled by the Communist Party of China]
. . making it possible for the Japanese invaders to mount

.
large-scale offensives against the liberated areas, while they

themselves [i.e., the Guomindang] sat on the mountain and
5
watched the tigers fight.
In early 1981, Zhang Jian of the Economics Department of

Wuhan University followed in Mao's footsteps in his analysis
6
of the broad objectives of Soviet foreign policy. According to
Zhang, some Western circles had mistakenly assumed that the
Soviet incursion into Afghanistan was aimed primarily at China.
On the basis of that assumption, these Western parties held the
illusion that the conflict between China and the USSR could
worsen to such an extent that China would ultimately carry
most of the burden of containing Soviet expansion, so that the
West could continue to "sit on the mountain and watch the
tigers fight."
Observe the Fire on the Opposite Shore • i 3 3
In Zhang Jian's view, however, the Soviet invasion of Af-

ghanistan could be accurately viewed only within the context
of the Kremlin's overall strategy, which aimed at achieving
worldwide hegemony. The central problem of achieving that
dominance, stated Zhang, was control over Western Europe,
which required its strategic encirclement. There were, in this
view, two Soviet rings of encirclement aimed against Western
Europe, one extending from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea,
the other from the Black Sea to the Pacific. Afghanistan was the
point at which these two rings intersected, providing a spring-
board for actions not only against Western China but also in
the direction of the Arabian oilfields and the ports of the Indian
Ocean.
Says the 1989 edition of the Beijing stratagem book:
When dissension appears in enemy ranks, and internal con-

flicts erupt with increasing openness, then is the time to
"sit on the mountain and watch the tigers fight." It would
be a mistake to try and benefit immediately from the other
side's distress, to "loot a burning house." For hasty inter-
vention often serves only to temporarily unite the frag-
mented forces of the opposition and increases the danger
of a counterattack. It is better to thoughtfully stepback
and wait until the dissension in the enemy camp has ripened
to the pointwhere the enemy forces turn against one an-
other and do themselves in. 7
But Stratagem No. 9 does not involve only waiting. When the
time is ripe, the waiting must be transformed into well-prepared
action. To paraphrase a thought ascribed to Laozi, it might be
said: "Apparent inaction is the highest form of action."
9.6 Far from the Red Dust
Beijing linguistics expert Liu Jiexiu has drawn a connection

between the words of Stratagem No. 9 and a poem by the Tang
Dynasty monk Qiankang. The poem, however, deals not with
tactical behavior, or stratagems, but with the seclusion, the re-
moteness from the world, of Buddhist sages. "Red dust" is a

Buddhist expression denoting transitory earthly existence, and
"green mountaintops, cool as mute ice" reflects the peace and
ascetic seclusion of the hermit.
There, on the other riverbank,

in the red dust,
hordes of people, impetuous and irascible
as tongues of flame.
Here, before the gates of the hermitage,
only green mountaintops everywhere,
cool as mute ice.
STRATAGEM N O 1
A. Hide your T)agger

behind a Smile
The Chinese
characters x & 77
Modern xiao cdng dao
Mandarin
pronunciation
Meaning of each smile in hide dagger

character
B. Honey in the ^Mouth,
a Sword in the Belt
The Chinese
characters
Modern
p
kou
* K M
mi jian
fu
Mandarin
pronunciation
Meaning of each mouth honey belly sword

character
Applications Speak but plan evil in your heart; mask

flattery,
evil intentwith outward friendliness and fine-

sounding words. The stratagem of the forked
tongue, or the "Judas kiss"; the "two-faced" or
"Janus-headed" stratagem.
10.1 Li Yifu and Li Linfu
Formula A was coined in the ninth century a.d. by Bai Juyi,

one of the most famous poets of the Tang period, to characterize
agovernment official known as Li Yifu. In his poem "Tian Ke
Duo" (Heaven Can Be Measured), he writes that individuals
like Li Yifu "hide a dagger behind their smile and murder
people." In a poem cycle about the virtues of drinking wine,
the same author ends a poem with another sideswipe at types
like Li Yifu:
Stop sharpening a dagger behind your smile.

It is better to drink wine and,
deep in your cups,
lie there peacefully.
Who was this Li Yifu? Historical tradition has it that, in the

seventh century a.d., he flattered his way into the favor of Tang
Emperor Gaozong and, by toadying and bootlicking, became a
i37
—
high-ranking dignitary at court. According to the Jiu Tang sbu

(Old History of the Tang), written around a.d. 940:
[Li] Yifu pretended to be soft-spoken and modest; when

he spoke with others he always presented a sparkling smile.
Inwardly, however, he was deceptive and sly. Anyone who
offered him the slightest resistance was earmarked by him
for destruction. Consequently his contemporaries said of
him that "Li Yifu hides a dagger behind his smile."
The Xin Tang shu (New History of the Tang), composed the
following century, speaks of Li Yifu in similar terms. And the
phrase coined by Bai Juyi also found its way into various novels
and plays.
Formula B was handed down by historian Sima Guang. In
his Zizhi tong jian (Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Govern-
ment), he reports as follows about Li Linfu, an eighth-century

imperial minister:
He had a special hatred of the literati. . . . Outwardly he

encouraged them, and lured them with sweet words, but
secretly he harmed them [whenever possible]. His contem-
poraries said of him, "He has honey in his mouth, but
[carries] a sword in his belly [i.e., in his belt]."
Following the death of Mao Zedong on September 12, 1976,

the members of the Gang of Four were repeatedly referred to
in the Chinese press as "disciples of Li Linfu." Mao himself,
back in 1939, had compared the "imperialists" to Li Linfu and
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to Li Yifu. At an-
other point Mao, speaking of China's domestic politics, called
for opposition to the attitude embodied by the figures of Li Yifu
and Li Linfu, which he described as follows:
Outwardly yielding, but inwardly resistant, affirming with

the lips but denying with the heart, speaking fine-sounding
words to people's faces but making mischief behind their
backs this is how hypocrisy expresses itself.
Hide Your Dagger Behind a Smile •
i 3 9
Also worth mentioning in this context are the "sugarcoated

bullets" of the bourgeoisie, which Mao regarded as the chief
danger to the proletariat after the victory of the Chinese Com-
munists.
The formula "Honey in the mouth, a sword in the belt" also
appears in the Chinese edition of Lenin's Collected Works,

where it is used as the title of a 1907 essay. The commonly used
German-language edition of Lenin's writings renders the title as
"Honey in the mouth, gall in the heart."
Apropos the Soviet Union: In the 1969 Hong Kong stratagem
book, 1 Khrushchev is described as a Li Yifu or Li Linfu type,
who appeared to be a most loyal follower of Stalin during that
dictator's lifetime but then condemned him at the famous Twen-
tieth Party Congress of 1956.
Stratagem No. 10 seems to be quite popular in China, as
indicated by some variations on the two formulas cited so far,
such as:
mian dai zhonghou, nei cdng jidnzhd "The face displays —

loyalty and goodness, but the interior harbors cunning and
falsehood,"
or
zuishdng fang mltdng, xinli cdng pisbudng — "There is honey
on the lips, but arsenic hidden in the heart."
Needless to say, such hypocrisy is not unknown outside of
China. And formulas such as "Hide your dagger behind a smile"
need little or no elaboration. But the following cases, taken from
various Chinese stratagem books, may cast light on some sur-
prising dimensions of No. 10.
10.2 The Dangerous Liaison
The first example is drawn from a work ascribed to Han Fei,
the most important representative of the so-called School of

Legalism.
During the Spring and Autumn period, Duke Wu of Zheng
•
schemed to annex the state of Hu. But because he had only

limited military means, he did not dare a direct attack against
Hu. Instead he resorted to Stratagem No. 10. First, he offered
his beautiful daughter to the Prince of Hu as a prospective wife.
The Prince accepted the offer and thus became Duke Wu's son-
in-law. Then, in order to lull Hu's suspicions even more, the
ruler of Zheng gathered his ministers around him and said, "I
am thinking of attacking another state. I ask you: Which state
would be a most suitable target of attack?"

One minister suggested that a strike against Hu would be
most rewarding.
In simulated fury, the Duke shouted, "What? You propose
war against Hu, which is allied to us by marriage?" And he had
the offending minister beheaded.
When the Prince of Hu learned of this incident, his last doubts
about Duke Wu's genuine friendship evaporated, and from then
on he felt that vigilance against Zheng was unnecessary. Sud-
denly, however, Duke Wu mounted a surprise attack against
Hu and conquered it. For a long time afterward, Zheng re-
mained a powerful state; it was destroyed only in 375 B.C. by
Han.
A book on Chinese military phraseology offers the following
commentary on the foregoing incident:
This is a typical example of the military application of

Stratagem No. 10. The Duke of Zheng did not hesitate to
sacrifice his own flesh and blood and to unjustly execute
his own minister, in order to create the illusion of friend-
liness and thus lull his enemy into a false sense of security.
The point, then, is to convince your opponent that you
have only the most friendly or peaceable intentions. Your
opponent is thus persuaded to relax his vigilance. In secret,
however, you plan to strike against him at the first favor-
able opportunity, and you make the necessary preparations
for the strike in such a way that your opponent notices
nothing. 2
141
10.3 The King as Stable Boy
In the Spring and Autumn period, China was fragmented into

dozens of states, with wars repeatedly breaking out among them
and alliances constantly shifting. At one point, Goujian (d. 465
B.C.), King of Yue, was defeated by Fuchai (d. 473 B.C.), ruler
of Wu, 3 at the Battle of Fujiao. Goujian's first inclination was

to flee abroad with some five thousand soldiers. But his adviser
Fan Li counseled him to surrender to Fuchai and, by pursuing

a consistent policy of self-abasement, to prepare the ground for
future vengeance.
Goujian sent Wen Zhong as an emissary to Fuchai and offered
him all the riches of Yue. Goujian also declared himself willing
to serve Fuchai forever as a humble servant. Against the advice
of one of his own generals, Fuchai accepted the offer. Goujian
donned an undyed robe and, with his adviser, his wife, and three
hundred men, migrated to Wu. Appearing before his conqueror,
he knelt down and, in the humblest terms, expressed his thanks
to Fuchai for sparing his life.
Fuchai permitted Goujian to work as a groom in his stables.

Whenever Fuchai went riding, Goujian prepared the horses and
time after time he expressed his gratitude to the ruler of Wu for
not having had him executed. When Fuchai fell ill, Goujian
tended him attentively, even examining his feces to determine
the cause of the malady.
Since Goujian was so assumed that he had
respectful, Fuchai
become a loyal subject. After three years he permitted Goujian
to return home. There, in order not to forget his dream of
vengeance, Goujian slept on a bed of straw and brushwood,
and each day, before each meal, he ate a piece of gall. At the
same time he quietly set about preparing his hour of revenge.
Finally, the time came. Wu's leading army commander was
murdered. The country just then was suffering a terrible
drought, so severe that crabs dried up in the streambeds and
rice wilted on the stalk. At that inauspicious time, the ruler of
Wu went abroad to attend a conference of heads of state. With

all these circumstances favoring his enterprise, Goujian launched

a major attack against Wu, and in no time his forces had oc-
cupied and destroyed it.
10.4 Masquerade as a Swine to Defeat the Tiger
Shu Han, author of a stratagem book published in Taipei in

1986, 4 links the story of Goujian with that of Lucius Junius
Brutus in Rome of the sixth century B.C.
Legend has it that when Tarquinius Superbus, last king of
Rome, defeated Brutus's father and elder brother, Brutus himself
was spared because he played the fool. He played the part so
well, in fact, that Tarquinius brought him to court as a jester
for his own sons' amusement. But after the rape of Lucretia and
her suicide, Brutus threw off his disguise. He persuaded Lucre-
tia's husband and father to swear that they would not rest until
the tyrant and his shameless sons would be driven from the
land. Then he hastened to Rome, bearing Lucretia's body, and
with a passionate speech he persuaded the people to topple their
king and banish him, also gaining the support of the army. All
of this eventually led to the founding of the Roman Republic
and the election of Brutus and his loyal comrade Collatinus
among its first consuls.
In recounting this tale, author Shu Han gives it the subtitle
"Masquerading as a swine to defeat the tiger." This is a well-
known Chinese expression. According to the 1969 Hong Kong
stratagem book, it is based on the idea that a hunter, by dressing
up as a pig and imitating its grunts, can attract the attention of
a tiger and kill the surprised beast at close range. In this context
the same book cites an aphorism ascribed to Laozi, the legendary
founder of Daoism: "[Let] wisdom [seem] like stupidity" and —
the eleventh-century poet Su Shi's saying: "The man of great
wisdom appears to be a fool." The book then continues:
"Mas querading as a swine to kill the tiger" is [a tactic]
used against a stronger opponent. You hide your sword

i 4 3
from him, pretend to be as stupid as a pig and compliant

in all things,keep a friendly smile on your face, and work
like a slave. Ultimately, your enemy will be completely
deceived. Then, when a favorable opportunity presents it-
self, quick as lightning the slave turns into an executioner. 5
10.5 An Offer of Capitulation
In the third century B.C., the state of Yan attacked the state of
Qi and captured seventeen cities. Only two cities continued to
resist, one of them called Jimo. When Jimo's commanding gen-
eral died in battle, Tian Dan took his place. After trying various
devices, Tian Dan ordered elderly and weak men and women
to mount the city walls and sent emissaries to the Yan army to
negotiate the city's capitulation. The Yan soldiers cheered. Tian
Dan took up a collection among the people of his city and raised
more than a thousand gold pieces, which he had delivered to
thecommanding general of the Yan army along with a letter
from Jimo's wealthier citizens. The letter said, "Jimo will soon
surrender. All we ask is that our relatives, wives, and concubines
not be taken prisoner." The Yan Yan
general agreed, and the
army's vigilance dwindled steadily. This was the moment for
Tian Dan to lead a sortie out of Jimo and into the enemy camp,
which ended with a devastating defeat for the Yan army.
No wonder that Confucius warned, "Smooth words and an
ingratiating expression are seldom paired with humaneness."
In his treatise The Art of War, Confucius's contemporary Sun
Tzu terms the humble words of the enemy an alarm signal, and
warns, 'Those who come seeking peace without a treaty are
plotting." 6
In a 1977 edition of Sun Tzu's classic work published in
Taipei, this idea is updated with the following formula, de-
scribed by the Taiwanese regime as having been the guiding
principle of the Chinese Communists (in the years 1945-49):
"When the enemy attacks, we begin to negotiate. When the
enemy negotiates, we attack."
10.6 A Change of Command in Lukou
In its chapter on No. 10, the Beijing stratagem book 7 cites an

incident from the year a.d. 219 that is also described in the
popular novel The Romance of the Three Kingdoms. The story
centers on Lii Meng, a military strategist in the service of Sun
Quan, ruler ofWu, one of the three kingdoms.
General Guan Yu, of the kingdom of Shu, was the comman-
dant of Jiangling, a city important for the control of the Yangtze
River. Learning that the General was planning an attack against
Fancheng in the southern part of the kingdom of Wei, Lu Meng
decided that the time was favorable for the conquest of Jiangling.
His ruler Sun Quan gave him a free hand in carrying out his
plans. Arriving at Lukou, Lii Meng found that signal towers

had been erected at frequent intervals along the river and that
the army guarding Jiangling was very well equipped. Realizing
that an attack against Jiangling would fail, he remained in Lukou
and spread the word that he had fallen ill. Sun Quan sent the
strategist Lu Xun, still little known at that time, to Lukou. Lu
Xun advised that Lii Meng go one step further and resign his
command entirely, since he was the only opponent taken seri-
ously by the heroically posturing Guan Yu. Lii Meng's successor
would then humbly pay his respects to Guan Yu, so that the
latter in his arrogance would pull his troops out of Jiangling
and lead them into the campaign against Fancheng.

Sun Quan approved the plan, and following Lii Meng's res-
ignation the ruler appointed Lu Xun as the new supreme com-
mander charged with guarding Lukou. Lu Xun proceeded to
carry out the tactic of masking the secret preparations for his
planned campaign by a series of friendly gestures. He sent Guan
Yu a flattering, subservient letter, and gifts of choice horses, fine
silks, and delicious foods. Lu Xun's emissary brought the letter
to Guan Yu with the remark that Lu Xun hoped to establish
good relations with the Shu general.
Very quickly, Guan Yu came to feel secure. Lu Xun's spies
reported that half the Jiangling garrison had been withdrawn

Hide Your Dagger Behind a Smile • i 4 5
for the conquest of Fancheng. The kingdom of Wu secretly

established contacts with the kingdom of Wei in order to avoid
a war on two fronts. Then, when Guan Yu had completely lost
sight of Wu and turned his entire attention to the conquest of
Fancheng, Lu Meng returned to action. With a war fleet dis-
guised as commercial vessels, he sailed down the Yangtze River
and mounted a surprise attack against Jiangling, which he con-
quered without much difficulty.
10.7 Soviet and Vietnamese Tricks
According to the 1989 edition of the Beijing stratagem book, 8

the Soviet Union (among others) has always regarded political
and diplomatic dissimulation as an essential prerequisite for the
preparation of sudden military operations. As a case in point,
the book cites the events leading up to the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in late 1979. For years, says the Chinese author,
the Soviets had kept up a pretense of "friendly cooperation"
through so-called financial aid, sending military advisers and
training Afghan military personnel. In this way, it achieved con-

trol over the Afghan army and laid the groundwork for its
occupation of Afghanistan.
China's daily press also accused Vietnam of using Stratagem
No. 10 by attempting to lull the vigilance of the Southeast Asian
countries through talk of "regional cooperation" after it had
occupied Cambodia. On August 16, 1979, Renmin Ribao (Peo-
ple's Daily), the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist
Party, published an analysis of Vietnam's foreign policy under
the headline: "The diplomacy of a smile with a dagger hidden
behind it."
STRATAGEM NO. 1 1
Let the Plum 7ree Wither

in Place of the Peach
The Chinese
characters
Modern
$ i\
dai
m
tao
\%
jiang
Mandarin
pronunciation
Meaning of each plum instead peach wither

character tree tree
Applications The stratagem of the scapegoat, or the sacrificial

lamb:
a. With the aid of deception, sacrifice yourself
to save another.
b. With the aid of deception, sacrifice another
to save yourself.
c. With the aid of deception, sacrifice someone
else to save a third party.
d. Make a small sacrifice to gain something
more valuable.
11.1 The Source
The formula used to describe this stratagem derives from a

famous collection of folk songs and ballads. The collection was
assembled by the Yuefu (Music Bureau), which was founded by
Emperor Wu of the Han (140-87 B.C.) for the purpose of col-
lecting and preserving popular and aristocratic poems and songs.
Part of the collection has been preserved in a later compilation,
the Collection of Yuefu Poems, 1which contains a chapter fea-
turing Han folk songs that are meant to be performed to the
accompaniment of string and wind instruments. One of the
songs, "The Cock Crows," contains this passage:
A peach tree grows by a well.

A plum tree grows next to it.
When insects attack the roots of the peach,

The plum tree sacrifices itself and withers instead of the
peach tree.
149
•
1 5 o The Book of Stratagems
If trees sacrifice themselves for one another,

Can brothers forget each other?
11.2 Under a False Flag
To illustrate this stratagem, the 1969 Hong Kong stratagem

book 2 cites an incident of Chinese history which occurred more
than twenty-five hundred years ago. It is described in the classic
Confucian work the Zuo Commentary, one of the major col-
lections of writings, biographical incidents, and other material

ascribed to chroniclers, scribes, and soothsayers from the tenth
to the sixth century B.C.
Duke Xuan of Wei has intimate relations with his father's
concubine. She bears him a son named Jizi. Later, Duke Xuan
plans to marry off his son Jizi to Xuan Jiang, a woman from
Qi. But she is so beautiful that the Duke takes her for his own
wife. Xuan Jiang bears two sons, the gentle Shou and the crafty
Shuo. At a later point in the story, Xuan Jiang and her son Shuo
slander Jizi to the Duke, claiming (among other things) that Jizi
cannot forgive his father for taking the beautiful Xuan Jiang
away from him and still longs for her. The Duke finally sends
Jizi on a mission to Qi, at the same time commissioning a band
of robbers to lie in wait for him at a certain place and kill him.
Shou, Xuan Jiang's good son, loves his half-brother Jizi. Learn-
ing of the plot, he warns Jizi and advises him to flee. But Jizi
rejects the advice with a reply reflecting the typical Confucian
virtue of absolute filial piety:
4
if I do not obey my father's
commands, how can be worthy I to be called 'son'? If there

were a kingdom without fathers, would be I able to flee there."
Prior to Jizi's departure for Qi, Shou gets him drunk, steals
the standard designating the crown prince, and himself sets out
for the fateful rendezvous. Believing he is Jizi, the robbers kill
Shou. Shortly thereafter, Jizi appears and cries, "It was I you
were supposed to kill. What had he done wrong? Kill me as
well!" And the robbers murder Jizi too.

Let the Plum Tree Wither in Place of the Peach '151
In this tale, the gentle Shou plays the role of the plum tree.
But here the peach tree (Jizi) does not accept the sacrifice.
11.3 Outwitting a Roughneck
Another story, this one dating from the eleventh century A.D.,
also tells of a brother who plays the role of the plum tree. But
3
this incident does not end in calamity.
Di Qing had lost his parents at an early age, and lived with
his elder brother Di Su, a poor but upright farmer. One day, as
Di Qing was bringing Di Su's lunch to him in the fields, a woman
hurrying by called to him that his brother was having a fistfight
with Iron Luohan on the riverbank. Iron Luohan was a local

good-for-nothing; he had gone out into the fields drunk that
day, looking for trouble. Meeting a peasant, he took the man's
bread away and ate it. The peasant, trying to resist, was thrown
to the ground. At this point Di Su, who had been quietly watch-
ing the incident, stepped in and punched Iron Luohan, which
led to a brawl between the two strong men. A woman bringing
food to her husband in the fields saw the fight, ran for help,
and told Di Qing about it.
Arriving on the scene, Di Qing found the fight over and his
brother Di Su sitting on a rock, gasping for breath, his forehead
wrinkled with worry. Di Qing looked around and saw Iron
Luohan, who could not swim, struggling for his life in the river.
Di Su had kicked him so hard that he had fallen into the water.
Di Qing knew that, if the fellow drowned, his brother would
be in serious trouble. Under the laws of the Song Dynasty, in
fact, he might be sentenced to death. So Di Qing immediately
jumped into the river to rescue Iron Luohan, who was nearing
the end of his strength. Sensing a rescuer approaching, the
drowning man desperately reached out and clutched the collar
of Di Qing's threadbare old shirt. It Luohan
tore, leaving Iron
with only a scrap of cloth in his grip. Di Qing grabbed him by
15 2.- The Book of Stratagems
the hair and pulled him to shore, at the same time whispering
in his ear, "I am Di Su, and I've saved your life."
Iron Luohan had swallowed a great deal of water and was

half unconscious. He could not tell who had saved him. Hardly
had he been brought to land when he fainted and lay there like
a corpse.
"I've killed him," said Di Su, horrified. "I'll pay for it with
my life. And what will become of you, Little Brother?" The
tears ran down his cheeks.
"Calm yourself, Brother," replied Di Qing. "I think he has
only fainted. He isn't dead."
"Even so, things look bad for me," answered Di Su. "I've
obviously hurt him, and the magistrate will punish me severely
for it."
By this time some villagers had hurried to the scene. They
consoled Di Su, saying, "Don't worry. You had every right to
intervene and try to help someone else. We'll put in a good word
for you."
The headman came hurrying along. He shouted, "Di
village
Su, our Emperor proclaimed the laws. Beating someone is a

crime. If you start a fight and kill someone, you must pay for
it with your life."
Di Su rose and stood there silently, waiting to be taken into

custody.
"Wait!" called his younger brother.
"You dare to oppose me, young fellow?" said the headman
with a stony countenance.
"You're confusing things," shouted Di Qing. "It is perfectly
clear that Iron Luohan persecuted a weak villager. This infu-

riated me, and out of fraternal feeling I helped the weaker party.
That Luohan was careless and nearly drowned. But

ruffian Iron
my brother pulled him to shore and saved his life."

The village headman looked at him doubtfully, then
looked around at the assembled people as if to ask, "Is this
true?"
Immediately some of the people shouted, "It's true. We can
testify to it."
Let the Plum Tree Wither in Place of the Peach •
i 5 3
Di Qing strengthened his case even more. "You see? He's got
a piece of my collar gripped in his hand."
—
The official bent down to look and sure enough, Iron Luo-
han was clutching a ragged collar. He was about to arrest Di
Qing, when the youngster said, "Just a moment. It's not certain
that Iron Luohan is really dead." Reluctantly, the headman had
to agree. "All right," he said, "let's see."
Di Qing immediately jumped on Iron Luohan, sat astride him,
and began massaging his stomach. Soon Iron Luohan opened
his mouth and vomited dirty water. Then he regained con-
sciousness, and at that moment Di Qing bent over and whispered
something to him. Iron Luohan shook himself, stood up, walked
shakily over to Di Su, bowed him with his arms crossed over
to
his chest, and said, "I thank you for saving my life." Then he
trotted off.
Di Su was astonished. A storm cloud that had suddenly gath-
ered above him had passed with equal swiftness. The spectators,
realizing that there was nothing more to gape at, took them-
selves off. On their way home, Di Su asked Di Qing, "Younger
Brother, I do not understand why Iron Luohan thanked me after
our life-and-death struggle. What happened?"
Di Qing replied, "When Iron Luohan took the peasant's bread
from him, then fought with him and with you, he was very
drunk. He didn't remember much of all that. When I pulled him
out of the river, I deceived him by saying, 'I am Di Su, and I'm
saving your life.' Later, when he came to, I whispered to him
that he should thank you. And that's exactly what he did."
Di Su profoundly admired his younger brother's clever use of

such a stratagem, which had saved him from a nasty fate. Ac-
cording to the tale as told in Children's Epoch magazine, Di
Qing was only fifteen years old at the time. He later became a
famous general of the Northern Song Dynasty.
11.4 Swapping Clothes with the King
Vietnam's war of resistance against Ming China lasted from

a.d. 1418 to 1427. In the year 1419 the Vietnamese army,
headed by the peasant leader Le-Loi, was surrounded at Chi-
Linh. A vassal by the name of Le-Lai then said to Le-Loi, "Give
me your robe. I it and leave the camp."
will dress myself in
When the Chinese saw him they thought he was Le-Loi, so
they captured and killed him. In the meantime, the real Le-Loi
escaped and later went down in history as King Le-Thai-To,
founder of Vietnam's Le Dynasty (which lasted from a.d. 1428
to 1793). Today this application of Stratagem No. 11 is still
recalled by the Vietnamese expression "Le-Lai rescues the

King." There is reportedly also a street named Rue Le-Lai in
Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon), commemorating the one
4
who sacrificed himself for his leader.
11.5 The Arrest of Chiang Kai-shek
After the Chinese Red Army's "Long March" in 1934-35 and

its arrival in northern Shaanxi, Chiang Kai-shek gave precedence
to fighting the "Communist menace" over resisting the Japanese
invaders of his country. In Xi'an, capital of Shaanxi Province,
he set up an anti-Communist command that was supposed to
deal with the bases that were being directed from Communist
headquarters in Yan'an. The dominant personality of the anti-
Communist command was Zhang Xueliang.
The general situation at that time was characterized by two
major elements: on the one hand, a growing wave of Chinese
patriotism in the face of the Japanese threat, with mounting
calls for an end to the civil war between the Guomindang and
the Communists; on the other hand, the desire of the Comintern
(the Kremlin-directed Communist International) to forge a
united front of Chinese Communists and non-Communists.
i 5 5
Even the Guomindang troops in Xi'an were vulnerable to the

influence of the Communists' slogan: "Chinese should not kill
Chinese, but unite all their strength for the struggle against the
Japanese."
Zhang Xueliang shared that viewpoint. In June 1936 he made
contact with Chou En-lai and concluded an agreement on the
practical cessation of hostilities. In August 1936 an unofficial
representative of the Chinese Communist Party was sent to serve

on Zhang Xueliang's staff.
Word of all this reached Nanking, then the Chinese capital,

prompting Chiang Kai-shek to travel to Xi'an at the end of
October, just when the Japanese were attacking Suiyuan. This
attack triggered numerous anti-Japanese strikes in China, no-
tably in Shanghai and Qingdao. Even the military commandants
of Guangxi and Guangdong called on Chiang Kai-shek to halt
China's civil strife and organize the resistance against the Jap-
anese. But Chiang rejected these demands, along with that of
Zhang Xueliang to form a united front with the Communists
against the Japanese. Chiang also refused to transfer at least a
part of the Xi'an garrison to Suiyuan.
On December 4, Chiang Kai-shek called for a general offen-
sive against the Communists to be launched on December 12.
But he failed to obtain the cooperation of either Zhang Xueliang
or Yang Hucheng, who at that time was serving as the "paci-
fication commissar" for Shaanxi. When Chiang relieved Zhang
Xueliang of on December 10, the opposition decided
his post
to intervene. On December 12, 1936, an elite group of Zhang

Xueliang's bodyguards took Chiang prisoner. In subsequent ne-
gotiations, Chiang was presented with a list of eight demands
and confronted with the necessity of a united front against
Japan.
The arrest of Chiang Kai-shek created a great stir throughout
China and the rest of the world. The leadership of the Chinese
Communist Party immediately sent a delegation to Xi'an, which
includedChou En-lai. After long and complicated negotiations,
Chiang accepted the demands which had been presented to him,
and on December 25 he flew back to Nanking accompanied by
Zhang Xueliang. Zhang was brought to trial, summarily re-
moved from office, and sentenced to ten years in prison. His

punishment continued even after the Nationalist (Guomindang)
regime Taiwan in 1949, and as of 1990 Zhang was still
fled to
living there, now

a more or less free man.
The Hong Kong stratagem book 5 emphasizes that Zhang Xue-
liang took full responsibility before the military tribunal for the
arrest of Chiang Kai-shek, thus saving his colleagues, and par-
ticularly Yang Hucheng, from prosecution. With that noble
deed, continues the author of the Hong Kong book, Zhang
Xueliang demonstrated the spirit of the plum tree that sacrifices
itself for the peach tree.
11.6 The Embroidered Slipper
The phrase representing Stratagem No. 11 was also used by

seventeenth-century author Pu Songling in the most famous of
his works, Liaozhai zhiyi (Strange Stories from the Leisure Stu-
dio), a collection of more than 490 tales. This story is entitled
"Yanzhi."
In Dongchang there lived a man named Bian, who was a
quack veterinarian. His daughter Yanzhi was beautiful and tal-
ented. He would have loved to see her married to a scholar. But

his poverty and low social status stood in the way. Yanzhi was
fifteen years old and still not betrothed.
In a house across the way lived Mrs. Wang, wife of Gong
and a friend of Yanzhi. Mrs. Wang was a flighty woman and
loved practical jokes. One time after a visit, Yanzhi accompanied
her back to her door and saw an elegant young man pass by,
all dressed in white. Yanzhi seemed to catch fire. Her eyes con-
tinued to follow the young man, even as he receded into the
distance. Mrs. Wang noticed what had happened and laughingly
suggested to Yanzhi that this was the perfect mate for her.
Yanzhi blushed but said nothing. Mrs. Wang told her that she
had once lived in the same street as the young man's parents.
His name was E Qiuzhun, and he was uniquely gentle and
i 5 7
obedient. His fatherhad died and, more recently, his mother as

well, which was why he was dressed in mourning. Mrs. Wang
then proposed going to E Qiuzhun and prompting him to request
Yanzhi's hand in marriage. The girl said nothing. Mrs. Wang
laughed and went her way.
For several days nothing happened. Doubts arose in Yanzhi's
mind. Had Mrs. Wang not done as she intended? Or was she,
Yanzhi, simply of too low a class? She began to worry, stopped

eating, and took to her bed. One day Mrs. Wang came
fell sick,
to visitand asked Yanzhi what was ailing her. The girl claimed
to have no idea. She had felt poorly after their last parting, she
said, and now she was exhausted and had no idea what was to
become of her.
Mrs. Wang away on
reported that her husband had been
had had no chance yet of speaking with
business, so that she
E Qiuzhun. Could that be why Yanzhi was ill? When the girl
heard this she blushed furiously. Mrs. Wang said jokingly, "If
that's how things are with you, and that's what your sickness
is all about, you can stop worrying. I shall have Mr. E come to
you this very night, and the two of you will be happily united.
How could he refuse you?"
Yanzhi replied, "As things stand, there is no room for shame.
If he doesn't feel that I am socially too far beneath him, and he
sends an intermediary to ask for my hand, I shall feel well again
in an instant. But I'm not at all prepared to meet him face-to-

face myself."
Mrs. Wang nodded her approval and departed.
Since her youth Mrs. Wang had kept up an intimate rela-
tionship with her neighbor Sujie. Since her marriage, he had
visited Mrs. Wang whenever her husband was away on a trip.
On this day Sujie cameand she told
to see her him about Yanzhi
just to amuse him. Sujie had long thought Yanzhi to be very
beautiful, and now he conceived a scheme to have her. Fearing

Mrs. Wang's jealousy, he feigned a lack of interest but listened
carefully and took note of the exact location of Yanzhi's bed-
room. The following night he climbed the wall of her house and
knocked on her window.
"Who's there?" she asked.
"E Qiuzhun."
Yanzhi replied, "I think about you day and night, about being
with you forever, growing old together — but not about sharing
just one night's pleasure. If you really love me, find an inter-
mediary quickly and arrange our marriage. But I won't receive

you privately like this."
Sujie saw no alternative but to pretend agreement. He pas-
sionately begged her, however, to at least let him press her hand
once as a pledge of their troth. Yanzhi could not bring herself
to refuse, rose weakly from her bed, and opened the window.
Sujie pushed hisway roughly into the room, grabbed her, and
pressed her to make love. Yanzhi, being too weak to resist, fell
to the floor gasping. Sujie tried to lift her, and she threatened
to scream.
Afraid he might be discovered, Sujie did not dare to push his
luck. He asked only that she set a time for their next meeting.
Yanzhi replied that their next meeting would be their wedding
day. The false suitor grabbed her foot, pulled off an embroidered
slipper, and disappeared out the window.
Sujie went straight to Mrs. Wang's. Lying in bed there, he

kept thinking about the slipper and secretly felt for it in his
sleeve pocket. But the slipper wasn't there. He searched for it
everywhere, failed to find it, and finally could not avoid telling
Mrs. Wang the whole story and asking her help. But even work-
ing together they could not find the slipper.
There lived in that same narrow street a good-for-nothing by
the name of Mao Da,who had pursued Mrs. Wang in vain,
spied on her, and knew about her relationship with Sujie. He
hoped to obtain proof of her infidelity and blackmail her with
it. On that evening he went to her house and sneaked into her
garden. Suddenly he stepped on something soft. Picking it up,
he found it was a woman's slipper. Listening at the window,
Mao Da heard Sujie's detailed description of his visit to Yanzhi.
Delighted, he left the garden.
A few evenings later Mao Da climbed over the garden wall
of Yanzhi's house. Not knowing the way, he landed outside her
father's room. Yanzhi's father, looking out his window, saw a
i 5 9
man and immediately suspected someone of being after his

daughter. Furious, he grabbed a knife and stormed out of the
house. Mao Da took fright and ran away. He tried to climb
back over the wall, but the man was right behind him. Mao Da
turned around and forced the knife out of the older man's hand.
Yanzhi's mother now began to scream too. Desperate, Mao Da
killed Yanzhi's father and fled.
Yanzhi now came hurrying into the garden with a lantern.

She saw her dead father and her slipper next to him on the
ground. Asked about it, a weeping Yanzhi told her mother the
story of the slipper, though she could not bring herself to involve
Mrs. Wang in the matter and mentioned only E Qiuzhun.
The next day, charges were made against E Qiuzhun at the
district magistrate's office, and he was arrested. At this time he
was only nineteen years old and still little more than a child.
Brought before the magistrate, he did not know what to say.
He denied nothing, just stood there and trembled. The magis-
trate became increasingly convinced that E was the culprit. He
had the youngster interrogated under torture, for in imperial
China only someone who confessed could be convicted. The
young scholar couldn't stand the pain, admitted everything, and
was sentenced to death.
A report of the entire matterwas sent to the superior au-
thorities in Jinan. After one look at E Qiuzhun, the prefect in
Jinan began to doubt his guilt. He had an agent in disguise

placed in E's prison cell, so that the young man would speak
freely. What he learned in this way strengthened the prefect's
belief in E's innocence. By confronting Yanzhi with E Qiuzhun
and interrogating Mrs. Wang, the prefect finally was led to Mrs.
Wang's lover Sujie. He, however, while admitting his adventure
in Yanzhi's room, denied killing her father. Under torture, how-
ever, he too confessed and was sentenced to die. Desperate for

help, Sujie wrote a letter to the highly regarded Commissioner
Shi Yushan, who came to the conclusion that something was
wrong with the case and had all the files brought to him for
review.
Further questioning of Mrs. Wang revealed the names of sev-
•
i6o The Book of Stratagems
eral men who had been after her, including the scapegrace Mao
Da, whom Yushan immediately suspected. But since Mao
Shi
Da refused to confess, Shi Yushan said, "Now the spirits of the
temple must unmask the culprit."
All of Mrs. Wang's male friends, stripped to the waist, were
forced to enter a darkened Buddhist temple and stand in front
of a wall. There, Shi Yushan told them, "The spirit of the temple
will place a sign on the back of the guilty man." After a while
the wily commissioner called the men out and looked at their
backs. He pointed to Mao Da: "You are the murderer." And
indeed, there was a mark on the man's back. The wall had been
covered with ashes in advance, and Mao Da, knowing himself
guilty, had pressed his back against the wall to prevent the spirit
from marking him. Finally, Shi Yushan wrung a confession from

Mao Da.
In reading his sentence, Shi Yushan declared that Sujie had
"let the plum tree wither instead of the peach tree," because in
his nighttime encounter with Yanzhi he had pretended to be

E Qiuzhun. And Mao Da, having been caught in the act, had
"put Zhang's hat on Li's head" — that he had diverted
is, re-
sponsibility for his own act to Sujie — by leaving the embroidered

slipper at the scene of the crime.
11.7 The Hidden Offspring
The examples cited so far have involved two-sided relationships,

in which the "plum tree" voluntarily sacrificed itself for the
"peach tree" or else was made

do so by the latter. At another
to
level of interpretation of Stratagem No. 11, a third party is
involved who assigns the role of "plum tree" to someone else.

In the year 607 B.C., Duke Ling of Jin was assassinated by a
member of the powerful Zhao clan. A few years later a former

favorite of Duke Ling, a man by the name of Tu'an Gu, was
appointed to high office by Ling's successor, Duke Jing. Tu'an
Let the Plum Tree Wither in Place of the Peach • i 6 i
Gu yearned for revenge against the murderers of his old patron

and plotted to exterminate the Zhao clan.
A general who did not approve of the plan revealed it to the

head of the Zhao family. That worthy, seeing no other way out
and willing to accept the necessity of his own death, had his
pregnant wife, a princess from the house of Duke Jing, brought
to the Duke's palace to live. Shortly thereafter, Tu'an Gu's
troops stormed the residence of the Zhao family and killed all
its members. The only survivor was the wife of the clan's chief,
who was now living safely in the palace.
Some time later she gave birth to a son. Tu'an Gu immediately

sent his men to the palace with orders to bring the child to him.
But the mother managed to hide the infant, and Tu'an Gu,
believing it had already been smuggled out of the palace, had
his men search for it everywhere.
Meantime two loyal vassals of the Zhao family, Gongsun
Chujiu and Cheng Ying, sought a way to save the clan's only
male offspring. Finally they hit on the following plan: Cheng
Ying searched for a male child of the same age. When he had
found it, Gongsun Chujiu hid with it in a mountain hut. Cheng
Ying then revealed the hiding place to Tu'an Gu, whose men
searched for the substitute child and killed both it and its guard-
ian Gongsun Chujiu. While this was going on, the real Zhao
child was smuggled out of the palace and brought to a safe
place, where it grew up unrecognized.
When the boy was fifteen years old, Duke Jing rehabilitated
the Zhao clan. Young Zhao revealed himself to Duke Jing, and
the ruler permitted him to wreak vengeance on Tu'an Gu, who
was killed together with his entire family. 6
In this tale the innocent little boy who lost his life in place of
the noble Zhao child, who could then grow up in safety, was
"plum tree" by the vassals Gong-
selected to play the role of the
sun Chujiu and Cheng Ying. Gongsun Chujiu also appears in
the role of a voluntary "plum tree," while the surviving "peach
tree" is, of course, the last scion of the Zhao clan. Gongsun
i6z- The Book of Stratagems
Chujiu's behavior inevitably calls to mind a saying ascribed to

Confucius and quite typical of the Confucian virtue of uncon-
ditional loyalty:
Ifyou are another's subject, and can be of service to him

by being beheaded, you should do so.
11.8 The Vacillating Ruler
In the conflicts among the various states which occupied the

territory of pre-imperial China (i.e., prior to 221 B.C.), one of
the principal goals was to avoid falling victim to the attempts
by rulers of the stronger states to gain predominance. In such
cases the game often involved surviving as the "peach tree"
instead of ending in the role of the "plum tree."
During the Warring States period, the Han state, whose ruler
King Xuanhui was a temporizer, was caught between the two
mighty Qin and Chu. The King of Qin regarded the
states of
Chu hegemony in the land. He would have

as his sole rival for
liked to attack Chu, but the Han state was in his way. So, in
317 B.C., he sent Zhang Yi, a specialist in forming alliances, to
persuade Han to join him in a common war against Chu. But
the ruler of Han opted for a policy of neutrality toward both
his powerful neighbors. This infuriated the ruler of Qin, who
decided to subjugate Han.
The Qin army marched into Han, encountering no serious
resistance. Desperate, the King of Han summoned Minister
Gongzhong. But that notable avoided taking a direct stance on
the matter, instead citing the popular song, "The plum tree
withers in place of the peach tree." The Han ruler, however,

did not understand what his minister was getting at. So Gong-
zhong pointed to two trees in the royal garden and said, "Let
us assume that the smaller is a peach tree and the larger a plum.
The peach tree is suddenly attacked by insects. The only way
to save it is to cause the insects to attack the plum tree instead."
Let the Plum Tree Wither in Place of the Peach -163
Now the Han ruler understood what Gongzhong had in mind.

The calamity which threatened Han was to be diverted to Chu,
which would serve as Han's sacrificial lamb. Whereupon the
King of Han sent his minister to Qin, with a promise that it
would be rewarded with an important Han city if Qin would
enter into an alliance for a war against Chu.
These developments were reported to the King of Chu, who
asked the counsel of his adviser Chen Zhen. The latter laughed
and said, "Han is planning to use the stratagem 'Let the plum
tree wither in place of the peach tree' against us. Let us fight
Han with own stratagem!"
its
The King of Chu approved his adviser's plan. He prepared

his army militarily for an attack and same time spread
at the
the rumor through other states in the region that he was heeding
Han's call for help and would soon send troops into that state.
The King of Chu also sent an emissary to Han bearing many
costly gifts for its ruler and proposing an alliance against Qin.
The Han chancellor rejected the proposal, saying that it would
simply mean Han would suffer to protect Chu. Whereupon the
Chu emissary declared that his country had already mobilized
its entire army and swore that, together with Han, Chu would
fight Qin until final victory was won. Han's vacillating monarch
took these clear words of the Chu emissary at face value and
annulled the old plan of joining forces with Qin to attack Chu.
The King of Qin did not at first credit the news of the Han-
Chu alliance. So he sent spies disguised as merchants to both
states. His spies confirmed the news.
Angered at the Han ruler's vacillation, the King of Qin
marched his troops into Han even before those of Chu had
gotten there. The Han army put up brave resistance, but as the
situation grew more critical the Han King sent messengers to
Chu requesting troop support. In accordance with Chen Zhen's
plan, the ruler of Chu had sent troops marching toward Han,
but only for the sake of appearances, in order to prompt Qin
to conquer Han as a preemptive move. The King of Chu assured
the Han emissaries that support troops were already on their
way. In reality, of course, he had no intention of helping Han.
•
The Han troops waited for the Chu army, which did not
arrive. The morale of the Han troops declined and fear spread
through the ranks. Many soldiers deserted. At that point, Qin
mounted a general attack against Han and conquered its main
army. Han became Qin's vassal state.
Following the Qin victory over Han, the ruler of Chu feared
an attack by the Qin army. But his adviser Chen Zhen told him
that he was worrying unnecessarily. The plum tree had already
fallen, so that the survival of the peach tree was assured for the
time being.
The Qin ruler's advisers pushed for a campaign against Chu.
But the King himself opposed the idea. The war against Han
had caused serious losses. The Chu troops were well prepared
and awaited their exhausted enemy at their ease. So the King
of Qin returned with his army to his own country. Chen Zhen's
stratagem had succeeded totally. Han had been sacrificed and
the security of Chu thus assured. 7
11.9 General Tian Ji's Horse Race
In the Warring States period, General Tian Ji often held horse

races with the Prince of Qi — and the stakes were high. The races
consisted of three heats, each with a different horse from each
contestant's stables. Tian Ji lost regularly.
One day he was in the company of Sun Bin, a descendant of
Sun Tzu and himself a military writer and strategist. Sun Bin
saw that Tian Ji's horses were inferior to those of the royal
house. Yet Tian Ji's steeds, like the royal ones, could be divided
into three classes: good, mediocre, and poor.
The next time a race with three heats was scheduled, Sun Bin
advised Tian Ji to run the first heat with his poorest horse against
the royal house's best, then in the second heat to use his best
against the prince's mediocre animal, and finally to run his
mediocre horse against the poorest of the royal house.
Tian Ji followed this advice. The result was that he had to
Let the Plum Tree Wither in Place of the Peach -165
sacrifice one heat, the first, in which his poorest horse lost to
the best of the royal house, but won the other two heats and
thus emerged the victor of the race as a whole.
In this instance, letting the plum tree wither in place of the
peach meant making a partial sacrifice as the price for an

tree
overall victory. If Tian Ji had pursued the usual course and tried
to win all three heats with his inferior horses, he would inev-
itably have lost them all.
11.10 General Tian Ji's Battle Plan
The same Sun Bin made military use of Stratagem No. 11 after
saving the state of Zhao by surrounding the capital of Wei (see
Section 2.1, "With the Army into the Void"). By surrounding
the city, Sun Bin forced the Wei army to give up its siege of
Zhao and return to its home territory. On its hurried march
homeward, the Wei army was divided into three columns: left,
middle, and right. The left-hand column was the strongest, the
middle column next, and the right-hand column the weakest.
General Tian Ji of the Qi army, accompanied by his adviser
Sun Bin, wanted to apply the method he had learned in the horse
racing episode (see Section 11.9, "General Tian Ji's Horse
Race"), dividing his own army into three columns, strong,
medium-strong, and weak, and attacking the enemy's strongest
division with his own weakest, the enemy's medium-strong col-
umn with his own strongest, and the enemy's weakest division
with his own medium-strength column.
But Sun Bin pointed out that this time the objective was not
to win two out of three but to destroy as many enemy troops
of Wei's generally superior forces as possible. He proposed that
the weakest Qi troops attack the strongest Wei column and the
medium Qi troops be used to attack Wei's medium-strong col-
umn. This yielded a segment of the battlefront where the enemy
was superior and another where the two sides were well
matched. But Sun Bin ordered those two Qi divisions merely to
involve the two Wei columns in battle and to hold their own
for a while. At the same time he used his own strongest troops
in a lightning attack against the weakest enemy column, which
was easily defeated. Next he hurried his elite troops to the central
segment of the front, where they helped the medium-strong
troops defeat the enemy's medium-strong column. Finally both
victorious Qi divisions joined forces with the weakest Qi unit
to decimate the strongestenemy column. The result was absolute
superiority which secured the victory of the Qi army in the Battle
of Guiling.
11.11 The Tang Emperor's Tactic
According to an overview of Chinese history by Fan Wenlan, 8

was used by Tang Emperor Taizong.
a tactic similar to Tian Ji's
During the civil war that preceded the founding of the Tang
Dynasty in the seventh century a.d., Taizong had amassed a
wealth of experience which enabled him to judge at a glance
which were the weak and strong positions of an enemy combat
formation. He often used his own weaker units against the
enemy's stronger and his own stronger units against the enemy's
weaker. Pressed by the stronger enemy force, his own weaker
unit would fall back a certain distance, while his own stronger
unit would penetrate the weaker enemy's front line. Then Tai-
zong's stronger unit would turn and attack the stronger enemy
unit from the rear. Caught in a pincers movement between
Taizong's strongest and weakest units, the enemy troops would
usually be totally wiped out.
Here the "plum tree" that is initially sacrificed is the weaker
division of Taizong's army. The "peach tree" that is saved is
embodied by the ultimately victorious army.
i 67
11.12 The Red Army Victory at the Dnieper
In the autumn of 1943, during the Battle of the Dnieper, two

commando units of the Soviet 381st Rifle Battalion crossed the
river north of Kiev. After the raiding partyhad occupied a base
on the far riverbank, they were discovered by the Germans, who
saw through the Soviet plan and mobilized a large number of
tanks for a counterattack. The Soviet command swiftly shifted
gears to accommodate the new situation. Orders were given to
the commando had crossed the river to hold on to
units that
their newly acquired base at all costs and to launch an offensive
against the Germans from there, so that the enemy would think
that the main Soviet force was concentrated on that bridgehead
and would send the German troops against it.
Meantime, the main body of the 381st Rifles, which originally
was supposed to have crossed the Dnieper north of Kiev after
the advance units had paved the way, was regrouped, absorbed
into the 38th Attack Unit, and sent to a new bridgehead south
of Kiev.By the time the two commando units had been almost
wiped out, the main Soviet force had already easily crossed the
Dnieper at the other point and established more than twenty
operational bases on the far bank.
This example, cited in the 1989 edition of the Beijing stratagem

book, illustrates how a sudden emergency can necessitate re-
course to Stratagem No. 11. The two Soviet commando units
were the "plum tree" that was sacrificed to save the "peach
tree," in this case the successfully operating Soviet main force.
11.13 The Secret Weapon of the Weaker Party
In their interpretations of Stratagem No. 11 as illustrated by

the last few examples, Chinese stratagem books employ the
following considerations:
a. The clash of forces in war is based on objective, generally

measurable factors, which form the basis for each force's
superiority or inferiority. But subjective factors play a sig-
nificant role in how this superiority or inferiority is played
out tactically on the battlefield.
b. Battle command based on objective factors (e.g., weapons

stocks, technology, reconnaissance, etc.) should be supple-
mented by subjective factors (estimates of the situation, vig-
ilance, speed of reactions, etc.). The proper application of
one's own subjective factors may make it possible to trans-
form objective inferiority into tactical superiority.
c. Accurate estimation of one's own strengths and weak-

nesses and those of the enemy is decisive for victory. Strat-
agem No. 11 can serve as a powerful secret weapon with
which the weaker party may defeat the stronger. It is to be
used whenever a situation arises in which some loss is un-
avoidable. At that point you sacrifice a part for the sake of
the whole.
Highly relevant here are three of the ten secret rules of

Chinese chess (called Go in Japanese)
9
formulated by Wang
Jixin in the eighth century A.D.:
Yield some stones, if it helps you to gain the upper hand.

Accept a small loss of territory, if it makes possible a greater
gain of territory.
Faced with certain dangers, you must give up some stones.
Stratagem No. 1 1, then, helps one to accept some partial losses
in order to avoid a total loss and possibly to gain ultimate

i 69
victory. The essence of the process is to choose the greater of

two benefits and the lesser of two disadvantages.
11.14 Contracts with a

Capitalist
Proletarian Government
These thoughts about calculated military sacrifices naturally can

be extended to civilianlife as well. The theme of accepting a
sacrificewas sounded, for example, in the following passage

from a July 1979 commentary published in Canton's Southern
Daily dealing with China's economic opening to the outside
world:
In order to transform China into a strong, modern socialist

state in the not-too-distant future, we must pay a price,
pay our "dues" [i.e., the "plum tree"]. From an overall,
long-range standpoint, however, it is worthwhile to permit
foreign investors to earn certain profits.
It is not difficult to find passages in the works of Lenin which

touch on the idea of calculated August 1978, just
losses. In
before the official start of China's policy of opening (December

1978), the Beijing newspaper Guangming Daily cited the fol-
lowing passages from Lenin's writings:
If we want trade with other countries — and we do want

it, we recognize its necessity what we — are most interested
in is to acquire from the capitalist countries as soon as
possible those means of production (locomotives, machin-
ery, electrical equipment) without which we cannot restore
our own industries. . . . Let us bribe the capitalists with
high profits. ... To hell with those excessive profits [the
"plum tree"]. We [the "peach tree"] will thus acquire what
is important, with the help of which we will grow strong,
finally get ourselves on our feet, and economically defeat
Capitalism. 10
This is even more true in granting concessions. Without
ito •
in the least eliminating 'its policy of nationalization, the

Workers* State leases certain mines, forests, oil fields, and
other resources 'the"plum trees*'] to foreign capitalists, in
order to obtain from them additional machinery and equip-
ment which enable us [the "peach tree"] to accelerate the
buildup of Soviet heavy industry. 11
The concession-holder is a capitalist. He manages the
enterprise in capitalist fashion, for the sake of profit: he
signs contracts with the Workers" State in order to achieve
profits that go beyond the ordinary, or to acquire raw
materials which he could otherwise not obtain at all or
only with great difficulty [the "plum tree"]. The Soviet State
[the "peach tree"] thereby gains an advantage by devel-
oping its productive forces and increasing its quantitative
12
output, whether immediately or in a very brief time.
Some well-meaning Western observers have at times regarded

the expansion of Chinese trade relations with the West as at
least a partial "sellout." Their fear has been that China might
lose its hard-won independence. But it may be fruitful to apply
the perspective of Stratagem No. 11 to this matter.
The sacrifice, the "plum tree" being given to the insects to
eat, could be interpreted in this context as a certain carefully
calculated loss of Chinese economic independence, involving
certain concessions and obligations undertaken to foreign trade
partners. The great goal to be thereby won by China — the

'"peach tree" rescued in the formula for Stratagem No. 11 —
would be a degree of modernization not to be achieved without
Western help. In the final analysis (as Lenin noted in the quotes
cited above), the sacrifice turns out to be only an apparent loss,
since it is more than adequately compensated by the ultimate
gain.
This "sacrificial lamb" stratagem calls to mind the Confucian
saying "A lack of tolerance in small things endangers great

plans." In this case, however, in view of China's sheer size, the
"small things" for which tolerance is needed may not be so
small — at least from the standpoint of some of China's Western
business partners.
STRATAGEM N O 1 2
Seize the Opportunity

to Lead the Sheep Away
The Chinese
characters
Modern shun
*
shou
#
qian
*
yang
Mandarin
pronunciation
Meaning of each easy hand lead sheep

character (effortless) away
Applications Alertly seize the opportunity that presents itself

when a sheep happens to cross your path, and
lead the animal away.
The stratagem of chance: Constant vigilance
and psychological readiness to exploit oppor-
tunities to one's own advantage, whenever and
wherever they arise.
The stratagem of serendipity.
The sheep, the eighth animal in the Chinese zodiac, was con-
sidered a symbol of filial piety in ancient China, because it kneels
as it nurses from its mother. But it can also stand for yang,
masculine power. Modern scholars maintain that the present-
day Chinese character denoting "beauty" is derived from the
characters for "large" and "sheep." A large sheep was regarded
as tasty (i.e., "beautiful") food, much favored by the Chinese.
The formula used to describe Stratagem No. 12 appears in a
number of literary sources, beginning with the thirteenth-
century drama Armed only with a whip, Wei Chigong takes the
lance from Yuanji, by Guan Hanqing. There, however, it is less
a stratagem than a flowery description of how the protagonist

disarms his enemy.
Another usage appears in chapter 99 of the popular vernac-
ular novel Water Margin, where the phrase serves as a comment
on how a priest, happening along at the right moment, uses his
staff to trip up an escaping villain so that he can be caught.
In the sense most germane to our discussion, the phrase is

used by Wu Cheng'en in his novel Journey to the West, in
describing an incident involving the attempted theft of Buddhist
i73
174" The Book of Stratagems
monk Tripitaka's radiant robe (see Section 5.1, 'The Radiant

Robe"). Tripitaka's companion, the Monkey King, watches as
some monks ignite firewood they have heaped around Tripi-
taka's room, and ponders:
They want to kill us and ... I

steal the [radiant] robe.
could attack them with my
magic wand, but that would
be too easy. One blow and they'd all be dead. But then my
Master would surely accuse me of violence. So let's leave
that. Instead I'll use the tactic "Seize the opportunity to
lead the sheep away" and turn their own murder plans
against them, so that they, instead of we, lose their lives.
Here the "sheep" is the murderous scheme hatched by the host

monks in an attempt on the lives of Tripitaka and the Monkey
King. The latter "borrows" it, in the sense of Stratagem No. 3
("Kill with a borrowed knife"), in order to turn the tables.
"Leading the sheep away" in this instance involves the com-
prehension and reworking of the enemy's insidious plan.
The essence of No. 12, then, is the alert recognition and
exploitation of favorable opportunities and, in particular, of an
enemy's suddenly revealed weaknesses. To quote a relevant
Chinese proverb: "The crumbling of a great wall may start at
an insignificant corner, and a branch may begin to rot at the

forking of a twig."
12.1 XlANG YU VS. TlAN RONG
The 1989 edition of the Beijing stratagem book cites the fol-
lowing historical example.

As was recounted in Section 8.1, "The Burned-Out Wooden
Path," in 206 B.C. Xiang Yu declared himself "Hegemon of
Western Chu" and installed eighteen vassal lords in as many
fiefdoms. But Tian Rong, who had expected to receive a fiefdom,
was passed over. That same year he rebelled, killing or driving
out several of the vassal lords and occupying three segments of
Seize the Opportunity' to Lead the Sheep An .
•
175
which Xiang Yu had awarded to his own

the former state of Qi,
men. Xiang Yu then launched an attack in an effort to neutralize
Tian Rong. At that point Liu Bang, who was supposed to have
withdrawn to Hanzhong in the west, took advantage of Xiang
Yu's momentary inability to attend to the western part of his
realm and secretly marched his troops to Chencang, where they
easily conquered three sections of the former state of Qin. This
episode is recounted in greater detail in Section 8.1.)
In this example the "sheep" is the temporary weakness of

Xiang Yu, who is preoccupied with the campaign against Tian
Rong. By "leading the sheep away" in the sense intended here,
Liu Bang laid the groundwork for establishment of the long-
lived Han Dvnastv.
12.2 Zhao Calls for Help
In 354 B.C., King Hui of Wei hatched a plan to annex the state
of Zhao A
strong Wei army, commanded by Gen-
to the north.
eralPang Juan, marched into Zhao and easily reached its capital,
Handan, which was surrounded in the year 353 B.C. At that
point the King of Zhao sent a plea for help to the ruler of Chu,
a powerful state situated south of Wei. But the Chu ruler hes-
itated to grant the requested aid. At a meeting of his advisers,
Minister Zhao Xixu opposed helping Zhao, suggesting that they
instead strengthen Wei, which would Zhao to put up tough
force
resistance until, ultimately, both states would be seriously weak-
ened by the war and Chu could plav the role of the "laughing
third."'
Jing She disagreed and instead advocated his own plan for
weakening both Zhao and Wei. The King of Chu approved the
plan, commissioned Jing She a general, and gave him command
of a medium-size army, which quickly crossed the border be-
tween Chu and Zhao on the pretext of bringing help to Zhao.
The Zhao commanders spread the word about Chu's aid among
their own defending troops. But despite the brave resistance of
the Zhao army, after a seven-month siege and by dint of using
all Pang Juan finally conquered the Zhao capital,

his forces,
Handan. At that very moment a report was received that the
state of Qi, responding to a plea for help from Zhao, had sent
its troops marching toward Wei's now-unguarded capital. Pang
Juan immediately withdrew his forces from the Zhao capital

and began the forced march homeward. En route, Pang Juan's
forces were ambushed and defeated by the Qi troops, which
had employed the stratagem "Await the exhausted enemy at
your ease." (For descriptions of this episode from various view-
points, see Sections 2.1 "With the Army into the Void," and
4.1, "The Trap at Guiling.")
Now, with both Zhao and Wei seriously weakened by war
and defeat, Jing She saw his chance. With his small army, he
conquered part of Zhao's territory. His strategy of "seizing the
opportunity to lead the sheep away" was an outstanding success.
Zhao's request for help from Chu had given the latter an excuse
to send its troops into Zhao territory, and once external con-
ditions were ripe theChu army could exploit the favorable
circumstances and easily annex parts of Zhao (the "sheep").
12.3 Thirty Kilometers from Moscow
The alert exploitation of an enemy's suddenly perceptible weak-

nesses, says the Beijing stratagem book, is particularly relevant
to the conditions of modern conventional warfare:
An army consisting of tanks, mobile artillery, and infantry,

capable of advancing at high speed, can hardly avoid sit-
uations in which coordination among various units some-

times down, logistical support occasionally is
breaks
temporarily absent, and protection of the flanks sometimes
fails to keep up. Consequently, temporary and relative
weak spots will often crop up to the rear of rapidly ad-

vancing tank units. The clever commander will exploit
those openings.
Seize the Opportunity to Lead the Sheep Away •
1 77
During World War II, explains the Beijing book, this is how
the Soviet military leadership acted toward the German troops
that had advanced to within 30 kilometers (18.6 miles) of Mos-
cow. The Soviets assumed that the enemy front was overex-
tended and had become separated from the support units in the
rear. It was a case of "an arrow that has reached the end of its
trajectory" and has lost its penetrating power. According to the

Chinese sources, flank attacks devastated the German army and
marked the beginning of the tide's turning in favor of the Red
Army.
12.4 An Easy Climb Up Tiger Mountain
Qu Bo, author of the well-known modern Chinese novel Linhai

xueyuan (The Forest in the Snow), joined the Communist-led
Eighth Route Army at the age of sixteen. An episode in his book
relates how, during China's civil war, a special reconnaissance
squad of the People's Liberation Army spied on and fought
against Guomindang troops in the forests of northeastern China.
Parts of this novel were made into the revolutionary Beijing
opera Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy, one of the few stage
works performed in China during the Cultural Revolution.
In chapter 12 of the novel, Shao Jianbo, commander of the
special reconnaissance squad, interrogates a captured enemy spy
nicknamed Yizuomao ("Bushy Hair"). The spy is asked about
enemy positions on Tiger Mountain, the fortified hideout of
Zuo Shandiao, a bandit allied to the Guomindang troops. Yiz-
uomao makes a sketch map, indicating a canyon in the lower
left-hand corner of the paper. About this he remarks, "The
canyon is completely hidden. If you go that way to get up the
mountain, you can't fail."
Shao Jianbo is taken aback. He thinks, "This canyon is ob-

viously one of the enemy's weak spots, and he is surely keeping
a careful watch over it. Yizuomao is trying to put something
over on us. I've heard that Zuo Shandiao's people are good at
—
'seizing the opportunity to lead the sheep away.' Maybe Yiz-

uomao is trying to use that stratagem against us. If we try to
get up that canyon, we'll probably be wiped out."

The reconnaissance squad in this example is not being lured
up Tiger Mountain but itself wants to get up there. The enemy
spy is simply making alert use of this sudden chance to mislead
his enemy and send them into a trap. But his attempt is foiled
by the suspicions of Shao Jianbo, who suspects that the allegedly
safe way up Tiger Mountain indicated by the spy is an appli-
cation of Stratagem No. 12.
12.5 An Emperor Flees
Imprisoned by rebels in the imperial capital of Chang'an, Em-

peror Xian escapes at the first opportunity and heads for Luo-
yang. But a group of rebel horsemen pursue him and are getting
very close. His old imperial adviser Dong Cheng says, "Let us
scatter all our jewelry and treasures along the road."
And so it happens. All their precious goods are unloaded,
including even the jade-studded crown and the Empress's neck-
laces. Seeing these treasures lying on the ground, the rebel sol-
diers stop their horses, leap from the saddle, and, ignoring their
commander's angry orders to keep riding, feverishly begin gath-

ering up the precious objects. What they stand to gain here is
more than most of them would otherwise ever see in their life-
time. So they forget about pursuing the Emperor. They gladly
take possession of the "sheep" encountered by the wayside
i.e., the tangible treasure in front of them — and thus lose sight
of their original purpose.

This case brings to mind a deceptive maneuver often used in
Chinese warfare. In order to seduce the enemy, you accumulate

valuables (gold, silk, foodstuffs, etc.); if the enemy goes after
the booty, his troops fall into disarray, and at that point your
own forces, lying in ambush, can deal them a devastating blow. 1
One must judge by the overall situation whether a newly

i 79
visible advantage (a "sheep") is really worthwhile and should

be "led away." A mistake one must avoid is losing the important
goal for the sake of something of lesser value. As one of the ten
secret rules of the game of Go 2 puts it, "Yield smaller things to
win the big one."
12.6 The Seven Voyages of Zheng He
3
According to a 1973 stratagem book published in Taipei, an
excellent example of the application of No. 12 is linked to the
unknown fate of the Ming Dynasty's Jianwen Emperor (r. 1399—
1403). After ascending the throne, the Emperor wanted to smash

the power of feudal lords in his empire, to which end he de-
throned several feudal princes and demoted them to the status
of common subjects. Finally, the only one left was the ruler of
the fiefdom of Yan, who organized a rebellion which led to a
three-year civil war. The conflict ended when the Prince of Yan
conquered the imperial capital, Nanking, and put the imperial
palace to the torch. But what happened to the Jianwen Emperor
remained a mystery. His disappearance was surrounded by leg-
ends, including one that said that he had escaped abroad dis-
guised as a monk. His enemy, the Prince of Yan, became his
successor and ruled as the Yongle Emperor from 1403 to 1424.
Noteworthy during Yongle's reign were the naval expeditions
which he entrusted to the command of Zheng He, a Muslim
eunuch from Yunnan. Between 1405 and 1433, Zheng He went
to sea seven times. The first expedition (1405-7) involved more
than three hundred ships and twenty-seven thousand seamen,
and took Zheng He to the southern coast of Vietnam, to Java,
Sumatra, Malacca, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and Calicut (on the west
coast of southern India). In the process, Zheng He intervened
in the affairs of some other states, including a conflict over royal
succession in a Javanese kingdom. During subsequent expedi-
tionsZheng He made the kingdoms of Calicut, Cochin, and
Ceylon vassals of the Ming empire, and Chinese troops inter-
•
i8o The Book of Stratagems
vened in the internal affairs of a sultanate in Sumatra. The

longest expedition, in the years 1417-19, brought Zheng He to
the Arabian Peninsula and the East African coast.
According to later depictions of Chinese history, the Emper-
or's purpose in mounting these expeditions was to gain prestige
on the seas of East Asia. But the author of the Taipei stratagem
book claims that such prestige was only "the sheep that fell
by chance into China's hands," while the real goal of the
expeditions —the destruction of the Jianwen Emperor, presumed

to be living abroad — was never achieved. The political gains,
says the Taipei author, were exploited later through the use of
Stratagem No. 12, in order to mask the failure of the expedi-
tions' real purpose. He supports this assertion by pointing out
that never before had a Chinese Emperor dem-
felt the need to
onstrate his authority outside the boundaries of his realm. More-
over, if prestige had really been the main objective, the Emperor
would certainly not have entrusted the foreign missions to a
eunuch, since eunuchs were not considered the highest repre-
sentatives of Chinese culture.
The biography of Zheng He included in the Ming shi (History
of the Ming Dynasty), published in China in 1739, seems to
support that assertion. It includes this statement:
Emperor Chengzu (the Yongle Emperor) suspected that

Emperor Hui (the Jianwen Emperor) had fled abroad; he
wanted him pursued. He also wanted the splendor of his
army to penetrate remote regions and to display China's
wealth and power.
12.7 Waiting for the Peach
Zhao Zhongsen, a factory worker from Kaifeng, was quoted in
the February 5, 1 977, issue of the People's Daily with a variation

on the original formulation of Stratagem No. 12:
To work is Again and again one encounters

to struggle.
opposition and resistance. Responding to these is a serious
i 8 i
problem. There are people who depend entirely on "wait-

and-see." They wait and wait for the problem to resolve
itself. If waiting proves unsuccessful, they disclaim all re-
sponsibilityby pointing out that they have done nothing.

But if the problem clears up while they wait, they then
"pluck the peach as they go" [i.e., they exploit the oppor-
tunity to take credit for themselves].
12.8 Juggling with the Facts
In an issue of the Beijing newspaper Guangming Daily published

in December 1978, one Shi Qiao attacked the operations of the
so-called Gang of Four and its supporters:
They select individual facts from overall reality, isolate

them from the rest, and then proceed to draw absurd con-
clusions from them. For example, one or two mistakes by
an official are selected from a total of 100 acts, and by
keeping about the 90-plus percent of positive achieve-
silent
ments, the [isolated mistakes] are put forward as proof of
his incompetence.
According to Shi Qiao, over the years this "counterrevolutionary

trick" has led some Chinese comrades into the bad habit of
juggling with facts. They emphasize how important it is to keep
contact with reality but then confine themselves to "seizing the
opportunity to steal the sheep that cross their path" — i.e., se-
lecting a few fragmentary data and bits of documentation out
of a whole range of material. "In this way they try to prove
that they are in the right."
12.9 Promoting the Sheep
An editorial comment in the Heilongjiang periodical Party Life

about strategies and tactics used in gaining or awarding pro-
182 •
motions was deemed important enough to be picked up by the

official People's Daily on April 3, 1984:
In considering the promotion of young Party officials, one

repeatedly encounters generally favored "sheep." These are
people with a malleable character; they say "Yes" and
"Amen" and
to everything, are mediocre in their morals
expertise, and never cause the leadership any difficulties.
. Promotions fall readily into their laps. [Such people]
. .
are "raised up with a light hand."

This is inappropriate . . . not because these individuals
might cause disorder or unrest, but out of concern that they
will contribute nothing, have insufficient qualifications
. will undertake nothing and achieve nothing, indeed,
. .
that they will pull down the general level of achievement.

It is obvious that someone who always says "Yes" and
"Amen" and looks to the leadership before making a move,
when he himself is elevated to a high post, will continue
to look to the higher leadership [for guidance] and will
continue to do only second- or third-class work. It is easy
to "seize the opportunity to promote [such] a sheep," but
that will not help to bring about a new beginning [for
China].
12.10 Spoons Fly without Wings
In the Chinese press, Stratagem No. 12 is often cited in con-

nection with casual or petty theft, which aptly illustrates an
interpretation of No. 12 made during the Qing period by Gu
Zhangsi:
"Seizing the opportunity to steal the sheep" means lying

in wait for an opportunity to commit a theft.
In March 1983 the People's Daily complained that certain peo-

ple "seize the chance to steal the sheep, " the sheep here standing
for publicly owned objects, or the intellectual property of others.
In June 19X4 the Shanghai newspaper Jiefang ribao (Liber-
Seize the Opportunity to Lead the Sheep Away '183
ation Daily) used the phrase "Grabbing the chance to take a

plate away" who, during
as a headline over the story of a teacher
lunch at a school picnic, said to his neighbor, "You can't buy
this kind of plate at the market. I'm going to take it home."
"Stop people from 'stealing the sheep'!" was used by a re-

gional Chinese newspaper as the title of an article in which an
officer of a tobacco and alcohol company in a Shanghai district
observed, "Lately many restaurants have noticed that quite a

few of their spoons seem to have flown away without wings."
12.11 Taking Home the Rope
A necessary condition for the execution of Stratagem No. 12,

says the Taiwanese stratagem book, 4 is that the "sheep" be led
away unobserved and unhampered. If one is disturbed in the
act, however, the ability to present a clever and plausible excuse
is a further requisite for success of the stratagem. In this context,
the 1969 Hong Kong stratagem book 5 offers the following
anecdote:
A cattle thief was brought before the judge and accused of

theft. But the thief defended himself by saying, "Since when
am I I saw a piece of rope lying on the road.
a cattle thief?
I up and brought it home with me. The cow that
picked it
was attached to the rope came along on its own."
The Taiwanese stratagem book describes the essence of No. 12

this way:
The use of Stratagem No. 12 involves not concentrating

one's attention on a single concern, but keeping one's field
of vision wide open so that all objective opportunities for
gain may be (a) recognized and (h) exploited.
Even the smallest advantage, hardly worth mentioning,
is not to be lightly dismissed. For small drops fill an ocean.
The value of the stratagem "Seize the opportunity to steal

the sheep" lies not in snatching an individual sheep, but in
the invisible gain generated by a permanent and funda-

mental alertness to —
every possibility and that gain is of
far greater value.
STRATAGEM N O 1 3
Beat the Qrass

to Startle the Snake
The Chinese
characters
Modern
# 4
da cao
i*
ftng
*&
she
Mandarin
pronunciation
Meaning of each beat grass startle snake

character (frighten)
Applications Beat the bushes: The stratagem of indirect warn

ing or deterrence.
Intimidation: The "warning shot" stratagem.
Provocation: The "agitation" stratagem.
13.1 A Shocked Conscience
One of the oldest sources for the formulation of this stratagem

is the work Nan Tang jin shi (Timely Facts from the Southern
Tang Dynasty), written by Zheng Wenbao in a.d. 977. He
reports that, during the Southern Tang Dynasty, a certain Wang
Lu, a greedy and corrupt official, was prefect of Dangtu District.
One day the people of his district submitted an official complaint
against his secretary, accusing the man of being open to bribery,
among other things. When Wang Lu read the accusations, which
applied equally to him, he was deeply shaken. While in that
mood he wrote, "You [i.e., the people of his district] have only
beaten the grass, but I am already a frightened snake."
Tradition does not confirm whether the intimidation of Wang
Lu was a deliberate aim of the complaint. In any case, his state-
ment is the source for the standard formulation of Stratagem
No. 13, which even found a place in Chinese Buddhist writings.
In the Chuan deng lu (Notes on Handing on the Lamp), a
collection of Buddhist teachings from the Song period, a Buddh-
187
i 8 8 •
ist master says, "I beat the grass, and the snake takes fright."
The allusion here is to the use of a stick or staff to administer
"clouts of illumination" to novices, a Buddhist pedagogical
practice reportedly introduced by the monk Deshan during the
Tang period. The novice's body receiving the blows is the
"beaten grass," while the novice's soul, thus rudely jolted out
of its worldly dreams — or, to use Chinese imagery, dreams
steeped in the "red dust" of this world — is the "snake."
13.2 Execute One to Warn a Hundred
Yin Wenggui, governor of Donghai during the reign of Emperor

Yuan of the Han (74-49 B.C.), is still remembered in the Peo-
ple's Republic for his exemplary use of this stratagem in com-
batting crime. Tradition has it that Yin Wenggui was a
conscientious official who kept strictly to the law. He always
investigated personally all criminal cases within his territory and
ordered that executions of those who had committed serious
crimes be carried out during his own tours of inspection or
during the assemblies of officials held every spring and autumn.
Behind this was the intention of "warning a hundred by exe-
cuting one." According to Yin Wenggui's biography in the Han
sbu (History of the Han Dynasty), officials and commoners alike
were duly impressed by this procedure; overcome by fear, they

changed ways and began to lead better lives.
their
Yin Wenggui personally executed the prominent criminal Xu
Zhongsun, whom Yin's predecessors had not dared to punish.
This execution shook the entire province. In the words of the
biography, "The whole area [under his governorship] was over-
come with fear and trembling, and no one dared break the law
anymore. The result was that peace and order returned to Dong-
hai during Yin Wenggui's time in office."
1
The "beating of the grass" in this instance is the exemplary

punishment of an individual, by means of which other criminal
Beat the Grass to Startle the Snake '189
elements ("frightened snakes") are deterred from further illegal
acts.
13.3 Kill a Chicken to Frighten the Monkey
Author Li Boyuan (1867-1906) uses a variant of Stratagem No.

13 in chapter 53 of his political novel Guanchang xianxing ji
(Exposing the World of Officialdom). Wenming, the Manchu-

rian governor-general of Jiangnan, is about to eat his lunch when
a foreign visitor is announced, the consul of some other country.
Why has he come? Some time ago Governor-General Wenming
executed a soldier in his bodyguard. That in itself, says the
visitor, isno great matter; His Excellency doubtless had his
reasons. "But the sentence was carried out in the wrong place
— that is, not on the parade ground but immediately next to
my consulate!" expostulates the aggrieved foreign official. And
he demands an explanation.
The governor-general is old but fortunately also very expe-
rienced and quick in his responses. "The Honorable Consul has
not asked me," he replies after a brief pause for thought, "just
who it was had executed. That soldier was a bad lot; he
that I
belonged to the Boxers and had taken part in all the harassment
aimed at your worthy country and other countries in our na-
tion's capital during the Boxer Rebellion."
"If he was a Boxer, he certainly deserved execution," says the

consul. "But why did it have to take place right next to our
consulate?"
Once again the governor-general pauses, and then responds,
"There was ample reason. The execution was meant to serve as
a warning to other Boxers. The Honorable Consul may not be
aware that these rebels wanted to topple the Qing Dynasty and
wipe out all foreigners. That is why I used this stratagem. I had
the scoundrel executed next to your consulate so that his fellow
conspirators could see what awaited them. There is an old say-
ing: 'Kill a chicken to frighten the monkey.' I had only one
•
soldier executed, but having seen it, the other Boxers will now
no longer dare to molest your consulate or your countrymen."
The foreign consul erupts in loud laughter, praises the gov-
ernor-general's foresight, and departs. After which the governor-
general returns to his chair, weak with relief at having gotten
himself out of a most unpleasant situation. For in reality the
execution had been held next to the foreign consulate purely by
oversight, withno particular motive behind it. His quick think-
ing and application of Stratagem No. 13, however, turned a
potential embarrassment into something that redounded to his
credit — an illustration of how the rhetorical use of stratagems
(provided they are correctly applied, of course) can rescue some-
one from a tight spot.
As the governor-general presented it, the soldier executed next
to the consulate was the "beaten grass," and his fellow Boxers
the "startled snakes."
13.4 Surveying the Land and

Winning a Concubine
In many cases the application of No. 13 is not limited to intim-

idating the "snake" in order to neutralize it, so to speak. At
another level of interpretation, according to other examples
cited in the relevant Chinese literature, "beating the grass" can
be used to agitate the snake and provoke it to certain actions.
In the brief tale "Surveying the Land and Winning a Con-
cubine," recounted in the Prologue to this volume, the boy's
brazen references to his eventual inheritance ("beating the
grass") not only infuriate his aunt ("the snake") but, since she
is determined not to let the boy inherit, provoke her into urging
her husband to take a concubine, thus yielding what she had
previously been denying him.
Beat the Grass to Startle the Snake -191
13.5 Marriage as a Way Out
The King of Zhongshan had two concubines, court ladies named

Yin and Jiang. Both hoped to become queen, and they secretly
fought each other bitterly. The rivalry between the ladies seemed
to offer Counsellor Sima Xi an opportunity to gain wealth and
influence. So he sent an emissary to Lady Yin, to deliver the
following message anonymously:
It isno easy thing to become queen. If you achieve it, you

become the first lady in the land, with power and authority.
But if you fail, not only your life but those of your family
will be in danger. So either give up that goal or else take
up the challenge. If the latter, do so only if victory is as-
sured. Sima Xi is the only person who can guarantee your
success.
Lady Yin thereupon paid a secret visit to Sima Xi, who en-
chanted her by laying out a clever plan. When he had finished,
she thanked Heaven and Earth and said, "If you succeed, I will
reward you richly," leaving him with an advance gift of money.
In keeping with his plan, Sima Xi sent a memorandum to the
King with a plan for strengthening their own kingdom and
weakening those of their neighbors. The monarch was highly
intrigued and sent for Sima Xi to give him more precise details.
The counsellor proposed that he be sent on a state visit to the
kingdom of Zhao, where he would secretly study the military
installations, topography, and political situation. Only after his
return would he be in a position to work out a precise plan.
His ruler gave him gold and gifts and sent him off to Zhao.
After the official talks with the ruler of Zhao, Sima Xi re-
marked during the confidential part of their discussion that he
had heard great praises for the beauty of Zhao's women. "To
be honest," he continued, "I've traveled all over the world, have
seen beautiful women everywhere, but never have I found one
to compare with Lady Yin in my own country. To me she seems
like a fairy who has floated down to earth. No one can describe
her beauty in words or depict it with brush and ink."
The King of Zhao's heart beat faster at these words, and he
quickly asked, "Could she be acquired on my behalf?"
Growing thoughtful, Sima Xi replied, "I was just remarking
on it. If Your Highness wishes the lady for himself, alas, I can
be of no help. Although she is but a lady of the court, our King
loves her passionately. But I beg Your Highness, do not speak
of this to anyone or it may cost me my head."
The King of Zhao smiled craftily and let it be understood that
he wanted that woman at all costs.
Sima Xi returned to Zhongshan and reported to his king. In
doing so, he complained about the immorality and corruption
of the King of Zhao, who thought only of women. "Inciden-
tally," he added, "I have it from an impeccable source that the
King of Zhao is secretly planning to get his hands on Lady Yin."
The ruler of Zhongshan roared his displeasure, but Sima Xi

admonished him to keep calm and said, "At present, Zhao is
stronger than we are. We could not conquer it. If the King of
Zhao demands Lady Yin, we must hand her over. If we do not,
Zhao would regard it as a hostile gesture and would attack and
destroy us. Of course, if we do turn her over, we will become
a laughingstock and people will say that we are so weak we are
even forced to hand Your Highness's concubine to another
ruler."
"What shall we do?" asked the King.
Calmly Sima Xi replied, "There is only one way out, and that
is to formally make Lady Yin your queen. That will dampen
Zhao's desire. No ruler has ever desired as his wife the queen
of another land."
"Excellent!" said the King. And so Lady Yin easily became
queen of the realm.
Here, Sima Xi's sexual titillation of the Zhao ruler may be
regarded as "beating the grass," and the King of Zhongshan is
No. 13 serves as a strat-

the startled "snake." In this instance
agem of provocation by which the King of Zhongshan is pro-
voked into marrying his concubine Lady Yin.
Beat the Grass to Startle the Snake • i 9 3
13.6 The Dangers of Yaoshan
In 627 B.C., Duke Mu of Qin decided to invade the remote state

of Zheng. Minister Jian Shu warned against a campaign with
tired troops in a distant territory, but the ruler ignored him.
Jian Shu sadly accompanied the departing army a little way

along the road and warned General Meng Mingshi about Yao-
shan (Mount Yao), which would have to be dealt with on the
homeward march and where there was danger of an ambush.
But the general, self-confident and high-spirited, paid no atten-
tion to the adviser's warning.
Having failed in his campaign, General Meng Mingshi re-
turned over Mount Yao without sending any advance scouts

ahead of the main army. All he did was divide his troops into
four columns, which marched one behind the other. The for-
ward column was ambushed by a small squad of enemy soldiers,
who quickly retreated, however. Without further scouting the

territory, Meng Mingshi marched narrow val-
his troops into a
ley, until they were completely surrounded by enemy units wait-
ing to attack. The Qin army was wiped out completely.
This incident was first recounted in Sima Qian's Records of the

Historian and retold in the 1989 Beijing stratagem book. It
illustrates the possibly catastrophic consequences of ignoring

the stratagem "Beat the grass to frighten the snake." In this
case, that tactic would have meant sending an advance party
ahead to lure the waiting enemy out of ambush, instead of
marching an entire army into unknown territory without first
scouting the situation.
13.7 The Cautious Sima Yi
After the fall of the Han Dynasty in a.d. 220, three kingdoms
were formed in China: Wei in the north, Wu in the southeast,
and Shu in the southwest. As we have already seen, Shu was
founded by Liu Bei, a descendant of the imperial Han clan. In
an effort to restore the rule of the Han Dynasty over the entire
empire, Shu undertook several campaigns against Wei between
a.d. 225 and 234.
In the year 231, Shu's Prime Minister Zhuge Liang launched
the fifth campaign against Wei. Once again his opponent was
General Sima Yi. For a long time the two armies faced each
other on Mount Qishan without engaging in combat, since Sima
Yi preferred avoiding a direct confrontation. Suddenly the news
reached Zhuge Liang that Wei had come to an agreement with
the kingdom of Wu and was taking advantage of Zhuge Liang's
absence to attack the western part of Shu. In order to avoid
becoming entangled in a two-front war, Zhuge Liang sounded
the retreat.Sima Yi learned of this from spies, though he had
heard nothing as yet about the alliance between Wu and Wei.
Suspecting that Zhuge Liang was employing the stratagem
known as yin she cbu dong, or "lure the snake from its hole,"
he refrained at first from pursuing the Shu troops and rejected
the advice of Zhang He, one of his unit commanders, that they
give chase immediately. Only when new intelligence reached
him about the Shu army's withdrawal did Sima Yi leave his
mountain stronghold. However, fearing that Zhuge Liang might
have laid a trap for him, he decided to employ the stratagem
of "Beat the grass to frighten the snake."
This time when Zhang He pressed to launch the pursuit, Sima
Yi agreed. But, with Stratagem No. 13 in mind, he allowed him
to take only a fewthousand cavalry troops with him, keeping
the main force to march behind them. Having waited impa-
tiently for a direct clash with the Shu army, Zhang He rode
furiously ahead with his men. But, as Sima Yi had suspected,
Zhuge Liang had laid a trap in the valley into which hotheaded
Beat the Grass to Startle the Snake •
i 9 5
Zhang He now galloped. The latter did not suspect that he had
been chosen by Sima Yi as the "stick" with which to startle the
"snake" out of hiding. When Zhang He had penetrated deep

into the valley, a group of Shu soldiers suddenly sprang out of
the woods and Wei Yan, challenged Zhang He to
their leader,
combat. After only a few passes, however, Wei Yan turned tail
and appeared to flee. Without hesitation, Zhang He and his
troops pursued the apparently retreating Shu. As darkness fell,
theWei vanguard rode through a ravine. Suddenly tree limbs

came crashing down from all sides and Shu soldiers waiting in
ambush showered the Wei troops with arrows, wiping out all
of them.
When the news reached Sima Yi, he congratulated himself for
having used Stratagem No. 13 and thus having kept his main
fighting force intact. 2
In dealing with No. 13, books on the 36 Stratagems sometimes

cite a statement from the chapter on "Maneuvering Armies" in
Sun Tzu's classic The Art of War:
When an army is traveling, if there is hilly territory with

many streams and ponds or depressions overgrown with
reeds, or wild forests with a luxuriant growth of plants and
trees, it is imperative to search them carefully and thor-
oughly. For these afford stations for bushwackers. 3
13.8 The Battle on Korea's Chongdong Plateau
In the Beijing stratagem book reissued in 1989, 4 reference is
made to the Chinese army's attack on the northwestern high-

lands of Chongdong during the Korean War. The enemy was
dug into positions in two tunnels and a large number of bunkers
and dugouts. The Chinese attackers had two regiments, sup-
ported by some artillery and a few tanks. On the evening of
i^6- The Book of Stratagems
November 4, 1951, two Chinese squads made a sudden advance

and fired at the enemy from both flanks. A bitter twenty-minute
exchange of fire forced the enemy to leave their fortifications
and enter the fray. Once the enemy's troop strength and fire-
power had become visible, the two advance squads pulled back
quickly and the Chinese opened up with rocket launchers, field
artillery, howitzers, and tanks, inflicting heavy losses on the

enemy.
Here, the initial attack by the two advance squads is the
equivalent of "beating the grass" to lure the enemy, like the
snake, out of its hiding place.
13.9 Firing at Dummies
According to the Beijing stratagem book, when the British and

French launched their landing operations at Port Said, on the
Suez Canal, in November 1956, they first sent wood-and-rubber
dummies down by parachute. The Egyptians, believing they
were real paratroopers, opened fire with their land-based artil-
lery. Then Egyptian soldiers were sent out to pin down and kill
the paratroopers. In this way the Egyptians revealed what they

had in the way of artillery and troops. With this information
in hand, the French and British sent in their aircraft and dealt
5
the Egyptians heavy losses.
13.10 The Dream of the Hundred Flowers
In its chapter on No. 13, the Hong Kong stratagem book cites
the following example:

In 1957 the Communist Party of China wanted to uncover
all elements hostile to it inside Party ranks, the bureaucracy,
and cultural circles. To that end, the campaign known as "Let
a hundred flowers bloom" was launched, ostensibly to create
197
an atmosphere which diverse opinions could be freely ex-

in
pressed. There was an enormous reaction throughout the coun-

try. From peasant villages to major cities, from public school
teachers to university professors, countless Chinese gave vent

The movement did not last long, however.
to their disaffection.
It was quickly broken off and followed by renewed repression
aimed at liquidating the "right." Many of those who had openly

expressed themselves during the days of the "hundred flowers"
movement now suffered the consequences.
Years later, the use of that ruse to "startle the snakes" out
of their hiding placeswas still a source of bitterness to many
Chinese. In November 1979 the Beijing newspaper Guangming
Daily wrote: 6
There are [still] people who regard the Party norm "Let a
hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools contend" as
a stratagem, employed to "lure the snake out of its hole."
In 1986, the thirtieth anniversary of the "hundred flowers"

movement was celebrated throughout the People's Republic.
Even today, the "hundred flowers" party norm is still upheld,
in the sense of a certain degree of pluralism in literature and
the arts and sciences — limited, of course, by a strict insistence
that the Party's absolute authority not be endangered. At the

same time, this party norm also continues to be applied as a
stratagem, insofar as it repeatedly encourages some "snakes"
to leave their "holes," whereupon they are promptly caught by
the Party.
13.11 The Return of the Monkey King
"Get out of my sight!" said the monk Tripitaka to his com-

panion, the Monkey King Sun Wukong. With those words, Tri-
pitaka dismounted from his horse and told his other companion,
Sha the Sand Monk, to bring him paper and a brush. Then he
drew a little water from a nearby stream, wet his ink stone and
rubbed it against a rock to get some ink, and wrote out a
certificate of dismissal on the spot.
"Mangy ape! Take this paper. I don't want you as a disciple
anymore. If I ever set eyes on you again, I'll cast you down into
the deepest cavern of Hell!"
The Monkey King hastily took the document and said, "Mas-
ter, there's no need to swear an oath. I'm going!" He bowed
reverentially before Tripitaka, and then gave a bit of advice to
the Sand Monk.

"If during the journey a monster comes and overpowers the
Master, you need only tell the monster that I, Monkey King,
the
was the Master's first disciple. Since my abilities are known to
all fiends and monsters, none will dare to do the Master any
harm."
The Monkey King had every reason to be self-confident. Born
in ancient times of a Heaven-fertilized stone egg, he had become
ruler of the Monkey Kingdom to the east, in the middle of the
Great Sea, on an island named Flower-Fruit Mountain. A Pa-
triarch taught him the secret of immortality and inducted him
into all the magic arts. The Monkey King was able to change
his form at will, to multiply himself, and even to make himself
invisible. He was master of all the elements and could fly on
the clouds across thousands of miles in a twinkling. His diamond

pupils saw through everything and everyone. As a weapon he
carried a huge iron cudgel with golden hooks on all sides, and
he used it without hesitation whenever he spotted a monster,
no matter in how pleasant a form it appeared. The cudgel would
grow to monstrous proportions whenever he commanded it to
do so, or it would shrink to the size of a needle, which he could
then stick behind his ear for safekeeping. Once, however, he
had sent all the Heavens into an uproar with his unruly behavior,
and none of its inhabitants could stop him. So the Heavenly
King had had no choice but to acknowledge his power and give
him the rank of "Great Sage, Equal to Heaven."
But the Monkey King continued to misbehave. He ate fruit
from the Immortal Peach Garden which he had been entrusted
i 99
to supervise, drank of the Heavenly Nectar without permission,

and gobbled down all the Pills of Life concocted by Lao-tse. It
was only the Buddha himself who managed to imprison the
Monkey King under the Mountain of the Five Elements. He
remained there for five centuries, until he finally repented of his
former behavior and was freed in order to help the monk Tri-
pitaka to obtain the sacred scriptures from the West.
Now Tripitaka wanted nothing more to do with him. "I am
a good monk," he said. "Never again will the name of a villain
such as you cross my lips. Now get out of here!"
Seeing that his Master would not relent, the Monkey King
took his departure, somersaulted onto a cloud which instantly
transported him thousands of miles away, and headed for his
old kingdom on the Flower-Fruit Mountain.
What had brought things to this pass?
On his journey westward to India to seek the sacred scriptures
of Buddhism, Tripitaka, who was traveling with his two stal-
warts Sha the Sand Monk and Zhu Bajie the pig, as well as the
Monkey King, had reached the mighty White Tiger Mountain,
where the demon Lady White Bone lived. She had already heard
of the monk Tripitaka and knew that anyone who ate the flesh
of that pious man would gain immortality. To get near him,
the demon disguised herself as a charming girl and offered the
hungry monk food. With his diamond pupils, the Monkey King
immediately recognized the demon for what she was and, raising
his great cudgel, dealt the "girl" a mighty blow. But the demon
knew some magic, too, and just before the blow landed she
slipped away into the air, leaving behind her the horribly mauled
corpse of what apparently had been a beautiful maiden.
Horrified by the Monkey King's brutality, Tripitaka was pre-
pared to dismiss him from his service but was softened by his
pleading and forgave him. The demon, however, did not give
up. She came back down from the cloud on which she had been
recovering, took on the form of an old woman, and walked
down the mountain toward the pilgrims, crying bitterly. Seeing
this figure, Zhu Bajie cried to Tripitaka, "That is doubtless the
mother of the girl killed by the wicked monkey."
•
Once again the Monkey King saw through the demon's dis-
guise and swung his cudgel. And once again the demon left a
false corpse behind, in the form of the old woman. Tripitaka
was so dismayed that he fell off his horse. Once more he was
on the verge of dismissing the Monkey King but was persuaded
to forgive him again.
The third time was too much. The demon came down the
mountain in the form of an old man with white hair, reciting
Buddhist sutras. His daughter had disappeared, he said, and

now his wife as well, and there had been nothing left for him
but to take to the road himself, to see what had happened to
them.
The Monkey King, seeing through the ruse, ordered the local
spirits and the mountain god to position themselves in the air
around the spot, so that the demon could not get away. And
this time his blow not only smashed the demon's external form,
it truly destroyed the she-monster forever. All that remained
was her original substance: a heap of white bones. Seeing them,
Tripitaka was prone to believe the Monkey King's insistence
that he had indeed killed a demon. But his pig-shaped disciple
Bajie shouted, "It's murder! He was afraid of your punishment,
Master, and so he turned the old man's body into a heap of
bones to deceive you."
Tripitaka believed Zhu Bajie, and so he banished the Monkey
King — which is where we began this tale.
Now the monk, his two remaining disciples, and his white
horse cross White Tiger Mountain and come to the Black Pine
Forest. There Tripitaka is overcome by hunger. Dismounting
from his horse, he sends Bajie on a search for vegetarian nour-
ishment. Zhu Bajie hikes for ten miles or more without en-
countering a living soul and eventually sinks down into the grass
and falls asleep. Since his emissary fails to return, Tripitaka
sends Sand Monk to look for him.
Left alone in the forest, Tripitaka cannot sit still for long and
sets out to look around him. Soon he comes to a golden pagoda,
not knowing that it is inhabited by the Yellow Robe Fiend. The
fiend takes him prisoner, but thanks to the intercession of the
Third Princess of the Precious Image Kingdom, he is released.

This princess had been captured by the Yellow Robe Fiend
thirteen years earlier and forced to become his wife. Now she
secretly gives Tripitaka a letter to take to her parents —which
is why she so warmly urges the fiend to let the monk go.
Arriving in the Precious Image Kingdom, Tripitaka gives the
letter to the King, who, having read it, asks the monk to go
back and subjugate the fiend. But Tripitaka is incapable of such
a thing. His two disciples Sand Monk and Zhu Bajie, who have
some magical abilities, offer to go instead. But they have over-
estimated their abilities. Sand Monk is taken prisoner, and Bajie
runs off in the middle of the fight with the fiend and hides in
the grass.
The Yellow Robe Fiend now transforms himself into a hand-
some youth and thus gains entry to the court of the Precious
Image Kingdom, with the pretext of asking acceptance as the
King's son-in-law. Before the King's eyes, he changes Tripitaka
into a tiger, claiming that he is in fact a tiger who has only
assumed the form of a monk. Tripitaka is caught and caged.
Left alone, Tripitaka's white horse — really a small dragon
king who had been changed into Tripitaka's horse as a punish-
ment for his crimes —hears news of his Master's fate and regains
his original form in order to save him. Seeing the fiend alone in
the throne chamber, he turns himself into a lithe young court
lady who serves the fiend a great deal of wine and then tries to
kill it while performing a sword dance. A battle ensues, in which
the fiend injures the dragon-horse-lady with a candlestick.
Weakened, the dragon manages to escape into the water of the
palace moat and that same night meets with Zhu Bajie, who
has returned. After some effort, the dragon persuades Zhu Bajie
to set out for the Flower-Fruit Mountain, where he is to get the
Monkey King to return, defeat the fiend, and rescue Tripitaka.
Zhu Bajie, going on this mission reluctantly, tries to lure the
Monkey King back with a lie. He has been sent by Tripitaka,
he claims, who misses the Monkey King and wants him to
return. (It is Zhu Bajie's idea that, if the Monkey King goes
back and sees his former Master in desperate straits, he will
•
surely help.) But the Monkey King shows Bajie his realm, seems
very content, and is not inclined to return. So Zhu Bajie leaves
the Monkey Kingdom in failure. Hardly has he gone a few miles,
however, when he turns around and shouts curses back at his
former companion. Spies report this to the Monkey King, who
angrily has Bajie arrested and brought before him. Now Zhu
Bajie has no choice but to reveal his real purpose in coming.
"The white dragon-horse said that you are good, honorable,
and noble. A noble soul does not cling to old hurts, he said,
and you'd surely be willing to rescue our Master. I plead with
you, Elder Brother. Remember the saying 'He who is your
teacher for one day is your father for a lifetime.' For the sake
of Heaven, come back with me and save Tripitaka!"
"Fool," cries the Monkey King. "Didn't I tell you when I left
that, if ever some demon should pursue our Master, you were
to say that I, Sun Wukong, am his chief disciple? Why didn't
you heed my advice?"

Zhu Bajie says to himself, "Asking a general to act is not as
good as provoking a general to act. So . . . I'll provoke him."
And aloud he says, "Elder Brother, it would have been better
ifI had never mentioned you. As soon as I did, the demon
became livid with rage."
"What did you tell him?"
"I said, 'Fiend, don't be so impudent. Leave our Master in
peace. Do you know who my Elder Brother is? Sun Wukong,
the Monkey King, whose magic powers can overcome any mon-
ster. If he should turn up here, you wouldn't find an inch of
ground in which to rest your corpse.'
"But hearing this, the fiend grew even more furious and
started to curse. 'Sun Wukong, is it? You don't think I'm afraid
of him, do you? Let him come. I'll skin him alive, strip his
muscles, gnaw and devour his heart. He may be a
his bones,
skinny monkey, but I'll cut him up into little pieces and fry him
in oil.'"
Hearing this, the Monkey King springs up wildly, scratches
his cheeks, pulls his earlobes, and howls, "Who was it who had
1
the nerve to speak thus of me?'

203
"Calm yourself, Elder Brother," says Zhu Bajie. "It was the
Yellow Robe Fiend who spoke of you with such disrespect. I
am merely repeating his words."

"Rise, dear Brother," saysMonkey. "I don't really want to
leave here, but since the fiend hashad the temerity to abuse me
this way, I cannot let him go unpunished. I'm coming with you.
Five hundred years ago I turned Heaven upside down, and all
the celestial spirits bowed before me, respectfully calling me
'Great Sage.' Now an uncouth demon dares to slander me be-
hind my back! Well, he'll pay dearly for it. I'll catch him and
cut him up into mincemeat. And after taking my revenge, I'll
return home again."

"Fine, Brother," says Zhu Bajie hurriedly. "You come with
me now and take care of the fiend. After that, whether you
return or not is entirely up to you."
Thus it was that Zhu Bajie, in Journey to the West, applied the
stratagem of provocation, formulated in the words "Asking a
general to act is not as good as provoking a general to act,"
and succeeded in persuading the Monkey King to return to earth
and rescue Tripitaka.
// jiang ji, also known as Ji jiang fa, the stratagem of "pro-
voking the general," is virtually identical with No. 13. Some
form of provocation is used to emotionally motivate another
person to perform an act which, under normal circumstances
— if merely asked or cajoled —he would not perform. An appeal
is made to his vanity or pride, so that he loses his head, or else
(as a Beijing University professor suggested) he is persuaded to
a belief in his own omnipotence or the inevitability of his plans.
Alternatively, feelings are aroused in him of anger, shame,
honor, jealousy, envy, etc. In any case, the matter is handled in
such a way that the person does not notice how he is being
manipulated by his opponent, and under the latter's guidance
he does what the provocateur wants him to do — as in the next
case.
204 *
13.12 The Pavilion of the Bronze Sparrow
As the army of Cao Cao, ruler of northern China, advanced,

many voices were raised in the eastern kingdom of Wu call-
ing for capitulation. General Zhou Yu, who served as the leading
foreign policy adviser to the ruler of Wu, inclined toward ac-
cepting Cao Cao's rule. Wu's ruler was undecided and waited
for Zhou Yu's decision in the matter. War or peace depended
on that one man.
Suddenly, Zhou Yu received a visit from Zhuge Liang, com-
mander of Liu Bei's army. Shortly before, Liu Bei had paid three
visits to Zhuge Liang's mountain hut [see Section 16.13, "Three
Visits to the Thatched Hut"] to recruit his help in strengthening

Shu in southwestern China. Having thrown in his lot with Liu
Bei,Zhuge Liang realized that if the kingdom of Wu were to
fall Cao Cao's hands, Cao Cao would then become
into so
powerful that his realm would sooner or later envelop all of
China. Such a fatal development had to be prevented if Liu Bei
were to have any chance of achieving his ambitious objectives.
At first Lu Su, a military adviser to the court of Wu who was
accompanying Zhuge Liang, pressed Zhou Yu to agree to a war
against Cao Cao. But Zhou Yu replied that he had no wish to
oppose Cao Cao, who was, after all, acting in the name of the
Han Emperor. He was also very strong. An attack against him
was simply too risky. "In my opinion," said Zhou Yu, "war
would mean certain defeat, while conciliation will bring peace."
"You are mistaken," stammered Lu Su. "Our land has been
ruled by the same dynasty for three generations. It cannot be
suddenly ceded to another. Why do you adopt the stance of a
weakling?"
"If the people of this land were to be devastated by war as a
result of my decision, I would earn their hatred. So I am deter-
mined to advise our ruler to yield to Cao Cao."

"But you are underestimating the power of our ruler, and the
favorable topography of our land. If Cao Cao attacks us, it is
highly questionable whether he will attain his objective."

The two men continued to dispute one another for a time,

while Zhuge Liang sat there smiling. Finally Zhou Yu asked
him the reason for his smile, whereupon Zhuge Liang replied,
"I am smiling at your interlocutor, Lu Su. He does not realize
what hour has struck."
"Sir, what do you mean by that?" inquired Lu Su.
"I mean," said Zhuge Liang, "that Zhou Yu is quite right in

advocating capitulation."
"Clearly, Zhuge Liang understands the signs of the times,"
interjected Zhou Yu. "He agrees with me."
SaidLu Su, "Is that really your opinion, Zhuge Liang?"
Zhuge Liang responded, "Capitulation means safety for the
women and children; it will bring wealth and high position . .
."
Lu Su broke in angrily, "Do you really wish my Master to

kneel before that rebel Cao Cao?"
Zhuge Liang replied, "I have a stratagem. If we apply it, you
need give no sheep and no kegs of wine as gifts to Cao Cao nor
cede him any land or seals of high office. It will not even be
necessary to cross the river to meet him. All you would have to
do is send a boat with two people in it to Cao Cao. As soon as
he has these two individuals in his grasp, his army will lay down
its weapons, roll up its flags, and withdraw."
"With which two persons could one achieve such a huge
effect?" inquired Zhou Yu.
"Two people who are as expendable in this populous land as
two leaves from a great tree or two grains of corn from a
granary. Yet, if Cao Cao could get his hands on them, he would
gladly depart."
"Well, about which two people do you speak?" Zhou Yu
insisted impatiently.
Zhuge Liang explained. "When I was living in the
Finally,
Longzhong Mountains, 7 I heard that Cao Cao had had a pa-
vilion built along the Zhang River and called it the Pavilion of
the Bronze Sparrow. It is a most magnificent place. Cao Cao
then searched out the most beautiful women
in the land and
bade them take up residence there. He you must know, a
is, as
great womanizer. For a long time now, he has known about
•
two beauties who live in this area. They both come from the
Qiao family. So beautiful are they, that at the sight of them fish
sink thoughtfully beneath the waves, birds tumble from the
skies, the moon hides its face, and blossoms blush with shame.
Cao Cao has sworn that he lusts after only two things in this
world: the imperial throne, and the two beauties named Qiao,
with whom he hopes to amuse himself in his old age at the
Pavilion of the Bronze Sparrow. According to his oath, having
attained those two goals he will go to his grave one day without
regrets. The real motive for his advance upon this land is pos-
session of those two women!"
Turning now to Zhou Yu, Zhuge Liang continued, "One
could approach the father of those two beautiful sisters, buy
them from him for a thousand gold pieces, and send them across
the river to Cao Cao. Once he has achieved the real objective
of this war, he will withdraw satisfied. Why not employ this
little stratagem?"
"What proof do you have that Cao Cao feels such fiery lust
for the Qiao sisters?"

Zhuge Liang replied, "At his behest, his son Cao Zhi com-
posed the 'Ode to the Pavilion of the Bronze Sparrow.' The
entire poem deals only with Cao Cao's burning desire for the
imperial throne and for the two Qiao women. I believe I could
recite the poem by heart, if you wish it, since I admire it for its
beauty."
"Go ahead, try Zhou Yu.
it," said
So Zhuge Liang recited the "Ode to the Pavilion of the Bronze
—
Sparrow" a lengthy poem in which Cao Cao sings of his an-
ticipated lusty life after gaining the imperial throne, sporting
with the two beauties in the wondrous pavilion. Or so, at least,
it seemed to Zhou Yu, as he heard lines such as these:
Two towers and right,

rise to the left
one called Jade Dragon and the other Gold Phoenix,

united with the two Qiaos, in the east
and in the south, in the thicket of desire.
Zhou Yu listened to the entire poem and then suddenly sprang

up in fury. Shaking his fist toward the north, the direction from
which Cao Cao's army approached, he thundered, "You old
rebel, you humiliate me too deeply now!"
Zhuge Liang also jumped up, and inquired, "Why are you so
excited about two common women?"
"You clearly do not know, sir," said Zhou Yu, "that the elder
of the two sisters is the widow of Sun Ce, father of our present
ruler, and that the younger is my wife."
Zhuge Liang pretended vast astonishment and said, "No in-

deed, I did not know. What a fatal error I have made. What a
fatal error!"
Now Zhou Yu intoned, "Either I or the old rebel will have

to die. We cannot both continue to live. That I swear!"
This episode drawn from The Romance of the Three King-

is
doms. Cao Cao had indeed built a Pavilion of the Bronze Spar-
row. But in the poem which Zhuge Liang recites, the passage
dealing with the "two Qiaos" and their being united in the
"thicket of desire" actually referred to two suspension bridges
connecting the towers to one another. For one of the meanings
of the word qiao in Chinese is "bridge." Zhuge Liang exploited
the similarity of sound between the word and the family name
Qiao to make Zhou Yu believe that the poem (which, inciden-
tally, appears in no source other than the novel itself) referred
to the two sisters. By so doing he kindled the general's anger
and so arrived at his goal indirectly: winning Zhou Yu's support
for a campaign against Cao Cao. (See Section 9.1, "The Vic-
torious Observer," for the outcome of that campaign.)
•
13.13 How a History Lesson Won

the Championship
In his handbook on sports tactics (published in Beijing, 1985),

world table tennis champion Zhuang Zedong relates the fol-
lowing:
It was evident before the twenty-sixth Ping-Pong World

Championships [in Beijing, 1961] that the finals would be
between China and Japan. The Japanese were favored by
the public and the experts, and China was not given much
of a chance. Several members of our team were very fearful,
and a dark shadow lay over my heart as well. Before the
final matches I was sitting on a stool, torturing myself with
the question of how to beat the Japanese. Suddenly I heard

a soft voice address me. I looked up and saw an old sports
official. I quickly rose and offered him my seat. But, un-
expectedly, he did not sit down. There was an intense,
gloomy look on his face, the muscles of which kept work-
ing. I wondered why this old master, who usually expressed
nothing but good cheer and sunshine, had such a dark

visage that day. As I stood there, he stretched his arms out,
rolled up his sleeves, and began to speak. He talked about
the scandalous humiliations our nation had suffered in the
past from imperialist aggressors. At that time, he said, the
great powers saw us as "the Sick Man of Asia." Time and
again we were the victims of ruthless attacks. "But today,"
he added, "as competitors on behalf of the Chinese people,
it is incumbent upon us to win honor for our nation and
increase its prestige in the world."

When he had finished speaking, he threw me a brief
glance and then silently left. Suddenly, my fearful feelings
had vanished totally. An unparalleled elan surged through
me and was determined to give my all for victory. This
I
energy did not fail me even when was unexpectedly called

I
on to play two final matches against the Japanese. In ret-

rospect see that the fighting spirit which the old sports
I
leader evoked in me was a decisive factor in our triumph

over Japan.
209
In this instance the "provoked general" is the Ping-Pong player

Zhuang Zedong. The old sports official pulled him out of the
emotional depths by inciting his patriotic emotions. In the course
of that year's world championship matches, a Chinese team won
the crown for the first time, and in the men's singles Zhuang
Zedong defended the title that had been won by a Chinese player
in 1959 in Dortmund, Germany.
13.14 The Tricky Hare
Hare went to God

and asked him for a new trick.
God spoke:
(i
Good. I have heard your request.
But first you must prove yourself.
You will bring me a live python.
You will bring me the fresh milk
of a buffalo cow.
You will bring me a gourd full of flies.
You will bring me a gourd full of mosquitoes.
When you have done all that,
you will bring me a live hyena.

Then I will add a new trick
to those you already know."
Hare went forth.
He took a gourd, went with it to the buffalo cow,
and said,
"This fills it, this fills it not,
this fills it, this fills it not."
"What are you saying?" asked the buffalo cow.
Hare answered, "If I were to milk
one of your udders, it would not suffice
to fill my gourd."
Said the cow, "Just wait, you'll see
how wrong you are."
•
no The Book of Stratagems
And Hare began to milk.

When the gourd was full, he closed it.
Then he went to the flies and said,
"This fills it, this fills it not.

33
This fills it, this fills it not.
The flies replied,
33
"Good brother Hare, what are you talking about?
"This gourd says that if all of you fly into it,
33
you would not fill it up.
They buzzed, metemetemete, and flew into the gourd.
Hare closed it up, menemeneku,
and went on his way.
He came to the mosquitoes and said,
"This fills it, this fills it not,
33
this fills it, this fills it not.
The mosquitoes asked: "Hey, Big Brother Hare,
3 33
what re you up to?
"This gourd says that if all of you fly into it,
33
you would not fill it up.
33
"Well, let's see, they said,
and and
they flew into the gourd filled it.
Hare closed it up, menemeneku,

and went on his way.
He cut himself a big stick.
The python asked, "Hey, what's happening?
33
What's up with you, Little Brother Hare?
3
"This stick wants to prove that it s
33
bigger than you, said Hafe.
3
"Fine, measure/ said the python.

let's
And when it had stretched itself out

alongside the stick,
Hare them together, krrr,
tied
put the stick and the snake over his shoulder,
and carried them away.
Then he went to the hyena.
The hyena asked, "Hey, where you go/;/'
with all that stuff?"
— —
211
Said Hare, "We're going together!

If you can carry me,
I'll climb on your back with all my things
and we'll go.
They've killed a great steer,
we'llgo there and eat some meat together."

The hyena said, "What?"
"It's true," said Hare.
"Okay, I'll follow you."
"No, I'll climb on your back."
"Right. Get on!"
Hop. Hare jumped onto the hyena's back,
grabbed its short mane,
and quickly put a bridle around its snout.
Then Hare began to sing.
They marched and marched
until they came to the Great God.
Hare offered God everything he had collected.
The Great God said, "heave everything here.
Go and bow down."
Hare ran a distance off and bent his back.
The Great God took a heavy object and wu! —
threw it at Hare.
Hare jumped up and stood stock-still.
"Ha!" said the Great God,
"if I would teach you another trick,
you'd trick me right off my throne." 9.
In this tale Hare seeks greater wisdom, an increase in his knowl-

edge of stratagems, in order to lord it over the other creatures.
Interestingly enough, it is God he approaches to teach him new
tricks. God sets him some "impossible tasks." Hare uses various
stratagems to accomplish them. In each case he opens with No.
13, the stratagem of provocation, by uttering arcane phrases
which arouse Then he uses No. 13 again
his victim's curiosity.
to provoke the other's self-esteem. The victim, of course, tries
to prove that he can do what Hare has claimed he cannot
and promptly falls into Hare's trap. In the case of the hyena,
Hare uses Stratagem No. 7, "Create something from nothing,"
and then uses the image of the slaughtered steer as the "brick"
(see Stratagem No. 17) with the aid of which he gains the
"jade" — that is, the prize, the hyena itself.
Finally, the Great God sets Hare one last task: to run off,
bowing as he goes. Then God throws something heavy at Hare,

who, hearing the sound of its passage through the air, jumps
—
up and then stands absolutely still thus violating the divine
commandment but probably saving his own life in the process.
In doing so, Hare has passed the final test: He has remained
alert even in the presence of God. But here the African deity
refuses to teach him any more tricks, because with greater wis-
dom Hare would become godlike and thus dangerous to God
(just as Adam and Eve, having eaten of the Tree of Knowledge
of Good and Evil, had become, as God says in Genesis, "like

one of us"). One of the aspects of this African tale is to present
the Great God as the highest source and wielder of stratagems. 9
13.15 Rhetorical Provocation
The stratagem book published in Taipei in 1986 10 recommends

No. 13 as a rhetorical tactic. It suggests that, in certain critical
conversations, one should not talk incessantly oneself but rather
provoke one's opponent with a few brief remarks so that he
begins to speak. The opponent's stream of verbiage should there-
after be interrupted only with a few provocative words, in order
to deduce from his pattern of reactions what he really thinks
about the matter under dispute. On

no account, continues the
author of the Taipei book, should one suddenly embark on a
lengthy sermon oneself, because that would give the opponent
a chance to return to quiet contemplation and reserve. In this
usage, "beating the grass" would be using a few provocative
remarks, while the "startled snake" is the opponent who is
provoked into excessive speech.

The philosopher Schopenhauer offers another variant of

No. 13 when used rhetorically:
Contradiction and contention irritate a man into exagger-

ating his statement. By contradicting your opponent you
may drive him into extending beyond its proper limits a
statement which, at all events within those limits and in
itself, is true; and when you refute this exaggerated form
of it, you look as though you had also refuted his original
11
statement.
Here, the "provocation" stratagem aims at so agitating an op-

ponent that he is provoked into making extreme statements,
which can then be easily disproved or shown to be lacking in
credibility. Schopenhauer continues his "Twenty-third Strata-
gem" with the following advice:
Contrarily, you must take care not to allow yourself to be

misled by contradictions into exaggerating or extending a
statement of your own. It will often happen that your op-
ponent will himself directly try to extend your statement
further than you meant it; here you must at once stop him,
and bring him back to the limit which you set up. "That's
what I said, and no more." 12
13.16 The Discourteous Host
The following incident, dating from the year 625

shows B.C.,
that an opponent's tongue need not always be loosened by

purely rhetorical means. It is drawn from the Confucian classic
the Zuo Commentary.
Against the advice of his minister, the King of Chu named
Prince Shangchen to be his successor. Later the monarch came
to regret his decision, preferring that his son Zhi succeed him.
So he decided to kill Shangchen. The Prince heard about the
plan but was unsure whether the rumor was true. He asked his
teacher Pan Chong how he could find out the truth. Pan Chong
told him, "Give a dinner for the King's sister, and treat her
rudely."
The Prince followed this advice. His rudeness provoked the
lady to anger, and she shouted, "Base scoundrel! No wonder
His Majesty intends to kill you and make Zhi his heir instead."
Shangchen told his teacher that the rumor was indeed true.
He then carried out a coup, during which the King of Chu
was killed. Shangchen succeeded him as King Mu and reigned
from 625 to 614 B.C.
In this instance Shangchen's calculated discourtesy is the equiv-

alent of "beating the grass," while the infuriated and therefore
loquacious royal sister is the "frightened snake."
Of course, like every stratagem,No. 13 can be turned into
foolishness through clumsy or thoughtless application. The re-
sult may be described by the phrase "waking a sleeping dog"
or "stirring up a hornets' nest." A premature warning, more-

over, could cause an opponent to be on his guard or to launch
a quick, preemptive strike.
STRATAGEM N O 1 4
Borrow a Corpse
for the Soul's Return
The Chinese
characters ft / A ^t
Modern jie shi hudn bun
Mandarin
pronunciation
Meaning of each borrow corpse return soul

character
Applications a. Revive something from the past by infusing

itwith new purpose. The "renewal" strat-
agem.
b. Explicitly or implicitly, give new polish to
old ideas, traditions, customs, works of lit-
erature, etc., and thus harness them for con-

temporary ideological or political purposes.
The "warming-over" stratagem.
c. Apply a patina of venerable age to something
that is actually new. The "patina" stratagem.
d. Use new institutions as instruments for car-
rying out old behavior patterns; use new per-
sonnel to carry out old policies. Don new
shoes, but tread an old path. Pour old wine
into new bottles. The "renovated facade"
stratagem.
e. Acquire the goods (or position or reputation)
of another by absorbing his strength or
power, in order to build up your own. The
"parasite" stratagem.
f. Exploit every possible means to overcome
a difficult situation. The "comeback" or
"phoenix" stratagem.
14.1 Li of the Iron Crutch
One of the oldest sources for the phrase expressing Stratagem

No. 14 isdrama Lii Dongbin Instructs Li Yue of the Iron
the
Crutch, written by Yue Bochuan during the Yuan period (a.d.
1271-1368). 1 The phrase for No. 14 crops up about half a
dozen times in the course of the play, though it is used in a
completely Buddhist-Daoist context and thus somewhat liter-
ally, rather than metaphorically as a stratagem.

In the first act the play's protagonist, a Zhengzhou district
official named Yue Shou, reports that the Emperor has sent Han
Weigong, a provincial circuit judge, on a secret mission to the
district, with orders to behead incompetent and corrupt officials.
As a result, says Yue, many of the officials have fled. But he

himself has not fled because he does not regard himself as
crooked. In fact, he goes to welcome Han Weigong on his arrival
but fails to meet him.
On the way back home he encounters a Daoist priest at his
gate, who calls to him, "Yue Shou, you headless demon, you
217
2i8- The Book of Stratagems
shall die." Angered, Yue Shou orders his subordinate to

hang the priest from the gatepost. The priest is in reality
a Daoist immortal, Lii Dongbin, who has recognized in Yue

Shou a likely candidate for entry into the Realm of the Im-
mortals. But in order to gain entrance, Yue Shou must first be
purified. This initial scene was the first step in the purification
process.
A little later an old farmer comes along and unties the priest
from the gate. This causes an altercation between Yue Shou and
the old farmer. Yue calls him an unreasonable peasant and
boasts of his own powers. Finally, the old man reveals himself
as none other than the imperial emissary Han Weigong and
orders Yue Shou to wash his neck clean and present himself at
the district offices early the following morning, when he will
test the edge of his sword on him.

This threat of death so frightens Yue Shou that he dies and
goes to the Underworld. Yama, the Prince of Hell, is about to
spear him with and dip him in a vat of boiling oil,
a pitchfork
when the Immortal DongbinLiiappears and begs Yama to
rescind the punishment, give Yue to him as a disciple, and permit
him to return to the Upper World. Yama checks his books and
replies, "I regret to inform you that his wife has already burned
the body, so his soul cannot return."

"Please help us, Yama," says Lii Dongbin.
Yama goes through his books again and reports, "Illustrious
Immortal, in Fengning, in Zhengzhou District, just inside the
eastern gate, a young butcher named Li has just died. His body
is still warm. What if we were to borrow Li's corpse so that
Yue Shou's soul could return to earth?"
"Very good," says Lii Dongbin. And, addressing Yue Shou,
"But who would have thought that your wife would already
have burned your body?"
Yue Shou's soul enters the corpse of the young butcher Li.
Since Li had one lame foot, Yue Shou now needs a crutch.
Immediately upon awakening, he sets out to see his family. Now,
he abruptly realizes how crookedly he had behaved in his former
incarnation as a district official:
Borrow a Corpse for the Soul's Return -219
J lied with brush and ink,

made the crooked look straight,
deceived Heaven and Earth in my heart.
How often did I accept bribery,

declare right to be wrong.
When an accused man stood before me,

guilty, but with ready cash,
Imanaged to acquit him swiftly.
But if he was innocent and poor,
he soon felt the bailiff's grip.
I numbed my conscience, forgot my duty,
seeking only to extort money.
Why one of my legs now too short?
is
Because in my former life

I walked a crooked path.
After a brief meeting with his wife and interrogation by the

imperial emissary Han Weigong, Yue Shou follows Lu Dongbin
and withdraws from the world. Eventually he is transformed
into one of the Eight Immortals.
In Fuzhou, in Fujian Province, a statue of the lame Li with
adorns the shore of West Lake.
his crutch
The phrase for Stratagem No. 14 also appears in the play

Emerald Peach Blossom, by an unknown author of the Yuan
period. Here the deceased Xu Bitao borrows the corpse of her
dead sister in and marry. The rebirth motif
order to return to life
is also a key part of the drama Peony Pavilion (also known as
The Tale of the Soul's Return), by Tang Xianzu (1550-1617).

This play is still popular in China today.
In all these cases the Chinese text uses the word hun for
"soul." In classical Chinese there was also another word for
soul: po. The po-soul gave a person life; after death it hovered
for a while about the individual's grave. The hun-soul gave a
person his personality; it too lived on long after the body's death,
watching over the deceased's surviving loved ones. When sor-
cerers had dealings with the dead, they worked through the bun-
1
soul. As a stratagem, of course, the expression "Borrow a
corpse for the soul's return" is understood figuratively.
14.2 The Shepherd Xin Becomes King of Chu
During the Spring and Autumn period, there were scores of

separate states on Chinese soil. Of those, only about twenty
were left at the beginning of the Warring States period. Seven
of them, including Chu and Qin, were the most powerful. They
battled one another for domination over all China. Qin ulti-
mately defeated and annexed the others, including Chu (in 223
B.C.), which had the largest territory of all.
When the first Qin Emperor died in 210 B.C., he was succeeded
by his twenty-one-year-old son, Hu Hai, who led a dissolute
life at the expense of his neglected people. During the first year
of his reign, there were uprisings led by Chen Sheng and Wu
Guang in the territory of the former state of Chu. Chen Sheng
was killed in the year 208 B.C., but his rebellion gave the signal
for uprisings throughout the land, most of them occurring
within what had been Chu This was no mere coin-
territory.
cidence. The people of Chu nurtured a special hatred for Qin

because, back in 299 B.C., King Huai of Chu had been lured to
Qin and assassinated, a national affront which the people of
Chu never forgot.
Among Xiang Liang and his nephew
the rebel leaders were
Xiang Yu. Xiang Liang was the son of a famous Chu general.
When another rebel chieftain declared a descendant of an old
noble clan to be the King of Chu, Xiang Liang was advised by
the hermit Fan Zeng to find a genuine scion of the royal house
and declare him king. If he could do that, he would win the
sympathy of the Chu people and thereby also gain the support
of the other Chu rebels against Qin domination.
Xiang Liang followed that advice and searched everywhere,
until he finally, found a grandson of King Huai named Xin, who
Borrow a Corpse for the Soul's Return •
22 1
was working as a shepherd. Xin was willing to have himself

declared King of Chu, and took the name of Huai, the Chu
monarch who had been so shamefully imprisoned and killed by
Qin. The crowning of the new King of Chu gave greater impetus
to the popular Chu rebellion, which smoothed the path for
Xiang Liang and his nephew Xiang Yu to gain a dominant
3
position in the empire.
In this example of No. 14, the young shepherd Xin, grandson

of the murdered King Huai, serves as the "corpse" or "body"
which is borrowed by Xiang Liang and Xiang Yu to breathe
new life into the defunct royal house of Chu. By also injecting
new vitality into the name of King Huai, who had been assas-
sinated almost a century earlier, they at the same time rekindled
the hatred of the Chu people against Qin and gave their rebellion
the appearance of a legitimate struggle on behalf of a venerable
old dynasty.
According to the authors of a stratagem book published in
1983 in Guizhou, in the People's Republic, the peasant rebel

chieftains Chen Sheng and Wu Guang also used Stratagem
No. 14, to the extent that they fought in the name of the old
state of Chu and inscribed the words Da Chu (Great Chu) on
their flags.
The 1989 edition of the Beijing stratagem book points out
that descendants of a bygone dynasty (the "corpse") are often
"borrowed" and placed in the service of a political program

(the "soul" manipulating the corpse) which may be quite irrel-
evant or even inimical to the old dynasty. The hope is that, by
so doing, the loyalty of the people to the old dynasty can be
channeled to the new political system. A twentieth-century ex-
ample, made familiar by the film The Last Emperor, was that
of Pu Yi (1906-67), the last Manchu Emperor of China, who
was deposed in 1911. In 1932 he was crowned head of the
puppet regime of Manchukuo (Manchuria) by the occupying
Japanese, who tried to pass it off as a continuation of the Man-
chu Dynasty.
14.3 Wang Mang Fiddles with History
The machinations of Emperor Wang Mang (r. a.d. 8—23) also

call to mind Stratagem No. 14. In order to secure power for
himself and his followers, he harnessed the so-called Old Script

School to his own purposes.
Under the Qin Dynasty, had been a vast book-burning
there
of Confucian writings in the year 213 B.C. After the downfall
of the Qin Dynasty, there was a great desire to restore the old
classics. During the reign of Emperor Wu of the Han, texts
written in an archaic script were allegedly found, under unusual
circumstances, in the wall of what had once been Confucius's
house. The scholars who concerned themselves with these writ-
ings came to be known as the adherents of the Old Script School.
The texts in question were suspected by many scholars of not
being genuine. But Emperor Wang Mang and his supporters
lent strong support to the Old Script School. The old writings
were reissued and, according to sinologist Wolfram Eberhard, 4
in the process certain passages suiting Wang Mang's purposes
were inserted into the texts. The Emperor also had other works
reissued and falsified.
In all his actions, Wang Mang now assumed the pose of one
who meticulously adhered to what had been written down in
the books of earlier rulers and ministers. He insisted that his
new laws were simply amplifications of decrees from the

"Golden Age." In doing so, he constantly cited the old texts,
either totally distorting the meaning of relevant passages or else
smuggling appropriate remarks into the new editions. According

to Eberhard, there can be no doubt that Wang Mang and his
clique deliberately falsified and deceived at first, but that even-
tually the Emperor began to believe in his own falsehoods.
This is an instance of combining Stratagem No. 14, "Borrow
a Corpse," and No. 7, "Create Something from Nothing."
14.4 Vietnam Invokes History
According to a commentary published in the People's Daily in

July 1978, the Vietnamese exploited real events from premodern
history for contemporary political purposes. Without specifi-
cally referring to Stratagem No. 14, the author of the Chinese
commentary made the following observations:
For a long time Vietnamese newspapers, magazines, and

radio broadcasts have been running features on the history
of aggression by Chinese feudal rulers against Vietnam. [In
those presentations] civilian and military officials of the
Vietnamese royal dynasties are presented more fully and
magnificently than are modern proletarian heroes. .The. .
Vietnamese rulers organize many activities each year com-

memorating historical events or personalities related to [Vi-
etnamese] resistance against Chinese aggression. Relevant
historical dramas, stories, news reports, and propaganda
photos are disseminated; schoolchildren are assigned to
collect material about the struggles of old Vietnam against
Chinese feudal rulers. Every means is used to illustrate the
aggression from the north. . . . This is the trick of speaking
about old matters while really referring to new ones.
In other words, the constant representations of past Chinese

incursions against Vietnam and of heroic Vietnamese resistance
were being used, according to the Chinese commentator, as a
means of provoking the Vietnamese people's hatred of the pres-
ent-day People's Republic. The long-dead Chinese aggressors
and their Vietnamese opponents served as the "corpse," so to
speak, into which new life was being breathed to deliberately
stimulate anti-Chinese resentment.
14.5 New People's Principles
The stratagem book published in 1973 in Taiwan 5 accuses Mao

Zedong of using No. 14 by invoking a popular old doctrine to
pursue a new and totally different goal. Well before he gained
power, says the author of the Taiwanese book, Mao used the
stratagem in the knowledge that the Chinese people were
full
generally opposed to Marxism and, though disappointed in its

performance, approved of the Guomindang regime's basic doc-
trine, the Three Principles of the People —
nationalism, democ-
racy, and a secure livelihood.
The Three Principles had been formulated by Dr. Sun Yat-
sen, founder of the Guomindang. In order to deceive the people
and weaken their power of resistance, says the author of the
Taiwanese stratagem book, in January 1940 Mao wrote an essay
on the so-called "Three New People's Principles," in which he
used Sun Yat-sen's ideas as postulates for the period of transition
to socialism. Mao pretended that all he wanted to do was topple
the unpopular Guomindang regime and that he was not at all
opposed to Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles. By doing this, he

convinced many academics and university graduates and won
them to his cause. But once he came to power, says the Tai-
wanese writer, therewas no more talk of New People's Prin-
ciples reminiscent of those enunciated by Sun Yat-sen. In effect,
then, he borrowed the old Three Principles as a "corpse" into
which he breathed new life with a Communist "soul."
The interesting thing about this example is the manner in
which Mao's writing is analyzed by a Taiwanese author from
the perspective of a particular stratagem. But a careful reading
of Mao's essay shows that his New People's Principles read very
differently from those of Sun Yat-sen. Mao's New Principles are
solidarity with the Soviet Union, solidarity with the Communist
Party of China, and support for the peasants and workers. More-
over, in the version of the essay published in 1949, after the
establishment of the People's Republic, Mao clearly distanced
himself from Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles. So, on the basis of

the currently available version of the essay, it cannot fairly be

maintained that he set out to deceive the Chinese people.
14.6 The Victorious Corpse
In the year a.d. 234, Zhuge Liang, minister and chief strategist
of Shu, mounted his fifth field campaign against the kingdom
of Wei in northern China. His opponent was once again Sima
Yi, commander of the Wei army. Because of the distances in-
volved and the resulting supply problems, Zhuge Liang was
anxious to engage in a decisive battle as quickly as possible.
But, under Sima Yi's command, the Wei army prepared for a
long war of attrition and dug itself in along the banks of the
Huai River.
Time and again Sima Yi was urged by his lieutenants to engage
in open combat. But he clung to his porcupine tactics. After a
while, Zhuge Liang sent an emissary to Sima Yi bearing a chest.

Suspecting that Zhuge Liang's messenger brought a declaration
of war, all the eager Wei officers crowded into Sima Yi's tent
and watched tensely as their leader opened Zhuge Liang's letter.
In that document, the Shu minister insulted Sima Yi mercilessly,
saying that he was anything but a general, that he clung to life
and feared death and therefore resembled a woman more than
a man. Inwardly Sima Yi boiled with rage, but he did not show
it. Smiling, he opened the chest. It contained nothing but wom-
en's clothing.
Seeing how Zhuge Liang had derided and insulted their com-
mander, Sima Yi's officers demanded the immediate execution
of the emissary and a battle to the death with Zhuge Liang. But,
according to a comic-strip version published in Lijiang, Sima
Yi answered them with a quote from Confucius: "A lack of
tolerance in small things endangers great plans." Instead of
executing Zhuge Liang's messenger, he invited him to dinner.
During the meal, Sima Yi avoided military subjects and drew
•
from the emissary information about Zhuge Liang's general

circumstances and the state of his health.
After dismissing the emissary, Sima Yi said to his officers,
"Zhuge Liang is trying to use the stratagem of provocation. We
must not let ourselves be tricked. He is overburdened with mil-
itary and political work, is not eating, and sleeps badly. I believe
that he will not live much longer. Now, you are to prepare
yourselves well for his death. As soon as news of his demise
reaches us, we will launch the battle."
So the Wei army remained which made
in its fortifications,
Zhuge Liang furious. The war had already dragged on for more
than a hundred days. Every day Zhuge Liang took counsel with
his generals on what do next, and every night he thought
to
sleeplessly about how he could defeat Sima Yi. Zhuge Liang
thus exhausted himself; he began to spit blood, grew steadily
weaker, and finally died.
The generals of the Shu army were overcome with grief and
wanted to hold the burial ceremony immediately. But the com-
manders Yang Yi and Jiang Wei, who were privy to Zhuge
Liang's will, determined to follow its instructions and persuaded
the other generals to postpone the burial. Zhuge Liang's body
was laid in a coffin and the order was given for the army to
retreat.
The next morning Sima Yi received the news that Zhuge Liang
had died and the Shu army was preparing to withdraw. Now
Sima Yi and his army finally left their entrenched positions and
began pursuing the enemy. Along the way, Sima Yi climbed a
hill from which he could observe the Shu army at a distance.
He saw that the enemy forces were maintaining exactly the same
battle formation and running the same flags as they had under
Zhuge Liang's command. Sima Yi now began to question
whether his opponent were really dead, suspecting that the news
had been given out simply to lure him onto the battlefield. But,
at the urging of the other generals, he felt constrained to continue
the pursuit.
Suddenly the Shu army halted its retreat and, at a signal,
turned in perfect battle formation to face the pursuing Wei
forces. This was precisely in keeping with Zhuge Liang's tac-

tics. Sima Yi again was beset by doubts, and just then Zhuge
Liang's standard-bearer appeared between two trees, with the

flags of Shu, surrounded by several generals and among them
a wagon which the allegedly dead Zhuge Liang sat upright.

in
When Sima Yi saw all this, he immediately gave the signal for
a general retreat. At the same time the Shu army continued its
withdrawal until it had reached a position of safety. And now
the funeral of Zhuge Liang was held with all proper ceremony.
Only then did Sima Yi discover that his old enemy was truly
dead and the figure riding the wagon had been just an effigy.
Sima Yi immediately resumed the pursuit, but by this time the

opposing forces were well away.
The Wei officers were furious at the lost opportunity of de-
stroying the Shu army. But Sima Yi said with a sigh,"Yang Yi

led the Shu forces exactly as Zhuge Liang used to do. It was as
if the soul of the dead Zhuge Liang had come back to life in
Yang Yi. And I was taken in by the stratagem of 'Borrow a

"6
corpse for the soul's return.'
14.7 The Origin of Christmas
In the Weekend Supplement to the Christmas Day 1983 edition

of the German-language Swiss daily newspaper Neue Zurcher
Zeitung, author Anne-Susanne Rischke described an important
episode in the history of religion that, from the standpoint of
the stratagems, could well be regarded as an application of
No. 14:
Celebrating the turn of the year is an ancient custom. The

Romans celebrated the Saturnalia, the festival of Saturn,
god of the harvest, between December 17 and 23. It was
the most cheerful festival of the year. All work and com-
merce stopped, and the streets were filled with crowds and
a carnival atmosphere. Slaves were temporarily freed, and
the houses were decorated with laurel branches. People
visited one another, bringing gifts of wax candles and little
clay figurines.
Long before the birth of Christ, the Jews celebrated an
eight-day Festival of Lights [at the same season], and it is
believed that the Germanic peoples held a great festival not

only at midsummer but also at the winter solstice, when
they celebrated the rebirth of the sun and honored the great
fertility gods Wotan and
Freyja, Donar (Thor) and Freyr.
Even after theEmperor Constantine (a.d. 306-337) de-
clared Christianity to be Rome's official imperial religion,
the evocation of light and fertility as an important com-
ponent of pre-Christian midwinter celebrations could not
be entirely suppressed.
In the year 274 the Roman Emperor Aurelian (a.d.
214-275) had established an official cult of the sun-god
Mithras, declaring his birthday, December 25, a national
holiday. The cult of Mithras, the Aryan god of light, had
spread from Persia through Asia Minor to Greece, Rome,
and as far as the Germanic lands and Britain. Numerous
ruins of his shrines still testify to the high regard in which
this god was held, especially by the Roman legions, as a
bringer of fertility, peace, and victory.
So it was a clever move when, in the year a.d. 354, the
Christian church under Pope Liberius (352-66) co-opted
the birthday of Mithras and declared December 25 to be
the birthday of Jesus Christ.
Thanks to that clever move, says this author, a "body" already

in decline but still with considerable impact and influence — i.e.,
the Mithras cult — was imbued with a new "soul," the Christian
one, so that something ancient lived on endowed with new
meaning.
14,8 The Empress of China
In February 1977, a writer in the newspaper Guangming Daily

suggested that, since direct public relations efforts on behalf of
the Gang of Four, and particularly Mao's widow Jiang Qing,
229
had been rejected by the masses, indirect methods had been used
to get the message across, including Stratagem No. 14. For
example, the Gang of Four's propagandists had praised the
historical figure of Lu Hou, wife of Liu Bang, and
the founder
first emperor of the Han Dynasty. She helped her husband in
his conquests and after his death loyally carried out his wishes.
To the author of the Guangming article, this was a clear dem-
onstration that Jiang Qing was determined to take up the scepter
after Mao's death.
Another example: A
1974 essay by a Beijing writers' collective
known as Liang Xiao idealized the Tang Empress Wu Zetian,
saying that she had dominated China's political stage in the
midst of a struggle between two political lines. But according
to an April 1977 commentary in Guangming Daily, what the
1974 essay had glorified as her "blows against conservative
forces" and "struggle against reaction" was in reality the use
of brutal methods to gain and retain imperial power, involving
secret agents, assault, murder, etc. What was really a struggle
for power and wealth was distorted by the Liang Xiao writers'
collective to appear as "a struggle of political lines" between
the reformer Wu Zetian and reactionary Confucians. The un-
derlying purpose of presenting Wu Zetian as "a woman with
new ideas," however, was to glorify Jiang Qing. In other words,
maintained critics of Jiang Qing, the "corpse" of Wu Zetian,
dead for more than a thousand years, was to have breathed into
it the "soul" and political aspirations of Mao's widow, who
wanted to become the Wu Zetian of the twentieth century.
14.9 Change the Infusion But Not the Herbs
Stratagem No. 14 can also be interpreted another way: Some-

thing outwardly new is "new body"), but the
presented (as a
soul breathed into it is actually old. This may be thought of as
"pouring old wine into new bottles," "putting on new shoes
•
but walking an old path," "putting new labels on old goods"

— or "changing the infusion but not the herbs."
This latter phrase was used by the Beijing periodical Shijie
zhishi (World Knowledge) June 1986
as the headline over a
commentary on Babrak Karmal by Naji-
the replacement of
bullah as chief of Afghanistan's ruling Democratic People's
Party.
The Chinese commentator Mei Wen came to the conclusion
that the "change of horses," as he termed it, meant only that
the Kremlin's old Afghanistan policy was to be continued under
a new name, while nothing fundamental would change. On the
one hand, the Soviets wanted to intensify their military activities
in order to crush the resistance of the Afghan people and expand

their own political dominance, in order to create favorable con-
ditions for an eventual bloodless troop withdrawal. At the same
time, they were trying to disarm world opinion by demonstrat-
ing a flexibility aimed at a political solution (e.g., via Afghan-
istan negotiations in Geneva), postpone the time of their troop
withdrawal, and get the other side to offer negotiating terms

which would be favorable to Moscow.
This interpretation of Stratagem No. 14 can also be extended
to cover the veiled restoration of an old order, with new insti-
tutions serving as instruments of an old mode of behavior.
14.10 An Invitation to Shu
In a military context, Chinese stratagem literature moves the

expressive image of No. 14 onto an abstract level, in which the
starting point is a poor or hopeless situation, and the "soul's
return" is a comeback or the "rise of the phoenix."
The 1989 book cites the fol-
edition of the Beijing stratagem
lowing example, based on the Zizhi tong jian (Comprehensive
Mirror for Aid in Government), by Sima Guang:
Following the Battle of Red Cliff (see Section 9.1, "The Vic-
torious Observer"), both Sun Quan and Liu Bei turned their
231
desire for conquest to the territory of Shu. As a result of his

military weakness, Liu Bei found himself in an unfavorable
position.
In the winter of the year a.d. 214, Cao Cao attacked Han-
zhong. This posed a threat to the internally divided group
around Liu Zhang, which had occupied Yizhou in Shu. Liu
Zhang feared an attack by Cao Cao after he had conquered
Hanzhong. So he asked Liu Bei for help and gave him permission
to march into Shu. Liu Bei took advantage of the opportunity
and headed for Shu with his forces. Two years later he had
gotten rid of Liu Zhang and annexed Yizhou, thus laying the
groundwork for establishment of the later kingdom of Shu (one
of the three great realms of the third century a.d.) and securing
his own political ascent. Liu Bei did not have the military
strength to conquer the region of Shu. Yet the strategic plans
of his adviser Zhuge Liang designated that territory as an es-
sential power base if he hoped to extend his political influence.

In that situation, Liu Zhang's invitation to come to Shu was
the "corpse," so to speak — i.e., abstract terms, the
in less fa-
vorable opportunity —with which Liu Bei could win the territory
necessary for his political rise (the "return of the soul").
This example shows the Chinese word;/, which I have translated

as "stratagem," used more in the sense of a "calculated move"
rather than an actual combat tactic. The Chinese word has many
layers of meaning,which cannot always be completely covered
by our rather more narrow concept of "stratagem."
14.11 Conclusion
According to the 1986 Taipei stratagem book, 7 No. 14 can also

be applied in business, for example by seeking new shareholders
or creditors when an enterprise finds itself in crisis. They are
the "corpse" or "body" which is borrowed to make it possible
to put the business back on a firm footing —the "return of the

soul."
In closing, a comment from the Beijing stratagem book: 8
No one is always victorious. Setbacks are normal. The

important thing is to keep a clear head in a period of failure,
to analyze the situation calmly, and borrow all available
"corpses," that is, discover all useful ways to regain the
initiative and turn defeat into victory.
STRATAGEM NO. 15
Lure the Jiger
Down from the ^Mountain
The Chinese
characters Ml A* % J*
Modern diao bu shan
Mandarin
pronunciation
Meaning of each move tiger leave mountain

character
Applications Get the tiger to leave the mountain; lure it from

itsmountain stronghold down onto the plain.
Separate the enemy from his base.
a. Lure the enemy down onto the plain in order
to neutralize him.
b. Lure the tiger away from the mountain in
order to capture the mountaintop (and per-
haps to kill the tiger as well).
c. Weaken enemy by separating him from
the
his main supporters.
d. Separate the tiger from those it protects, in
order to more easily neutralize them once
they are defenseless. The stratagem of iso-
lation.
The following passage appears in the book Guanzi (Master
Guan), ascribed to the early political philosopher Guan Zhong:
When and the leopard leave their lair and ap-

the tiger
proach humankind, they fall prey to humans. As long as
the tiger and the leopard rely on their lair, they can retain
their positions of power.
Han Fei is said to have written:
It is and fangs which enable the tiger to tame the

the claws
dog. you remove the tiger's claws and fangs and give
If
them to the dog instead, the dog will tame the tiger.
In the sentence that formulates Stratagem No. 15, "tiger" is a

metaphor for the enemy, while "mountain" stands for the en-
emy's stronghold, the familiar ground on which he finds it most
convenient and comfortable to fight. The objective of No. 15
is enemy from that familiar ground. This is
to separate the
especially important when the tiger is powerful. By permitting
a powerful tiger to fight on its home territory, one is, in the
^35
words of another Chinese expression, Wei hu fu yi "lending —

—
wings to the tiger" that is, making a powerful enemy even
stronger.
There are, naturally, many "tigers" who are not only powerful
and courageous but clever as well and not so easily lured off
course oraway from their "mountain." Odysseus was one such.
Sailing past the island of the Sirens, he plugged his crew's ears
and had them bind him to the mast, which permitted him to
sailundeviatingly onward.
No. 15 has many possible variants, of which the main ones
are listed under the Applications above.
15.1 Journey to the Son of Heaven
Duke Wu of Zheng had two sons. The elder, Wusheng, had

come into the world by a breach birth (i.e., feet first), and
because of his difficult birth he was spurned by his mother. She

loved their second son, Duan, more than anything in life, and
wanted him to succeed to the throne. But the Duke refused to
violate the traditional order of succession. Besides, he pointed
out, his elder son had done nothing wrong. So Duan was given
only a small legacy, while Wusheng became the heir apparent
and assumed the throne after his father's death. He ruled as
Duke Zhuang of Zheng.
Highly dissatisfied with her favorite son's insignificant posi-
tion, the Duke's mother asked that a large city, Zhi, be assigned
as his brother's fiefdom. Duke Zhuang refused, since Zhi was
far too important a center, whereupon his mother requested the
city of Jing for her younger son.
Zhai Zhong, one of the Duke's advisers, objected. According
to traditional rules, the largest vassal cities were not to be any
more than one-third the size of the capital. This was by no
means the case with Jing. And just as two suns did not shine in
the sky, added Zhai, so there could not be two rulers in their
state. The city of Jing was centrally located, large and populous,
Lure the Tiger Down from the Mountain •
2 3 7
almost as important as the capital politically and militarily.
Moreover, Duan was the favorite of the old duke's widow. "If
he is given the city, whether we like it or not there will suddenly
be a second ruler on the scene."
But Duke Zhuang replied that his mother had ordered it and
itmust be done. So he gave Duan the city of Jing as a fiefdom.
Before setting out, Duan met with his mother, who advised him
to use his new power base to prepare himself to seize the throne
when an opportunity should present itself.
Some time afterward Duan ordered the commanders of the
northern and western border territories to obey his commands,
especially in military matters — though as a vassal ruler he was
not really entitled to such obedience. Duan also occupied some
neighboring territories, and grew more powerful each day.
This became known atDuke Zhuang's court, but the Duke
did nothing about it. A dignitary by the name of Gongzi Lii
advised the ruler to have his younger brother eliminated as soon
as possible, but the Duke replied, "Duan is my mother's favorite.
He is my younger brother. How could I let myself be angered
by a few territorial adjustments and act against my mother's
wishes?"
Gongzi Lii remarked, "To hesitate at decisive moments is a
sure road to disaster. And once disaster has arrived, it is too
late for regrets."
Duke Zhuang sighed. "Oh, I have thought about this problem

only too often.Duan is certainly aiming to usurp the throne.
But so far he has not openly rebelled. If I move against him
now, my mother will use it against me and I will be universally
blamed for a lack of brotherly love and insufficient respect for
my mother. The only thing I can do is pretend that I've noticed
nothing, leave my brother alone, and wait until he actually
commits a rebellious act. Then I will have tangible proof of his
criminal intent."
Gongzi Lii objected. "On you are right to
the one hand,
hesitate. But on the other hand, your brother grows mightier
each day. Ultimately he will be stronger than you. How would
it be if we give him an opportunity to reveal his intentions as
—
soon as possible, so that we can be rid of this threat without

further delay?"
Gongzi Lu proposed the following: The Duke had not traveled
outside his own realm for a long time, for fear of his brother's
machinations. Now he would journey to the imperial court for
an audience. The Duke's absence would lure his brother to
march on the capital and try to capture it. But Gongzi Lu would
lead troops a way outside of Jing, where they would lie
little in
wait, and as soon as Duan left the city they would march in
and take it. That would rob the Duke's brother of his base, and
then would be an easy matter to neutralize him.

it
The Duke approved the plan and made Zhai Zhong his deputy
during his absence. The Duke's mother, seeing that the moment
had come to realize her plans, sent an emissary to her favorite
son with a secret message about taking the capital. But Gongzi
Lu captured the emissary, killed him, sent the letter to Duke
Zhuang, and sent another messenger to Duan, pretending he
was from the old Duchess and bearing the same message. Duan
sent the emissary back to his mother carrying a reply in which
he revealed the date of his planned military action. Gongzi Lu
intercepted this letter as well and sent the messenger on to the
Duchess with a forged note containing the same information.
Now Duke Zhuang had the proof he wanted. He took his
leave of his mother and, accompanied by a guard of honor, set
off with great pomp and circumstance for the imperial court.
At the same time, Gongzi Lu and his troops established them-
selves near the city of Jing and waited for the "tiger" to leave
his "mountain." Duan mobilized all the soldiers in Jing and
marched them toward the capital, insisting that they had to

safeguard the city during his brother's absence. Gongzi Lu sent
some saboteurs into Jing; they set fires and instigated riots
and the city was easily captured.
En route to the capital, Duan learned that his own city had
fallen and immediately ordered his troops to march back. Out-
side the city walls, he and his army set up camp, preparing to
retake Jing. But his army's morale was deteriorating. Some of
Gongzi Lii's people infiltrated the camp and spread the news
2 3 9
that Duan was really out to dethrone his brother, the Duke.
Overnight, half of Duan's army deserted him.
Duan wanted to flee to Yanyi with his remaining loyal sol-
diers, but the Duke's troops had already occupied it. Finally,
with nowhere else to go, Duan retreated to the small town he
had been given in the first place but with which he had not been
content. However, the Duke's troops soon advanced on the
town, which was too small to withstand the attack. So Duan
saw no alternative but to take his own life. 1
15.2 Out on a Limb
In an extended sense, the first variant of Stratagem No. 15 as

illustrated above can also be applied in debate or rhetoric. The
trick is to lure your opponent out of his reserve and, through
standard debating techniques, lead him into unfamiliar territory,
where he can be tripped up more readily.
No. 15 may also be applicable when signing contracts with
foreign businesses, in formulating the clause dealing with the
venue of arbitration in case of dispute. This clause may be so
designed that, in the event of a disagreement, the foreign partner
would have to leave his usual legal environment and operate on
unfamiliar, and therefore unfavorable, judicial terrain.
15.3 Sun Ce Calls for Help
During the last decades of the Han Dynasty, large portions of

China came under the domination of various warlords. South
of the Yangtze River there were two main centers of power:
one in the southeast, on the territory of today's Jiangsu Province,
under the command of Sun Ce, governor of Guiji, and another
northwest of there, on the territory of today's Anhui Province,
•
ruled by Liu Xun, governor of Lujiang. These two potentates

vied with each other for domination of all South China.
By the year a.d. 199, Liu Xun had extended his power far
enough to become an immediate threat to Sun Ce. What was
to be done? Many of Sun Ce's advisers urged a direct military
confrontation as soon as possible, in which Liu Xun would be
destroyed. But others felt that this would be a dangerous course.
Zhou Yu in particular advocated a more indirect method. It
was his belief that the tiger must be lured down from the moun-
tain before one entered its den.
Sun Ce decided to follow Zhou Yu's advice. He knew Liu
Xun's character: greedy, ambitious, and a bit stupid. On that
basis,Sun Ce sent a special emissary bearing a letter and gifts
for Liu Xun. On his way to Lujiang, where Liu Xun resided,
the emissary saw several army encampments; preparations for
war were clearly under way. Going to his audience with Liu
Xun, he had to pass a line of warriors armed to the teeth.
Arriving before the warlord, the emissary handed him Sun Ce's
letter. It read:
We look up to Your Excellency with great respect and

desire good relations with you. However, as a result of
constant warfare we have not had the leisure to pay you a
visit. Now Shangliao is sending troops and persistently ha-
rassing the weaker territories south of the Great River. We
ourselves are too weak to mount a long-range campaign.
Hence we send you this message, along with precious gifts,
and request that Your Excellency mount a punitive expe-
dition to conquer Shangliao. It is our opinion that, if you
carry out such a campaign, you will be giving immeasurable
aid and support to the weak states south of the Great River.
Now the emissary presented the warlord with Sun Ce's gifts.
Liu Xun was convinced of Sun Ce's sincerity. He had heard

about the wealth of Shangliao, possession of which would mean
great power and prosperity. And now Sun Ce was asking for
his support, had even sent a large number of precious gifts!
Beside himself with delight, Liu Xun threw a splendid banquet

Lure the Tiger Down from the Mountain -241
for Sun Ce's emissary, during which the latter raised his goblet
many times to toast victory in Liu Xun's forthcoming war
against Shangliao. Liu Xun's generals likewise drank to the
coming victory. Only one civilian official, by the name of Liu
Ye, showed concern. After the banquet, Liu Xun asked him why
he was disturbed. The official replied, "Shangliao is small, it is
true, but the city is surrounded by strong walls. It is difficult to
take. I fear that Sun Ce is employing the stratagem of 'Lure the
tiger down from the mountain' against us. I fear certain defeat."
Autocratic and pigheaded, Liu Xun grew furious and shouted,
"Silence! If Sun Ce really wanted
match himself against me,
to
he would not have sent an emissary." And Liu Xun's generals
agreed completely. So the campaign against Shangliao was or-
ganized. The threatened city heard about the impending attack
and made all necessary preparations for defense. Though Liu
Xun's troops were weary after their long and difficult march,
he ordered them to surround the city and attack it from all sides.
Well rested and with their morale intact, the defenders fought
valiantly against their tired attackers, sending countless arrows,
rocks, and tree trunks down upon the troops trying to scale the
city walls. Liu Xun's offensive failed, leaving his troops de-
moralized.
At the same time, Sun Ce had learned that Liu Xun was
attacking Shangliao with his main forces, leaving only a small
detachment behind to guard Lujiang. Said he to his advisers,
"The tiger been lured from its mountain. We can first
has now
capture and then easily deliver the final blow."
its lair
So Sun Ce's army stormed Lujiang, which surrendered with-

out a fight. Sun Ce then turned his attention to Liu Xun's main
force, whose morale had already dwindled to nothing at the
news of Lujiang's fall. The battle ended in catastrophe for Liu
Xun, who after his total defeat lamented to the Heavens, "Why
didn't I listen to Liu Ye's advice? I was Sun Ce's
tricked by
stratagem of 'Lure the tiger down from the mountain' and mis-
fortune is the result!"
Liu Xun subsequently took service with Cao Cao. As for Sun
Ce, this proved to be the easiest of his military campaigns, and
it laid the foundation for the later kingdom of Wu, one of the
three major realms in the first half of the third century a.d. 2
15.4 The Letter in the Carp
On the northern shore of a reed-rimmed lake stood the village

of Sanheshe, to the east was the village of Huozhuang, to the
south the village of Gaobaozhuang, and to the west the village
of Lushi. During China's war against its Japanese invaders
(1937-45), there was a man named Ba Sanfu who had a farm
in Gaobaozhuang. The Communists in the area regarded Ba as
a local despot. As the village headman, he had curried favor

with the invading Japanese.
The parents of fourteen-year-old Hong Yazi, a fisher girl, had
failed to pay their taxes. So Ba Sanfu incited the Japanese to
kill the family. The girl managed to escape and went to her
grandfather's house in Sanheshe. Her grandfather was a contact

man for the Chinese Communist Party, so Hong Yazi became
a courier for the local "armed work unit" (the term used to
designate anti-Japanese resistance groups operating under the
leadership of the Communist Party).
Hong Yazi would go out fishing in her little boat, and during
her excursions she would secretly gather and transmit infor-
mation. On Communists one night
the basis of her reports, the
carried out an attack against a Japanese outpost on the western
shore of the lake, killing the commandant there. As a result, a
unit commanded by an officer named Kameno was assigned to
reinforce the Japanese position in the village of Gaobaozhuang
on the southern lakeshore and to establish a communications
link with the Japanese troops in Huozhuang on the eastern
shore. Working from those two points, the Japanese hoped to
catch the Communists in a pincers movement.
The fisher girl learned of all this and reported it to the leader
of her work unit, who now gave her a special assignment. Hong
Yazi went out onto the lake in her boat and began fishing near
24 3
Gaobaozhuang. Suddenly she heard a loud voice from the shore:

"Come here, or I'll shoot." This was what she had been waiting
for. She rowed ashore and was interrogated by Japanese soldiers.
She said simply, "I'm just fishing here."

At that moment Ba Sanfu came along. He lived in that village
and had been ordered to prepare a welcoming meal for the
Japanese commandant Kameno. But he had no fresh fish. As
she had been instructed, Hong Yazi hid her hatred of Ba Sanfu.
The headman ordered her to show him her fish baskets. But he
found the fish too small. Hong Yazi said there were no big fish
in theimmediate area but indicated that large ones were to be
found around Sanheshe to the north.
"Really big ones?" asked Ba Sanfu.
"You may believe it or not, as you wish," replied the girl.
"Yesterday I saw an old fisherman catch a carp as big as a man.

And there were others like it in the water. But he wouldn't let
me fish there, because I was a stranger."

"Go and get me some big fish," commanded Ba.
"Those fish aren't for sale," said the girl. "If you want to buy
some, go get them yourself!"
A little suspiciously, Ba Sanfu asked, "Are there any men of
the Eighth Army around there?" (The Eighth Army was a mil-
itary arm of the Chinese Communist Party in the anti-Japanese
war.) Hong Yazi reassured him that there were not. So Ba Sanfu
cook Lan Hongyan to go with the girl and get the fish.
sent his
Hong Yazi rowed out into the lake, singing a fishing song in
her melodious voice. Suddenly a shot sounded from the reeds
on the shore. The cook Lan Hongyan cowered bottom in the
of the boat.Hong Yazi pretended to be afraid as well, and
dropped an oar. The next moment an armed figure popped up
among the reeds and said gruffly to the girl, "What are you
doing here?"
"I'm going to buy some fish," said Hong Yazi, not revealing
that she knew the man, who was the commander of her work
unit. She pointed to Lan Hongyan. "He's Ba Sanfu's cook. Ba
sent him out to buy fish." The other suddenly doffed his hat
and said courteously, "Mr. Ba is our friend. Please continue on
your way and fulfill your task.". The cook recovered from his
fright and bowed low to the man in the reeds. Hong Yazi
rowed on.
After a while they came to the northern shore of the lake.
There, the girl's grandfather was seated beneath a ginkgo tree
fixing his nets. Hong Yazi said, 'That's the old fisherman I saw
yesterday. Go and get your fish."
Lan Hongyan rudely commanded the old man to give him
some fish. At first the fisherman said he had none. But Lan
Hongyan said, "Mr. Ba sent me. He wishes to serve a meal to
Commandant Kameno. Would you rather have the Communists
of the Eighth Army take your fish, instead of feeding the Imperial
Japanese Army?"
"Oh, why didn't you say so in the first place?" said the old
man, suddenly the soul of courtesy. "So you come from Mr.
Ba? Why, of course I have a fish for you." And he brought out
of his house a huge carp of at least thirty pounds. Lan Hongyan
took the fish without paying for it and ordered Hong Yazi to
row him back. Arriving at Gaobaozhuang, he commanded the
girl to tie her boat to a tree and help him.
In the kitchen the cook cut the carp open, and in its stomach
he found a piece of oiled paper with writing on it. "Come
quick!" he shouted, "there's a letter hidden in the carp." People
came rushing in, Ba Sanfu among them. He took the piece of
paper and saw on it the words "Strictly Confidential" and "Per-
sonal to Mr. Ba." He was frightened.
Hong Yazi took this opportunity to go into the dining room
and get hot water to brew tea. She told everyone she met about
the letter in the fish. The Japanese officer Kameno, who was
drinking tea at the time, heard the news and hurried into the
kitchen. Since the attack on the Japanese camp in Liishi he had
been hearing rumors linking Ba Sanfu to the Communist Eighth
Army, so he was already suspicious of the man. Now, striding
into the kitchen, he demanded to see the letter.
After reading the document Kameno went silently out of the
room. Ba didn't know what to do. Kameno called the cook and
interrogated him. The cook told the truth as he knew it: Ba
Sanfu had sent him to Sanheshe; along the way he had met a
24 5
soldier of the Eighth Army who said that Ba was a friend.

Kameno then questioned Hong Yazi, whose statement coincided
perfectly with the cook's. Now Kameno returned to the kitchen
and confronted Ba Sanfu. The more Ba cringed and fawned, the
more suspicious Kameno became. When Ba tried to pour him
a glass of wine, Kameno threw the drink in the man's face and
drew his sword.
Ba stammered, "It's all a mistake!"
Kameno ordered him to read the "fish letter." It said:
Tonight we attack Huozhuang. We hope you can make the

pig Kameno drunk and prevent him from helping Huo-
zhuang. You will be rewarded later for this and for your
help at Lushi.
Armed Work Unit: Jiang Qi
Kameno beheaded Ba Sanfu on the spot. Leaving the house, the

Japanese officer heard shots from the vicinity of Huozhuang.
Commandeering two motorboats, he and some troops imme-
diately set out to reinforce the garrison at the other village. As
soon as they had departed, a group of armed Communists turned
up at Ba Sanfu's farm, tied up the two surprised Japanese guards,
and set the place on fire.
In the meantime, Kameno approached Huozhuang without
finding any sign of the Communists. Angry, he turned his head
and saw in the distance his base at Gaobaozhuang going up in
flames. Only now did he realize that he had wrongly killed Ba
Sanfu and fallen victim to the stratagem of "Lure the tiger down
from the mountain." He immediately ordered a return to Gao-
baozhuang. But by this time the armed work unit had laid a
trap and dealt the Japanese a devastating defeat. 3
15.5 Agrarian Reform in Suifendadianzi
The novel Forest in the Snow, by Qu Bo (see Section 12.4, "An

Easy Climb Up Tiger Mountain") deals with China's 1945-49
civil war. Chapter 29 is titled "Luring the Tiger from Its Moun-
tain." It tells this story:
Shao Jianbo, commander of a reconnaissance unit of the Com-

munist People's Liberation Army, has a problem. He is trying
to figure out how to dislodge Ma Xishan, the leader of three
hundred men fighting on the Guomindang side, who is holed
up with his troops in a cave on a peak in the Guokui Mountains.
The summit is very difficult to reach; the only access is by a
narrow path through dense woods. The nearest village is Sui-
fendadianzi, many miles away.
Some of Shao Jianbo's comrades propose a direct attack;
others suggest using deception to cause Ma to flee and thus
expose himself to attack. Shao Jianbo opts for Stratagem No.
15. He sends his men to give agricultural aid to the village of
Suifendadianzi, near the foot of the mountain. His assumption
is that, since the Guomindang troops have links to the village
elders, these revolutionary measures will cause the enemy unit
to leave its stronghold in order to attack the Communists in the
valley below.
As the first step in the plan, grain, tools, and horses are
confiscated from the village's three richest landowners and
distributed to As anticipated, one of the land-
the poor.
owners runs Guokui Mountains and describes the
off to the
situation to Ma Xishan. The Guomindang officer thinks that,
with his three hundred mounted troops, it should be an easy
matter to handle the fifty or so Communist guerrillas whose
only transportation is their own skis. That night Ma Xishan
gives the order for his men to leave the mountaintop, in order
to surprise the Communists down in the village the next
morning.
On that same night, however, Shao Jianbo's troops also get
moving. Leaving the village, they take a detour and ski their
way up to the summit. Early the next morning, Shao observes
the enemy searching for him down in the village far below.
"Comrades!" he calls out to his men. "The tiger has been lured
from his mountain. Now our work really begins. We must enter
the tiger's lair and destroy it, so that those bandits have nowhere
24 7
to hide. Then, with the aid of the snow, we can attack them
whenever and wherever we wish."
15.6 Joshua's Ambush
Some authorities 4 regard the Bible's Book of Joshua as a virtual

handbook of military strategy. For example, in chapters 7-8
the story is told of how the Israelites conquered the city of Ai
in Canaan. First Joshua and his troops attempted a frontal as-
sault, in which they were defeated and fled (mainly, according
to the biblical tale, aspunishment for prior transgressions, which
had to be expiated before other matters could proceed). On the
second try, Joshua divided his army into two segments. One
part was sent westward to wait in ambush, while Joshua himself
led the remainder of the troops in another frontal attack against
the city. The King of Ai, having been victorious the first time
around, mustered his troops and marched out of the city to do
battle. Joshua and his men pretended to
and the army of flee
Ai pursued them ("Not a man was left in had all gone Ai; they
out in pursuit of the Israelites and had left the city
. . .
—
undefended" Joshua 8:17). The other part of the Israelite army
now quickly advanced on the city, occupied it, and then hastened
back to help their comrades. Joshua's troops in the field now
turned on their pursuers and attacked them, while the Israelites
returning from the city on the enemy from behind. Caught
fell
in a pincers, theAi army was destroyed to the last man. 5

According to some reports, England's famous Battle of Has-
tings (a.d. 1066) was decided in much the same way. The Nor-
man army under William the Conqueror had tried in vain to
defeat the Anglo-Saxon forces, which had fortified themselves
on a rise behind strong earthworks. So William resorted to a
version of Stratagem No. 15: His troops made another unsuc-
cessful assault, then turned tail to flee. This time the Anglo-
Saxon troops went after them, confident that they could destroy
the Normans. But suddenly they found themselves surrounded.
The "flight" of the Norman forces had only been a ruse to lure
the Anglo-Saxons out of their invulnerable defensive position. 6
15.7 Fan Zeng's Fury
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, one variant of

No. 15 is to weaken the "tiger" by separating it from its main
supporters.
In the year 204 B.C. Liu Bang, founder of the Han Dynasty,
was threatened by a powerful enemy, Xiang Yu. Liu Bang's
adviser Chen Ping proposed a stratagem to sow discord among
Xiang Yu's troops, based on his knowledge that Xiang Yu was
a mistrustful leader.
Chen Ping had rumors circulated in the enemy camp that
Xiang Yu's advisers and chief supporters were dissatisfied, be-
cause they had not been amply rewarded for their efforts on his
behalf, and they were therefore interested in allying themselves
with Liu Bang to destroy Xiang Yu. The rumors reached Xiang
Yu, who immediately grew suspicious. In an effort to investigate
the matter, he sent an emissary to Liu Bang's camp. Liu Bang
had a festive banquet prepared, and when Xiang Yu's messenger
arrived Liu Bang pretended to be surprised. "Why, I expected
Fan Zeng's emissary. But you're a messenger from King Xiang!"
And Liu Bang sent his caterers and staff away and had Xiang
Yu's emissary served only a scanty meal. Returning to his home
base, the messenger recounted all this to his master. Xiang Yu
was filled with suspicion of Fan Zeng, his chief adviser. Was
the man him and allying himself with Liu Bang?
turning against
Some time later, Fan Zeng advised his master Xiang Yu to
mount an attack against the city of Xingyang. But Xiang Yu
did not follow his advice. When Fan Zeng realized that his lord
no longer trusted him, he was furious and said to Xiang Yu in
effect, "Continue the campaign without me. I quit. I'm going
back home." Filled with rage, he left Xiang Yu and died a short
time later.
249
In this instance, the "tiger" is Xiang Yu and the "mountain"

is his adviser Fan Zeng, from whom Xiang Yu is tricked into
parting.
15.8 The Caravan over the Lion Camel Mountains
In previous chapters, we have recounted some of the adventures

monk Tripitaka and his entourage, consisting of Sun
of the
Wukong the Monkey King, Sha the Sand Monk, and Zhu Bajie
"The Radiant Robe," and Section 13.11,
the pig (see Section 5.1,
'The Return of the Monkey King"). Told in the sixteenth-
century novel journey to the West, these adventures take place
as the little group goes on a mission to India, to bring sacred
Buddhist scriptures back to China.
One day, Tripitaka and his companions come to a huge moun-
tain which bears the fantastic name Eight-Hundred-Mile Lion
Camel Mountain. An old man warns them not to proceed, since
forty-eight thousand fiendish demons led by three archdemons
live on the mountain and devour any passing mortals. The Mon-
key King reconnoiters and successfully battles two of the arch-
demons, who accompany Tripitaka and his
finally agree to
followers safely over the mountain. As they are discussing this

in their cave, the third archdemon says, "Yes, by all means let
us escort them. They will surely fall prey to my stratagem of

luring the tiger down from the mountain.' "
"What do you mean by that?" asks the oldest archdemon.
The third archdemon, named Great Bird of the Three-
Thousand-Mile Cloud Path, explains his plan, to which the
other two archdemons gleefully agree. The third archdemon
came originally from the Lion Camel City some four hundred
miles away. Five hundred years earlier he conquered the city,
which is now inhabited exclusively by monsters and demons.
He has heard that a pious monk had been assigned by the Tang
court to travel westward and collect certain sacred writings. The
Tang monk is reputed to be a good person who has lived a pure
•
life Whoever would eat of his flesh, it was

for ten generations.
said,would prolong his own life and never grow old. Realizing
that he was not strong enough by himself to overpower the
monk and his traveling companion Sun Wukong, wielder of
magic powers, this archdemon has come to the Lion Camel
Mountain to join forces with the other two archdemons.
In accord with the third archdemon's plan, the monk Tripi-
takais borne over the mountain in a sedan chair by eight de-
mons, with the unsuspecting Monkey King going on ahead, the

Sand Monk bringing up the rear, and Zhu Bajie carrying the
luggage. After a march of four hundred miles, a city suddenly
appears that radiates a sense of evil. Now the Monkey King
grows suspicious, and turning around he sees that the third
archdemon is about to hurl a huge halberd at him. Immediately
he assumes a defensive posture, and a violent battle ensues. At
the same time the other two archdemons attack Sand Monk
and Zhu Bajie. And while this is going on, the eight litter bearers
quickly carry Tripitaka into the city, where he is taken prisoner.
Here the "tiger" is Tripitaka, who is deliberately isolated from
his "mountain" —
i.e., his three protecting companions.
15.9 Conclusion
A professor of contemporary Chinese history once told me that

Stratagem No. 15 was used often by the Chinese Red Army in
itsmobile two-front war against the Japanese and the Guo-
mindang. The object was to maneuver the enemy forces into a
situation or a location in which they could carry out no useful
function and constitute no genuine danger. By tricking the en-
emy into moving his main force to some strategically useless or
tactically disadvantageous place, the Communists, though al-
most always inferior from a purely military standpoint, were
able to win battles or to defeat enemy units which had been cut
off from their main force, and thus weaken the enemy as a whole.
A Hong Kong book on the stratagems points out that
Lure the Tiger Down from the Mountain -251
No. 15 finds special application in political conflicts, where the

objective is an increase in power and each participant may be
both "tiger" and "hunter."
A Beijing stratagem book closes its observations on No. 15
by citing Friedrich Engels's essay "The Siege of Silistria":
One may be forced to retreat, one may suffer a setback,

but as long as one is on the
in a position to exert pressure
enemy [i.e., from its "mountain"] in-
to force the "tiger"
stead of being subjected to the enemy's pressure, one re-
mains superior to him to a certain extent.
Finally, in thefamous Chinese book of oracles J Ching (Book

of Changes), there is a sentence dealing with the hexagram Chien
(Obstruction), which reads:
Going [to the enemy] leads to obstructions,

Coming [i.e., letting the enemy come to you] meets with
praise.
STRATAGEM NO. 16
% Catch Something,
Jirst Let It Qo
The Chinese
characters
Modern
&yu
4k
qin
-tt
g«
H
zong
Mandarin
pronunciation
Meaning of each want catch temporarily let go

character
Applications The "cat-and-mouse" stratagem; the "laissez-

faire" stratagem; th( ; "winning the heart"
stratagem.
In the Zuo Commentary, one of the thirteen Confucian classics,
it is said, "If you release an enemy for one day, it will bring evil
to many generations."
Yet there are situations in which Stratagem No. 16 seems
absolutely called for. The classic example of No. 16 cited in all
"The Seven
the Chinese sources will be given in Section 16.2,
Releases of King Menghuo." It is taken from the novel The
Romance of the Three Kingdoms, which we have drawn upon
several times in previous chapters. In the novel it is preceded
by the following episode, in which No. 16 also plays a central
role.
16.1 Victory Through Friendliness
Liu Bei, ruler of Shu in what is now Sichuan Province, died in

the year a.d. 223. Cao Cao, ruler over the northern kingdom
of Wei, felt that the critical phase of transition in Sichuan pro-
vided a favorable opportunity for an attack against Shu, victory
^55
z$6- The Book of Stratagems
over which would be a big step toward his avowed goal of

unifying all China. An Cao Cao make a
adviser proposed that
series of alliances and, with the help of his new allies, attack
Shu territory from five directions at once. One of these allies

was King Menghuo, a member of the non-Chinese Yi people,
whose kingdom lay south of Shu, in today's Yunnan Province.
The news of the impending five-front war reached Liu Bei's
successor, the new Shu ruler, whose Chief Minister Zhuge Liang
eventually succeeded in outmaneuvering Cao Cao and thwarting
his plans. His first success was gaining the allegiance of the King
of Hu, one of those whom Cao Cao had hoped to enlist on his
side. This eliminated the threat from the north. Just then, the
news arrived that Menghuo had invaded the southwestern cor-
ner of Shu with 100,000 men. According to the report, the
prefect of Jianning had gone over to Menghuo; this prefect,
Yong Kai by name, was an aristocratic vassal of the defunct
Han Dynasty. It was also reported at the same time that Zhu
Bao, prefect of Zangge, and Gao Ding, prefect of Yuesui, had
handed their districts over to Menghuo and were supporting
him in his attack against the district of Yongchang, the prefect
of which was in a hopeless situation.
Zhuge Liang found these developments so ominous that he
personally assumed command of his now-famous Southern
Campaign of the year a.d. 225.
When the three Chinese rebels learned that the great Minister
of Shu was marching against them, they mobilized more than
fifty thousand men. Gao Ding assigned E Huan to command a
vanguard against the Shu army. Near Yizhou, E Huan encoun-
tered Wei Yan, commander of the advance Shu troops. Before
the two formations began their battle, Wei Yan rode out alone,
heaped insults on E Huan, and called on him to capitulate.
Instead of surrendering, however, E Huan charged his opponent
and engaged him in single combat. After a few charges, Wei
Yan pretended he was beaten and fled. E Huan fell for the trick,
pursued Wei Yan, and after a few miles fell into an ambush.
Taken prisoner, he was brought before Zhuge Liang.
Applying Stratagem No. 16, the Shu Minister had E Huan's
To Catch Something, First Let It Go •
z57
chains removed, served him food and wine, and said, "I know
that Gao Ding is a loyal subject of Shu. He has merely been
misled by Yong Kai. I shall release you so that you may return
to your master. But I expect you to bring Gao Ding to his senses,
so that he will soon return to our side. That will save him from
catastrophe."
E Huan expressed his thanks and departed. Returning to Gao
Ding, he reported about the friendliness with which Zhuge Liang
had treated him. Gao Ding was deeply touched by this. Not
long afterward Yong Kai came to Gao Ding's camp and asked
why E Huan had been released. Gao Ding replied, "Zhuge Liang
was demonstrating his friendliness."
"What Zhuge Liang was doing," Yong Kai responded, "was
applying the stratagem of 'sowing discord.' He obviously hopes
to turn us against one another."
Gao Ding was inclined to believe Yong Kai, yet he was
plagued by doubts about his judgment on this matter.
Some time later Yong Kai and Gao Ding mounted a joint
attack against Zhuge Liang. But had set a trap,

the wily minister
so that many of the attacking troops were killed and even more
were captured. Brought to a prison camp, Yong Kai's and Gao
Ding's soldiers were held in separate groups. Zhuge Liang had
the rumor spread that he was going to release Gao Ding's men
and execute Yong Kai's. When the rumor had had a chance to
circulate, Zhuge Liang had Yong Kai's men brought before him.
"Who is your commander?" he asked.
"We are Gao Ding's men!" they all shouted.
Whereupon Zhuge Liang pardoned them all and, again ap-
plying Stratagem No. 16, after a good meal sent them back to
their camp. Then he had the real troops of Gao Ding brought
before him and put the same question to them.
"We are under Gao Ding's command," they replied.
Using No. 16 for the third time, Zhuge Liang pardoned them
as well, refreshed them with food and drink, and then said to
them, "Yong Kai has just sent a messenger announcing his ca-
pitulation. As proof of his loyalty he offers me the heads of Gao
Ding and Zhu Bao. I will not accept his offer. Since you are
under Gao Ding's command, I shall permit you to return to

him. But do not fight against me again. Next time, I will show
no mercy."
The soldiers thanked Zhuge Liang, returned to their base, and
spread the word of what they had heard about Yong Kai. To
find out more, Gao Ding sent a spy into Zhuge Liang's camp.
But the spy was caught. When the man was brought before him,
Zhuge Liang pretended to believe that the spy was an emissary
from Yong Kai. "Your commander has offered me the heads of
Gao Ding and Zhu Bao," he roared. "Why has he not kept his
promise? You're not very clever. What are you sniffing around
here for?"
The spy could no clear reply. Zhuge Liang served him
give
food and finally gave him a letter, saying, "Bring this dispatch
to Yong Kai and tell him to finish the business quickly."
Returning to Gao Ding, the spy handed him the note. When
he had read it, Gao Ding was furious. "I've always been loyal
to Yong Kai. Now he proposes to kill me!" He then decided to
tell the whole thing to his military adviser E Huan, who was
already very well disposed toward Zhuge Liang. Said E Huan,

"Zhuge Liang is a most benevolent master. It would ill become
us to stand against him. It is Yong Kai who misled us into this
rebellion. The best thing would be to kill Yong Kai and go over
to Zhuge Liang's side."
And so it was. Gao Ding killed both Yong Kai and Zhu Bao
and pledged allegiance to Zhuge Liang, who appointed him

prefect of Yizhou.
In this case,Zhuge Liang used more than one stratagem. He

not only applied No. 16, he also employed No. 33, "The Strat-
agem of Sowing Discord," and No. 3, "Kill with a Borrowed
1
Knife." In Chinese, such a combination is often referred to as

lianhuanji (a chain of stratagems).
2 5 9
16.2 The Seven Releases of King Menghuo
On his subsequent march southward, Zhuge Liang was told that

an emissary from the Shu ruler had arrived. It was Ma Su, who
had been ordered by Liu Bei's son, the Emperor, to bring gifts
of wine and silks for the troops. Zhuge Liang said to him, "Our
ruler has commanded me to pacify the tribal territories. The
fame of your sage advice has reached my ears, and I hope to
benefit from your words."
Ma Su replied, "These alien people to the south refuse to
recognize our rule, because they believe that they are protected
by the mountains and the remoteness of their lands. You may
conquer them today, but tomorrow they will fall away again.
Wherever you come with your army, of course, peace will im-
mediately descend. But as soon as you pull your armies out of
the south for an attack against Cao Cao to the north, those
alien tribes will seize the opportunity and invade Shu once more.
An important maxim in employing military means is 'Better to
win hearts than cities; better to battle with hearts than with
weapons.' I hope you will succeed in winning the hearts of these
people."
"You read my very thoughts," said Zhuge Liang.
Word reached Menghuo, King of the southern tribes, that
Zhuge Liang was personally taking the field against him and
had already used stratagems to eliminate his three allies Yong
Kai, Zhu Bao, and Gao Ding. So he gathered the leaders of the
Three Gorges before him and proclaimed, "Zhuge Liang is lead-
ing a huge army and will attack our land. We must stand to-
gether and resist him!"
The leaders of the Three Gorges assembled three separate
columns of about fifty thousand men each and marched against
Zhuge Liang. But they could not match his skill in the art of
war. One of the three leaders fell during a surprise nighttime
attack,and the other two, Dongtuna and Ahuinan, were cap-
tured. When
they were brought before Zhuge Liang, he im-
mediately untied their fetters, had refreshments served, and
l 60 •
released them with an admonition to refrain from hostile acts

in future. With tears in their eyes, the two leaders thanked him
and hastily departed.
When they had gone, Zhuge Liang said to himself, "Tomor-
row Menghuo himself will certainly mount an attack against
us. That will give us an opportunity to capture him." Where-
upon he issued instructions to two officers, who then left the
camp with five thousand troops each, followed by two more
commanders and their units.
Zhuge Liang had now made all the necessary preparations
for the clash with Menghuo, who did indeed attack the following
day. After a brief skirmish, the Chinese troops turned tail and
fled. Menghuo pursued them for about twenty miles. Suddenly
he found himself surrounded by Chinese soldiers appearing from
ambush to the left and the right; his rear was cut off as well.
With a few of his officers. Menghuo managed to flee to the
Jindai Mountains, pursued by the enemy. Suddenly he was faced
with Chinese troops there too. Thus Menghuo and his entourage
were captured.
Back at his base, Zhuge Liang awaited them with meat and
wine. The commander's great tent was surrounded by seven
squads of armed guards; the entire camp, with Zhuge Liang at
its head, made an imposing impression. When all the prisoners

except Menghuo had been brought before him, the minister had
their chains removed and addressed them.
"You upright men. It is Menghuo's fault that you find
are all
yourselves in such unpleasantness. I believe you all have parents,

brothers and sisters, wives and children waiting for you at home.
The news of your defeat will have affected them terribly; they
are doubtless shedding bitter tears at your fate. I am going to
release vou, so that you can return home to your loved ones
and comfort them."
W hereupon he had food and wine served to them and released
them. The men were deeply touched and thanked Zhuge Liang
with tears in their eyes. Then Zhuge Liang sent for King
Ighuo and asked him, 'The late sovereign of Shu never
ed you badly. Why have vou rebelled?"
26 1
Replied Menghuo, "You invaded our land without the slight-

est provocation. How can you accuse me of rebellion?"
"You are my prisoner," rejoined Zhuge Liang. "Do you admit
your inferior position?"
"As a result of my own carelessness, you captured me in wild
mountainous terrain. Why should I feel myself inferior?"
"If I release you," asked Zhuge Liang, "what will you do?"
"I will pull my army together again and lead it against you
in a decisive battle. But if you capture me a second time, I shall
bow to your superiority."
Zhuge Liang ordered Menghuo's fetters be loosened and
that
that he be given food and clothing and accompanied back to
his camp. As a final gesture, he made him a gift of a horse and
saddle.
The Shu officers were upset at the release of the foreign chief.
They went to Zhuge Liang's great tent and said, "Menghuo is
the most powerful leader of the southern border peoples. He
was in our power today. The South could have been pacified.
Why did you let him go?"
Zhuge Liang replied, "I can capture that man as easily as I
can draw something from my pocket. I am trying to win his
heart. When I do, peace will come of itself here in the South."
The Chinese officers absorbed these words without much
enthusiasm.
In the meantime Menghuo had reached the Lu River, where
he met some of his scattered troops. They had been trying to
learn what had happened to their leader, and now they were
joyful at his return. They asked him how he had been able to
make his escape. Menghuo lied. "They held me prisoner in a
tent. I killed more than ten guards and fled under cover of
darkness. Then I met a mounted spy and killed him as well.

That's how I got this horse."
No one doubted him. Delighted, they helped him cross the
river and up camp. Menghuo immediately began reassem-
set
bling his troops and mustering a new army. Once again he called
upon Dongtuna and Ahuinan, the two glen chieftains who had
been captured and then released by Zhuge Liang. Though re-
z6z •
luctant, they could not avoid responding to the call. Menghuo

declared, "Zhuge Liang is a master in the use of stratagems. We
cannot defeat him in direct combat. But his people have had a
long march, and the hot season approaches. Those are factors
in our favor. We also enjoy the protection of the Lu River. So
we will dig in here. The heat will debilitate Zhuge Liang's army
so badly that he will be forced to withdraw. Then we can strike
and take him prisoner."
Faced with Menghuo's defensive tactics, Zhuge Liang ordered
an officer named Ma Dai to lead troops across a shallow spot
on the lower course of the Lu River and cut Menghuo's supply
route. At the same time Ma Dai was told to gain the allegiance
of the two chieftains Dongtuna and Ahuinan.
Ma Dai successfully carried out his first commission, captur-
ing more than a hundred wagons bearing food Menghuo's
for
army. When the tribal chief learned of this, he sent a young
officer out to do battle. Ma Dai defeated him easily. Next
Menghuo sent out the chieftain Dongtuna to regain the enemy
bridgehead on their side of the river. Some of Ma Dai's men
recognized Dongtuna and told the officer that the man was one
of those who had been captured and then released.
Ma Dai galloped toward Dongtuna and berated him for his
ingratitude. This affected Dongtuna deeply. Without replying

or lifting a weapon, he rode back in shame.
Menghuo was furious and screamed, "Traitor! Just because
Zhuge Liang treated you well, you refuse to fight." And he
ordered Dongtuna's execution. With great difficulty the other
officers persuaded Menghuo to rescind the order. Instead, he
had Dongtuna punished with a hundred blows of the cudgel.
Inwardly, most chieftains sided with Dongtuna.
Later, the chieftains assembled in Dongtuna's camp and said,
"Zhuge Liang is a master of stratagems. He is feared even by

Cao Cao and Sun Quan, ruler of Wu. How much more, then,
must we fear him! Moreover, he has treated us well. We owe
him our lives. It is time we showed him our gratitude. Let's kill
Menghuo and subordinate ourselves to Zhuge Liang. In that
way we will spare our people greater misery."
To Catch Something, First Let It Go -263
Whereupon Dongtuna took sword and, accompanied by

his
about a hundred men, hastened to the main camp. It so hap-

pened that Menghuo was drunk at this time. He was taken
prisoner by Dongtuna, brought to the Lu River, and turned over
to Zhuge Liang. When Dongtuna had recounted the entire
course of events to him, Zhuge Liang rewarded him handsomely
and released him and the group of chieftains with him. Then
he ordered the executioners to bring Menghuo out, and said to
him, "The last time you said that if I took you captive again
you'd surrender. Well?"
Menghuo replied, "My capture this time was not due to your
abilities. My own people are responsible for my unfortunate
position. Why should I surrender?"
"And what will happen if I release you again?"
"I am, it is true, only a member of the southern peoples. But
do not think that I therefore know nothing about the arts of
war. If you let me return to my glens, I will assemble another
army to fight against you. If you capture me again, my heart
will yield and I will acknowledge fealty to you."
Whereupon Zhuge Liang loosened his fetters and had food
and drink brought for the prisoner. Then Zhuge Liang invited
Menghuo to ride with him through his army camp, to see how
well equipped and supplied his troops were. After the inspection
Zhuge Liang turned to Menghuo.
"Consider my experienced troops, my capable officers and
ample supplies. How can you hope to defeat me? If you yield,
I will inform our sovereign. You will get to keep your kingdom,
and your sons and grandsons will be the guardians of the south-
ern territory forever. What do you say?"
Menghuo responded, "Even if I were to yield, the people in
my would never agree. If you let me return home, I will
glens
call them together and convince them that we should accept
your dominion."
Overjoyed at these words, Zhuge Liang took Menghuo back
to his great tent, ate and drank with him until evening, and then
personally accompanied him to the Lu River, where he had him
transported to the opposite bank.
But upon returning home, Menghuo's first act was to have

Dongtuna and Ahuinan executed. Then he took counsel with
his brother Mengyou. "I'm now familiar with the situation in
Zhuge Liang's camp," he said, and gave his brother certain
instructions which the latter immediately began to carry out.
Mengyou loaded a hundred strong men with gold, jewels,
pearls, and rhinoceros horn, crossed the Lu River, and headed
for Zhuge Liang's camp. There he was stopped by soldiers under
the command of Ma Dai, who asked what he wanted, listened
to the reply, held Mengyou back, and sent a message to Zhuge
Liang. When Zhuge Liang read the note, he asked Ma Su what
he thought of its contents. Ma Su replied that he did not dare
express his opinion aloud butwould offer it in writing. When
Zhuge Liang read what Ma
Su had written, he was delighted,
for Ma Su's view of Mengyou's mission coincided exactly with
his own.
Zhuge Liang thereupon issued orders to a few officers, and
when everything was ready he sent for the bringer of gifts.
Mengyou said, "My brother Menghuo wishes to express his
gratitude for your benevolence. You spared his life, and so he
has sent me with these gifts. Moreover, in future he will pay
tribute to the ruler of Shu."
Zhuge Liang had Mengyou and his hundred fierce-looking
men served a royal feast.
In the meantime Menghuo waited in his tent for news. Finally
two scouts returned and reported on how well Mengyou and
his gift-bearers had been received. Everything, they said, was
ready for the attack that was to be made during the second
watch of the following night.
Confidently, Menghuo now set out with thirty thousand sol-
diers. In the dusk he crossed the Lu River. Then, accompanied

by a hundred picked men, the tribal chief stormed Zhuge Liang's
main camp. Its gate stood open and he encountered no resis-
tance. Menghuo rode through the camp toZhuge Liang's great
tent and swept the entrance curtain aside. The tent was brightly
lit with torches —
and there lay his brother and all his men,
totally drunk. The wine they had been served had been drugged.
Menghuo realized that he had again fallen victim to one of

Zhuge Liang's stratagems. He loaded his brother on his shoulder

and had the other unconscious men carried away to rejoin their
main force.
But as he turned to go, torches suddenly sprang into life on
all sides and drums began to beat. Fear gripped his men, who
scattered in every direction, pursued by Zhuge Liang's warriors.

Menghuo tried to escape, but his path was cut off everywhere.
Finally, in a last desperate attempt, he reached the river. There
he saw a boat that seemed to contain some of his own men. He
called it over and jumped aboard. Suddenly an order was given,
and several men grabbed Menghuo and took him prisoner. The
boat had been prepared byMa Dai and manned by Shu soldiers
dressed like Menghuo's troops.
This time was not only Menghuo but also his brother and
it
numerous who had been captured. But none of the

dignitaries
prisoners was harmed in any way.
Once again Menghuo found himself brought before Zhuge
Liang, who laughed. "Did you really think that I'd be fooled
by that trick with your brother and his gifts? Well, I've captured
you again. Will you yield now?" he asked.
Menghuo replied, "This time I was caught because of my
brother's drinking and the effect of your drugs. If I had played

my brother's role and he had given me outside troop support,
I would certainly have won. It's rotten luck that has caught me,
not my own inability. So why should I yield?" And Menghuo
hung his head and remained silent.
Zhuge Liang smiled and said, "I'm going to let you go again."
Menghuo responded, "If you let me and my brother go, we'll
gear up for another battle with your army. But if I'm captured
again, I shall yield at last."
Zhuge Liang ordered Menghuo, his brother, and the other
officers tobe released. They thanked the minister for his mercy
and hurried away.
Proud of having escaped three times running, Menghuo re-
turned to his glen, from which he sent his friends out as emis-
saries to the eight hordes and ninety-three tribes. In due course
he assembled an army of 100,000 men.
When Zhuge Liang heard about it, he said, "This is what I've
-
z66 The Book of Stratagems
been waiting for. Now we have a chance to demonstrate our

full power." At first, however, he avoided an armed confron-
tation, since he wanted to dampen the opposing army's appetite
for battle a bit. After a while, detecting signs of fatigue among
Menghuo's troops, he instructed his unit commanders to lay
certain traps. Then he pretended an overly hasty withdrawal,
by leaving behind an empty camp full of supplies. Menghuo
reasoned, "It must have been something urgent to cause Zhuge
Liang to break camp so suddenly. Shu is probably being attacked
either by Sun Quan, ruler of Wu, or by Cao Pi, Emperor of
Wei. We must not miss this opportunity. We must give chase
at once."
Menghuo immediately saw Zhuge
Arriving at the Erhe River,
Liang's camp pitched on the northern riverbank. He said to his
men, "Zhuge Liang fears our pursuit. So he has dug in on the
northern bank. He'll probably pull out in a few days."
Menghuo gave the order to cut down trees and prepare to
ford the river. He had not noticed the Shu soldiers hidden on
the southern bank of the river. That day, the wind blew strongly.
Suddenly Menghuo's army found itself surrounded by a sea of
torches, while drums beat on every side. The Shu troops had
left their hiding places and swarmed toward Menghuo's posi-
tions. There was panic, and Menghuo fled with a few followers.
He tried to return to his old camp, but Shu troops were already
there. The only escape route open to him led along the edge of
a dense forest. Suddenly he saw an escorted wagon, with Zhuge

Liang seated on top in solitary splendor. Menghuo immediately
ordered his men to take Zhuge Liang prisoner. They all ran
toward wagon,
the there was a shout —
and they seemed to
disappear. Zhuge Liang had had a ditch dug, and Menghuo and
his men had fallen into it. Menghuo, his brother Mengyou, and
their men were again prisoners of the Shu army.

Once again Zhuge Liang freed all the lower-ranking prisoners
them lavish hospitality and some encouraging
after offering
words. Menghuo's men left the Shu camp filled with gratitude.
Then Mengyou, Menghuo's brother, was brought forward.
Zhuge Liang castigated him. "Your brother is a simple fool.
You should some sense into him. This

talk is the fourth time
I've captured him. Does he feel no shame?"
Mengyou blushed with disgrace. He threw himself to the
ground and begged for clemency. Zhuge Liang said, "If I'm to
kill you, it won't be today. I pardon you. But you must bring
your brother to his senses!" And he ordered Mengyou's chains

to be loosened and the man released. Mengyou thanked him
tearfully and went on his way.
When Menghuo was brought out, Zhuge Liang feigned fury.
"Well, I've caught you again today. What have you to say?"
Menghuo replied, "Again I've been a victim of your
stratagems."
Zhuge Liang ordered his prisoner beheaded. But Menghuo
showed not the slightest fear. He merely turned his head toward
Zhuge Liang and said, "If you let me go again, I wili avenge
my four defeats."
Zhuge Liang laughed, ordered him released from his chains,
invited him into the commander's tent, and served him lavishly.
Later he asked, "Four times I've treated you with courtesy, and
yet you won't yield. Why?"
To which Menghuo replied, "I am a man from outside the
realm of Chinese culture. Unlike you, I do not rely on perfidious
stratagems. Why should I yield?"
Asked Zhuge Liang, "Will you resume the struggle if I let you
go a fourth time?"
SaidMenghuo, "If you capture me again, I will pledge fealty
to you with all my heart and give everything I have in my glen
to your army. I will swear never to betray you."
Once again Zhuge Liang released him. Menghuo headed
southward and met his brother Mengyou, who said to
finally
him, "We're not strong enough for this enemy. We've been
beaten several times now. I think it'd be best if we hide in the
mountains. The Shu army won't be able to stand the summer
heat. They'll have to leave."
So the two men wentTulong Gorge, which was ruled by
to
Mengyou's friend King Duosi. This glen was highly inaccessible.
One entrance was barricaded by King Duosi's men, and the
•
other was mortally dangerous to. pass, infested with scorpions

and poisonous snakes. At night deadly fumes floated above the
earth;anyone who drank from the area's four wells was doomed
to die.
In this secure refuge, the two brothers and King Duosi gave
themselves over to a life of drink and revelry. With supernatural
help, however, Zhuge Liang managed to penetrate to their lair
and set up camp nearby. When Menghuo learned of this, he
gave a big feast to raise his troops' morale and decided to launch
an attack against the Shu army. Just at that moment Yangfeng,
chieftain of the Yixiyinye Gorge, appeared on the scene with
thirty thousand soldiers and offered his help to Menghuo. The
tribal king held a festive banquet for Yangfeng and his sons.
During the meal, Yangfeng brought in some sword dancers to

perform and had his sons pour wine for Menghuo and Mengyou.
As they were about to begin drinking, Yangfeng issued a sharp
command, and his two sons grabbed Menghuo and his brother
and bound them. The same thing happened to King Duosi.
"We were friends! Why are you doing this to me?" asked
Menghuo.
"My brother, my sons, and my nephews joined your rebellion.
They were captured along with you. But Zhuge Liang released
them. I've captured you today to repay his generosity. Now I'll
bring you to him."
Zhuge Liang asked Menghuo, "Will you yield this time?"
"It was not your cleverness," replied Menghuo, "but treach-
ery in my own ranks that put me in your hands. Kill me if you

wish. I'll not yield."
Zhuge Liang responded, "I will show mercy yet again. You
may lead your army into battle against me another time. But if
I get my hands on you again, I'll exterminate you and your
entire family." And he released Menghuo, Mengyou, and King
Duosi. Yangfeng and his men were rewarded with rich gifts and
high offices and sent home.
Menghuo, however, hurried to the Yinkang Gorge, where he
concluded an alliance with King Mulu. But Zhuge Liang was
victorious this tune too. King Mulu was killed and the Yinkang
Gorge conquered. Zhuge Liang gave orders to search for

Menghuo. Then a report reached him that, after fruitless at-
tempts to persuade Menghuo Menghuo's brother-

to surrender,
in-law had taken him, his wife, and a hundred members of his
clan prisoner and was bringing all of them to Zhuge Liang.
Hearing this, Zhuge Liang instructed two of his commandants
to hide with two thousand men near the great tent. Then he
ordered that Menghuo and all the other prisoners be permitted
to enter.
When the prisoners stopped in the entranceway of the tent
to bow, Zhuge Liang gave a prearranged signal to the hidden
troops. They pounced upon the new arrivals and searched them
thoroughly, revealing that each and every one of them was
carrying a sharp sword or dagger.
Zhuge Liang said, "You only pretended to surrender. In real-
ity you wanted to murder me." And turning to Menghuo he
added, "Did you not say last time that you would yield if I were
to capture your family? What do you say now?"
"We came here voluntarily, risking our own lives. My capture
is not a result of your skill. Why should I yield?"
Zhuge Liang, "This is the sixth time I've caught you,
Said
and still you won't give in. How long will this go on?"
"If you capture me a seventh time I shall give you my loyalty
and never rebel again."
"Very well," replied Zhuge Liang. "Your last refuge is de-
stroyed. What have I to fear?" And he loosened Menghuo's

chains with the words "If I capture you again, I will not release
you."
Menghuo and his people covered their heads with their hands
and fled like rats.
Now the tribal king was left with only one possible ally: King
Wutugu of Wuge, who was prepared to provide thirty thousand
troops for a campaign of vengeance. The soldiers were clad in
a kind of armor woven of vines that had been soaked in oil for
half a year and then dried, the process being repeated several
times, after which the vines were woven into helmets and body
armor. Thus clad, the Wuge warriors could swim rivers without
•
getting wet, and no blade was able to penetrate their armor.

In an initial clash at the Taohua River, Zhuge Liang suffered
a setback. He spoke with the local people to find out about his
new opponent, then climbed a mountain to examine the to-
pography. On his way back down the mountain, he came upon
a valley which was like a long snake, its stone walls to right
and left barren of vegetation. A single path led through the
valley. This discovery gave Zhuge Liang great satisfaction. He
immediately issued secret orders to his officers and commanded
Wei Yan to set up a camp at the ford of the Taohua River. If
King Wutugu attacked, Wei Yan was to relinquish the camp,

keep a lookout for a white flag, and march toward it. During
a period of half a month he was to flee the Wuge troops fifteen
times, leaving behind seven pitched camps and their tents.
In Menghuo warned King Wutugu about
the meantime,
Zhuge Liang's stratagems. He was especially dangerous, said
Menghuo, when it came to ambushes, and Wutugu was to be
particularly wary of big valleys. Wutugu took the warnings very
seriously.
Then a report arrived about the establishment of a Shu camp
on the Taohua River. Wutugu sent some of his armored troops
across the river, and after just a few skirmishes the Shu soldiers
fled. Fearing a trap, the Wuge troops refrained from pursuit.
Similar clashes took place on the second and third days. Then
Wei Yan saw a white flag waving in the distance. Leading his
retreating troops there, he found an empty camp. Fifteen times

Wei Yan accepted similar defeats, and he relinquished seven
camps in the process. Wutugu's pursuit became increasingly
reckless, yet he halted whenever he came to dense woods or
undergrowth. Sometimes he sent scouts on ahead, and they
spotted Shu flags in the trees.
Menghuo said with a laugh, "Zhuge Liang has run out of
stratagems. We've finally figured him out. He's been forced to
run fifteen times now, and we've conquered seven bases. One
last effort and victory is ours."
Wutugu heard this with great joy. By this time he was not
inclined to take the Shu army very seriously. On the sixteenth
day there was another skirmish with Wei Yan's troops, who
once again fled before any serious fighting had taken place.
Wutugu's men followed hard on their heels. Wei Yan led his
unit into the narrow, winding, stony valleywhich Zhuge Liang
had discovered and where another white flag was waving. Seeing
neither tree nor bush in the valley, Wutugu decided there was
no ambush to be feared and continued his pursuit.
In the interior of the valley, several dozen wagons suddenly
blocked the path. Believing them to be Shu supply wagons aban-
doned in the enemy army's flight, Wutugu pressed his men on-
ward toward the valley's exit. Suddenly tree trunks and rubble
came tumbling down the valley walls, blocking the narrow exit.
At the same time Wutugu realized that the wagons were filled
with straw and had started to burn. Hidden charges of powder
were exploding, set off by burning torches tossed down the
valley and lighting long fuses led to the wagons. The
which
whole valley was suddenly turned into a sea of flames. The oil-
soaked armor of the Wuge troops quickly caught fire, and thirty
thousand warriors died.
Watching the horrible bloodbath from his observation post,
Zhuge Liang felt tears come to his eyes, and he said, "I've
performed a great service for the imperial house, but at a terrible
human life."
cost in
Wuge soldiers reported to King Menghuo, who had not taken
part in the pursuit, that his ally Wutugu had scored a great
Menghuo hastened to the valley of his triumph,
victory. Joyfully
only to find thatWutugu and his army had been wiped out.
Attempting to withdraw, Menghuo was taken prisoner by the
same Wuge troops who had led him to the scene of the
slaughter — they were actually Shu soldiers in disguise. Once
again Menghuo and members of his family found themselves in
Zhuge Liang's hands. They were brought to a tent and served
food and drink. During the meal a messenger appeared in the
doorway and turned to Menghuo. "Zhuge Liang would find it
shameful to come before you again. He has commissioned me
to release you. Mobilize another army against him, if you can,
and try once more to defeat him. Now go!"
zjz- The Book of Stratagems
But instead of fleeing, Menghuo began to weep.

"Seven times captured and seven times released," he said.
"Nothing like this has ever happened. Though do not share

I
your culture, I do not lack a sense of what is right and proper.

How could be so shameless!"
I
Now he and the members of his party fell on their knees,

bared their torsos as a sign of penitence, and crawled to Zhuge
Liang's great tent. "O Great Minister, yours is the majesty of
Heaven. We men of the South will never again offer resistance
to your rule."
"Do you now yield?" asked Zhuge Liang.
"I, my sons, and my grandsons are deeply moved by Your
Honor's boundless, life-giving mercy. How could we not
yield!"
Zhuge Liang invited Menghuo into his tent, offered him a
seat, and had a festive banquet prepared. He confirmed Mengh-
uo's kingship and restored all conquered territories to his rule.
But two of his high officers objected to his generosity. "After
such a difficult campaign, why do you not appoint our own

officials?"
Zhuge Liang replied, "There are three obstacles to doing so.

First, I would have to send contingents of troops to safeguard
our own officials. Second, after their heavy losses in the fighting,
the southern peoples would resist rule by Chinese officials. And
third, the southern tribes would always remain mistrustful of
foreign overlords. If leave no one behind, moreover, I will also

I
not have to supply food for anyone down there."
The compassion Zhuge Liang was requited

of the conquering
by the gratitude of the southern peoples. They even built a shrine
in his honor. From then on there was peace along Shu's southern
border. And so Zhuge Liang won the hearts of the defeated

2
through the use of Stratagem No. 16. (The authors of a book
issued by the People's Liberation Army Press/ however, point
out that Zhuge Liang's psychological warfare would not have
succeeded if it had not been backed by great military might.)
27 3
16.3 Mao and His Prisoners of War
According to a copy of the stratagem book I ever

first
bought 4 — I acquired itbook fair in Taipei Mao

at a large —
Zedong too drew inspiration from No. 16 during the civil war
(1945-49) between Communist troops and Chiang Kai-shek's
Nationalist army.
In applying this stratagem to captured Guomindang troops,
Mao first separated those officers and men who were considered
specially loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. They were to be treated
strictly as prisoners. The others received a more lenient treat-
ment. The most effective tools in reorienting them in favor of
the Communist cause were the so-called "complaint sessions"
(sukuhui). At these meetings, carefully indoctrinated members
compared their poverty and
of the lowest social class drastically
and sisters" with the luxury
the misery of all their "class brothers
of the wealthy, whose patron they alleged to be Chiang Kai-
shek. Dramatic descriptions of events were offered at these
sessions,sometimes reinforced by bloody props such as the —
rope with which a youngster's father had hanged himself after
being harassed by a big landowner. These techniques aroused
hatred against the "exploiters" and their political and military
representatives.
In his later writings, Mao praised the remarkable efficacy of
these efforts at "reeducating" captured Guomindang soldiers.
Those who did not opt to immediately join the Red Army after
this treatment were given food and money and told to go home,
with the following advice: "Next time you come up against our
troops in the field, don't forget: Chinese don't fight against
Chinese!"
Mao expected that the released soldiers would cause agitation
and subversion enemy ranks and thus undermine Guo-
in the
mindang morale. They would also effectively counter enemy
propaganda about alleged Communist brutality.
Of course, the released soldiers went about insisting they had
escaped. Many of them told their comrades and superiors about
the high moraleand military discipline of the Communist army.

Others committed acts of sabotage or deserted to the Com-
munist side at critical moments. Even before the Red Army
crossed the Yangtze River in 1949 for its decisive advance south-
ward, the morale of the Guomindang troops had been severely
shaken.
In this way, Mao succeeded in neutralizing the opposing army
by releasing those of its members whom he had previously cap-
tured and indoctrinated. (But here too, as in the previous case,
Mao's own military strength was a prerequisite for the strata-
gem's success.)
16.4 Escape as a Trap
Beginning on June 30, 1947, five columns of the Shanxi-Hebei-

Shandong-Henan Field Army, some 130,000 Communist troops
under the command of Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, crossed
the Yellow River and moved toward the Dabie Mountains in
Shandong Province.
On July 14, two Red Army columns surrounded two enemy
units near the hamlet of Liuyingji. In order not to force the
enemy to fight with the desperation of doomed men, the Com-
munist commanders decided to apply Stratagem No. 16 and
opened the encirclement on one side. This led the enemy to
attempt a breakout. The Communist commanders had naturally
positioned their soldiers so that the escaping enemy troops fell
right into the trap and were easily destroyed.

Sun Tzu wrote, "Do not drive a desperate enemy into a hope-
less corner." This is confirmed by the original treatise on the

36 Stratagems as reproduced in the 1979 Jilin book, where it
is written:
If you drive an opponent into too tight a corner, he will

mobilize his utmost energy to save himself. But if you open
a way out for him, his tension and fighting energy slacken,
z7 5
and in that state he becomes easy prey. This also helps

5
avoid bloodshed on your own side.
Taking its inspiration from the / Cbing, the old treatise on the
36 Stratagems states in its chapter on No. 16, "Easing leads to
subjugation — bright future."
16.5 Rafsanjani and the American Gifts
On November 14, 1986, in its column Shijie zhi chuang (Win-

dow on the World), the Shanghai newspaper Wenhui bao
opened a long report on the latest Iran affair with the following
remarks:
Exciting news has just been reported in the American press.

The U.S. has been conducting secret negotiations with Iran
for the past 18 months and has delivered arms to Iran in
order to gain release of American hostages being held in
Lebanon. According to the American revelations, these ne-
gotiations were carried out in circumvention of the State
Department, the Department of Defense, and the CIA, with
the personal approval of President Reagan. The latest issue
of the American magazine Newsweek, whose newsstand
date was moved forward, has a report on the background
[of the affair]. The following paragraphs are an adapted
translation of that report for our readers.
These introductory remarks by editors Ji Yun and Liang Ren

were followed by an abridged translation of the article "Cloak
and Dagger" from the November 17, 1986, issue of Newsweek.
On November 4, 1986, the article remarked, the seventeenth
anniversary of the occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran,
Iranian Parliamentary President Rafsanjani was especially
pleased, because an article in a Lebanese periodical had caused
embarrassment to the "Great Satan."
Up to this point, the Chinese editors followed the Newsweek
zj6- The Book of Stratagems
text closely. But here they inserted a subhead with an indirect

reference to Stratagem No. 16:
McFarlane came bearing gifts, but Iran's Parliamentary

President first let go of the thing he wanted to catch.
The report then went on to describe how five U.S. officials,
including the former head of the National Security Council,

Robert McFarlane, had secretly flown to Teheran. The dele-
gation had brought with it symbolic gifts, such as a cake in the
shape of a key (a hint about the establishment of new relations)
and a Bible with a dedication by Ronald Reagan. High Iranian
had even been promised Colt pistols. According to an-
officials
other version of the story, a far more worrisome offer had been
made: a planeload of U.S. weapons.
"Iran did not go for the bait," remarked Rafsanjani. "We
told them that we did not accept the gift and that there was
nothing for us to discuss." The Americans, he opined sarcas-
tically,"wanted to borrow our influence in order to solve their
problems in Lebanon."
—
This refusal of the initial American offer i.e., the Colts, or
a planeload of military equipment —
was interpreted by the
Chinese journalists in terms of Stratagem No. 16. The Iranians,
they remarked, had first let something go in order to lure the
Americans into making a better offer. The result of this appli-
cation of No. 16 was, according to the Newsweek report, that
Iran harvested more than $60 million worth of equipment, in-
cluding antitank missiles, radar systems, and spare parts for
their obsolete navy.
It is interesting to note the differences between the American
and Chinese reports. The former was simply a rather dry pres-
entation of the facts, without a deeper analysis of the possible
Iranian tactics behind the episode. The Chinese, on the other
hand, whether rightly or wrongly, described the Iranian behav-
ior during the early phase of the American advances as arising
from a specific stratagem. This is an excellent example of the
To Catch Something, First Let It Go ' 2-77
Chinese inclination to view international developments in tac-

tical (or "stratagemical") terms.
16.6 Shang Yang's Confucian Sleeping Pill
In the fourth century B.C., Duke Xiao of Qin issued a decree

calling on China's most capable men to apply for positions in
Having learned of this in his homeland of Wei, Shang
his service.
Yang traveled to Qin in 361 B.C. Thanks to a recommendation
from Jing Jian, one of the Duke's confidants, he was received
by the ruler personally.
At the first audience, Duke Xiao fell asleep during Shang
Yang's presentation. Five days later, during a second audience,
the Duke was equallyunmoved by the theories that Shang Yang
expounded. It was only during his third audience that Shang
Yang's words seemed to catch the Duke's attention, and at the
was sparked to such an extent
fourth audience the ruler's interest
Shang Yang went on for several days.
that his conversation with
Jing Jian asked Shang Yang, "The Duke has completely
changed his opinion about you. How did you manage it?"
Shang Yang replied, "During the first two audiences I spoke
about the Confucian way of ancient rulers. The Duke thought
these old Confucian methods of ruling too inefficient. To succeed
with that technique requires a sustained effort over dozens or
even hundreds of years. According to Confucian doctrine, the
rulers of antiquity succeeded chiefly through the impact of their
own virtue, and long stretches of time were required for that
influence to spread throughout the land. What ruler these days
possesses such patience? So Duke Xiao found this model of
sovereignty inadequate.
"Then I began to expound to him the theory of the School
of Legalism about how to create a wealthy nation with a strong
army — a goal that can be achieved quickly through application
of a strict system of rewards and punishments that favor farmers
but are war-oriented and anchored in a code of law. Of course,
—
the reputation of a ruler may suffer in implementing such a

method. Nevertheless, suddenly the Duke was infused with a
fiery enthusiasm."
One Taiwanese writer on the subject of stratagems points out
that Shang Yang deliberately began by presenting a position
the Confucian doctrine —
that was not his own. By not imme-
diately trying to win the Duke to his own theories, those of the
School of Legalism, he was first exposing him to "enemy con-
cepts," so to speak. But apparently Shang Yang represented
those concepts in such a manner that the Duke was bored to
death. Once the ruler had turned away from a doctrine that he
found boring, Shang Yang began to speak up for what was
nearer his own heart, putting forward the theories of the School
of Legalism. In short, Shang Yang's long-winded exposition of
the other ideas was really only a ploy with which to intensify
the Duke's interest in his own position. 6
16.7 Through Slovenly Rule to Strict Morality
Duke Jing of Qi appointed Yanzi as administrator over the city

of Dong'e. After three years one heard nothing but ill of him
throughout the land. Duke Jing was not pleased and summoned
him to court to dismiss him. But instead of resigning, Yanzi
said, "I admit my mistakes. I beg you to permit me to conduct
the affairs of Dong'e for another three years, after which time
you will surely hear nothing but good spoken of me throughout
the land."
Duke Jing could not refuse this appeal and appointed him as
administrator of Dong'e for another three years. After that pe-
riod, indeed, nothing but good was heard of Yanzi. The Duke
was delighted and again summoned him to his court, this time
to reward him. But Yanzi refused any gifts. When Duke Jing
asked him his reasons, he replied:
"When I came to guide the affairs of Dong'e, had roads
first I
and
built I promoted measures favoring the poor farmers. This
was resented by the wicked. 1 encouraged the thrifty and the
z79
industrious, as well as those who demonstrated filial piety and

brotherly love. I punished the fraudulent and the lazy. This was
resented by the good-for-nothings among the people. In criminal
matters, I did not go out of my way to protect the wealthy and
the powerful. This was resented by the wealthy and the pow-
erful. What the people around me requested, I granted if it was
compatible with the law but denied when it violated the law.
This was resented by the people around me. When I attended
my superiors, I never did more than was required by rite and
custom. This was resented by my superiors. And so, all these
people spread their slander about me, even here at court. After
three years these slanders came to Your Excellency's attention.
"This time wanted to be very careful and do things differ-
I
ently. So I had no roads built and postponed measures to benefit

the poor farmers. This delighted the wicked. I discriminated
against the thrifty and industrious and those who demonstrated
filial piety and brotherly love. I let the fraudulent and the lazy
go unpunished. This delighted the good-for-nothings among the
people. In criminal matters, I favored the wealthy and the pow-
erful. This delighted them. I approved of everything that the
people around me requested. This delighted them. When I at-
tended my superiors, did more than custom required.

I This
delighted my superiors. And so it was that all these people sang
my praises everywhere, even here at court. After three years
came to Your Excellency's ears. Three
these hypocritical praises
years ago, when you wanted to punish me, I really deserved a
reward. And now that you wish to reward me, punishment
would be more appropriate. These are the reasons why I cannot
accept your gifts."
Recognizing Yanzi for the truly capable man he was, Duke
Jing appointed him administrator of the entire country. And in
just three years the land of Qi experienced a period of great
growth.
In this anecdote from Yanzi chunqiu (The Springs and Autumns

of Yanzi — see Section 3.3, "Two Peaches Kill Three Knights"),
Yanzi wanted to gain the confidence of Duke Jing. He could
•
not do so by following his own inner convictions and conducting

an honest government. Instead, he eased off for three years. By
temporarily relinquishing all his principles and thus generating
positive gossip about himself, he regained the Duke's interest
and goodwill. Then, by dint of a skillful presentation, he con-
vinced the ruler of the value of his ethical position.
16.8 Tension to the Last
In Section 8.6, "The Match," we briefly reviewed part of Wen-

kang's nineteenth-century Tale of the Gallant Maid, in which
the young scholar An Ji, traveling to visit his old father, was
rescued by Thirteenth Sister from the clutches of a gang of
criminals and thus from probable death. Later in the story he
tells his father about his miraculous rescue.
Father An would like to express his gratitude to his son's
rescuer, but An Ji knows nothing about her identity. As to where
she lives, he recalls only a poem she had written on a wall of
the monastery which the bandits had used as their headquarters.
Its last lines were:
Ifyou seek me,

you will find me somewhere in the clouds.
Father An sits lost in thought, endlessly chanting the poem's

last lines and outlining with his finger on the table the three
Chinese written characters for 'Thirteenth Sister." Suddenly he
pounds his fist on the table and shouts in gleeful relief, "I
have it!"
His son naturally wants to know what it is his father has

understood. The old man says, "I see clearly now. But it is not
yet time to reveal it to you. Be patient for a while. Then I shall
both speak and act."

For better or for worse, An Ji is forced to control his curiosity,
while questions spin around in his head. The author writes:
It is not only the young An who is plagued by doubts. The

reader of this book, too, must be experiencing impatience.
But just as other authors write works in which they first
let the reader go in order to catch him later, so am I con-

strained in this tale of mine to narrate things in their proper
order, from head to toe. So have patience! You, dear
Reader, shall know everything at the proper time.
Author Wenkang reveals the secret of Thirteenth Sister only

near the end of his novel. 7
Wenkang is using Stratagem No. 16 here as a kind
In effect,
of literary trick. What he wants to catch is the reader's attention,
in order to hold it for the remainder of the novel. Shortly before
revealing the secret and thus resolving the tension, he lets the
reader drop back into uncertainty. In this way, the author piques
the reader's curiosity about the solution to the mystery, which
has been held out as a kind of bait.
16.9 First Forbearance, Then Admonition
Someone who causes an auto accident is usually shocked and

ashamed at first. If the guilty party is reproached harshly while
in that state of mind, it is very likely that he will react negatively
in self-defense, instead of realizing and admitting his fault. So
the first thing to do with a person who is responsible for a traffic
accident is to speak gently with him, sympathize, listen to his
version of things, and wait until he has calmed down, before
stating clearly that he is to blame.
To state the matter in more universal terms: At first, permit
the feelings of the guilty party free rein, because in the initial
stage he will not be open to accepting blame or admonitions.
But once his excitement has abated, he may be receptive to a
sense of responsibility and an awareness of his own mistaken
behavior.
—
16.10 Praise unto Death
The foregoing observations are linked to the Confucian virtue

of forbearance. In another variant of Stratagem No. 16, Lin
Biao is reported to have jotted down this maxim in the margin
of a page of Stalin's essay On Questions of Leninism: 8
When is no other choice, resort to the method of base

there
flatteryand fulsome praise. Later, you can expose the
praised one and bring him down.
At that time, Lin Biao was regarded as the crown prince, Mao's
heir designate. But in 1971 it was reported that, after a failed
coup attempt against Mao, he died in a plane crash while trying

to escape to the Soviet Union. Afterwards, Lin Biao was branded
asMao's archenemy. The maxim quoted above was cited by
some authorities as proof that Lin Biao hoped to "praise [Mao]
9
to death."
During that period, the ideas of Mao Zedong were firmly
entrenched in Communist China. To openly oppose them would
have been suicidal. An enemy such as Lin Biao — according to
this analysis — had no other choice but to pretend to be an
especially zealous follower of Mao. But in order to discredit
Mao's ideas and the man himself, Lin Biao did everything pos-
sible to raise Mao to impossible heights, declaring him to be
the kind of genius who is born only once every thousand years:
"Mao is the genius of geniuses."
— "Mao Zedong's ideas are
greater than material forces, and can even replace them."
— "The
ideas of Mao Zedong are the pinnacle of human thought."
"Every sentence uttered by Mao Zedong is an ultimate truth."
By pushing the Mao cult to extremes, Lin Biao was trying to
create the conditions under which Mao could be toppled from
his exaggeratedly high position. This process may also be sub-
sumed under Stratagem No. 16: You give your enemy total
freedom, in fact encourage his vanity and inflate the reverence

in which he. is held, to the point where a reaction of resistance
and disgust sets in and it becomes relatively easy to obtain

popular support for his downfall.
16.11 The Trap of Arrogance
One day in 1925, He Long, 10 the military commandant of Feng-

zhou (Hunan Province), received a report that an English busi-
nessman had been caught trying to smuggle munitions and
opium near the city of Jinshi and that the contraband had been
impounded on the spot. A little later an official of the British
Embassy, accompanied by an official from the Chinese pro-
vincial government, appeared in He Long's office. The English-
man was aggressive and arrogant.

He Long led his guests into the reception room and asked the
Englishman what his problem was. "An English businessman
who was going about his business near Jinshi was thoroughly
robbed by one of your subordinates. I insist that you set the
matter to rights."
Calmly, He Long replied, "I am aware of the incident. I have
already ordered an investigation. As soon as it is concluded, I
shall institute the appropriate measures."

Believing that He Long was intimidated, the Englishman re-
sponded, with even greater arrogance, "Each and every piece
of stolen property must be replaced."
"In that case," said He Long, "be so kind as to list the lost
items on this form."
By his seemingly naive and tame reaction, He Long made the
Englishman think that all the contraband would be given back.
The man did not realize that, in keeping with Stratagem No.
16, He Long was deliberately cultivating that impression. As

the Englishman began listing the impounded goods, a soldier
appeared and reported to He Long, "The investigation has been
concluded. Our people did indeed confiscate the goods carried
by an English merchant near the city of Jinshi. The goods con-
sisted of rifles, ammunition, and opium."
"Very well," said He Long. Stepping over to the British of-

he said, "Be sure to list everything."
ficial,
The Englishman did so, and signed the list. He Long took the
sheet and read it through. His expression darkened, and he
pounded his fist on the table. "This is just the kind of arms
peddler and drug smuggler I most want to get my hands on,"
he said emphatically. He ordered the contraband brought to
him, compared it with the official's list, and said flatly, "Your
compatriot has violated Chinese law."
Outmaneuvered, the British official was speechless.
16.12 Accommodating Illusions
The Chinese have a saying, Qi yi qi fang, which means "to

deceive someone by means of his own attitude or cast of mind."
This can be seen as a highly refined application of Stratagem
No. 16: You let your opponent bask in his own preconceived
ideas, prejudices, convictions, or wishful thinking rather than
saying anything to disturb or contradict them, even when the
truth in a particular instance may run contrary to those notions.
In this way you leave your opponent "free" to remain, in reality,
a prisoner of his own illusion. The writings of Mencius, the
second most important advocate of Confucian doctrine, contain
two apt examples of this technique.
1. Yao, a legendary sage-emperor of ancient China, named

the virtuousShun as his successor. This aroused the jealousy of
Xiang, Shun's younger brother, who decided on fratricide. One
day Shun was cleaning out a well. After his work was done, he
came out of the well by way of a side shaft which tunneled into
the basement of the palace. Believing his brother was still in the
well,Xiang ordered his servant to seal up the mouth of the well
so that Shun would drown. Then he returned to the palace,
where he saw Shun seated on his bed playing the zither. Xiang
feigned pleasure. "Brother," he said, "how I've been longing to
see you!" When Shun saw Xiang he was truly delighted. "You've
come at just the right time," he replied. "I'm thinking about

some important affairs of state. Help me work things out."
Reading this anecdote, the student Wan Zhang was confused.
He asked Mencius, "If things really happened as the book says,
wasn't Shun's pleasure in seeing Xiang equally a pretense?"
Mencius replied, "No. Shun was a truly virtuous man. When
he saw his younger brother's pleasure, he was happy too."
2.An official named Zichan once received a live fish as a gift.
He couldn't bring himself to kill it for dinner, so he gave it to

the pondkeeper and told him to throw it into the pond. But the
pondkeeper killed the fish and ate it. Afterward he told Zichan
that he had released the fish and that it had looked dead at first
when it landed in the water but then had begun to move and
had swum away.
Zichan was pleased. But the pondkeeper said to others, "How
can people think Zichan is a wise man? I ate his fish, but he
thinks the fish is still swimming around in the pond."
In a more active version of the same predicament, one may
be put in the uncomfortable situation of having to lie in order
to appear truthful, to "bend" the truth in such a way that the
person one is dealing with will be able to fit it into his own
fixed conception of reality. This is exemplified in the following
short-short story: 11
The host poured tea into the cups and placed them on a little
table before his guests. Then he covered the cups, each cover
making a sweet, on. Seeing that some-
tinkling sound as it went
thing was missing, the host placed the thermos jug on the floor
and hurried into the next room. The two visitors, a father and
his ten-year-old daughter, heard the sound of pantry doors open-
ing and things being moved around.

The daughter stood at the window looking at some flowers.
The was approaching the delicate handle of his
father's finger
teacup, when suddenly there was a terrible bursting sound, like
an explosion.
The thermos jug on the floor had fallen over. The girl started
and looked around quickly. Everything seemed normal and yet
somehow strange. Neither she nor her father had touched the
jug. There could be no doubt of that. When had put
their host
iton the floor it had wobbled but had not fallen over right away.
The sound of the crash brought the host running to his guests.
In his hand he held a box of sugar cubes. He looked at the
steaming puddle on the floor and murmured, "It doesn't matter.
It doesn't matter!"
The father seemed inclined to say something but held his
tongue at first. Then he said, "I'm terribly sorry. I kicked it
accidentally."
"It doesn't matter," repeated their host calmly.
On the way home, the girl asked her father, "Did you kick
the thermos jug?"
was nearest to it," said her father.
"I
"But you didn't touch it! I saw your reflection in the window
just at that moment. You weren't moving at all."
Her father laughed. "Well, tell me then, what else could I
have done?"
"The thermos fell by itself," insisted the girl, "because the
floor was uneven. I saw it wobble when Uncle Li put it down.
Father, why did you say ?" . . .
"Uncle Li didn't see what happened."

"But you could have explained it to him."
"No, my child" was the father's reply. "It was better to say
that I had accidentally kicked it. That was much more believable.
Sometimes you just don't know how something happens. And
the more truthfully you tell about it, the less truthful it seems
and the less you are believed."
The girl was silent for a while.
At last she asked, "Was that the only way?"
"The only way!"
16.13 Three Visits to the Thatched Hut
The names of Liu Bei, founder of Shu, and his Chief Minister
Zhuge Liang have come up several times in previous chapters.
To Catch Something, First Let It Go '287
How did thosetwo men develop the unshakable mutual con-

fidence which marked their relationship?
In his early years Zhuge Liang lived as a recluse in the Long-
zhong Mountains near the city of Xiangyang, observing political
developments in China. Speaking with his intimate friends, he

often compared himself to Guan Zhong and Yue Yi, the great
old masters of statesmanship and military strategy in preimperial

China. What he lacked, in order to emulate their example, was
a personage in whose service he could prove himself. He saw
no opportunity for rapid advancement in any of the established
power groups. Liu Bei seemed to offer the only chance worth
taking.
Although Liu Bei's high-flown plans to become China's su-
preme leader had thus far come to nothing, he nevertheless

was remotely related
radiated a certain princely aura, since he
to the imperial house of Han. Hearing that Liu Bei was looking
for an adviser, Zhuge Liang decided to do everything possible
to gain his trust. So he prompted certain people to sing his
praises to Liu Bei.
At that time Liu Bei, already tortured by his sense of ap-
proaching age, had recently suffered one setback after another.
In a battle against Cao Cao he had lost almost his entire army.
Then he had barely escaped two assassination attempts by Liu
Biao, the governor of Jingzhou, a distant cousin with whom he
had sought asylum. Everything seemed lost. Then, while fleeing
from Xiangyang after the second attempt on his life, he en-
countered the hermit Sima Hui (also known as Master Water-
Mirror).
"I chanced to pass this way," said Liu Bei, "and have been
guided to you by a shepherd boy. I am grateful for the privilege
of greeting you."
Sima Hui replied, "Your Excellency is clearly in flight. I con-
clude this from your wet clothing and your exhausted look.
Your Excellency should not attempt to hide the truth."
Whereupon Liu Bei recounted what had happened to him in
Xiangyang, Sima Hui gave him tea to drink and said, "Your
fame has long preceded you. How have you come to this difficult
pass?"
To which Liu Bei responded, "My fate is not a good one."

Said Master Water-Mirror, "It is not Your Excellency's fate
that is lacking, but good men at your side."
Liu Bei did not agree. He enumerated all his helpers and
declared that they were all loyal to him.
"Agreed, you have first-rate warriors," said Sima Hui. "How-
ever, the three advisers you have named are nothing but pallid
scholars. They are not capable of bringing order out of chaos
or help to a troubled world."
Said Liu Bei, "I have also been seeking one of those sages
who live in seclusion, waiting for their day to come round. But
in vain, alas."
Sima Hui "The most capable men in the kingdom are
replied,
assembled in this region. Seek them out!"
"Where may I find them?"
"If you could win the help of the Sleeping Dragon, the king-
dom would be yours."
"Who is he?"
Sima Hui clapped his hands and said, laughing, "Well, well!"
When Liu Bei repeated his question, Sima Hui said, "It is late.
Your Excellency may spend the night here. Tomorrow we will
talk again."
After supper, Liu Bei lay awake for a long time, the words
of Master Water-Mirror going round and round in his head.
The next day he asked Sima Hui about the Sleeping Dragon.
But the hermit only laughed and again said, "Well, well!"
Liu Bei asked Sima Hui to enter his service. But the hermit
refused, saying, "There are others ten times more qualified than
I to lend you their support. Your Excellency must only seek
them out."
Liu Bei took his leave of Sima Hui and rode to Xinye, where
he again joined his boon companions Guan Yu and Zhang Fei.
At a later point a friend of Zhuge Liang, known as Dan Fu,
entered Liu Bei's service as a military adviser. Compelled by
family affairs to quit his service, Dan Fu in parting strongly
recommended Zhuge Liang to Liu Bei in these words: "His
father died young, and he was raised by his uncle in Nanyang.
He took the name 'Sleeping Dragon' after a nearby mountain.
Following the death of his uncle, he went to live in the Long-

zhong Mountains with his younger brother. Your Excellency
If
succeeds in obtaining his assistance, you need have no more

worries about pacifying the kingdom."
Liu Bei's attention was thus focused on Zhuge Liang by both
Sima Hui and Dan Fu. From then on, obtaining Zhuge Liang's
services as adviser became Liu Bei's main goal. With his two
companions, and laden with costly gifts, he set out to find this
mysterious personage.
According to the version of the tale recorded in a Taipei
stratagem book, Zhuge Liang had also taken other steps to
increase his prestige in Liu Bei's eyes. When the Prince ap-
proached the Longzhong Mountains, he heard peasants in the
fields singing a song the lyrics of which contained hints about

a wise hermit in the area. When asked who had composed the
song, the peasants named Zhuge Liang. They also pointed out
the way to the thatched hut in which he lived.
Now Zhuge Liang was very eager to enter Liu Bei's service.
But he made sure not to be at home when the Prince called.
Making himself scarce was yet another device for piquing Liu
Bei's interest.
Disappointed, the Prince returned to Xinye. En route he
"chanced" to meet Cui Zhouping, yet another of Zhuge Liang's
friends, who, in the course of a brief conversation, struck Liu
Bei as a profoundly wise man. From Xinye, Liu Bei sent scouts
to the Longzhong Mountains to look for Zhuge Liang. They
returned with the report that he had now gone back to his hut,
whereupon Liu Bei set out for another visit. His confidant Zhang
Fei first suggested that, since Zhuge Liang was simply an or-
dinary man of the countryside, it would be more appropriate
to bid him come to them. But Liu Bei replied, "How could I
order the wisest man of our time to come before me?"

So Liu accompanied by his good companions, rode for
Bei,
a second time into the Longzhong Mountains. It was midwinter

and very cold. Suddenly a blizzard struck. His friends advised
turning back, but Liu Bei said, "By braving the snow, I may
demonstrate my Zhuge Liang."
respect to
But once again Zhuge Liang was absent. From his younger
•
brother, whom he met in the hut, Liu Bei learned that the man
he sought had set out with Cui Zhouping on a long hike. Their
destination, however, was unknown to the brother. For a second
time, Liu Bei was forced to leave Zhuge Liang's dwelling without
having encountered the man himself. This time, though, he left
a message behind, in which he expressed his profound disap-
pointment at having missed him again and the hope that Zhuge
Liang would lend him his support in pacifying the realm. He
also promised to come again, after having purified himself
through fasting and cleansing herbal baths.
This time Liu Bei waited for the spring and consulted the
oracle of the / Ching to select a favorable day for his visit. On
that day he traveled to Zhuge Liang's thatched hut for the third
time. To show he dismounted early and went the
his respect,
last few miles on The young boy who guarded Zhuge

foot.
Liang's house informed him that his Master had returned the
previous day.
"Please inform him that I have come to visit him."
"My Master is at home, but just now he is sleeping."
"Then do not tell him now," said Liu Bei.
He told his two companions to wait outside the hut. He
himself went in cautiously and found Zhuge Liang deeply asleep
on straw mats. Liu Bei folded his hands breast-high in greeting
and waited silently at the foot of the bed. A long while passed,
and Zhuge Liang did not awake. Finally he moved but only
still
to turn over on his other side, with his face to the wall. The
young servant boy wanted to wake him, but Liu Bei did not
permit it. He stood there for another hour, waiting. Finally the
Sleeping Dragon opened his eyes. He turned to the boy and said,
"Have guests come?"
"It is Liu Bei, the Emperor's uncle," said the boy. "He has
been standing here waiting a long time."
"Why did you not tell me sooner? First let me change my
clothes." And Zhuge Liang disappeared into an adjacent apart-
ment, to reappear after a lengthy interval, carefully clothed.
During the subsequent conversation, Zhuge Liang explained
how Liu Bei might gain the kingdom. He proposed that Liu Bei
first secure the territory of what is now Sichuan Province as

his power base, good relations with Sun
then establish
Quan, the ruler of Wu to the east, win the allegiance of the
alien peoples to the west and south, and finally, with massed
forces, move against Cao Cao, ruler of the kingdom of Wei to
the north.
Liu Bei's heart could not have been more open to Zhuge
Liang's ideas. Their strategic talks in the Longzhong Mountains
ended with Liu Bei jumping up, crossing his hands across his
breast in greeting, and exclaiming, "Having listened to you, it
is as if a light has suddenly appeared, as if dark clouds have

blown away and I see the blue sky. I have no great name and
am a man of but little virtue. Yet I dare hope that you, O Master,
do not despise me, that you will deign to come out of your
seclusion and lend me your support. I shall follow your instruc-
tions with the greatest respect."
To which Zhuge Liang replied, "For a long time now I have
been tilling my fields here and have been happy in doing so. I
have no desire to conform to the demands of the outside world

and therefore cannot grant Your Excellency's request."
Liu Bei began to weep. "If you, O Master, do not choose
to step out into the world, what will become of the poor
people?"
When he saw that the other man's sleeves were wet with his
tears, Zhuge Liang was convinced of Liu Bei's firm intention

to rely upon his advice. Liu Bei, so urgently in search of
a wise counsellor, had placed his heart firmly in Zhuge Liang's
hands. Zhuge Liang hesitated no longer. And thus began his
meteoric rise as chief to Liu Bei, who gave him his absolute
trust.
Although the The Ro-

historicity of this episode, as depicted in
mance of the Three Kingdoms, has not been proven beyond all
doubt, many historians place these events in the year a.d. 207.
In any case, they are regarded as the basis for the relationship
of rockbound confidence between Liu Bei and Zhuge Liang. As
292.- The Book of Stratagems
noted in stratagem books from Hong Kong and Beijing, Zhuge

Liang made clever use of No. 16, twice letting Liu Bei go, so
to speak, in order to bind him more firmly the third time.
This episode lives on today in the Chinese saying San gu mao
lu
— "Make three calls at the thatched cottage."
16.14 The Deathbed Wish
Through his own carelessness, and because he had failed to

follow Zhuge Liang's advice, Liu Bei suffered a serious defeat
during a campaign against the kingdom of Wei to the north.
Plagued by grief and self-accusation, he fell ill and was brought
to White Emperor City. When his sickness took a dramatic turn
for the worse, he employed Stratagem No. 16 against Zhuge
Liang.
Deeply fearful that his dynasty might fall, as the hour of his
death approached he called his faithful minister to him and said

tearfully, "Thanks to your counsel, I was able to gain an empire.
But my own abilities were too poor. Thus I ignored your advice
and brought this defeat upon Now am from worry
myself. I ill
and shame. I find myself facing death. My own son is weak and
inept. Yet I have no choice but to give the empire into his
hands."
As he spoke these words, his tears fell copiously. Zhuge
Liang, deeply moved, could not help crying as well. Later,
brushing his tears away with his hand, the dying Liu Bei
said, "My end draws near. I will reveal to you my innermost
thoughts. You are greatly superior to the ruler of Wei. You have
the capacity to pacify China and complete the great task. If you
can bring yourself to support my son, please help him. Should
he prove himself unfit for the crown, assume the throne
yourself!"
Hearing these words, Zhuge Liang was beside himself. He
broke out in a cold sweat, wept, then knelt by Liu Bei's deathbed
and swore, "Never would I presume to do anything other than

29 3
serve your son loyally, with all the strength at my command,

even unto death!"
By offering him the empire and virtually encouraging him to

mount a coup against his own son, the dying ruler Liu Bei
cemented Zhuge Liang's loyalty and thus secured the future of
hisendangered family dynasty.
16.15 Patience Brings Success
Hexagram No. 5 of the I Ching is Hsu (or Xu), which is given

thetwo meanings of "Waiting" and "Nourishment." There is
a commentary on this hexagram which explains the relation
between those two meanings and elevates the contents of Strat-
agem No. 16 to a higher plane in the art of living:
We should not worry and seek to shape the future by in-
terfering in things before the time is ripe. We should quietly

fortify thebody with food and drink and the mind with
gladness and good cheer. Fate comes when it will, and thus
we are readv. 12
STRATAGEM N O 1 7
Joss Out a Brick

to Attract Jade
The Chinese
characters
Modern
•&
pao
4
zhuan
$|
yin
ii
yu
Mandarin
pronunciation
Meaning of each throw brick attract jade

character (toss)
Applications Much like the English expression "Throw a

sprat to catch a herring."
Give someone something of lesser value in order
to obtain something precious in exchange; de-
rive great benefit from an insignificant gift or
favor; give your opponent something expend-
able now in order to gain something more val-
uable later. The "give-take" stratagem; the
"worm-fish" stratagem.
Since ancient times, jade has been China's favorite gemstone. It
is a compact mineral that, dependingon its iron content, appears

in a wide variety of colors from red to black, blue, green, and
even white (though it's best known in its green form, of course).
In ancient China, jade was used for imperial and ritual symbols,
as well as for decoration and jewelry. The "Jade Emperor" is
the highest divinity in Chinese folk religion.
Just as the phrase "Let a hundred flowers bloom" does not
refer to real flowers but to a broad range of artistic and literary
forms and styles, so Stratagem No. 17 does not refer to actual
bricks and jade. The goal of No. 17 is to obtain something of
value (the "jade") by giving something of lesser worth (the
"brick") or using it The images may stand for many
as bait.
different things, which is why Li Zongwu, a Hong Kong expert
on stratagems, has declared that No. 17 has the broadest range
of application among the 36.
2-97
17.1 Completing the Poem
The famous Tang poet Zhao Gu was about to pay a visit to

Suzhou. A local poet by the name of Chang Jian wanted to make
sure that Zhao would produce at least a few lines of poetry
while he was there. Chang Jian was certain that Zhao Gu would
pay a visit to the Lingyansi, the Temple of the Spirit Cliff. So,
on one wall of the temple, Chang Jian deliberately wrote just
two undistinguished lines of a Chinese verse form that really
calls for four lines, each with five or seven characters.
When Zhao Gu was disturbed by the
visited the temple, he
incomplete poem and finished it by adding the final two lines.
Zhao's lines were far more skillfully composed than the two
contributed by Chang Jian, and so subsequent generations re-
1
ferred to Chang's ruse as "tossing out a brick to attract jade."
17.2 The Half-Baked Novice
During the Tang period, the Buddhist monk Congshen used to

assemble his novices in a room where they meditated together.
With eyes closed, they had to sit very still and purge their minds
of all worldly thoughts in an effort to approach a state of genuine
withdrawal from self. Before one of these sessions, the monk
announced, 'This evening there are questions to be answered.
Any of you who has achieved profound insight into Buddhist
doctrine, please step forward."
Most of the novices reacted correctly, by assuming the proper
seated position and sinking into silent, unmoving meditation.
But one young novice, very taken with himself, arose, stepped
l
forward, and bowed. The monk Congshen said slowly, 'Just
now I tossed out a brick, hoping to attract a piece of jade. And

what did I get back? A half-baked brick."
This anecdote is taken from a Buddhist anthology dating from
the Song period. The monk Congshen's challenge before the
Toss Out a Brick to Attract Jade •
29 9
meditation period is the "brick" with which he hoped to dis-

cover the "jade" of a novice who had truly gone far along the
path of enlightenment. But his ploy failed.
17.3 Soviet Woodcuts for Chinese Paper
In modern China, No. 17 is still often used as a rhetorical ploy

involving self-deprecation. For example, in the first section of
Mao Zedong's 1940 essay on the New Democracy he wrote:
As to cultural matters, I am a layman. . . . For the cause

of progressive culture in our country, what I have to say
should be regarded merely as a brick tossed out in expec-

tation of a piece of jade.
Chinese authors often refer, ironically or self-effacingly, to their

own works as "bricks." For example, a long essay on the study
of the English language, published in the Beijing newspaper
Guangming Daily, begins its final paragraph this way:
Our ideas and proposals are still tentative. We have merely

raised a series of questions, tossing out a brick in hope of
attracting a piece of jade.
In a note to his 1985 detective novel, Dark Shadows over the

Villa of Autumn Fragrance, which deals with the Chinese Com-
munist Party's political norms for private home ownership, au-
thor Cao Zhengwen writes:
The Chinese detective story ... is only in its infancy. By

offering this slender volume to the Reader, I have tossed
out a brick in order to attract jade.
In this rather lighthearted spirit, Communist China's best-

known twentieth-century author, Lu Xun, gave the title Yin yu
ji (Collection of Attracted Jades) to a 1934 collection of Russian
3oo- The Book of Stratagems
woodcuts which he edited. In 1931, when Lu Xun wanted to

publish the novel The Iron Stream, by Alexander S. Serafimov-
itch, he read in a magazine about the existence of Russian wood-
cuts made work and very much wanted to acquire them.
for this
A friend of Lu Xun who was visiting the Soviet Union at the
time sent him a few of the woodcuts, remarking that they were
very expensive. But, he wrote, Russian printmakers were very
partial to Chinese paper for making their prints, and if Lu Xun
could send paper he would get the woodcuts gratis. Examining
the woodcuts, Lu found had indeed been printed on

that they
Chinese paper, the kind used in China merely for bookkeeping
and bills. So Lu Xun sent a supply of cheap Chinese and Japanese
paper (the "bricks") in exchange for which he received thirty-
six valuable woodcuts (the "jade pieces").
17.4 The Graveside Promise
The maiden Cai was lovely of feature, with a strong, healthy

body. She found favor in the eyes of King Gong of Chu, who
chose her for his wife. One day the courtier Jiang Yi visited
Lady Cai and asked her, "Did your ancestors perform outstand-
ing military service for the dynasty?"
"No," replied Lady Cai.
"Have you yourself performed any special services for the
crown?"
"No."
"How then," asked Jiang Yi, "have you come to enjoy such
a lofty position?"
"I do not know the reason," answered Lady Cai.
Jiang Yi remarked, "I have heard it said that, if you attract
a person with money, he will withdraw his favor as soon as the

money is gone. And if you attract a person with beauty, he will
withdraw his favor when the beauty pales. Today you are in
the full bloom of your womanhood, but one day your beauty
Toss Out a Brick to Attract Jade -301
will fade. How you insure that the King will continue
will to
grant you his favor and not turn away from you?"
Lady Cai replied, "I am young and ignorant. Therefore I
entreat you, give me your sage advice."

Said Jiang Yi, "It will suffice for you to let His Majesty know
that you propose to be buried with him."
"I shall follow your advice," said the young woman.
Jiang Yi took his leave. A year later he met Lady Cai again
and asked her whether she had conveyed to the King her inten-
tion to be buried with him. She replied, "I have found no op-
portunity of doing so."
A year later, Jiang Yi once again visited Lady Cai and asked,
"Have you told our ruler?"
"No. I have found no suitable opportunity."
To which Jiang Yi responded, "You ride with His Majesty
in the same carriage. Two years have gone by, and yet you
maintain that you have not been able to speak with the King
about this. Presumably you regard my advice as of little value."
And he went away grumbling.
Later that year the King held a great hunt. Torches smoked
like fiery clouds; the howling of wolves and roaring of tigers
were like peals of thunder. A frenzied rhinoceros broke out of

the forest and headed for the side of the royal carriage. The
King raised high his standard of command and ordered his best
marksman to kill the beast. One arrow, and the rhino sank to
the ground. The King clapped his hands in delight, laughed,
turned to his wife, and said, "With whom will you share such
pleasures after my life has ended?"
Lady Cai hesitated a moment, then shed a few tears, threw
her arms around the King, and said, "After Your Majesty has
lived for ten thousand years, his humble subject will accompany
him into his tomb. How, then, shall I know who will enjoy
these pleasures as the next king?"
Hearing these gratifying words, on the spot King Gong
awarded Lady Cai a fiefdom of three hundred households. This
is why it is said, "Jiang Yi is an expert in stratagems, and Lady
2
Cai is an expert at picking the most opportune moment."
• —
In this instance, of course, the "brick" is Lady Cai's promise,
while the "jade" is the gift which made her secure for the rest
of her life.
17.5 Ode to a Fart
"Flowering talent" Xiucai — was the designation for a certain

rank of scholar in imperial China. One such scholar had just
died and made his appearance before Yama, the Prince of Hell.
At that moment Yama broke wind mightily. And immediately
the "flowering talent" improvised this "Ode to a Fart":
The golden- shimmering rump arches high,

Releasing an expansive zone of savory aspiration.
The sound is like that of strings and brass,
The aroma that of musk and fragrant marjoram.
The Prince of Hell was greatly pleased, gave the "flowering

talent" a gift of ten additional years of life, and sent him back
3
to the world of mankind.
Here the "brick" is the totally worthless "ode," a piece of
unbridled, bootlicking flattery. The "jade" that it brings in,
of course, is the extra ten years of life granted by the Prince of

Hell. A blatant case of "I give you a little, you give me a lot."
17.6 Schopenhauer's 36th Stratagem
In 'The Art of Controversy," the philosopher Arthur Schopen-

hauer explains the following tactic:
You may also puzzle and bewilder your opponent by mere

bombast, and the trick is possible, because a person gen-
erally supposes that there must be some meaning in words
Toss Out a Brick to Attract Jade '303
[gewohnlich glaubt der Mensch, wenn er nur Worte hort,

es musse sich dabei dock auch was denken lassen]. If he is
secretly conscious of his own weakness, and accustomed
to hear much and to make as
that he does not understand,
though he did, you can easily impose upon him by some
serious fooling that sounds very deep and learned, and
deprives him of hearing, sight, and thought; and by giving
out that it is the most indisputable proof of what you
17.7 Angling for a King
Meaningless but attention-provoking actions are another way

of getting high returnson small investments. According to leg-
end, this was the technique used by Jiang Ziya toward the end
of the Shang Dynasty to enter the service of King Wu of Zhou.
Disgusted by conditions at the Shang court, Jiang Ziya left
the capital and withdrew to live a hermit's life on the bank of
the Wei, an important tributary of the Yellow River. At that
time this area was ruled by Prince Chang of the Zhou clan,
Ji
an enemy of the Shang. Jiang Ziya was aware of Ji Chang's far-

reaching political plans and his search for capable advisers.
In order to attract Ji Chang's attention, Jiang Ziya began to
fish in the Wei River — but in a most unusual manner. His hook
was straight instead of bent, he had no bait on it, and he kept

the hook at least three feet above the water. He sat there, his
fishing pole pointing up toward the sky, and repeated this sen-
tence over and over: "All fish that are tired of living should
come up and bite my hook."
This odd angling technique naturally was soon reported to Ji
Chang. He thought the fisherman must be a very unusual fellow

and sent a soldier to bring him to the court. Jiang Ziya, however,
paid no attention at all to the soldier. Instead he muttered to
himself, "Hook! Hook! Hook! But instead of a fish, there's a
little shrimp out to make mischief!"
The soldier went back to the palace and reported the failure
of his mission to Ji Chang, who became more than ever con-

vinced that the fisherman must be a strange but extraordinary
person. Whereupon he sent a government official to invite the
man to the court. When Jiang Ziya spotted the arriving official,
he ignored him completely and spoke to himself, "Hook! Hook!

Hook! The big fish won't bite, but a smaller one is hanging
around."
The official went straight back and reported to Ji Chang, who
said to himself, "That's really a very intriguing fellow."
Prince Ji Chang now loaded himself up with precious gifts
and personally went to invite the fisherman to the palace for a

conversation. This proved to Jiang Ziya that Ji Chang was sin-
and he entered the service
cere in his search for capable advisers,
of the Zhou. According to all reports he was of material help
to the Zhou in toppling the Shang Dynasty.
In terms of this stratagem, Jiang's strange fishing technique
was the "brick," and the growing interest of the Zhou ruler was
the "jade."
17.8 A Fragrant Name

for
a Hundred Generations
"A fish sees only the bait, not the hook," writes Wang Zhihua
in the Chinese Youth Journal. Because of this the fish bites and
lands on the fisherman's dinner plate. Society too offers plenty
of "bait," observes Wang, and as an example he cites some
advertising copy for a commercially published Who's Who of
the Chinese business world:
This Who's Who is an absolute must for every factory

director and manager. Keep a copy handy at all times. From
this book you can learn about the experiences and ideas
of others and, with the help of its data, can make contact
with other people in situations similar to yours. The book
also helps spread glory and honor over your own family,
down to your grandchildren and great-grandchildren, by
showing how you have added a page of fame to your fam-

ily's Your name will go down forever in the annals
history.
of Chinese factory and mine directors, thus gaining its place
in history and spreading its fragrance for a hundred
generations.
The price of being listed in the Who's Who of Chinese Directors

and Managers is a registration fee of four yuan, plus ten yuan
more for layout and twelve yuan for one copy of the book: a
total of twenty-six yuan (something around seven dollars U.S.
at the 1988 rate), which is no small sum by Chinese standards.

The publishers try to extract their hefty prices from factory
officials by issuing a string of fine-sounding but essentially empty
promises.
Irving M. Copi, a prominent American logician, has termed
this kind of propaganda the argumentum ad populum, for which
he cites the example of a new car that is photographed sur-
rounded by a bevy of beautiful women, which is supposed to
it's the best. Copi notes that advertising people glorify
prove that
their products and help sell them by linking them to people's
dreams.
17.9 The Raven, the Fox, and the Cheese
Master Raven sits in the trees,

holds beak a chunk of cheese.
in his
Master Fox, having smelled the cheese,

speaks as follows, if you please:
"God bless you, Raven, in that tree,
handsomest bird I ever did see.

Your feathers are fine and lovely and long,
and equally beautiful is your song.
A veritable Phoenix is what you are
in all these woods, both near and far."
Our Raven preens himself with pride

3o6* The Book of Stratagems
and opens his pointy beak full wide

to give forth song — but the cheese he drops,
and into the fox's mouth it pops.
Says Fox, "Each flatterer, Old Bird,
feeds off those who swallow his words.
This lesson — which I hope will please —
is certainly worth a ripe old cheese/'
(from La Fontaine's Fables) 5
The fox's words of greeting clearly are the "brick" through

which he obtains the cheesy "jade."
17.10 A Gift of Five Cities
In the Warring States period, the state of Qin wanted to conquer

the state of Wei. To that end it allied itself with the state of
Zhao. Qin promised that, in the event of a victorious campaign,
the Wei city of Ye (in what is today Henan Province) would be
ceded to Zhao.
Threatened by a two-front war, the King of Wei was terrified
and called his ministers together for a council. No one knew

what to do. Finally the monarch asked General Mang Mao,
who was especially prized for his cunning. The General said
that there was really no cause for alarm, since relations between
Qin and Zhao had never been good.
"The purpose of the present military alliance," continued
General Mang Mao, "is only to divide up our land and expand
the territory of the other two kingdoms. Though the strength
of the alliance seems overwhelming, in fact each partner is pur-
suing his own goals. Qin sets the tone, whileZhao serves only
a subsidiary role. All we need do is offer Zhao a tangible ad-
vantage, and it should be easy to shatter its alliance with Qin."
Mang Mao then spun out his own plan. The King of Wei
approved it and carried it out. He sent an emissary to Zhao
with the following communication for that realm's ruler: "In
the present situation we can no longer hold the city of Ye. Sooner
or later it will fall. You are attacking our land along with the
kingdom of Qin for no other reason than to obtain that city.
To avoid a war the King of Wei has decided to hand over the
city of Ye without a fight. Do you accept our offer?"
Delighted, the King of Zhao said, "Why should the King of

Wei deign to make us a gift of the city even before the battle is
joined?"
The emissary replied, "That is quite simple. War is a terrible
thing; it costs human lives and devastates entire areas. His Maj-
esty the King of Wei is being guided by humanitarian consid-
erations and loving care for his people, whom he wishes to spare
misery and destruction. Therefore he has chosen the path of
peace."
The ruler of Zhao inquired, "But what does the King of Wei
expect of me, should I accept his offer?"
To which the emissary responded, "Naturally, His Majesty
does have certain expectations, since he is offering a peaceful
settlement, not an unconditional surrender. Wei and Zhao used
to enjoy friendly relations and a working alliance. On the other
hand, profound hostility has always characterized relations be-
tween Wei and Qin. Qin is a predator; the Qin warriors are
like wild beasts. We would prefer to entrust our territory to old
friends rather than let become the prey of barbarians. That
it
is surely comprehensible. If you are prepared to conclude a treaty
of friendship with the King of Wei, he expects you to break off

relations with Qin. Then you shall receive the city of Ye as a
token of that friendship. However, should you refuse this offer,
our state will pursue a scorched-earth policy and fight to the
lastdrop of blood."
That night the King of Zhao conferred with his minister, who
suggested accepting the offer. After all, he reasoned, if they could
gain the real objective of the war — the city of Ye — without
fighting, why conductwar at all? Moreover, after annexing
a
the kingdom of Wei, Qin would become even more powerful
and might then turn its spears against Zhao. So it made sense,
concluded the minister, to exploit the excellent opportunity of-
3o8- The Book of Stratagems
fered them by Wei, secure Wei's support, and in so doing, to

contain Qin's expansionism and thus strengthen Zhao's own
security.
The King of Zhao therefore accepted the conditions laid
down by Wei, immediately broke off relations with Qin, and
closed the border crossings to that country. This news so in-
Qin that he immediately broke off his prep-
furiated the King of
arations for an attack against Wei and instead laid plans to
move against Zhao.
In the meantime, thinking to translate into action the terms
of the pact he had concluded with the emissary from Wei, the
King of Zhao sent an army marching toward the city of Ye with
the intention of occupying it. Ye was held by troops under the

command of General Mang Mao, who blocked the path of the
Zhao army at the frontier and asked its commandant whether
they came in peace or in war. The Zhao commander explained
about the Wei-Zhao pact and the ceding of Ye to his army.
"Damn it!" roared Mang Mao, "I've been put in charge of
safeguarding this city. Do you expect me to just hand it over
without a fight?"
"We're talking about a secret diplomatic agreement," replied
theZhao General. "The King of Wei has given his approval."
"What d'you mean, secret agreement?" responded Mang
Mao. "Has my King personally put his seal to this business?
Has he signed that pact you're talking about? If so, kindly show
me the document."
"What?" Zhao commander. "Are the words of a
said the
royal emissary from Wei worth nothing?"
"What emissary?" replied Mang Mao gruffly. "If you're re-
lying on the words of an emissary, you'd better apply to him
for further instructions. Our King has given me no new orders.
I'm not empowered to hand over the city. If you want to take
over the city, ask my commander in chief for permission. Now
I'm warning you: if you don't withdraw immediately, I'll cut
off your retreat and attack you!"
The Zhao General had no choice but to withdraw and report
back to his ruler. Only then did the King of Zhao realize that
he had been tricked by the King of Wei. Just then he heard

reports that Qin was trying to conclude a military alliance with
Wei against Zhao, which made him even more fearful. After an
emergency meeting with his advisers, he voluntarily ceded five
cities to Wei to persuade that kingdom to join with Zhao in an
alliance against Qin. 6
The "brick" here is Wei's deceptive promise to cede the city
of Ye; the deterrence of the planned Qin attack and the five
cities ceded by Zhao constitute the "jade."
17.11 Stalin's War Against Japan
The anonymous author of a Taipei stratagem book 7 refers to

the Yalta Conference of February 1945 as "the secret division
of spoils." According to that writer, Stalin applied Stratagem
No. 17 at Yalta. In order to end the war as quickly as possible,
Roosevelt (at that time "a very sick man," according to Lord
Moran, Churchill's personal physician) and Churchill (who, ac-
cording to the same source, had "feelings of friendship and
respect" for Stalin) requested Stalin to declare war on Japan.
The Soviet leader agreed to enter the war against Japan after
Germany's capitulation. This was Stalin's "brick," in exchange
for which he elicited various Western concessions in East Asia,
among them the annexation of the Japanese Kuriles and the
southern part of Sakhalin Island.
According to the Yalta agreements Stalin should have declared
war on Japan in May 1945. But he permitted the date to pass
without taking any action, leaving the Japanese a free hand in
their war with the Allies.

It was only on August 8, after the atomic bomb had been
—
dropped on Hiroshima in other words, at a time when Japan
—
was already ripe for capitulation that Stalin formally declared
war on Japan and effortlessly harvested the profits that Roo-
sevelt and Churchill had promised him. Among other things,
the Kremlin was able to impose its influence on northeastern
3io- The Book of Stratagems
China, which helped the Communist Chinese army gain control

of the entire country.
According to the Taiwanese stratagem book referred to above,
Stalin's behavior is a perfect example of No. 17. At the Yalta
Conference he exploited the Allies' thirst for victory, mobilized
their sympathies with a few well-chosen words, and thus assured
himself of gaining power in East Asia.
Similarly, according to another Taiwanese author, the Soviet

government under Stalin signed an agreement with Chiang Kai-
shek in Moscow on August 14, 1945, in which the Kremlin
recognized Chiang's regime as the sole legal representative of
the Chinese people and promised it help against the advance of
the Chinese Communists. In exchange, the Soviet government
gained three important concessions: recognition of the old
Chinese territory of Outer Mongolia as an independent state
(which quickly fell under Soviet influence), joint administration
of the Changchun railway line in northeastern China for thirty
years, and a thirty-year lease on the harbors at Port Arthur and

Dalian. The author notes that, through this application of No.
17 (the "brick" being Stalin's fraudulent promise to treat the
Guomindang as China's legitimate government and help it
against the Chinese Communists), Russia gratified its imperialist

ambitions and secured a bridgehead in the Far East.
17.12 All the Kingdoms of the World
Chapter 4 of the Gospel According to Matthew recounts:
The devil took him to a very high mountain, and showed

him all the kingdoms of the world in their glory. "All
if you will only fall down
these," he said, "I will give you,
and do me homage." But Jesus said, "Begone, Satan! Scrip-
ture says, 'You shall do homage to the Lord your God and
"
worship him alone.'
Then the devil left him; and angels appeared and waited
on him. 8
Satan's offer
—
"all the kingdoms of the world" is obviously —
a worthless illusion, nothing but the "brick" with which Satan
hopes to obtain what is of real value to him, Jesus' abandon-
ment of God and worship of himself. Here Jesus provides the
model for an appropriate reaction to the malicious use of No.
17: he throws the "brick" back at the one who offered it.
17.13 Quenching Thirst with a Promise of Plums
One time Cao Cao lost his way during a battle campaign and
led his men into an area without water. The soldiers became
very thirsty, whereupon Cao Cao had the following procla-
mation made: "Up ahead there is plum trees.
a large grove of
Much of the fruit is ripe. It has a sweet-sour taste and is very
thirst-quenching." When the troops heard this, their mouths
watered. In this way Cao Cao kept them marching until at last
they really did find a source of water. 9
Today this incident lives on in the Chinese expression "to
quench the thirst with a promise of plums" —that is, to console
or sustain someone with an illusion.
17.14 Satisfying Hunger with a Painted Cake
In his search for Buddhist enlightenment, the monk Zhixian left
his family,renounced the world, and went to the Dhyana mon-

astery on Mount Guishan. There the monk known as Master
You, who liked Zhixian for his dedication to the Buddhist path
and hoped to bring him further enlightenment, said to him, "I
do not ask you to speak of what you have learned in your lifetime
of study or of what is written in the great classics. Instead, I
beg you, tell me something ofwhat it was like while you were
still in your mother's womb and had not yet learned to differ-
entiatc anything. Tell me of that primal state untouched by

wisdom and experience with the external world/"
learned
Somewhat taken aback, Zhixian was silent for a while, then
muttered to himself for a long time, and finally uttered a few
sentences in an effort to meet the Master's request. But You was
not satisfied with the answer. Finally Zhixian said, "I beg you
to say something about this matter/"
Master You replied, "Anything I could say would be my own
view. How could that possibly enrich your perceptions?"
Zhixian then returned to his cell and searched all his books
and manuscripts for an appropriate response. But he found
none. Finally he said to himself with a mighty sigh,"One cannot
satisfy hunger with a painting of a cake." Whereupon he burned
all his books, saying, "I shall study the Buddhist way no longer
in this life. Instead I shall become a wandering beggar and thus

plague my spirit no more."
Tearfully he left Mount Guishan and went out into the world.
Zhixian had suddenly found Buddhist doctrine to be like the
mere painting of a cake, the consumption of which had only

seemed to offer profound insights. The painted cake was the
"brick," the presumed knowledge the "jade/" But in this case
even the jade turned out to be only a brick.
17.15 The Unguarded Woodgatherers
In the military sphere, says a Beijing stratagem expert, "tossing

out a brick" often means executing a tactical dissimulation de-
enemy in specific ways. The dissimulation
signed to mislead the
may involve sham troop movements or sham attacks. The main
ingredient insuring that your side obtains its "piece of jade/"
however, is the psychological state of the enemy. If you judge
the enemy's state of mind properly, you can induce him to take
the pretense for the real thing.
In the year 700 B.C. the state of Chu attacked the state of
Jiao and laid siege to its capital city, which was stoutly defended
3 1 3
by the Jiao army. Finally an official by the name of Qu Xia

came to the King of Chu and said, "The state of Jiao is small,
and its ruler can therefore be easily disconcerted. He who is
easily disconcerted does not think things through carefully. Let

us therefore send our troop of woodgatherers out to do their
work unguarded, in order to lure the Jiao defenders into a trap."
In ancient times, a Chinese army out in the field took with it
a troop of men responsible for gathering firewood and preparing

meals. Usually, these men were protected by soldiers when they
went out searching for firewood. Qu Xia was proposing to send
them out unguarded this time.
The King of Chu approved the plan. The first time the wood-
gatherers went out unprotected, thirty of them were captured
by Jiao troops. The next day the entire Jiao army was on the
alert to when they were again sent
capture the woodgatherers
out unguarded. In the meantime, the Chu army had sent some
of its forces to set an ambush in the mountains and others to
lay in wait outside the city gates. When the Jiao army, concen-
trating on hunting for the woodgatherers, was solidly encircled,
the Chu army attacked and defeated its opponents, eventually

forcing Jiao to capitulate.
The woodgatherers captured on the first day by the Jiao troops
served as the "brick," and Jiao's surrender was the "jade."
17.16 Misleading the Enemy
In March 1947,230,000-man army of the Guomindang re-

a
gime advanced toward the Communist stronghold in the
Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border area. Mao Zedong ordered that,
instead of trying to hold any particular positions, the Com-
munist forces were to operate in a hit-and-run mode and inflict
on the enemy. He then pulled out

the heaviest possible losses
of the Red headquarters at Yan'an, which was promptly oc-
cupied by twelve Guomindang brigades. The fall of the Com-
munists' symbolic capital was naturally celebrated by Chiang
3i4* The Book of Stratagems
Kai-shek's Nationalist regime as a great victory, and a large part

of the Guomindang army dug itself in at Panlong near Yan'an.
The Communist Northwest Field Army wanted to attack the
base at Panlong, but it was very strongly fortified. To overrun
it, they must lure away the forces guarding the base. So the Red
Army concentrated a large number of boats at certain crossing

points of the Wuding and Dali rivers, in the area of Suide and
Mizhi, and sent small detachments of troops marching by di-
verse routes, apparently heading for Suide. Observing these

movements through its aerial reconnaissance, the Guomindang
mistakenly believed that the Red Army's main force was trying
to pull back eastward to an area around the Yellow River. In
consequence, it sent nine regiments marching northward.
The Red Army now applied Stratagem No. 17. It ordered
various units to mount constant attacks against the enemy forces
moving northward. At the same time it deliberately left sub-
stantial objects behind it, in order to clearly mark the route for
the enemy and awaken the impression that the presumed main
force of the Red Army intended to veer northward. In this way
the Guomindang regiments were misled into constantly chasing
what they believed to be the main force of the Northwest Field
Army, in the hope of joining forces with a Guomindang force
stationed in Yulin and catching the fleeing Red Army in a pincers
movement.
When the main Guomindang force had thus been lured north-
ward, the main Red Army force came out of its hiding place
near Yongping, marched to Panlong, surrounded the fortified
base on April 29, 1947, began its attack on May 2, and took
the base on May 4, killing all 6,700 troops left behind to defend
it. By that time the main enemy force was much too far away
to be able to relieve Panlong.
17.17 Women Instead of Weapons
At the end of the third century B.C. the Xiongnu, sometimes

known as the "Huns of East Asia," founded a large federation
3 1 5
of nomadic tribes. Their empire stretched from Lake Baikal (in
southern Siberia) to Lake Balkhash (in what is now Soviet Ka-

zakhstan) and southward to the areas of today's Inner Mon-
golia, Gansu, and Xinjiang. The Xiongnu mounted many attacks
against Chinese territory, 10 in the course of which they captured
much booty and made slaves of the prisoners they took. The
Han Emperor dared not go to war against these fierce barbar-
ians. What was he to do?
In the year 198 B.C., Emperor Gaozu summoned Prince Liu
Jing to come to the palace and discuss the situation. Liu Jing
began by observing that the Xiongnu could not be defeated by
force of arms. "Surely you don't think," replied the Emperor,
"that we could tame them through cultural influence?"
To which Liu Jing countered, "The nature of Mo Du, King
of the Xiongnu, is like a smoldering fire. His actions are those
of a wolf. Toand speak with him about such matters as
try
humanity, duty, and virtue would be futile. But there is another
way of taming him, and not only him but his descendants as
well. It is a long-term strategy. But I do not know what Your
Majesty will think of it."
The Emperor wanted to hear more. Liu Jing continued: "The

only way to tame the Xiongnu is by political marriage, which
turns the enemy into a relative. I propose that you offer a prin-
cess to Mo Du as his wife. That will fill him with gratitude. The
Chinese woman will be his queen, and the sons she bears him
will be Mo
Du's successors. You can use the relationship of
father-in-law to son-in-law as a vehicle by which to cultivate
regular contacts, supported by frequent precious gifts. Such
treatment will turn even the wildest tiger into a tame one on
which you can ride. As your son-in-law, Mo Du will no longer
dare to plague your empire, and his successors, your grandsons,
will most certainly behave peaceably. In this way you can sub-
jugate the enemy's soldiers by peaceful means, without war.
This is a scheme that offers long-term security."
The Emperor's first reaction was an angry one. "How could

an honorable Chinese Emperor give a wild barbarian a Chinese
princess for a wife? Iwould earn scorn and derision."
Liu Jing replied, "Your Majesty might also sacrifice a plum
tree in place of a peach tree, by pretending that the most beau-

tiful lady-in-waiting at your court is a princess and marrying
her to Mo Du."
The Han Emperor followed this advice. And indeed, Mo Du
gleefully accepted the proffered bride and declared himself will-
ing to assume a family tie with Emperor Gaozu. Chinese women

were also married to Xiongnu rulers after Mo Du's death. Al-
though the peace between the Xiongnu and China was of rel-
atively brief duration and the barbarian attacks never ceased

entirely, the Chinese ruler's action certainly ranks as an appli-
cation of Stratagem No. 17. The Chinese brides, with all due
respect, were the "bricks" in this instance, and the "jade" was
the peace (however temporary) won by the ploy of political
marriage.
17.18 The Helpful Telegram
During World War II, American forces in the Pacific became

aware that the letters AF were cropping up frequently in Jap-
anese wireless communications they were monitoring. The
Americans assumed that this was a code designation for the
Midway Islands. In order to confirm their suspicion, the U.S.
Marine commandant on Midway was ordered to send a tele-
gram, in readily comprehensible English, stating that there was
a problem with the drinking water supply on the islands. Soon
afterward the Americans intercepted a Japanese telegram con-
taining the message that "AF would probably run out of drink-
ing water soon." This confirmed the American suspicions that
AF was the code name for the Midway Islands, and from then
on the U.S. forces were able to anticipate all Japanese actions
against the islands.
3 1 7
17.19 The Empty Case
Bi Ai, a resident of Lanxi District in Zhejiang Province, was a

man wise in the ways of the stratagems. One day he received a
visit from a friend who worked in the yamen, the district's
government building. The man asked Bi Ai come to

to please
the yamen. There he met Huang, the new prefect, who was
widely regarded as a thoroughly honest official and was now in
a state of extreme agitation.
After an elaborate greeting, Prefect Huang told Bi Ai of his
problem. It seems that the had suddenly
official district seal
disappeared. Huang suspected the prison guard Hu, a greedy

fellow who did not always place the law above his own material
advantage. District chief Huang had already reprimanded him
several times on that account, which had earned him the prison
guard's enmity. To get revenge, Hu had befriended the keeper
of the seals and apparently had taken advantage of the keeper's
brief absence to purloin the district seal.
Having discovered the theft, Huang had called a meeting of
those officials loyal to him. The situation was complicated.
There was no proof of Hu's guilt. Were he to be arrested, he
would doubtless deny everything. If he felt driven to desperate
measures, there was even a danger of his destroying the seal.
Then Hu could not be arrested, the seal would be gone forever,
and Prefect Huang, who bore overall responsibility, might lose
his position and even be punished. Friendly admonition would
not persuade Hu to confess either, since he would fear a harsh

reaction from the prefect. The officials at the meeting had turned
matters this way and that but arrived at no solution. Finally
they had hit upon the idea of consulting Bi Ai.
After thinking for a while, Bi Ai said to Huang, "Do not
trouble yourself any longer. Report yourself sick immediately.
Receive no visitors for three days, do no official business, and
issue no documents. You can be certain that, by the fourth day,
the seal will be in your possession once again." Whereupon Bi
Ai recounted the details of his plan to the district chief.
3 i 8
•
On the night of the third day, a fire suddenly broke out in
the yamen. The news shocked the whole city. Gongs sounded
and people shouted. Prefect Huang ordered all town employees
to fall to and help put out the fire. The prison guard Hu naturally
had to obey the order too. When he came running up, Huang
called him aside and said, "Many people are helping to put out
the fire. I've taken charge of the operation myself. You need not
involve yourself. Instead I want you to take care of the official
seal of the district. Here you take good care of it,
is the case. If
I shall regard it as your contribution toward fighting the fire."
With those words, the prefect hurried away. Hu had accepted

the case without much thought and now found that it was
locked, so that he could not simply open it on the spot, show
everyone that it was empty, and give it back to Huang. Suddenly
the prison guard realized that he had been tricked. As soon as
he handed the case back to the prefect, Huang would open it
in front of all those present and, should it be empty, would
accuse him of theft. Hu could see no alternative but to take the

empty case home and return the seal to it in the same way that
he had removed it.
The fire was extinguished that same night. The next day Pre-
fect Huang assembled his employees in order to reward them
good work. Prison guard Hu appeared with the

for their case.
—
Huang opened it immediately and there was the official seal,
nestled within as it should have been. Naturally, Prefect Huang

pretended to be unaware that anything had happened and gave
Hu his reward along with everyone else.
In this way Prefect Huang averted the danger of losing his

position and being punished for loss of the seal, by applying
Stratagem No. 17.
17.20 Lao-tze— Philosopher of Intrigue?
What you wish to limit, you must first expand.

What you wish to weaken, you must first strengthen.
3 1 9
What you wish to topple, you must first erect.

To him from whom you would take, you must first give.
11
Because of this passage in the Daodejing, the main scripture of

Daoism, its reputed author Lao-tze is sometimes accused of
propounding a philosophy of intrigue. In some commentaries
these lines are said to apply to the military realm.
Gao Heng, a historian of philosophy who died in China in
1986, rejected such an interpretation. In defense of Lao-tze, he
rendered the lines quoted above as follows:
What will shrink, must surely first expand.

What will become weak, must surely first be strong.
What will decline, must surely first rise.
What is to be taken, must surely first be given.
In his Readily Comprehensible Interpretation of the Lao-tze

Text (Beijing, 1987), Lu Yuanchi tries for a compromise be-
tween the first and second renderings. In his view, both readings
are linguistically correct; Gao Heng's version applies to natural
phenomena and the earlier one to human society. Lao-tze him-
self, says Lu Yuanchi, was primarily describing certain "dialec-

tical laws" in nature but at the same time sought to provide
metaphors for specific social processes and thus warn people
about them.
Be that as it may: In the Han Feizi, a book ascribed to Han
Fei and containing the oldest collection of examples elucidating
Lao-tze citations, the passage in question is unmistakably treated
in terms of stratagems and tactics.
17.21 A Bell as a Vanguard
Marquis Zhi, the most powerful of the six nobles in the kingdom
of Jin in the mid-fifth century B.C., was thinking of attacking
the kingdom of Chouyou. But its terrain was very difficult. So
he had a great bell cast and offered it as a gift to the ruler of
Chouyou. That worthy was delighted and proposed making his

country more accessible so that the bell could be brought to
him. His adviser Chizhang Manzhi said, "You must not! Mar-
quis Zhi is acting like the ruler of a small state paying his respects
to the ruler of a larger one. But Marquis Zhi rules a powerful
state. The bell will surely be followed by soldiers. Do not accept
the gift!" But the ruler of Chouyou did not take this advice. He
accepted the bell —
and seven months later Chouyou was de-
stroyed. Marquis Zhi's troops had indeed followed the bell.
The Han Feizi uses this anecdote to illustrate the relevant
ideas in the Daodejing. After citing the incident, the Han Feizi
states, "That is why it is said: To him from whom you would
"
take, you must first give.'
17.22 The Deadly Gift
Another time, Marquis Zhi demanded a piece of land from

Prince Xuan The Prince refused. His adviser Ren Zhang
of Wei.
asked, "Why do you not give him the land?"
"Marquis Zhi is demanding land from me without so much
as giving a reason. Why should I let him have it?"
To which his adviser replied, "If you give the Marquis some
land now, his arrogance will increase, as will his greed for yet
more land. This will make the rulers of neighboring states ner-
vous and they will join forces against him. When this happens,
Marquis Zhi's life will be over. As it is said, To him from whom
you would take, you must first give.' Your Excellency would
do well to let the Marquis have the land and thus increase his
arrogance."
"Very well," said the Prince. And he gave Marquis Zhi a
fiefdom of ten thousand households. Zhi was delighted. Later
he demanded land from kingdom of Zhao, which refused.
the
Thereupon Marquis Zhi launched a war against Zhao. The
kingdoms of Han and Wei hurried to Zhao's aid and Marquis —
Zhi lost his life.
Here the "brick" is the fiefdom, while the "jade" is the ul-
timate destruction of Marquis Zhi.
17.23 Downfall of a Dynasty
In the eighth century B.C., with the Western Zhou Dynasty

seemingly nearing its downfall, Duke Huan said to his adviser
Shi Bo, "Our dynasty is endangered. I fear that its imminent
collapse will affect me as well. Where can I flee to escape death?"
Shi Bo replied, "The foreign peoples to the west and north
will surely gain strength from our decline. There are many other
states around Zhou, but none of them offers a true haven. Hao
and Kuai are among the larger royal fiefdoms. Because of their
strategic locations, the rulers of Hao and Kuai are proud and
arrogant. They are also greedy. If you offer to entrust your wife,
children, and fortune to the care of those two rulers, they will
not dare refuse your request. But if the Zhou Dynasty then
collapses, their arrogance and greed will prompt them to break
their word. They will turn against you in order to get their
hands on your wealth. You will then have good reason to mo-
bilize your loyal Zhou vassals, march against Hao and Kuai
because they betrayed you, and conquer their territory."
The Duke found this advice very attractive. So he sent his
wife and children to the rulers ofHao and Kuai, who took them
under their care. In this way Duke Huan lured the other rulers
into a trap. The "brick" was his family and his wealth, which
the others' greed would tempt them to try and hold onto. The
"jade" was the secure haven which Duke Huan obtained for
12
himself by creating an excuse to go to war.
17.24 More Than a Horse
The Donghu began settling in eastern China during the Spring

and Autumn period and had repeated friction with neighboring
peoples. In the year 209 B.C., the ruler of the nearby Xiongnu
(see Section 17.17, "Women Instead of Weapons") was mur-
dered by his son Mo Du, who then ascended the throne. Wishing
to feel Mo Du out, the Donghu ruler sent an emissary to him
with a request that Mo Du givehim a gift of a "thousand-mile
horse" — a horse of great speed and endurance.
Mo Du saw the intention behind the request. He called his
ministers together and held council. The ministers noted that
there was only one thousand-mile horse in the entire land, in-
herited from the late king. How could it simply be given away
to another realm?
But Mo Du decided differently. "We cannot possibly risk our
good neighborly relations for the sake of a horse." And so he
gave away the thousand-mile horse.
The Donghu ruler now believed that Mo Du feared him. After
a while he sent another emissary, this time demanding that Mo
Du's wife be given to him. Once again Mo Du took council
with his advisers. Indignant, they called out, "Scandalous, the
arrogance of that Donghu chieftain. Now he wants our queen
for his wife! We suggest that you punish him by declaring war."
Again Mo Du took a different tack. "Why should we endanger
our friendship with our neighbors for the sake of a woman?"
And he had his wife delivered to the Donghu ruler.
Having received from Mo Du not only his finest horse but
also his beautiful wife, the Donghu chief's success went to his
head. A short time later he sent yet another messenger to the
Xiongnu court. This time he demanded a thousand-mile strip
of land in the frontier territory between the two states.
Once again Mo Du met with his advisers. Some of them

advocated yielding the land, others were opposed. Suddenly Mo
Du stood up and thundered, "Land is the foundation of the
state. How could we away!" And he commanded
ever give it
that all those advisers who had proposed giving up the land be
executed. Then he drew on his armor, mobilized the army, and
struck with lightning speed against the Donghu.
The enemy's troops were so surprised by the attack and by
this first refusal that they were unable to mount any defense.
3 2 3
In no time, Mo Du had destroyed the entire Donghu state and

penetrated to the ruler's palace, where he killed the Donghu
chief.
The "bricks," the princely gifts to the Donghu ruler, yielded

the "jade" of greater power and territory.
17.25 Gold and Silks for the Turks
In the mid-sixth century a.d., Turkic-speaking peoples estab-

lished a large empire in the territory of what is now Mongolia
and stretching far to the west. In the year 582 the empire split
into a western and an eastern part. Though held in check to
some extent by China's Sui Dynasty, the Eastern Turks were
encouraged by the chaos and palace intrigues early in the suc-
ceeding Tang Dynasty to mount repeated incursions into

Chinese territory.
In the year a.d. 622, Xieli, the Khan of the Eastern Turks,
led an army of 100,000 men in an attack against the area that
is now By promising annual
the Chinese province of Shanxi.
tribute, an emissary of the Tang Emperor persuaded Xieli to
withdraw. Then, in 624, Xieli joined forces with Tuli, another
Turk leader, and again attacked China. That threat was likewise
averted, this time thanks to the courage of Li Shimin, a son of
the Chinese Emperor, who succeeded in sowing discord between
the two Turkic leaders.
In the year 626, Xieli attacked China yet again with 100,000
troops and advanced to within a few miles of the Chinese capital
of Chang'an. At that time the recently founded Tang Dynasty
was still weak. The youthful Li Shimin, now Emperor of China,
rejected the suggestion by one of his advisers that he fortify his

position inside the capital, fearing that if he did so the Turks
would must show them
lay waste to the Chinese provinces. "I
that I am not afraid," he declared. He mobilized his small army
and rode ahead with a few warriors to the bank of the Wei
River, where the Turks were waiting on the opposite bank for
the battle to begin. His voice ringing with outrage, Li Shimin

hurled an accusation against the Khan: "You are violating ear-
lier agreements!"
At the sight of the Chinese Emperor, the Turk leaders lost
their courage, dismounted from their horses, and made reverent
obeisance to him. Suddenly, the well-ordered Chinese force ap-
peared on the scene — a majestic sight, with banners flying and
armor glittering in the sun. The Turks were overcome with
naked fear. At a sign from the Emperor, the Chinese troops fell
into battle order in the background. Then the Emperor rode
alone onto the Bian Bridge and challenged the Khan to single
combat.
Intimidated by his opponent's boldness, Xieli did not dare
accept the challenge. Instead, he offered peace. Having achieved
his objective of averting the immediate Turkish threat, the Tang
Emperor accepted the offer and gave generous gifts of gold and
silks to Xieli.
According to a chronicle known as the Old History of the

Tang (compiled a.d. 940-945), the following conversation sub-
sequently took place between the Tang Emperor and one of his
subjects:
Said Xiao Yu, ". Your advisers and brave generals

. .
wanted war, but Your Majesty avoided it. I have some

doubts about that."
To which Emperor replied, "Had I engaged the Turks
the
in battle, there would have been many dead and wounded.
And had been victorious, the Turks would no doubt have
I
reorganized their government in the coming years for fear

of further defeats. Filled with hatred against me, they would
eventually cause us much misery. Today laid down my
I
armor and weapons. lured them with jade and fine silks.
I
In this way have nourished the arrogance of our intract-

I
able enemy — and that

is undoubtedly the beginning of their
eventual total defeat. That is what is meant by the words

To him from whom von would take, you must Hrst give. 1
'
In the year a.d. 630 the time was ripe. In a single campaign,
the Tang Emperor destroyed the Eastern Turkish state. Khan
3 25
Xieli was at that time totally isolated, a hopeless position to

which he had been brought by discord in his own ranks, some
of which had been skillfully sown by the Chinese.
The which the Tang Emperor had given the Turkish
rich gifts
ruler in 626 were the "brick." They played their part in easing
relations between China and the Eastern Turk state. As the
conflict with China grew less acute, internal conflicts within the
Turkic realm became worse, and China was able to exploit them
to eliminate its enemy. This was the "jade."
17.26 The Vanishing Horse
Once was an old man who lived in a Chinese frontier

there
area. as the Old Man of the Border. One day
He was known
he found that his splendid horse had disappeared without a
trace. Neighbors and friends came running to console the old
man over his loss. But he showed no sign of being upset. Smiling
gently, he said, "Yes, the horse has vanished, but who knows
if thatmay not be a fortunate thing?"
Some time went by. And lo and behold! The lost horse re-
turned to the Old Man of the Border. Unexpectedly, it brought

another horse with it, an even more valuable one. The entire
villagewas wild with excitement over this turn of events.
Crowds of people came along to congratulate the old fellow.
But he showed no sign of happiness. Said he, "What is there to
congratulate me about? Who knows if this may not really be a
misfortune?"
A few days man's only son mounted the second
later the old
horse. The animal, unfamiliar with its new rider, ran wild and
finallythrew the young man, who was crippled for life.
When the villagers heard about it, they came by to console
the old man, who showed no sadness and said, "Who knows
if may not be a fortunate mishap?"
this
Some time later, war broke out in the frontier region. Many
young men were conscripted into the army and sent to the front.
All of them were killed. Only the invalid son of the Old Man
of the Border remained at home and survived. 13
The Liberation Daily, the newspaper of the Party Committee

of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai, alluded to this
story in a sports report. Ithow, during a European
related
basketball tournament, the Bulgarians were matched against the
Czechs in the semifinals. With only eight seconds to the final
whistle, the Bulgarians were ahead by two points. But the rules
called for a five-point lead to qualify for the finals. At that
decisive moment the Bulgarian coach called a time-out and gave
special instructions to two players. When the game resumed,
the Bulgarian team took the ball toward the opposing basket
at first. But the Bulgarian player who had the ball suddenly
turned around and sank it in his own team's basket. At that
moment the whistle blew, leaving the game with a tied score.
The Czech players and the spectators were totally surprised by
the home basket, which also puzzled some members of the
Bulgarian team. But the rule book stipulated that a tied score
permitted the game to go into five minutes of overtime. The
Bulgarians pulled themselves together, summoned all their ener-
gies, and won the game by six points, which got them into the
finals.
The Chinese commentator writing about this incident points
out that the final result revealed the cleverness of the Bulgarian
coach. The remaining eight seconds of playing time would not
have enabled the Bulgarians to gain the necessary five-point lead.
So their coach ordered his players to risk a deliberate loss by
scoring two points for the Czech side. This was the "brick" that
they threw out, and it gained the Bulgarian team a precious
extra five minutes in which to score extra points; those minutes
were a "piece of jade," which led to the even more valuable
prize of qualifying them The Bulgarian coach's
for the finals.
cleverness lay in properly weighing loss and gain on the spur
of the moment and in resolutely accepting a momentary setback
for the sake of ultimate victory.
3 2 7
"To him from whom you would take, you must first give,"
says the Chinese author of the article, Chu Zhang, pointing out
that matters often develop in accordance with the dialectic of
"taking one step back in order to take two steps forward."
17.27 Copper for Customers
A comic-strip magazine published in Beijing in 1987 tells the

story of a small food company that participated in a Chicago
trade fair in 1975. When John, the owner of the company,
arrived at the exhibition hall, he found that he had been assigned
a remote corner for his display. Many people visited the trade
fair, but hardly any found their way to John's booth. He did
not give up, however. On the third day, early arrivals at the fair
found the floor strewn with little copper plaques, on which was
written, "The bearer of this plaque is entitled to a souvenir at

the booth of John's Food Company, Inc." Suddenly the once-
obscure corner which housed John's display was flooded with
visitors. Even when the supply of copper plaques was exhausted,
people kept coming.
17.28 Training as Contract Bait?
The title of this section was used back in 1985 in a report
by the Tokyo correspondent of the prominent Swiss daily Neue

Ziircher Zeitung — an inadvertent but apt allusion to Stratagem
No. 17. The report dealt with a Sino-Japanese agreement on

cooperation in the nuclear energy field. The relevant part of the
text reads:
As soon as the nuclear treaty between Japan and China

was signed in August 1985, a negotiating team from Mit-
subishi Heavy Industries traveled to Beijing bearing offers
of cooperation designed to give Japanese suppliers access

to the presumably lucrative market for nuclear power sta-
tions in China. The leading Japanese business newspaper,
Xihon Keizai, reported that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
had come to terms with the Chinese on a broad technical
cooperation agreement. The report states that Mitsubishi
has offered its Chinese counterparts know-how for the con-
struction and operation of an atomic power station south
of Shanghai. . . . [The] first Japanese technicians are ex-
pected to travel to China next year.
Also proposed is a special study program for Chinese
engineers and technicians in Japan, to give them practical
experience in the construction and operational stages. Ac-
cording to Nihon Keizai, this training program could begin
next month.
The Japanese business journal reports that Mitsubishi
expects the cooperation agreement to give it an excellent
starting position in the competition with American and
European suppliers, when it comes to securing contracts
for construction of additional nuclear power stations in
China.
Clearly, Mitsubishi was offering the "brick" of a training pro-

gram in hope of securing the "jade" of advantage against its
competitors for access to the Chinese nuclear business. 14
17,29 Cooperation as Divisiveness
In his book View of Japan (Beijing, 1985), Wu Xuewen offers
this tactical analysis:
In the spring of 1979 the Soviets tried to turn Stratagem

No. 17 against the Japanese by offering certain Japanese fishing
companies the right to fish in the territorial waters surrounding
those formerly northern Japanese islands which the USSR has
occupied since the end of World War II. The Soviets also pro-
posed forming some joint-venture fishing companies with the
Japanese. These offers were the "brick." By making them, the
Soviets hoped to weaken the Japanese demand for the return of
3 2 9
those northern territories to Japan. If Japanese fishing companies

had accepted the would have been
offer of cooperation, they
tacitly accepting Russian sovereignty over the islands. That was
the "jade" the Kremlin was trying to gain.
17.30 A Gift of Melons You Gave Me
We end the chapter on Stratagem No. 17 with a poem that is
more than twenty-five hundred years old, from the classic Con-
fucian Book of Songs, the oldest collection of Chinese poetry.
Its verses deal essentially with the exchange of gifts between a
man and a woman, and in a broader sense with how a modest
gift may be reciprocated by a more valuable one. If a gift of
fruit brings a jewel in return, what would the gift of a jewel
bring? But perhaps the deeper sense of the poem is that friend-
ship is greater than any gift:
A gift of melons you gave me,

I give you a ruby in its place.
Mine does not requite your gift,
But my love is eternally yours.
A gift of peaches you gave me,

I give you a jade in their place.
A gift of plums you gave me,

I give you a sapphire in their place.

STRATAGEM O N 1 8
% Catch the Bandits,

first Capture 7heir Leader
The Chinese
characters
ft jtf*. ft
Modern qin zei qin wang
Mandarin
pronunciation
Meaning of each catch thieves catch leader

character (bandits)
Applications Neutralize your enemy by first eliminating his

elite (thinkers, leaders, etc.); eliminate your op-
ponent's head, or leadership, or headquarters,
in order to more easily checkmate the opponent
himself.
"Catch-the-leader" stratagem; "blow-to-the-
head" stratagem; the stratagem of the Archi-
medean point.
18.1 The Original Poem
The phrase that describes Stratagem No. 18 is more than twelve

hundred years old. It was coined by Du Fu, one of the most
prominent poets of the Tang period, an age when Chinese lit-
erature flourished, producing more than twenty-three hundred
poets and an outpouring of some fifty thousand poems. Feng
Zhi, himself a poet and translator, wrote in 1962 that Du Fu's
work "shines down the centuries like an inextinguishable lamp."
Du Fu suffered a great deal of privation during his lifetime; one
of his children actually starved to death. But posterity elevated
him to the highest pinnacle of fame. He is known in China as
shisheng, literally the "poet-sage," with the "sage" to be under-

stood not in a religious sense but rather as someone who has
achieved the height of poetic perfection. His works, sometimes
termed "history in verse," provide a colorful picture of his times.
They tell of a bitterly harsh rural life, and also of political and
military events. Of the approximately fourteen hundred poems
333
by Du Fu that have come down to us, one from the cycle "Into
the Borderlands" is especially famous:
Ifyou draw a bow, draw the strongest.

Ifyou use an arrow, use the longest.
To shoot a rider, first shoot his horse.
To catch a gang of bandits, first capture its leader.
fust as a country has its borders,

So the killing of men has its limits.
If the enemy's attack can be stopped,

why have any more dead and wounded than necessary^
In the year a.d. 730, the Tufan Empire in Tibet, having suffered
a number of defeats, put out peace feelers to the Chinese imperial
court. Heeding his advisers, Chinese Emperor Xuanzong reluc-
tantly agreed. Peace came to the border areas, and the Tufans
withdrew all their troops. Seven years later, the Chinese Em-
peror wanted to exploit the opportunity presented by the un-
guarded Tufan frontier, and in a period of peace he ordered an
attack against the Tibetans. The Chinese General Cui Xiyi pen-
etrated far into Tufan territory and inflicted a grievous defeat
on the Tibetans. Once again, China and the Tufans were at war.
In the year 740, when the Chinese princess married to a Tufan
ruler died, a Tibetan delegation traveled to the Chinese imperial
court to convey the sad news and sue for peace. Emperor Xuan-
zong refused their suit. A year later the Tibetans captured Shi-
baocheng, an important border The Chinese
fortification.
Emperor ordered it retaken. But the military commander

charged with the task refused to obey, for which he was nearly
executed. In 749, the Emperor ordered Geshu Han, a Turk in
the service of the Chinese throne, to retake Shibaocheng. With
an army of thirty-three thousand men, Geshu Han carried out
the order. The fortified position was again in Chinese hands,
but more than ten thousand men were killed in the process. It
is this wanton policy of conducting war that Du Fu is attacking
2
in his poem.
The main message of the poem is this: In every situation,

To Catch the Bandits, First Capture Their Leader -335
concentrate first on the central point, the driving force; limit

your action initially to that, and only then deal with the sec-
ondary issues. Du Fu uses a number of colorful images to make
his point: If you want to use a bow, choose the strongest bow
available and don't waste time and effort with a weaker one.
The same applies to the choice of arrow. In aiming at a mounted
soldier, the main thing is to rob him of his driving power, his
mobility. So do not aim at the slender silhouette of the rider
and risk missing the mark; instead, aim for the horse, which
gives you a better chance of stopping your enemy with a single
stroke. Instead of hunting down the individual members of a
band of outlaws, capture its leader or leaders; deprived of their
leadership, the remaining bandits will be easy marks. Along
similar lines, war with foreign enemies should be confined to
effective defense against their attacks; once that objective has
been achieved, hostilities should cease. The best-known of the
poem's images is "To catch a gang of bandits, first capture its
leader."
Shu Han, a Taiwanese writer on stratagems, points out that,
while the phrase "To catch a gang of bandits ." must be . .
regarded first and foremost as a verse from a famous poem, "it
is also the key to victory in many kinds of conflicts."
18.2 Monkeys without a Tree
Not only war but also in life's everyday struggles, one should
in
concentrate on discovering the "leader" of the "bandits," fig-

uratively speaking. This may be an individual or a group of
people, perhaps an object or a particular problem.
Once you have figured out whowhat is the "leader," or
or
the main support of the opponent, you must concentrate your
efforts on eliminating it. Success in doing so will set off a chain
reaction affecting the overall situation. To borrow a colorful
image from the J Ching, when the "leader" has been neutralized
or knocked out of the battle, "the horde of dragons loses its
head." The enemy organization becomes a headless creature.

As one commentary on Stratagem No. 18 puts it: When you
capture the enemy leader, you can bring down the entire enemy
force; if its main support has been destroyed, the enemy will
collapse. This is reminiscent of another pithy Chinese saying:
"When the tree falls, the monkeys scatter."
According to revelations published in the Chinese press, dur-
ing China's Cultural Revolution the so-called Gang of Four
(Shanghai leader Wang Hongwen, chief ideologist Zhang Chun-
qiao, propagandist Yao Wenyuan, and Mao Zedong's wife Jiang
Qing) headed a countrywide network of supporters. It also ex-
ercised virtually total control over China's mass media. And yet
the Gang of Four and its nationwide network were neutralized
almost overnight. How? In October 1976, a few weeks after
the death of Mao Zedong had deprived the Gang of its main
support, its four leaders were arrested. And, as the People's
Daily put it some years later, "When the Gang of Four was
smashed, the tree and the monkeys scattered."
fell
Naturally, there are many methods of "neutralizing" the

"leaders of the gang." Sometimes other stratagems are used;
the choice of these depends on the nature of the "leader" and
the general circumstances of his central function. If the "leader"
is a person, there are two basic choices: hard or soft means.
The use of violence is among the possible hard means, involving
the physical elimination of the leader. Soft means often aim at
"capturing" the leader's thoughts and feelings, changing his

mind or corrupting him. One prominent "soft" technique is the
use of a "flesh —
bomb" the Chinese equivalent of the Western
term "sex —
bomb" which, according to a Hong Kong stratagem
book, is often more effective than a real bomb.
18.3 When a Man Dies His Policy Dies with Him
Basic to Stratagem No. 1 8 is a powerful belief in the overarching

power of a single ruler or an elite class. In this sense it reflects
the hierarchical thinking and personalistic regimes of China's

imperial period. Just as the emperor reigned supreme in the
empire as a whole, so within each family the father's authority
was unquestioned. Most social groups in traditional China were
organized along similar lines. The importance of one powerful
leader remains largely true in China today, where there is still
often talk of renzhi, "personal rule." The essence of renzhi,

basically advocated by all the philosophers of ancient China, is
reflected in the following sentence from a classic Confucian

work: "As long as the man [i.e., the leader] lives, his policy is
carried out; if he dies, his policy dies with him."

This sentence also alludes to the chain reaction triggered by
the life or death of a central authority figure. In a 1980 speech
officially titled "On the Reform of the System of Party and State
Leadership," which dealt with the traumas of the Cultural Rev-
olution, Deng Xiaoping (China's strongman after the death of
Mao Zedong) said:
During the "Cultural Revolution," when someone got to

the top, even his dogs and chickens got there too; likewise,
when someone got into trouble, even his distant relatives
were dragged down with him.
None of this has changed much. "Personal rule" and its rami-
fications remain essentially the same today. The West's "insti-
tutional rule," which limits the power of individual leaders to

a certain extent through division of power and systems of checks
and balances, has not yet taken firm hold in contemporary
China.
18.4 The Abandoned Emperor
Every rule has its exceptions. Even in China, the capture of a

central leader has not always had the desired effect.
During the Ming Dynasty, the powerful palace eunuch Wang

Zhen (d. a.d. 1449) forced the twenty-three-year-old Yingzhong

Emperor to personally lead a field campaign against the Oirats,
who were attacking from eastern Mongolia under their leader
Esen Khan (d. 1454). Yingzhong was defeated and taken pris-
oner near Tumu, a fortification in the north of what is now
Hebei Province. Infuriated Chinese soldiers thereupon killed the

eunuch Wang Zhen. The Oirat army continued its advance to-
ward which 100,000 Chinese men and
Beijing, in the course of
women were The Oirats took the
killed or taken prisoner.
Chinese Emperor with them as they advanced. The further

course of events is described by Wolfram Eberhard in his book
on Chinese history:
The Oirats had no intention of killing the emperor. They

wanted him as a hostage, for whom they hoped to obtain
a rich ransom. But the various cliques at the imperial court
had loyalty to their Emperor. With the decline of the
little
clique around [the palace eunuch] Wang, there were two

cliques left. The group centered on General Yu enjoyed
specialpower, because he had managed to fend off the
itself. The general appointed a
Oirat attack against Beijing
—
new Emperor not the infant son of the captured Emperor,
as should have been the case, but his brother. Another
clique, however, insisted that the infant become the new
ruler. All ofwhich convinced the Oirats that the Chinese
were not inclined to give much for their former Emperor.
So they reduced their ransom demand enormously and vir-
tually forced the former Emperor on the Chinese again,
hoping that reappearance in Beijing would create new
his
—
advantageous to the Oirats which is ex-
political unrest
3
actly what soon happened.
This example illustrates that the capture of the "leader" does

not invariably result in paralyzing the entire "gang of bandits."
To Catch the Bandits, First Capture Their Leader •
3 3 9
18.5 Drowning in Superstition
In the fifth century B.C., during the reign of Duke Wen of Wei,
an official by the name of Ximen Bao was appointed chief officer
of Ye District. Arriving there, he paid visits to the town elders
and asked them what the local people found most oppressive
in their lives. The elders replied, "We are plagued by the obli-
gation to supply brides for the river god. This is what keeps us
in poverty."
Requesting more details, Ximen Bao was told, "Each year

our three education officials and the district clerk levy taxes on
the people. The revenues they collect amount to a hundred times
ten thousand. Between twenty and thirty times ten thousand are
used for the wedding of the river god. The remainder the officials
divide with the old sorceress and keep for themselves. When the
time comes, the sorceress roams the district looking for beautiful
girls. When she proclaims, This maiden shall be the bride of
the river god,' a wedding ceremony is arranged. New silken
garments are prepared for the maiden. She is made to live a
secluded and may consume neither alcohol nor meat. On

life
the riverbank, a special hut for the ceremony is erected, its four
sides hung with gold and red silk curtains. The maiden is quar-
tered there. The meat of oxen and other foods are prepared for
the ceremony. After about ten days the girl is bedecked with
jewelry, then ordered to lie down on a mat, which is tossed into
the river. It floats for a few miles, then sinks with the river god's
bride. Families in which there is a beautiful young daughter live
in fear that, when she reaches the right age, she may be chosen
by the sorceress as the river god's bride. Hence most families
with daughters flee to remote areas. As a result, our city is being
steadily depopulated, and its poverty increases. This has been

going on for a long time. There is a saying among the people:
'If no bride is given to the river god, the waters will rise, destroy
our property, and drown us all.' So they say."

After this recitation, Ximen Bao said, "The next time the river
god takes a bride, I want the three education officials, the sor-
ceress, and the town elders to be present and bid farewell to the
maiden when she is sent out upon the river. I shall be there as
well." Everyone agreed.
When the day came, Ximen Bao went to the riverside. The
three education officials, magistrates and other officials, the
town and all the prominent people of the community
elders,
were assembled. About three thousand townsfolk also gathered
to witness the spectacle. The sorceress was a woman of about
seventy years, and she arrived with an entourage of ten other
women, all robed in silk and following closely behind the priest-
ess of magic.
Ximen Bao said, "Call the bride of the river god to me. I wish
to see if she is truly beautiful."
The chosen one was brought from the ceremonial hut. Ximen
Bao gazed at her. Then he turned to the three education officials,
the sorceress, and the town elders, and said, "This maiden is
not beautiful. I therefore request that the great sorceress go
down into the river and report to the river god. Should he wish
a more beautiful bride, tell him that she shall be sent down to
him another day." Whereupon he ordered his bailiffs to toss the
old woman into the river.
After a while Ximen Bao said, "Why does the old sorceress
remain so long beneath the water? Send one of her women
followers to hurry her up." So one of the women was thrown
into the river.
After a while Ximen Bao said, "What's keeping them so long?
Send another woman after them." And another of the sorceress's
followers was tossed into the river. After some time, the same
thing happened to a third woman.
Finally Ximen Bao said, "The sorceress and her followers are
women; they are incapable of giving a clear report to the river
god. I request that the three education officials go into the river
and report to the god." And he had the three officials tossed
into the water.
Now Ximen Bao bent forward and gazed into the river for a
long time. The town elders, the other officials, and even the
common spectators were filled with fear. Finally Ximen Bao
turned around and said, "The old sorceress, her followers, and
the three education officials have not returned. What shall we
do next?"
He was about to have the town clerk and another local dig-
nitary thrown into the river as well, in order to hasten the earlier
emissaries along. But these worthies suddenly sank to their
knees, bowed to the ground, turned toward Ximen Bao, and
beat their heads against the earth until their foreheads bled.
Their faces were as pale as cold ashes. "Very well," said Ximen
Bao, "we'll wait awhile."
After a short time he said, "Stand up! I assume that the river
god will keep his guests with him for quite a long time. You
needn't join them. Go home!"
All the people, the officials and the common folk of Ye, were
horrified by what they had witnessed. After that, no one dared
even speak of the river god's wedding, much less ever try to
hold such a ceremony again.
An attempt at mere verbal explanation by Ximen Bao would
doubtless have failed to shake the popular superstition. Yet that
superstition was the basis for chicanery through which a small
clique enriched itself at the people's expense. Once the leader
of that clique, the sorceress, had been thrown into the river
along with several of her accomplices, the superstition was
drowned forever, so to speak, along with the villains of the
4
piece.
18.6 Arrows of Rue
During the An Lushan rebellion (a.d. 755-63), a battle devel-

oped between Zhang Xun, governor of Zhenyuan District
(Henan Province), and the rebel General Yin Ziqi. Zhang Xun's
troops stormed the opposing army's position, taking some five
thousand lives. But victory was not yet won. Zhang Xun wanted
to eliminate the leader of the enemy force, but in the confusion
that prevailed among the opposing troops he could not identify
342.* The Book of Stratagems
General Yin Ziqi. So Zhang Xun commanded his own soldiers

to shoot off arrows made of rue branches. Finding such pow-
erless projectiles raining down on them, the opposing soldiers
were delighted, for they assumed that Zhang Xun's men had
run out of proper arrows.
The enemy troops crowded around one particular warrior,
obviously their leader, to whom they showed the useless arrows.
Observing this, Zhang Xun now knew which man on the op-
posite side was Yin Ziqi. He immediately ordered his troop
leader to shoot a real arrow at the rebel general. The arrow hit
Yin Ziqi in the left eye, whereupon he instantly gave up the
battle and withdrew in defeat.
In this case it was only the elimination of the opposing leader
that brought final victory. The Jilin book on the stratagems
warns, "To believe that one can gain total victory without
eliminating the enemy leader and without destroying the main
enemy force is as foolish as letting a tiger escape back into the
mountains."
18.7 Snowy Night March
The rebellion of An Lushan and Shi Siming dealt a harsh and

lasting blow to the power of the Chinese imperial court. The
weakening of the empire's top leadership prompted numerous
regional military governors to set up their own little kingdoms.
During the rule of Emperor Xianzong (a.d. 805-20), there were
two secession-minded brothers, Wu Shaocheng and Wu Shaoy-
ang, who served successively as military governors of Huaixi
Region. But Wu Shaoyang's son, Wu Yuanji, openly rebelled
against the Emperor in 814. He established himself in Caizhou
and steadily expanded his power. Various attempts to tame this
rebel failed. Finally, at his own request, Li Su was appointed
military governor of the region adjacent to the area under Wu
Yuanji's rule and was assigned the task of beating down the
uprising.
—
By initially assuming a low profile, Li Su led Wu Yuanji to

believe that he was faced with a weak opponent. At the same
time, Li Su quietly prepared for battle. He studied the topog-
raphy of his enemy's territory, sent out spies, and drilled his
troops. Most particularly, he made sure that captured rebels
were treated well. Even high-ranking deserters who fell into his
hands were pardoned and accepted into his own army. Thus he
built up a core of warriors who were intimately familiar with
Wu Yuanji's territory. In this way Li Su learned that Wu Yuanji
had set up his main base not in Caizhou but in nearby Huiqu
and that Caizhou itself was virtually unprotected.
In planning his campaign, Li Su concentrated on these con-
siderations: All his predecessors had failed to make any headway
against Wu Yuanji, who had never suffered a defeat. As a result,
his prestige had risen tremendously. He had two important
friends, Li Shidao, military governor of Yunzhou, and Wang
Chengzong, military governor of Hengzhou. Those two had not
yet openly broken with the Emperor, but if there were to be a
long, drawn-out campaign against Wu Yuanji there was a dan-
ger that the two military governors would ally themselves with
the rebel. There was only one way to prevent such an unwelcome
development: a devastating surprise blow against Wu Yuanji
5
in other words, an application of Stratagem No. 18.
On a wintry night late in the year a.d. 817, Li Su set out for
his surprise attack against Caizhou. No imperial soldiers had
put in an appearance there for the past thirty years, so that no
one in the city expected an attack, especially on such a night.
It was snowing, and army snapped in
the flags of the marching
an icy wind. But Li Su's troops forged ahead. Toward morning
they reached the walls of Caizhou. The watchmen on the ram-
parts were sound asleep. Li Su's soldiers quickly cleared a way
and marched into the city.
News of the fall of Caizhou took the rebel Wu Yuanji totally

by surprise. He was soon captured and deported to the imperial
court at Chang'an. Thus the years-long secession of Huaixi
Region was ended with a single blow.
More than eleven hundred years later, during China's civil
war, Chen Yi, who after 1949 held several important posts in
the People's Republic, wrote a poem titled "Snowy Night
March," which seems to evoke the scene from the year 817:
Mount Taishan is shrouded in deep snow.

The River Yi is covered in thick ice.
A quick march
through the black night.
Army morale is high
and hearts are united.
To catch the gang of bandits, we will first
capture its leader.
Then together we will celebrate
the Festival of Spring.
18.8 Grabbing the Enemy by the Throat
The advent of parachute troops gave a new dimension to Strat-
agem No. 18. Paratroopers make it possible to mount a large-

scale, lightning attack against the enemy's nerve center. Under
cover of diplomatic smoke screens and political maneuvering,
the enemy's capital or crucial strategic positions can suddenly
be occupied by airborne troops; the enemy is thus "grabbed by
the throat," his central command positions put out of action,
and the way cleared for ground-based units to march in. Ac-
cording to one Chinese writer on the stratagems, the occupation
of the Afghan capital of Kabul by Soviet airborne troops in
1979 provided a perfect example of this technique.
18.9 Posthumous Glory through Brush and Ink
Many Chinese deeply long "to exude fragrance for a hundred

generations" — that is, to stand high in the world's regard long
after their death. And they profoundly fear "to leave behind a
stench for myriad years" — that is, to be sullied by scandal and
shame for generations to come.
The following dialogue between high imperial official Zhuang
Xiaoyan and his son Zhuang Zhiyan is taken from the novel
Blossom in a Sea of Sin, by Zeng Pu. First published in 1907,
the novel was issued in a French translation by Isabelle Bijon
in 1983, as Fleur sur V Ocean des Peches.
Zhuang Xiaoyan: "I have something important to tell you.
Leave the city quickly, go to Ai Yun, and tell him I said he is
to wait on old Master Li in the garden of His Excellency Cheng

this afternoon. Now hurry, lose no more time!"
Zhuang Zhiyan, surprised: "Who is old Master Li?"
Zhuang Xiaoyan, laughing: "You've no way of knowing that,
of course. Master Li is none other than Li Chunke, the most
important literary figure of our time. His disciples are to be
found everywhere. Anyone who wants to have our leading lit-
erary men on his side must first win the favor of Li Chunke. As
the old saying goes: To catch a gang of bandits, first capture
"
its leader.'
Zhuang Zhiyan: "But what influence has this old gentleman,
that you're so eager for his favor?"
Zhuang Xiaoyan: "His influence is enormous! Don't you re-
alize? The axe and lance of rulers may have effects lasting a
hundred years. But the brush and ink of the literary artist leave
impressions for a thousand years. Posterity's judgment as to
whether we have acted properly or falsely, indeed the question

of whether we will be remembered or forgotten by posterity,
depends entirely on the writings of these literary men."
Zhuang Xiaoyan is acting on the assumption that, if he wins
the sympathy of the man he considers the leading literary light

of his time, his own posthumous fame will be secure forever.
One is reminded here of the poem "Euphrosyne," by Goethe,
which the poet dedicated to his early love, Christiane Neumann,
who died at a young age. In the poem he talks of seeing her
ghostly form in the mountains at night and hearing her words

of farewell, in which she begs him to immortalize her in a poem,
since only those praised by the poets live on after death; the
others fade to insubstantial shadows: 6
Do not let me go unsung down to the Shades!

Only the Muse can grant Life in Death. 7
18.10 The Inspired Mind
In the early thirteenth century a.d. Wang Mai, a government

official and literary figure, wrote the following poetic guidelines
for an aspiring young writer, Zhang Jingshan. In them he uses
"capturing the leader of the robber band" as a metaphor for
the writer cultivating "the breath of spirit" in himself.
Heavy of heart I bid you farewell,

I take you by the hand and reveal to you the secret chamber
of my heart.
The foundation of a literary education is the assimilation
of the greatest works;

That is a principle never to be forgotten!
It is like preparing for a journey of a thousand miles, for
which you must take provisions enough to last three
months.
There is yet another key to literary success, one that is
forever valid, and that is the unfolding of one's own

spirit.
Our concern with this may be likened to an attack against

enemy fortifications:
It is essential to capture the leader of the robber band. . . .
Once the foundation of literary creativity, the knowledge
and assimilation of literary works, is firmly rooted, it
grows ever stronger.

Once the breath of one's spirit unfolds fully, its inspiring

power grows ever stronger.
After a time of ripening, the assimilated literary knowledge
broadens and deepens, and the spirit's ability to take
wing increases.
When a profoundly educated man takes up his brush to
write, it is like a wealthy man who can conjure endless
gold from his pocket.
He who has cultivated the breath of his spirit has a broad
horizon, unlike the common man who, attempting to
create literary works, sinks into profound emptiness and
never grasps the essence.
One day, when you are famous, we shall meet again and
I shall be only an insignificant scribbler in comparison
8
to you.
It is the "breath of the spirit," Wang Mai tells us, that gives
soul and inner fire to a literary work. Cultivation of the spirit
is the central key to success in literary endeavor, and without

that inspiration a literary man's book learning, no matter how
broad, remains lifeless raw material. In light of this, Wang Mai
regards cultivation of the spirit as comparable in importance to
capturing the opposing leader when storming enemy forti-
fications.
18.11 Shooting Down a Ping-Pong Ace
During the Twenty-sixth Table Tennis World Championships

held in Beijing in 1961, the Chinese men's team won the world
title in their category for the first time. Previously, Japan had
won the team title five times running. But the Chinese success
could not mask the fact that some of the Chinese players, who
specialized in the speed-attack method, had not found an effec-
tive way of dealing with the Japanese topspin technique. The
34^* The Book of Stratagems
Chinese had a very difficult time, holding their own whenever

they came up against Japanese players using this technique.
Zhang Xielin, a member of the Chinese team, was a specialist
in defensive tactics, a superb player, and knowledgeable about
the use of stratagems. Secretly he planned to concentrate on the
outstanding Japanese specialist in the topspin, study his meth-
ods, and devise adequate defenses.
In the Twenty-seventh Table Tennis World Championships,
held in Belgrade in 1963, Japan hoped to regain the team title.
But the Chinese team sent Zhang Xielin in for the decisive game,
equipped with his newly developed moves to counter the top-
spin. Almost as soon as the match began, the Japanese player
found himself totally outclassed, with nothing in his bag of tricks
to handle Zhang Xielin's mercurial, varied defensive technique
and sharply cut serves. Hardly knowing what hit him, he lost
the game. Zhang Xielin's victory had a miraculous effect. Once
he had defeated the strongest member of the Japanese team, the
Chinese were firmly in control and successfully defended their
9
title.
The strongest Japanese player may here be regarded as the

"leader." Zhang on the best player of the
Xielin's concentration
opposing team and him dealt a mortal blow to
his victory over
the morale of the Japanese team (the "gang of bandits").
18.12 The Four Main Contradictions
In the very first sentence of his 1981 remarks on No. 18, Beijing
stratagem specialist Li Bingyan uses the phrase "main contra-
diction." 10 The fundamental importance of No. 18 in wartime,
he writes, is to focus on the main contradiction, resolve it, and
thus achieve total victory.

The "main contradiction" is a central concept in the teachings
of Mao Zedong dating from the 1930s. As have shown else-
I
11
where, these teachings long constituted the guiding doctrine
for the leadership of this nation of more than one billion people
To Catch the Bandits, First Capture Their Leader •
3 49
(and may still do so to a considerable degree). According to
Mao, the whole world is a tangle of conflicts, dilemmas, po-

larities, and paradoxes, for all of which the Chinese use the
single generic term "contradiction." In each phase of develop-
ment it is the task of China's political leadership to select one
of the currently existing conflicts and proclaim it the "main
contradiction." All the energies of the Chinese people must then
be concentrated on dealing with that issue — until such time as
the Chinese leadership defines some other phenomenon as the
"main contradiction." It is this "dialectic" that results in the
tremendous changes, the radical shifts in course, which have so

astonished the world in recent Chinese history.
Four times since the mid-1930s, the Chinese leadership has
redefined the main contradiction:
1 . In the period 1937-45, the main contradiction was China

vs. Japan. At that time, in the view of the Chinese Com-
munist Party, "China" included the Guomindang headed
by Mao's archenemy Chiang Kai-shek. The primary task
was to defeat Japan.
2. During 1946-49, the main contradiction was the Chinese
Communist Party under Mao vs. the Guomindang regime
under Chiang. The primary task was to defeat Chiang
Kai-shek.
3. From 1949 to 1976, themain contradiction was the pro-
letariat vs. the bourgeoisie. The primary task was the
"class struggle" of the Chinese proletariat to defeat the
bourgeoisie.
4. Since 1976 (or 1978, by some reckonings), the main con-
tradiction as officially defined by the Chinese Communist

Party has been (and still remains) modernization vs. back-
wardness. The new primary task is to overcome China's
backwardness through the "four Socialist moderniza-

tions" — by modernizing China's industry, agricul-
i.e.,
ture, national defense, and science and technology, under

the unshakable leadership of the Chinese Communist
12
Party.
—
35°' The Book of Stratagems
To most Western observers, the link between the "main con-

tradiction" and "secondary contradictions" may often seem
puzzling. But, in its essence, the logic of the theory of contra-
dictions is quite clear. For instance, once it has been established
that the main contradiction facing China in recent years is that
between the need for modernization and the country's long-
standing backwardness, the conceptual path is more or less
cleared for dealing with all secondary conflicts or tensions. It is
logical, for example, that everything within reason be under-

taken to encourage modernization. Since the industrial West
seems to be in the vanguard of modernity, the resolution of the
"secondary contradiction" represented by the question "Should
Chinese students be sent to the West to study modern Western
science and other important fields?" appears self-evident. The
same holds true for the secondary contradiction stated as
"Should China increase its imports of Western technology and
foreign capital?" For instance, to the extent that the Coca-Cola
Company can contribute to modernizing China's soft-drink in-
dustry, from the standpoint of orthodox Maoist Sino-dialectics
there is little fundamental problem about resolving the question
"Cooperation with Coca-Cola: yes or no?"

Of course, in China as elsewhere, "the devil is in the details."
Developing concrete solutions to secondary contradictions can

sometimes give rise to serious disagreements on basic policy
issues. For example: "In addition to Western technology and
management methods, should China also adopt Western social
13
and/or political institutions?"
At any rate, in terms of Stratagem No. 18, whatever has been
declared the "main contradiction" by the Chinese leadership in
effect takes the role of "leader," with all secondary issues con-
stituting the "robber band." In singling out such a main con-
tradiction, China's Party and government unleash a kind of
windstorm which sweeps across the countryside, blowing all
grasses in the same direction. Every individual problem area
whether economy, in sports, literature, etc. may be de-
in the —
fined in terms of the main contradiction, and pursuing the
resolution of that main issue is the equivalent of trying to capture
the leader of the robber band. Although would be an exag- it
geration to see the Chinese version of Marxist dialectical ma-

terialism entirely in terms of stratagems, Mao's doctrine of the
—
"main contradiction" which still exerts a fundamental influ-
ence on China's leaders —
certainly is related to the essential idea
behind Stratagem No. 18.
The following remarks appear in a previously cited university
textbook on the principles of Marxist philosophy:
The main contradiction occupies a leading, indeed a dom-

inant position among all contradictions. ... Its resolution
has a decisive influence on the overall situation. The diverse
other contradictions are subordinate to this main contra-
diction. If the main contradiction is resolved, all others can
be more easily resolved. During the Chinese war
civil
[1945-49], for example, the battle for Jinzhou was the

main contradiction with respect to all operations in West
Liaoning-Shenyang [September 12 to November 2, 1948].
Once Jinzhou was conquered, the enemy was transformed
into "a turtle caught in a jug" — that is, it was possible to
cut off the enemy's path of retreat and to defeat him. This
ultimately accomplished the strategic goal of destroying the
enemy in the entire northeastern region.
This example shows how the main contradiction deter-
mines and influences the other contradictions. ... If the

other contradictions are to be moved toward resolution,
one's energies must be concentrated on resolving the main
contradiction. Some common expressions [which describe]
this method are: you beat a snake, beat him on the
. . . "If
head" [or] "If you lead an ox, lead him by the nose-ring"
14
[or] 'To catch a gang of bandits, first capture its leader."
Appendix A
PLACE NAMES
Caizhou, city in Runan County, Henan Province.

Changchun, capital of Jilin Province.
Cbi-Linh, in what is now Thanh-hoa, central Vietnam.
Daliang, now the city of Kaifeng, Henan Province.
Dangtu, district in Anhui Province.
Dengzhou, city in Shandong Province.
Donghai, region covering southeastern Shandong Province
and northeastern Jiangsu Province.
Fancheng, city near Xiangfan, Hubei Province.
Gaolong, Hunan Province.
Guiling, northeast of Heze, Shandong Province.
Handan, city, now seat of Handan Prefecture, Hebei
Province.
Hanzhong, city, now seat of Hanzhong Prefecture, Shaanxi
Province.
Hengzhou, Hebei Province.
Hongmen, east of Lintong, Shaanxi Province.
Hu, pre-Qin state, in Henan Province.
Huaixi, region in Henan Province.
353
Jiang, Henan Province.

Jiangling, county in Hubei Province.
Jianning, city in the old Shu empire; today known as Puning,
in Yunnan Province.
Jiao, pre-Qin state, in Hubei Province.
Jinggangsban Mountains, in Jiangxi Province.
Lam Son, in province of Thanh— hoa, central Vietnam.

Liaodong, region in eastern and southern Liaoning Province
(formerly southern Manchuria).
Lin an, now Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province
city of
(provisional capital of the Southern Song Dynasty in the
twelfth century).
Lu, pre-Qin state, in southern Shandong Province and
northern Jiangsu Province.
Lukou, town in Chongyang County, Hubei Province.
Nanjing (Nanking), imperial capital during the Three
Kingdoms and Southern Dynasties periods (third to sixth
century) and again in the early Ming (1368-1421); in
1928-37, capital of the Republic of China.

Pengcheng, now city of Xuzhou, Jiangsu Province.
Puban, former town in western Yongji County, Shaanxi
Province.
Qi, pre-Qin state, in northern and central Shandong Province
and northeastern Hebei Province.
Sbibaocbeng, former city southwest of Xining, Qinghai
Province.
Shu, third-century state, in Sichuan Province.
Taocbeng, now town of Taoyangcheng, Gansu Province.
White River, in northeastern Songpan County, Sichuan
Province.
Wu, pre-Qin state, in Jiangsu Province, eastern Anhui
Province, and northern Zhejiang Province.
Xiayang, now Hancheng County, in Shaanxi Province.
Xiangyang, prefecture in Hubei Province, with Longzhong
Mountains to the west.
Xingyang, city in Henan Province.
Yaoshan (Mount Yao), in Henan Province.
Appendix A *
3 5 5
Ye, former Wei city, now in Henan Province.

Yue, pre-Qin state, in Zhejiang.
Yunzhou, city in what is now Shandong Province.
Zheng, now Zhengzhou, capital of Henan Province, south of
the Yellow River.
Appendix B
CHINESE STRATAGEM BOOKS
Jilin:
Wu Gu. Sanshiliu ji (The 36 Stratagems). Jilin Renmin
Chubanshe (Jilin People's Press). 1st edition, Changchun,
1979; 3rd ed. 1982.
Wu Gu. Huitu sanshiliu ji (The Illustrated 36 Stratagems).
Jilin Wenski Chubanshe (Jilin Literary-Historical Press).
Changchun, 1987.
Beijing:
Li Bingyan. Sanshiliu ji xin bian (The 36 Stratagems: A
Modern Version). Zhanshi Chubanshe (Soldiers' Press).
1st edition. Beijing, 1981. The publishing house changed

its name, so reprints and subsequent editions (varying
only in minor details) appear under the imprint of

Jiefangjun Chubanshe (People's Liberation Army Press);
the latest edition consulted by the author was the 9th
printing, dated March 1991.
357
Taiwan:
Shu Han. Sanshiliu ji miben jijie (The Secret Book of the 36
Stratagems, with Explanations). Guojia Chubanshe
(National Press). 1st edition, Taipei, 1982; 2d edition,
1984; 3d edition, 1986. (The 2d and 3d editions are
each listed simply as zaiban [new edition], so it is
uncertain whether other "new editions" may not have

appeared between 1982 and 1986. The 1986 edition
does not differ from that of 1982.)
Douzhi— sanshiliu ji (Wisdom in Struggle: The 36
Stratagems). Xingguang Chubanshe (Starlight Press).

19th edition, Taipei, 1985. (This is a pamphlet no —
author given.)
Hong Kong:
Ma Senliang and Zhang gu jin yin li
Laiping. Sanshiliu ji
(The 36 Stratagems, with Examples from Times Past and

Present). Yuzhou Chubanshe (Universe Press). Hong
Kong, 1969.
Appendix C
HISTORICAL FIGURES
An Lushan (d. a.d. 757), Turkish-Sogdian military governor

in the service of Emperor Xuanzong, who launched a
disastrous rebellion against the Tang in 755. [Sections
7.1, 18.6, 18.7]
Bai Juyi (a.d. 772-846), popular mid-Tang poet. [Section
10.1]
Bao (d. 204 B.C.), Prince of Wei. [Section 6.2]
Cao Cao (a.d. 155-220), warlord, politician, and leading

literary figure; founder of the Wei Dynasty. [Sections
3.11, 9.1, 9.2, 13.12, 14.10, 16.1, 16.2, 16.13, 17.13]

Chen Sheng (d. 208 B.C.), peasant rebel leader during the Qin
Dynasty. [Section 14.2]
Chen Yi (1901-72), Communist official who held numerous
posts after 1949, including mayor of Shanghai and
foreign minister of the People's Republic. [Section 18.7]
Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975), statesman and general; leader
of the Guomindang on mainland
(Nationalist) regime
China 1943-49, then of the Nationalist government on

Taiwan until his death. [Sections 2.4, 6.6, 9.3, 9.5, 11.5,
16.3, 17.11, 17.16, 18.12]
359
}6o- The Book of Stratagems
Chou En-lai (1898-1976), now generally spelled Zhou Enlai;

prominent Communist and Chinese foreign minister and
long-time premier of the People's Republic. [Sections 8.7,
11.5]
Confucius (551-479 B.C.), Chinese sage from the state of Lu;
taught humanistic philosophy canonized as
Confucianism. [Sections 3.6, 7.15, 10.5]
Deng Ai (a.d. 197-264), a Wei general during the Three
Kingdoms period. [Section 8.2]
Deng Xiaoping (b. 1904), early member and official of
Chinese Communist Party; comrade-in-arms of Mao
Zedong; political official who has held many offices (e.g.,
vice-premier, member of Presidium and Central
Committee, etc.); out of favor with Mao Zedong for
some years, later restored to favor; became heir
apparent, de facto leader of the country after Mao's
death; now officially retired from public office but still
regarded as China's strongman. [Sections 1.6, 2.4, 7.9,

16.4, 18.3]
Di Qing (a.d. 1008-57), prominent general of the Northern
Song Dynasty. [Section 11.3]
Du Fu (a.d. 712-70), one of the best-known poets of the
Tang Dynasty; sometimes considered China's greatest
poet. [Section 18.1]
Fuchai (d. 473 B.C.), ruler of Wu. [Section 10.3]
Gaozong (a.d. 649-83), Tang Emperor. [Section 10.1]
Gaozu [See under Liu Bang]
Goujian (d. 465 B.C.), King of Yue. [Section 10.3]
Guan Zhong (d. 645 B.C.), politician and political
philosopher; considered the founder of the School of

Legalism. [Intro, to No. 15, 16.13]
Han Fei (ca. 280-223 B.C.), leading representative of the
School of Legalism. [Section 10.2; Intro, to No. 15,
17.20]
Han Shizhong (a.d. 1089-1151), general under the Southern
Song Dynasty. [Section 7.12]
Appendix C -361
Han Xin (d. 196 under Liu Bang; instrumental

B.C.), general
in launching the Han

Dynasty. [Section 6.2, 8.1, 8.4]
He Long (1896-1969), a founder of the People's Liberation
Army. [Section 16.11]
Huai (d. 299 B.C.), King of Chu. [Sections 8.1, 14.2]
Huan, Duke (r. 806-771 B.C.), ruler of Zheng, in the
Western Zhou Dynasty. [Sections 3.5, 17.23]
Hui (369-319 B.C.), King of Wei. [Section 12.2]
Hui (r. 337-311 B.C.), King of Qin. [Section 9.5]
Hui [the Jianwen Emperor] (r. a.d. 1399-1403), Ming
Dynasty ruler. [Section 12.6]
Jiang Wei (a.d. 202-64), a Shu general during the Three
Kingdoms period. [Sections 8.2, 14.6]
—
Jianwen Emperor see third entry for Hui, above.
Jing, Duke (d. 490 B.C.), ruler of Qi. [Sections 3.3, 16.7]
Kong Rong (a.d. 153-208), twentieth-generation descendant
of Confucius; Han statesman and loyalist executed for
opposition to Cao Cao. [Sections 1.4, 3.11]
Lao-tze (b. 604 B.C.?), now usually spelled Laozi, Chinese
philosopher, possibly apocryphal; reputedly the founder
of Daoism and author of its central book, the Daodejing
(or Tao-te-cbing). [Intro, to No. 7, Sections 10.4, 13.11,
17.20]
Laozi — see Lao-tze.
Le Loi (d. a.d. 1433), once a wealthy Vietnamese farmer,
then leader of the uprising at Lam Son. [Sections 7.5,
11.4]
Li Boyuan (1867-1906), author. [Section 13.3]
Li Linfu (d. a.d. 752), Chief Minister to Tang Emperor

Xuanzong. [Section 10.1]
Li Shimin (seventh century a.d.), Tang Emperor. [Section
17.25]
Li Su (ninth century, a.d.), military governor under Emperor
Xianzong. [Section 18.7]
Li Yifu (a.d.614-66), courtier and official at the court of
Tang Emperor Gaozong. [Section 10.1]
Lin Biao (1907-71), Chinese Communist leader, earmarked
as Mao Zedong's successor, then accused of an

attempted coup and reported killed in a plane crash
while trying to escape to the Soviet Union. [Sections 7.9,
7.10, 16.10]
Liu Bang 250-195
(ca. B.C.), also known as Peigong, also as
Emperor Gaozu of the Han; rebel leader against the Qin
and founder of the Han Dynasty, China's longest-lived
imperial dynasty (206 b.c.-a.d. 220). [Sections 6.2, 8.1,
12.1, 13.7, 14.8, 15.7]
Liu Bei (a.d. 161-223), founder and ruler of the kingdom of
Shu (or Shu Han) in the area of Sichuan Province.
[Sections 1.3, Intro, to No. 9, 9.1, 13.7, 13.12, 14.10,
16.1, 16.2, 16.13, 16.14]
Liu Xun (second century a.d.), warlord governor of Lujiang
during the last decades of the Han Dynasty. [Section
15.3]
Luo Guanzhong (ca. a.d. 1330-1400), author active in early
Ming period, to whom several novels and dramas are

attributed, including the novel Sanguozhi yanyi (The
Romance of the Three Kingdoms). [Section 2.1]
Lu Xun (a.d. 183-245), strategist in the kingdom of Wu.
[Section 10.6]
Lu Xun (1881-1936), author, greatly revered in the People's
Republic. [Sections 9.4, 17.3]
Lu Hou (241-180 B.C.), wife of Liu Bang, his helper, and,
after his death, faithful executrix of his wishes. [Section
14.8]
Lu Meng (a.d. 178-219), strategist for the kingdom of Wu
during the Three Kingdoms period. [Section 10.6]
Mao Zedong (1893-1976), founder of the People's Republic
member of the Guomindang; after
of China; initially a
Guomindang-Communist split, led disastrous "Autumn
Harvest Uprising" in Hunan; led the Red Army's "Long
March" (1934-35); continued to fight Guomindang even
during anti-Japanese war (1934-45) and after it; in
1949, with Communists in command of most Chinese

territory, Mao became Chairman of the central
Appendix C '3^3
government and the Party; led the country through

various waves of upheaval, such as the Great Leap
Forward (began 1958) and the Cultural Revolution
(1966-76); one of the Communist world's leading
theoreticians, his ideas became highly influential in the
Third World. [Sections 1.6, 2.2, 4.3, 7.9, 9.5, 10.1, 14.5,
14.8, 16.3, 16.10, 17.3, 17.16, 18.2, 18.3, 18.12]

Mencius (390-305 B.C.), or Mengzi in Mandarin; great
Confucian philosopher. [Section 16.12]
Mo Du (d. 174 B.C.), leader of the Xiongnu, founder of a
large federation of nomadic tribes that launched many
attacks against Chinese territory. [Sections 17.17, 17.24]
Nguyen Trai (a.d. 1380-1442), leading adviser to Le Loi;
Vietnamese scholar, author, strategist, and statesman.
[Section 7.5]
Pang Juan (fourth century B.C.), Wei army commander.
[Sections 4.2, 12.2]
Pu Songling (a.d. 1640—1715), prominent story writer of
early Qing period; author of the collection Liaozbai zbiyi
(Strange Stories from the Leisure Studio). [Section 11.6]
Pu Yi (1906-67), last emperor of China. [Section 14.2]
Qu Bo (twentieth century a.d.), author of the novel The
Forest in the Snow. [Sections 12.4, 15.5]
Shang Yang (fourth century B.C.), government official of Qin;
proponent of the School of Legalism. [Section 16.6]
Sima Guang (a.d. 1019-86), Song historian; compiler of the
Zizhi tong jian (Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in
Government), recounting the history of China from the
end of the fifth century B.C. to the tenth century a.d.
[Sections 10.1, 14.10]
Sima Qian (b. ca. 145 B.C.), historian; author of the Shi ji
(Records of the Historian). [Sections 2.1, 9.5, 13.6]

Sima Yi (a.d. 179-251), commander of the Wei army and a
frequent opponent of Zhuge Liang. [Prologue, Sections

13.7, 14.6]
Song Xiang (a.d. 1756-1826), poet. [Section 3.11]
Sun Bin (fourth century B.C.), strategist and military adviser
to General Tian Ji during the Warring States period.

[Sections 2.1, 4.1, 4.2, 11.9, 11.10]
Sun Ce (r. a.d. 175-200), Governor of Guiji. [Sections 13.12,
15.3]
Sun Quan (a.d. 182-252), King of Wu during the Three
Kingdoms period. [Sections 9.1, 10.6, 14.10, 16.2,
16.13]
Sun Tzu (sixth century B.C.), now properly transcribed as
Sunzi; general and military theorist; author of the
treatise The Art of War. [Introduction, Sections 2.1, 2.2,
Intro, to No. 4, Intro, to No. 5, Intro, to No. 6, 8.4,
10.5, 11.9, 13.7, 16.4]
Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), Chinese revolutionary and
statesman; founder and leader of the Guomindang; twice
chosen president of China. [Section 14.5]
Sunzi — see Sun Tzu.
Taizong (a.d. 627-49), Tang Dynasty Emperor. [Intro, to
No. 1, Section 11.11]

Tan Daoji (d. a.d. 436), general in the Southern Song
Dynasty. [Introduction]
Tian Ji (fourth century B.C.), Qin army commander during
the Warring States period; worked closely with Sun Bin.
[Sections 2.1, 4.2, 11.9, 11.10, 11.11]
Wang Mai (thirteenth century a.d.), government official and
literary figure. [Section 18.10]
Wang Mang (r. a.d. 8-23), Han emperor. [Section 14.3]

Wang Zhen (d. a.d. 1449), powerful palace eunuch during
the Ming Dynasty. [Section 18.4]
Wen, Duke (445-396 B.C.), ruler of Wei. [Section 18.5]
Wenkang (nineteenth century a.d.), Manchurian author.
[Section 8.6, 16.8]
Wu, Duke (r. 770-744 B.C.), ruler of Zheng. [Sections 10.2,
15.1]
Wu Cheng'en (ca. a.d. 1500-1582), author of the novel
journey to the West, which recounts some of the
adventures of the mythological Monkey King. [Section
5.1, Intro, to No. 12]
Wu of the Man (140-87 B.C.), Emperor. [Sections 11.1, 14.3]
Appendix C *
3 6 5
Wu Zetian (a.d. 624-705), Tang Empress and founder of the

Zhou Dynasty. [Section 14.8]
Xiang Yu (third to second century B.C.), rebel leader against
the Qin Dynasty, later "Hegemon of Western Chu."
[Sections 8.1, 12.1]
Xiao, Duke (r. 388-361 B.C.), ruler of Qin. [Section 16.6]
Xieli (seventh century a.d.), Khan of the Eastern Turks.
[Section 17.25]
Ximen Bao (fifth century B.C.), government official of Wei.
[Section 18.5]
Xuan, Duke (r. 718-700 B.C.), ruler of Wei. [Section 11.2]
Xuanhui (r. 332-312 B.C.), a ruler of the Han state during
the Warring States period. [Section 11.8]
Xuanzong (a.d. 712-56), Tang Emperor. [Section 18.1]
Xunzi (ca. 313-238 B.C.), philosopher. [Section 7.15]
Yanzi (fifth century B.C.), highly ethical administrator of the
city of Dong'e under Duke Jing of Qi; later promoted to
Chief Minister of Qi. [Sections 3.3, 16.7]

Yongle Emperor (r. a.d. 1403-24), Ming ruler. [Section 12.6]
Yuan (74-49 B.C.), Han Emperor. [Section 13.2]

Yue Bochuan (a.d. 1271-1368), Yuan period dramatist.
[Section 14.1]
Yue Fei (a.d. 1101-42), military leader and patriotic hero of
the Southern Song Dynasty. [Section 7.12]
Zeng Pu (1872-1935), Chinese author. [Section 18.9]

Zhang Xun (a.d. 709-57), loyalist Tang Dynasty general;
governor of Zhenyuan District during the An Lushan
rebellion. [Sections 7.1, 18.6]
Zhang Yi 310 B.C.), famed rhetorician and political figure
(d.
of the Warring States period; won greatest renown as

minister of Qin. [Sections 7.6, 11.8]
Zheng He (fourteenth to fifteenth century a.d.), Muslim
eunuch who, under the Ming Dynasty's Yongle Emperor,
headed numerous naval expeditions in the early fifteenth
century a.d. to remote parts of Asia. [Section 12.6]
Zhi, Marquis (midfifth century B.C.), powerful nobleman in
kingdom of Jin. [Sections 17.21, 17.22]
Zhou Enlai — see Chou En-lai.
366 •
Zhou Yu (a.d. 175-210), general, commander of Wu forces.

[Sections 9.1, 13.12, 15.3]
Zhuang, Duke (743-701 B.C.), ruler of Zheng. [Section 15.1]
Zhuge Liang (a.d. 181-234), also known as Kongming;
legendary prime minister of Shu under Liu Bei during the
Three Kingdoms period. [Prologue, Sections 1.3, 3 (Note
3), 9.1, 13.7, 13.12, 14.6, 14.10, 16.1, 16.2, 16.13,
16.14]
Zigong (b. 520 B.C.), disciple of Confucius. [Section 3.6]
Appendix D
MAJOR CHINESE DYNASTIES AND PERIODS
Xia c. 2100 B.C.-C. 1600

Shang c. 1600-c. 1028
Zhou c. 1027-256
Western Zhou c. 1027-771
Eastern Zhou c. 770-256
Spring and Autumn 722-468
Warring States 403-221
Qi N 221-207
Han 206 b.c.-a.d. 220
Former Han 206-8
Later Han 25-220
Xin 9-25
Three Kingdoms 220-265
Wei 220-265
Shu 221-263
Wu 222-280
Six Dynasties (Wu, Eastern Jin, Liu
Song, Southern Qi, Southern
Liang, and Southern Chen) 222-589
367
3 68 •
265-420
Jin
Western Jin 265-317
Eastern Jin
317-420
Southern Dynasties 420-589
Former (Liu) Song 420-479
Southern Qi
479-502
Southern Liang
502-557
Southern Chen
557-589
Northern Dynasties 386-581
Northern Wei 386-534
EasternWei 534-550
Western Wei
535-577
Northern Qi 550-577
Northern Zhou 557-581
581-618
Sui
618-907
Tang
907-960
Five Dynasties
916-1125
Liao
960-1279
Song
Northern Song
960-1126
1127-1279
Southern Song
1115-1234
Jin (Jurchen)
1260-1368
Yuan
1368-1644
Ming
1644-1911
Ching
Appendix £
THE 36 STRATAGEMS
(based on the oldest-known stratagem treatise, Sansbiliu ji
miben bingfa)
1. Fool the Emperor and Cross the Sea.

2. Besiege Wei to Rescue Zhao.
3. Kill with a Borrowed Knife.
4. Await the Exhausted Enemy at Your Ease.

5. Loot a Burning House.
6. Clamor in the East, Attack in the West.
7. Create Something from Nothing.
8. Openly Repair the Walkway, Secretly March to Chencang.
9. Observe the Fire on the Opposite Shore.

10. Hide Your Dagger Behind a Smile.
11. Let the Plum Tree Wither in Place of the Peach.
12. Seize the Opportunity to Lead the Sheep Away.
13. Beat the Grass to Startle the Snake.
14. Borrow a Corpse for the Soul's Return.
15. Lure the Tiger Down
from the Mountain.
16. To Catch Something, First Let It Go.
369
37°' The Book of Stratagems
17. Toss Out a Brick to Attract Jade.

18. To Catch the Bandits, First Capture Their Leader.
19. Firewood from Under the Pot.
Steal the
20. Trouble the Water to Catch the Fish.
21. Shed Your Skin Like the Golden Cicada.
22. Shut the Door to Catch the Thief.
23. Befriend a Distant Enemy to Attack One Nearby.
24. Borrow the Road to Conquer Guo.
25. Replace the Beams with Rotten Timbers.
26. Point at the Mulberry, But Curse the Locust Tree.
27. Feign Madness But Keep Your Balance.
28. Lure the Enemy onto the Roof, Then Take Away the
Ladder.
29. Deck the Dead Tree with Bogus Blossoms.
30. Exchange the Role of Guest for That of Host.
31. The Stratagem of the Beautiful Woman.
32. The Stratagem of the Open City Gates.
33. The Stratagem of Sowing Discord.
34. The Stratagem of Injuring Yourself.
35. The Stratagem of Linking Stratagems.
36. [When the Situation Is Growing Hopeless] Running Away
Is the Best Stratagem.
[Translator's note: In the original Chinese, the phrases depicting

the 36 Stratagems are not couched in the imperative form used
here for most of the English renditions. Chinese sentences often
do not specify the subject of the verb, especially when the subject
is clearly implied or readily understood by both speaker and
hearer. Most of the stratagem formulas could equally have been
rendered in the -ing form (e.g., No. 3: "Killing with a Borrowed
Knife," or No. 22: "Shutting the Door to Catch the Thief").
But I felt that, in English, the imperative form most aptly cap-
tures the spirit and conciseness of the original.]
Notes
STRATAGEM 1
1. Shehui kexue zhanxian (Social Science Front), publ. 1978 in

Changchun, People's Republic of China (PRC).
2. This tale is taken from the photo comic strip Zbuge Liang zbao
qin (Zhuge Liang Searches for a Bride), (Beijing: Chinese Theatre Press,
1985). The modern text, written by Zhao Kuihua, is certainly not
historically accurate. But some of the same details, including people's
scorn of the homely Huang Zhengying and Zhuge Liang's marriage
to her, are recorded in the twenty-volume collection Wall of Writings,
by the fourteenth-century literary figure and government official Tao
Zongyi. That work, in turn, is a kind of extended anthology compiled
from more than six hundred earlier books, some of which have since
been lost. The story of Zhuge Liang and Huang Zhengying is recounted
in the section ''Reports from Xiangyang." Tao Zongyi's way of de-
scribing Huang Zhengying's homeliness is to refer to her "golden hair
and dark skin."

3. This tale is even older than the preceding ones. It is cited to
illustrate Stratagem No. 1 in the Jilin and Taiwan books mentioned

in the Introduction and listed in Appendix B.
4. This additional tale from ancient Chinese history, illustrating
Stratagem No. 1, is taken from the Sanshiliu ji xin bian (The 36
37i
3 7 2 * Notes
Stratagems: A Modern Version), 7th edition (Beijing, 1989). See Ap-

pendix B.
STRATAGEM 2
1. "Sun Bin wei Wei jiu Zhao" (Sun Bin Besieges Wei
Cf. the story
to Rescue Zhao), which appeared in the largest Chinese children's
magazine, Ertong shidai (Children's Epoch), No. 18 (Sept. 16, 1981),
Shanghai.
2. Sunzi bingfa (Sunzi's Art of War) has appeared in several English
translations. Unless otherwise noted, all quotes from that work cited
in this book are taken from: Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Thomas
Cleary (Boston & Shaftesbury: Chambala Publications, 1988).
3. The Art of War, op. cit., pp. 102, 105.
4. Su Ruozhou and Ke Li, Junshi chengyu (Military Idioms), Shaanxi
Renmin Chubanshe (Shaanxi Province People's Press), (Taiyuan,
1983), p. 486.
5. Zhongguo gudai zhexue yuyan gushi xuan (A Selection of Phil-
osophical Parables and Tales from Ancient China), (Shanghai, 1980).
6. Translator's note: Unless otherwise noted, all citationsfrom the
writings of Mao Zedong are translated into English from the author's
German rendition of the original Chinese text: Mao Zedong xuanji
(Selected Works of Mao Zedong), (Beijing, 1969). This quote is from
vol. 2, p. 398.
7. This event was graphically depicted in a widely circulated comic
strip published in Shanghai in 1981.
8. Sanshiliu ji xin bian (The 36 Stratagems: A Modern Version), op.
cit. See Appendix B.
9. Shu Han, Sanshiliu ji miben jijie (The Secret Book of the 36
Stratagems, with Explanations), 3d edition (Taipei, 1986). See Ap-
pendix B.
10. The Art of War, op. cit., pp. 112-13.
STRATAGEM 3
1. Translator's note: This and subsequent biblical quotations arc

from The New English Bible with Apocrypha (Oxford & Cambridge
University Press, 1970).
2. Translator's note: Sir James George Frazer, The Golden Bough,
8th printing (New York: Macmillan Paperbacks, 1975), p. 704.
3. The text of this story comes from Yanzi chunqiu (The Springs
Notes '373
and Autumns of Yanzi), a collection of anecdotes about Yanzi (d. 500

B.C.), who
served three successive rulers of Qi. The book contains a
great deal of poetry, some of it clearly influenced by the thinking of
Chinese philosopher Mozi (ca. 468-376 B.C.). There is an excellent
German translation of this work: Die Fruhlinge und Herbste des Yan
Zi, trans. R.Holzer (Wiirzburger Sino-Japonica, 1983, vol. 10).
found a modern Chinese version of this story in a book on Chinese
I
idioms published in Jilin in 1982 (Chen Ripeng and Jin Shijie, Chengyu
gushi sanbai pian [Three Hundred Tales Built on Chinese Idioms], p.
99ff).
The poemat the end of the anecdote was composed by Zhuge Liang
(a.d. 181-234), Prime Minister of Shu, himself an outstanding expert
on stratagems. In it he glorifies the dead men and vilifies Yanzi for
his use of Stratagem No. 3 and for not daring to openly call for the
execution of the disrespectful knights. Instead, exploiting the well-
known fact that heroic people are often irritable and oversensitive
about their honor, pride, and dignity, Yanzi sowed discord among
them and caused them to commit suicide.
4. Andrew Lang, ed., The Blue Fairy Book (New York: Dover Pub-
lications, 1965), pp. 304-12.
5. This application of Stratagem No. 3 is described in the Han Feizi
(Book of Han Fei).
6. Sanshiliu ji xin bian, op. cit., p. llff. See Appendix B.
7. Participation of the German secret service in Tukhachevsky's liq-
uidation by means of forged documents is still regarded as questionable

in the West. But the Chinese version of the affair is confirmed by and
large in Victor Alexandrov's historical work affaire Toukhatcbevsky V
[Verviers/Belgium, 1978] and in Gustav Adolf Pourroy's Das Prinzip
Intrige [Ziirich/Osnabriick, 1986].
8. Ma Senliang and Zhang gu jin yin li (The
Laiping, Sanshiliu ji
36 Stratagems, with Examples from Times Past and Present). (Hong

Kong, 1969), op. cit., p. 32ff. See Appendix B.
9. In the People's Republic this stratagem tale has been staged by
the BeijingOpera as Wang Xifeng da nao Ningguofu (Wang Xifeng
Creates Great Tumult in the Ningguo Residence), which was well
received by the public and praised by a critic in the Beijing Evening
News. It was also reproduced in a sixteen-part comic-strip version of
the Dream of the Red Chamber published in 1984 in Shanghai.
10. The 36 Stratagems: A Modern Version, op. cit., p. 10. See Ap-
pendix B.
11. Sanshiliu ji miben jtjie, op. cit., p. 25. See Appendix B.
—
3 7 4' Notes
STRATAGEM 4
1. The Art of War, op. cit., p. 122.

2. Ibid., p. 100.
3. Qin Shihuang (the first Emperor of the Qin), who founded the
first centralized Chinese empire in 221 B.C., also employed Stratagem
No. 4 in the year 223 B.C. to defeat Chu, one of the two remaining
rival states standing in the way of his unification of China. During the
Cultural Revolution (1966-76), Qin Shihuang was greatly lauded in
the People's Republic for his historic accomplishments.
4. Mao Zedong xuanji, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 192.
5. Ibid., p. 188.
6. Sanshiliu ji (The 36 Stratagems), 1st edition (Changchun, 1979),
p. 15. See Appendix B.
STRATAGEM 5
1. The Art of War, op. cit., p. 51. [This is an unclear rendition. It

might better read: "When the enemy is in chaos, exploit the oppor-
tunity to overpower him." ed.]
2. Translator's note: Xi you ji (Journey to the West), by Wu
Cheng'en (ca. 1500-1582), is a classic of Chinese legend and has been
published in several versions in the West. One of the more colorful is
The Monkey King, translated from the Czech by George Theiner [Lon-
don: Paul Hamlyn, 1964]. Probably the most popular is Monkey,
translated by Arthur Waley [New York: Grove Press, 1958]. The
complete Journey to the West (in 4 vols.) has been translated into
English by Anthony C. Yu [Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1977-83].
3. These details are related by Gu Yun in a pamphlet titled Zhong-
guo jindaishishang de bupingdeng tiaoyue (The Unequal Treaties in
China's Modern History), (Beijing, 1973).
4. The New English Bible with Apocrypha, op. cit., Genesis 25:
29-33.
STRATAGEM 6
1. The statement serves as the title of a chapter on the nature of

war in Du You' s work Tong dian (A General History of Institutions).
Notes '375
3. This historical incident is recounted, with an explicit reference to

Stratagem No. book
young people titled Zbongguo gudai
6, in a for
zbanzbeng gushi (War Stories from Ancient China) (Beijing, 1978).
4. The New English Bible with Apocrypha, op. cit., Joshua 6:8-20.
5. Cited in: Daniel Reichel, Beweglichkeit und Ungewissbeit (Flex-
and Uncertainty), vol. 5 of Studien und Dokumente (Studies
ibility
and Documents), Federal Military Dept. (Berne, Switzerland, 1986).

6. Shuihu zhuan (Water Margin, sometimes translated as On the
Water's Edge) dates from the end of the Yuan and beginning of the
Ming period (thirteenth to fourteenth century a.d.). An early trans-
lation of the work by novelist Pearl S. Buck was titled All Men Are
Brothers.
7. This passage has been rendered into English from the excellent
German version Die Rauber vom Liangshan-Moor (The Robbers of
Liangshan Moor), translated from the Chinese into German by Jo-
hanna Herzfeldt (Leipzig, 1968).
STRATAGEM 7
1. Sanshiliu ji xin bian, op. cit., p. 24. See Appendix B.

2. The Lindenhof is a handsome, elevated square in Zurich's Old
Town, still a favorite gathering place for lunchtime breaks, outdoor
concerts, etc.
3. "If it be not true, 'tis a charming invention."
4. Gottfried Schadlich, Kriegslist gestern und heute (Tricks of War,
Yesterday and Today), 2nd edition (Herford/Bonn, 1979).
5. Can, "Un grand stratege du peuple," Europe, Revue litteraire
Vu
mensuelle, No. 613 (May 1980), Pans, p. 71.
6. This example is drawn from the book Zbanguo ce (Stratagems
of the Warring States), probably dating from the early 2nd century
B.C., the largest anthology of fables, historical anecdotes, and
stories
about famous personalities from the time before the Han Dynasty (i.e.,
prior to 206 B.C.).
7. This is the title of a drama from the Yuan period (a.d. 1271-
1368), the plot of which summarized in these paragraphs.
is
8. The original title of the short story recounted here is "Kuang qi

(Stratagem for Fooling the Wife). Written by Yu Hengxiang,
the
ji"
story appeared in the anthology Yibaige chengxin (A Hundred Sat-
isfactions) (Shanghai, 1983).

9. In: Gao Mingxuan, ed., Xingfaxue (Theory of Criminal Law),
Falii Chubanshe (Legal Press) (Beijing, 1982), p. 421.
3 7 6
*
Notes
STRATAGEM 8
1. The play is titled The Great Emperor of the Han Washes His
Own Feet and Thus Angers General Ying Bu.
2. The Art of War, op. cit., pp. 93-95.
3. Publ. 1978 in Inner Mongolia, People's Republic of China.
STRATAGEM 9
1. See, for example, Makesizhuyi zhexue yuanli (Principles of Marx-

ist Philosophy), Jilin Renmin Chubanshe (Jilin People's Press), 4th
edition, 5th printing (Changchun, 1983), p. 150.
3. Ibid., p. 543f.
4. Translated from the German-language edition: Mao Tse-tung,
Ausgewahlte Werke (Selected Works) (Beijing, 1969), vol. 2, p. 320f.
6. Zhang Jian's analysis was published in the Zhongguo qingnian
bao (Chinese Youth Journal), the official newspaper of the Chinese
Communist Youth Federation (Jan. 24, 1981).
7. Sanshiliu ji xin bian, op. cit., p. 30. See Appendix B.
STRATAGEM 10
1. Sanshiliu ji gu jin yin li, op. cit., p. 221.

2. Su Ruozhou and Ke Li, Junsbi chengyu (Military Idioms),
Shaanxi Renmin Chubanshe (Shaanxi Province People's Press)
(Taiyuan, 1983), p. 486.
3. In 1984, the Chinese press reported that a sword belonging to
Fuchai of Wuhad been unearthed in the course of excavations.
4. Sanshiliu miben jijie, op. cit., p. 64f.
ji

7. Sanshiliu ji xin bian, op cit.
8. Ibid.
Notes •
3 7 7
STRATAGEM 11
1. The Ywe/w shiji (Collection of Yuefu Poems) was compiled during

the Song Dynasty.
3. Titled "Di Qing Saves His Elder Brother with a Stratagem," this
story was recounted in the April 1986 issue of Ertong shidai (Chil-
dren's Epoch), the leading Chinese magazine for children. In China
most reading matter tends to have a didactic function. In this case the
young readers are being taught the use of a stratagem in the service
of brotherly love.
4. Viet-Nam Su-Luoc (Outline of Vietnamese History), Ministry of
Education, Republic of South Vietnam (Saigon, 1971), vol. 1, p. 219.
6. This story, recounted in the 1969 Hong Kong stratagem book,
may be found in Records of the Historian, by Sima Qian, mentioned
several times in the present work. During the Yuan period 1271—
(a.d.
1368) it was used by Ji Junxiang as the basis for his play The Orphan
of Zhao. This was one of the first Chinese plays to be translated into
a Western language. The French version, Vorphelin de Tchao, by P.
Premare, is found in Description geographique, historique, chrono-
logique, politique et physique de V empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie
chinoise, vol. 3 (Paris, 1735), edited by the Jesuit father Jean Baptiste
Du Halde (1674-1743). It inspired Voltaire's tragedy Vorphelin de
la Chine.
7. This tale comes originally from Stratagems of the Warring States
(see Note 6 to Stratagem No. 7). Our recounting of the story, however,
was drawn not from the original text but from a modern version
issued as a comic strip in 1982 in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous
Region.
8. Fan Wenlan, Zhongguo tongshi (An Overview of Chinese His-
tory), 2nd edition (Beijing, 1978), vol. 3, p. 344.
9. This game has beenhighly prized in China for millennia, and
eventually reached Japan. In it, the two opponents use white and black
stones on a board to try and win as much territory as possible. The
important thing is to concentrate on the decisive battle(s), even at the
risk of being weak in secondary areas or accepting some
small, partial
that the
defeats. This process is based on the Chinese understanding
war
main concern is not to win each individual battle but to win the
as a whole.
Lenin are
10. This and subsequent citations from the writings of
edition of Lenin's
translated into English from the German-language
3 7 8
*
Notes
writings: W. I. Lenin, Werke (Works), Dietz-Verlag (Berlin, 1974),

This quote is from vol. 31, p. 476.
11. Ibid., vol. 32, p. 480.
12. Ibid., vol. 32, p. 359.
STRATAGEM 12
1. This example is taken from: Kai Werhahn-Mees, ed., Cb'i Chi-

kuang — Praxis der chinesischen Kriegfiihrung (The Practice of Chinese
Warfare) (Munich, 1980).
2. See Section 11.13 and Note 9 to Stratagem No. 11.
3. Sanshiliu ji yin li (The 36 Stratagems, with Examples) Jinri Taiwan
She (Society for Modern Taiwan) (Taipei, 1973), p. 86.
4. Ibid., p. 85.
STRATAGEM 13
1. This information has been drawn from the book Chengyu gushi
wubai pian (Three Hundred Tales About Chinese Idioms), by Zhou
Jinhua (Chongqing, 1982); see the chapter devoted to the phrase
"cheng yi jing bai" (Punish one to intimidate a hundred).
2. The version given here is based on a Chinese comic strip dealing
with the 36 Stratagems, in which No. 13 is illustrated with this
incident.
4. Sanshiliu xin bian, p. 41. See Appendix B.
ji
5. This use of Stratagem No. 13 during the 1956 Suez crisis, how-
ever, is confirmed neither by Col. Trevor N. Dupuy in his book Elusive

Victory— The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-74 (London, 1978), nor by
Jacques Massu in his work La Verite sur Suez 1956 (Paris, 1978).
6. For detailed information on the Chinese Communist Party's three
categories of party norms, see my essay "Recent Developments in the
Relations between State and Party Norms in the People's Republic of
China,"in The Scope of State Power in China, ed. Stuart R. Schram
(New York, London, Hong Kong: St. Martin's Press, 1985), pp. 171ff.
7. See Section 16.13.
8. This is a slightly abridged version of a folktale widespread in East
%
Africa, taken from the book L enfant ruse et bambara

autres COfltes
— Mali et Senegal oriental (The Tricked Child and Other Bambara
Tales from Mali and Eastern Senegal), collected, translated, and edited
Notes *
3 79
by G. Meyer and V. Gorog-Karady (Paris, 1984).The folk figure of

the Trickster-Hare is also familiar in the Sudan and in South Africa;
it is equivalent to the Black Antelope or the Turtle in Central Africa
and Cameroon, and to the Spider Woman in the Atlantic zones of
Africa.
9. The relationship between the Divinity and trickery in various
cultures is illuminated by studies of the Trickster in mythology and
folklore. Among the best-known trickster figures are the Norse god
Loki (see Section 3.2) and the Greek god Hermes. This figure's ap-
pearance in Indian mythology is investigated by Paul Radin in his
book The Trickster, with a commentary by C. G. Jung on the psy-

chology of the trickster (3rd edition, New York: Greenwood Press,
1969). Another worthwhile study is Paul V. A. Williams's The Fool
and the Trickster (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1979).
10. Sanshiliu ji miben jijie, op. cit., p. 80.
11. 'The Art of Controversy," Section 3, "Stratagems," XXIII, in
The Complete Essays of Schopenhauer, trans. T. Bailey Saunders,

Willey Book Co. (New York, 1942), pp. 26-7.
12. Ibid.
STRATAGEM 14
1. A German translation of this play, by Alfred Forke, was published

in Dramen der
Chinesische Yiian-Dynastie (Chinese Dramas of the
Yuan Dynasty) (Wiesbaden, 1978).
2. Additional details are available in the Lexikon chinesischer Sym-
bole (Lexicon of Chinese Symbols), by Wolfram Eberhard (Cologne,
1987).
3. This example was drawn from the chapter on No. 14 in a comic-
strip series on the 36 Stratagems published in Jilin.
4. Wolfram Eberhard, Geschichte Chinas (History of China), 3rd
edition (Stuttgart: Kroner Verlag, 1980), p. 109.
5. Sanshiliu ji yin li, Note 3 to No. 12), p. 83.
op. cit. (see
6. A comic-strip series on the 36 Stratagems published in Lijiang

used this tale in its chapter on Stratagem No. 14. The story's original
source is chapter 104 of the novel The Romance of the Three King-
doms, which is cited numerous times in the present work.
7. Sanshiliu ji miben jijie, op. cit., p. 85.
8. Sanshiliu ji xin bian, op. cit., p. 45.
3 8 o •
Notes
STRATAGEM 15
1. This incident was described in the novel The History of the East-
ern Zhou States, dating from the Ming period (fourteenth to seven-
teenth century a.d.). The novel was given its present form during the
Qing period (seventeenth to twentieth century), and contains tales from
the eighth to the third century B.C. Though based on historical fact,
the stories are often imaginatively embellished. The events related here,
for example, are also recounted in the Confucian classic the Zuo
Commentary, but much more simply and without the addition of
stratagem details. The version told in these pages is based on stratagem
books published in Taiwan and Hong Kong.
2. This example of the application of Stratagem No. 15 is taken
from the chronicle Sanguo zhi (The History of the Three Kingdoms)
by Chen Shou (a.d. 233-97). It has often been retold, one recent
version appearing in a series of comics about the stratagems published
in the People's Republic of China.
3. This incident from the war of the Chinese Communists against
the Japanese invaders appears in a comic strip published in 1982 in
Shenyang, People's Republic of China, with a printing of 920,000

copies.
4. Cf. Beweglichkeit und Ungewissheit, op. cit.
5. Cf. Abraham Malamat, "Conquest of Canaan: Israelite Conduct
of War
According to Biblical Tradition," in Encyclopaedia Judaica
Yearbook 1975-76 (Jerusalem, 1977).
6. See Gottfried Schadlich, Kriegslist gestern und heute (Tricks of
War, Yesterday and Today), 2nd edition (Herford/Bonn, 1979).
STRATAGEM 16
1. See Appendix E. Stratagems 19-36 will be treated in Vol. 2 of

this work, scheduled for future publication.
2. The first mention of the seven releases of King Menghuo appears
in the chronicle by Xi Zuochi (d. a.d. 384). Nowadays the historicity
of the report is doubted by some scholars. Nevertheless, Zhuge Liang's

heroic handling of this particular episode is often cited to young
Chinese, especially in comic strips and books for young people.
3. Bingyan and Sun Jing, Shuo san guo hua quanmou (Explaining
Li
Stratagems Through the Novel "Romance of the Three Kingdoms"),
Jiefangjun Chuhanshe (People's Liberation Army Press), 5th ed. (Beij-
ing, 1989), p. 208.

Notes
4. Sanshiliu ji yin li, op. cit., p. 118.

5. Miben bingfa sanshiliu ji (The 36 Stratagems: The Secret Book
of the Art of War), as reproduced in: Wu Gu, Sanshiliu ji (The 36
Stratagems) (Jilin, 1982), op. cit. See Appendix B.
6. Historian Sima Qian, who wrote the earliest biography of Shang
Yang, remarks, "On closer examination we see that Shang Yang, in
first trying to persuade Duke Xiao of the value of the ways of the old
kings and emperors, was operating with mere shadow arguments. This
was not his true intention."
7. The German translation of the book, by Franz Kuhn, is titled Die
Schwarze Reiterin (The Black Rider).
8. The German-language edition is: J. W. Stalin, Werke (Works),
Red Morning Press (Dortmund, 1976). The specific reference is: vol.
8. p. 12ff.
9. This analysis by Wang Yunqiao appeared in the Beijing periodical
Lishi yanjiu (Historical Research).

10. He Long (1896-1969) was one of the founders of the People's
Liberation Army. After 1949 he served as vice-premier of the People's
Republic of China and a leading sports official. I found this anecdote
in the Chinese Youth Journal.
11. This short-short story is translated from the Chinese Youth jour-
nal. The tale was written by Bai Xiaoyi and won first prize out of
30,000 entries in a 1985 all-China contest for short-shorts written by
young people.
12. Ching, trans. [German] Richard Wilhelm, [English] Cary F.
I
Baynes, Princeton University Press, 3rd edition, Bollingen Series XIX

(Princeton, N.J., 1967), p. 25.
STRATAGEM 17
1. This anecdote has been repeated in hundreds of books since the

Song era. Yet it cannot be correct. Chang Jian lived during the first
Zhao Gu in the first half of the ninth. Could
half of the eighth century,
Lingyansi
an incomplete four-line poem painted on the wall of the
Temple have evoked the two missing verses from Zhao Gu a century
that were true, the story as it is traditionally

later? Perhaps. But even if
toldwould still be inaccurate.

B.C.) in the
2. This episode was recounted by Liu Xiang (77-6
(Garden of Anecdotes).
chapter on stratagems in his book Shuo yuan
1550-1627),
3. This "ode" was composed by Zhao Nanxing (a.d.
a political and literary figure who rose in the Ming government to
He tried with little success to

become Director of the Secretariat.
382- Notes
combat corruption among the palace eunuchs under Wei Zhongxian.

The "Ode to a Fart" is found in his book Xiao zan (In Praise of
Laughter), in which he satirizes many abuses of the time.
4. "The Art of Controversy," in The Complete Essays of Schopen-
hauer, op. cit., p. 39.
5. Retranslated from the German by Myron B. Gubitz. The German
rendition of the French original, which appears in the original edition
of Stratagems, is by Hanno Helbling.
6. This incident was originally drawn from the book Stratagems of
the Warring States, dating from around 200 B.C. That entertaining
work uses anecdotes, political speeches, and aphorisms to depict in a
most delightful way the political intrigues of the two centuries pre-
ceding the unification of the kingdoms under Qin. The elaborated
version recounted here was taken from a modern stratagem book
published in Taipei.
7. Sanshiliu ji yin li, op. cit., p. 246.
8. The New English Bible with Apocrypha, op. cit., Matthew
4:8-11.
9. This tale is taken from the chapter "Falsehood and Trickery" in
Shi shuo xin yu (New Tales of the World), ascribed to Liu Yiqing
(a.d. 403-44).
10. Although its history goes back to the seventh century B.C., the
Great Wall of China was built largely in response to these attacks by
the "barbarians from the north."
11. These lines have been retranslated from the German rendition.
12. I discovered this story in a popular edition of the Guoyu (Con-
versations of the States), published in China in 1985, a collection of
reports and anecdotes purportedly dating from the tenth to fifth cen-
turies B.C. To the Chinese, the Guoyu is the oldest historical work
divided according to individual Chinese principalities; to a Western
sinologist, however, the boundary between serious history and literary
invention in this work seems rather blurred. The 1985 edition from
which I drew this account contains a selection of passages from the
originalwork, which is still regarded in Mainland China as instructive
and stimulating.
13. This parable is found in the Huainanzi, a collection of enigmatic
textsdrawn from Daoist and Confucian sources and from the ancient
Chinese School of Legalism. The work was written by learned men
whom Liu An, Prince of Huainan (179-122 B.C.), gathered around
him at the end of the second century B.C. The parable is reminiscent
of the aphorism in Laozi's Daodejing: "Fortune rests on misfortune,
misfortune is hidden in fortune."
I found this episode recounted in Stories About Idioms [Beijing:
8
Notes -383
Chinese Youth Press, 1982]. That book explains the significance of

"The saying 'Wasn't it fortunate that the Old Man
the tale as follows:
of the Border's horse ran away?' indicates that something bad can
turn into something good, or a temporary loss into a later gain."
14. In September 1987, while in Tokyo, I learned that Mitsubishi's
use of this stratagem had not worked so far.
STRATAGEM 18
1. Retranslated from the author's German rendition.

2. The historical background to the poem is given in Cao Mufan's
work Du shi zashuo (Observations on Du Fu's Poems) (Chengdu,
1981).
3. Wolfram Eberhard, Geschichte Chinas (History of China), op.
cit., p. 318f; Jacques Gernet, Die chinesische Welt (The Chinese
World), (Frankfurt a.M.: Insel Verlag, 1983), p. 341.
4. This recounting of an event which took place more than twenty-
four hundred years ago is drawn from Sima Qian's Records of the
Historian — to be precise, from
supplement to that work, written by
a
Chu Shaosun The story is known to almost
in the first century B.C.
every schoolchild in China. (Today the figure of Ximen Bao lives on
in the People's Republic mainly in comic strips.) I found the tale in
vol. 4 of the official series of school textbooks for Chinese language
instruction in Taiwan's junior middle schools. It is also cited as a fine
example of No. 18 in Hong Kong and Taipei books on the stratagems.
5. That this in fact constitutes an application of Stratagem No. 18
is pointed out by Jiang Guowei and Jiang Yongkang, authors of a
book on the stratagems published in Guizhou, 1983.

6. This interpretation was taken from the article "Lob der Gegen-
wart" (In Praise of the Present) by Ernst Leisi, which appeared in the
Swiss newspaper Neue Zurcher Zeitung, Aug. 29-30, 1987, p. 66.
7. These lines translated from the German by Myron B. Gubitz.
8. Retranslated from the author's German rendition.
9. This incident was taken from the chapter on Stratagem No. 1
in: Zhuang Zedong and Niu Chen, Chuang yu jian (Battle and Sword)
(Beijing, 1985), p. 141. Author Zhuang Zedong himself won the table
tennis championships several times and also played some part in the
1971 "Ping-Pong diplomacy" between the USA and China during the
Nixon administration.
10. Sanshiliu ji xin bian, op. cit., 1st edition, p. 56.
11. See my book Partei, Ideologie und Gesetz der Volksrepublik

in
China (Party, Ideology, and Law in the People's Republic of China),

—
384* Notes
Verlag Peter Lang (Berne, 1982), andmy essay "Recent Developments

in the Relationsbetween State and Party Norms in the People's Re-
public of China" in The Scope of State Power in China, op. cit.
12. This is the official definition of the "main contradiction" as laid
down by Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress of the
the Third
Chinese Communist Party in December 1978. The definition was not
changed even after the June 1989 violence at Tiananmen Square, and
it continues to dominate all official activities of the Party and govern-
ment of the People's Republic. American (and many other Western)

China experts, however, tend to ignore the Sino-Marxist theory of
contradictions and the pervasive influence of the "main contradiction"
in all aspects of China's official politics, internal and external.
[Some observers, however, see today's "main contradiction" as that
between the need for social and political change on the one hand, and
an aging, conservative leadership's determination to cling to power
on the other. ed.]
13. Despite the violent suppression of the democracy movement in
China and the subsequent clampdown on open dissent, the oppor-
tunities for Chinese university students to study abroad have continued
more or less as before. This is because the official definition of the
"main contradiction" has not changed. Chinese students continue to
be sent abroad mainly to absorb the West's advanced technology,
management methods, and social engineering techniques. During the
Deng period of socialist modernization (1978-90), the number of
Chinese students abroad to study the humanities and
officially sent
social sciences never exceeded 5 to 10 percent of all the Chinese stu-

dents sent abroad.
14. Makesizhuyi zhexue yuanli, op. cit., p. 162.
Jndex
NOTE: Chinese names are generally alphabetized under the

Pinyin system. Exceptions occur for famous persons familiar to
Westerners, which are in the Wade-Giles form. Titles of Chinese
works are found under their English translation.
Afghanistan, 40, 132-33, 145, Bai Juyi, 137, 138

230, 344 Bai Zhengshi, 15
Ahuinan, 259, 261, 264 Balder (Norse god), 45
Ai, city of, 247 Bao, Prince of Wei, 79, 80
Ai, King of, 247 Ba Sanfu, 242-45
Albrecht, Duke of the Haps- Bathsheba, 43-44
burgs, 89-90 Beijing, Treaty of (1861), 72
Ammon, 43-44 Beijing Daily, 71
An, Father, 280-81 Bi Ai, 317

Anji, 119, 120,280-81 Bian Zhuangzi, 130-31
An Lushan, 88, 342 Bible:
Archive of the Political Institute Genesis, 72-73

of the People's Liberation Joshua, Book of, 80-81,247
Army, 8 Matthew, 310-11
"Art of Controversy, The," Samuel, Second Book of, 43-
302-3 44
Art of War, The (Sun Tzu), 6, Blossom in a Sea of Sin (Zeng
37, 61, 69, 77, 115-16, Pu), 345

143, 195 Blue Fairy Book, 48
385
386 Index
Book of Changes (J Ching), 4, Chen Yi, 344

8, 121, 251, 275, 293, ChenZhen, 130-31, 163, 164
335-36 Chess, Chinese, 168, 179
Book of Songs, 329 Chiang Kai-shek, 39, 82, 128,
Britain: 132, 154-56, 273, 349
Suez crisis of 1956 and, 196 Soviet recognition of regime
unequal treaty with China, 72 of, 310
before World War II, 131, Children's Epoch, 153
132 Chinese Communist Party, 196-
Brutus, Lucius Junius, 142 197, 349
Buddha, 117-18, 199 Chinese Communists, 154-55,
Buddhism, 188, 298, 311-12 242-45
Bulgarian basketball team, 326 Chinese Red Army, 82, 128,
177, 246, 250, 273-74,
Cai, Lady, 300-2 310,313-14
Calais, France, 115 Chinese Youth Journal, 129,
Cambodia, 31, 39, 82 304
Cao, 38 Chizhang Manzhi, 320
Cao Cao, 56, 57, 126, 127-28, Chou En-lai, 121, 155
204-7,231,241,255-56, Chouyou, kingdom of, 319-20
259,287,291,311 Christmas, 227-28
Cao Pi, 266 Chu (state), 38, 71, 78-79,
Cao Xueqin, 54 162-64,220-21,312-13
Cao Zhengwen, 299 Chu, King of, 93, 163, 164,
Cao Zhi, 206 213-14,313
Carthaginian army, 90 Churchill, Winston, 53, 309
Cartoons, stratagems in, 7, 32 Chu Zhang, 327
Cassia Blossom, 95-101 Civil War in China (1945-49),
Chain of stratagems, 258 128, 177, 246, 250, 273,
Chamberlain, Neville, 138 343-44,349,351
Changchun, 128 "Cock Crows, The," 149-50
Chang Jian, 298 Collected Works (Lenin), 139
Chencang, 113, 175 Collection of Attracted Jades
Chen Dynasty, 29 (Lu Xun), 200
Cheng Ying, 161 Collection of the Art of War
Chen Ping, 248 Based on the 36 Strata-
Chen Sheng, 220, 221 gems, A, 7
Chen Xiaochuan, 108 Collection of Yuefu Poems, 149
Index '
387
Comintern, 154 Donghu (state), 321-23

Communist Chinese, see Chinese Dongtuna, 259, 261-64
Communists; Chinese Com- Dream of the Red Chamber
munist Party; Chinese Red (Cao Xueqin), 54
Army Duan, 236-39
Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Du Fu, 333-35
Government (Sima Guang), Duosi, King, 267, 268
138, 230 Diirrenmatt, Friedrich, 55
Confucianism, 12, 170, 229, Du You, 77
277, 278
Confucius, 51, 143, 162, 222, Eastern Rurks, 323-25
225 Eberhard, Wolfram, 222,
Congshen, 298-99 338
Core of the Art of War, The, 58 Egypt, 64-65, 196
Cui Xiyi, 334 E Huan, 256-57, 258 .
Cui Zhouping, 289, 290 Emerald Peach Blossom, 219

Cultural Revolution, 102, 103, Encyclopedia of the Yongle
106, 336, 337 Reign, 16
Czech basketball team, 326 Engels, Friedrich, 251
E Qiuzhan, 156-57, 159
Dan Fu, 288-89 Esau, 72—73
Daodejing (Laozi), 87-88, 318- Esen Khan, 338
319, 320 "Euphrosyne," 345-46
Dark Shadows over the Villa of Evil intent, stratagems used
Autumn Fragrance (Cao with, 44

Zhengwen), 299 Exposing the World of Official-
Daughter's Letter, The, 74 dom (Li Boyuan), 189
David, 43-44
Deng Ai, 114 Fa, 5
Deng Xiaoping, 30, 39, 101-2, Fabius, 90
274, 337 Fables (La Fontaine), 306
Deshan, 188 Fan Li, 141
Devaraja, King of Heaven, 70 Fan Wenlan, 166

Di Qing, 151-53 FanZeng, 112,220,248-49
Di Su, 151, 153 Feng Menglong, 129
Dneiper, Battle of the (1943), Feng Zhi, 333
167 Forest in the Snow, The (Qu
Dong Cheng, 178 Bo), 177-78, 245-47

1
388 Index
France: Great Atlas of World War II,
German invasion in World The, 115

War II, 32 Great Bird of the Three-
Suez crisis of 1956 and, 196 Thousand Mile Cloud
unequal treaty with China, 72 Path, 249-50
before World War II, 131, Great Proclamation of the De-
132 feat of the Ngo (Nguyen
Fuchai, 141 Trai), 92
Great Stratagem (monk), 70
Guangming Daily, 74, 169-70,
Gang of Four, 30, 101, 102, 181, 197, 228-29, 299
138, 181, 228-29, 336 Guan Hanqing, 173
Gao Ding, 256, 257-58, 259 Guan Yu, 144-45
Gao Heng, 319 Guan Zhong, 235
Gaozong, Emperor, 137 Guan Zhuzi, 130
Gaozu, see Liu Bang Guo Jia, 127
Genesis, 72-73 Guomindang, 102, 103, 132,
Germany: 154, 156, 224, 273-74,
before World War II, 131, 313-14
132 war in China,
civil 128, 177,
in World War II, 32, 53, 91, 246, 250, 273, 343-44,
167, 177 349, 351
Geshu Han, 334 Stalin's recognition of, 310
Giles, Lionel, 6 Gu Yezi, 46-47
Go, 168, 179 Gu Zhangsi, 182
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von,
345-46 Haigong, 118
Golden Bough, The (Frazer), 45 Han (state), 62, 71, 78-80,
Golden Lotus, 117 112, 130, 131, 140, 162-
Golden Phoenix, 119-20 164, 320
Gong, King of Chu, 300-1 Handan, 35, 36
Gongsun Chujiu, 161—62 Han Dynasty, 24, 112, 194,
Gongsun Jie, 46, 47 239, 248
Gongsun Kang, 127 establishment of, 113, 175
Gongzhong, 162—63 Han Fei, 139, 235, 319
Gongzi Lii, 237-39 Han Fm/ (Han Fei), 319,320
Goujian, King of Yuc, 141-42 Hannibal, 90
Gozeridse, Captain, 90-91 1 lao, fiefdom of, 32
Index •389
Han Shizhong, 106 Hu Hai, 220

Han Weigong, 217-19 Hui, Emperor (Jianwen Em-
HanXin, 79-80, 116 peror), 180
Hare, The, 209-12 Hui, King of Qin, 130
Hastings, Battle of (1066), 247- Hui, King of Wei, 175
248 "Hundred flowers" campaign,
Heaven Can Be Measured, 137 196-97
He Long, 283-84 Hu Yan, 38
He Ruobi, 29
Hijackings of aircraft, 39-40 IChing,4, 8, 121,251,275,
History of the Han Dynasty, 293, 335-36
188 "Into the Borderlands," 334
History of the Ming Dynasty, Iran, 40, 129
180 Iraq, 129, 275-76
History of the Song Dynasty, Iron Luohan, 151-53 •
106 Iron Stream, The (Serafimo-

History of the Southern Dynas- vitch), 300
ties, 3-4 Israel and Israelites, 32, 64-65,
Hongmen Philosophy, 8 80-81, 247
Hongmen Secret Society, 7-8, 9 Italy, 131
Hong Yazi, 242-45
Hong Zicheng, 12 Jacob and Esau, 72-73
Ho Tal-su, 73-74 Japan, 132, 316, 327-29, 347-
Hother, 45 348
Hu, 317, 318 Soviet Union's declaration of
Hu (state), 140 war on, 309, 310

Hu, King of, 256 at war with China, 131, 132,
Hua Guofeng, 30 154, 155, 242-45, 250,
Huai, King of Chu, 111,220, 349

221 Jericho, 80-81
Huainanzi, 77-78 Jesus, 310-11
Huan, Duke, 50-51,321 Jia Lian, 54
Huang, Prefect, 317-18 Jiang (state), 38
Huang Chengyan, 21, 22, 23, Jiang, Lady, 191
26 Jiang Qing (widow of Mao),
Huangpu, Treaty of, 72 103, 228-29, 336

see also Gang of Four
Huang Zhengying, 21-28
Huang Zu, 56, 51 Jiang Taigong, 24
3 9o Index
Jiang Wei, 114,226 Lady White Bone, 199-200

Jiang Yi, 300-1 Lady You, 54-55
Jiang Ziya, 303-4 Lagrene, Marie Melchior Joseph
Jian Shu, 193 Theodore de, 72
Jianwen, Emperor, 179, 180 Lam Son, 92
Jiao, 372-73 Lan Hongyan, 243-44
Ji Chang, Prince, 303-4 Lao-tze, see Laozi
Jin, 38, 51 Laozi, 87-88, 133, 142, 318-

Jingde, 18-19 319
Jin Dynasty, 104, 105 Last Emperor, The, 221
Jing, Duke of Jin, 160, 161 Le Dynasty, 154
Jing, Duke of Qi, 46, 47, 278- Le-Lai, 154
280 Le-Loi, 92, 154
Jing, Emperor, 81 Lenin, V. I., 139, 169-70

Jing Jian, 277 Li (butcher), 218, 219
Jing She, 175, 176 Liang Ren, 275
Jing Yang, 78-79 Liang Xiao, 229
Ji Yun, 275 Lian Po, 52
Jizi, 150, 151 Liaodong, 127
Joab, 43, 44 Liao Hua, 114
John's Food Company, Inc., 327 Liberation Daily, 182-83, 326-
Joshua, 80-81,247 327
Joshua, Book of, 80-81,247 Li Bingyan, 348
Journey to the West (Wu Li Boyuan, 189
Cheng'en), 69, 173-74, Li Chunke, 345
203, 249 Li Linfu, 138
Judge and His Hangman, The Lin Biao, 101, 103, 282
(Diirrenmatt), 55-56 Ling, Duke of Jin, 160
Jurchen, 104, 105 Ling Huchao, 88-89

Li Shidao, 343
Li Shimin,323-24
Kameno, 242, 243, 244-45 Li Su, 342-43
Karmal, Babrak, 230 Liu An, Prince, 77
Khrushchev, Nikita, 139 Liu Bang, 79, 111-13, 175,
Koguryo, 15, 16-17 229,248, 315-16
Kong Kong, 28 Liu Bei, 23, 24, 125, 126, 194,
Korean War, 89, 195-96 204,230-31, 255,259,
Kuai, 50-51, 321 286-93
Index 39i
Liu Biao, 56, 287 Master You, 311-12

Liu Bocheng, 39, 274 Ma Su, 259, 264
Liu Jiexiu, 133 Matthew, Gospel according to,
315-16
Liu Jing, Prince, 310-11
Liu Xun, 240-41 Ma Xishan, 246
Liu Ye, 241 Mei Wen, 230
Liu Zhang, 231 Mencius, 284-85
Li Yifu, 137-38 Meng Gongwei, 25, 26, 27
Li Zongwu, 297 Menghou, King, 256, 259-72
Loki, 45 Meng Mingshi, 193
Lu, 51 Mengyou, 264, 266, 267, 268
Lucretia, 142 Midway Islands, 316
Lu Dongbin, 218, 219 Mi Heng, 56-57
Lu Dongbin Instructs Li Yue of Military Phraseology, 37
the Iron Crutch, 217 Military theory, stratagems as,
Lu Hou, 229 6, 10-11
Lu Meng, 144-45 Ming Dynasty, 8, 179
Luo Guanzhong, 36 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,
Luo Siding, 120, 121 327-28
Lu Su, 204, 205 Mithras, cult of, 228
Lu Xun, 129, 144, 299-300 Mo Du, King of the Xiongnu,
Lu Yuanchi, 319 315-16, 322-23
Monkey King (Sun Wukong),
McFarlane, Robert, 276 69-71, 174, 197-200,

Ma Dai, 262, 264, 265 201-3, 249-50
Manchu Dynasty, 221 Moscow, Soviet Union, 177
Mang Mao, 306, 308 Mountain Demon, 71

Mao Da, 158-59, 160 Mu, Duke of Qin, 193
Mao Zedong, 38, 63-64, 101, Mu, King of Chu, 214
131-32, 138-39, 224-25, Mulu, King, 268
229, 273-74, 282, 299,
313, 348-49 Najibullah (Afghani leader), 230
death 336
of, Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 227-28,
Marquis Zhi, 319-21 327-28
Ma Senliang, 53 New Democracy, 299
Master Guan, 225 New History of the Tang, 138
Master Water-Mirror, see Sima Newsweek, 275-76

Hui Nguyen Trai, 92
392- Index
Nib on Keizai, 328 Polish underground army in
Normandy, Allied landing at, Warsaw, 53

114-15 Precious Image Kingdom, 201
Notes on Handing on the Lamp, Third Princess of the, 201
187-88 Pu Songling, 156
Pu Yi, 221
"Ode to a Fart," 302
"Ode to the Pavilion of the Qi (state), 35,36,51, 62, 71,
Bronze Sparrow," 206, 207 78-79, 143, 175, 176,
Oirats, 338 278-79
Old History of the Tang, 138, Qi, Prince of, 164
324 Qiankang, 133
Old Man of the Border, 325-26 Qiao family, 206, 207
Old Script School, 222 "Qi Holds Back," 71
On Questions of Leninism, 282 Qin (state), 51, 52, 71, 162-64,
"On the Reform of the System 175, 220, 306-9
of Party and State Leader- Qin, King, 162, 164
ship," 337 Qing Dynasty, 7, 11, 222
Opium Wars, 72 Qin Kui, 105, 106
Qin Ming, 83-84
Pan Chong, 213-40 Qu Bo, 177, 245
Pang Cong, 107 Qui Tong, 54-55
Pang Juan, 62, 63, 175, 176 Qu Xia, 313
Pan Qiaoyun, 118
Party Life, 181 Rafsanjani, Ali-Akbar Hahsemi,
Patton, General George, 115 275-76
Peigong, see Liu Bang Readily Comprehensible Inter-
Peony Pavilion, 219 pretation of the Lao-tze
People's Daily, 31, 32, 82, 102, Text (Lu Yuanchi), 319
103-4, 121, 180-81, 182, Reagan, Ronald, 275, 276
223, 336 Records of the Historian (Sima
People's Liberation Army, see Qian), 35, 130, 193
Chinese Red Army Ren Zhang, 320
Phoenix, 73-74 Rischke, Anne-Susanne, 227-28
Ping-Pong, 84, 208-9, 347-48 Romance of the Three King-
Plum in the Golden Vase, The, doms, The (Luo Guan-
117 zhong), 7,36, 125, \lh,
Polish Communist Party, 53 144,207,255, 291
Index 393
Romans, 90, 142 Shu Han, 39-40, 142, 335

Rommel, Field Marshal Erwin, Shu He, 8
90 Shun, 284-85
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 53, 309 Shuo, 150
Russia, see Soviet Union "Siege of Silistria, The," 251
Sima Guang, 138, 230
Samuel, Second Book of, 43-44 Sima Hui, 287-88, 289
Sanggamryong Mountain, Battle Sima Qian, 35, 36, 130, 193
of (1952), 89 Sima Xi, 191-92
Satan, 310-11 Sima Yi, ix-xi, 194-95, 225-
School of Legalism, 5-6 227
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 213, Sima Zhao, x
302-3 "Snowy Night March," 344
Secret Book of the 36 Strata- Song, 38
gems, with Explanations Song Xiang, 57
(Shu Han), 9, 16, 39, 142, Southern Daily (Canton), 169
183,212,231 Southern Qi Dynasty, 3
Selection of Philosophical Para- Southern Tang Dynasty, 187
bles and Tales from Ancient Soviet Union:
China, A, 37 in Afghanistan, 40, 132-33,

Serafimovitch, Alexander S., 300 145, 230, 344
Shangchen, Prince, 213-14 Chinese view of, 31, 32
Shang Dynasty, 303, 304 disinformation about China,
Shang Yang, 277-78 103-4

Shao Jianbo, 177-78, 246-47 fishing rights extended to Ja-
Sha the Sand Monk, 69, 197, pan by, 328-29
198, 199, 200, 201, 249- Iran-Iraq war and, 129
250 nonagression pact with Ger-
Shi, 5 many, 132

Shi Bo, 321 treaties with China, 72
Shi Qiao, 181 U.S. grain embargo, 40
Shi Siming, 342 in World War II, 53, 90-91,
Shi Yushan, 159-60 167, 177
Shou, 150, 151 Yalta and, 309-10

Shu, 5 Stalin, Joseph, 52, 53, 139,282
Shu (state), 194-95, 225-27, agreement with Chiang Kai-
231, 255-57, 259, 266, shek, 310

272 at Yalta, 309-10
394 *
Index
Strange Stories from the Leisure Marches Secretly to Chen-

Studio (Pu Songling), 156 cang, 113
Stratagems: Su Shi, 142
chain of, 258 Suzhou, 298
in Chinese literature, 7-9
Confucianism and, 12 Table tennis, 84, 208-9, 347-
defined, 1-3, 5 348
goals of, 5 Tai Shici, 28-29
history of, 3, 7-9 Taizong, Emperor, 15, 17-20,
as idiomatic expressions, 6 166
interpretation of, 7, 10-12 Taking Tiger Mountain by Strat-
in military theory, 6, 10-11 egy, 177

Strategic Problems of the Parti- Tale of the Gallant Maiden, The
san War Against the Japa- (Wenkang), 119-20,280
nese Aggression (Mao Tale of the Soul's Return, 219
Zedong), 38 Tales from the Tang Period (Wu
Strategic Problems of the Revo- Gu), 16
lutionary War in China Tan Daoji, 3-4
(Mao Zedong), 63 Tang Dynasty, 323
Suez Canal, 196 Tang Xianzu, 219
Sui Dynasty, 29, 323 Tao-te-ching, see Daodejing
Sujie, 157-58, 159 Tarquinius Superbus, 142
Sun Bin, 35-36, 62-63, 164 Thirteenth Sister, 119-20, 280
Sun Bins Art of War (Sun Bin), 36 Stratagems, see Stratagems
36 36 Stratagems, The (comic-strip
Suh Ce, 239-42 series) (1981), 7
Sun Hua, 94-95 36 Stratagems, The (Jilin
Sun Quan, 126, 144, 230-31, People's Press), 9, 10,
266, 291 11, 16, 65, 127,274-75,

Sun Rong, 94-95 342
Sun Wukong (the Monkey "36 Stratagems, The" (Xinghau
King), 69-71, 174, 197- Press), 8
203, 249-50 36 Stratagems: A Modern Ver-

Sun Yat-sen, Dr., 224 sion, The, 9, 10, 32, 39, 52,
Sun T/.u, 6, 37,40, 61, 69, 77, 78, 89, 114, 121, 12S, 133,
I 15-16, 143, 195,274 144, 145, 167, 174, 176-
Sun/i, see Sun Tzu 177, 193, 195, 196, 221,
Supreme Commander Han 230, 232, 292
Index •
3 95
36 Stratagems: Secret Book of Uriah the Hittite, 43-44

the Art of War, The, 16, 32 USSR, see Soviet Union
36 Stratagems, with Examples,
The, 179, 180, 224 Vietnam, 31, 39, 82, 92, 117,
36 Stratagems, with Examples 145, 154, 223
from Times Fast and Pres- View of Japan (Wu Xuewen),
ent, The, 9, 93, 108, 142, 328
150, 156, 183, 196, 292
Three Principles of the People, Wang, Mrs., 156-57, 158,
224 159-60
Tian Dan, 143 Wang family, 95-101
Tian Ji, 35, 36, 52, 164-65 Wang Hongwen, 336
Tian Kaijiang, 46, 47 see also Gang of Four
Tian Qianqiu, 121 Wang Jingze, 3, 4
Tian Rong, 174-75 Wang Jixin, 168
Tibet, Tufan Empire in, 334 Wang Lu, 187
Tien Chensi, 71 Wang Mai, 346-47
Timely Facts from the Southern Wang Mang, Emperor, 222
Tang Dynasty (Zheng Wen- Wang Xifeng, 54-55
bao), 187 Wang Zhen, 337-38
Tricks in Combat: The 36 Strat- Wang Zhihua, 304-5
agems, 11 Wan Zhang, 285
Tripitaka, 69-71, 174, 197- Warring states period, see indi-
201, 249-50 vidual states
Tu'an Gu, 160-61 Warsaw, Poland, 53

Tufan Empire, Tibet, 334 Water Margin, 83-84, 117,
Tukhachevski, Marshal, 52 118, 173
Tuli, 323 Wei (state), 35-36, 38, 62-63,
Turks, Eastern, 323-25 71, 78, 79-80, 107, 130,
131, 144, 145, 175-76,
United States: 194-95, 225-27, 255-56,

Chinese view of, 31 266, 292, 306-9, 320
grain embargo against Soviet Wei, King of, 306, 308, 309
Union, 40 Wei Yan, 195, 256, 270, 271

Iran relationship, 275-76 Wenhui bao, 275
in Korean War, 89 Wenkang, 119,280-81
unequal treaty with China, 72 Wenming, 189-90
before World War II, 132 Wen Zhong, 141
396 •
Index
Western Zhou Dynasty, 321 Ximen Bao, 339-41

Who's Who of Chinese Direc- Xin, 220-21
tors and Managers, 304-5 Xiongnu, 314-15, 322
William the Conqueror, 247 Xuan, Duke of Wei, 150
Wisdom in Struggle, 9 Xuan, Prince of Wei, 320
World Knowledge, 230 Xuanhui, King of Han, 162-64
World War II, 32, 53, 90-91, Xuan Jiang, 150
114, 167, 177,309-10, Xuanzong, Emperor, 334
316 Xue Rengui, 16, 17
Wu (state), 51, 141-42, 144, Xu Maogong, 18, 19, 20
145, 194, 204, 242, 266 Xunzi, 108
Wu, Duke of Zheng, 139-40,
236 Yalta Conference (1945), 309-
Wu, Emperor of the Han, 222 310
Wu, King of Zhou, 303 Yama, the Prince of Hell, 218,
Wu Cheng'en, 69, 173-74 302
Wu Gu, 16 Yan (state), 71, 78, 143
Wu Guang, 220, 221 Yan, Prince of, 179
Wu Shaocheng, 342 Yang, 173
Wu Shaoyang, 342 yin and, 4, 5, 8-9
Wusheng Duke Zhuang of
(later Yangfeng, 268
236-39
Zheng), Yang Hucheng, 155, 156
Wutugu, King of Wuge, 269-71 Yang Yi, 226, 227
Wu wei, 5 Yanzhi, 156-60, 278-80
Wu Yuanji, 342, 343 "Yanzhi," 156-60
Wu Zetian, Empress, 229 Yanzi, 46, 48
Yao, 284
Xian, Emperor, 178 Yao Wenyuan, 336
Xiang, 284-85 see also Gang of Four
Xiang Liang, 220-21 Yellow Robe Fiend, 200-1,

Xiang Yu, 111-13, 174-75, 202, 203
220-21, 248-49 Yellow Turbans, 80
Xiang Zhuang, 112 Yijing, seeChing
I
Xianzong, Emperor, 342 Yin, Lady, 191-92

Xiao, Duke of Qin, 277-78 Yin and yang, 4, 5, 8-9
Xiao Yu, 324 Yingzhong, Emperor, 338
Xiao Zixian, 3 Yin Wcnggui, 188
Xicli, Khan, 323-25 Yin Ziqi, 341-42
Index *
397
Yizuomao, 177-78 Zhao family, 160-61

Yom Kippur War, 32, 64-65 Zhao Gu, 298
Yong Kai, 256, 257, 258, 259 Zhao Kuo, 52
Yongle Emperor, 179-80 Zhao Xixo, 175
Yongxin, 82 Zhao Zhongsen, 180-81
Yuan, 80 Zheng (state), 140, 193
Yuan Shang, 127-28 Zheng He, 179-80
Yuan Shao, 127 Zheng Wenbao, 187
Yuan Xi, 127-28 Zhi, 213, 214
Yue (state), 141 Zhixian, 311-12
Yue Bochuan, 217 Zhongshan, King of, 191, 192
Yue Fei, 104-6 Zhou clan, 303, 304
Yue Shou, 217-19 Zhou Dynasty, 24
Yue Yin, 105, 106 Zhou Enlai, see Chou En-lai
Yunnan Province, 102-3 Zhou Yafu, 81
Zhou Yu, 126, 204-7,
Zeng Pu, 345 240
Zeng Zesheng, 128 Zhuang, Duke of Zheng, 236-
Zhai Zhong, 236, 238 239
Zhang Chunqiao, 336 Zhuang Xiaoyan, 345
see also Gang of Four Zhuang Zedong, 208-9
Zhang Dan, 112, 113 Zhuang Zhiyan, 345
Zhang Fei, 288, 289 Zhu Bajie, the pig, 69, 199,
Zhang He, 194-95 200, 201-3, 249-50

Zhang Huan, 18, 19 Zhu Bao, 256, 258, 259
Zhang Jian, 132-33 Zhu De, 82
Zhang Jingshan, 346 Zhuge Liang, ix-xi, 20-28,
Zhang Laiping, 53 125, 126, 194-95, 204-7,
Zhang Xian, 105, 106 225-27,231,256-72,

Zhang Xielin, 348 286-93
Zhang Xueliang, 154-56 Zhu Jun, 80
Zhang Xun, 88-89, 341-42 Zhu Kechuan, 74
Zhang Yi, 92-94, 162 Zichan, 285
Zhao (state), 35-36, 51, 52, 71, Zigong, 51
107, 175-76, 306-9, 320 Zuo Commentary, 38, 150, 213,
Zhao, King of, 175, 191-92, 255

307-9 Zuo Shandiao, 177-78
Zhao Benxue, 8 Zurich, city of, 89-90

(Continue
with more than two hundred

examples culled from
history, legend, and military
lore— from both East-
ern and Western sources. For
Westerners, The
Book of Stratagems will not only provide a key to
much of Chinese thinking but will open the readers
eyes to the stratagems often hidden
behind seem-
ingly harmless phenomena in
everyday life. Dra-
matically vivid, exhilarating very simplicity,
in their
these venerable principles have powerful implica-

tions for anyone concerned with surviving— and
triumphing— in todays world.
Harro von Senger holds degrees

history, and sin^' >ujdied in
Taipei, u nu oeijing,.and he has since spe-

cialized in Chinese language, literature, law, poli-
tics, and history. He is professor of sinology at the

University of Freiburg im Breisgau (Germany) and
expert for Chinese law at the Swiss Institute of

!
Comparative <;sanne, Switzerland. Some

of his 1
e oeen translated into French,
Italian inese, and Russian.
MvRor Subitz is executive editor of the monthly

Swiss Review of World Affairs. As a writer, trans-
lator, and editor he has specialized in such

diverse fields as aerospace, Jungian psychology,
and Jewish culture. He was the founder and

editor of the monthly Switzerland Today and, more
recently, of the semiannual ORIM: A Jewish
Journal at Yale.
Jacket design by Michael Ian Kaye

Chinese calligraphy by Ying Kit Chan is the character zhi,
which signifies "stratagem" or "wisdom."
#*!R\
VIKING PENCl IN
a division of Penguin Books USA Inc.
375 Hudson St r<» NY. 10014
VDONG Printed in U.S.A.
ik,
out only when
jt also by politicians, bui
the application of stratagei
irder to a chaotic world; h<
in transform poverty in1
hopeless situation into a promisii

struggle one needs stratagems. Everyoi
moment of inattention, and somec

'ho understands stratagems will a lw<
—from the Introduction
ISBN 0-670-83962-0
90000>
9 780670 M 839629

The Book of Stratagems Tactics For Triumph and Survival

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H A R R VON SENEiEF!

EDITED AND TRANSL

With The Book of Stratagems Swiss

First systematically catalogued at the end

Drawing on years of research in the Far

ALLEN COUNTY PUBLIC LIBRARY

FORT WAYNE, INDIANA 46802

You may return this book to any agency, branch,

HARRO VON SENG.ER

Penguin Books Ltd, Registered Offices:

First published in 1991 by Viking Penguin,

Wen County ftMfclilr*|

Translation copyright © Viking Penguin,

Originally published in Switzerland

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING IN PUBLICATION DATA

Printed in the United States of America

Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above,

In a project such as this, there are always a few people who

A Prologue in Two Tales ix

Fool the Emperor and Cross the Sea 13

Openly Repair the Walkway, Secretly March

Let the Plum Tree Wither in Place of the Peach 147

THE OPEN CITY GATES

Accompanied by 5,000 troops, Prime Minister Zhuge Liang of

Sima Yi's army approaches, no one is to take any independent

trap. If my troops had entered the city, they would certainly

was most appropriate move."

Zhuge Liang answered, "He based his thinking on the fact

moves. When he saw this scene, he assumed that our troops

stratagems of our Prime Minister would fool even the spirits of

A three-foot zither, inlaid with jade, overcame the elite

SURVEYING THE LAND AND WINNING A CONCUBINE

"What you doing here?" she inquired.

Stratagems are used everywhere, by people in all walks of life.

But Western civilization has never produced anything remotely

1. a. An operation or act of generalship; usually an artifice

or trick designed to outwit or surprise the enemy.

The Chinese language, in which individual written characters

— modern Mandarin pronunciation zhao

=Jr — modern Mandarin pronunciation ji

=~ — pronounced ydn in Mandarin, with the meaning of "to

~| — pronounced shi, and standing for "ten."

Taken together, the two parts mean "count to ten," or in a

1. a tactic or ruse of war;

There isone more written character worthy of special men-

jacket and title page of this volume. It is pronounced zhi. In

manner in which wisdom and cunning are integrated in Chinese.

As commander of the [Song] expeditionary force, Tan

they feared an ambush, did not dare approach [the Song

The Book of Stratagems

encampment], and withdrew. Although Tan Daoji had not

This report makes it clear that Tan Daoji succeeded'in saving

trente-six is sometimes used in French colloquial speech to mean

dinarily require that the Chinese title of the Book of Changes

ing to the oldest commentary on the J Ching, which dates from

the principle of yin is represented numerically by 6. Thus 36

sense — ranges from a simple trick or a spontaneous action based

• a situation is perceived as precarious, but it precludes direct

Among the chief general goals of stratagems are: masking

As has already been noted, the stratagems are permeated with

of state," the priority of state interests over Confucian ethical

The Chinese word ji, which I translate in this work as "strat-

good at martial arts overcomes others' forces without battle,