r ;' ..

• a Kn7.o413-225

DHLASSIFIED B~ U/HOH
lAW £.0. 13526
DAH~ 2D10tZO"

PROJECT APPROVED
PIBLIC RELEASE
FOR

CBECO •
a&;···wt•.:·· .. -r· ..,..... "* ·r+M
I

SOUTHEAST ASIA
REPORT
THE ROLE OF THE USAF
IN SUPPORT OF
SPECIAL AOIVI'QES IN · SE,A
.....
··tUl .- io

-_, __ ·.\·
80-CVAH(S)-D_s-~~
ClASSIF1£D BY 15 S£P 76 HO USAL I/ lJ, .... vur 1ES
__ J
EXEMPT FROM GENERAl D£ClASS1FI
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 116a£ 119 PACAF 8A 76-858
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 3 '
ASSIFY ON 3l.OE&EMB(R 2006 . :v:- ... ti'IB . I. I XL"
~
I.

811¥i'~ ~,. • 1 1
1
Do'IAitV'G-JU})~p -ro sr;crc£t
(3 y .f'!lt;l/111 ZP CPL L. L. Sllffr;
JoJitNctlf /
(THIS· PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED)
 Form Approved
Report Documentation Page OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington
VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it
does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED

JUL 1976 N/A -
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
The Role Of The USAF In Support Of Special Activities At Sea 5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

REPORT NUMBER
HQ PACAF Directorate, Tactical Evaluation CHECO Division
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT

NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF
ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE
SAR 155
unclassified unclassified unclassified

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
,
DEPA RTM ENT OF THE AIR FORC E
AIR FORC E
HEAD QUAR TERS UNITE D STAT ES
WASHI NGTON , D.C.

2031 4

-YTO CHO
ATTN OF'
23 Feb ruar y 1977

sUBJEC T' CHECO Rep ort on Spe cial Ope rati ons

To, AF /CHO Use rs

"Th e Rol e of the USAF
1. Dis trib utio n of the CHECO rep ort,
SEA" (TS- NFD ), is bein g
in Sup por t of Spe cial Act ivit ies in
one cop y, to be stor ed in
tigh tly lim ited . AF/CHO wil l hold
my saf e.
ret clea ran ce may be ac-
2. AF/CHO his tori ans hav ing Top Sec d the re is an off icia l
cord ed acc ess to this rep ort, pro vide
ase do not cite or mak e
pur pos e in the ir inv esti gat ion . Ple
y; if it is imp orta nt tha t
refe ren ce to the rep ort in you r stud
tiat e corr esp ond enc e on the
a cita tion be incl ude d, we wil l ini
mat ter wit h AF/XOXXS.
ene d insi de the fron t
3. A cop y of this lett er wil l be fastO rep ort.
cov er of the AF/CHO cop y of this CHEC

~L~. /~
JO~~- HUSice
TON, Maj Gen , USAF
of Air For ce His tory
Chi ef, Off

Bonds
Underwrite rour Country's Migh t- Buy U.S. Savings
 K717.o413-225

THE ROLE OF THE USAF

IN SUPPORT OF
SPECIAL ACTIVITIES IN SEA {U}
1 JULY 1976
CHECO /CORONA HARVEST DIVISION
OPERATIONS ANALYSIS OFFICE
HO PACAF

Prepared by

CAPTAIN TOM G. ABBEY

Proiect CHECO 7th Af
 UNCLA·SSIFIED
DISTRIBUTION LIST

(U} Only eleven copies of the report exist. All eleven were forwarded to
AF/CHOF: one for retention by AF/CHO, and ten for distribution to AF/XOX.

The original was destroyed.

\\
'.

ii

UNCLASSIFIED
 liGRi 7 •

TABLE OF CONTENTS (U) Page

FOREWORD .............................. ·...•.•••.•.•.• • •. • •. • . · • • • .

v

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION ....................................... . 1

CHAPTER I I . · BACKGROUND .....................•.....•..•...••.•.. 3

United States Unconventional Warfare Policies~ 1947-1955 ... 4

Early American Assistance to Vietnam, 1944-1954 ....•......... 5·
The Threat to South Vietnamese Stability, 1954-1956 ..•..... 7
The Eisenhower Commitment to Vietnam ......•.•....•........ 8
9
The Lansdale Mission ................•...•..•.•......•.....
New Problems .......... ·...................•................ 11 ..-
New Solutions ..... ~ ...................................... . l3
Precursor to OPLAN 34A--The CAS Program ..............•. ~ .. 17
OPLAN 34A--The Combined CIA-DOD Task Force ..•...•......... 19
. 25
CHAPTER III. THE INSTRUMENT FOR FURTIVE WAR·········~·········
"'-.,.

Mission and Objectives .......................•••.......... 25

MACSOG Organization ...................-.......• ~ .......... . 27
Programs and Operations •.......................••......... 29
Maritime Operations ...........•......•..•........•........ 29
Psychological Warfare Operations ...............••......... 30
·Airborn~ Operations .........................•••...........
32
Cross-Border Operations in Laos .......... • .......•........ 36
Cross-Border Operations in Cambodia .•.•.•................. 43
Personnel Recovery Operations .....•.•.••••..•..•...•.•.... 47

CHAPTER IV. AIR OPERATIONS ••.•...••..•....•.••••..•...•... • • · · 53

Part I: Fixed Wing Ass~ts .••....•.... ·~····•················· 54

·;,

Heavy Hook Project .........•..............•.•...•.......... 54

CHINAT and VNAF Training ....•.............•....•.......•.. 58
Heavy Hook--Cover, Security, and Deception •................ 62
Combat Spear Aircraft ..................................... . 68
Combat Spear versus Heavy Hook ....••...••..•....••.....•.. 69
Combat Spear--Cover,Security, and Deception •...•.•.•.•..... 72
Aircraft Utilization--Heavy Hook and Combat Spear ........ . 74
Redep 1oyment Attempts .••.......•..•...•..•..•..•.......... 80

Part ·!I: Rotary Wing Assets .•.•.•......•.......•.......••... . 85

General Background of USAF Helicopters .....•..........•... 85
The UH- 1 He 1i copter .........................•....•........ 90
Inception and Organization of the 20th Helicopter Sq ....•..... 91
Early 11 Greeri Hornet" Support to MACSOG ....•.•....••.•..... 91
" u~reen Hornet" Ops...!l968 .........•.•..· •••.•. • · · · · · · • · · · · ··• · • 93
'

iii

liSAzil
 The 20th SOS Crisis in 1969 and 1970 • . . . • . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Post-Crisis Operations, 1970-1972.............................. 99
A Closer Look at the Helicopter in Cross-Border Operations..... 102
Helicopter Gunships........................................... 110
Night Operations • . • . •.• • • • • . • . . • . • . . • • • . • • . . • • . . . . . . . • • • ..• • . . • • 114
CHAPTER V. COMMAND AND CONTROL . • • • • • . • • . • . • • . • • . . • . • . • • • • . . • • • . . • . 117
Early Approval Procedures for Air Operations .•.••........•...• 119
Tasking of a Heavy Hook Mission . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . • • . . . . 121
Command and Contro 1 , 1965-1968 . • . . . • . • • • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . • . 122
Post-1968 Command and Control Considerations ..•...........••.• 128
CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION •.. H....................................... 129
FOOTNOTES . • . .• . . . • .• •. . . .. .. . . .• . • • . . . •• • • . • • . .. .. .• . . . . . . . . . • •. . . • . 133

GLOSSARY .................................... : .......... . .............. . -

145

,, \

iv
 FOREWORD ·(U)

· (+G JIFQ) This report surveys the role of the United States Air
Force in support of special activities in Southeast Asia. The term, "spe-
. cial activities," refers to unconventional warfare operations of the United
States of a covert and clandestine nature, permitting plausible denial of
US sponsorship. This study emphasizes the USAF support rendered to the
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Studies and Observations Group
(MACVSOG, MACSOG, or SOG), which was the principal US agency for the con-
duct of unconventional warfare against the North Vietnamese from 1964 to
1972. Unilateral covert~and clandestine programs of in.dividual Service
"-
components and Controlled American Sources (CAS -- overseas elements of
the Central Intelligence Agency) are described only to the extent that
such programs·directly affected MACSOG programs or to lend continuity to
the history of US unconventional warfare actions in Southeast Asia.
(U) The purpose of this Project CHECO Report is to depict achieve-
ments and problems of US unconventional warfare operations in SEA with a
focus on aspects of USAF air support. This report hopefully will aid
military planners -- of both conventional and unconventional operations
in the future application of covert and clandestine actions in times and
arenas of interest to the United States Government.
(8 UF8) Compilation of the history of special operations in South-
east As-i-a is beset with pecul i.ar problems. Continuity is 1imited by
several ·factors: (1) The highly classified and sensitive nature of these
operations and the stringent "need to know" requirement caused a tendency
_ among qperators, particu·larly during the early MACSOG days, to carry out
"

v
attendant administrative and historical documentation duties on an informal
basis if at all. (2) The cornpartrnentation inherent to covert and clan-
destine organizations militated against centralized filing systems except
at the highest levels of authority. {3) Access to many documents was
controlled by agencies outside the Department of Defense, such as the
White House, State Department, and Central Intelligence Agency. Addition-
ally, documents addressing controversial topics and indicating inter-
Service rivalries were sometimes withheld by the originating Service com-
ponent. (4) The disposal or destruction of records after prescribed
periods of time limited the research material for the early MACSOG days.
(5) The 12-month rotation cycle of ~rsonnel adversely affected continuity,
-especially during the accelerated redeployment of American forces from

Vietnam.
(U) Althou~h the·aforen~ntioned conditions imposed restrictions on
the study, numerous individuals at both staff and operational levels
provided valuable assistance to the researcher. Personnel on the Joint
and Air Force Staffs were .instrumental in. obtaining authorization and
offering guidelines for the study. Individuals clt Seventh Air Force,
MACSOG; and subordinate operational units were highly cooperative and
knowledgeable sources of information: A singularly valuable contribution,)
to this study was the vo 1umi nous MACSOG Documentation Study, compiled )
in 1969 by the Joint StafL This comprehens-;ve document was indispensable ~
and frequently provided the only source of information available for
particular periods of the MACSOG history. The author acknowledges, how-
ever, the potential his~orical bias that can arise from over-reliance on
'' '· ,...
'. '·
a single reference source.

vi

18ttFIBEI~fiAis a
 UNCLASSIFIED
(U) Finally, the author recognizes the limitations in the scope and
methodology of the Command and Control chapter. More extensive research

•Ill is needed in this critically important and controversial aspect of special

air warfare.operations.

•
•R1

"

vii

UNCLASSIFIE·D
 . CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION (U)

(U) " ..• The US Government should immediately stop ..•

the dropping of leaflets and gifts for psychologi-
cal warfare purposes, the parachuting of rangers
from US spy planes coming from aircraft carriers and
Laotian territory, the shelling of the demilitarized
zone from the south, the violation of the territorial
waters of the. DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnan1] by
US battleships and ranger boats, the provocations
against and kidnapping of citizens of the DRV, and
so forth ... "l . ·
Xuan Thuy, North Vietnams Chief Negotiator at the Paris
Peace Talks, 3 October 1968 ·
(U) The demands for cessation of US covert and clandestine activi-
ties, as expressed above by a promi11.ent North Vietnamese leader to a
-Canadian correspondent on 3 October 1968, revealed the impact of these
operations on the North Vietnamese leadership. US termination of uncon-
ventional warfare {UW)activities and aerial and naval bombardment of
North Vietnam territory were p·ublically said to be requisite conditions
for the commencement of negotiations for a Vietnam settlement.
'
4'9 ltFB) This report describes the program of covert and clandes-
tine activities waged against the North Vietnamese from 1964 to 1972
through a special agency under the Commander of the United States Mili-
tary Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV). The designation of that
agency was the Military Assistance Command Studies and Observation Group
(MACSOG or SOG -- originally called the Special Operations Group). This
study investigates the background, inception~ organization, and evolu-
tion of MACSOG with particular emphasis on air operations.
~E tlf8) After the establishment of MACSOG, the United States Air
Force assumed an ever-expanding and increasingly versatile role in sup-
'' • t ~'
port ol unconventional warfare operations,_ in Southeast Asia. ,Although
a wide variety of USAF ·air assets supported SOG operations, aircraft
1

I!CI:!Y =
 SE€RiiT t

used on a dedicated and semi-dedicated basis provided the most signifi-

cant service. These assets included the UH-1, CH-3, and CH-53 heli-
co~ters and specially-configured t-123 and C-130 aircraft. The Air
-Force ·also supplied Forward Air Controller (FAC), reconnaissance, logis-
tics and strike aircraft from non-dedicated assets. These assets were
indispensable to SOG operations; it is the length of this study and not
the importance of their contributi-on whi.ch limits the discussion on
.
these aspects of air support. USAF efforts included insertion, resupply,
and extraction of agents and agent teams; tactical air strikes; tactical
airlift; visual and photo reconnaissance_; airborne radio relay; and
psychological warfare (PSYWAR) op-e-rations.

-;.

"

IE81liT
'• (U)
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND (U)

Clandestine. and covert operations became essential govern-

·mental instruments in the "cold war" confrontation which emerged after

rt World War II. Operations cloaked in secrecy afforded to a major power

• the opportunity to effect national policy while. minimizing the likeli-

hood of direct conflict with another competing major power.
war, the exercise of unconventional warfare tactics presented to a
In limited

"superpm·Jer" additional means and options for realizing nadonal inter-

ests at a lowrisk of nuclear war ..
(At'ziCI 11) The use of covert and clandestine operations in Indochina
provided several other advantages to the United States: {1) The United
States was able to effect certain polities without overtly violating
the Geneva.Agreement of 1954, thereby lessening adverse world opinion
of US involvement (this advantage was most evident in the early stages
of escalation). (2) The United States was able ·to implement policies
through organizational mac.hinery without the close scrutiny of Congress,
news media, and American public. (3) The United States Administration
had at its disp6sal an instrument that was highly responsive to policies
emanating from Washington. The inherent-sensitivity of covert operations
necessitated close supervision and cognizance by the highest echelon of
governmental authority; therefore, conmand-and control was·less cumber-
some than in the conventional military command system. {4) Unconventional
warfare doctrine, vis-a-vis conventional military doctrine, offered
greater flexibility for exerting pressure on the enemy. Unconventional
'' . ~ .

warfare, by definition; included social~ psychological' economic, and

political measures.
3
'• United States Unconventional Warfare Policies, 1947-1955 {U)
(U) U!lited States participation in unconventional warfare acti-

•l1 vities was neither new nor unique to the Indochina War. During the re-
organization of the US armed forces following World War II, the National
Security C.ouncil promulgated numerous directives which defined covert

• and clandestine actions, granted authorities for their conduct, and

established organizational machinery to·impleinent these measures.
the advent of the Kennedy era, genera 1 po 1i cies on the conduct of UW
With

activities were tatlored to the Indochina War.

c(i@ iii b) The National Security Act of·l947 established the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) as an independent agency responsible for the
performance of functions related to intelligence affecting the national
security of the United States. During times of peace, the CIA was the
primary agency.for conducting covert and clandestine actions. National
Security Council directives from 1947 to 1954 defined these actions and
outlined responsibilities for their conduct among various agencies,
particularly with regard ~o the interface between the Department of De-
fense and the Central Intelligence Agency.
(TB flli8) 'In 1954 the National Security Council rescinded several
previous directives .and on 19 August issued Directive 5412. This direc-
2
tive defined covert operations as follows:
...... all activities conducted pursuant to this directive
which are so planned and executed that any US govern-
ment responsibility for them is not evident to unauthor-
ized persons and that if uncovered, the US Government
can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them .....

.. ns NED} A follo~-on directive from the National Security

,·
Council,
"
NSC Directive 5412/2, provided the basic ~ational authority 'tor UW
4
operations as later conducted in Southeast Asia (SEA). It also included
3
a more detailed definition of UW concepts:
" ... propaganda; political action,..economic warfare;
preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-
_sabotage, demolition; escape and evasion and evacua-
tion measures; subversion against hostile states or
groups including assistance to underground resistance
movements, guerrillas or refugee liberation groups;
support of indigenous and anti-communist elements in
threatened countries of the Free World; deception plans
and operations ... "
It further stated: "Such operations do not include armed conflict by
recogni"zed military forces, espionage and counter-espionage, nor cover
~nd deception for military operations." 4 The most significant outcome
of this directive was the establis-hment of the Special Group (5412),
which was the highest national authority to grant approval and disap-

proval of aJl covert operations.

Early American-Assistance to Vietnam, 1944-1954 (U)

(U) The exact date of initial American military involvement in
Vietnam is not known. Toward the end of World War II, the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS), the predecessor to t~e CIA, began working
actively with r_esistance groups in I"ndochina, including the communist-
sympathizing Viet Minh guerrillas l~d by Ho Chi Minh. The obvious pur-
pose of this support was to undermine the Japanese forces occupying
mainland Southeast Asia. Although President Roosevelt disapproved
proposals to aid resistance groups in Indochina by a decision on 13
October 1944, it is known that Ho Chi Minh visited the OSS Headquarters
in Kunming Province of southern China on several occasions in late 1944
and ·early 1945. 5 In 1'945 Pr.esident RoQ__Sevelt approved the "QSS proposal

5
 UNCLASSIFIED
to aid the:Viet Minh, and by the latter months of the war, American OSS
officers were training and, sometimes, actually leading Viet Minh guer-
ri11as.6 Thus, the first American military support rendered to the
·vietnamese included material aid and unconventional warfare training to
the guerrillas who later became the enemy in the Second Indochina War.
(U) When President Roosevelt died in office, US opposition to the
return of the French to Indochina diminished;· however, faced with more
pressing problems in other areas of the world, such as Europe and China,
American leaders left only a remnant of Americans in Vietnam and pro-
vided but a negligible~amount of military aid. The co~unist takeo~er
of mainland China and deployment of large numbers of Chinese Communist
forces along the northern borders of Laos and Vietnam rejuvenated
American interest in Southeast Asia. The United States Administration
perceived the ~rench-Viet Minh conflict in a new image; it was now a
7
confrontation between the Free World and International Communism. US
interest and aid to the French rose proportionately with US fears of
Communist expansion. Tocounter the threat, the United States estab-
lished the Military Assistance and Advisory Gro~p (MMG) in Saigon in
August 1950. From that date until the defeat of the French in May of
"
1954 at Dien Bien Phu, the United States provided roughly 80 percent of
8
the cost of French military efforts in Indochina. The United States
Air Force provided 1,800 airlift sorties, ~omprising 13,000 flying hours

in aid of the French.

(U) Meanwhile, the Korean War exacerbated US fears of continued
cq_(.l11l~ni.st expansion in.Asia and induced heightened reluctan~.e to commit
' \

American ground forces ·without the backing of Allies. Although the French

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
were defeated and the resulting armistice prohibited external support
to Vietnam, the US reflected its growing concern over Indochfna by ini-
tiating the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) Pact, which
9
·placed-th~ United States squarely in the Southeast Asia picture.

The Threat to South Vietnamese Stabilit , 1954-1956 U

{U) The problems confronting the South Vietnamese regime following
the Geneva Agreement did not elicit optimism from the American spec-
tators. President Diem of the southern zone faced the challenges of
resettling hundreds of thousands of refugees; controlling an unruly and
power-seeking army; engendering nationalism among the·relatively autono-
"-
mous and armed sects of Hao Hao, Cao Dai, and Binh Xuyen; and establish-
ing a stable government capable of coping with communist subversion.
(U) Both of the Vietnamese delegations at Geneva in 1954 expressed
dissatisfaction with the settlement; the Viet Minh, in particular, were
reluctant to cede territory under their control. Under the supervised
cease-fire, most of the Viet Minh military units loyal to Hi Chi Minh
..
moved to the North (reportedly about 120,000 pe.rsons). Among this group
were carefully .selected younger men destined for military training and
eventual return to the South. Numerous elite military units did not
travel to North Vietnam; instead, they moved to mountainous and jungled
areasin the South to establish base areas. Hanoi directed thousands of
well-·{rained and disciplined party members to remain in their native
villages i·n South Vietnam {SVN) to awa.it further orders. Arms and am-
10
munition were cached throughout the countryside.
\' ·-(U) During the c!'ucial period of.,[lation-building ther'~ were·
.I
li
UNCLASSIFIED
scattered, sporadic incidents of terrorism, harassment, and sabotage;
however, many incidents were not attributable directly to the communists.
In fact, it is believed that Hanoi generally directed the southern ele-
ment_s. to e.ngage only in po 1 i ti ca 1 action and admoni s·hed armed forays.
The use of subversive tactics and more active involvement by the North
Vietnamese regime became more prevalent by the end of 1956, by which time
that regime had established-better control over elements of the popula-
tion in the north, and the alternatives for unification of Vietnam under
11
. b h h d d" . .
commun1sm y ot er means a 1m1n1s e . h. d

The Eisenhower Commitment to Vietnam (U)

(U) Officials of the Kennedy""" and Johnson administrations often cited
a letter from President Eisenhower to Premier Diem, dated 23 October 1954,
relating to_-the origin and continuity of US involvement in South Vietnam.
12
This letter implied that American aid-was forthcoming. The decision to
launch a program of economic and military aid to Diem, no doubt, occurred13
earlier in a meeting of the National Security Council in August of 1954.
(U) During this peri6d the Unit~d States was negotiating in Paris
and Saigon to gain permission to train the South Vietnamese Army. In
1955 the United States assumed this~responsibility from the French. On
May 10, 1955 the White House announced that 11 at the request of the Govern-
ment of Vietnam and with the agreement of the Government of France,[the
United"States] had undertaken responsibility for the training of Viet-
14
namese national armed forces... The French military forces evacuated

Saigon on 20 May, 1955.

"z·gs
.
·n• The aim.of US policy was to build a complete~y autonomous
15 . '
11

Vietnamese Army... A Joint Chiefs of Staff study on possible intervention

·8
• in Vietnam revealed US· reluctance for any involvement beyond that re-
quired for a training mission. The study stated: "Indochina is devoit
of decisive military objectives and the allocation of more than token
·US armed forces in Indochina would be a serious diversion of limited
16
US capabilities."
(U) For the most part~ US advisors were affected by a "Korean
syndrome"; they directed their efforts toward building a conventional
army capable of repelling an invasion across the northern border. Never-
theless~ US policy-makers recognized the threat of insurgency and sent
their most reputed un<;enventional warfare expert~· .Col Edward G. Lansdale~

to Saigon.

The Lansdale Mission (U)

(U). Colonel Lansdale's invaluable support to the President of the
Philippine Government, Magsaysay~ in suppression of the Huk rebellion
marked him as the most qualified Amer'ican to aid Diem in consolidating
political power and fightlng communist subversion. Lansdale's specialty
-was political-psychological warfare and paramiljtary operations.
(U) In June of 1954 Lansdale arrived in Saigon to become the Chief
of the Saigon Military Mission (SMM). One of his missions was to estab-
lish an orgariization and program for clandestine and covert actions
agains·t the North Vietnamese. These actions were to discredit "an active
and intelligent enemy who made full use of legal rights to screen his
activities in establishing his stay-behind organization south ·of the 17th
17
parallel." These actions were similar to those used by the North Viet-
\\ '\. .
namese 1n South Vietnam. '
\

9
 UNCLASSIFIED
(U) Beginning in August, after the SMM was adequately staffed,
several clandestine operations commenced against North Vietn~m. Para-
military teams were located in Hanoi, Haiphong, and south of the 17th
·parallel.. Psychological warfare operations included "rumor campaigns"
and the distribution of leaflets which propagated themes relating to
property ownership, money reform, etc. One specific example of a propa-
ganda theme was the description of Chinese Communist reprisals against
Viet Minh villages. Another type of leaflet distributed was a bogus
holiday pass. Moreover, in addition to pr~paganda efforts, the para-
military teams ~onducted sabotage, such as contamination of oil supplies.
Further, they prepared for a late?· resistance movement by recruiting
indigenous agents and caching paramilitary-supplies. By the time the
North Vietnamese regime assumed complete control of the North, an unoffi-
18
cial report reviewed the accomplishments of the SMM:
"It had taken a tremendous amount of hard work to
beat the Geneva deadline, to locate, select, exfil-
trate, and equip the men of these teams and have them
in place, ready for actions required against the
enemy ... "
;..

Further information regarding unconventional-warfare activities of the

SMM or other US agencies prior to 1960 is sketchy.
(U) During Lansdale's presence in-South Vietnam, President Diem's
succe~ses in consolidation of power infused optimism among American ob-
servers. Although intelligence estimates fndicated that the communists
were capable of undermining his regime; they had not committed themselves
to armed force on·a large scale from 1954 to 1956. Beginning in 1957,
h~~e~:r, armed encounters between the communists and securi~y forces
'

10
U-NCLASSIFIED
 became more widespread. The Viet Minh (Viet Cong) reacted strongly to
Diem's renunciation of the elections prescribed by the Geneva Accord,
his intensified campaign to eliminate Viet Minh remnants in South Viet-
. nam, and his greater reliance on American economic, military, and poli-
tical support. By 1959 American officials were alarmed by the situation,
and by 1960 they suspected an active role_ by the Hanoi regime in South
Vietnam. The challenge of the sixties was expressed by Senator Kennedy
in his presidential campaign: "Now the problems are new and they require
19
new solutions."

New Problems (U)

(U)
"·
From the end of 1959,. through.l960 and 1961, the insurgency
intensified and expanded throughout the South Vietnamese countryside.
The. Viet Cong
- attacked government positions more frequently and in ever-
increasing size. Large rural areas were denied to government officials
without substantial armed escort; the populace was becoming sympathetic
to the Viet Cong if not indifferent to the Diem regime. To complicate
. matters, security forces. were inept in meeting ~the challenge. The
police, accustomed to handling common law enforcement tasks, left
counterinsurgency matters to the army, which i·n turn conditioned to
"'
responding to a conventional military 'threat, left internal security mat-
20
ters to the police force.

(B IIFS) Official estimates of Viet Cong strength rose proportion-

ately with the alarm felt among both Vietnamese and American officials.
From mid-summer 1961 to January 1962, the estimated "hard core•i Viet Cong
stren~th jumped from 12,000 to 20-25,000. Because of the reportedly
' '

11
 zll!eltEY I ·

high number of ene~ casualties, government officials suspected that in-

filtration from North Vietnam enabled a steady gr:owth in numerical
strength of the insurgent body. Reports of captured Chinese Communist
weapons added credence to the suspicion of external support to the Viet

Cong.
By the end of 1961 North Vietnam had surrounded it~elf with
·(U)
21
a "wall of aggressive suspicion." North Vietnamese were involved in
numerous border incidents in laos and were responsible, to a degree,
for a 20-fold increase in Pathet lao numbers from 1959 to 1961. Rela-
tively solid communist~control of the area·contiguous' . to the northwestern
.

South Vietnamese border permitted"the development of Viet Cong base and

staging areas and a system of infiltration routes co~only referred to as
22
the "Ho Chi:Minh Trail."
(U} Evidence of Soviet, Chinese, and North Vietnamese support to
the Viet Cong, as well as an obvious deterioration of internal security
and political stability in South Vietnam, forced a fresh American ap-
praisal of its position ·in Indochina. In September 1960 the US Ambassador
·;-

to Saigon apprised President Kennedy that "it may become necessary for
the US Government to begin consideration of alternative courses of
23 "
action and leaders."
(U} International developments in early 1961 strengthened American
resol.ye to defend South Vietnam against Conmuni st expansion. In January
Krushchev announced Moscow's intentiori to back "wars of national libera-
24
tion" around the world. Too, the laotian crisis and Cuban Bay of Pigs
f,ias.~o in April caused alarm in Washington. On April 20th,,. one day
'
after the abortive a~tempt to invade Cuba, President Kennedy requested
\

12

e!eltl' a
that the Secretary of Defense appraise the Vietnam situation and recom~
mend actions to pre·vent communist domination. The Deputy Secretary of
Defense submitted a study in response to the presidential request; this
study envisioned a greater emphasis on covert and paramilitary operations
as well as deployment of additional military and CIA personnel to South
Vietnam. This proposal, as modified by the Secretary of Defense and
Secretary of State, met Kennedy's approval; it signaled the beginning
of an ineluctable American commitment to Vietnam in the sixties.

·New Solutions (U)

+'IS 141 B) The Deputy Secretary of Defense's plan; as related il'l the
"'-= 25
MACSOG Documentation Study, proposed the f?llowing authorities:
" ... authority to expand positive and counterintel-
ligence operations against communist forces in South
Vietnam and against North Vietnam and the use of civi-
lian.aircrews of American and other nationality, as
appropriate, in addition to Vietnamese in operations
against North Vietnam ... The US would assist the RVNAF
(Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces] to increase border
patrol and insurgency suppression capabili-ties by
establishing an effective border intelligence system,
by instituting regular aerialsurveillance over the
entire frontier area, and by applyin~modern tech-
nological area-denial techniques .to close the roads
and trails along the border ... "
The effect of the plan was immediate; the first of US Special Forces
26
Teams arrived in the SVN by the end of May 1961.
+'8 IIFB) In June 1961 National Security Action Memorandums (NSAM's)
55, S~, and 57 expressed the President's support of unconventional war-
fare operations and his increased reliance on the military establish-
A sunmary
ment for the conduct of covert and paramilitary operations.
" . 27
of these significant N?AMs follows: '
 (1) NSAM 55 (28 June 1961) described the relation-
ship between the President and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) . . It stated that the advice of the JCS,
in cold war as well as declared war, was to come to
the President unfiltered and direct .
. (2) NSAM 56 {28 June 1961) expressed the President's
interest in using unconventional warfare operations
to meet future requirements. This memorandum requested
the Department of Defense (DOD) in conjunction with
the Department of State and Central Intelligence
Agency, to inventory all paramilitary assets in the
US Armed Forces and to consider various areas of the
world where implementation of US policy may require
indigenous paramilitary forces.
(3) NSAM 57 (28 June 1961) promulgated key policy
intended to maximize effectiveness and flexibility
in the plann~ng and conduct of UW operations in the
context of cold war. It provided the basis·for as-
signment to the DOD of the responsibility for conduct-
ing covert and paramilitary operations against North
Vietnam. It received considerable comment, parti-
cularly from the CIA, as to its applicability and
V9lidity. This directive defined paramilitary opera-
tions (PM) as those operations in which tactics,
requirements in military~type personnel, equipment and-
training approximate those in conventional military
operations. The DOD was to receive the responsibility
for conducting overt PM operations, and the CIA was to
conduct covert or disavowable PM operations, pro-
viding that these operations were within the CIA's
capabilities .. AnY large PM operat"ions, wholly or partly
covert, which required significant numbers of mili-
tarily-trained personnel, amounts of~military equip-
ment.which exceeded normal CIA-controlled stocks and/
or military experience of the kind and level peculiar
to the Armed Services wa~ properly the primary
responsibility of the DOD with the CIA in a support-
ing role. All operations were to be considered on
a case-by-case basis to determine the office of pri-
mary responsibility. The directive envisioned the
establishment of the Strategic Resources Group as the
decision-making body for determination of responsibility
for operations; however, the Special Group {5412) re-
tained its status. Special Group (5412) was renamed
later as the 303 Committee.
(TO IIFI) Prior to.the promulgation of the aforementioned
. ~
directives
" ·.
which defined interdepartmental relationships, the Secretary of Defense

14
restructured the DOD to streamline the planning, coordination, and con-
duct of covert and clandestine activities. In February 1961 the Secre-
tary of Defense appointed Brigadier General lansdale as the Assistant
·to the Secretary of Defense (ASTD) to handle functions related to
(1) Special Group (5412)/303 Committee matters, (2) special defense
activities as approved by the Secretary of Defense, and (3) CIA-DOD
28
relationships of special interest to the Secretary of Defense.
(TE tiF9) Also during February, the Deputy Secretary of Defense re-
quested that a small, secure staff element be established on the Joint
Staff to serve as a po1nt of contact between General ~~nsdale and t~e JCS.
The purpose of the new office waslo facilitate coordination between the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and various agencies on the Joint
Staff and overseas commands. General sup·port responsibilities to the
ASTD entailed (1) special logistical support, such as military equipment,
airlift, and realty faci 1ities; (2) fabrication of cover stories;
(3) planning in connection with support requirements· for special opera-
tions of an interdepartmental nature; (4) research and coordination
·;,.
pertaining to policy aspects of DOD support for covert actions and
29
special operations. By the fall of 1961 misunderstandings about the
functions of this staff element, designated the Special Operations
Division, were resolved by memorandums from the Secretary of Defense
and the ASTD. This clarification of role ~ermitted individual Service
.. 30
components to effect direct liaison with the CIA on routine matters.
111 I Sf In early ·1962, the Special ·operations Division was trans-
f~rr~d en toto from under the Directorate of Plans and Poli~y and placed
\

directly under the Director of the Joint" Staff. It was redesignated

\15
rl the Office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special
Activities (OSACSA).
_ . That reorganization followed upon the heels of the establish-
ment of the Special Group (CI--Counterinsurgency)~ a top echelon decision-
making body with authority similar to that of the Special Group (5412);

is a means
" ... It to ensure unity of effort and to
use all available resources with·maximum effectiveness
i~ preventing and resisting subversive insurgency
and related forms of indirect aggression in ·friendly
"-..
countries ...
As a result of the NSAM of 18 January 1962 which activated the Special
Group (CI), there were two direct lines of authority fo':' prosecuting the
war in Southeast_Asia from Washington: Special Group (5412) monitored
covert actions; Special Group (CI) monitored conventional--counterinsur-
gency--operations.
(U) National decisiQns leading to increased aid to South Vietnam
were bound inextricably to the decisions alter.ing the US command apparatus.
By 1 January 1962~ the United States had pledged additional aid to the
~ .
South Vietnamese regime on four separate occasions. The White House re-
leased to the public on 15 December 1961 an exchange of letters between
Diem a~~ Kennedy. Diem requested 11 further assistance from the United
States if we [South Vietnamese] are to win the war now being waged against
32
us... .Kennedy pledged: "We shall promptly increase our assistance to
33
YOI{f defense effort......
~ . .
During 1961~ there was an enormous increase in ~'

' \
numbers of US personnel stationed in Vietnam. To enhance the management

16
 UNCLASSIFIED
of the larger force, the United Stated replaced the MAAG with th~ Military
Assistance·command, Vietnam (MACV) in February, 1962. American Indochina
~xperts exuded optimism over the sizeable increase and predicted that the
. 34
war would be won·in from one to th.ree years.
(U} By 1963, however, American policy-makers and military planners
in Washington faced a dileiTilla with regard to the future commitment to
South Vietnam; conventional and unconventional military efforts had not
.
diminished the threat, in fact, the·position of the South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment had become less tenable. Various meetings of high-level US offi,-
cials during the year called for an escalation of counterinsurgency ef-
forts and unconventional warfare act-ions. OperatioiP Plan (OPLAN) 34A
·emerged from these meetings; it specified an-intensified program of
clandestine a~d covert operations against North Vietnam to be administered
by a· combined Central Intelligence Agency-Department of Defense task
35
force.

Precursor to OPLAN 34A -- The·CAS Program (U)

(U) The Controlled American Source progra_m of covert and clandes-
. "'
tine operations in Laos and North Vietnam began, for all practical pur-
The
., earlier CIA efforts to establish
poses, in late 1960 and early 1961.
a stay-behind organization after the Geneva Agreement of 1954 had been
relatively unsuccessful due to the forced removal of its team from Hanoi
in 1955·: By the time the United States and South Vietnamese governments
recognized the seriousness of the communist threat and extent of external
support to the insurgency, the northern regime had established effective
36 ,..
popUlation controls over' its citizens. '
'
'17

UNCLASSIFIED
 - (TO una) From 1961 to 1964 the CAS program underwent severa 1 dis-
ruptive changes. The initial mission was intellige·nce collection. The
principal mission then became sabotage and harassment operations with
intelligence collection as a by-product. In the summer of 1963. emphasis
was placed on the insertion of PSYWAR teams. These polity changes, as well
as the Geneva Accord in Laos in 1962, severely undermined CAS unconven-
tional warfare efforts. Actual results of CAS agent operations from 1961
~o 1964 reflect the scope of the problems: Of the 33 agent teams infil-
37 .
trated, 19 were lost.
e(TJ IIFB) The two pr:-imary means of infiltrating agents were air and
sea delivery. Of the 33 successfuf'infi ltrations under the CAS UW program,
-23 were accomplished by air drops. Three aitcraft were lost during these
efforts: one Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) C-47, one CIA C-46, and one CIA
.38
· C-54. Acquisition of five C-123 aircraft, specially configured with
Electronic Countermeasure Equipment (ECM), considerably enhanced the de-
livery capability of agent teams into North Vietnam. ·Controlled American
Sources negotiations with th.e Chinese Air. Force (CAF) secured CAF crews
for these aircraft, permitting plausible denial' of us sponsorship of air
operations over North Vietnamese territory.
z(TB tlli9) Numerous problems were" associated with air delivery of
agents into North Vietnam. The requirement to conduct undercover opera-
tions necessitated that missions be flown only during the hours of dark-
ness, Navigational shortcomings further limited the scheduling of missions
to only four or five nights out of every month, depending on lunar illu-
min~ti?n. Terrain featu,res and weather condit.ions were important factors
in flight planning; overcast weather often obscured drop zones, forcing

\ .
18
a mission to abort. Resupply of agent teams was considerably more-diffi-
cult than insertion of agents; a compromised team could lure the aircraft

into an enemy trap.

4'fJ&i41 b) Air Force personnel associated with the CAS program and
documents cited in the MACSOG Documentation Study both identified proce-
dural limitations for air operations over North Vietnam. A general cri-
ticism was the lack of flexibility in flight planning -- a failure to
s~lect alternate routes, identification points, and drop zones. Reluc-
tance to use Danang as a staging base, thus denying aircrews the needed
crew rest,was also cited. Further, due to the sensitivity of the operations,
pre-flight briefings were withheld u-ntil the last minute, allowing insuf-
39
-ficient time for study of the flight plan.
(Ti tlwD~ Controlled American Sources operations in Laos differed
markedly from those in North Vietnam. Operations in Laos were without
air support. CAS conducted numerous operations of a reconnaissance nature
in the area between Attopeu and Tchepone. Its company.-sized exploitation-
40
type operations resulted in a high numberof friendly casualties.
,ns &!ED) CAS operations in Laos and North v·1etnam required 1ittl e
USAF support. Th~ Air Force provided a small contingent of personnel,
undercover, who aided in flight planning .. It also provided logistics,
weather forecasting, and aerial reconnaissance support. Training of the
Chinese Nationalists aircrews in the C-123 a~rcraft was, possibly, the

major contribution.

OPLAN 34A -- The Combined CIA-DOD Task Force (U)

" HE By the end of 1963, the US Administration was , deter-
tiED) ' \

mined to expand the covert and clandestine program against North Vietnam.

19
OPLAN 34A reflected this intent, envisioning a scale of activity be-
yond the capability of the CIA a_lone.
· HE tiER) The Department of Defense had advocated an expansion and
intensification of covert and clandestine actions in SEA as early as 1962.
In April, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) recommended c:overt
air strikes against Tchepone (laos) and Vinh. (North Vietnam) to counter
infiltration. Concurrently, the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Command
(CINCPAC) forwarded to the JCS his conceptual views of harassing actions
against North Vietnam (NVN). This plan, as modified by the JCS, did not
meet Special Group (5412) approva.l.
•(ljfi4fb) In 1963 General Ear}G. Wheeler, Chief of Staff of the Army
-(SA) led -a staff visit team to Vietnam to investigate prospects of ending
the conflict within a reasonable amount of time. He then briefed the
. .
President, recomt11ending that the US intensify UW training for Vietnamese
forces and encourage the Vietnamese to conduct raids and sabotage missions
against NVN. Wheeler's report led to more specific studies by agencies
6n the Service and Joint staffs. · The most notable study resulting from
Wheeler's trip report was an. Army study entitled ·1·A Study of the Feasi-
41
bility of Conducting limited Military Operations in North Vietnam." Army
"
planners envisioned a Joint Unconventional Warfare Task-Force, which would
eclipse the scope of CIA UW operations against North Vietnam.
(TO flliP) This plan was a topic of discussion at conferences held by
the Secretary of Defense in the Pacific area in 1963. There emerged a
more active role for the DOD in conducting special operations in SEA.
The Secretary of Defense, directed CINCPAC to prepare specific target
,, ' ~
. '.
folders for covert and paramilitary oper~tions in North Vietnam, and he
\

20
offered ~ssistance to the CIA in accelerating its capabilities. In
response to the Secretary of Defense offer, the CAS Station Chief, Saigon
requested that additional military personnel be made available. In May
1963, while.the request was being considered, the JCS directed CINCPAC to
formulate a plan of action for CIA support of the DOD.
· . sUS liFO) During the subsequent months, message traffic between Wash-
ington and the field revealed continual high-level discussion of altering
·the command structure for prosecution of UW actions in SEA. By November
some CAS programs had been transferred to MACV. During that month, repre-
sentatives from the Depar.tment of Defense, Department of State, and Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency discussed DOD/CIA relationships, setting the
~stage for OPLAN 34A. Specifically, the November meetings called for the
transfer from_CAS to MACV of all irregular forces in SVN, a joint CAS-
. MACV ·operation _plan for a 12-month program of intensified operations
against North Vietnam, and the transfer of cross-border operations in_ Laos
to MACV auspices effective 1 December 1963. The operations plan developed
by CAS Saigon and MACV was completed on 15 December.
z(Tti IIFB) The plan outlined the mission of the joint task force as
42
follows:
"COMUSMACV and Chief of Station CAS, Saigon will
2

provide necessary advice, assistance, training and

material support to enable the RVN to conduct a
graduated and intensified program of actions against
the DRV which, in conjunction with-other military
·· and diplomatic actions in SEA, will lead to a judge-
ment on the part of the DRV leadership that continued
direction and support of insurgent activities in the
Republic of Vietnam and Laos should cease."
US \'SO) OPLAN 34A, specified five types of operations: intelligence
"
pol~tical resi~tanc~
.
collection, psychological operations, pressure,

21
operations~ and physical destruction (hit.-and-run and aerial attacks).
The three possible methods for implementation of the UW programs were:
(1) either by CAS or MACV with the second party providing required sup-
. port, (2) by a joint CAS-MACV command or, (3) by both CAS and MACV, each
43
conducting a portion of the tota 1 program.·
(TE tiFQ) CINCPAC generally concurred with the plan; he was, however,
somewhat apprehensive regarding the effects of the proposed actions on
..
the North Vietnamese leadership. He also expressed.fears of possible
. 44
Chinese intervention.
(TE N5 P) In December 1963, after recei~ing the OPLAN 34A briefing

in Saigon, the Secretary of Defense"and Director of Central Intelligence

-decided to present the plan to the Special Group (5412) for approval. The
plan was then_presented to the President; he, in turn, established an
interdepartmenta1 committee to select from the plan those operations which
were feasible and offered the greatest return with minimal risk. Major
·General Krulak, the Chief of SACSA, chaired this commi·ttee. (The Office
of the Assistant to the Secr.etary of Defense was disbanded earlier in
·;.-

1963.) In evaluating the possible effects of the intensified program,

the committee expressed· less than total optimism; however, it considered
~ 45
the advantages of selected operations to outweigh the risks. In January,
a joint message from the Department of Defense, Department of State, and.
Central_.Intelligence Agency indicated that the committee's recommendations
had received presidential approval and were to be executed commencing on
1 January 1964. A joint MACV-CAS task force was to implement OPLAN 34A.
Oper:at_~onal control rested with COMUSMACV; overall political ~ontrol
rested with the US Ambassador to Vietnam.' The Joint Task For2e was to

22
provide planning, liaison, logistics, and training to its Vietnamese

counterpart.
(IE tWP) Ambassador Lodge presented a sanitized version of the plan
to the South Vietnamese government in January; however, a coup d'etat
required that the plan be resubmitted to General Khanh on 3 February.
General Khanh•s appraisal of the plan was related in conversation with
Secretary McNamara, Ambassador Lodge, and General Taylor. The MACSOG
. 46
Documentation Study gave the following account:
"General Khanh agreed that actions designed to exert
increased pressure on North Vietnam could be helpful
assistance to his effort but that they would be no
substitute for· successful actions in South Vi.etnam
against the Viet Cong. Further, General Khanh said
that his base in South Vi"etnam was not strong enough
for overt operations against North· Vietnam but that
he would like to redouble covert operations right.
away."
· (IE UFO} In preparation for execution of the plan, the Secretary

of Defense had deployed all necessary equipment and personnel to Saigon

to await further instructions. It was envisioned that the personnel as-
signed in-country, and existing equipment stockpiles, would be sufficient
to meet most of the initial requirements. The ptincipal requirement levied
on the Air Force ·was for six specially-modified C-123 aircraft, equipped
with ECM, radar detection, ·and pinpo{nt navigation equipment. These air-
47
craft were not available until after the activation of MACSOG.

\\
'

23
 CHAPTER III
THE INSTRUMENT FOR FURTIVE WAR (U)

.(E fiP8) The fonnation of MACSOG marked the beginning of a graduated

and intensified campaign of covert and clandestine activities under mili-·
tary direction by the United States against North Vietnam. The objective
was to dissuade·North Vietnamese leaders from waging hostilities against
South Vietnam. Obviously, SOG did not achieve this objective within the
specified one-year period; after that it continued to conduct covert and
clandestine operations in Southeast Asia until 1972, at which time it as-
sumed solely an advisory:function.
48 IUD) The effect of MACSOG ~tions on North Vietnamese leaders and
the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) is difficult-to assess. An evaluation of
the impact of.these actions is certainly not within the purview of this
report; however,.an exposition of the organization, evolution, and specifi~
programs of MACSOG is vital to_an understanding of the USAF role in un-
conventional warfare in SEA.

;
Mission and Objectives (U)
~8 nre) The MACSOG program was under the close scrutiny of Washington
authorities. Hence, its stated missien and objectives necessarily changed,
reflecting the vicissitudes of Washington's Vietnam Policy. Other factors
affecting the SOG mission were its own capabilities and limitations ·and
the effectiveness of North Vietnamese countermeasures. The final step of
the original operation plan, active US support to an armed resistance
movement in North Vietnam, was never realized. Even if the US President
- had "approved such an operation, it is doubtful that the movement would

25
have been successful in the rigidly controlled, totalitarian North. More
48
1i.mited objectives were to:
• Divert North Vietnamese military resources to defense
and internal security missions.
1 Produce an adverse effect on the North Vietnamese
economy.
• Impede the infiltration of military resources to the
Republic of Vietnam.
• .Create the impression that an active, unified, in-
ternal opposition exists in North Vietnam.
(13 hiD) Changes to the SOG mission statement in 1965 an·d 19.67 were
incorporated to reflect expanded operations in Laos and Cambodia. The
latter revision remained basically Unchanged until the demise of SOG. In
49
-abbreviated form, it read:
"[The SOG mission is] to plan and conduct covert/
clandestine operations in North Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia and special operations in South Vietnam, as
directed, in such a manner that operations can be
plausibly denied by the US and RVN [Republic of Viet-
nam] governments. These operations are planned and
conducted in coordination with various othe~ agencies
and with the RVNAF STD [Strategic Technical Direc-
torate-- Vietnamese counterpart to SOG]."
zz(B tiF9) In actuality, a major change to the:.-SOG mission resulted
from the Presidential decision in November 1968 to cease both bombing and
unconventional warfare operations in North Vietnam. (The ban, however,
did not apply to radio broadcasts beamed toward the populace of North

Vietnam.)
ns NfQ) A synopsis of some 50 interviews with MACSOG personnel
indicated that the major shortcoming of mission and program statements was
the lack of clear and well-defined statements outlining SOG's relationship
"' ·. ' ,..
to other agencies such as the. Fifth Special Forces Group, the tiA, and

the STD.
MACSOG Organ i za ti on {U)
(Ti tlilil) The establishment of MACSOG under the operational control
of COMUSMACV on 24 January 1964 did not effect a complete and abrupt
transfer from CAS to MACV of responsibility for all unconventional warfare
operations in Southeast Asia. CAS continued to conduct some secretive
operations unilaterally: for example, the t~aining of Meo tribesmen in
Laos and portions of North Vietnam. ·Within the SOG structure itself, CAS
personnel continued to handle some functions through CAS channels. One
particular case was the supervision of air operations. CAS retained
responsibility for approval and disapproval of air opera_tions until O~tober
1964. In most cases, however, CAS responsibilities diminished when suffi-
·cient amounts of DOD paramilitary assets had'arrived in the RVN.
(TB fllii8)_ According to planning documents, manpower and materiel re-

. _sources located jn South Vietnam were adequate to satisfy initial require-

ments. Where shortages existed, personnel on temporary·duty (TOY) aug-
mented SOG manning. Substantial numbers of US, Vietnamese, and Chinese
Nationalist personnel, along_ with numerous ·facilities, were transferred to
SOG by CAS. The rapid increase in the number of US military personnel
assigned to MACSOG, from an initial contingent of six officers and two
.,.
enlisted men to 144 men by the end of 1964 and to over 400 by 1969, was
beset with some problems, especially in the early stages of build-up. The
Chief of MACSOG Air Operations alluded to the shortcomings of personnel
.. 50
who replaced CAS officers.
" ... initial selection was based on availability of people
with retainability in the theater and wit~ the proper rank .•.
a major problem was the total ignorance of everyone con- ·
" cerned in this type of operatiot:J." ·

27
 e(TG tiFQ) Commensurate with the increase of personnel and addition of.
programs, the SOG' organizational s.tructure proliferated. At the end of
1964 there were five major branches under the Commander (An Army colonel)
and the Deputy Commander (a CAS officer): Administrative, Intelligence,
Operations, Logistics, and Communications. Additionally, four command
elements came under the operational control of the SOG Commander: SOG·
Flight Detachment, Psychological Operations Group, Long Thanh Training
Detachment, and Maritime Operations Group. Staff elements within the Op-
erations Branch of SOG Headquarters exercised staff supervision over the

command elements.
(TJ UFB) The most significant"changes to the organization in 1965

- · -were the addition of a Plans Branch to the headquarters element, addition

of Medical an~ Airborne Operations Sections under the Operations Branch, and
. the rede~ignatio~ of the CAS officer as the Special Assistant to the Com-
mander. The vacated Deputy Comma-nder -space was changed to a military billet.
The Flight Detachment at Nha Trang was renamed the Air. Operations Group.
(Ti tiFP) Again in 1966, major chang~s to the SOG organization re-
sulted from the .escalation of military efforts against North Vietnam. The
increase in air activity, in particula'r, resulted in internal changes in'
the Intelligence Branch and the addition of the Joint Personnel recovery
Center (JPRC). The JPRC, which provided MACV with the capability for per-
sonnel recovery operations subsequent to the-termination of Search and
Rescue (SAR) efforts, was activated officially on 17 September 1966.
(T3 IH'") After 1966 there was little change to the SOG organization,
other than streamlining lines of authority within SOG Headquarters. Estab-
~ ~ ' 0

lishment of Command and Control Detachments at Danang, Kontum~ and Ban Me

28
Thuot facilitated the management of cross-border operations in Laos and
Cambodia. Organizational changes relating to the coll11land and control of
air assets are discussed in the chapter on air operations.

Programs and Operations (U)

z(TE tlflia) Under the charter of OPLAN 34A SOG executed four types of
UW operations against NVN under the Footboy (C) program (the covername for
all SOG UW actions against Nerth Vietnam): Maritime Operations- Parboil (C);
Psychological Warfare Operations -Humidor (C); Airborne Operations-
Timberwork (C); and Air Operations - Midriff. (C). Later in 1965 SOG as-
sumed responsibility from the Fifth Special Forces Group for the conduct of
"-..

cross-border operations in southern Laos: the nickname of this operation

was Shining Brass (formerly called Delta under the auspices of the Special
Forces Command). Closely associated with the operations in Laos were those
conducted in the.Demilitarized Zone under the nickname of Nickel Steel.
In 1967, SOG commenced cross-border operations in Cambodia under the nick-

name of Daniel Boone.

Maritime Operations (U)

az(TC tlf8) Pa.rboil (C) Teams, consisting of third country nationals and
.,
indigenous personnel, staged out of Danang and covered ne.arly the entire
coastline of North Vietnam. They conducted missions of sabotage and
harassm~nt, intelligence collection, and psychological warfare. They were
particularly instrumental in disseminatingpropaganda in support of a fic-
titious resistance group, the Sacred Sword Patriots' League. Furthermore,
Parboil (C) Teams provid.ed the United States command with most of the hard
'' . .. \
'·
intelligence of the North Vietnamese coastline.

29
 ns NEQ} Air support requirements for Maritime Operations were
negligible. USAF air assets provided high- and medium-level aerial recon-
naissance, and occasionally were on call to assist in the event of an

emergency.

Psychological Warfare Operations (U)

a(TE tlfQ) The MACSOG Documentation Study acclaimed the Humidor (C)

operation to be the most successful program against North Vietnam. The

numerous North Vietnamese publications and broadcasts which denounced US
psychological warfare ope.rations evinced the effectiveness of these opera-
tions. Persistent demands for the cessation of such operations prior·to
"-
the commencement of peace negotiations further underlined Hanoi's fears of
the effects of US propaganda. A SACSA study addressed Hanoi's problem in
- 51
countering the Humidor (C) program:
•• ... Fa~ed with the problem of maintaining control and
developing motivation in a closed society under conditions
of extreme hardship, the Hanoi regime is sensitive to
every perceived threat to its control and motivation of
the population. Psychological operations which strike
at the spirit and morale of the. people are viewed with
great concern. . . The requirement for i)lcreased security
results in increased diversion of resources to internal
security. But, at the same time, the need to exert con-
trol at every level of government makes decentralization
necessary and this very decentralization places a sus-
pect element, the cadres, in a key position between the
masses and central authority. In this dilemma, the gov-
ernment tends to exaggerate every allied action which
has a potential .impact on these contradictory forces
and the resulting frustration is manifested in a series
of ad. hoc measl!res ·to counter allied psychological war-
fare efforts." ·
•(TJ nre) The importance attached to psychological warfare by the
US ,~o~mand was reflected in a 1967 statement by CINCPAC that .the entire
Footboy' program would be· better oriented toward two basic object·ives:

30
creation of a psychological. impact, and development of an intelligence
capability. Further, in his view all SOG actions against the NVN should
52
be designed to achieve those two ends .
..(TB fiJi~) SOG used three general categories of psychological warfare
operations -- black, gray, and white. Black operations attributed sponsor-
ship to the North Vietnamese or Viet Cong; gray operations made sponsor-
ship undiscernible; and white operations clearl'y gave the impression of US
or South Vietnamese sponsorship. Under all three categories, SOG disse-
minated a myriad of themes, both strategic and tactical. The former por-
trayed a better life without communism; the latter aimed at exploiting
specific time-sensitive vulnerabilities. Propaganda was disseminated by
-several means: radio broadcasts; dispatch of black letters; delivery of
leaflets, gift kits, and portable radios; and indoctrination of detained
. NVN citizens. T~e rapid expansion of the Humidor (C) program is reflected

by statistics showing the number of leaflets dispensed over North Viet-

nam: 67 million leaflets were delivered in 1965, 142 million during the
53
following year, and 271 mill.ion during 1967.
· a(TE rtFB) Psychological warfare operations a·lso became an integral
part of other SOG. operations. Maritime forces distributed propaganda
leaflets and gift kits along the NVN ~o.astline and abducted NVN citizens,
subjecting them to indoctrination at Paradise Island (near Danang).
Teams i~_filtrating into the Ho Chi Minh Trail Network deposited contamina-
ted ammunition and defective weapons in cache sites in an effort to under-
mine the NVA confidence in communist war materiel. Too, the Humidor (C)
pro~ra~ was particularly, integrated with Midriff (C) operatio~s since
aerial delivery was the principal means for delivering leaflets.

31
Airborne Operations (U)
'li tiFQ) The Timberwork (C) program entailed the infiltration, re-
inforcement, resupply, and exfiltration of agents and agent teams. It en-

countered immense difficulties under both CAS and SOG direction. Evalua-
tions of these operations revealed that they were largely ineffective, and
54
were, in fact, the least successful of the Footboy (C) sub-programs.
(Ti "m) When SOG took control of the long-term agent program, 169
agents were 1ocated at the training facility," Camp Long Thanh, and 24
agents (4 teams) were located iD North Vietnam. In 1964, SOG ·inserted
an additional team and conducted 13 reinforcement/resupply missions. By
the end of the year, 59 agents were~perating in NVN. They destroyed
55
- three bridges, conducted one ambush, and recruited two agents. Opera-
tions were co~tly: 54 agents were lost and less than 25 percent of the
. . 56
scheduled reinforcement/resupply missions were completed successfully.
ns NfQ} In 1965' SOG infiltrated 2 more teams and successfully
completed 22 reinforcement and resupply missions. Teams continued to
conduct harassment, destruction, and temporary interdiction missions along
Lines of Communication {LOCs); however, with theadvent of overt aerial
bombing and heightened concern over the buildup of Soviet and Chinese aid
to North Vietnam, greater emphasis was pl~ced on intelligence collection
and development of a broad intelligence base.
(TB JIFB) In an attempt to rejuvenate the program, SOG initiated an
operation to exfiltrate one of the long-termagent teams. This would
allow extensive interligence debriefing and feedback for the critique of
agent training. Furthermore,
'
a successful exfiltration would provide
,·
'' ·. '.
tangible evidence for trainees that exfiltration was possible: In the late

32
sulllller of 1965, SOG directed five members of one team to move overland to
Laos, where CAS assets would render assistance for evacuation to Vientiane.
Unfortunately, radio contact with the agent team was lost; presumably it
was captureQ by Pathet Lao. Later efforts to recover other long-term
agent teams also were i 11-fated .
.(IE tlf9) Nevertheless, SOG continued to expand its agent network in
North Vietnam in 1966, adding 3 more teams and accomplishing 28 reinforce-
ment and resupply missions. But the resupply effort was not enough. Teams
were expending greater effort to ensure their own survival. Some teams
were dormant due to the lack of supplies. One team, for example, had not
been resupplied since 1962. Even thUugh the introduction of helicopters
~and high performance aircraft partially alleviated resupply problems, and

the newly acqt:~ired C-130 Combat Talon aircraft {with sophisticated naviga-
tional equipment} also enhanced the SOG aerial delivery capability, ap-
praisal of airborne operations at the end of 1966 led to the developfl_lent
of n·ew airborne concepts. Two concepts imp 1emented during 1967 were the
diversionar,y agent program, .under the covername of Forae {C), and the
Short Term Roadwatch and Target Acquisition {STRATA) Operation. These
enhancements to Airborne Operations were designed to contravene NVN secu-
-'
rity measures, which were well-coordinated and extensive. The 1967 MACSOG
57
history stated:
The NVN government has intensified internal security
11

measures and has employed all available conmunications

media to make the population aware of the presence of
SVN 'spy-rangers' in their midst. In-place teams
continued-to encounter enemy forces and suffer casu-
alties as a result ..• the pressure now being exerted
by the enemy appears to be well organized and employed
" .\.
throughout NVN. 11 c

'

33
 (H tiED) Forae (C) played upon the NVN fear of agent operations, at-
tempting to divert even larger numbers of NVN militia and NVA personnel
to internal security functions. The program was not designed to deceive
the -enemy indefinitely. Even if the-North Vietnamese suspected bogus
agent drops and resupply missions, they could not ignore the potential

threat to internal security •

.,(TE tlfQ) Deception measures included dropping of supplies in areas

where no active agent teams were. located, parachuting NVA prisoners incri-
minated with false documents, dropping ice bJocks rigged in parachutes,
and making radio broadca$tS to fictitious teams.
(TE tiED) The STRATA concept of" operations had several advantages
over the long-term agent program.· Namely, successful exfiltration of agents
was more probable. The new· concept focused on intelligence collection
along lines of c01111lunication -- areas of key interest to higher authori-

ties. Data acquisition was more timely.

(Ui t'ED) The origin of the STRATA concept dated back to 1965, when

.SOG proposed the Early Warning Observation Team concept in response to

·,-

queries from the JCS and CINCPAC regarding the extent of external support
to NVN and logistics activity on major LOCs in the NVN panhandle. Concurrent
with that proposal, SOG requested and rece.ived authority to use helicopters
for infi_ltration. The concept then became workable after the Thai government
allowed. the transfer of OPLAN 34A agents from fixed-wing aircraft to
58 .
helicopters at Thai bases.
~rs NfD) In January 1967 a COMUSMACV message outlined the STRATA
con~~P~ of operations. Teams of five to fifteen indigenous p~_rsonnel \

34
were to infiltrate Laos or NVN by USAF or RVNAF helicopter., move overland
to a base camp in NVN, and perform 15 to 30-day missions to include:
installation of seismic devices, installation of wire tap devices, road-
watch of critical LOCs, reconnaissance and exact location of suspected
enemy locations, and target acquisition for airstrikes. The concept, as
approved by the JCS in April, specified a general operating area extending
50 kilometers inside the North Vietnamese border north of the Demili-
tarized Zone to 19 degrees N~rth. As noted above, USAF helicopters were
59
authorized to infiltrate the teams.
:e(TJ 14F5) SOG condu~ted two STRATA operations i.n late 1967, extracting
one of the teams after a successfullnission. In 1968 SOG inserted 24
teams; only one team was lost in entirety ana three teams suffered partial
losses. Hence, STRATA team survival rates were conside·rably higher than
60
those ex peri en ceQ by 1ong- te rrn agent teams.
(T8 UF5) The STRATA operationand most aspects of the Forae (C) op-
eration, as well as the waning long-term agent program, ceased on 1 Novem-
ber 1968. STRATA assets were then transferred to the Laos cross-border

operation.
(TS tiFB) The relatively poor performance of airborne operations over
"
the years may be explained partially by looking at· the various obstacles
which w~re endemic to such an operation. The following factors comprised

the ma~qr limitations:

. 1 •. North Vietnam, under a strong totalitarian regime, was a
closed society with efficient anti-subversion machinery.
2. High echelon control and mission approval/disapproval
" procedures impeded .the planning and execution of operati~ns.
' \

3. Diplomatic restrictions, such as the initial limitation

35
 on oyerflights of Laotian ·territory and on the use of Thai
facilities, restricted flexible planning of missions.
4. Terrain features and climatical conditions imposed severe
difficulties in achieving accurate aerial delivery of agents
and supplies. ·
5. ·The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong apparently had a good
intelligence collection system in. the vicinity of the Long
Thanh training facility and. possibly had secured information
sources in the South Vietnamese Strategic Technical Direc-
torate. · ·
6. There was not full cooperation between CAS Vientiane
and MACSOG.
7. The air defense system of NVN prevented operations in· the
vicinity of population centers for C-lc3 and C-130 aircraft.
8. A shortage of air assets limited the number of--combat
operations and training exercises.
9. Navigational aids on SOG fixed-wing·aircraft did not enable
pinpoint delivery accuracy in aerial drops over obscured drop
zones. ·
io. The-quality of.a~entpersonnel increasingly diminished;
poor motivation was manifested by high desertion and absen-
tee rates.
11. Heavy cloud cover and other missions of highe.r priority
sometimes denied SOG the necessary·aerial photography for
mission planning. ·

Cross-Border Operations in Laos (U)

(£ flf8) After assuming responsi9ility for cross-border operations in

Laos in October 1965, SOG intensified the-operations until 1968. The level
of activity was then stable until 1971, when 'the dearth of military assets,
. especia·,.ly air assets, prompted curtailment of these operations .
. (IS tlf8) At the outset of Shining Brass operations in -1965, US
active military involvement in Laos was surrounded by secrecy. To conceal
- thi~ involvement, Washington established stringent political constraints
. ' '

36
which were not removed until after the coi11Tlunists' control of the laotian

panhandle was firmly acknowledged.

( 15 NfQ) The initial Shining Brass operation plan envisioned three
phases of activity to be conducted by RVN forces with US support. The
objective of the first phase was to acquire short-term tactical intelli-
~ence. Phase Two entailed intelligence collection missions of longer dura-
tion in combination with limited harassing attacks, including ground direc-
tion of air strikes against lucrative targets. During this phase teams
were to be resupplied and reinforced by air. The final phase ·of the pro-
gram, which was never implemented, called for the development·of an active
61
resistance base among the indigenous. populace.
cz(TJ IIFB) In the last two months of 19&5, SOG commenced operations in
the Shining Brass Area of Operations. Penetrations into Laos were extremely
shaliow, primarily because the US Ambassador to laos prohibited the use of
helicopters for infiltration. The VNAF possessed a limited number of heli-
copters which could theoretically be used to support the cross-border pro-
gram, but their use was subject to the approval of the US Ambassador to
Laos. Citing the success of these initial operat'ions and noting the en-
hancement to be realized by using ~elicopter support for infiltration and
exfiltration of Shining Brass Teams, tOMUSMACV requested authority to
employ US helicopters for this purpose. He offered specific justification:
airborne delivery of te~ms would improve the_security of teams by reducing
the distance to be traveled by foot through hostile territory. Too, this
type of infiltration would lengthen in-place time and reduce the require-
ments for aerial resupply. In April 1966 the Department of State and
" . ' 62
DOD responded favorably, authorizing the 1JS helicopter insertion method . .

37
 •
ns "SA) Another instrumental decision in 1966 had considerable ef-·
feet on· the evolution of the Shining Brass program: the Secretary of
Defense authorized the organization of three battalions of Exploitation
Forces (EF) for the execution of Phase Two of the operation plan. These
forces, sometimes referred to as reaction forces or .. Hornet forces, .. were
capable of rapid engagement of targets developed by smaller reconnaissance
teams. Specific missions of the EF battalions included the following:
platoon and multi-platoon size elements to conduct reconnaissance-in-force,
route interdiction, ambushes and raids; to establish and secure temporary
patrol bases to support wide-area reconnaissa·nce team operations; and to
provide short-term area denial .and cache destruction capabilities.
(TE JIFQ) The Exploitation Forces thus <:omplemented the reconnaissance
teams, known a_s Spi,ke Teams. These smaller teams were trained to perform
. .
.a myriad of specialized missions, to include area and point reconnais-
sance, road and river watch, route mining and ambush, prisoner of war cap-
,ture, bomb damage assessment, ground photography, communication wire tap,
hand emplacement of sensor .devices, direction of artillery and airstrikes
on detected targets, and 1imited direct ground .combat.
s(TO JIJiilil) ·The tempo of reconnaissance team operations in Laos increased
•
dramatically in 1966. An average of two operations per month rose to
approximately 11 per month by the end of the year. Exploitation Force
· operations commenced ·in June and averaged about two each month for the re-
mainder of the year. This e·xpanding trend continued in 1967 a·s restric-
tions on the use of helicopters and geographical boundaries were eased.
Furt~ermore, the JCS auth,orized larger exploitation forces to participate
in operations, allowing a·combined force of three platoons on any one op-
63
eration.
38
 {IS NFQ) The development of two new concepts in 1967, Muscle Shoals
and Search~Locate-Annihilate-Monitor (SLAM), placed greater requirements
on the Shining Brass program. The Mus·c 1e Shoa 1s program was a DOD-
conceived anti-infiltration system, entailing the emplacement of electronic
sensors along the Ho Chi Minh Trail by aircraft and ground teams and SLAM
was a type of exploitation operati,on. Reconnaissance teams were to search
for and locate the enemy, reaction forces were to exploit the intelligence,
and a stay-behind force was to monitor the area after the withdrawal of
64
the exploitation force.
ns t' 5 9) In 1968 the salient feature of the progr.am (renamed P~airie

Fire on 1 March 1967) was the high nUmber of ·operations conducted in-
country versus the number of operations conducted in Laos. Only after the
cessation of the Communist Spring-Winter Campaign did SOG resume its pri-
mary cross-border. mission. During the communist offensive, SOG support
to the in-country conventional military forces allowed only 17 percent of
the Prairie Fire (PF) efforts to be freed for cross-border operations.
Another reason for the diver.sion of efforts from Laos to South Vietnam was
;,.

the loss of two Forward Operating Bases -- Khe Sanh and Kham Due. After
the communist threat in South Vietnam diminished during the last three
months of the year, SOG directed three-quarters of its PF operations in
65
laotian_territory. By this time, however, NVA security elements in laos
. had bec.qme much more effective in countering-Prairie Fire operations, as
indicated by shorter stay-times of the teams and more frequ·ent resort to
66
emergency team extractions.
"(JSt'FP~ Actions offsetting these limitations were incr~ased reliance
'. . ~ \

on indigenous personnel and establishment of a launch facility at Nakhon

39
._____L____________ _ _ _ c•r•ET
 Phanom, Thailand. Although the US Ambassador to laos had disapproved
a SOG request to develop a resistance base among indigenous elements, he
permitted their use in intelligence collection activities. The support
racility at_Nakhon Phanom permitted insertion in the Prairie Fire Area
of Operations {PFAO) by using western approach routes, lessening the enemy
threat to air assets, and enhancing the covertness of PF operations.
Additionally, flight paths originating in Thailand vice the central high-
lands of the RVN were inhibited less frequently by inclement weather con-
67
diti ons.
The addition of another Thai launch facility in 1969 at
uH£ tlliQ)
..
Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base bett~red the flexibility in launching teams
-into the southern Prairie Fire zone. Concurrently, CAS Vientiane granted
permission for Thai-based helicopters to use a refueling and staging site
. located on the B~lovens Plateau. Another major development during 1969
which reflected the greater emphasis being placed on the southern PFAO,
the tri-border area, was the establishment of the Command and Control De-
tachment at Kontum. These. d~velopments were complemented by other inno-
. ~

vations, such as the activation of mobile launch teams to accompany recon-

naissance and expioitation elements to forward operating bases and to
serve as field command elements.
.
Another.new effort was the Earth Angel
program, whereby SOG used NVA defectors who volunteered to work as agents
in laos and Cambodia. These developments enabled SOG to conduct rela-
tively successful operations throughout 1969 at a tempo comparable to that
of 1968 operations. The most notable problem encountered was the shortage
68
of helicopters; loss rat~s during the year were inordinately ~igh.
" ·,

(Tfi flf8) Maintaining the same level' of operations in 19l0, SOG

40
• implemented more versatile methods of infiltration to include High
Altitude-low Opening (HALO) drops from C-123s and C-130s. Replacement of

• the CH-3 helicopter by the CH-53 also enhanced infiltrationcapabilities.

•
Better coop~ration between SOG and American authorities in laos -- the
Embassy and CAS -- resulted in the authority to insert teams outside of
69

- the Area of Operations (AO) for overland movement into target areas .
.-(T8 fiFO) Prairie Fire operations (renamed Phu Dung in 1971) con-

-kJ tinued at a comparable level in 1971; however, the enemy's improved de-
fensive posture resulted in a reduction of team stay-time by more than
one-third. To crjeate naw drop and landing zones, SOG relied on the Com-

- mando Vault program, whereby C-130 a; rcraft de 1i vered 15, 000-pound bombs
-which cleared such zones. This method proved to be effective if recon-

• naissance teaf!1S were inserted immediately after the "LZ (landing zone)

-
blow." As durin~ 1970, operations were characterized by greater cooperation
between CAS and SOG. This was particularly true in support of lam Son

- 719, the ARVN incurs ion into laos early in 1971. By that time, US per-
sonnel were prohibited from participation.'in cross-border operations in

-
70 .
consonance with JCS message dated 8 February 1971:

-
(1 5 Q'FP) Phu Dung operations ceased in 1972 after a steady drawdown
of supporting air assets. On 15 May, " SOG was deactivated and was re-

-d designated the Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team with an

advisory staff of 158 personnel.
n( 1 f PIPQ) Numerous study groups at MACV, CINCPAC, and the Pentagon

.. reviewed and evaluated the cross-border efforts in laos.

and recommendations were contradictory.
Their conclusions
Merits of the program were that

.a.
\\ • I

SOG teams provided one of the few sources'of hard inte 11 i gence' on the

41
ld
 Lao-Vietnamese border area and the Demilitarized Zone and that exploita-
tion operations achieve~ a high kill ratio of enemy forces to friendly
forces. The degree of disruption on enemy logistics could not be deter-
mined but~.undoubtedly, SOG operations caused the diversion of enemy
armed forces to provide internal security in the Phu Dung area. The major
drawback of the program was its cost. Operations resulted in numerous air-
. craft losses, especially helicopter losses, and placed heavy demands on a
.
limited number of air assets available in the RVN. A compilation of the
alert time of SOG-dedicated air assets during periods when teams were in
the field would permit a.better estimate of program costs, but these data
\'Jere not available. Furthermore, study of such data may not have been
-productive according to the COMUSMACV Ad Hoc-Evaluation Group formed in
December 1967. The group stated that SOG operations should not be subject
71
to a cost-effectiveness analysis.
(lE flf8) Evaluations revealed that in-country conventional military
forces were critical of SOG cross-border operations. One comment from
the Ad Hoc Evaluation Group took issue with the focus of the intelligence
collection efforts, noting that there should be "~reater orientation to
satisfy the needs.of the Field Forces" (the US Army forces engaged in
72
conventional operations in RVN). T~e group also alluded to a Seventh
73
Air Force appraisal of the Phu Dung program:
"According to Seventh Air Force, SOG-produced intell i-
.. gence has been of minor value to 7AF for the development
of tactical air and Arc Light [B-52 strikes] targets.
With the exception of a Prairie Fire location of a truck
part repair facility in the southeast sector which re-
sulted in an Arc Light, and the provision of initial
information of the Santa Fe trail net, information has
\\
been limited to minor troop concentrations, trail nets,
·and storage facilities. It appears, however, that the

42
•tl Prairie Fire intelligence contribution to Arc Light
targeting is greater than indicated by 7AF representa-
tives."

• 4If t1F8) The overall finding of the Ad Hoc Evaluation Group's review

was more favorable to SOG cross-border operations in Laos than the afore- .

• .
mentioned Seventh Air Force view. It stated:
74

•
"Prairie Fire operations have been effective and have
achieved significant results in harassing and slowing
the enemy. They have caused the enemy to shift some of

•lit
his infiltration routes to areas further from South Viet-
nam with a consequent increased time for transit and a
greater opportunity for tactical air exploitation. .
Prairie Fire operations have caused the enemy to be con-
cerned for his Lines of Communications and to expend his
resources on security that might otherwise be employed in
South Vi'etnam. · These operations also have contributed
significantly to the targeting of areas for concentrated
airstrikes which have been effective. Prairie Fire personnel
kills have been signifi·cant although the ratio of enemy
killed to friendlies killed and missing has not been as
hig~ as in-country ratios."

Cross~Border Operations in Cambodia (U)

..(T!S tWN As ear1y as 1965, COMUSMACV became concerned about the

• enemy's use of Cambodian territory as a sanctuary and requested·authority

•
from Washington to conduct limited US actions aga.inst
., communists up to five
kilometers inside the Cambodian border. He proposed the use of specially-

• trained reconnaissance units comprise9 of indigenous and US personnel for

missions of intelligence coll~ction and verification. Infiltration was

•.. envisioned to be by foot or by helicopter. COMUSMACV also advocated the

1imited. ·use of forward air controller/observation aircraft and tactical

fighters.
75

- .(.liE tiFB) In late 1965 and early 1966, planning for cross-bomber op-

- era~ions into Cambodia e'nsued. In June 1-?66, the JCS approve~ a CINCPAC

43
 recommendation to organize, train, and equip a paramilitary force for these
operations. During the remainder of the year, the Fifth Special Forces
76
Group trained the force.
#B FIF8) Pending the ot:Jtcome of a joint Defense-State-CIA Study Group
which was considering diplomatic an,d psychological initiatives, CINCPAC
r~quested authority from the JCS in April 1967 to conduct limited ground

reconnaissance operations in the Cambodian sector of the tri-border region. ·

In May, the JCS approved the proposal, with State Department concurrence,
but added stringent restrictions. Coordination procedures ensured strong
control from Washington .. The size of the teams and number of operations
authorized for a given time frame were 1imited. Helicopters could be used
- _·for emergency extractions only. The employment of exp·loitation forces and
77
tactical airstrikes was prohibited.
( 35 NFQ) ~fter commencement of Daniel Boone (DB) operations and sub-

sequent review, COMUSMACV requested the removal of some constraints. Al-

though many·were lifted, the State Department continued to exert a restrain-
ing force in the interest of resuming dip_lomatic relations with the Cam-
bodian government .. The revised operating authorities did, however, allow
expansion of the 'area of operations, permit the use of helicopters for
.
insertion and extraction, and authorize the use of FAC aircr-aft for Visual
Reconnaissance (VR} of target areas and for airborne control of helicopter
gunships and trooplift ships during infiltration and exfiltration of
reconnaissance teams. A JCS message stated that all FAC flights would be
on a mission essential basis and. of minimum duration, and reconnaissance
fli~h~s would be limiteq to two per Daniel Boone mission. FAC flights
over Zone Bravo [the southern sector of the AO] would have to'be approved

44
 78
on a case-by-:case basis at the Washington level.
~TJ flli8) &v the end of 1967 SOG had launched 99 Reconnaissance Team
missions from forward operating bases along the Cambodian border, mostly
in the tri-border region .. Sixty-three teams successfully penetrated ·
Cambodian territory. The MACV Ad Hoc Evaluation Group assessed the Daniel
Boone program as potentially valuable since it was the only ground intelli-
gence effort in Cambodia for MACV use, but it stated that intelligence
results had been fragmentary and low-level and not particularly suited to
the needs of MACV and the Field Forces. Addressing the use of helicopters,
. 79
the Group noted the limited quantity·of assets. It stated:
"Daniel Boone was initiat~o without the provision of
helicopter assets specifically for these operations with
the resultant drawdown on limited helicopter resources
for support of operations in the RVN. Prior to any
expansion of DB operations, helicopter resources in addi-
tion to those currently in the RVN should be obtained
for SOG support."
z(TE tiFii?) Acquisition of additional rotary wing assets engendered
rapid expansion of the program. The number of operattons doubled in 1968,
but, as in the case of Prairie Fire operations, the major effort was direc-
·;,

ted in-country in reaction to the Communist offensive. After the offen-

sive subsided SOG resumed its primary mission and by the end of September
was conducting 95 percent of the Daniel Boone operations in Cambodia. The
JCS relaxed some restrictions, but due to the State Department's insistence
80
continu.~d to ban the use of tactical airstril<es and exploitation forces •

. (.Is tiFB) A particularly interesting development during 1968 was the

formation of the Vesuvius Committee in January. This committee, consisting
of MACYJ2 and MACSOG representatives, compiled a list of targ~ts of hard
' \

intelligence value to demonstrate to the Cambodian Prime Minister,

45
 n the boun-
uk, the ex ten siv e pre sen ce of Vietnamese communists wi thi
Sihano
81
da rie s of Cambodia.
atic rel ati on s with the Cam-
( 13-NPD} In the following ye ar diplom
les s rig id
gov ern me nt we re reo pen ed, enabling SOG to operate under
bodia n
ducting
int s. Se ver al no tew ort hy innovations were adopted in con
co ns tra
ert ion
era tio ns suc h as the fir st use of he lic op ter paradrop ins 82
the op
9 -- Salem Ho use .
umed a new nickname in 196
methods. The program als o ass.
granted
an of the. Jo int Chiefs of St aff
(T!I fiFQ) -I n 1970, the Chairm
s. CINCPAC
cit au tho rit y for SOG tea ms to contro 1 tac tic al air str i ke·
ex pli
for ce s. On
au tho riz ed the em plo ym ent of pla too n-s ize ex plo ita tio n
lat er
the Air
, a JCS me ssa ge app rov ed an 'expansion of the AO, forming
20 Ap ril
al AO. The
tio n Zon e (al so ca lle d Fre edom Deal)-west of the ori gin
·In ter dic
hte rs
str i~e in th is zon e oc cu rre d on 24 April when tac tic al fig
fir st air
au tho rit ies
150 cor rm uni st tro op s in ope n ter rai n. Other sig nif ica nt
caught
nic
rin g the ye ar inc lud ed the following: in fil tra tio n of eth
granted du
so rs, and
ans , em pla cem ent of mi nes in the AO, emplacement of sen
Cambodi 83
tar ge ts of op po rtu nit y.
the use of ar til ler y agains~
months of
I ltF8 )s Af ter the Al lie d inv asion of Cambd'dia during the
(T!
use program.
Jun e, pu hli c ann oun cem ent s were binding on the Salem Ho
May and
o Cambodia;
nel cou ld no lon ge r acc om pany reconnaissance teams int
US person
m lea de rsh ip
the Re pu bli c of Vie tna m (AR VN) personnel assumed the tea
Army of
op lif t he li-
ibi lit ies . Fu rth erm ore , Wa shington banned the use of US tro
res po ns
he lic op ter gunships and tac84 tic al air
and pe rm itte d the use of US
co pte rs
ly wh en suc h sup po rt was bey ond the means of the VNAF.
ass ets on
imposed co ns tra int s, the lev el of SOG
rNE D) De spi te ~he rec en tly .
,, {IS
.

g 1971. Although'there was a

·. .

bod ia rem ain ed sta ble du rin

op era tio ns in Cam
46
I,. trend toward greater .emphasis on interdiction operations, the basic mis-

.. sion remained one of intelligenc e collection and verificatio n.

vious year•s extensfon of ~he area of operations allowed more extensive
The pre-

-
reconnaissance efforts of western waterways. Too, refined infiltration
techniques using SOG fixed-wing assets permitted deeper, undetected inser-

• tion. The continued high level of operations was attributabl e, in part,

to the acquisition of STRATA assets for Cambodian operations and volunteers

•
I[J
from the Cambodian Army. The latter were used in an attempt to develop an
indigenous UW capability until they were wit_hdrawn by their Government in
October 1971 .
85

..(liB ltf8) Subsequent to 1971, Thot Not (nickname changc:d after a

compromise of Salem House) operations were not distinguish ed by new tech-

niques or significant changes in operating authorities . Operations

dwindled rapidly .due to the paucity of air assets remaining in the RVN ih
the·acceler ated phase-down of American military presence.

Personnel Recovery Operations (U)

(TB UFB) T~e escalating US military activity in SEA resulted in in-
creased numbers of Americans who were falling into enemy hands or being
classified as Missing-in-Action (MIA):- This gave rise to growing concern
among American officials and prompted them to seek ways to recover American
prisoners and to resolve the MIA problem. In the summer of 1964, the
Prisoner and Detainee Committee of the US Embassy in Saigon recommended to
Ambassador Maxwell Taylor that an organizatio n be formed to coordinate
86
personnel recovery operations~ The recommendation was passed through
,, .... ..
- COMUSMACV to MACVJ2, but no concrete actign was taken during the next 18

47
 months. ln December 1965, interest in forming a viable personnel recovery
or.ganization was rejuvenated at an Escape and Evasion (E&E) Planning

• Converence at Pacific Co_mmand (PACOM) Headquarters. CINCPAC directed

COMUSMACV to take action.· An Air Force Colonel from Thirteenth Air Force,

••• Col Aderholt, coordinated and formalized the concept with MACVJ5 in May 1966.
On 17 September 1966 COMUSMACV officially activated the Joint Personnel
Recovery Center. The JPRC also was known as the Recovery Studies element
. 87
within the SOG organizational structure.
a.k"FS tiER) h'ithout delay the JPRC attempted its first recovery opera-
tion. Interrogation reports of a VietCong rallier.and low-level aerial
photography pinpointed the location~f a prison camp where an American
-prisoner allegedly was detained. A company-sized unit infiltrated the area
and found a bonafide prison camp, but it had been vacated prior to the ar-
- 88
rival of the ·raiding party. These circumstances were repeated throughout
the history of the· JPRC. later: improvements in concepts and techniques
did, however, result in the return of numerous ARVN/RVN personnel.
(IE tWR) SOG prisoner recovery actiyities were not limited to camp
raids. Agents were responsible for establishing ~nd monitoring E&E nets.
SOG continually mbnitored Safe Areas for Evasion (SAFE) zones. It also
prepositioned air-deliverable surviva1 kits throughout Southeast Asia. It
. disseminated E&E letters to operational units on a monthly basi~ to be used
. by evadees in identifying their locations to..overflying aircraft. SOG
briefed aircrews about the JPRC mission. It maintained liaison with military
and other gdvernmental agencies, particularly with the intelligence
conmunity, establishing intelligence collection requirements and ensuring
\\ '. I ,· .

the flow of pertinent information regarding us detainees and evadees· to

48
 the JPRC. ·In fact, the JPRC became the largest depository for such in-
formation in Southeast Asia. Its program was closely interwoven with the

•..
I
psychological warfare program; JPRC personnel assisted in developing a
reward program to pay sources of information leading to the recovery of
US servicemen detained or missing and to the return of remains of US

•
servicemen. Aerial leaflet drops throughout mainland Southeast Asia pro-
. 89
vided the primary means for publicizing the reward program.

- ..( E flf8) The mast unique capabi 1ity used by the JPRC for personne 1
recoveries was the Fulton Recovery System, a system integral to the. SOG

• C-130 Combat Spear aircr{lft. This system enabled rescue attempts in hos-

•
tile areas inaccessible to friendlY"-9round forces. This type of operation·
- co11111enced with the delivery of a special kit- by air. The kit contained

• a harness, nylon line, and. balloon assembly.

cove~ed
The individual to be re-
would don the harness and release the inflated balloon which ex-

• tended the line for a C-130 to snatch during a low-level 'pass over the sur-

•
vivor. When the line was secured in a forked device Qn the nose of the
90
aircraft, it was reeled into the aircraft.
(6 tiFQ) After encouraging test results of the Fulton system, the
· JPRC familiarized SEA aircrews with its operation and prepositioned Fulton
kits at several locations for subsequent delivery by high performance air-
craft in the event a Fulton recovery attempt were to be executed.
(I£ N&D) The first actual recovery attempt using the Fulton system
invo.lved two downed crew members located deep in North Vietnam. Opera-
tion Gambler, as it was called, began on 21 May 1967 when F-:-4 aircraft
dropped kits in the vicinity of the survivors. Unfortunately, North
\' '

Vietnamese security elements recovered the packages, forcing the Combat

49
 Spear aircraft to abort its pick-up mission. As a consequence of this
91
attempt, SOG expressed the limitations of the Fulton system:
The Fulton Recovery System has proven to J:>e of doubt-.
11

ful use in the recovery of aircrews downed in hostile

environments. If SAR forces are unable to recover downed
airmen due to the presence of hostile troops, automatic
weapons, antiaircraft artillery, etc., it is extremely
unlikely that the use of the Fulton system will succeed
where they have failed. The drop of a Fulton kit to a
downed aircrew may give away their position, and the
amount of time required to retrieve and activate the
kit gives hostile forces ample time to locate and cap-
ture the aircrew, or prepare an ambush for the Combat
Spear HC-130 m~king the pickup ...
..(IE PIED) Insertion of ground teams, known as Bright Light Teams,
was normally the method used to search for and attempt ·to recover evadees.
-......
These operations were costly however, and the expectation of succes.s was
low:
a {Is DIFPr Raids on Prisoner of War (POW} camps were equally unsuccess-
ful. For example; prior to 1968 the JPRC conducted 16 such raids with one
success -- freeing 20 Vietnamese prisoners. Thirteen scheduled raids were
92
cance 11 ed.

0
rrs Nf~ In trying to improve the recovery record, MACV delegated
the authority to ~onduct in-country prisoner recovery operations to the US
conventional military forces, i.e., tpe Field Forces. The decentralization
of the planning and conduct of. P.W recovery operations was designed to
quicken the exploitation to perishable intelligence regarding suspected
prison ·s-ites where Americans were detained .
. ( 13-NFO) Out-of-country Pow· recovery operations remained under the
purview· of SOG, and for operations planned for targets in North Vietnam,
- Wasllington approval was 'required on a case-by-case
' basis. For commando
\

50
 raids aimed at POW sites in Laos and Cambodia, extensive coordination with ·
military and governmenta 1 agencies often preempted rapid response to:time-
sensitive intelligence. In raids planned for the Salem House AO, SOG had
to coordinate with the JCS, ClNCPAC, COMUSMACV, and the US Embassies in
Saigon and Phnom Penh. For the Prairie Fire AO, it had to clear the opera-
tion with COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, and the American ·Embassy in Vientiane.
Naturally, these encumbrances resulted in less frequent forays across the

• border for POW recoveries. A later agreement among SOG, CAS Udorn, and

•
CAS Vientiane in 1969 streamlined coordination procedures: MACV assets
were to be used only wheR CAS assets were inadequate an~ only under the

•ill operational control of CAS Udorn.

to ameliorate the situation.
The new operating procedures did little

:e(TS ltP8) _ In-country POW raids, free from extensive coordination re-

••
quirements inherent to cross-border POW recovery operations, experienced
an upturn in 1968, largely due to the employment of local forces. Eight

•.. out of 32 attempts were profitable, recovering 155 South Vietnamese mili-
tary and political prisoners.
(If PIFQ)
93 .
The JPRC assisted in these efforts •
The favorable trend continued over the next two years. In

-..
1969, 18 raids initiated and conducted by conventional units resulted in
the release of 112 allied prisoners. "' One.critically wounded US ·soldier was
recovered, but he died shortly afterward. The JPRC assisted in planning

.. 11 suc~!aids during the year, one of which recovered five ARVN prisoners .
During the following year, POW recovery operations rescued 100 South

.,
. 94
Vietnamese prisoners .
" Cyf Beginning. in 1970, Washington-level policymakers
tiFQ) . . evinced
greater concern over POW recovery efforts ' and resolution of the
' status of
Ill
the Missing-in-Action. Bright Light operations~ particula~ly Crash Site
Inspection operations, received higher priority. COMUSMACV responded to
the new pressure by issuing a Bright Light Operation Plan in October 1970.
L~ter, SOG established a tactical operations center under the concept of a
Joint Recovery Task Force (JRTF). The purpose of the task force was des-.
. 95
cri bed in ,a COMUSMACV message, dated 6 June 1971 :
"A Joint Recovery Task Force will be established to
conduct primarily aut of country and to a lesser extent,
in country PW/escapee recovery operations. MACVSOG will
provide both the command and control staff and the prin-
cipal ground element of the JRTF. These US-led and ad-
vised elements \'lill be rapidly task organized to meet
the requiremen~s of the tactical situation. Required
ground reserve.forces and air assets will be provided as
appropriate by USARF [US Army, Vietnam] and Seventh Air
Force from units previously earmarked to support re-
covery operations." -
(Related SOG proposals to reintroduce US ground elements into Laos, to
. acquite better intelligence, were not approved by the JCS.)
c(:TIS) The establishment of the Joint Recovery Task Force, under the
operational control of the Chief, MACSOG, received enthusiastic ·support at·
CINCPAC and the CAS/SOG Conference at Udorn. Seventh Air Force dissented,
however, contending that demands for air assets were excessive under in-
creasingly restrictive headspace levels .
..
~TE flf8) On 15 March 1972, approximately one year after its forma-
tion, the JPRC was removed from SOG and placed within MACVJ2. Tasked air
resources were returned to the operational control of the Commander, 7AF.
Its success in POW recovery attempts during 1971 and 1972 was minimal;
25 POW recovery attempts freed only nine South Vietnamese prisoners. It
was"no~ a fitting end to. an otherwise more profitable venture, in which the
. JPRC aided in the recovery of 492 South Vietnamese prisoners and the return
of 101 bodies of deceased US personnel.
52
 •t. CHAPTER IV
AIR OPERATIONS (U)

• ..(S DIFQ)
-
MACSOG air operations began as a relatively minor effort in

• 1964 and expanded rapidly until 1970, when dwindling air assets caused the
trend to begin to reverse. This unique saga of air warfare finally phased

• out in 1972. The full extent of the USAF contribution to the SOG UW pro-

•
gram cannot be measured accu:ately. The ample statistics which relate part
of the story fail to capture the color of the SOG missions and the men who
performed them .
5
&15Q}_ The USAF members participating in SOG ope_rations were hi.ghly

•
.(

"-
dedicated and well-trained; they operated sophisticated aircraft to support
. -

••
unusual missions. The organization itself was unusual. It was flexible
and divorced from standard command and control channels.· Cover stories
and stringent security procedures wrapped it in a mantle of secrecy .
fiS-NfQl The First Flight Detachment, the 90th Special Operations

• Squadron (formerly designated the 15th SOS), and the 20th Special Opera-

•
tions Squadron were three units situated in the RVN which were almost ex-
elusively dedicated to supp.ort SOG operations.· The respective aircraft of

-•• these units were the "Heavy Hook"

helicopter.
C-123, "Combat Spear" C-130, and UH-1
,
This chapter focuses on these units and aircraft; Part I
covers fixed wing assets and Part II addresses rotary wing assets. Although
a discussion of Air Force units not dedicated predominantly to the support
d of SOG is not included, this does not imply that their contribution was

- insignificant.

,
The 504th Tactical Air Support Group and the 56th Special
·Opex:attons Wing contributed immeasurably to the SOG mission by their pro-
'
vision of 0-1, 0-2, and.OV-10 FAC/Observation aircraft, and A-1, CH-3, and
\

53
 CH-53 assets. Additionally, tactical fighter aircraft exploited lucrative
targets reported by SOG teams and provided close air support during
emergency extractions. Fighters also dropped resupply kits to agent teams
and Evasion/Survival kits in areas where US evadees were suspected. Recon-
naissance aircraft supplied needed photographic and electronic intelligence.
Cargo aircraft rendered logistical support. Airborne platforms provided
radio relay support.
Part I: Fixed Wing Assets (U)
Heavy Hook Project (U)
..(T8 llP8) In 1963 the Secretary of Defense directed that six C-123
aircraft be modified with special n~vigational and electronic counter-
measure equipment for use in an unconventionil warfare role against North
96
Vietnam. · The.project name was Duck Hook, later renamed Heavy Hook.
(19 nre) First Flight Detachment, located at Nha Trang Air Base, was
responsible for the supervision of the Heavy Hook program under the opera-
tional control of the Chief, MACSOG. Its first aircraft arrived on 28 June
. 97
1964; its first combat mission was flown on 16 December.
0 (rs NEQ) First year activitie~ included negotiating contracts, or-

• ganizing the unit, and developing operating procedures. A small contingent

of five USAF officers and four enlisted men, clothed in mufti and identi-

• fied by fictitious names, began to perform their primary mission: training

•
and sup~_rvising Chinese Air Force aircrews •. -(Only the Chinese crews were
authorized to fly combat missions over North Vietnam.) Initially, First
Flight personnel were ·also responsible for administering similar training to
Vietpa~se Air Force crews; this program, however, never achi~ved lasting
'·
success.

54
 eH tlriB) In 1964 the unit encountered several problems which delayed
attainment of operational .status. Organizational, personnel, and mainte-
nance problems were most prominent. Factors over which First Flight had
no control,_such as political constraints, inclement weather, enemy
countertactics, and aircraft operational limitations, also hampered ini-
tial operations.
ns DI£N The unit suffered from the lack of specific guidelines and
directives covering its formation. In the haste to organize, higher
authorities neglected to task individual Service components to support SOG;
hence, SOG experienced difficulty in acquiring the necessary
.
qualified.
personnel and equipment. OPLAN 34A'did not address air operations in
·detail; it only stated broad requirements for training aircrews in mine-
laying and fo~ installing special equipment on six C-123 aircraft. The
plan did not spe~ify flying hour and sortie requirements nor related mat-
ters upon which a systematic evaluation of the validity of six aircraft
could be based. An Air Force officer assigned to SOG elaborated on inci-
98
pient problems:
"[There was] no clear statement as to ;ho was responsible
for pro~iding the ... [aircraft]. There was confusion in
SOG as to how they were to be configured. What was the
method of sanitization and to what extent? To the Air
Force, sanitizing the aircraft meant completely removing
all identification marks and serial numbers from the
aircraft. and all of its component parts, black boxes,
and so forth, so that nothing on the aircraft could be
officially traced to the US. This-is an expensive and
· · time-consuming process since the aircraft had to be com-
pletely disassembled and reassembled. The decision was
then made to merely paint the airplane, {an?] remove tail
numbers and mai.n records from the aircraft."
(15 lfPIS) Inexperience in unconventional warfare activities among per-
,, ·· ....
sonnel initially assigned to Air Operatio~s was a major problem in the

55
 99
formulative period. An Air Force officer related the problem:
'' .•. none of the original Air Force personnel assigned to
MACSOG had any previous background in unconventional
warfare operations. This was despite the fact that at
Hurlburt the Air Force had a group of personnel trained
and experienced in such operations. The result:
MACSOG merely continued to do what CAS had been doing
without any real change in direction, scope, or effect
of the program i tse 1f."
Another officer cited the specific shortage of instructor pilots at First
100
Flight Detachment:
" ... one of the first problems we encountered was our_
shortage of instructor pilots for training Chinese crews.
We had fighter pilots, but none had been checked out in
C-123 aircraft~ Consequently, we had to obtain instruc-
tor pilots from the Air Force."
:::.(IE flfi8) First Flight's unique relationship to higher Air Force
authorities created several peculiar orga~izatinnal problems. Aircraft
accident investigation procedures attracted criticism. Since the aircraft
were not carried ·in the Air Force inventory, but because crewmembers were
attached to the Air Force, the question arose as to who was responsible
_to investigate. Standardized procedures were not implemented until_after
the third aircraft accident. The scope of the pr9blem extended beyond
accident ·investig~tion standards. Headquarters Pacific Air Forces (PACAF)
contended that the initially high non;operational rates were attributable
to non-conformance to Air Force standing operating procedures and safety
101
regulations.
(T8' ltPB) From the beginning of First Flight, maintenance support
became a controversial topic. During 1964 the United States Government
and the Government of the Republic of China negotiated at length on
- mairl'tenance procedures for the Heavy Hook,aircraft. Agreement, was finally

56
•
•
reached in November 1964, China Airli11es (CAL) was contacted for rear
echelon maintenance and USAF was tasked for flightline maintenance.
though the US was reluctant to grant major maintenance responsibilities to
Al-

CAL, subsequent appraisal of the arrangement revealed that CAL's support

was commendable. One SOG member stated:
"The maintenance we received from
102
the Chinese was far superior to that we had been receiving from Clark AB."
J.H DIF8) Even prior to First Flight's acquisition of the Heavy Hook
aircraft, SOG questioned its·suitability for the mission. ·Although the
aircraft possessed equipment enabling it to perform low-level,- long-range
combat missions over hostile and mountainous·. terrain, SOG requested a re-
placement aircraft, presumably the ~-130, by the close ·o·f.l964. The 1964
11
-Corrmand History related this dissatisfaction_with the C-123: The C-123
load capacity, operating range, and inability to fly in adverse weather
103
greatly hampered airborne operations." A letter from the Airborne Opera-
tions Section, dated 30 December 1964, further alluded to navigational and
104
delivery limitations of the C-123. It stated:
"Reports from in-place teams indicate that resupply ·bundles
are landing too far from drop zones. Distances involved
range from 1000 to 3000 meters. Teams spend anywhere
from two to seven days locating the bundles because of
the rugged terrain and dense vegetation surroun.di ng the
drop zones." ·
(1 5 hWD) Not a 11 factors inhibiting· success of ai_r support to agent
operations were inherent to the aircraft. Adverse weather conditions and
inadequate weather reporting constituted major hindrances to operations.
The 1964 Command History noted that "the DRV as a whole has some of the
105
poorest flying weather in the world." Regarding weather reporting, the
106
finst .$0G commander said:

57
 •• I stress the importance of weather reporting in this
type [airborne] of operation. Once we were able to

•
obtain the benefits of the satellite weather program,
we had a fine weather facility- and this was a real asset
to effective operations."
Training of OPLAN 34A agent teams in basic weather reporting procedures
later enhanced the effectiveness of their air support.
(H tiFQ) f'olitical constraints imposed by higher authorities re-
stricted the overflight of politically sensitive and high threat areas.
For example, flight within 20 miles of the Chinese border or within the
immediate vicinity of Hanoi was prohibited. The restriction of Heavy Hook
flights within the, effective. range of known Anti -Ai rcra.f_t Artillery {~AA)
and Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) sites became more cumbersome with the
proliferation of these sites in reaction to 1nitiation of overt air activity
107
in 1965.

CHINAT and VNAF Training (U)

(It PIFQ) A Memorandum of Understanding between the United States
Government and the Government of the Republic of China (GRC), signed on
19 September 1964, defined the terms and consider.ations under which Chinese
Nationalist {CHINAT) aircrews were to participate in OPLAN 34A activities.
Seven Chinese Air Force aircr~ws were-selected in March 1964 to begin
training in the Heavy Hook aircraft. They comprised the Thirty.;Fourth CAF
Squadron, the counterpart organization to First Flight Detachment. After
experiencing a delay in the commencement of training because of the wait
for proper security clearances, the aircrews attended language training
at Lackland Air Force Base {AFB), followed by combat crew training at
,, . •
- Hurlburt Field {April to July 1964). Some members attended ECM training

58
 at Ma.ther AFB~ . loadmasters and radio operators received training at Taiwan.
The first CAF crew complement arrived at Nha Trang on 16 October 1964; it

• consisted of two pilots, two navigators, one radio operator, one flight

•
engineer, one Bomber Defense Operator (equivalent to USAF Electronic War-
108
fare Officer),and two loadmasters .

• .{Is tiFQ) Quring 1965 First Flight supervised six CAF crews (one of
the original seven was withdrawn from the program). Normally, four crews

- were on-station at Nha Trang and·two crews were on crew rotation at Hsin-
Chu Air Base, Taiwan.

aircrew complement.
109
In October First Flight received its first full US

(I 5 DIFQ) P.lthough information"-regarding the initial training program

-conducted at Nha Trang is sketchy and fragmentary, it must have achieved a
degree of suc~ess according to the first SOG commander. He cited the im-
provement of these CAF crews over those previously under the employ of
110
CAS:
11 The [CAS] Air Operations were being conducted by CHINAT

crews, who, when they transferred to MACSOG, refused to

work for the military. Consequently, MACSOG never had
a successful operation by the CHINAT crews who were in
the employ of CIA at that time. It too'k us several
months to train our own CHINAT crews and to run success-
ful aii operations ...
An Air Force colonel in charge of the·· SOG·Air Section, however, stated that
although the first CAF crew to arrive at Nha Trang was outstanding, there
was a deterioration in caliber of later arrivals. Shuffling of crew mem-
bers.allowed First Flight to salvage some qualified crews. An interview
111
with the aforementioned individual casts more light on the problem:
" ... we had to go into a complete retraining cycle. Fir.st,
" '·
we had to fly 'the crews through some current programs
until they were able to handle the airplane, make weather
· landings, and· fly at night. Following this, we found

59
 out·that the crews were·unable to perform the mission
as we believed it should be flown. Our mission required
a low-altitude night contour flying for seven or eight
hours through the valleys below the peaks of hills to
stay out of the enemy GCI [Ground Control Intercept]
coverage. They had to fly visually and they had to fly
by the light of the moon. It was a very difficult mis-
sion and the people were not really prepared for it ...
we proceeded to requalify the Chinese.· Our method of
indoctrinating them into the mission was to develop a
series of courses in SVN through the mountains which
would simulate as much as possible the type of terrain
.they would be flying inj-rf"North Vietnam."
...lH tlf8) /\s the CHINAT flying training progressed, most American
counterparts lauded the CHINAT performance. Only a few minor ·problems
persisted, such as a gro\jing reluctance to fly dangerous missions and
112.
frequent requests for leave to Taiwan. One SOG officer commented:
"The Chinese C-123 crews were well-disciplined and were
given proficiency training frequently. They were highly
professional. Though the Chinese crews flew the 34A mis-
sions only during the light of the moon, we used them

•
foi psychological operations missions during the dark of
the moon. As North Vietnamese air defenses built up, the
Chinese became more and more reluctant to fly missions
over North Vietnam; consequently, for Psyops missions we

• obtai ned approva 1 for the use of American C-.123 crews."

The last commander of First Flight Detachment, who had nearly four years

• of association with the unit, stated that the CAF" crews were regarded

•••
as a real source of expertise and continuity for First Flight Detachment .
When asked what was the major lesson learned.from the First Flight opera-
tion, he responded with: "the ability of the USAF to work closely with
113
a foreign country's air force in accomplishing a mission ...

• ~TB nr~) Concurrent with the acquisition and training of CHINAT air-
crews, and arising from the same dissatisfaction with aircrews previously
used in the CAS program,, SOG drafted a plan to train six VNAF aircrews.

•'••
'' •,

Vietnamese, like the Chi.nese, had flown for CAS. The deci si ori' to select
• and train Vietnamese aircrews was supported by the following rationale, as
.
stated by the SOG Chief of Air Operations:
114

• " ... We went to the Vietnamese aircrews with two thoughts

in mind. First, to get rid of the CAS Chinese aircrews;
secondly, to be able to train, retain and control the
Vietnamese aircrews better than in the case of the Chi-
nese. Starting out with the base that the Chinese and
. Vietnamese were of the same quality, we. hoped that
through completion of an intensive training program, to
which the Vietnamese would be receptive, we would be able
to improve their quality as compared to that of the Chi-
nese who practically refused to participate in any train-
ing program at all."
. 115
The sarre individual related init1al results of the VNAF training program:
"The quality of the Vietnamese aircrews was at least as
good as that of the Chinese. The Vietnamese were more
receptive to training whiCh was reflected in their will-
ingness to participate in training missions. Overall,
I think that we did improve our capability by employing
the Vietnamese crews in lieu of the CAS Chinese crews.
The Vietnamese were difficult to control, however. They
were very independent, and seemed to feel that they were
· doing us a favor when they went on a mission. They did
not see the mission from a nationalist point of view."
•(T8 ltfi8) The problem may have been as much political in nature as
psychological. The VNAF officers selected for C-123 training were former
A-:1 pilots belonging to Air Commodore Ky's exclus.~ve squadron, referred to
. 116 .
by one SOG indivi~ual as Ky's "precious counter-coup aircrews." These
aircrews were reluctant to leave Saigqn, for either personal or operational
reasons. The requirement to remain proficient in the A-1 aircraft com-
plicated the matter. They irked some of their American counterparts by
request~for special compensation for their services to First Flight
117
additional pay, bonuses, special privileges, etc. Alleged inaction
by the individual assigned to the air liaison position in the Vietnamese
118
- counterpart organization' apparently exacetbated the situation<

61
 as(+£ fiFB) Be~ite these problems, three VNAF C-123 aircrews completed

•
training in 1965; Success was short-lived: one crew was lost opera-
tionallyt one was considered. "politically unstable," and one was ineffec-
tive because of a co-pilot vacancy. The circumstances surrounding the loss
of one crew underlined one of the major fallacies of the programt that is,
the haste to become operational. The Chief of SOG Air Operations
119
stated:
"They flew the mission during extremely marginal
weather and hit Monkey Mountain [near Danang AB] ...
We felt that mission shouldn't go and the Air Section
at Nha Trang was opposed to it. ~owever, the people in
Saigon in the 0P€rations Section felt that the weather·
was not too bad to complete the mission and they gave
the go-ahead. This was aile of the problems that we
had during the "first part of the entire mission--pres-
sure from Washington to get the miSsion going; to take
it over from CAS as fast as possible and we believe
that the people in Washington did not have a proper
appreciation for the inadequacy of crews caused by
the_delays in getting them to us ... " ·
p(TO IIPB) By 1966 the problems of the VNAF training program had be-
come such a hardship that the SOG Deputy Chief of the Operations Branch
disqualified the one remaining VNAF aircrew and cancelled plans for send-
ing additional crews to the United States for tra.ining. Earller actions by
the Chief of SOG through the Chief of Staff of VNAF had not rectified the
situation. Stopping the VNAF program " had .minimal impact on operations
s·ince the Chinese aircrews had attained a high degree of proficiency by
that time.

Heavy Hook--Covert Security, and Deception (U)

- (IS tiF8) Cover stories, security measures, and deception techniques

were' es-sential and important features of the Heavy Hook opera~ions.
characteristics pervaded-the entire SOG.organization but were deemed
These

62
 particul~rly necessary for protection of aircrews and aircraft which were
·exposed to the high riskof falling into enemy hands. Loss of an aircraft
and capture of ·an ·aircrew possibly could cause an incident of international .
propor:tions; it could cause great embarrassment to the United States
Government. Hence, security precautions remained stringent requirements
throughout the existence of SOG. Deception devices and techniques were
refined continually in reaction to more concerted defensive efforts by
the enemy. Cover stories were fitted to mission requirements, crew and
aircraft configurations, and US policies governing the US invo·lvement in
SEA. ·
ez(TJ rtre) . fhe enemy developed and employed various systems to detect
-aircraft overflying North Vietnam, ranging from rather primitive means of
posting sky watchers to more sophisticated monitoring by using advanced
Soviet radar ·equipment. -Heavy Hook aircrews necessarily used multiple
pro·cedures to disguise their presence and location. They held radio trans-
missions to a minimum and sporadically alter~d flight paths. Flying low-
level, the crews used terrain-masking effects to minimize exposure to
. 120
enemy radar nets. ·They sometimes made bogus drops.
(
1
£ N~Q) Prior to take-off on a combat mission, the aircraft and
aircrew were sterilized of markings and documents which might identify
the United States as sponso~ of the mission. (After the US began bombing
operations over North Vietnam, however, such~recautions were not taken.
They wore Air Force flight uniforms and the aircraft carried US markings.)
When missions were to stage out of Nakhon Phanom for heliborne insertion,
Heavy Hook planners would attempt to combine a logistics mission with the
'\ •,

agent transport mission to avoid stereotyped operations which lnight alert

63
'• . the enemy of an impending agent infiltration. Of course, all coordination
121

•ii
of planning was handled through secure communications channels .
.,{JO 11118) . After the Heavy Hook aircraft was airborne, the crew had
special equ~pment on board which they used to complement deceptive flight
maneuvers. Warning receivers alerted the crew of radars employed for AAA,

•il SAM", and airborne intercept which were trained on the aircraft.
warning receivers indicated the bearings, signal types, and signal strengths
of enemy radars.
Other

Deceptive repeaters misdirected AAA fire control radars

·and fighter aircraft intercept radars. Dispensing of chaff helped blot
~ out enemy weapon controller screens which could otherwise pinpoint the

•
. 122
location of the aircraft. '
Security and deception measures served a definite purpose:

•
z(:JH IIFB)

to minimize the chances of an aircraft loss and otherwise to prevent the

• exposure of -Information pertaining to SOG operations. But these measures

were not entirely adequate, particularly in the case of an aircraft loss .

• Additional protection was provided by the use of cover stories.

(T 5 NfQl The office of primary responsibility for the fabrication of

•
0

Heavy Hook cover stories was the Office of the Special Assistant for

• Counterinsurgency· and Special Activities on the Joint Staff.

US!Jally acting upon proposals from the field, would contrive a cover story
and coordinate it with various agencies in Washington, including the CIA,
This office,

State Department, White House, Public Affairs Office under the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, and appropriate Ser-
123
vice component headquarters.
aU£ ri~D) According. to the initial cover story for the Heavy Hook
'' . ,·.

program, the aircraft were on loan to the'Vietnamese Air Force' from the

64
'• Chinese Air. Force. During non-mission periods, the air~raft were located
at Saigon; they carried VNAF markings. Markings were removed for missions .

•• The.CAF crew members were documented as Vietnamese citizens while on•duty

in South Vietnam. If downed during a combat mission, the crews were to·
il explain that they were CAL employees engaged in ferrying the aircraft from
the RVN.to Taiwan for periodic maintenance but had wandered off course due
to faulty navigational equipment. They were to state that the aircraft
was unmarked because the VNAF markings removed from the aircraft had not
been replaced with Chinese Nationalist markings. A~counting for the agent
teams on board, the crew-members were to state that.those individuals were
enroute to Taiwan to participate in~raining; they carried equipment be-
-cause they did not know if it would be available at their trai.ning
124
destination.
o(TO liP'S) t':qver stories underwent frequent revision; modifications

contained more explicit definitions and added greater detail. Guidance

was not limited to crew member statements in the event of capture. Cover
documents outlined preparatory procedures for ditching an aircraft, specified /
aircrew and aircraft sanitization procedures, and~ provided guidelines for
official responses to North Vietnamese accusations or to queries from news

reporters.
a(T~ liFO) P. SOG message dispatched on 7 September 1964 defined the

conditions under which an overt rescue attempt was authorized for a Heavy
Hook.aircrew. SAR efforts were permitted when the aircraft was downed
ov,er international waters, frien~ly terri tory, or Laotian territory where
the threat was considered minimal. The announced rationale for US in-
", ' ·,
' '
volvement in the rescue attempt was for 11 humanitarian purposes." ·If an
 idrcraft,were lost over North Vietnam, no official US statement
would be made except in response to a North Vietnamese accusation. The
official response was "no US aircraft was involved." The South Vietnamese
Government was to deny deliberate penetration of NVN and make counter-
charges against enemy penetration. It was .to accuse NVN of the .. barbaric
125
act of shooting at a harmless and lost transport aircraft in distress."
#(TO llli8) 1:; situations when an aircrew was unable to fly their air-
craft to a friendly base from a combat mission over North Vietnam, they
were to attempt to bail out in the Gulf of Tonkin at least 20 miles off-
shore or in a SAFE area in laos. If unable to clear hostile territory,

- a bail-out was preferable to a crash-landing in order to disassociate the

-crew from the aircraft.

.
Time permitting, the crew was to drop all agents
and supply bundles in remote a.reas, jettison any other payload material,
126

-
and destroy flight plans, maps, and ECM equipment.
.e(IE tWO) Ig November 1965 MACV promulgated its first cover story

- regarding VNAF crews flying Heavy Hook aircraft.

·paralleled that used for CAF crews.
The .story basically
They were to admit their VNAF status,
saying that they were on a training mission near Danang when they suffered
· a complete loss of navigational and radio gear while flying instrument
Flight Rules. To make such an explanation plausible, crews were to destroy
127
radio and navigational equipment and remove the magnetic compass.
CZ( 13-141 B) .With the advent of USAF-flown-Heavy Hook missions, addi-

tional guidance was required. In early 1967 COMUSMACV, with the assis-
·tance of the American Embassy, Vientiane, contrived a cover story for USAF
aircr.ews attired in USAF flight uniforms on board Heavy Hook aircraft with
. ·\\ '·._ I

US markings. If an.aircraft loss was imminent during a psychological

66
 operations (Psyops) mission, the aircrew was to attempt to jettison all Psyops
material. If unable to do so, it was to state that the aircraft was on a
routine Fact Sheet (unclassified Psyops Program) mission. If the aircraft
had no Psyops material on board, the crew was to state that it was diverted

to the area to participate in a SAR operation.. A similar explanation was

to be offered if agents.v>Jere. c.arried on the aircraft; the agents were chosen

. 128
becau$e of their linguistic qualifications.
••-''lli1iif•'Mi:SIIIB-.)~IiDa&other development in 1967 lending credence to cover

stories was the drafting of a bogus contract between MACV and China Air-
line~, whereby CAL agreed to provide flight crews and maintenance personnel

•
I
to support MACV in conducting logistics and ferry missions involving

~ C-123 aircraft based in South Vietnam. Although this contract was designed

•• t9 ~ubstantiate the Heavy Hook cover story, it was not referenced in the

-
cover story until after a SOG review in 1_969 pointed out the shortcoming .

· (T 5 "59) Lbe SOG s.tu.dy of cover stories, conducted in 1969, revealed

.
other shortcomings in the Heavy Hook cover·story. For example, the USAF-
-\'
CAF crew complement was not addressed. IFfurther noted discrepancies

., such as aircraft location, Saigon ·instead of Nha ·;-Trang, and aircraft mark-

ings, VNAF instea~ of USAF. A major critici~m was directed against the

lack of definitive guidanc~ regarding'ai~crew and aircraft sanitization.

•
' 129·
The overall conclusion of the study stated the following:
Existing cover stories may assi·st-in explaining the
rw· presence of an aircraft and/or aircrew in a politically
sensitive area but will not permit plausible denial of
Lll
sponsorship .

.,•
(TO UFi) The fallibility of cover stories was, in fact, cited much

- · earl'ie'r in their evolution.In a letter .from CINCPAC to COMU~MACV, dated

. 130
15. November 1965, the following limitations.were noted:

67
 It is recognized that under the given set of opera-
tional circumstances it is virtually impossible to com-
pose a ·story that wi l1 adequately cover all emergencies
~nd incidents. However, in order to delay the opposi-
tion's establishing firm facts as to the real nature
of the missions [Heavy Hook] and to provide the crew and
passengers with an alternative to (a) immediate execu-
tion, or (b) stating the truth ... It is not expected
that a cover story will permanently deceive the opposi-
tion nor discourage them from eventually bringing pub-
lic charges which are close to the truth.

Combat Spear Aircraft (U)

· a· qs 'lSD) In 1965 the Air Force directed that 14 C-130E a.ircraft
be modified on the production line in an uncbnventionaT warfare configura-
tion. These .aircraft were assigned to the Special Operations Forces ele-
"-
ment under the project name of Stray Goose (~ater renamed Combat Talon}.
Later, four of these aircraft were deployed to the PACOM area: the nicl<-
131
name.of this .component was Combat Spear.
--~~~rliis..,.rlfiiiiBj!j)~SOG asked for more sui.table aircraft to replace the C-123
as early as 1964. SOG ·reemphasized its acute requirement for replacement
.aircraft after two losses of Heavy Hook aircraft in late 1964, on 1 Novem-
ber and 10 December 1964. At that time, the JCS deferred decision on the
SOG request for several reasons: modified C-130 aircraft would not be
available befqre mid-1965; only US crews were considered capable of operat-
ing the C-130 and this was not a viable concept under the current UW pro-
gram; and higher authorities imposed restrictions on employment of the
. 132
C-130 in· a UW role at that time.
a(JJ hi B) +11 March 1965 CINCPAC reopened the subject by requesting
MACV to furnish additional justification for a.cquisition of UW-modified
- C--130 a,ircraft. Again the JCS rejected tbe MACV proposal. La.ter during

68
• the year, howevet:', CINCPAC, providing additional justification, supported
a MACV proposal to use Combat Spear aircraft in support of OPLAN 34A
operations as outlined in the "C-l30E Sky Hook Study,. completed on 27
September. The JCS concurred and on 31 March 1966 notified CINCPAC of
approval of the request, directing the Air Force to deploy four aircraft
133
to PACOM.
· e (T8 liP'S) Tile Combat Spear aircraft were assigned to Detachment 1,

314th Tactical Airlift Wing at Ching Chang Kuan Air Base, Taiwan, until
December 1966. They were then reassi.gned to the 15th Special Operations
Squadron (SOS) at Nha Trang Air Base, RVN. The first logistics support
mission was flown in support of Shin-ing Brass on 20 October 1966; the first
-Psyops leaflet drop mission was flown on 3 November; and the first OPLAN 34A
134
resupply and ~~ent delivery mission was flown on 25 December.

Combat Spear Versus Heavy Hook (U)

$H '!52) Ihe thrust of the MACV Sky Hook Study was a comparative
analysis between the Combat Spear and Heavy Hook aircraft. The study
135
cited the following advantages of the C-ljo over the C-123: /

• Of the two aircraft, only the C-130 aircraft had the

growth potential to meet future payload requirements.
Using the 463L aerial deliv~ry system (ADS), it could
deliver three 12-foot platforms of 8000 pounds each
as opposed to approximately one for the C-123.

• The C-130's higher altitude envelope considerably in-

creased the Psyops de 1i very capabil-ity. The 1anger
··· periods of drift of Psyops material permitted dr6p
points in relatively undefended areas for targets in
heav-ily defended areas which were inaccessible to the
C-123 aircraft.

,, • '·
The C-130 was capable of significantly higher speed,
decreasing the.exposure time in hostile territory. ··
' \

69
 • · The C-130's radar and terra in avoidance equipment
enabled a contour low-level profile rather than merely

••
a low altitude mission capability. It could be op.era-
ted in valleys out of line of sight of Early Warning
(EW) radar and fire control systems.

•
• The C-130 had the capacity for expansion of ECM equip-
ment to cope with the improving air defenses in NVN.
The C-123 had exhausted its stretch-out capability due
to limited payload capacity. ·
(Is "ED) After the C-130 aircraft arrived in-theater, SOG immediately
•
put them to work in reducing. the logistics backlog-- logistics support
requirements had tripled since the commencement of Shining Brass opera-
tions. The C-130's greater allowable cargo .load was its most immediate
advantage over the C-123~ A SOG officer related .the si.tuation in an in-
136 "-
terview:
There was a tremendous backlog of logistic supplies to
be moved ... Most 'of the cargo could be airlifted by 7AF
outfits. However, because of classification of some of
the cargo, it was very difficult to have the material
people at that point in time make a complete switch
into the 7AF system. As a result, MACSOG hauled tremen-
dous tonnages with MACSOG available aircraft .... [After]
the C-130's arrived and helped reduce the bqcklog, we
were able to identify cargo that was to be handled
strictly by 7AF. However, all special cargo continued
to be handled with C-123 and C-130 SOG aircraft [and
a C-45 and C-47 on contract from CAL]. ~
ns DIFN Itre C-130 Is improved ACL also enhanced combat missions over
•
NVN by eliminating the need to restage or refuel at Thai bases, as in
the case of C-123's. Furthermore, several Psyops leaflet drops could be
accomplished on one sortie. The C-130 could_dispense approximately five
million leaflets on one mission, whereas the C-123 could dispense only
half that amount.
a (IE ti•Q) Although the C-130 possessed more advanced navigational and
\\ .
ECM equipment, greater accuracy in aerial' delivery and improved

70
 survivability in the NVN air defense environment could not be demonstrated.
Both ·aircraft were constrained by similar conditions of lunar illumina-
tion and cloud cover during agent resupply/reinforcement missions. Nor-
mally, acceptable conditions prevailed only four or fivenights a month.
Too, ~oth aircraft flew under the same JCS restriction against flight within
effective ranges of known SAM-and AAA sites. Therefore, advantages of
the C-130's ECM equipment, such as additional power output and a more auto-
137
mated chaff dispensing system, were of little importance.
,...(+8 hi B) Although a distinction of capabilities was made to justify
acquisition of the C-130, the differences of capabilities between the C-123
and C-130 was not normally a primary- consideration in the selection of an
caircraft to support a particular OPLAN 34A agent mission. An equitable
alltication of_ flying hours to both the 15th SOS and First Flight ·Detach-
. ment ·and satisfaction of user preferences were more corrmon criteria used
in aircraft selection. After the development of HALO insertion methods in
1967, however, the higher flight ceiling of the C-130 .became a valid con-
138
sideration in the selection of an aircraft to support a HALO mission.
e(TO UP'B) · zDespite the disadvantages of the (-123 aircraft, it also had
139
some advantages, as noted by the MACSOG Documentation Study:
Although the C-130 had advantages of greater speed,
range and capacity, it was more expensive· to operate
and difficult to maintain. When used at FOls [Forward
Operating Locations], the C-123 had advantages of rugged
construction and easier maintenance. There was little
·· advantage to the C-130 so long as low level terrain
masking techniques were used, a 3000-pound payload was
the maximum, and staging bases were available.
Another advantage of the Heavy Hook aircraft, although not inherent in the
- air~rat:t,was the Chines-e aircrew capability,diminishing the··likelihood
. ' 140 \
of exposing US sponsorship of air operations over NVN.-

7l
 Combat Spear-.:.cover, Security, and Deception (U)
"'I iii B) .,.lie Combat Spear cover story was promulgated in May 1966.
·In many respects, it resembled the Heavy Hook cover story, omitting any
_guidance· re1ating to VNAF and CAF aircrews. The aircraft carried USAF
markings; its crew wore standard USAF flight uniforms. In the event of
~n incident over friendly territory, downed aircrews and any agent team

members accompanying them were to state that they were flying a routine
airlift mission in South Vietnam when diverted. The diversion was to
participate in a search mission initiated after receipt of an international
distress call from an unidentified aircraft. · Similarly, 'for incidents
over hostile territory, ai'rcrews were to state that they were on an
-authorized SAR mission for downed US aircrews. Agent team members were
selected as part of the rescue team because of their linguistic qualifica-
tions. For incidents occurring when the aircrew was flying a Psyops
leaflet drop mission, the crew was instructed to jettison all Psyops material
and state that they were on a SAR mission. If unable to rid the airplane
of such evidence, the crew. was to say that they were flying a routine Fact
141 ·;-

Sheet mission .
. il(lfB IIFB) Deception devices and techniques were similar to those used
on the Heavy Hook aircraft. "' safe and, hopefully, undetected
The key to
penetration of enemy territory was painstakingly detailed flight planning
which e~~ablished ingress and egress .routes earefully avoiding populated
and high threat areas. This required optimal use of terrain masking against

.. enemy .radar. If the aircraft encountered a threat', the crew had a choice
of evasive maneuvers and, ECM tactics to employ.
\' ·.
Since ECM tactics and

•.. equipment were discussed earlier, attention 1s focused on evasive maneuvers .

72
 z(S "59) According to the Tactical Air CoiTilland Manual outlining
procedures for Combat Talon aircrews, an aircraft encountering an un-
expected AAA threat should turn to a heading that would immediately
increase the range between the threat and the aircraft. In some situa-
tions, however, depending on the effectiveness of repeaters, weather
conditions, type and effectiveness of enemy firing, and so on, rapid
changes· in altitude and heading were not netessarily the best reac-
142
tion. ·
11(5 Iii b) Aircrews regarded the SAM threat with apprehension. The

best means to counter this threat was by low.:.level contour flying.

Maneuvering the aircraft to place the SAM threat at either the three
·or nine o'clock position induc'ed the highest· missile-guidance-
prediction error by virtue of increasing the angular acceleration re-
quired for a hit. Jinking {rapid, random altitude and course change}
and chaff dispensing were additional measures used when the aircrew
143.
received a valid missile launch warning.
aU uris).. Low-le~el flight during low. illumination was the best
·;-

insurance against airborne intercept. Visual spotting of the Combat

Spear aircraft under such conditions was unlikely. If detected, how-
ever·, the aircrew could employ evasive maneuvers, repeater jamming,
and chaff dispensing. If the aircraft encountered an airborne inter-
ceptor·at high altitudes, the general tactic was to descend rapidly,
ensuring that the interceptor's position was not looking directly at
144
the aft section of the C-130.
,, '.
'·

73

• &E&Rif
 •
Aircr·aft Utilization~-Heavy Hook and Lombat Spear (U)
e( I 3 iii U) . ii@&vy Hook and Combat Spear aircraft performed three prin-

• cipal tyP.eS of miss.ions: insertion and resupply/reinforcement of agent

teams, delivery of Psyops mate·rial, and logistics airlift. To a lesser

• degree these aircraft were also flown in ,support of aircrew proficiency

• and reconnaissance team training .

RF "W) Stati sties depicting the first full year of Heavy Hook op-

•1!1 erations showed that 22 -resupply/reinforcement missions were completed

successfully out of 63 such missions scheduled.
aborts were attributed to adverse weather conditions.
Most cancellations and
Other factors which

•
degraded the air support to OPLAN 341:\ teams were maintenance problems,
-failure to establish contact with ground teams, and inaccurate aerial de-

• liveries. During that first year 30 successful Psyops missions were flown,
while logistics airlift accounted for 656,000 pounds of SOG cargo .
145

•.. /r tiER) Ihe UW-modified C-123 aircraft continued to be the primary

5

workhorse for SOG air operations during the following year, although Combat

..
Spear and high performance aircraft, such as F-4s and A-ls, were used to
support airborne and psychological operations. In 1966 First Flight
successfully accomplished 16 resupply and infiltration missions out of Bl

• scheduled missions. Weather conditions accounted for 78 percent of the

-ld
cancellations and aborts. Maintenance difficulties and failure to estab-
lish contact with targeted teams caused, resp_ectively, 14 and 8 percent
..
of the aborts and cancellations. Forty-two out of 68 Psyops missions
were flown successfully, yielding a substantial increase over the previous
year's Psyops effo.rt. The most dramatic increase in air support, however,

.. \' ·.
resulted from a surge in logistics requirements. H'eavy Hook a·ircraft,

•
74
 •
••• together with CAL C-45 and C-47 airct'dft, transported 4,891,228 pounds of
. .
~argo and 13,893 passengers .

. a. gg 'Wpt 6
146

1ring 1967 Heavy Hook and Combat Spear aircraft inserted

three ·agent_ teams out of six such missions scheduled. The C-123s accomp-
lished 8 of 32 scheduled resupply missions, while C-l30s made 12 out of 30

- scheduled deliveries.
substantially.
The number of Psyops missions during the year grew
First Flight performed 23 out of 28 scheduled Psyops mis-

- .
sions, and the 15th SOG accomplished 44 out of 67 scheduled. By this time
most of the resupply missions were assigned to high performance aircraft.
Then, with expansion of Shining Brass and the commencement of Daniel Boone
operations, logistics airlift incre'ased rapidly. During the year Heavy
·Hook, Combat Spear, and CAL contract air.craft moved 10,738,580 pounds of
cargo and 25,016 passengers. (One unique logistic requirement levied on
SOG Air Operations during 1967 was to devise a free-fall aerial delivery
method to drop rice to Cambod~an troops. From an altitude of 1,000 feet,
the aircraft dropped triple-bagged rice; fully 97 percent of the ric~ was
147
recoverable.)
(TI lifO) Figures on aircraft utilization i~ 1968 reflected diminished

combat flying efforts. Heavy Hook aircraft successfully executed 6 of

11 resupply .missions, and Combat Spear aircraft carded out 5 of 21 such
missions. The number of Psyops missions. a1so decreased: Heavy Hook air-
craft completed 14 of 21 missions, and Combat Spear aircraft completed 24
of 38 missions. On the other hand, the percentage of total mission flight
time committed to logistic airlift increased from 65 to 85 percent. The
148
C-123s
,, and C-l30s carrie,d 8,888,447 pounds of cargo and 34,915 passengers.

75
 (JbN§Q' · Jp 1968, a.ircraft utili ~ation came under study by the MACV
Ad Hoc Evaluation Group. ·Regarding Heavy Hook and Combat Spear aircraft,
149
the group concluded:
The current resources, both in personnel and aircraft,
far exceed those required to s·atisfy MACSOG's airlift
requirements. Three C-130 mission-configured aircraft
(7.15 mi-llion dollars each) can provide current and
projected combat mission support, to include training
f1 i ghts for crew and ground teams. One C-130 standard
cargo aircraft {2.15 million dollars) when supplemented
· by the one C-45 Tradewind and one C-47 aircraft, on
contract from CAL, ean provide the required logistic
support for MACSOG. Better projection of logistic
planning coupled with a shift to common-user airlift.
for routine cargo can absorb any short-fall.
(??HEll itudy of declining aircraft utilization, resulting from re-
duced combat mission commitments, 'also focused attention on the problem of
maintaining aircrew proficiency. A letter from the 15th SOS, dated 14 August
150
196B, described the problem:
Our recent operational commitments have not permitted
us to maintain the high state of proficiency and
readiness possessed by our aircrews upon completion
of Combat Talon training. Frequent logistic support
sorties and infrequent combat missions have not pro-
vided enough current crew exposure in all areas of the
Combat Spear mission.
The same letter contained a proposal to implement a training program at
Clark Air Base (AB), to include Fulton Recovery System pickups, low-level
..
terrain-following flights, and Black Baron* exercises.
trl) Later in the year, on 1 November, representatives from Detach-
ment 4~_405th Tactical Fighter w·;ng, First·night Detachment, 15th SOS,
621st Tactical Air Control Squadron signed a Joint Memorandum of Agreement.
-This agreement outlined the Black Baron training program as it was to be

*~Radar intercept training in conjunction with airborne i~terceptpilots

and Grbund Control Intercept controllers~
76
 •
'•• -
conducted in an area southwest of Udorn Royal Thai Air Base (instead of
151
Clark AB) .

trS "W) nuather aircrew proficiency training program conceived in

• the s~me period was the Red Baron program in which SOG C-123s and C-130s
were to make repeated runs against simulated AAA sites. land-based, gun-

• laying radar sites were to attempt "lock-on" and "tracking" of the aircraft,

•
and the aircrew of the targeted aircraft was to perform evasive maneuvers
and to use all available electronic countermeasure·s. Strategic Air Com-
mand Combat Skyspot radars situated in SVN were identified for Combat
r!l Spear training, and Chinese radars located in Taiwan were selected for

•
..
Heavy Hook training .

~If} In 1969, both the 15th SOS and First flight Detachment began

• conductingaircrew proficiency training programs; these missions, however,

• .comprised only a small percentage of the overall flying effort, as logis-

tics support requirements placed great demands on both units. A breakdown

• of Combat Spear flight time, for example, revealed that 79 percent of total

•
flying hours were devoted .to logistics support, 10 percent to combat sup-
port missions, 6 percent to training missions, arid the remaining 4 percent
152

•
to maintenance flights .

c(JQ fiFO) Mission figures for 1969 showed that Heavy Hook and Combat

•:1 Spear aircraft flew 10 and 12 combat missions respectively.

ported 7,681,460 pounds of cargo and 42,590 passengers.
They trans-
C-123 crews
participated in 20 Black Baron and seven Red Baron training sessions. C-130
crews conducted 18 Black Baron training sessions, but the number of Red
I
••I
Baron missions was not discernible since the crews conducted this type of
"
training in conjunctiqn with routine logistics missions. Botn Heavy Hook

77
'• and Combat Spear aircrews practiced low-level terraio-following flight.
Combat Spear aircrews demonstrated the Fulton system on six occasions

•Iii du-ring the year.

a
1969.
153

_.,iris~'M'S~P+)~S~everal
. factors adversely affected aircraft utilization in
Aircraft ava i1 abi 1ity rates for both the C-123 and C- 130 decreased

• as a result of modification programs. Heavy Hook aircraft underwent K-

modification during the first part of the year, and C~mbat Spear aircraft

• began rotating to the CONUS beginning in August to undergo modification.

Another specific factor undermining·the Black Baron training-program was
the deployment of Thai-based F-102s to Clark ·AB. A subsequent arrangement

for training with the 12th Tactical"fighter Wing at Cam Ranh Bay AB proved
-to be less satisfactory because of other operational commitments of the
154
F-4 units.
-WE

•
IIFB) In 1970 the number of combat support missions flown by First
Flight and 15th SOS increased significantlyi due in part to the Allied
incursion into.Cambodia and the increased support ·requirements for the
agent training program at Long Thanh. Heavy Hook aircraft were used for
27 combat missions without an abort: three agent"infiltrations in Laos,
three Psyops leaflet delivery missions in Laos, and 21 resupply and re-
hearsal team drops in South V~etnam a~d C~mbodia. Combat Spear aircraft
were used for a similar mix of missions; 18 of 21 scheduled combat mis-
sions were flown. Logistic airlift also incr-eased as a result of higher
"in-commission" and availability of aircraft rates. Heavy Hook trans-
ported 3,258,697 pounds of cargo and 22,460 passengers; Combat Spear car-
155
ried 4,874,600 pounds of cargo and 23,515 passengers.
'' ·. '

.,l&il!iD)_ Existing logistics airlift'commitments, and a·lack of

78
if
• intercep~or

programs in 1970.
aircraft participation, 1 imited aircrev-1 proficiency training
First Flight conducted only one Black Baron training

• session~ and 15th SOS accomplished nine such training missions. Both

•
units conti'nued Red Baron training; Heavy Hook crews participated in 14
exercises in conjunction with phase maintenance checks in Taiw.an, and

• Combat Spear crews accomplished similar training in conjunction with in-

country airlift missions. In addition to ECM training, Combat Spear crews

•
.
practiced low-level terrain-following flights in the Philippines about
once every three months,and Heavy Hook crews conducted the same type of
maneuvers in Taiwan approximately once every·six weeks. Fulton Recovery
System pickups continued to constitute part of the Combat Spear training
156
·throughout the year.
(TO ill B) In 1971, First Flight Detachment and the 90th SOS (the 15th
SOS ~as rede~ignated as the 90th SOS in October 1970) increased their unit
flying time, primarily as a result of acquisition of expanded Psyops mis-
sions. ·On 25 January the 90th SOS assumed responsibility for aerial de-
livery of leaflets on specified targeis in Laos, Cambodia, and South Viet-
nam under the program names of Frantic G.oat, Fountain Pen, and Brown
'
. ~tallion. (The latter program commenced on 16 May.) In August, First
Flight Detachment took charge of Psyops program previously accomplishe~ by
Candlestick aircraft staging out of Nakhon Phanom. This program.entailed
dispensing of leaflets over the Ho·Chi Minh trail complex; it was nick-
named the·Trail Campaign. In all, the 90th SOS successfully completed 226
combat missions (including Psyops missions) of 282 scheduled missions
in 1971. First Flight Detachment successfully accomplished 51 combat mis-
'' \. . \

sions during the year. The mission figures for 1971 for both'the 90th SOS

79
and First Flight Detachment included an increase in the number of in-
filtration and resupply missions. Overall logistics airlift during the
year reflected a decrease in tonnages, due mainly to greater reliance on
834th Air Division air assets. Statistics depicting the training efforts
during 1971 were presented in flying hours rather than missions. Hence,
they are not helpful in establishing a trend of training based on pre-
157
vious years' data.

Redeployment Attempts (U)

zJ(:S Ill q I he first documented attempt ·to diminish the number of

·fixed-wing aircraft supporting MACSOG surfaced in early ·1968. The pre-

"·
_ viously ment1oned MACV Ad Hoc Evaluation Stu~y Group report specifically
-stated that the contract with the Government of the Republic of China for
four. C-123 mission-configured aircraft could be terminated without ad-
versely affecting SOG operations. CINCPAC backed the MACV recommendation,
but the JCS replied that the termination of the contract would require
. 158
extensive negotiations with another agency of the US Government.
Js[R liFE) Jiu July 1968, CINCPAC queried the ;JCS on the status of
negotiations to dissolve the arrangement with the Chinese. The JCS
responded:
"GRC resources represent the only MACSOG assets available
for certain operations and possibly future operations
including those in the post hostilities era. This third
country participation, once lost, may be difficult to
reacquire."l59 ·
CINCPAC pressed the case further, citing the cost of $480,000 annually
for an average of only two Footboy (C) missions per month flown by the
GRc'crews. The JCS finally closed the i~sue, stating that th~re would
160
be no attempt to termin·ate the agreement.

80
 o( 5 iii B) Beginning in 1970 and extending into 1971, the Air Force
I

initiated a series of attempts, highlighted by two memorandums from the

CSAF to the JCS in May and September of 1970, to withdraw the Combat
Spear aircraft from South Vietnam. The thrust of the Air Force position
was that the Combat Spear aircraft were not used· sufficiently in a combat
role to justify their retention in SVN, and that most SOG logistics re-
quirements could be satisfied by the Common User Airlift System. MACV,
hbwever, with CINCPAC backing, insisted that these assets must remain in
11
South Vietnam. Countering the Air Force rationale, MACV cited the main-
tain in readiness'' doctrjne postulated by the JCS after the bombing halt
in 1968 and contended that securitj'considerations precluded the use of
-Common Service Airlift to transport MACSOG's- sensitive cargo and passen-
161
gers.
:iz(TS liFO) J\1 though no forma 1 proposa 1s to relocate the 90th SOS

, actually surfaced until 1970, Air Force planners had evidenced concern over
the utilization of the UW-configured C-130 aircraft as early as the summer
of 1969. a CiNCPACAF message, dated 12 August 1969, revealed that the
use of Combat Spear aircraft had come under close examination from October
1968 to July 1969. PACAF analysis showed that 81 percent of the 90th SOS
flying time was devoted to combat sup"port (logistics) missions, whereas
only seven percent was committed to combat missions and about eight per-
162
cent to training missions. The analysis Jncluded the estimation that
75 percent of the combat support mission flying time could have been
163
handled by aircraft in the Common User Airlift System.
et(i IIPB) The 1970 MACSOG History stated that 7th Air Force proposed
,, . ·. ..
relocation of the Combat Spear unit as ea'rly as January 1970.' Earliest

81
first-hand documentation, however, is a 17 April letter from the Commander,
164
7AF to COMUSMACV, which stated:
"Examination of this unit [15th SOS], in terms of its
essentiality as an element of MACV strength, leads to
the conclusion that, in the present and likely future
c6ntext of limitations on_U.S. force structure in SEA,
it is marginally productive:
"a. It is special mission, contingency-oriented as
opposed to the multi-purpose, firepower orientation of
tactical units subject to withdrawal now and in the
future.
"b. ·It requires space and supporting personnel and .
facilities at Nha Trang which will impede expansion of
the VNAF under the I&M [Improvemen-t and Modernization]
program.
"c. Relocation in-country· (i.e., to Cam Ranh Bay) re-
quires extraordinary preparation and investment.
"d. For the last eight months, the hours flown were less
than one percent combat, 20 percent mission peculiar
(sensitive combat support), with the remainder being
routine logistic support which can be acc.omplished by the
MACV in-country airlift system, Air America, or dedicated
off-shore support.
"In my view there is insufficient justification to main-
tain this unit at Nha Trang or to move it elsewhere in
SEA. I question the essentiality of its contingency mis-
. sian in competition with other units i~ an austere force
structure; however, retention and relocation off-shore
(Taiwan) may be warranted~"
As a conclusion to the di scuss.i on, th~ Commander, 7AF recommended that
COMUSMACV concur on one of two proposals. The first proposal was, as a
minimum, to relocat~ the 15th SOS to an off-shore location. The second
proposal was deactivation of the unit if further joint examination war-
ranted. COMUSMACV did not agree to either proposal.
:zUS Ill B)R Rather than dampening the attempt to relocate the 15th SOS,

the''MACV response merely' shifted discussions of the issue to higher

' \

82
echelons of command. The Commander in Chieft PACAF (CINCPACAF) dispatched
a message o~ 15 May 1970 stating that the time might be propitious for
165
the CSAF to intercede with the JCS on the matter .
•·~,•T•s•'•I.F•f•}.-10• 21 May 1970t a CSAF Memorandum was presented to the JCS .
•
It contained a brief historical sketch of the Combat Spear aircraft and
presented statistics similar to those contained in the earlier PACAF
analysis. The memorandum also pointed out peculiar problems regarding·
166
aircraft safety and aircrew proficiency training:
"These expensive and highly sophisticated aircraft are
vulnerable to enemy ground attack while located in their
present enviroRment; .. lt is .extrem~ly difficult, if not
impossible, to.replace them under budgetary constraints ...
'"~

"Since only three percent of the total effort now in-

volves this type of mission [combat], and since neither
low-level nor electronic warfare training is feasible
wit~in a.combat zone, aircrew proficiency training re-
quirements cannot be satisfied within the RVN.~

• as r:wl The CSAF Memorandum went on to recommend that Combat Spear

support to MACSOG ·be provided on a TOY basis from an off-shore location.
This would provide MACSOG with the unique capabilities of the Combat Spear
aircraft when miss·ion requirements dictated and w9uld provide CINCPACAF
with greater flexibility in satisfying CINCPAC theater-wide special opera-
tions requirements. Specific benefits of an off-shore based unit were
167
noted as follows:
"a. Protecting the weapons system for future employment
in its primary UW mission.
"b. Permitting tactical training to sustain proficiency
for deep penetration into hostile environme~ts.
"c~ Providing CINCPAC flexibility by being able to
operate from any forward base in PACOM.
" ' '.
"d. Providing·ciNCPAC a responsive force to conduct on-
going PSYOPS throughout PACOM.
'• "e. Affording a substantial saving by basing the C-130's
\"ith like aircraft while permitting rapid deployment to
forward operating bases.
"f. In keeping with present nation a 1 po 1icy of with-
drawing forces from the RVN."
'r§ ysp) £ecause of the Joint/combined service implications of the
CSAF proposal, the JCS solicited CINCPAC and MACV for comments. CINCPAC
responses on 12 June and 4 July, supported by a COMUSMACV message on
168
1 July, strongly opposed the.CSAF position. CINCPAC, in addition to
advancing the same argument that COMUSMACV used against the 7AF proposal,
stated that deployment of the Combat Spear u-nit to an off-shore location
would include an additional cost and that the split ope.r.ation would weaken
MACSOG'scapabilities, particularly when covert and clandestine opera...:
tions were expected to increase after the Allied withdrawal from Cambodia.
CINCPAC further noted that the VNAF was incapable of furnishing-the
necessary air support. CINCPAC directly contested statistics pertaining
to Combat Spear flying time; he stated that the aircraft were being
169
"fully ·used in combat or sensitive combat support missions."
•4•t•S~DI"'UIIp8PP)~Despite unfavorable consideration by the JCS on the first
CSAF Memorandum, a CSAF trip report on a July visit to SEA indicated
that staff action should continue in an effort to relocate the Combat
"
Spear unit. Preliminary Air Force actions centered on attempts to ac-
quire more management information on all aspects of air support to MACSOG.
These unilateral efforts to obtain more definitive operational statistics
were, by themselves, to no avail; in the final analysis, the Air Force
would have to convince the Joint Staff. After some headway was made, the
CSA'f again asserted his desire to relocate the 15th SOS. The•proposal
appeared to have been ill-timed. A personal 12 October 1970 message

84

·- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.
 frorilCINCPAC to the Chairman, JCS requested an abrupt stop to any attempts
170
to change the location af the 15th SOS.

a qs M§Q) be Combat Spear unit remained at Nha Trang until early

1

1972, closing out its operation shortly before the deactivation of MACSOG.
Although earlier attempts by the Air Force to withdraw the unit from South
Vietnam \'/ere unsuccessful, these attempts did focus high level attention
on the unit and enabled the Air Force to acquire more comprehensive manage-
ment information.
Part II: Rotary Wing A~sets (U)
..0£ tiSpt Il?e employment of USAF helicopter forces in Southeast Asia
arose out of considerable controversy in both dipJomatic and inter-Service
arenas. Even after the deployment of USAF helicopters in SEA, particu-
larly during their expanding role in support of special operations, con-
tention surrounded the USAF involvement in helicopter operations.

General Background of USAF Helicopters (U)

III IIJI) Apparently the concept of helicopter support to US ground
forces was born in the Air Force in the early 1950s. By mid-1955, the
Air Force had a force of five troop carrier squadrons which participat~d
in joint exercises. But because the Army failed to validate the require-
ment for USAF helicopter support,and due to tightening budgetary cons-
17l
traints, the USAF helicopter squadrons were deactivated.
1 (Cb!w} With the resurgence of emphasis on tactical operations in
the early 1960s, no authority clearly delineated Army and Air Force respon-
sibilities with regard to helicopter operations. By that time, the Army
- ·had'attained a sizable aviation force. TQe struggle over missJons and
roles finally culminated in an Army-Air Force agreement in April 1966.

85
 172

• The CSAF agreed:

TO relinquish all claims for helicopters and follow-
11

on rotary wing aircraft which are -designed and operated

• for intra-theater movement, fire support, supply and

resupply of Army forces and those Air Force control
elements assigned to DASC [Direct Air Support Center] and

-
subordinate thereto. (CSA and CSAF agree that this does
not include rotary wing aircraft employed;by Air Force
SAW [Speci a1 Air ~Jarfare] and SAR forces and rotary wing

•
administrative mission support aircraft .....
t (£ IFI) Later clarification was added as an addendum to the agree-
"173
ment in May 1967:
11 SAH rotary wing aircraft - armed if required - will be
employed to train foreign air forces in the operation
and employment-of helicopters and to support U.S. Air
Force forces, 6ther government agencies, and ~ndigenous
forces only when operating· without U.S. Army advisors
11
or not under U.S. Army contra 1.
.labilfiillj!'li§li?f-)-.Prior to the agreement cited above, the Air Force had initia-
ted efforts in South Vietnam to develop a professionally trained and well-
equipped helicopter force in the VNAF. A field training unit from Stead
AFB, Nevada arrived in Saigon in June 1964. Up to and during that time,
however,- the buildup of helicopter forces receiv-ed low priority due to the
higher priority placed on enhancing a tactical styike capability.
IlliTE IIEB:l Jhe major- impetus for the dep 1oyment of helicopters to SEA

was the desire to develop an air_rescue capability organic to the Air

Force. Then, recognition of the broad potential of the USAF helicopter
to assume an expanded role began to emerge. Heightened concern over the
insurgent movement in Northeast Thailand accelerated the decision to use
- 174
USAF helicopters in SEA.
iFF tiEliW 1 he decision to allow the Air Force, instead of the Army,
to ,,train
.
the Royal Thai ' Air Force in hel"l_copter operations re~ulted from
extensive discussion among the State Department, DOD, JCS~ CINCPAC,

86
COMUSMACV, Commander, US Military Assistance Commarid, Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI),
and the American Embassy in Thailand. The probable rationale for assigning
·the mission to the Air Force was to ensure that US involvement in Thailand
continue .at a low profile. Strong pressure exerted by Air Force to obtain
·the mission undoubtedly influenced the outcome. A CINCPACAF message,
175
dated 9 April 1966, reflected CSAF views on the matter:
'' ... It should be recognized that the.JCS decision on this
helicopter augmentation with the 606th ACS [Air Corrmando
Squadron]. presents the USAF with a unique opportunity to
demonstrate its. abi 1ity to operate rotary wing aircraft
in the USAF SAW force."
dii The USAF CH-3 and UH-lF crews·and aircraft involved in the
IIFB)
..
Thai operation achieved notable success before their politically-directed
-withdrawal from Thailand in January 1967. The US Ambassador to Thailand
176
commented on the impact of the program:
"The work of these helicopters has shown dramatically to
the Thais not only the need but the practicality of unify-
ing the region. These 25 helicopters had a catalytic af-
fect on the Thai counterinsurgency effort which cquld not
have been produced by several years of vastly more expensive
and more diffused direct assistance. The results are evident
everywhere -- in getting governors out in their provinces;
accelerating the· fielding of medical and information teams;
and stimulating further deployment·of Thai security forces
into critical areas ... "
· aBE "FE) .The degree of success ~chieved in the Thai operation, the

experience gained in infiltration and exfiltration tactics, the release of

helicopte·r assets upon termination of the Thai operation, and the shortage
of VNAF·helicopters supporting UW cross-border operations all set the
stage for the employment of USAF helicopters in support of MACSOG. The
Air Force pushed strongly for acquisition of the mission. COMUSMACV over-
rul~d Army objections. ·A 7AF message on 27 May 1967 quoted an earlier
' ' .

COMUSMACV message which stated that: "The increasing tempo and scope of

87
US/SAW operations place the highest pl'iority on utilization of armed
177
. UH-lF aircraft. In that same message, COMUSMACV had requested that the
arming of those USAF helicopters be completed on a priority basis to permit
thei.r earliest possible employment in support of MACSOG cross-border
178 .
operations.
(ll liFE) . {vidence of Air Force interest in this mission was contained
179
in a CSAF message to CINCPACAF in January 1967. It stated:
The value of and increasing need for a vertical lift
11

capability in the Special Air Warfare (SAW) forces has

been clearly demonstrated. Future requirements for this ·
capability, both in s.upport of joi-nt and combined UW
operations and_ in training and supporting the counter-
; nsurgency e 1ements of fnd i genous air forces,. demand
even greater USAF capability. Therefore, a long range
objective of the Air Force iS to achieve a significant
expansion in our SAW vertical lif~capabilities ...
11
Whil e in Thailand, the he 1i copters from both the 606th
Acs·and 20th Squadron achieved significant results.
Th~se results have been recognized at all levels includ-
ing Ambassadors Martin and Sullivan, and CINCPAC. It
is.essential that the prestige and image of these forces
s hou 1d be emp 1oyed in SAW type mi s s_i ons and not become
·unnecessarily absorbed in non-SAW-sup_port activities
which are competitive with U.S. Army helicopters present
in extensive numbers. It is recognized that CINCPAC
has in part justified the retention of these aircraft
in SEA based on accomplishing or augmenting a variety
of support missions. However, in light of increasing
civic ~ction and cross-border UW requirements, we
beli~ve that these resources can be effectively and
principally used in a SAW role. This in turn will
lend validity to future actions to expand the SAW
helicopter force structure ...
az(l& hi G) L~dr Force efforts to attain tbe SOG support mission were
·180
further evidencedin a CINCPACAF message to the CSAF in February 1967:
Ref is CSAF guidance on arming SAW helicopter for use in
11

SAW role and indicated strong initial support for pro-

ject from COMUSf4ACV fundamental to successful implementa-
.\\
•.
tion of progr~m. 7AF has advised close conta~t with
"

. 88

...A
• MACV (MACSOG) has so far ind·icated no resistance to
use of AF gunships support SAW operations. 7AF also
advised that SAW trained crews are undergoing refresher
training on UW in/exfiltration tactics and use of
side mounted miniguns installed in four SAW modified
UH-1Fs.
" ... 7AF is pressing with AF MACSOG personnel use these
helicopters as gunships. Rationale in urging immediate
employment is to cite •accompl ished fact• should opposi-
tion to using AF helicopters as gunships SAW operations
arise later ...
a (II 1171) The major argument to be advanced against Army allegations
of a breach of the CSA-CSAF Agreement by the Air Force was to cite the
fact that MACSOG was a Joint UW Task Force, not under Army control. In.
retrospect, this rationale did not appear to be entirely-cogent. An End
"-
of Tour Report (written by the 20th SOS Commander from October 1967 to
April 1968) contained a more candid appraisal of the USAF helicopter role
with_regard to the CSA-CSAF Agreement. It noted that the Air Force employ-
ment of the UH-lF was considered to be outside of the scope of the agree-
ment between the CSA and CSAF. The approved employment of USAF SAW rotary
wing a·ircraft (including armed helicopters) included training of foreign
air forces, support to USAF forces, and other gov~rnment agencies and
indigenous forces,but only when operating without US Army advisors or not
under US Army control. The op.eration . . with 5th Special Forces Group
units for SOG, the report stated, was clearly Army advi~ed·and Army con-
trolled:
u(TI lint) Qespite the controversy surrounding the USAF helicopter role,
the Air Force proceeded rapidly to employ its rotary wing assets in South-
east Asia. Attention is now directed toward the primary USAF helicopter
- which ~pported MACSOG, the UH-lF, and the unit which controlled these
' \

ai.rcraft, the 20th Helicopter Squadron (renamed the 20th Special Operations
squadron on 1 Aug ·1968).
89
• The UH~l Helicopter (U)
4(131hlb) The assets required to initiate modification and employment
of USAF helicopters in a special operations role were obtained from SAC.
(SAC used helicopters for. missile ·site support.) Thirty-nine aircraft
were configured for a UW role .. Twenty-one were identified for the 20th
SOS, five for the Tactical Air Command Combat Cre\'1 Training School, three
for USAF Southern Command, and the remainder for an advanced attrition
reserve. Concurrent with the acquisition and modification of SAC UH-lF
helicopters, Air Force planners saw the need for a follow-on ~ircraft and
began planning for the t"!in-engined "N" model. The Air Force requested
18.1.
79 "N" model "Hueys" at a cost of 42..million dollars .
. (IS ''59) Although the CH-3 helicopter had some advantages over the
UH-1 and did provide some support to ~~CSOG, selection of the UH-1 as the
primary USAF ·helicopter to support MACSOG was based on several factors.
CAS requirements in laos and the newly developed Igloo White program,
which emp 1aced sensors a1ong enemy 1ogi sti cs routes, P.l aced heavy demands
on the.existing CH-3 force in SEA. Furthermore, the installation and
maintenance of numerous conmunications and navigational aid sites, namely
Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) sites, throughout laos, RVN, and Thailand
182
required extensive CH-3 he 1i1 ift supp6rt. Disadvantages of the CH-3
in comparison to the UH-1 were its.lack of armament and its requirement
183
for a larger landing zone.
#IS-itFS) ~e first deployment of UH-lF models to SEA followed
shortly after the CSA-CSAF Agreement. Four of these aircraft were armed.
After completion of the Royal Thai Air Force training program, these assets
" .
were transferred to the 20th SOS operating sites located in South Viet-
nam.
90
 Inception and Organization of the 20th Helicopter Squadron (U)
a(JS IIFI) ilk Department of the Air Force directed activation of the

• 20th Helicopter Squadron in October 1965. Originally assigned to the 2nd

•
Ajr Division at Tan Son Nhut AB in Saigon, it came from Eglin AFB, Florida .
The unit possessed eight CH-3C helicopters arid 20 co~bat crews, each

• consisting of one pilot, one co-pilot, and one crew chief.

mission included personnel and cargo airlift and assistance in SAR opera-
Its initial

-11!1
184
tions. Crews were detached to Cam Ranh Bay, Thailand, and Danang.

e (Is t!SR) Tl:e unit's headquarters element was later relocated to Nha
Trang and managed four flights located at three operating locations •

• Three flights were stationed at Udorn RTAFB and were devoted primarily
-to CAS support, counterinsurgency activities-, and transportation. "E"

- Flight, the V1etnam-based contingent, provided several types of support:

unconventional warfare, reconnaissance film courier, base defense, SAW
training, logistic airlift, and psychological operations. As of 1 January
1968, the three flights in Thailand were designated "A", "B" ~ and "C"
Flights, and the one flight in Vietnam wa~ broken down into "0'', "E", and
"F" Flights. 11
Pony Express .. was the conmon name ?for the Thai component,
and "Green Hornets 11 became the nickname of those 20th SOS helicopters
185 "
operating out of South Vietnam.

Early "Green Hornet" Support to MACSOG (U)

S(S Iii B) The 20th Helicopter Squadron picked up the SOG mission in
February 1967. On 19 February, four UH-lF helicopters, armed with 7.62
miniguns and 2.75 rocket launchers, flew their first SOG cross-border
186
mis~ion. They staged out of Kontum.

91
 V "58)· By July 1967, the unit had 13 UH-lF helicopter deployed at
.Nha Trang, Tan Son Nhut, and Kontum. From 1 July to 30 September 1967,

• supporting cross-border operations out of Kontum, the UH-lFs transported

•
more than 63 tons of cargo and 5,314 passengers, and expended 389,000
. 187'
rounds of ammunition .

• :zt£ iii b) The squadron's assets were stretched to the 1imit.

problems, which were due in large part to ·the conduct of operations remote
Logistics

• from the main operating base, compounded the problem of helicopter short-

ages .
...._. Nevertheless.tbe "Green Hornets" increased the level of opera-

• tions during the last three n1onths ~f 1967.

-lowing missions in support of MACSOG:
188
The unit performed the fol-

• 'Armed UH-1 F: Infiltration

Exfiltration
104
127

•
Visual Reconnaissance 66
Army Base Defense 21
Tactical Movement 257

• 43
Unarmed UH-lF:
IU b)
Infiltration 148
ifhe highlight of the last quarter of 1967 was a change in

• the location of the Forward Operating Location ffom Kontum to Ban Me

Thuot on 10 December. Ban Me Thuot (BMT), with only a few temporary in-

• terruptions, remained the primary FOL of the 20th SOS until its withdrawal
from the RVN in early 1972. The probable reason for the move to BMT was
to enhance SOG operations into Cambodian territory. The effect of the
move on the 20th SOS was alleviation of aircraft shortages and associated
logistic·problems, since BMT was significantly closer to the main support
189
base
,, at Nha
\.,
Trang. , ...

92
I SEERif 1
• "Green Hornet" Operations - 1968 (U)_

'
1111
Jj O'Ett $he "Green Hornets" saw much more direct combat action in
early 1968. Reaction to the Communist Tet Offensive accounted for most
of the increase by diverting support from the primary mission: SOG cross-

1111 border operations. In the first three months of 1968, equipped with 15

• UH-lFs, the unit more than doubled the sortie level of the previous quarter •
Armed· helicopters fired some 834,000 rounds of'ammunition and launched

•
[I
over 2,000 rockets; the first figure represented nearly a three-fold in-
crease, and the second figure a seven-fold increase, over expenditures
during the previous quar~er.
190

• ff t'£2) Although helicopters ~ontinually .supported infiltration and

- exfiltration missions, they frequently supported ground elements in a

• conventio.nal air assault role. Extracts from the 20th Helicopter Squadron
191

•
Historical Report describe this type of support:
" ... The gunships were first scrambled before dawn on 30
January. They fired on suspected mortar concentrations.

• Later that day two gunships drove VC [Viet Cong] and NVA
troops from a stream of refugees and killed.six of the
enemy as confirmed by FAC's. Before the day was over, the

•Ill
gunships tookpart in an assault on an estimated two
companies of NVA, dropping, 28 more of the enemy according
to FAC's... At 0330 hours on 2 February 1968, a gunship
element was launched to attack observed enemy mortar .
positions. Anenemy position was observed firing and
was immediately attacked an'd destroyed by the gunships.
A few minutes later, the flight was advised that an ARVN
compound was under heavy attack 2 miles west of Ban Me
Ill Thuot . . . . The gunships put their initial fire at 50
meters inside the perimeter and o~ succeeding passes
worked outward to drive the enemy outside the compound ... "
. c:t(A UFB) · Buring the spring of 1968, the 20th Helicopter Squadron re-

ceived eight additional UH-lF helicopters, enabling another surge in opera-

tions~, To accommodate the new aircraft and aircrews, the unit formed
·'-.

93

• &liCRiT 1
 • liliElllEY

'I another flight, with the helicopters concentrated at Ban Me Thuot.

mally ten aircraft were situated there at any one time: four gunships,
Nor-

I four troop carrier helicopters (commonly called "slicks"), and two spare
192
helicopters (one gunship and one slick).
I a's ''FBJ 6upport to Daniel Boone operations, compared to other mission,
attenuated further during the spring~ The 20th Helicopter Squadron
I rendered support to Daniel Boone operations on only nine days during a

• three-month period~ The unit participated mostly in fire suppression mis-

193

•
sions, but did perform many insertions and extractions inside ·the RVN .
&(I IIFB) From 1 July through 30 September 1968, the newly-designated

• 20th SOS was able to increase its Stipport to MACSOG so that it represented
-approximately half of the squadron's total effort. It retained ten air-

• craft at Ban Me Thuot but transferred four aircraft to the Udorn

Both. in-country and out-country infiltration .and exfiltration missions
~etachment.

• encountered greater enemy resistance. The number of emergency extractions

• jumped !lOtably.
ately:
Aircraft damages and crewmember injuries rose proportion-
forty hits from enemy groundfire were sustained,and five crew-

•
. 194
members were wounded.

•
k'S-%PB,....The· following account of an emergency extraction alludes
to the hazards of such an operation ahd underscores the requirements for

• aircrew coura,ge, flight proficiency, and coordination between ground and

airborne forces:
195

• "On 2 September the UH-lF's were launched on an emer-

gency extraction of a Long Range Reconnaissance patrol. ..
When the forward air controller arrived, he located their

~
[ground team's] position and directed them eastward, to-
ward a landing zone. After cresting a hill and starting
'' ·, down slope, the team made contact with hosti 1e forces in
a trench and bunker complex. After exchanging fire'with

94

• SECRET ,
 sli&&I\Ef •

•' the enemy, the team ret rea ted to the west. . . . [UH-1 F]
crews arrived and protected the team with mini-gun
and rocket fire. The FAC directed the team toward a

• . bomb crater approximately 75 yards north; the team met

hostile fire after moving approximately 35 yards and
had to retreat to their previous position. The gunships

•
continued to deliver ordnance on known enemy positions
and were drawing automatic weapons fire from the· north,
east, and south of the team. The two gunships were getting
low on fuel and, prior to.being relieved by guns 3 and 4,

• they continued to suppress the fire in the bomb crater

area. The FAC directed the team into the bomb crater ...
[A slick] crew made a descent to come in at tree top level,

•
EJI
and to a hover aboye the bomb crater. The crater was too
. small to permit landing, so a rope ladder pickup ~as
made. As the team climbed the rope ladder, Gunihips 3 and
4 made repeated mini-gun passes overhead to suppress
the automatic weapons fire ... Du~ing the last five
minutes of the_pickup, the FAC received fire from heavy
·

automatic weapons to the south. Immediately a.fter the

• slick departed the landin~- zone, several hostile troops

were spotted in the bomb crater that was used for ex-
traction of the team."

• atR

craft.
Ill B)

· full~scale
In the ensuing months of 1968 the "Green Hornets" resumed
supp~rt to MACSOG. During this period the unit lost two air-
On 26 November, one gunship was downed by enemy groundfire during
an emergency extraction operation. The next day, a slick registered the
second loss when it crashed during an infiltration mission. These losses
portended an attrition problem which emerged in 1;g59 and severely jeopar-
. ·196
dized the Air Force SAW helicopter role.

The 20th SOS Crisis in 1969 and 1970 (U)

J£ NEB) In early 1969 the 20th SOS began experiencing a series of
-
helicop-ter losses from hostile causes and maintenance malfunctions. The
problem became acute in the summer when a rash of engine failures resulted
'in numerous losses and caused a low operationally ready rate in the re-
maining force.

95

;a SEEREJ '
 l&€ftET

'• J:B 'lEI) The first loss in 1969 occurred on 3 January when a slick
2-
attempted a pickup of a beleagured reconnaissance team after an initial

• ..\
attempt by the same aircraft encountered intense groundfire. The second

•
combat loss of the year occurred during an extraction attempt on 13 Feb-
ruary; a gunship burst into flames and crashed after being hit by ground-

• fire. A more tragic loss followed on 26 March. This loss~ resulting

from unexplained causes, killed the following personnel: the 20th SOS

• .
Commander~ the 14th Special Operations Wing (14th SOW) Deputy Conmander

for Special Operations (DCSO), the 14th SOW Deputy Commander for Materiel,
the 20th SOS Flight Surgeon, the 20th SOS Maintenance Officer, two door
197.
gunners, and the Bell Helicopter Company Technical Representative.
(5 t!SS) · Jhe succeeding squadron commander of the unit described the
cumulative effect of these losses as .. unbearable ... He further explained:
.. Unbearable,.because it has severely taxed the already limited resources
, 198
of men and aircraft assigned... The 20th SOS Historical Report elabo-
199
rated on these problems:
..... our replacement aircraft have been obtained in the
past by levying a demand on Strategic Air Command UH-lF
inventories. This source of aircraft nas been cut off.
Alternative sources, such as aircraft assigned to Tan Son
Nhut Air Base and Udorn Air Base, Thailand could be brought
to Vietnam; but this would require us to drop our missions
and commitments at these locations. No solution to this
problem ~as yet been found.
As our aircraft losses mount, crew training suffers in
11

direct proportion. As of the end gf this reporting

·· period, it was difficult to conduct half of the airborne
training considered to be minimal for upgrading pilots
and gunners. Reduction of training requirements is not a
feasible solution, as the extraordinary demands of this
mission require instruction that cannot be simulated, can-
not be taught in a· classroom, but must be provided to men
" under actua 1 c'ombat conditions and over the geography
of South Vietnam." ' '

96

., S!CitET L
 iiQttET

I e(F t!FR)•The attrition problem continued unabated through the spring

•
·of 1969 in the. face of heavy flying commitments and frequent emergency
extractions. Two slicks crashed on 13 and 21 April as a result of enemy

• groundfire. Another loss on 19 May was attributed to a mechanical mal-

function .
200

• '5 ?'ED) These losses aggravated the previously cited problems of

aircrew proficiency training and acquisition of replacement aircraft .

•
r!l
The unit was forced to request, and was granted, a partial stand-down for
the purpose of conducting con~entrated training. During the ien-day re-
prieve, Army helicopters. filled in for the 20th SOS helicopters at Ban Me

• Thuot. · In May and June respectively, four helicopters were received in-
- eluding two helicopters for the Udorn detachment. The latter transfer of

• two helicopters fo-llowed a recommendation contained in a 7AF study of

• Thai1and helicopter organizations, completed on 5 March 1969. CINCPACAF

directed the transfer of two UH-lFs to be accomplished by 30 June and pro;..

• . posed that the two remaining UH-lFs at Udorn be moved.to Vietnam after
September .
201

• . Jj IIFI) all series of engine failures in July and August accounted for
numerous.aircraft incidents and three aircraft losses -- on 14 July, 19
July, and 25 August. The downward trend in engine reliability led to
suspensions in 20th SOS flying activities, as reflected by flying time
statistics: 763.7 hours in July; 563.5 hour.s in August; 223.9 hours in
September, of which a major portion was Functional Check Flight time. By
the end of August, the 20th SOS was unable to support the MACSOG mission
at Ban Me Thuot, an operation which normally required 600 flying hours per
" ·. ' 202
month. Army helicopters· then replaced the Green Hornets.
11 11
'

97
 ~-SEC ilft!T · ,

• (£ t'SR) Movement of th·e squadron headquarters from Nha Trang to Tuy

Hoa on 5 September weakened the 20th SOS's ability to recover. The opera-

• tionally ready rate dropped further because of delays in the arrival of

203 .

•
supplies from Nha· Trang .

.,~
fS "52} Eventually, the unit's maintenance problems were remedied .

•II Special maintenance teams studied the problem andtheirrecommendations,

including the assignment of additional maintenance personnel, were
carri.ed out. The facilities at Tuy Hoa provided a better work area than

•
those located at Nha Trang. The sizable increase in maintenance personnel
permitted the estab 1i shment of a thorough inspection and repair program

• at the unit level. Construction beg.an at Ban Me Tliuot ·East Airfield to

204
-minimize the hazards of Foreign Object Damage ..

• cil IIFI) During the maintenance -ordeal, correspondence among the Com-

•
mander, 7AF,.CINCPACAF, and CSAF indicated uncertainty as to the future
role of the 20th SOS. Finally the Air Staff recommended retention of the
gunship-only role, keeping in mind that later attempt~ would be made to
regain the slick role. The only alternative to this course of action was
to relinguish the entire mission. The 20th SOS then resumed gunship opera-
205
tions out of Ban·Me Thuot on 1 December 1969.
Js iii 8) · In early i970, 7AF rece!'ived indications that the MACSOG
Commander was contemplating a request to MACV that Army aviation assume
responsibility for support of special operatjons in lieu of the 20th SOS,
unless the 20th SOS could fulfill both gunship and airlift helicopter
206
requirements. At that time the 20th SOS had only 12 possessed aircraft,
the minimum number of UH-lFs required to maintain the gunship-only support
,, ·. ~··

role. ·The 7AF Deputy Chief of Staff, Op~rations, dispatched a message

98

F SEEREf 7
 'ili€1\ET- _
207

•
~
to PACAF in later February stating tht: dilemma:
Heretofore, it was felt that the Air Force could
11

limit its MACSOG helicopter mission support to pro-

viding gunships. However, we are faced with either
possible loss of mission or Army criticism of our

•
limited helicopter support of MACSOG. The basic ques-
tion is: Does the Air Force want to retain this mis-
sion of helicopter support of MACSOG operations or
does the Air Frirce prefer to cede this mission to

• Army aviation?"
The message included a request for additional aircraft if continuation of

• the mts~ion was envisaged. Shortly thereafier, two combat losses on 14

and 19 March increased the requirement for additional aircraft to seven
.
UH-lFs. Aircraft were readied for transfer to PACAF from the CONUS, but
final action was held in abeyance un.til. completion of t"urther Air Staff
-study. At that time both CINCPACAF and Commander, 7AF, were lukewarm
to continued MACSOG mission support.

a· rs t!EN · Finally, in May 1970, CINCPACAF and the Commander, 7AF backed
the Air Staff position to continue support of MACSOG. The Air Staff pro-
posal noted the ramifications from default of the mission support: de-
fault surely would have precluded a later claim by the Air Force for this
type of mission. Too, the fact that the 42 milli-on dollar investment in
the "N" model was near "pay-off" was certainly a consideration in the
decision. The 20th SOS received the ~eplace~ent aircraft required to
sustain mission support until the arrival of the UH-lN.

Post-Cr-1sis Operations, 1970-1972 (U)

If '!59) During the latter half of 1970, "Green Hornet" attrition
showed a definite improvement. Only two aircraft were lost in combat,
nei-ther attributable to·mechanical failure as a primary cauSe. There were
two incidents of engine failure, but both aircrews successfully recovered

99

• &E&RiT 1
thei r airc raft without susta ining danKtge.
for regain~ng the USAF slick mission for Cambodian
•••'•ll'lllll's•a~al•'llllllnllf'pes
5

Presidenti.al edic t
cros s-bo rder oper ation s, however, were dashed by the
US helic opte r
which banned Americans from Cambodia afte r 30 June 1970~
s were replaced
gunship support was stil l perm itted , but the Army slick
nning in July , the only
by VNAF H-34 helic opte rs known as "King Bees." Begi
of Cambodian cros s-
US UH-lF troop carr ier helic opte rs flyin g in support
gunships and VNAF
border oper ation s were those.accompanying USAF UH-lF
as rescue airc raft , due to the limi ted lift
H-34 helic opte rs to serve 200
.
capa bilit ies of the H-34.
occasions
aM"ED) SOG subsequently reque.sted permission on several
but each requ est was
-to use US troo plift helic opte rs in the Cambodian AO,
numbers of airc raft
denied. After the 20th ·sos had received suff icien t
attempted to move the
to provide a·combined slick and gunship package, SOG
unit 's airc raft uti-
unit 's FOL from Ban Me Thuot to Pleiku to enhance the
to the move, it late r
lizat ion rate. · Although 7AF initi ally was amenable
disapproved it.
mber 1970.
The main oper ating base, however, was moved in Septe
1(1 liFO)
at a more opportune
The relo catio n from Tuy Hoa to Cam Ranh Bay occurred
This reloc ation had
time than the prio r move from Nha Tra:ng to Tuy Hoa.
ort of MACSOG. Air-
littl e, if any, adverse affe ct on oper ation s in supp
htly , however, be-
craf t maintenance and aircrew train ing did SJJffer slig
relat ions hips re-
cause of the requirement to esta blish new host -tena nt
desig nate and obta in
garding supply, maintenance, and oper ation s, and to
ties in adjustment to
tact ical clear ance for new train ing area s. Diff icul
,, •.

al and phase-in of
the new site were inte nsif ied by the concurrent arriv
-209
t~e firs t UH-lN mode ls.
loo
 'I&Cil&T
Jpi UFO). Tie€ first UH-lN models arrived at Cam Ranh Bay in late Novem-
ber 1970. Flight testing began in December and total conversion to the
twin-engined model was completed by March 1971. The new helicopte r had

severa 1 advantages ·over the UH- 1 F mode 1. The two engines offered greater

security as well as enhancing the power output. Inct·eased power output per-

mitted more passengers to be transport ed on the slicks and more ammunition

to be carried on the gun-ships. Added armor and self-seal ing'fuel tanks
improved aircraft combat survivab ility. On the other hand, disadvantages
of the N Model were its reduced range and loiter time. As a result, more

aircraft turnarounds and.short er distances between staging sites and

210
operating areas were required for SOG missions.
,.(5 tiEl?) .Jhe most important impact of the UH-lN was that it alleviate d
-helicopt er shortages and associate d problems of acquiring replacement air-
craft. . support to MACSOG
20th SOS ·,
improved noticably . Additional missions

were tasked. 11
Green Hornet 11 crews again began flying out of Tan Son Nhut,
performing routine administr ative support missions for. 7AF and MACV and assist-
ing in ·trainin g reconnaissance teams at. nearby Camp Long Thanh. The unit
restarted training in slicks and finally was able~ to provide a complete
helicopte r of four gunships and four slicks for a short-dur ation
packag~
~ 211
mission staged out of Dapang during September 1971.
(E rlfQ) The temporary mission launched from Danang proved to be the
highlight of 20th SOS operation s during the waning period of the unit's
existence . The unit provided over 1,000 sorties in an intensive operation
,in areas where groundfir e was usually entounter ed on each mission. Not

one aircraft was lost.

\\ .
This record was represent ative of 20th,. SOS opera-
tions since the advent of the UH-lN; duri~g 1971 and 1972 onli one aircraft

101
 was lost to mechanical failures and only one aircraft was downed by ground-
212
fire.

A Closer Look at the Helicopter in Cross-Border Operations (U)

zLs 'liB) @loss-border operations placed heavy and complex demands on
the helicopter units supporting MACSOG. To fully appreciate the role of
rotary wing aircraft in UW activities, a more· detailed examination of
cross~border operations is required. These operations involved detailed
planning, extensive coordination, and specialized tactics.
sDE IIFB) QJanning began with the nomin·ation and selection of intelli-
gence targets. This process involved
',_
several elements at SOG headquar-ters
and its subordinate units, ~1ACV and its field units, and 7AF. After monthly
targets lists were approved by COMUSMACV, the Commander of th~ SOG Ground
Studies ·Group assigned prioritized targets for execution to the Command and
Control (C&C) detachments. They, in turn, initiated further planning and·
scheduled specific missions, pending final approval by MACV and availa.:.
bility of air assets.
(TS-NFD) Air assets, namely UH-1 s and FACs •·.- were made ava i1 ab 1e to
the C&C detachments and their sub-forward operating locations beforehand
by a monthlY frag ...
11
In the case of the 20th SOS, 7AF directed that a
sufficient number of aircraft -- usually ten -~be in place to provide a
minimum of seven aircraft for infiltration and exfiltration at any time
of day br night. This tasking accounted for a substantial amount of alert
time.
s£U nns) -After scheduling reconnaissance missions based on the approved
- targets- list and adding other targets as Qeemed appropriate, tjle Command
and Control detachments· issued notices of intent to higher headquarters.

102
• The detachments then reviewed all a,vailable target data, including aerial

'• photography, and held briefings for their staffs and reconnaissance teams .
The FAC who was knowledgeable of the target area usually participated in

•
this phase of planning by suggesting possible landing zones and insertion
213
tactics.

• af 5
t!EP) . From an aviation standpoint, the actual mission began with a
visual reconnaissance flight over the target are(i. A successful VR was the

•l!l key to an effective infiltration.

helicopters performed the VR.
.,.g
Either a FAC aircraft or one or more

tiFB) · !Jsing the E'AC for the VR mission was normally preferred. This
method minimized the chance of forewarning enemy security elements of an
-impending insertion. Too, the FAC was most familiar with the area and
could plot mo!'e accurately the prospective LZs on a 1:50,000 scale map.
The selection ofthe landing zones, both primary and alternates, was made
during the VR with the assistance of the reconnaissance ·team leader, who
almost always flew on the VR. This decision, of course, required that the
· FAC be thoroughly familiar. with helicopter capabilities, limitations, and
tactics.
::z4£ tiFQ) The· Air Mission Commander, the senior helicopter pilot at
the. launch site, would sometimes perform the VR mission in the command
and control h~licopter. Again, the reconnaissance team leader was carried
on the mission. A 20th SOS manual on tactics, however, recommended that
a minimum of three -- optimally four -- helicopters conduct the VR. A
flight of four helicopters, two gunships and two slicks, would allegedly
appear to be more routine to enemy.security elements than would a single ship.
'' •, '

Furthermore, a flight of helicopters prov1ded gun cover at alt times and

103
 offered a rescue capability in the event that an aircraft were downed.
Normal crew composition on this type of VR consisted of two insertion
pilot~, the C&C helicopter pilot, ~nd two members of the reconnaissance
I 214 .
team.
I (E DIED) U.e ideal VR consisted of a single look -- one overflight to
pick out the primary and alternate LZs. · This was a difficult task. Large
I clearings were not always go()l LZs, since the enemy watched them closely
lit and sometimes employed boobytraps. Areas near rivers normally lay near
enemy logistic routes, hence near enemy concentrations. Small clearings

• encircled by dense veget~tion may.have offered minimal risk in regard to

•If
enemy forces, but the thick vegeta~inn constituted a hazard to insertion
. )

·helicopters and sometimes immobilized the gr.ound teams. Due to the presence
. \

of various potential hazards, a single overflight normally was not con-

sidered adequate to ensure planning for a safe and smooth insertion .

• eirE tiED) At the completion of the visual reconnaissance flight, the

•a VR crewmembers were thoroughly debriefed, and further .Planning ensued .

In most cases the Ground Mission Commander. supervised a joint briefing
. .

for helicopter pilots, team leader, and FACs to e-stablish take-off times,
checkpoints, orbit points, final approach azimuth, flight formation, emer-

• gency extraction plans, communication·'procedures, and so forth. Aircrews

•
and ground teams then separately refined their portions of pl~nning, co-
ordinating closely with .each other. Planning touched on the most minute
. 215
details; flexibility and imagination were essential.
Z{C-14FD} 6n the day of the mission, the final pre-mission briefing
was conducted at the launch site. It included such items as current weather
" .
conditfons, latest intelligence informati'on, ground-aircrew stgnaling

104

• Q8NFI8ENTIAI:s e
 =&8NFI8iN·Tiulsl
procedures, and so forth. After completion of comprehensive flight plan-
ning ~nd preflight checks of the aircraft, the mission was ready to launch.
The FAC took off first. After flying over the area to ensure that weather
permitted an insertion, he transmitted a "go-ahead" for the launch of
the helicopter package .
.ts 'IFQ) Ihe helicopter package typically included seven aircraft:
one slick acting as the command and control ship and as a rescue heli_.
copter; one slick which carried the reconnaissance team; another slick -to
transport the rest of the reconnaissance team (if a 12~man team) and
serve as a medical rescue aircraft; and four-gunships for armed escort.
Two gunships were considered sufficient if two others were availabl~
216
·within 20 minutes flight time to the target area .
..-{C-141 15) The command and contro 1 he 1i copter usually launched
first. The:other slicks launche~ next, followed by the
gunships. The helicopters proceeded to the rendezvous point in a loose,
nonstandard formation, commonly with the slicks in the front and gunships
in the rear. The rendezvo.us point most often was located three to five
. 217
kilometers from the landing zone.
t4t!EI\PD~ Fl i'ght to the rend~zvous point was normally at a safe
<""~

altitude, in excess of 1500 feet above the ground. If enemy forces occu-
pied high terrain which dominated the area of operations, however, the
advantages of a low-level flight were considered. In the absence of
prominent landmarks and roads, and with the scarcity of TACAN sites,
navigation was difficult -- particularly when cloud ceilings descended.

,, --~O~fi~F~B~)~F~~
.
the ~ime the helicopters arrived at the rendezvous
point until the time the reconnaissance team was implaced in the LZ,

105
18NFIB£NTIAL •
 •r•eOMPIDt.t~'lltls a
•I tactics and techniques varied
tion and the units involved.
mark~dly, depending on the tactical situa-
Infiltl·ations controlled by Command and

• Con~rol North frequently included landing zone "preparation," that

the dropping of ordnance prior to insertion.
is~

A gunship would make a

firing pass over the LZ, using flechette rockets for example, and a slick

• would insert the reconnaissance team immediately after the firing pass .
Command and Control Central sometimes sent slicks into the landing zone

~
•
L.a
followed by gunships on the same azimuth, allowing rapid and accurate
reaction by the gunships against any groundfire directed against the
slicks. Conm1and and Con:trol South occasionally elected to send a slick

•• into the LZ alone, directing the gunships to an orbit point away from
-the landing zone. On other occasions gunshi.ps flew a figure "8" pattern

•••
218
over the LZ while the slick was unloading the reconnaissance team.
·" tiF9)' ;ll;lthough some tactics were modified according to the situa-
tion, a 20th SOS manual outlined certain basic flying techniques which

• remained constant for the insertion aircraft.

practices were noted:
219
The following general

• • Altitude in the insertion area should be between 1500

and 3000 feet above the terrain. This altitude of-

•
fered the best combination of aircrew visibility of the
terrain and its protection from enemy groundfire.
"
• Descent should be as rapid as possible without going

• •
into full autorotation .
Terrain features should be used tQconceal the heli-

•
copter .
• Airspeed should be maintained between 80 to 100 knots

•rl
until final approach .

" '
*Tactital Air Navigation.

106

~ • E8NFI8iNTI.txL
 C8NFIDINJ'Al •

•• 1 Final approach should be shurt, fast, and low -- just

· above the tree tops. A moderate, gradual flare should
be made into the l l with a reduction of airspeed .

• 1 -Final descent should be made slowly and cautiously in

order to avoid trees a~d other obstructions and to pre-

•
vent settling with power .
• Take-off from the LZshouTd be slow and vertical until
obstacles are cleared. Departure flight should be at

• low-level for at least two kilometers, at which time a

maximum performance climb should be executed.

• ::z(G tiFQ) hsertion tactjcs could be categ.orized generally as two

types: .high-level and low-level. Using high-level tactics, the insertion
pilot would maintain a safe altitude until he sighted the LZ, then he

•
would descend in an evasive flight path. Keeping the L_l in sight or .
using a reference point for locating the LZ, the insertion pilot would

• maintain low-level flight during the last 500 to 1000 meters.

low-_level tactics, the fnsertion pilot would descend to low altitude at
Employing

• the release point, five to ten kilometers from the landing zone.
insertion aircraft commander controlled the operation, he would then pro-
If the

• ceed toward the landing zone, usually with gunships in trailing positions.

• More frequently, the FAC or the C&C.helicopter controlled

·:-
the operation,
in which case either one would direct the insertion helicopter to the LZ

• by giving changes in headings, distances remaining to the LZ, and air-

speed reductions.
"
The FAC or C&C helicopter avoided direct overflight

•~ of the final approach route and maintained a separation from the inser-
tion aircraft of about one kilometer.
+t 141 D)
220

Final authority for deciding to insert or abort rested with

II. the insertion aircraft commander.

aln'lbst,always decided to abort.
If groundfire were encountered, he
The C&C helicopter of FAC pilot then

•,. C8NFIDINTI.Jtla
107
"'

j
 '8N FIBE NTI!ll

•' would determine whether or not an insertion into an alternate LZ would

be attempted. Sometimes the insertion helicopter, \'·lith its armed heli-

• copter escort, would search for another LZ while the FAC orC&C helicopter
221

•
acted only as an observer~

4:8 fiPB) Szh1ce a formation of helicopters flying over enemy~occupied

• territory inevitably alerted ·the enemy, false insertion tactics were de-
veloped. The purpose of such tactics was to deceive the enemy or force

•1!1 him to cover a number of pos~ible insertions. Naturally, a false inser-

tion had to simulate an actual insertion as much as possible,·with the
exception of actual landJng. The decision to use false insertion tactics

• had to be weighed carefully, since -the risk was nearly_ equal to that
- encountered in actual insertions .

• (£ NfQ) Typical methods employed to effect a false insertion included

. 222

•
the fo 11 owing:
t Insert using low-level tactics; fake into another LZ

•
using high-level tactics .
• Insert using high-level tactics; fake a low-level inser-
tion .

• t The insertion aircraft descends into ttlree or more lZs

separated by about one kilometer from each other .

• • A formation of five helicopters flying abreast descends

simultaneously, each helicopter passing over a different
ground mark.

-•
!
• All aircraft start in a trail formation with the inser-
tion aircraft in the number two position. The insertion
aircraft lands, unloads, and joins the formation in one
of the followup positions.

..
a(€ tlf8) After an actual insertion in which reconnaissance team mem-
bers successfully de boarded the aircraft, the slicks and gunships would
'' I

•
\, ,..
fly to an orbit point and remain there at a safe altitude. The launch

•
-108

• CONIIDINTIAL
'• officer would release the aircraf't af'ver receiving notification from
the reconnaissance team that they were in good condition and had not

•
223
been compr:omised.

- fC-NfQ) When the reconnaissance team accomplished its objective,

• .

.was compromised, or had encountered enemy resistance and was unable to

•
break contact, an exfiltration operation ccm~enced. Extractions resembled
insertions in many ways; the ·major differences during the extraction were

•:1 less emphasis on secrecy and"more dependence on gunships.

briefings for exfiltrations included additional items such as team
status, its location, its method for identifYing its position, tentative
Pre-mission

type of pickup, and expected availa~ility of tactical close air support.

II -In the cases of emergency extractions, the crewmembers sometimes were

•
224
not afforded a comprehensive briefing.
J,b flf8) The FAC usually controlled the exfi ltration, both for sche-

• duled and emergency extractions. The FAC pinpointed the location of the

• team, estimated the degree of enemy resistance, directed the extr.action

helicopters to the scene, and obtained tactical close air support as needed .

• zz(O nro). The helicopter gunships normally la:unched before the slicks.
They flew to an orbit point which was much closer to the designated LZ

• than in the case of insertions. The ~unships, normally operating in pairs,

•
proceeded to the LZ to check and secure it. The extraction helicopter
commander closely monitored radio transmissiqns and fle~1 over the LZ at
a safe altitude to assess the terrain, enemy groundfire, and the ground
team's status and location. This familiarization precluded delay in
beginning an approach to the LZ after the gunships passed a "go-ahead."
,,

109

COPJFIBE~JTIAL ,
•
Timing was critical, particularly in emergency extr·actions. Entering the
LZ before the gunships had suppressed or subdued enemy groundfire was
·suicidal, and descending too long after the gunships cleared the area
225
allowed the enemy to recover and open fire again.
(0 fiFB) 'fhe LZ selected for a routine exfiltration was normally
large enough to permit the helicopte~ to land. The LZ used for an
emergency extraction, however, more frequently required the helicopter to
hover, suspending special equipment such as Stabo rigs, McGuire rigs, or
rope ladctet·s to the ground team. During the latter type of exfiltration,
the slick was usually un~ble to maintain a hover with the full team on
board. Hence, additional extractiOR helicopters were needed. The sue-
- ceeding helicopters would remain at high altitude, observing- the landing
zone, and would attempt to enter the LZ immediately after the preceding
heliCopter departed it.· Departure from the LZ during extractions was
the same as departure during insertions. Extraction pilots had to be
exceedingly cautious since operations were often conducted in confined
. . 226
areas, with the gunships flying over the lZ at low altitude.

Helicopter Gunships (U)

(e IIF8) Although helicopter gunship
., support of infiltrations and
exfiltrations has been addressed superficially in the foregoing, more
specific discussion of the USAF armed helicopter is appropriate for several
reasons: The gunship was the Air Force's major contribution of helicopter
support to MACSOG. The Air Force gunship's armament was unique, seemingly
better suited to SOG mission support than that ·of the Army UH-1. Equipped
with tbis aircraft, the'Air Force developed through combat experience a
vast repertoire of versatile, effective tactics.
110

€8NFIBEN,IJlli ,
 ••.a 8
(6 IIF8)
in nature.
• €8NFIBE-ITIA'
iiohe weapons system of tile UH-lF and the UH-lN was defensive
This helicopter was no substitute for tactical air power, nor

• was it even comparable to the Army's "Huey" Cobra in terms of firepower.

The USAF helicopter gunship was designed for close air support to ground

• troops, for limited duration and within an area that was not extremely
hostile. It could be used offensively only against "soft 11 targets such

• as buildings, trdop concentrations riot in bunkers, and watercraft.

•
u(O IIF8) The USAF gunship's most formidable weapon was its two printle-
mounted miniguns manned by two door gunners. Carrying 12,000 ro.unds of
7.62 millimeter ammunition, the aircraft,could si1nultaneously shower bul-
Q lets at the rate of 2,000 to 4,000 rounds per minute from each gun. From

•
'

an altitude of 1,500 feet, the heli~opter could hold its fire within 150
- feet of a target, a capability which proved -to be advantageous for i niti a1

• suppressive fire during the helicopter's descent toward the landing zone.
At low-level· flight, the miniguns obviously were more potent and enhanced

• ·.
by their wide degree of coverage. The guns could be aimed forward,

•
triggered by the pilot or co-pilot, or they could be operated by the door .
gunners with a coverage from 90 degrees forward to 30 degrees aft of the

•
aircraft. The guns could fire downward to an angle
~
of depression as great
227
as 70 degrees,.or upward, to an angle of elev~tion of about 5 degrees. *

• ~ ltf8) Rocket launchers complemented the miniguns.

"
The gunships
carried two pods of 2.75 inch rockets, each pod containing seven rockets .

•a The aircraft commander or co-pilot could fire the rockets singly or in

ripple~:
~CEIH 15) Gunship tactics for insertions varied. The standard

•.a -x-~n 1971, the 20th SOS began field testing· pintle-mounted 40mm grenade
launchers in place of the 7.62mm miniguns; however, due to the degraded
accura~y of fire and increased hazards of the new armament, the minigun
remained as the primary .weapon system. ' \

lll

CONFI8iN,IAk •
 • CCIMPID!!4TIAI!s

'••• procedure in the 20th SOS for armed helicopter escort was for two gun-
ships to trail the insertion slick to the LZ at a distance of 500 to

• 1000 meters, the distance depending on the expected time that the slick

•
would be in the LZ. A slow insertion, for example, required greater
spacing between the slick and gunships. Gunships avoided the slick's

• flight path due to the hazards ·of groundfire from enemy elements alerted
by the first passover .

•II J,li; flf8)

enabled continuous
While the slick was in the LZ, the gunships provided
coverage by using a variety of flight patterns.
cover~ge,
Simply orbiting the LZ
but made the gunships vulnerable to ground-
.

• fire and compromised the LZ to the enemy. Gunships sometimes made

-single pass directly over the LZ at reduced airspeed.
a_

Another method

• was. to fly an .. S.. pattern, passing by the LZ to one side, reversing, fly-
228

•
ing 6ver the ·Lz, then reversing to the exit heading .
(6 IH B) In approaching the extraction point, the gunships normally

• made a 11 tear-drop 11 type of descent toward the LZ, keep.ing the ground team
in sight at all times. This type of descent permitted the delivery of

• ordnance if the team were .in contact. In such a Situation the lead gun-

•
ship might have cleared the area with minigun fire, and after it departed
the line of fire the second gunship might have launched a salvo of

••• rockets. Firing passes were flown either directly over the reconnaissance
·team or between it and the enemy forces in cuntact .
229

c(G fiFQ.).. The actual tactics and flight patterns used by Air For.ce

gunship pilots in a particular situationwere based on such factors as

1\ weather, terrain, and degree of enemy resistance. Under these circum-

"

• stances'~ pilots determined which pattern,'or combination of patterns,

' CCNPIDI!NTIAI:a
112
• ·provided the best coverage to the ground team while minimizing exposure
-to groundfire .
230

• ... ltPB.) A 20th SOS manual on tactics cited the figure "8" pattern

as the tactic which was normally most

port to a small ground team.
effectiv~ for providing close sup-
Timing and spacing were critical. The pat-

• tern could be established directly over the ground team, permitting dual
gun firing, or offset from the team position, allowing mixed rocket and

• .
minigun attacks. Turns at the end of fi-ring passes had to be varied to

•
avoid repeated firing passes along one· flight path .
z(G PIFB) Another attack pattern used by·Air Force gunship pilots vias

•tf
'
the oval, or "racetrack," pattern. '-Agai.n timing and spacing were impor-
-tant. One helicopter was positioned to start a firing pass as soon as
the other rolled off. This pattern allowed mixed minigun and rocket fire
and was most effective against point targets.· As in the figure "8" pat-
. 231
tern, turning angles were varied to avoid stereotyped attack passes.
rzteiiQFO) I he 20th SOS also used both circular and clover-leaf pat-

terns, primarily for checking the securit¥ of an LZ. · When groundfire was
. encountered, changing to either the figure "8 11 of oval pattern was usually
considered the be.st attack technique. A MACV-published manual, however,
noted that a circular pattern was used for attack when the enemy was loca-
ted in one direction from the reconnaissance team and one minigun had
malfunctioned. The same manual stated that the clover-leaf pattern was
232
useful in providing 360 degrees of cover for a surrounded team.
cf'd-111 B,._If helicopter gunships were unable to suppress the enemy

groundfire within 15 to ,20 minutes, tactical fighters, particularly A-1

'-' ·.

aircraft, offered the best method of fire'suppression. Another solution

113
 was to have the ground team disengage, while helicopter gunships covered
233
their backtrail with fire .

• (£ DIED) P:fter successful recovery of a ground team, the gunships

•
sometimes continued firing against enemy elements or proceeded with the
slick helicopters to an orbit point directed by the FAC .

• Night Operations (U)

•
..,(o lfJ D) Another impOl~tant aspect of UW helicopter operations was
the conduct of insertions and extractions during darkness. Night opera-
tions provided _superior concealment; however~ such operations were dan-
gerous. SOG was never able to surmount the immense dif-ficulties and·
night operations were conducted only infrequently. Normally, only an ex-
treme emergency _justified the risk, and then an emergency extraction would
use !3rtifiCial illumination since the fear of compromising the team was
234
no longer paramount.
4'JENPO) Interest in night op~rations really emerged in 1969, when
planning began for conducting this type of operation in Cambodia. The
terrain in the Cambodian Area of Operations (AO) ;.was considered more
suitable than the. rugged terrain in the. Laotian AO. A MACSOG conference
on night helicopter operations, conve.ned in July 1969, outlined some major
problent areas: establishment of the criteria for selecting landing and
drop zones, setting minimal weather standards, providing means to maintain
. 235
aircrews• visual references, aircrew training requirements, etc.
z(TB UFB) The most significant problem was finding landing zones that
were suitable for night operations. Most of the sizable LZs in the
CamlJodian AO were the result of clearing by 11 Slash and burn" agricultural
. ' '

114
 methods. The ash on such zones was stirred' into the air by the helicopter
rotar wash, severely reducing visibility and endangering helicopter
flight. Navigation in darkness over the flat area of the ·Ao was a diffi-
cult task in the absence of easily identified ground checkpoints. Further-
inore, LZs had to be closer to mobile launch sites, since maneuvedng into
236
LZs at night required much more time .
...nc flfil5) weather was the second most important consideration in
planning night insertion. Although no minimum standards were set for
exfiltration, night insertion missions were not recommended when the
cloud ceiling was below 3000 feet and visibility was less than 5 miles.
Any cloud cover at all restricted n~tural illumination from the moon and
237
·stars.

z(T9 ltr5) *'he most prevalent means for providing artificial lighting

(during extractions only) was dropping flares from either fixed wing or
rotary wing aircraft. Fixed wing aircraft were preferred since they
could carry more flares and orbit longer. A shortcoming of flares was
that their descent and drift presented moving shadows to helicopter pilots.
Also, flares which prematurely burned out constitUted a hazard in that
they might drift into helicopter rotor blades. Xenon searchlights and
several types of starlight scopes wer~ tested. Unfortunately, search~
li~hts made the illuminating aircraft vulnerable to ene~y groundfire, and

starlight scopes proved to be unacceptable due to problems induced by

.. 238
helicopter vibration.
(8 lti'I'J) Development of night helicopter operations on a full scale
wou~,d have significantly. increased crewmember manning. Additional train-
ing would have been needed and directives'specified more crew'rest for

115

.
• night operations.
a continuous alert
Augmentation would also have been required to maintain
capability~ ~Hthout manning .increases, implementation
of night operations would have forced a reduction in the number of teams
in the field. Additionally, helicopter losses wou~d have increased be-
cause of the drastic decrease in the margin of error in piloting the air-
craft. For example, an engine failure during night operations would in
most cases result in the loss of the helicopter, whereas during daylight
operations chances for recovering the aircraft were reasonably good.

" '·

116

•S!Citlf 1
•• s '8NFI81~ttTII!I

CHAPTl:R V
COM~1AND AND CONTROL (U)
a

•I.· (' "FP) 'wtangling the web of command and control relationships
with regard to SOG air operations is, indeed, a difficult endeavor.
first step toward understanding the planning, organizing, coordinating,
The

I directin~, and controlling of air assets and operations is a clear defini-

•I
tionof "command and control."
(P flf8) eo111mand and control is an arrangement employed by a commander
to perform essential management functibns. Jhis arrangement embodies
command relationships, p~rsonnel, and facilities -- dyna_mic < .
component~

I
"-..
enabling the commander to translate objectives and instructions into
. 239
action which will produce the desired results. Stated differently,
~ when US forces are involved in a war, command and control consists of

• two essential 1ngredients: one is the joint command headquarters and

subordinate commanders with staffs containing talent necessary to plan and

•II control actions, and the second isan extensive and reliable communica-
tions system from the joint headquarters to Washington DC and from the
joint headquarters to forces in the field.
. 240 ;.

• (U) Terms frequently used in discussion of command and control are

"command" and "operational command/control." Differentiation of the terms

• is necessary since each entails a different degree of authority, i.e.,

•
the pow~r to direct action or to use resources to accomplish assigned
responsibility.
(U) Command entails a broad degree of authority. It is defined in
~- JCS,Pub 1 as follows:
241

• • E8NFIBENTIAL
117
 "Command includes the authority and responsibility for
effectively using available resources and for planning
the employment of, organizing, directing, coordfnating,
and control"ling military forces for the accomplishment
of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility
for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned
personnel."
(U) The standard definition of operational command (used synonymously
242
with operational control in this study) is the following:
"These functions of command involving the composition
of subordinate for~es, the assignment of tasks, the
designation of objectives and the authoritative direc-
tion necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational
command should be exercised by the use of the assigned
normal organizatinnal units through their responsible
commanders or through the commanders of subordinate
forces established by the commander exercising· opera-
tioRal command. It does rtvt include such matters as
administration, discipline, internal organization, and
unit training, except when a subordinate commander re-
quests assistance."
Simply stated; command carries with it authority over and res pons i bil ity
for all activities and needs of subordinate units. Operational command
-means partial authority or pat·tial responsibility.
u(TO hi D) Outlining the UW command and control arrangement, esp_e-
cially the evolution of that arrangement, present~ unique problems.
Conduct of UW activities, due to political sensitivities, required con-
siderable coordination with agencies I').Ormally peripheral to the military
chain of command. Political sensitivities also included deliberate ef-
forts to disguise lines of authority. For example, in many documents
classified at the Secret level, MACSOG was described as a staff agency
of MACV. Actually, MACSOG was an operational agency, but that fact was
highly classified. Some lines of authority were overt, such as the rela-
- tiorl~hip between the 15th SOS, 14th DESO,"'and 14th SOW; however, other
lines of authority were-covert, such as the relationship between 15th SOS,

118
 • Air Operations Group, and MACSOG.
a (E UFB) file lack of detailed documentation· on .command and control

• for the entire period of SOG's existence necessitates concentration on

the period ending with the 1968 memorandum of Agreement between 7AF and

• MACSOG. That memorandum provided extensive discussion on the responsi-

• bilities and methods for manag~ment of air assets.

•..
Early Approval Procedures for Air Operations (U)
..(Te flf8) Prior to 14 October 1964, the CIA handled the routing and
approval of OPLAN 34A air missions. On that· date the Department of
·Defense assumed responsibility for obtaining appropriate· clearances for

•
--~

the conduct of air ope·rati ons. The process began with a monthly opera-
tions schedule, submitted by COMUSMACV approximately 10 days before the
period began._· This schedule, incorporating CINCPAC's comments, went to
the JCS. SACSA,'the action agency for such matters, would obtain approval
through coordination with the Deputy Secretary of Defense (a member of
the 303 Committee), the Department of State, and the CI.A as required.
Approval of this schedule -represented final Washington
·:- authority for execu-
ting missions. However, 24 hours prior to execution of each mission,
COMUSMACV would obtain political clearance from the American Ambassador,
Saigon. Concurrently, a notice of intent was sent to the JCS, who in
turn would inform the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central In-
telligence, and the Secretary of State. The 24-hour requirement was
later reduced to 12 hours and the National Military Command Center was
charged with the responsibility for electrically transmitting notices of intent

to 't:he·.appropriate offic'es.

119
 -(TE JlfB) 6nee the mission launched, MACV would continue to submit

launch, recovery, abort, and spot reports. Almost all of these were by
Flash precedence. After completi.on of a mission, an after action report
. relayed aircrew debriefings. This report contained the reasons and
rationale for any departure from the planned sequence of events.
(IS NED) The procedures cited above pertained to missions which were
considered within the scope of already approved mission concepts. In
early 1966 the JCS delegated to CINCPAC the authority to approve and
execute specific· OPLAN 34A air missions falling within that category.
Approval for new mission.concepts, such as the use of helicopters for the
infiltration of agents into North Vt~tnam, continued to rest with Washing-
·ton offices. Once a precedent was firmly established, CINCPAC received
approval authority for that type of mission.·
.:.(TC PIF8) Common criticism of the command and control system, as
related by interviews contained in the MACSOG Documentation Study, was
that tight Washington control hampered the conduct of oper-ations, espe-
cially impeding timeliness. Additionally, there was a need for a more
integrated organization in Washington since .both tAS and MACSOG were con-
ducting covert operations in close proximity to each other. One senior
243
Air Force dfficer stated:
"If we are to participate in clandestine type operations,
we need a national level planning and coordinating
agency for that purpose. The actual planning of such op-
. · erations can be accomplished more effectively in the
field; the Washington level organization should consist
primarily of the agencies needed to ensure the requisite
coordination with other operations and to obtain the neces-
sary approval for conducting the particular clandestine
operations... ·
"
Another individual, a senior Navy officer~ cited some specific problems
244
. existing in OSACSA: .
120
• The Special Operations Division [SOD] of OSACSA, charged
11

with handling covert matters at the DOD level, is at the

bottom of the Joint Staff hierarchy and woefully under-

• staffed. The staffing of a covert action involves going

through layer after layer.of conventional hierarchy. SOD,
or the entity which is to handle covert matters must be
·placed high'enough in the organizational structure and
headed by a person of sufficient rank to facilitate prompt
access to the decision-makers. As a result of the inade-
quate m·ganizational machinery within the DOD for handl-
ing'c6vert matters there is virttially no link bet~een
the SOD and the 303 Committee. This link should operate
through the Deputy SecDef, but, because of SOD's isola-
tion at the bottom-of the Joint Staff hierarchy, it is
difficult to present a proposed action to the Committee."

Tasking of a Heavy Hook Mission (U)

(rs NSQ) D"ring the period that Heavy Hook aircra.ft were the pri-mary
,'.,

aircraft participating in MACSOG air operations, tasking was relatively

simple. SOG would pass a.series of targets to First Flight Detachment for
unit-level planning. SOG then reviewed these plans and passed them to
CINCPAC and Washington for final approval.. Twenty-four hours prior to a
scheduled mission, SOG sent an "intent 11 message to First Flight Detachment,
giving a particular mission number.
(TS-NFD) Upon receipt of an intent message~ First Flight planners
made last-minute ,changes to the mission plan, such as adding any re-
cently detected enemy gun positions ~hich might require alteration of
the fl'ight pf1th. When SOG approved the revised mission plan, First Flight
Detachment briefed the Chinese crews. They had the option of declining
to fly.the mission if they.so desired.
:zfTJ 14r8) Jl.pproximately 12 hours prior to mission execution, SOG
dispatched an "execute" message. Shortly thereafter, First Flight Detach-
ment s·tarted maintenance generation on the aircraft and briefed the Chinese
"

121
'• aircrews, both in Chinese and English to ensure no misunderstanding as
t9 what was required. The unit designated a staging officer, the mis-

•
il
sion commander, who was responsible for ensuring preparation of the air-
craft and for monitoring the mission from beginning to end.
a (TS flf8) The mission was monitored by a CIA station located in the

• Philippines. The aircrew was required to make radio transmissions at.

designated points along the flight route.
be closely monitored throughout its duration.
This permitted the mission to
245

Command and Control, 1965-1968 (U)

.ns NFQ) During the period from 1965 to 1968, the,·level of both.
''-

special and conventional operations rose dramatically. Increasing

numbers and types of USAF aircraft supported MACSOG operations. Intense
competition among different activities for a limited number of air assets
became evident. For example, the MACSOG cross-border air support re-
quirements vied with the 7AF interdiction requirements. Unfortunately,
an effective command and contro.l system lagged the buildup of an air
armada.and rapid escalation of the conflict. Spe~ifically, the lack of
explicitly define~ responsibilities and coordination channels between
7AF and MACSOG led to a strained relationship between the two entities.
(TS PJFQ) The rapid escalation of operations and competition for
air resources were not the· only reasons for a developing rift between
7AF and.'MACSOG. The extreme sensitivity of SOG activities added a compli-
cation. SOG requests for air support to 7AF encountered difficulties
because few JAF personnel were SOG-briefed."
11
From the 7AF standpoint,
''
- secrecy.engendered
.
concern for the proper,and efficient utili~ation of
'

122
its ass-ets under the operational control of MACSOG. 7AF officials demons-
trated particular anxiety regarding the necessity for Air Force supervi-
sion in such areas as tactics, flying.safety, and crew protection.
az(To· UPB) Jllf~llough specific command and control procedures before
1968 were not clearly evident from the available d6cumentation, various
interviews and official evaluations contained in the MACSOG Documentation
Study generally indicated where responsibilities rested and problems
existed. A senior Marine officer assigned to MACSOG in 1966 and 1967
246
stated:
.. Early in MACSOG's operations, the execution of air mis-
sions was controlled almost exclusively by MAGSOG. Later
we learned that our messag~s concerning air operations
were not being disseminated to the proper people. More-
over, some of our maritime operatidns were being inter-
fered with by friendly aircraft. Finally, 7AF insisted
on coordinating all flying activities, including those
of MACSOG. This improved coordination and control of
missions."
(IE tlfi) An Air Force officer assigned to MACSOG during the same
, -period further related difficulties in command and control and specifically
247
cited problems in the relationship between MACSOG and 7AF:
"We had communications difficulties from our facility in
Saigon in handling air operations which originated from
bases removed from the Saigon .complex. Because of secu-
rity requirements and the lack of hot line facilities,
in many cases our hands were tied in coordinating air
operations plans. This resulted in our recommendation to
have an air operations command post which would have hot
line communications direct to air facilities and the
base camps from which forces would launch.
" ... From an Air Force standpoint, comn1and relations were
rather tenuous for a while. Main missions were laid on
with very short notice. This caused us a great deal of
anxiety in attempting to get the support from 7AF. On
many occasions,. the 7AF frag's for the next day's combat
\\
operations were already cut. 7Af would have to divet:"t
air assets from· laid-on strikes .... As might be expected,
7AF was const~ntly badgering us for better advanced ·
planning."
123
 :#fl!'JZN/0}. liFe inability of ~ir r•or-ce personnel to obtain knowledge

concerning SOG operations was not limited to· headquarters eleme-nts and
key.staff personnel. For exan1ple, the airborne operations officers aboard
the Airborne Command Post (ABCCC) aircraft were responsible for allocating
air assets to cross-border support when such requirements exceeded the
~ormal sortie levels.A CINCPAC Joint Survey Team Report noted the need
248
for SOG-briefed individ~als on the ABCCC:
"For cross-border operations, SOG is allocated six A-lE
sorties per day. ~owever, this fixed allocation is not
sufficient in many cases. In such cases, the Tiger
Hound Airborne Command Post is requested to provide addi-
tional tactical air support. There have been times when
ll this support was not forthcoming or excessively delayed.
In order to in~ure that the airborne operations officer

•••
can properly assess the request for air suppo.rt, he should
be given a full and complete briefing on cross-border
operations. Although this will not insure Tacair sup-
port is always provided when required, it will insure
that the request is given proper consideration vis~a-vis
other requests for air support."

• · (E tlliB) · *fhe unsatisfactory working relationship between 7AF and

MACSOG led to concerted attempts to rectify the situation in 1967. A

• series of inter-agency meetings in the fall resulted i.n a 7AF/MACSOG

•
Memorandum of Understanding, signed by the Chief of·Staff, 7AF and Chief,
MACSOG on 26 October 1967. Most notably, the agfeement established the

• position of the Deputy Commander for Special Operations under the 14th ·
Special Operations Wing. In MACSOG terminology, the DCSO was called the

•
. 249
Commander, Air Studies Group (later changed to Air Operations Group).

•
(6 PIFQ) Three units were assigned to tbe DCSO: First Flight Detach-
ment; Detachment 1, 314th Tactical ·Airlift Wing (subsequently designated

.. the 15th SOS and 90th SOS); and 20th Helicopter Squadron. The UW-con-
figured C-123 and C-130 aircraft and associated personnel were placed

•
"

124
under the di~ect supervision and operational control of the OCSO. The
20th.Helicopter Squadron, an integral part of the 14th SOW, was not exclu-
sively dedicated to support of MACSOG, hence/ the OCSO was given responsi-
bility for supervising and controlling only those elements and activities

of the squadron in support of MACSOG.

o(( tiFQ) The underlying concept of this structure was to bring the
unique operations conducted by·these three units under the supervision of
. .
one authority. The Memorandum of Understandi.ng noted that the Office of
the DCSO v1as authorized one colonel, .two majors, and one enlisted man;
however, it did not outljne specific responsibilities and authorities of
'
the OCSO. The document was only a ~ge and a half in length; the most de-
- tailed description pertained to channels in which Officer Effectiveness
250
Reports were to be submitted.
· (' N5 0). Jhe first incumbent to fill the OCSO position arrived in
Nha Trang on 2 March, 1968. In his End of Tour Report, he related the
251
state of affairs at that time:
"Both 7th AF and MACSOG were delighted with the results
after the OCSO office was activ~ted. Problems that pre-
viously had been hashed and rehashed in conferences were
bucked to me for solution. Being located a considerable
distance from Saigon I had no personality problems with
either 7th AF or MACSOG. Consequently each problem could
be examined in light of facts and mission requirements.
Fortunately most problems were relatively minor in nature
and when isolated from an atmosphere of mutual hostility
the solution was fairly obvious. MACSOG was well satis-
fied with the air support they received, and all mission
requirements were fulfilled. Seventh Air Force was de-
lighted because minor problems which had previously con-
sumed an enormous number of manhours were now be·ing
handled by my office and they gradually withdrew from close
supervision of MACSOG activities."
"z(ife IIF"'Thus, according to the first OCSO, the new arrangement
' '
proved to be satisfactory. Subsequent appraisal by 7AF Headquarters_,

125
'
• however; indicated that it was not
tionship between itself and MACSOG.
hi~hly satisfied with the working rela-
A 7AF staff study conducted in
July 1968 pointed out several problem areas. The study specifically
criticized the 1967 Memorandutn of Understanding insofar that it addressed
only administrative matters and not the broad spectrum of 7AF support of
MACSOG activities. It further noted that 7AF/MACSOG problems frequently
could not be resolved in the absence of mutually agreed upon directives.
Consequently~ MACV was.asked.to arbitrate. MACV, in turn, requested that
.7AF, in coordination with MACSOG, prepare a memorandum of agreement to
formalize procedures to assure systematic and effective support of SOG
252 .
missions .
..(s tlF8) Meetings among 7AF staff agencies and between 7AF and MACSOG
ensued during the spring and summer of 1968. Due to the lack of know-
ledge in regard to these unique operations, 7AF had difficulty in select-
ing an agency to monitor SOG operations. Planning finally progressed
to the stage that a formalized agreement was reached in September 1968.
(U) The DCSO scathingly rebuked the revised agreement, which con-
sisted of approximately 40 pages and spelled out 1n great detail the pro-
cedures to be followed. Its one serious mistake, he stated, was the fail-
ure to coordinate the draft wi.th either the Commander, 14th SOW or the
DCSO prior to publication. He was i~ked because the Chief, MACSOG as~

sumed responsibility for preparing the Officer Effectiveness Report (OER,

or ER) of the DCSO, restricting the Commander, 14th SOW to writing only
a letter of evaluation. The DCSO described the impact of the change in
253
rating officials:
"

126
 UNCLA t:iSIFIED

" ... While this did not lessen the amount of control
the 14th SOW Commander was able to exert over his DCSO,
it did, in the eyes of ~tACSOG, give the Chief, MACSOG
a more powerful voi-ce in dictating to the DCSO how air
resources would be employed. The Chief, MACSOG being
an Army officer had little concept of air doctrine
and even less knowledge of the basic principles that
govern the employment of air forces in combat. This
lack of knowl~dge and expertise did not prevent him
from trying to influence tactics used, over-commit
air resources beyond thei t~ support capability, and
in general, disregard basic planning factors regarding
maintenance capabi]ity, supply lines, replacement parts,
and programmed flying hours. In addition, at times he
insisted that critical air resources be used for mis-
sions that could better be performed by other types of
aircraft whose availability was not limited.
"In fulfilling my responsibilities to the Ait..-Force
·for insuring air resource~ under my control were pro-
perly employed, I ran head on into a conflict with
Chief, MACSOG over matters described above. It was
clearly implied to me that my refusal to violate Air
Force principles and directives was a great disappoint-
ment to those for whom I worked ...
"The lesson to be learned from the foregoing is clear
and simple. An officer with ER writing authority
holds an enormous power over those individuals whose
ERs he prepares. Thus, an ambitious officer placed in
a position where he se'rves two masters will be sorely
tempted to favor the one who prepares his ER. With
the extreme secretiveness which surrounds MACSOG acti-
vities, it is well within the realm of'possibility
that aircraft could be employed improperly and no one
would be the wiser ... The solution to this undesir-
able situation is to place responsibility for prepara-
tion of the DCSO ER back in" Air Force channels. The
DCSO s hou 1d be respons i b1e to the 14th SOW Conmmnder
for providing air support to MACSOG to the maximum
extent of his capability. MACSOG, if dissatisfied
with the OCSO' s performance, should make this fact
·· known to the 14th SOW Commander for appropriate ac-
tion. The 14th SOW Commander is, the individual in
the proper position to evaluate the performance of
his immediate staff and would thus be able to objec-
tively evaluate the validity of MACSOG's complaints."
"
'

127

UNCLASSIFIED
 CONfiDINTIIJ'= •
Post-1968 Command and Control Considerations (U)

•
· .,J,r tlli'Q) As stated earlier, a dearth of information detailing. com-
mand and control relationships after 1968 prevents further coverage of the

• topic in this report. It is suggested, however, that expanded coverage of

the command and control aspects of special activities in SEA would form

• a natural sequel to this report. Such a study holds promise for identifying

•
lessons of potentially great significance to future UW activities .

[!I

"

128

·coNFIBENTIAL
 S&.CI'~&T

CHAPTLR VI
CONCLUSIONS (U)

sLS NFD) Throughout the Vietnam conflict, UW operations were tainted

with the constant infusion of conventional military thinking. There was
a natural tendency to escalate operations, to immediately exploit targets
within the UW area of operations to the maximum extent possible, and to
bring ever increasing amounts of firepower to bear on hostile forces. The
effects of conventional thinking and the attendant escalation of the ap-
plication of UW forces eventually undermine B covert program. The enhance-
ment of the enemy's defensive posture in the face ·of he_i_ghtened offen~ive
--.....
activity fron1 friendly forces makes such offensive operations more costly
both in exacting greater demands on limited numbers of forces and inducing
higher casualties. Too, as more forces are brought to bear on the enemY
the secrecy of these operations is jeopardized, since more
people are exposed to them.
~a flf8) Another manifestation of the need for separation of UW and
conventional concepts, resulting in-part from the colocation of US UW
offices and units in SEA, was a growing resentment between conventional
and unconventional forces. As would be expected, this resentment vacil-
lated according to the personalities of military commanders on the scene.
The rift was, however, deeper than personality differences; there was
genuine-competition over limited numbers of resources, particularly air
assets. Furthermore, with regard to the Air Force, there was a doctrinal
objection to MACSOG. "Dedicated air assets" was a concept antithetical
to 'the, Air Force concept· of the Sing 1e -Manager centr.a 1 i zed- contra 1.
'

129

· SECRET ·
·Air Force malaise was er:tgendered by suspicion that air assets, C-130s and
c-.123s, \oJere abused {many missions were not essential but were flown for
expediency or pleasure where common-use airlift would have sufficed.)
..(s PIFB) Thus, as evidenced during the Vietnam conflict, there is a
need to keep UW activities removed from conventional military planning. As
a result, there may be criticism that the UW program does not support the
needs of conventional military forces. ·rhis only serves to underscore the
fact that the program is designed to support strateg-ic, more than tactical
objectives, and to pursue political, as well as military goals. Accord-
ingly, UW forces must be.oriented to unconventional military thinking,
must be separated from conventional'-forces, and should not have to compete
-with conventional forces for resources. Finally, management of UW forces
should rest with an agency which is oriented towards strategic (as well
as tactical) and political (as well as military) objectives.
~ tlf8) One controversial aspect of control of UW forces was the
scope of involvement of high-level policy-makers. Operatives in SOG criti-
cized the officious nature of Washington in UW operations. From their view-
point, such criticism was valid. For example,. it impaired flexibility in
planning operations and, at times, induced unsuccessful missions because
reaction to fleeting intelligence was·: delayed by the lack of Washington•s
(or another level•s) political approval. On the other hand, it does seem
important to have such sensitive operations tmder the close scrutiny of
Washington policy-makers. What is needed is an arrangement which would take
advantage of on-scene expertise and provide rapid response, while at the
same time providing the ~ppropriate level of control at the Washington level.
"
•(T3 14fr5) Another controversial aspect of UW forces relates to cost

130
 • concepts. Emphasis should be placed on cost-effectiveness -- in direct

•
conflict to the MACV Ad Hoc Group's statement to the contt~ary. To
counteract an enemy whose war philosophy is based on Mao's "Protracted

• Warfare," ·it must be capable of sustaining itself for long duration.

sider the British experience in Malaya where, for example, light planes
Con-

• were substituted for helicopters as soon as landing strips were prepared,

•
·thus cutting operating expenses by about· seventeen-fold. Further, with-
drawal from exploitation operations reduces costs substantially.
{1 5 tiFQ) 8ne military alternative which would reduce both the visi-
:1 bility and the involvement of US personnel, offer greater benefits, and

•
' .
would be in consonance with the Nixbfl Doctrine \'JOuld be to place greater

•
-reliance on the use of indigenous or third country national forces. (In
·such cases, the scope of operations and secrecy may be managed better by

• . the CIA.) Again, look to the British use of foreign forces

in Malaya, where Sarawaks, Gurkhas, etc., were put to effective use. It

•.I should be obvious that support of these troops is much- less costly than
supporting American troops and that disclosure of their activities is
less likely. The First Flight experience in working with third country

•.I nationals has demonstrated that this modus of operandi, although handicap-
ped by language barriers, can be an outstanding success even during a
dangerous, difficult, and sophisticated mission.
~Te flf8) ·Regarding the secrecy aspect o.f UW activities, beyond the
Ml realm of a purely military evaluation, certain political realities have
become evident. In observing the public and Congressional reaction to

~ the furtive involvement in Cambodia and Laos, it is apparent that when such
'' ·. . ..
II operations assume too great a magnitude, hiding the scope from'decision-

II 131
•• makers and voters may be considered i1mnoral. When the conflict in question
becomes sufficiently large, it warrants candid revelation of the situa-

• tion to Congress and the public. Further, the rationale. for secrecy

•
should initially be carefully analyzed; and subsequently reevaluated. In
Southeast Asia, in the initi~l stages of th~ war, the major reason for

• secrecy may well have been to disguise US intentions from foreign countries
and the enemy so as to minimize the possibility of confrontation with a

•n major power bloc; in later years, however, the cloak of secrecy was donned
to hide operations from the news media, Congress, and the public.
•(Ti PIF8) In conclusion, US Unconventional Warfare operations in the
..

• · Vietnam conflict sh6uld not be used'as a model for the future direction of
-uw activities. The validity of the basic concepts used to govern the em-

•II ployment of UW assets in Vietnam is open to serious question. Perhaps

the greatest ·weakness was the inability to separate conventional and un-
conventional forces, planning, and. thinking. If unconventional forces are
to play a central role in attaining futlfre US objectives, the concepts of
II UW control and employment must take a new direction, departing from the

• road followed in Vietnam .

._,

•
"

132
 UNCLASSIFIED
..
FOOTNOTE~) ( U)

1. (TS). Study; "MACSOG Documentation Study (U)", OSA CSA, Pacific Area
Conmand, 1969. Hereafter cited as Doc Study.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. I bid.
5. (U) Cooper, Chester L., "The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam", Dodd,
Mead & Co., New York, 1970.
6. Ibid & Fall, Bernard B., "Two Vietnams", 1963.

7. ( U) Cooper.

8. (U) Fall.

9. (U) Cooper.

10. (U) Fall.

11. Ibid & Cooper.
12. (U) Sheehan-, Neil, ed., "The Pentagon Papers", Bant<irn Books, Inc., New
York Times, 1971. Hereafter cited as Pent Papers ..

13. Ibid.
14. (U) Cooper & Pent Papers.

15. (U) Fall & Pent Papers.

16. {TS) Doc Study & Pent Papers.

17. · (U) Pent Papers.
18. I bid.
19. (U) Raskin, t~arcus G., and Fall, Bernard B., ed., "The Vietnam Reader",
RaRdom House, New York.

20. (U) Fall .

••
21. Ibid.

22." Ibid .

133

• UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIF:IED
.

•' 23. (U) Raskin.

•
24 . Ibid & Cooper.
25 . (TS) Doc Study.

• 26.

27 .
(S) Project CHECO Report, USAF Support of Special Forces in SEA, 10 Mar 69.

(TS) Doc Study.

• 28. I bid.

•0
29 . Ibid ..

30. I bid.

31. Ibid.
32. ( U) Ltr, President Bi em to President John. F. Kennedy, re 1eased 15 Dec 61 .

• 33. (U) Ltr, President John F. Kennedy to President Diem, released 15 Dec 61.

•
34. (U) Pent Papers & Cooper .
35. (TS) Doc-Study & (U) Pent Papers .

• 36.

37.

38.
Ibid.

(TS) Doc Study.

Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. lbi d.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. I l:?i d.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47 "'' Xbid.
48. I bid.
134

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
'• 49. Ibid.

•
50 . Ibid.

51. Ibid.

• 52.

53 .
Ibid.

lbi d.

• 54. Ibid.

•tl
55. Ibid & (TS) History: 1965 Command History, USMACV, Mil Hi.st Branch, Office
of Sec., Joint and Staff, early 1966.

56. Ibid.

57. (TS)· History: 1967 MACSOG History, USMACV, undated.

•
58. (TS) Doc Study & 1965 Command History .
59. (TS) Doc Study .

• 60. Ibid.

61 . . Ibid .

• 62. Ibid.

•
63. (TS) History: 1966 Command History, USMACV, Mil Hist Branch, Office of
Sec., Joint and Staff, 19 Apr 67·& 1967 MACSOG History.

-
64 . . Ibid.
·;.-
65. Ibid.

-.. 66.

67.

68.
(TS)

Ibid .

I bid.
Doc Study.
•

69. I bid.

lfl 70. I bid.

71. (TS) Doc Study.

(TS) Report: MACV,Ad Hoc Evaluation Group Report, MACV, Feb 68. Here-
72.
" after cited as MACV AD Hoc Group. '-

135

UNCLASSIFIED
 Ibid ..
- SEGI~El~
73.

74. I bid.

75. (TS) Doc Study.

76. Ibid.

77. I bid.

78. Ibid.

79. (TS) Doc Study & MACV Ad Hoc Group.

80. (TS) Doc Study & History: 1968 History of MACSOG-751 (C), MACV Air
Operations Studies, undated.

1!1 81.

82.
Ibid.

(TS) Doc Study .

• 83.

84.

85.
Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid .

• 86.

87.
Ibid.

Ibid .

• 88. Ibid.

• 89.

90.
Ibid .

Ibid.

- 91.
92.
I bid.
Ibid & (TS) 1968 MACSOG History.

- 93. Ibid.
(T~) History: 1969 History of MACSOG-751 (C), MACV Air Studies Group, DCSO,

-
94.
30 Jan 70.
95. (TS) Msg, COHUSMACV, "PW Recovery Efforts in SVN,.Laos, and Cambodia (S),
060325Z Jun 71 .

1111 96~, (JS) Doc Study.

- 6E6REl
136

=
 UNCLAS-'SIFIED
• 97. Ibid.

•Iii
98. Ibid .

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid & Msg, CINCPACAF, Aircraft Mishap Investigation and Reporting (U),

•
041705Z Feb 72 (TS) .

102. · (TS) Doc Study .

•a . 103.

104.

lOS.·
(TS) History: 1964 MACV .Command History, MACV, early 1965, Annex A.

Ibid.

(TS) 1964 Command History.

•
106. I bid & (TS) Doc Study.
,,
107. {TS) Doc Study.

•Ill 108 . Ibid & ( TS) 1964 Command His tory. ·

109. . {TS) Doc· study.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid.

II 112. Ibid.

• 113. {TS) Interview by Captain Thomas Abbey with Col Rose, Cmdr, First Flight
Detachn1ent, undated. ;,

•
114 . . {TS) Doc Study.

115. Ibid .

•II 116.

117.

118.
I bid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

119. Ibid.

1\ 120.,, I bid.

• 121. Ibid.
137
'

• UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLA.S!iiFIED

• 122. Ibid.

•
123. Ibid .

124. Ibid .

• · 125.

126.

127.
Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

128. Ibid.

· 129 .. Ibid.

130. Ibid.

131. Ibid.

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid.

134. ( TS) 1966 Command His tory~

135. (TS) Study~ "C-l30E Sky Hook Study", MACV, 27 Sep 65.

136. (TS) Doc Study, L/Col Kenneth W. McNiven) USAF~ Sep 66 - Sep 67.

137. (TS) Doc Study, Appendix A, Summary.

(TS) 1966 Command History.

138. (TS) Doc Study, Appendix A, Summary.

139. Ibid.

140. Ibid.

141. Ibid.

142. (S) Manual, "C-130 Aircrew Operational Procedures (Combat TALON) (U)",
TACM 55-130, TAC, 25 Sep 70. -

143. Ibid.

144. Ibid.

145-., .(_TS) History: 1965 MACSOG History, no date available.

146. · (TS) History: 196.6 MACSOG History, no date available.

138

UNCLASSIFIED
 - CONFI DI~NTIAL

• 147.

148.
(TS) History: 1967 ~ MACSOG Histo•·y, no date available.

(TS) 1968 History of MACSOG .

• 149. (TS) Doc Study.

•
150. (TS) Ltr, 15 SOS, "Combat Spear Continuation Traininq (U)", 14 Aug 68 .
151. · (TS) Ltr, Memorandum of Agreement (between Det 4 (405th TPW), First
Flight Detachment ~15 SOS), and 621st TACS), 1 Nov 68 .

• 152. (TS) 1969 History of MACSOG, Appendix XV .

•d . 153.

154.
155.
Ibid .

Ibid.
(TS) History: History of Air Studies Group (MACSOG-75), US Military Assis-
tance Command, Vietnam~ 1 January 1970- 31 December 1970 (C).

- 156.
157.
Ibid.
(TS) History: History of" Air Studies Group .(MACSOG-75), US Military

•
Assistance Comnand, Vietnam, l January 1971 - 31 December 1971 (C) .

158. _(TS) Doc·study, Appendix A & (TS) Msg {Subj: Participation in Special
missioni (U), · CINCPAC 032146Z Feb 68 .
• ! 159. (TS) Msg, JCS (Sub: Special Air Assets (U)), 262220Z Jul 68 .

• 160.

161.
(TS) Msg, CINCPAC (Subj: Cost of Special Mission~ {U)), 070349Z Aug 68.

(TS) Memo: CSAF Memorandum, 21 May 1970.

- . 162.

163.
164.
(TS) Msg.: CINCPACAF, "Combat Spear {U)", 120251Z Aug 69.

Ibid.
(S) Ltr, Commander 7AF to COMUSMACV, "15 Special Operations Squadron and
the First Flight {Special Element) at Nha Trang (U) & (TS msg, CINCPACAF,
"Relocation of Units (U), 15 May 70.
165. (TS) Background Paper, "Pyatt Talking Paper on Combat Spear", 15 Oct 70.

166. (TS) Memo, "P/\CAF Unconventional Warfare-Configuration C-l30E (C}",

CSAF, 21 May 70.

167. Ibid.
- 168." (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, "Combat Spear (C-130E) Aircraft (C)", Ol0531Z Ju1 70.
'
139
CONFIBENTIAL
.. UNCLASSIFIED
• 169 .. {TS) "Pyatt Paper on Combat Spear".

•il
170. Ibid .
171. (TS) Briefing, "Helicopter Briefing (U)", to Gen Meyer, 21 May 70.
172. (S) Memo of Agreement: Initial Agreement Between Chief of Staff, US
Army and Chief of Staff, US Air Force, 6 Apr 66.

•
173. Ibid, Annex, 19 May 67 .
174. (TS) Project CHECO Report, The USAF Helicopter in SEA (U), 4 Dec 68 .

• "175.
176.
Ibid.
Ibid .

• 177. Ibid.

• 178.
_ l79.
Ibid .
(TS) Msg, CSAF to CINCPACAF, Jan 67 .

• 180. (TS) Msg, CINCPACAF to CSAF (Subj: AF Helicopters in U\~ Role {U)), Feb 67.
181. ·(TS) Talking Paper: "Talking Paper on Special Operations Helicopters in

• 182.
RVN (U)", AF/XOOSO, Major Cutler, 24 Jul 70 .

(TS) The USAF Helicopter in SEA .

• 183. (TS) Doc Study.

(TS) The USAF Helicopter in SEA .

•
184.
;,.
October 1967 -
185. (S) His tory: Hi stori ca 1 Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron, 1
31 December 1967 .

• 186.

187.
(S) History: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Sq~adron, 1 January -
31 March 1967.
(S) Histo~y: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron, 1 July 1967-
30 September 1967.
188. (S) 20 SOS Oct 67 - Dec 67 Hi story.
189. Ibid.
190. (S) History: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron, 1 January -.
" 3] March 1968.

140
UNCLASSIFIED
 ··UNCLASSIFIED

• 191.
192.
Ibid.
(S) History: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron, 1 April - 30

•
Jime 1968. ·

193. Ibid .

• 194. (S) History: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron, 1 July-

30 September 1968 .

• 195.

196.
Ibid., pp. 9, 10.

(S) History: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron,

1 October -

•
30 December 1968 .
1 January -
197. (S) History: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron,
31 March 1969.
[I 198. I bid .

•
'..,_
199. I bid.
1 April·-
200. (S) History: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron,

•
30 June 1969 .

201. I bid .

•;-· 202.

203.

204.
(S) History: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron, 1 July - 31
September 1 969. ( S) .

I bid.

I bid .

• 205.
206.
Ibid.
(S) Staff Summary Sheet: 11
20th SOS Helicopter Operations (U)
11
7AF/TACWFP,

• 207~
8 Feb 70.
(S) Msg, 7AF, 11 20th SOS UH-lP Helicopter Operations (U)", 240810Z Feb 70 .

•d 208.

209.
210.
(S) History: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron, 1 July -
30 September 1970.
(S) 20 SOS, History, Jul - Sep 70.
(S) History: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron, 1 Oct- 31 Dec
1970 .

I . 211." (S) History: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron, 1 Jul- 30 Sep
1971.
141
'

• UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
'-II 212. Ibid & (S) History: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron, 1 Oct-
31 Dec 1971.
213. (TS') Doc Study, Tab D to Annex 0 to Appendix B (SOPs) . .
II 214. (C) Draft Manual, ,.SAW (SEA) Helicopter Operations and Tactics (U)
11

•
20 SOS, undated. Hereafter cited as 20 SOS Tactics Manual (U) .

215 . I bid.

• 216. I bid ..

•
217 . Ibid.

218. lbi d.

219. I bid, paragraph 3-4. c.

~ 220. Ibid.

•If
'
221. I bid.

•
•
• 229. (C) Manual,. 11 Guide ·for Helicopter Tactics and Techniques for Use with

•
Reconnaissance Teams (U) 11 , Hq MACV, 12 Oct 70, Ch. 7. Hereafter cited
as MACV Tactics Manual (U). , ·

•II
.230. Ibid .
231. (C). 20 SOS Tactics Manual.

232. (t) MACV, Tactics Manual.

233. (TS) Doc Study, Tab D to Annex 0 to Appendix B, SOPs.

II 234;

"
(C) 20 SOS Tactics Manual, Section 3-9.

• UNCLASSIFIED
142
 UNCLA~SIFIED

'• 235.

236.
(TS) Memo, "Helicopter Night Operations (U)", MACSOG 32, 4 Aug 69 .

Ibid .

• 237. Ibid.

•
238 . Ibid.
239. (S) Project CHECO Report, Command and Control, 1966-1968 (U), Hq PACAF,
L/C Robert M. Burch, 1 Aug 69, p. 1.

• 240. (TS) Project CHECO Report,.Command and Control, 1965 (U), Mr. Kenneth
Sams, 15 Dec 66, p. l .

•
[I
241.

242.
(U) Publication, JCS Pub 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms, JCS, 3 Sep 74.
(U) Manual, AFM ll-1, "US Air Force G1ossary of Standardized Terms", 1
Jan 73, p. 150.
..

• '243.
- 244.
(TS) Doc Study .
Ibid .

• 245. I bid.

•
246. I bid .
247. I bid .

• 248.
249.
I bid.
(S). Memo: Memorandum of Understanding (BebJeen 7AF and MACSOG) (U), 7AF,

•
26 Oct 67. ·
250. Ibid .

• 251. (U) EOT Report, Col David C. Collins, Dep Comm for Spec Air Ops, 14 SOW,
FOUO, AFEO, undated, p. 2. "'

•II 252 . (TS) Study (SubJ: 7AF/MACSOG Relationships (U)), 7AF, July 1968. (TS)

253. (U} Col Collins EOT Report, pp. 2, 3. -

\\

. '
143

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
'• AAA
GLOSSARY

Anti-Aircraft Artillery

• AB
ABCCC
ACS
Airbase
Airborne Battlefield Command &Control System
Air Commando Squadron

• ADS
AFB
AO
Aerial Delivery System
Air Force Base
Area of Operations

•
ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASTD Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

•
:1
BMT

CAF
CAL
CAS
Ban Me Thuot·

Chinese Air Force

China Airlines
Controlled American Sources, ·or Close Air Support

•
C&C Command &Control
CHECO Contemporary Hi stor1"ta 1 Ex ami nation of Combat Operations
CHI NAT Chinese Nationalist

•
CI Counterinsurgency
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CINCPAC Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
CINCPACAF Con~ander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces

• GOMUSMACV
CSA
CSAF
Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Chief of Staff, Army
Chief of Staff, Air Force

• DASC
DCSO
Direct Air Support Center
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

• DIA
DOD
DRV
Defense Intelligence Agency
Department of Defense
Democratic Republic of Vietnam
~

• ECM
.·
Electronic Countermeasures

•
E&E Escape & Evasion
EF Exploitation Forces
ER (Officer) Effectiveness Report
EW Electronic Warfare

• FAC Forward Air Controller

.. FOL Forward Operating Location ·

•I
"

145

UNCLASSI-FIED:
 UNCLASSIFIED
Ill .

• GCI Ground-controlled Intercept

GRC Government o·f the Republic of China

• HALO . High Altitude, low Opening

• JCS
JPRC
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Personnel Recovery Center

• LOC
LZ
Line of Communication
landing Zone

•ld MAAG
MACSOG
MACV
t~ACVSOG
Military Assistance and Advisory Group
Mil itat'Y Assistance Command (Vietnam), Studies and
Observation Group
Militat·y_Assistance Command, .vietnam
Militat~y Assistance-Command, Vietnam, Studies and

•
Observation Grou~
MIA Missing in Action

NSAM National Security Action Memorandum

NVA North Vietnamese Army
. NVN North Vietnam

OER Officer Effectiveness Report

OPLAN Operations Plan
. OSACSA Office of the Special Assistance for Counterinsurgency
and Special Activities
ass Office of Strategic Services

PACOM . p·acific Command

PF Prairie Fire
PFAO Prairie Fire Area of Operations
PM Paramilitary
POW Prisoner of War
PSYOPS P~ychological Operations
PSYWAR Psychological Warfare

Ill
!
RVN
RVNAF
Republic of Vietnam
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

"
146

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLAf~SIFIED

Safe Areas for Evasio"

····'SAM .Surface-to-Air Missile
SAR Search and Rescue

• SAW Special Air Warfare

SEA Southeast Asia
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
Searc~-locate-Annihilate-Monitor

•
SLAM
SMM Saigon Military Mission
SOD Special Operations Division
SOG Studies and Observation Group

• sos
SOW
STO
Special Operations Squadron
Special Operations Wing
Strategic Technical Directorate

•:I
.STRATA Short Term Roadwatch and Target Acquisition
SVN South Vietnam

TACAN Tactical Air Navigation

TOY Temporary Duty

• uw
- U5ARV
Unconventional Warfare
US Army, Republic of Vietnam.

• VNAF
vc
(South) Vietnamese Air Force

•II
Vi·etcong
VR Visual Reconnaissance

•II
•I
••I "

147

I UNCLASSIFIED