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SOUTHEAST ASIA
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THE ROLE OF THE USAF
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SPECIAL AOIVI'QES IN · SE,A
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unclassified unclassified unclassified
2031 4
-YTO CHO
ATTN OF'
23 Feb ruar y 1977
sUBJEC T' CHECO Rep ort on Spe cial Ope rati ons
~L~. /~
JO~~- HUSice
TON, Maj Gen , USAF
of Air For ce His tory
Chi ef, Off
Bonds
Underwrite rour Country's Migh t- Buy U.S. Savings
K717.o413-225
Prepared by
(U} Only eleven copies of the report exist. All eleven were forwarded to
AF/CHOF: one for retention by AF/CHO, and ten for distribution to AF/XOX.
\\
'.
ii
UNCLASSIFIED
liGRi 7 •
iii
liSAzil
The 20th SOS Crisis in 1969 and 1970 • . . . • . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Post-Crisis Operations, 1970-1972.............................. 99
A Closer Look at the Helicopter in Cross-Border Operations..... 102
Helicopter Gunships........................................... 110
Night Operations • . • . •.• • • • • . • . . • . • . . • • • . • • . . • • . . . . . . . • • • ..• • . . • • 114
CHAPTER V. COMMAND AND CONTROL . • • • • • . • • . • . • • . • • . . • . • . • • • • . . • • • . . • . 117
Early Approval Procedures for Air Operations .•.••........•...• 119
Tasking of a Heavy Hook Mission . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . • • . . . . 121
Command and Contro 1 , 1965-1968 . • . . . • . • • • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . • . 122
Post-1968 Command and Control Considerations ..•...........••.• 128
CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION •.. H....................................... 129
FOOTNOTES . • . .• . . . • .• •. . . .. .. . . .• . • • . . . •• • • . • • . .. .. .• . . . . . . . . . • •. . . • . 133
,, \
iv
FOREWORD ·(U)
· (+G JIFQ) This report surveys the role of the United States Air
Force in support of special activities in Southeast Asia. The term, "spe-
. cial activities," refers to unconventional warfare operations of the United
States of a covert and clandestine nature, permitting plausible denial of
US sponsorship. This study emphasizes the USAF support rendered to the
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Studies and Observations Group
(MACVSOG, MACSOG, or SOG), which was the principal US agency for the con-
duct of unconventional warfare against the North Vietnamese from 1964 to
1972. Unilateral covert~and clandestine programs of in.dividual Service
"-
components and Controlled American Sources (CAS -- overseas elements of
the Central Intelligence Agency) are described only to the extent that
such programs·directly affected MACSOG programs or to lend continuity to
the history of US unconventional warfare actions in Southeast Asia.
(U) The purpose of this Project CHECO Report is to depict achieve-
ments and problems of US unconventional warfare operations in SEA with a
focus on aspects of USAF air support. This report hopefully will aid
military planners -- of both conventional and unconventional operations
in the future application of covert and clandestine actions in times and
arenas of interest to the United States Government.
(8 UF8) Compilation of the history of special operations in South-
east As-i-a is beset with pecul i.ar problems. Continuity is 1imited by
several ·factors: (1) The highly classified and sensitive nature of these
operations and the stringent "need to know" requirement caused a tendency
_ among qperators, particu·larly during the early MACSOG days, to carry out
"
v
attendant administrative and historical documentation duties on an informal
basis if at all. (2) The cornpartrnentation inherent to covert and clan-
destine organizations militated against centralized filing systems except
at the highest levels of authority. {3) Access to many documents was
controlled by agencies outside the Department of Defense, such as the
White House, State Department, and Central Intelligence Agency. Addition-
ally, documents addressing controversial topics and indicating inter-
Service rivalries were sometimes withheld by the originating Service com-
ponent. (4) The disposal or destruction of records after prescribed
periods of time limited the research material for the early MACSOG days.
(5) The 12-month rotation cycle of ~rsonnel adversely affected continuity,
-especially during the accelerated redeployment of American forces from
Vietnam.
(U) Althou~h the·aforen~ntioned conditions imposed restrictions on
the study, numerous individuals at both staff and operational levels
provided valuable assistance to the researcher. Personnel on the Joint
and Air Force Staffs were .instrumental in. obtaining authorization and
offering guidelines for the study. Individuals clt Seventh Air Force,
MACSOG; and subordinate operational units were highly cooperative and
knowledgeable sources of information: A singularly valuable contribution,)
to this study was the vo 1umi nous MACSOG Documentation Study, compiled )
in 1969 by the Joint StafL This comprehens-;ve document was indispensable ~
and frequently provided the only source of information available for
particular periods of the MACSOG history. The author acknowledges, how-
ever, the potential his~orical bias that can arise from over-reliance on
'' '· ,...
'. '·
a single reference source.
vi
18ttFIBEI~fiAis a
UNCLASSIFIED
(U) Finally, the author recognizes the limitations in the scope and
methodology of the Command and Control chapter. More extensive research
•
•R1
"
vii
UNCLASSIFIE·D
. CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION (U)
I!CI:!Y =
SE€RiiT t
-;.
"
IE81liT
'• (U)
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND (U)
•l1 vities was neither new nor unique to the Indochina War. During the re-
organization of the US armed forces following World War II, the National
Security C.ouncil promulgated numerous directives which defined covert
5
UNCLASSIFIED
to aid the:Viet Minh, and by the latter months of the war, American OSS
officers were training and, sometimes, actually leading Viet Minh guer-
ri11as.6 Thus, the first American military support rendered to the
·vietnamese included material aid and unconventional warfare training to
the guerrillas who later became the enemy in the Second Indochina War.
(U) When President Roosevelt died in office, US opposition to the
return of the French to Indochina diminished;· however, faced with more
pressing problems in other areas of the world, such as Europe and China,
American leaders left only a remnant of Americans in Vietnam and pro-
vided but a negligible~amount of military aid. The co~unist takeo~er
of mainland China and deployment of large numbers of Chinese Communist
forces along the northern borders of Laos and Vietnam rejuvenated
American interest in Southeast Asia. The United States Administration
perceived the ~rench-Viet Minh conflict in a new image; it was now a
7
confrontation between the Free World and International Communism. US
interest and aid to the French rose proportionately with US fears of
Communist expansion. Tocounter the threat, the United States estab-
lished the Military Assistance and Advisory Gro~p (MMG) in Saigon in
August 1950. From that date until the defeat of the French in May of
"
1954 at Dien Bien Phu, the United States provided roughly 80 percent of
8
the cost of French military efforts in Indochina. The United States
Air Force provided 1,800 airlift sorties, ~omprising 13,000 flying hours
American ground forces ·without the backing of Allies. Although the French
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
were defeated and the resulting armistice prohibited external support
to Vietnam, the US reflected its growing concern over Indochfna by ini-
tiating the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) Pact, which
9
·placed-th~ United States squarely in the Southeast Asia picture.
·8
• in Vietnam revealed US· reluctance for any involvement beyond that re-
quired for a training mission. The study stated: "Indochina is devoit
of decisive military objectives and the allocation of more than token
·US armed forces in Indochina would be a serious diversion of limited
16
US capabilities."
(U) For the most part~ US advisors were affected by a "Korean
syndrome"; they directed their efforts toward building a conventional
army capable of repelling an invasion across the northern border. Never-
theless~ US policy-makers recognized the threat of insurgency and sent
their most reputed un<;enventional warfare expert~· .Col Edward G. Lansdale~
to Saigon.
9
UNCLASSIFIED
(U) Beginning in August, after the SMM was adequately staffed,
several clandestine operations commenced against North Vietn~m. Para-
military teams were located in Hanoi, Haiphong, and south of the 17th
·parallel.. Psychological warfare operations included "rumor campaigns"
and the distribution of leaflets which propagated themes relating to
property ownership, money reform, etc. One specific example of a propa-
ganda theme was the description of Chinese Communist reprisals against
Viet Minh villages. Another type of leaflet distributed was a bogus
holiday pass. Moreover, in addition to pr~paganda efforts, the para-
military teams ~onducted sabotage, such as contamination of oil supplies.
Further, they prepared for a late?· resistance movement by recruiting
indigenous agents and caching paramilitary-supplies. By the time the
North Vietnamese regime assumed complete control of the North, an unoffi-
18
cial report reviewed the accomplishments of the SMM:
"It had taken a tremendous amount of hard work to
beat the Geneva deadline, to locate, select, exfil-
trate, and equip the men of these teams and have them
in place, ready for actions required against the
enemy ... "
;..
10
U-NCLASSIFIED
became more widespread. The Viet Minh (Viet Cong) reacted strongly to
Diem's renunciation of the elections prescribed by the Geneva Accord,
his intensified campaign to eliminate Viet Minh remnants in South Viet-
. nam, and his greater reliance on American economic, military, and poli-
tical support. By 1959 American officials were alarmed by the situation,
and by 1960 they suspected an active role_ by the Hanoi regime in South
Vietnam. The challenge of the sixties was expressed by Senator Kennedy
in his presidential campaign: "Now the problems are new and they require
19
new solutions."
(U)
"·
From the end of 1959,. through.l960 and 1961, the insurgency
intensified and expanded throughout the South Vietnamese countryside.
The. Viet Cong
- attacked government positions more frequently and in ever-
increasing size. Large rural areas were denied to government officials
without substantial armed escort; the populace was becoming sympathetic
to the Viet Cong if not indifferent to the Diem regime. To complicate
. matters, security forces. were inept in meeting ~the challenge. The
police, accustomed to handling common law enforcement tasks, left
counterinsurgency matters to the army, which i·n turn conditioned to
"'
responding to a conventional military 'threat, left internal security mat-
20
ters to the police force.
11
zll!eltEY I ·
Cong.
By the end of 1961 North Vietnam had surrounded it~elf with
·(U)
21
a "wall of aggressive suspicion." North Vietnamese were involved in
numerous border incidents in laos and were responsible, to a degree,
for a 20-fold increase in Pathet lao numbers from 1959 to 1961. Rela-
tively solid communist~control of the area·contiguous' . to the northwestern
.
to Saigon apprised President Kennedy that "it may become necessary for
the US Government to begin consideration of alternative courses of
23 "
action and leaders."
(U} International developments in early 1961 strengthened American
resol.ye to defend South Vietnam against Conmuni st expansion. In January
Krushchev announced Moscow's intentiori to back "wars of national libera-
24
tion" around the world. Too, the laotian crisis and Cuban Bay of Pigs
f,ias.~o in April caused alarm in Washington. On April 20th,,. one day
'
after the abortive a~tempt to invade Cuba, President Kennedy requested
\
12
e!eltl' a
that the Secretary of Defense appraise the Vietnam situation and recom~
mend actions to pre·vent communist domination. The Deputy Secretary of
Defense submitted a study in response to the presidential request; this
study envisioned a greater emphasis on covert and paramilitary operations
as well as deployment of additional military and CIA personnel to South
Vietnam. This proposal, as modified by the Secretary of Defense and
Secretary of State, met Kennedy's approval; it signaled the beginning
of an ineluctable American commitment to Vietnam in the sixties.
14
restructured the DOD to streamline the planning, coordination, and con-
duct of covert and clandestine activities. In February 1961 the Secre-
tary of Defense appointed Brigadier General lansdale as the Assistant
·to the Secretary of Defense (ASTD) to handle functions related to
(1) Special Group (5412)/303 Committee matters, (2) special defense
activities as approved by the Secretary of Defense, and (3) CIA-DOD
28
relationships of special interest to the Secretary of Defense.
(TE tiF9) Also during February, the Deputy Secretary of Defense re-
quested that a small, secure staff element be established on the Joint
Staff to serve as a po1nt of contact between General ~~nsdale and t~e JCS.
The purpose of the new office waslo facilitate coordination between the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and various agencies on the Joint
Staff and overseas commands. General sup·port responsibilities to the
ASTD entailed (1) special logistical support, such as military equipment,
airlift, and realty faci 1ities; (2) fabrication of cover stories;
(3) planning in connection with support requirements· for special opera-
tions of an interdepartmental nature; (4) research and coordination
·;,.
pertaining to policy aspects of DOD support for covert actions and
29
special operations. By the fall of 1961 misunderstandings about the
functions of this staff element, designated the Special Operations
Division, were resolved by memorandums from the Secretary of Defense
and the ASTD. This clarification of role ~ermitted individual Service
.. 30
components to effect direct liaison with the CIA on routine matters.
111 I Sf In early ·1962, the Special ·operations Division was trans-
f~rr~d en toto from under the Directorate of Plans and Poli~y and placed
\
\15
rl the Office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special
Activities (OSACSA).
_ . That reorganization followed upon the heels of the establish-
ment of the Special Group (CI--Counterinsurgency)~ a top echelon decision-
making body with authority similar to that of the Special Group (5412);
is a means
" ... It to ensure unity of effort and to
use all available resources with·maximum effectiveness
i~ preventing and resisting subversive insurgency
and related forms of indirect aggression in ·friendly
"-..
countries ...
As a result of the NSAM of 18 January 1962 which activated the Special
Group (CI), there were two direct lines of authority fo':' prosecuting the
war in Southeast_Asia from Washington: Special Group (5412) monitored
covert actions; Special Group (CI) monitored conventional--counterinsur-
gency--operations.
(U) National decisiQns leading to increased aid to South Vietnam
were bound inextricably to the decisions alter.ing the US command apparatus.
By 1 January 1962~ the United States had pledged additional aid to the
~ .
South Vietnamese regime on four separate occasions. The White House re-
leased to the public on 15 December 1961 an exchange of letters between
Diem a~~ Kennedy. Diem requested 11 further assistance from the United
States if we [South Vietnamese] are to win the war now being waged against
32
us... .Kennedy pledged: "We shall promptly increase our assistance to
33
YOI{f defense effort......
~ . .
During 1961~ there was an enormous increase in ~'
' \
numbers of US personnel stationed in Vietnam. To enhance the management
16
UNCLASSIFIED
of the larger force, the United Stated replaced the MAAG with th~ Military
Assistance·command, Vietnam (MACV) in February, 1962. American Indochina
~xperts exuded optimism over the sizeable increase and predicted that the
. 34
war would be won·in from one to th.ree years.
(U} By 1963, however, American policy-makers and military planners
in Washington faced a dileiTilla with regard to the future commitment to
South Vietnam; conventional and unconventional military efforts had not
.
diminished the threat, in fact, the·position of the South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment had become less tenable. Various meetings of high-level US offi,-
cials during the year called for an escalation of counterinsurgency ef-
forts and unconventional warfare act-ions. OperatioiP Plan (OPLAN) 34A
·emerged from these meetings; it specified an-intensified program of
clandestine a~d covert operations against North Vietnam to be administered
by a· combined Central Intelligence Agency-Department of Defense task
35
force.
UNCLASSIFIED
- (TO una) From 1961 to 1964 the CAS program underwent severa 1 dis-
ruptive changes. The initial mission was intellige·nce collection. The
principal mission then became sabotage and harassment operations with
intelligence collection as a by-product. In the summer of 1963. emphasis
was placed on the insertion of PSYWAR teams. These polity changes, as well
as the Geneva Accord in Laos in 1962, severely undermined CAS unconven-
tional warfare efforts. Actual results of CAS agent operations from 1961
~o 1964 reflect the scope of the problems: Of the 33 agent teams infil-
37 .
trated, 19 were lost.
e(TJ IIFB) The two pr:-imary means of infiltrating agents were air and
sea delivery. Of the 33 successfuf'infi ltrations under the CAS UW program,
-23 were accomplished by air drops. Three aitcraft were lost during these
efforts: one Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) C-47, one CIA C-46, and one CIA
.38
· C-54. Acquisition of five C-123 aircraft, specially configured with
Electronic Countermeasure Equipment (ECM), considerably enhanced the de-
livery capability of agent teams into North Vietnam. ·Controlled American
Sources negotiations with th.e Chinese Air. Force (CAF) secured CAF crews
for these aircraft, permitting plausible denial' of us sponsorship of air
operations over North Vietnamese territory.
z(TB tlli9) Numerous problems were" associated with air delivery of
agents into North Vietnam. The requirement to conduct undercover opera-
tions necessitated that missions be flown only during the hours of dark-
ness, Navigational shortcomings further limited the scheduling of missions
to only four or five nights out of every month, depending on lunar illu-
min~ti?n. Terrain featu,res and weather condit.ions were important factors
in flight planning; overcast weather often obscured drop zones, forcing
\ .
18
a mission to abort. Resupply of agent teams was considerably more-diffi-
cult than insertion of agents; a compromised team could lure the aircraft
major contribution.
mined to expand the covert and clandestine program against North Vietnam.
19
OPLAN 34A reflected this intent, envisioning a scale of activity be-
yond the capability of the CIA a_lone.
· HE tiER) The Department of Defense had advocated an expansion and
intensification of covert and clandestine actions in SEA as early as 1962.
In April, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) recommended c:overt
air strikes against Tchepone (laos) and Vinh. (North Vietnam) to counter
infiltration. Concurrently, the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Command
(CINCPAC) forwarded to the JCS his conceptual views of harassing actions
against North Vietnam (NVN). This plan, as modified by the JCS, did not
meet Special Group (5412) approva.l.
•(ljfi4fb) In 1963 General Ear}G. Wheeler, Chief of Staff of the Army
-(SA) led -a staff visit team to Vietnam to investigate prospects of ending
the conflict within a reasonable amount of time. He then briefed the
. .
President, recomt11ending that the US intensify UW training for Vietnamese
forces and encourage the Vietnamese to conduct raids and sabotage missions
against NVN. Wheeler's report led to more specific studies by agencies
6n the Service and Joint staffs. · The most notable study resulting from
Wheeler's trip report was an. Army study entitled ·1·A Study of the Feasi-
41
bility of Conducting limited Military Operations in North Vietnam." Army
"
planners envisioned a Joint Unconventional Warfare Task-Force, which would
eclipse the scope of CIA UW operations against North Vietnam.
(TO flliP) This plan was a topic of discussion at conferences held by
the Secretary of Defense in the Pacific area in 1963. There emerged a
more active role for the DOD in conducting special operations in SEA.
The Secretary of Defense, directed CINCPAC to prepare specific target
,, ' ~
. '.
folders for covert and paramilitary oper~tions in North Vietnam, and he
\
20
offered ~ssistance to the CIA in accelerating its capabilities. In
response to the Secretary of Defense offer, the CAS Station Chief, Saigon
requested that additional military personnel be made available. In May
1963, while.the request was being considered, the JCS directed CINCPAC to
formulate a plan of action for CIA support of the DOD.
· . sUS liFO) During the subsequent months, message traffic between Wash-
ington and the field revealed continual high-level discussion of altering
·the command structure for prosecution of UW actions in SEA. By November
some CAS programs had been transferred to MACV. During that month, repre-
sentatives from the Depar.tment of Defense, Department of State, and Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency discussed DOD/CIA relationships, setting the
~stage for OPLAN 34A. Specifically, the November meetings called for the
transfer from_CAS to MACV of all irregular forces in SVN, a joint CAS-
. MACV ·operation _plan for a 12-month program of intensified operations
against North Vietnam, and the transfer of cross-border operations in_ Laos
to MACV auspices effective 1 December 1963. The operations plan developed
by CAS Saigon and MACV was completed on 15 December.
z(Tti IIFB) The plan outlined the mission of the joint task force as
42
follows:
"COMUSMACV and Chief of Station CAS, Saigon will
2
21
operations~ and physical destruction (hit.-and-run and aerial attacks).
The three possible methods for implementation of the UW programs were:
(1) either by CAS or MACV with the second party providing required sup-
. port, (2) by a joint CAS-MACV command or, (3) by both CAS and MACV, each
43
conducting a portion of the tota 1 program.·
(TE tiFQ) CINCPAC generally concurred with the plan; he was, however,
somewhat apprehensive regarding the effects of the proposed actions on
..
the North Vietnamese leadership. He also expressed.fears of possible
. 44
Chinese intervention.
(TE N5 P) In December 1963, after recei~ing the OPLAN 34A briefing
22
provide planning, liaison, logistics, and training to its Vietnamese
counterpart.
(IE tWP) Ambassador Lodge presented a sanitized version of the plan
to the South Vietnamese government in January; however, a coup d'etat
required that the plan be resubmitted to General Khanh on 3 February.
General Khanh•s appraisal of the plan was related in conversation with
Secretary McNamara, Ambassador Lodge, and General Taylor. The MACSOG
. 46
Documentation Study gave the following account:
"General Khanh agreed that actions designed to exert
increased pressure on North Vietnam could be helpful
assistance to his effort but that they would be no
substitute for· successful actions in South Vi.etnam
against the Viet Cong. Further, General Khanh said
that his base in South Vi"etnam was not strong enough
for overt operations against North· Vietnam but that
he would like to redouble covert operations right.
away."
· (IE UFO} In preparation for execution of the plan, the Secretary
\\
'
23
CHAPTER III
THE INSTRUMENT FOR FURTIVE WAR (U)
;
Mission and Objectives (U)
~8 nre) The MACSOG program was under the close scrutiny of Washington
authorities. Hence, its stated missien and objectives necessarily changed,
reflecting the vicissitudes of Washington's Vietnam Policy. Other factors
affecting the SOG mission were its own capabilities and limitations ·and
the effectiveness of North Vietnamese countermeasures. The final step of
the original operation plan, active US support to an armed resistance
movement in North Vietnam, was never realized. Even if the US President
- had "approved such an operation, it is doubtful that the movement would
25
have been successful in the rigidly controlled, totalitarian North. More
48
1i.mited objectives were to:
• Divert North Vietnamese military resources to defense
and internal security missions.
1 Produce an adverse effect on the North Vietnamese
economy.
• Impede the infiltration of military resources to the
Republic of Vietnam.
• .Create the impression that an active, unified, in-
ternal opposition exists in North Vietnam.
(13 hiD) Changes to the SOG mission statement in 1965 an·d 19.67 were
incorporated to reflect expanded operations in Laos and Cambodia. The
latter revision remained basically Unchanged until the demise of SOG. In
49
-abbreviated form, it read:
"[The SOG mission is] to plan and conduct covert/
clandestine operations in North Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia and special operations in South Vietnam, as
directed, in such a manner that operations can be
plausibly denied by the US and RVN [Republic of Viet-
nam] governments. These operations are planned and
conducted in coordination with various othe~ agencies
and with the RVNAF STD [Strategic Technical Direc-
torate-- Vietnamese counterpart to SOG]."
zz(B tiF9) In actuality, a major change to the:.-SOG mission resulted
from the Presidential decision in November 1968 to cease both bombing and
unconventional warfare operations in North Vietnam. (The ban, however,
did not apply to radio broadcasts beamed toward the populace of North
Vietnam.)
ns NfQ) A synopsis of some 50 interviews with MACSOG personnel
indicated that the major shortcoming of mission and program statements was
the lack of clear and well-defined statements outlining SOG's relationship
"' ·. ' ,..
to other agencies such as the. Fifth Special Forces Group, the tiA, and
the STD.
MACSOG Organ i za ti on {U)
(Ti tlilil) The establishment of MACSOG under the operational control
of COMUSMACV on 24 January 1964 did not effect a complete and abrupt
transfer from CAS to MACV of responsibility for all unconventional warfare
operations in Southeast Asia. CAS continued to conduct some secretive
operations unilaterally: for example, the t~aining of Meo tribesmen in
Laos and portions of North Vietnam. ·Within the SOG structure itself, CAS
personnel continued to handle some functions through CAS channels. One
particular case was the supervision of air operations. CAS retained
responsibility for approval and disapproval of air opera_tions until O~tober
1964. In most cases, however, CAS responsibilities diminished when suffi-
·cient amounts of DOD paramilitary assets had'arrived in the RVN.
(TB fllii8)_ According to planning documents, manpower and materiel re-
27
e(TG tiFQ) Commensurate with the increase of personnel and addition of.
programs, the SOG' organizational s.tructure proliferated. At the end of
1964 there were five major branches under the Commander (An Army colonel)
and the Deputy Commander (a CAS officer): Administrative, Intelligence,
Operations, Logistics, and Communications. Additionally, four command
elements came under the operational control of the SOG Commander: SOG·
Flight Detachment, Psychological Operations Group, Long Thanh Training
Detachment, and Maritime Operations Group. Staff elements within the Op-
erations Branch of SOG Headquarters exercised staff supervision over the
command elements.
(TJ UFB) The most significant"changes to the organization in 1965
28
Thuot facilitated the management of cross-border operations in Laos and
Cambodia. Organizational changes relating to the coll11land and control of
air assets are discussed in the chapter on air operations.
29
ns NEQ} Air support requirements for Maritime Operations were
negligible. USAF air assets provided high- and medium-level aerial recon-
naissance, and occasionally were on call to assist in the event of an
emergency.
30
creation of a psychological. impact, and development of an intelligence
capability. Further, in his view all SOG actions against the NVN should
52
be designed to achieve those two ends .
..(TB fiJi~) SOG used three general categories of psychological warfare
operations -- black, gray, and white. Black operations attributed sponsor-
ship to the North Vietnamese or Viet Cong; gray operations made sponsor-
ship undiscernible; and white operations clearl'y gave the impression of US
or South Vietnamese sponsorship. Under all three categories, SOG disse-
minated a myriad of themes, both strategic and tactical. The former por-
trayed a better life without communism; the latter aimed at exploiting
specific time-sensitive vulnerabilities. Propaganda was disseminated by
-several means: radio broadcasts; dispatch of black letters; delivery of
leaflets, gift kits, and portable radios; and indoctrination of detained
. NVN citizens. T~e rapid expansion of the Humidor (C) program is reflected
31
Airborne Operations (U)
'li tiFQ) The Timberwork (C) program entailed the infiltration, re-
inforcement, resupply, and exfiltration of agents and agent teams. It en-
countered immense difficulties under both CAS and SOG direction. Evalua-
tions of these operations revealed that they were largely ineffective, and
54
were, in fact, the least successful of the Footboy (C) sub-programs.
(Ti "m) When SOG took control of the long-term agent program, 169
agents were 1ocated at the training facility," Camp Long Thanh, and 24
agents (4 teams) were located iD North Vietnam. In 1964, SOG ·inserted
an additional team and conducted 13 reinforcement/resupply missions. By
the end of the year, 59 agents were~perating in NVN. They destroyed
55
- three bridges, conducted one ambush, and recruited two agents. Opera-
tions were co~tly: 54 agents were lost and less than 25 percent of the
. . 56
scheduled reinforcement/resupply missions were completed successfully.
ns NfQ} In 1965' SOG infiltrated 2 more teams and successfully
completed 22 reinforcement and resupply missions. Teams continued to
conduct harassment, destruction, and temporary interdiction missions along
Lines of Communication {LOCs); however, with theadvent of overt aerial
bombing and heightened concern over the buildup of Soviet and Chinese aid
to North Vietnam, greater emphasis was pl~ced on intelligence collection
and development of a broad intelligence base.
(TB JIFB) In an attempt to rejuvenate the program, SOG initiated an
operation to exfiltrate one of the long-termagent teams. This would
allow extensive interligence debriefing and feedback for the critique of
agent training. Furthermore,
'
a successful exfiltration would provide
,·
'' ·. '.
tangible evidence for trainees that exfiltration was possible: In the late
32
sulllller of 1965, SOG directed five members of one team to move overland to
Laos, where CAS assets would render assistance for evacuation to Vientiane.
Unfortunately, radio contact with the agent team was lost; presumably it
was captureQ by Pathet Lao. Later efforts to recover other long-term
agent teams also were i 11-fated .
.(IE tlf9) Nevertheless, SOG continued to expand its agent network in
North Vietnam in 1966, adding 3 more teams and accomplishing 28 reinforce-
ment and resupply missions. But the resupply effort was not enough. Teams
were expending greater effort to ensure their own survival. Some teams
were dormant due to the lack of supplies. One team, for example, had not
been resupplied since 1962. Even thUugh the introduction of helicopters
~and high performance aircraft partially alleviated resupply problems, and
the newly acqt:~ired C-130 Combat Talon aircraft {with sophisticated naviga-
tional equipment} also enhanced the SOG aerial delivery capability, ap-
praisal of airborne operations at the end of 1966 led to the developfl_lent
of n·ew airborne concepts. Two concepts imp 1emented during 1967 were the
diversionar,y agent program, .under the covername of Forae {C), and the
Short Term Roadwatch and Target Acquisition {STRATA) Operation. These
enhancements to Airborne Operations were designed to contravene NVN secu-
-'
rity measures, which were well-coordinated and extensive. The 1967 MACSOG
57
history stated:
The NVN government has intensified internal security
11
'
33
(H tiED) Forae (C) played upon the NVN fear of agent operations, at-
tempting to divert even larger numbers of NVN militia and NVA personnel
to internal security functions. The program was not designed to deceive
the -enemy indefinitely. Even if the-North Vietnamese suspected bogus
agent drops and resupply missions, they could not ignore the potential
where no active agent teams were. located, parachuting NVA prisoners incri-
minated with false documents, dropping ice bJocks rigged in parachutes,
and making radio broadca$tS to fictitious teams.
(TE tiED) The STRATA concept of" operations had several advantages
over the long-term agent program.· Namely, successful exfiltration of agents
was more probable. The new· concept focused on intelligence collection
along lines of c01111lunication -- areas of key interest to higher authori-
queries from the JCS and CINCPAC regarding the extent of external support
to NVN and logistics activity on major LOCs in the NVN panhandle. Concurrent
with that proposal, SOG requested and rece.ived authority to use helicopters
for infi_ltration. The concept then became workable after the Thai government
allowed. the transfer of OPLAN 34A agents from fixed-wing aircraft to
58 .
helicopters at Thai bases.
~rs NfD) In January 1967 a COMUSMACV message outlined the STRATA
con~~P~ of operations. Teams of five to fifteen indigenous p~_rsonnel \
34
were to infiltrate Laos or NVN by USAF or RVNAF helicopter., move overland
to a base camp in NVN, and perform 15 to 30-day missions to include:
installation of seismic devices, installation of wire tap devices, road-
watch of critical LOCs, reconnaissance and exact location of suspected
enemy locations, and target acquisition for airstrikes. The concept, as
approved by the JCS in April, specified a general operating area extending
50 kilometers inside the North Vietnamese border north of the Demili-
tarized Zone to 19 degrees N~rth. As noted above, USAF helicopters were
59
authorized to infiltrate the teams.
:e(TJ 14F5) SOG condu~ted two STRATA operations i.n late 1967, extracting
one of the teams after a successfullnission. In 1968 SOG inserted 24
teams; only one team was lost in entirety ana three teams suffered partial
losses. Hence, STRATA team survival rates were conside·rably higher than
60
those ex peri en ceQ by 1ong- te rrn agent teams.
(T8 UF5) The STRATA operationand most aspects of the Forae (C) op-
eration, as well as the waning long-term agent program, ceased on 1 Novem-
ber 1968. STRATA assets were then transferred to the Laos cross-border
operation.
(TS tiFB) The relatively poor performance of airborne operations over
"
the years may be explained partially by looking at· the various obstacles
which w~re endemic to such an operation. The following factors comprised
35
on oyerflights of Laotian ·territory and on the use of Thai
facilities, restricted flexible planning of missions.
4. Terrain features and climatical conditions imposed severe
difficulties in achieving accurate aerial delivery of agents
and supplies. ·
5. ·The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong apparently had a good
intelligence collection system in. the vicinity of the Long
Thanh training facility and. possibly had secured information
sources in the South Vietnamese Strategic Technical Direc-
torate. · ·
6. There was not full cooperation between CAS Vientiane
and MACSOG.
7. The air defense system of NVN prevented operations in· the
vicinity of population centers for C-lc3 and C-130 aircraft.
8. A shortage of air assets limited the number of--combat
operations and training exercises.
9. Navigational aids on SOG fixed-wing·aircraft did not enable
pinpoint delivery accuracy in aerial drops over obscured drop
zones. ·
io. The-quality of.a~entpersonnel increasingly diminished;
poor motivation was manifested by high desertion and absen-
tee rates.
11. Heavy cloud cover and other missions of highe.r priority
sometimes denied SOG the necessary·aerial photography for
mission planning. ·
Laos in October 1965, SOG intensified the-operations until 1968. The level
of activity was then stable until 1971, when 'the dearth of military assets,
. especia·,.ly air assets, prompted curtailment of these operations .
. (IS tlf8) At the outset of Shining Brass operations in -1965, US
active military involvement in Laos was surrounded by secrecy. To conceal
- thi~ involvement, Washington established stringent political constraints
. ' '
36
which were not removed until after the coi11Tlunists' control of the laotian
37
•
ns "SA) Another instrumental decision in 1966 had considerable ef-·
feet on· the evolution of the Shining Brass program: the Secretary of
Defense authorized the organization of three battalions of Exploitation
Forces (EF) for the execution of Phase Two of the operation plan. These
forces, sometimes referred to as reaction forces or .. Hornet forces, .. were
capable of rapid engagement of targets developed by smaller reconnaissance
teams. Specific missions of the EF battalions included the following:
platoon and multi-platoon size elements to conduct reconnaissance-in-force,
route interdiction, ambushes and raids; to establish and secure temporary
patrol bases to support wide-area reconnaissa·nce team operations; and to
provide short-term area denial .and cache destruction capabilities.
(TE JIFQ) The Exploitation Forces thus <:omplemented the reconnaissance
teams, known a_s Spi,ke Teams. These smaller teams were trained to perform
. .
.a myriad of specialized missions, to include area and point reconnais-
sance, road and river watch, route mining and ambush, prisoner of war cap-
,ture, bomb damage assessment, ground photography, communication wire tap,
hand emplacement of sensor .devices, direction of artillery and airstrikes
on detected targets, and 1imited direct ground .combat.
s(TO JIJiilil) ·The tempo of reconnaissance team operations in Laos increased
•
dramatically in 1966. An average of two operations per month rose to
approximately 11 per month by the end of the year. Exploitation Force
· operations commenced ·in June and averaged about two each month for the re-
mainder of the year. This e·xpanding trend continued in 1967 a·s restric-
tions on the use of helicopters and geographical boundaries were eased.
Furt~ermore, the JCS auth,orized larger exploitation forces to participate
in operations, allowing a·combined force of three platoons on any one op-
63
eration.
38
{IS NFQ) The development of two new concepts in 1967, Muscle Shoals
and Search~Locate-Annihilate-Monitor (SLAM), placed greater requirements
on the Shining Brass program. The Mus·c 1e Shoa 1s program was a DOD-
conceived anti-infiltration system, entailing the emplacement of electronic
sensors along the Ho Chi Minh Trail by aircraft and ground teams and SLAM
was a type of exploitation operati,on. Reconnaissance teams were to search
for and locate the enemy, reaction forces were to exploit the intelligence,
and a stay-behind force was to monitor the area after the withdrawal of
64
the exploitation force.
ns t' 5 9) In 1968 the salient feature of the progr.am (renamed P~airie
Fire on 1 March 1967) was the high nUmber of ·operations conducted in-
country versus the number of operations conducted in Laos. Only after the
cessation of the Communist Spring-Winter Campaign did SOG resume its pri-
mary cross-border. mission. During the communist offensive, SOG support
to the in-country conventional military forces allowed only 17 percent of
the Prairie Fire (PF) efforts to be freed for cross-border operations.
Another reason for the diver.sion of efforts from Laos to South Vietnam was
;,.
the loss of two Forward Operating Bases -- Khe Sanh and Kham Due. After
the communist threat in South Vietnam diminished during the last three
months of the year, SOG directed three-quarters of its PF operations in
65
laotian_territory. By this time, however, NVA security elements in laos
. had bec.qme much more effective in countering-Prairie Fire operations, as
indicated by shorter stay-times of the teams and more frequ·ent resort to
66
emergency team extractions.
"(JSt'FP~ Actions offsetting these limitations were incr~ased reliance
'. . ~ \
39
._____L____________ _ _ _ c•r•ET
Phanom, Thailand. Although the US Ambassador to laos had disapproved
a SOG request to develop a resistance base among indigenous elements, he
permitted their use in intelligence collection activities. The support
racility at_Nakhon Phanom permitted insertion in the Prairie Fire Area
of Operations {PFAO) by using western approach routes, lessening the enemy
threat to air assets, and enhancing the covertness of PF operations.
Additionally, flight paths originating in Thailand vice the central high-
lands of the RVN were inhibited less frequently by inclement weather con-
67
diti ons.
The addition of another Thai launch facility in 1969 at
uH£ tlliQ)
..
Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base bett~red the flexibility in launching teams
-into the southern Prairie Fire zone. Concurrently, CAS Vientiane granted
permission for Thai-based helicopters to use a refueling and staging site
. located on the B~lovens Plateau. Another major development during 1969
which reflected the greater emphasis being placed on the southern PFAO,
the tri-border area, was the establishment of the Command and Control De-
tachment at Kontum. These. d~velopments were complemented by other inno-
. ~
40
• implemented more versatile methods of infiltration to include High
Altitude-low Opening (HALO) drops from C-123s and C-130s. Replacement of
•
Better coop~ration between SOG and American authorities in laos -- the
Embassy and CAS -- resulted in the authority to insert teams outside of
69
- the Area of Operations (AO) for overland movement into target areas .
.-(T8 fiFO) Prairie Fire operations (renamed Phu Dung in 1971) con-
-kJ tinued at a comparable level in 1971; however, the enemy's improved de-
fensive posture resulted in a reduction of team stay-time by more than
one-third. To crjeate naw drop and landing zones, SOG relied on the Com-
- mando Vault program, whereby C-130 a; rcraft de 1i vered 15, 000-pound bombs
-which cleared such zones. This method proved to be effective if recon-
• naissance teaf!1S were inserted immediately after the "LZ (landing zone)
-
blow." As durin~ 1970, operations were characterized by greater cooperation
between CAS and SOG. This was particularly true in support of lam Son
- 719, the ARVN incurs ion into laos early in 1971. By that time, US per-
sonnel were prohibited from participation.'in cross-border operations in
-
70 .
consonance with JCS message dated 8 February 1971:
-
(1 5 Q'FP) Phu Dung operations ceased in 1972 after a steady drawdown
of supporting air assets. On 15 May, " SOG was deactivated and was re-
.a.
\\ • I
SOG teams provided one of the few sources'of hard inte 11 i gence' on the
41
ld
Lao-Vietnamese border area and the Demilitarized Zone and that exploita-
tion operations achieve~ a high kill ratio of enemy forces to friendly
forces. The degree of disruption on enemy logistics could not be deter-
mined but~.undoubtedly, SOG operations caused the diversion of enemy
armed forces to provide internal security in the Phu Dung area. The major
drawback of the program was its cost. Operations resulted in numerous air-
. craft losses, especially helicopter losses, and placed heavy demands on a
.
limited number of air assets available in the RVN. A compilation of the
alert time of SOG-dedicated air assets during periods when teams were in
the field would permit a.better estimate of program costs, but these data
\'Jere not available. Furthermore, study of such data may not have been
-productive according to the COMUSMACV Ad Hoc-Evaluation Group formed in
December 1967. The group stated that SOG operations should not be subject
71
to a cost-effectiveness analysis.
(lE flf8) Evaluations revealed that in-country conventional military
forces were critical of SOG cross-border operations. One comment from
the Ad Hoc Evaluation Group took issue with the focus of the intelligence
collection efforts, noting that there should be "~reater orientation to
satisfy the needs.of the Field Forces" (the US Army forces engaged in
72
conventional operations in RVN). T~e group also alluded to a Seventh
73
Air Force appraisal of the Phu Dung program:
"According to Seventh Air Force, SOG-produced intell i-
.. gence has been of minor value to 7AF for the development
of tactical air and Arc Light [B-52 strikes] targets.
With the exception of a Prairie Fire location of a truck
part repair facility in the southeast sector which re-
sulted in an Arc Light, and the provision of initial
information of the Santa Fe trail net, information has
\\
been limited to minor troop concentrations, trail nets,
·and storage facilities. It appears, however, that the
42
•tl Prairie Fire intelligence contribution to Arc Light
targeting is greater than indicated by 7AF representa-
tives."
• 4If t1F8) The overall finding of the Ad Hoc Evaluation Group's review
was more favorable to SOG cross-border operations in Laos than the afore- .
• .
mentioned Seventh Air Force view. It stated:
74
•
"Prairie Fire operations have been effective and have
achieved significant results in harassing and slowing
the enemy. They have caused the enemy to shift some of
•lit
his infiltration routes to areas further from South Viet-
nam with a consequent increased time for transit and a
greater opportunity for tactical air exploitation. .
Prairie Fire operations have caused the enemy to be con-
cerned for his Lines of Communications and to expend his
resources on security that might otherwise be employed in
South Vi'etnam. · These operations also have contributed
significantly to the targeting of areas for concentrated
airstrikes which have been effective. Prairie Fire personnel
kills have been signifi·cant although the ratio of enemy
killed to friendlies killed and missing has not been as
hig~ as in-country ratios."
•
from Washington to conduct limited US actions aga.inst
., communists up to five
kilometers inside the Cambodian border. He proposed the use of specially-
fighters.
75
- .(.liE tiFB) In late 1965 and early 1966, planning for cross-bomber op-
- era~ions into Cambodia e'nsued. In June 1-?66, the JCS approve~ a CINCPAC
43
recommendation to organize, train, and equip a paramilitary force for these
operations. During the remainder of the year, the Fifth Special Forces
76
Group trained the force.
#B FIF8) Pending the ot:Jtcome of a joint Defense-State-CIA Study Group
which was considering diplomatic an,d psychological initiatives, CINCPAC
r~quested authority from the JCS in April 1967 to conduct limited ground
44
78
on a case-by-:case basis at the Washington level.
~TJ flli8) &v the end of 1967 SOG had launched 99 Reconnaissance Team
missions from forward operating bases along the Cambodian border, mostly
in the tri-border region .. Sixty-three teams successfully penetrated ·
Cambodian territory. The MACV Ad Hoc Evaluation Group assessed the Daniel
Boone program as potentially valuable since it was the only ground intelli-
gence effort in Cambodia for MACV use, but it stated that intelligence
results had been fragmentary and low-level and not particularly suited to
the needs of MACV and the Field Forces. Addressing the use of helicopters,
. 79
the Group noted the limited quantity·of assets. It stated:
"Daniel Boone was initiat~o without the provision of
helicopter assets specifically for these operations with
the resultant drawdown on limited helicopter resources
for support of operations in the RVN. Prior to any
expansion of DB operations, helicopter resources in addi-
tion to those currently in the RVN should be obtained
for SOG support."
z(TE tiFii?) Acquisition of additional rotary wing assets engendered
rapid expansion of the program. The number of operattons doubled in 1968,
but, as in the case of Prairie Fire operations, the major effort was direc-
·;,
45
n the boun-
uk, the ex ten siv e pre sen ce of Vietnamese communists wi thi
Sihano
81
da rie s of Cambodia.
atic rel ati on s with the Cam-
( 13-NPD} In the following ye ar diplom
les s rig id
gov ern me nt we re reo pen ed, enabling SOG to operate under
bodia n
ducting
int s. Se ver al no tew ort hy innovations were adopted in con
co ns tra
ert ion
era tio ns suc h as the fir st use of he lic op ter paradrop ins 82
the op
9 -- Salem Ho use .
umed a new nickname in 196
methods. The program als o ass.
granted
an of the. Jo int Chiefs of St aff
(T!I fiFQ) -I n 1970, the Chairm
s. CINCPAC
cit au tho rit y for SOG tea ms to contro 1 tac tic al air str i ke·
ex pli
for ce s. On
au tho riz ed the em plo ym ent of pla too n-s ize ex plo ita tio n
lat er
the Air
, a JCS me ssa ge app rov ed an 'expansion of the AO, forming
20 Ap ril
al AO. The
tio n Zon e (al so ca lle d Fre edom Deal)-west of the ori gin
·In ter dic
hte rs
str i~e in th is zon e oc cu rre d on 24 April when tac tic al fig
fir st air
au tho rit ies
150 cor rm uni st tro op s in ope n ter rai n. Other sig nif ica nt
caught
nic
rin g the ye ar inc lud ed the following: in fil tra tio n of eth
granted du
so rs, and
ans , em pla cem ent of mi nes in the AO, emplacement of sen
Cambodi 83
tar ge ts of op po rtu nit y.
the use of ar til ler y agains~
months of
I ltF8 )s Af ter the Al lie d inv asion of Cambd'dia during the
(T!
use program.
Jun e, pu hli c ann oun cem ent s were binding on the Salem Ho
May and
o Cambodia;
nel cou ld no lon ge r acc om pany reconnaissance teams int
US person
m lea de rsh ip
the Re pu bli c of Vie tna m (AR VN) personnel assumed the tea
Army of
op lif t he li-
ibi lit ies . Fu rth erm ore , Wa shington banned the use of US tro
res po ns
he lic op ter gunships and tac84 tic al air
and pe rm itte d the use of US
co pte rs
ly wh en suc h sup po rt was bey ond the means of the VNAF.
ass ets on
imposed co ns tra int s, the lev el of SOG
rNE D) De spi te ~he rec en tly .
,, {IS
.
-
reconnaissance efforts of western waterways. Too, refined infiltration
techniques using SOG fixed-wing assets permitted deeper, undetected inser-
•
I[J
from the Cambodian Army. The latter were used in an attempt to develop an
indigenous UW capability until they were wit_hdrawn by their Government in
October 1971 .
85
dwindled rapidly .due to the paucity of air assets remaining in the RVN ih
the·acceler ated phase-down of American military presence.
47
months. ln December 1965, interest in forming a viable personnel recovery
or.ganization was rejuvenated at an Escape and Evasion (E&E) Planning
••• Col Aderholt, coordinated and formalized the concept with MACVJ5 in May 1966.
On 17 September 1966 COMUSMACV officially activated the Joint Personnel
Recovery Center. The JPRC also was known as the Recovery Studies element
. 87
within the SOG organizational structure.
a.k"FS tiER) h'ithout delay the JPRC attempted its first recovery opera-
tion. Interrogation reports of a VietCong rallier.and low-level aerial
photography pinpointed the location~f a prison camp where an American
-prisoner allegedly was detained. A company-sized unit infiltrated the area
and found a bonafide prison camp, but it had been vacated prior to the ar-
- 88
rival of the ·raiding party. These circumstances were repeated throughout
the history of the· JPRC. later: improvements in concepts and techniques
did, however, result in the return of numerous ARVN/RVN personnel.
(IE tWR) SOG prisoner recovery actiyities were not limited to camp
raids. Agents were responsible for establishing ~nd monitoring E&E nets.
SOG continually mbnitored Safe Areas for Evasion (SAFE) zones. It also
prepositioned air-deliverable surviva1 kits throughout Southeast Asia. It
. disseminated E&E letters to operational units on a monthly basi~ to be used
. by evadees in identifying their locations to..overflying aircraft. SOG
briefed aircrews about the JPRC mission. It maintained liaison with military
and other gdvernmental agencies, particularly with the intelligence
conmunity, establishing intelligence collection requirements and ensuring
\\ '. I ,· .
48
the JPRC. ·In fact, the JPRC became the largest depository for such in-
formation in Southeast Asia. Its program was closely interwoven with the
•..
I
psychological warfare program; JPRC personnel assisted in developing a
reward program to pay sources of information leading to the recovery of
US servicemen detained or missing and to the return of remains of US
•
servicemen. Aerial leaflet drops throughout mainland Southeast Asia pro-
. 89
vided the primary means for publicizing the reward program.
- ..( E flf8) The mast unique capabi 1ity used by the JPRC for personne 1
recoveries was the Fulton Recovery System, a system integral to the. SOG
• C-130 Combat Spear aircr{lft. This system enabled rescue attempts in hos-
•
tile areas inaccessible to friendlY"-9round forces. This type of operation·
- co11111enced with the delivery of a special kit- by air. The kit contained
• tended the line for a C-130 to snatch during a low-level 'pass over the sur-
•
vivor. When the line was secured in a forked device Qn the nose of the
90
aircraft, it was reeled into the aircraft.
(6 tiFQ) After encouraging test results of the Fulton system, the
· JPRC familiarized SEA aircrews with its operation and prepositioned Fulton
kits at several locations for subsequent delivery by high performance air-
craft in the event a Fulton recovery attempt were to be executed.
(I£ N&D) The first actual recovery attempt using the Fulton system
invo.lved two downed crew members located deep in North Vietnam. Opera-
tion Gambler, as it was called, began on 21 May 1967 when F-:-4 aircraft
dropped kits in the vicinity of the survivors. Unfortunately, North
\' '
49
Spear aircraft to abort its pick-up mission. As a consequence of this
91
attempt, SOG expressed the limitations of the Fulton system:
The Fulton Recovery System has proven to J:>e of doubt-.
11
0
rrs Nf~ In trying to improve the recovery record, MACV delegated
the authority to ~onduct in-country prisoner recovery operations to the US
conventional military forces, i.e., tpe Field Forces. The decentralization
of the planning and conduct of. P.W recovery operations was designed to
quicken the exploitation to perishable intelligence regarding suspected
prison ·s-ites where Americans were detained .
. ( 13-NFO) Out-of-country Pow· recovery operations remained under the
purview· of SOG, and for operations planned for targets in North Vietnam,
- Wasllington approval was 'required on a case-by-case
' basis. For commando
\
50
raids aimed at POW sites in Laos and Cambodia, extensive coordination with ·
military and governmenta 1 agencies often preempted rapid response to:time-
sensitive intelligence. In raids planned for the Salem House AO, SOG had
to coordinate with the JCS, ClNCPAC, COMUSMACV, and the US Embassies in
Saigon and Phnom Penh. For the Prairie Fire AO, it had to clear the opera-
tion with COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, and the American ·Embassy in Vientiane.
Naturally, these encumbrances resulted in less frequent forays across the
• border for POW recoveries. A later agreement among SOG, CAS Udorn, and
•
CAS Vientiane in 1969 streamlined coordination procedures: MACV assets
were to be used only wheR CAS assets were inadequate an~ only under the
:e(TS ltP8) _ In-country POW raids, free from extensive coordination re-
••
quirements inherent to cross-border POW recovery operations, experienced
an upturn in 1968, largely due to the employment of local forces. Eight
•.. out of 32 attempts were profitable, recovering 155 South Vietnamese mili-
tary and political prisoners.
(If PIFQ)
93 .
The JPRC assisted in these efforts •
The favorable trend continued over the next two years. In
-..
1969, 18 raids initiated and conducted by conventional units resulted in
the release of 112 allied prisoners. "' One.critically wounded US ·soldier was
recovered, but he died shortly afterward. The JPRC assisted in planning
.. 11 suc~!aids during the year, one of which recovered five ARVN prisoners .
During the following year, POW recovery operations rescued 100 South
.,
. 94
Vietnamese prisoners .
" Cyf Beginning. in 1970, Washington-level policymakers
tiFQ) . . evinced
greater concern over POW recovery efforts ' and resolution of the
' status of
Ill
the Missing-in-Action. Bright Light operations~ particula~ly Crash Site
Inspection operations, received higher priority. COMUSMACV responded to
the new pressure by issuing a Bright Light Operation Plan in October 1970.
L~ter, SOG established a tactical operations center under the concept of a
Joint Recovery Task Force (JRTF). The purpose of the task force was des-.
. 95
cri bed in ,a COMUSMACV message, dated 6 June 1971 :
"A Joint Recovery Task Force will be established to
conduct primarily aut of country and to a lesser extent,
in country PW/escapee recovery operations. MACVSOG will
provide both the command and control staff and the prin-
cipal ground element of the JRTF. These US-led and ad-
vised elements \'lill be rapidly task organized to meet
the requiremen~s of the tactical situation. Required
ground reserve.forces and air assets will be provided as
appropriate by USARF [US Army, Vietnam] and Seventh Air
Force from units previously earmarked to support re-
covery operations." -
(Related SOG proposals to reintroduce US ground elements into Laos, to
. acquite better intelligence, were not approved by the JCS.)
c(:TIS) The establishment of the Joint Recovery Task Force, under the
operational control of the Chief, MACSOG, received enthusiastic ·support at·
CINCPAC and the CAS/SOG Conference at Udorn. Seventh Air Force dissented,
however, contending that demands for air assets were excessive under in-
creasingly restrictive headspace levels .
..
~TE flf8) On 15 March 1972, approximately one year after its forma-
tion, the JPRC was removed from SOG and placed within MACVJ2. Tasked air
resources were returned to the operational control of the Commander, 7AF.
Its success in POW recovery attempts during 1971 and 1972 was minimal;
25 POW recovery attempts freed only nine South Vietnamese prisoners. It
was"no~ a fitting end to. an otherwise more profitable venture, in which the
. JPRC aided in the recovery of 492 South Vietnamese prisoners and the return
of 101 bodies of deceased US personnel.
52
•t. CHAPTER IV
AIR OPERATIONS (U)
• ..(S DIFQ)
-
MACSOG air operations began as a relatively minor effort in
• 1964 and expanded rapidly until 1970, when dwindling air assets caused the
trend to begin to reverse. This unique saga of air warfare finally phased
• out in 1972. The full extent of the USAF contribution to the SOG UW pro-
•
gram cannot be measured accu:ately. The ample statistics which relate part
of the story fail to capture the color of the SOG missions and the men who
performed them .
5
&15Q}_ The USAF members participating in SOG ope_rations were hi.ghly
•
.(
"-
dedicated and well-trained; they operated sophisticated aircraft to support
. -
••
unusual missions. The organization itself was unusual. It was flexible
and divorced from standard command and control channels.· Cover stories
and stringent security procedures wrapped it in a mantle of secrecy .
fiS-NfQl The First Flight Detachment, the 90th Special Operations
• Squadron (formerly designated the 15th SOS), and the 20th Special Opera-
•
tions Squadron were three units situated in the RVN which were almost ex-
elusively dedicated to supp.ort SOG operations.· The respective aircraft of
- insignificant.
,
The 504th Tactical Air Support Group and the 56th Special
·Opex:attons Wing contributed immeasurably to the SOG mission by their pro-
'
vision of 0-1, 0-2, and.OV-10 FAC/Observation aircraft, and A-1, CH-3, and
\
53
CH-53 assets. Additionally, tactical fighter aircraft exploited lucrative
targets reported by SOG teams and provided close air support during
emergency extractions. Fighters also dropped resupply kits to agent teams
and Evasion/Survival kits in areas where US evadees were suspected. Recon-
naissance aircraft supplied needed photographic and electronic intelligence.
Cargo aircraft rendered logistical support. Airborne platforms provided
radio relay support.
Part I: Fixed Wing Assets (U)
Heavy Hook Project (U)
..(T8 llP8) In 1963 the Secretary of Defense directed that six C-123
aircraft be modified with special n~vigational and electronic counter-
measure equipment for use in an unconventionil warfare role against North
96
Vietnam. · The.project name was Duck Hook, later renamed Heavy Hook.
(19 nre) First Flight Detachment, located at Nha Trang Air Base, was
responsible for the supervision of the Heavy Hook program under the opera-
tional control of the Chief, MACSOG. Its first aircraft arrived on 28 June
. 97
1964; its first combat mission was flown on 16 December.
0 (rs NEQ) First year activitie~ included negotiating contracts, or-
•
and sup~_rvising Chinese Air Force aircrews •. -(Only the Chinese crews were
authorized to fly combat missions over North Vietnam.) Initially, First
Flight personnel were ·also responsible for administering similar training to
Vietpa~se Air Force crews; this program, however, never achi~ved lasting
'·
success.
54
eH tlriB) In 1964 the unit encountered several problems which delayed
attainment of operational .status. Organizational, personnel, and mainte-
nance problems were most prominent. Factors over which First Flight had
no control,_such as political constraints, inclement weather, enemy
countertactics, and aircraft operational limitations, also hampered ini-
tial operations.
ns DI£N The unit suffered from the lack of specific guidelines and
directives covering its formation. In the haste to organize, higher
authorities neglected to task individual Service components to support SOG;
hence, SOG experienced difficulty in acquiring the necessary
.
qualified.
personnel and equipment. OPLAN 34A'did not address air operations in
·detail; it only stated broad requirements for training aircrews in mine-
laying and fo~ installing special equipment on six C-123 aircraft. The
plan did not spe~ify flying hour and sortie requirements nor related mat-
ters upon which a systematic evaluation of the validity of six aircraft
could be based. An Air Force officer assigned to SOG elaborated on inci-
98
pient problems:
"[There was] no clear statement as to ;ho was responsible
for pro~iding the ... [aircraft]. There was confusion in
SOG as to how they were to be configured. What was the
method of sanitization and to what extent? To the Air
Force, sanitizing the aircraft meant completely removing
all identification marks and serial numbers from the
aircraft. and all of its component parts, black boxes,
and so forth, so that nothing on the aircraft could be
officially traced to the US. This-is an expensive and
· · time-consuming process since the aircraft had to be com-
pletely disassembled and reassembled. The decision was
then made to merely paint the airplane, {an?] remove tail
numbers and mai.n records from the aircraft."
(15 lfPIS) Inexperience in unconventional warfare activities among per-
,, ·· ....
sonnel initially assigned to Air Operatio~s was a major problem in the
55
99
formulative period. An Air Force officer related the problem:
'' .•. none of the original Air Force personnel assigned to
MACSOG had any previous background in unconventional
warfare operations. This was despite the fact that at
Hurlburt the Air Force had a group of personnel trained
and experienced in such operations. The result:
MACSOG merely continued to do what CAS had been doing
without any real change in direction, scope, or effect
of the program i tse 1f."
Another officer cited the specific shortage of instructor pilots at First
100
Flight Detachment:
" ... one of the first problems we encountered was our_
shortage of instructor pilots for training Chinese crews.
We had fighter pilots, but none had been checked out in
C-123 aircraft~ Consequently, we had to obtain instruc-
tor pilots from the Air Force."
:::.(IE flfi8) First Flight's unique relationship to higher Air Force
authorities created several peculiar orga~izatinnal problems. Aircraft
accident investigation procedures attracted criticism. Since the aircraft
were not carried ·in the Air Force inventory, but because crewmembers were
attached to the Air Force, the question arose as to who was responsible
_to investigate. Standardized procedures were not implemented until_after
the third aircraft accident. The scope of the pr9blem extended beyond
accident ·investig~tion standards. Headquarters Pacific Air Forces (PACAF)
contended that the initially high non;operational rates were attributable
to non-conformance to Air Force standing operating procedures and safety
101
regulations.
(T8' ltPB) From the beginning of First Flight, maintenance support
became a controversial topic. During 1964 the United States Government
and the Government of the Republic of China negotiated at length on
- mairl'tenance procedures for the Heavy Hook,aircraft. Agreement, was finally
56
•
•
reached in November 1964, China Airli11es (CAL) was contacted for rear
echelon maintenance and USAF was tasked for flightline maintenance.
though the US was reluctant to grant major maintenance responsibilities to
Al-
57
•• I stress the importance of weather reporting in this
type [airborne] of operation. Once we were able to
•
obtain the benefits of the satellite weather program,
we had a fine weather facility- and this was a real asset
to effective operations."
Training of OPLAN 34A agent teams in basic weather reporting procedures
later enhanced the effectiveness of their air support.
(H tiFQ) f'olitical constraints imposed by higher authorities re-
stricted the overflight of politically sensitive and high threat areas.
For example, flight within 20 miles of the Chinese border or within the
immediate vicinity of Hanoi was prohibited. The restriction of Heavy Hook
flights within the, effective. range of known Anti -Ai rcra.f_t Artillery {~AA)
and Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) sites became more cumbersome with the
proliferation of these sites in reaction to 1nitiation of overt air activity
107
in 1965.
58
at Ma.ther AFB~ . loadmasters and radio operators received training at Taiwan.
The first CAF crew complement arrived at Nha Trang on 16 October 1964; it
• consisted of two pilots, two navigators, one radio operator, one flight
•
engineer, one Bomber Defense Operator (equivalent to USAF Electronic War-
108
fare Officer),and two loadmasters .
• .{Is tiFQ) Quring 1965 First Flight supervised six CAF crews (one of
the original seven was withdrawn from the program). Normally, four crews
- were on-station at Nha Trang and·two crews were on crew rotation at Hsin-
Chu Air Base, Taiwan.
aircrew complement.
109
In October First Flight received its first full US
59
out·that the crews were·unable to perform the mission
as we believed it should be flown. Our mission required
a low-altitude night contour flying for seven or eight
hours through the valleys below the peaks of hills to
stay out of the enemy GCI [Ground Control Intercept]
coverage. They had to fly visually and they had to fly
by the light of the moon. It was a very difficult mis-
sion and the people were not really prepared for it ...
we proceeded to requalify the Chinese.· Our method of
indoctrinating them into the mission was to develop a
series of courses in SVN through the mountains which
would simulate as much as possible the type of terrain
.they would be flying inj-rf"North Vietnam."
...lH tlf8) /\s the CHINAT flying training progressed, most American
counterparts lauded the CHINAT performance. Only a few minor ·problems
persisted, such as a gro\jing reluctance to fly dangerous missions and
112.
frequent requests for leave to Taiwan. One SOG officer commented:
"The Chinese C-123 crews were well-disciplined and were
given proficiency training frequently. They were highly
professional. Though the Chinese crews flew the 34A mis-
sions only during the light of the moon, we used them
•
foi psychological operations missions during the dark of
the moon. As North Vietnamese air defenses built up, the
Chinese became more and more reluctant to fly missions
over North Vietnam; consequently, for Psyops missions we
• of association with the unit, stated that the CAF" crews were regarded
•••
as a real source of expertise and continuity for First Flight Detachment .
When asked what was the major lesson learned.from the First Flight opera-
tion, he responded with: "the ability of the USAF to work closely with
113
a foreign country's air force in accomplishing a mission ...
• ~TB nr~) Concurrent with the acquisition and training of CHINAT air-
crews, and arising from the same dissatisfaction with aircrews previously
used in the CAS program,, SOG drafted a plan to train six VNAF aircrews.
•'••
'' •,
Vietnamese, like the Chi.nese, had flown for CAS. The deci si ori' to select
• and train Vietnamese aircrews was supported by the following rationale, as
.
stated by the SOG Chief of Air Operations:
114
61
as(+£ fiFB) Be~ite these problems, three VNAF C-123 aircrews completed
•
training in 1965; Success was short-lived: one crew was lost opera-
tionallyt one was considered. "politically unstable," and one was ineffec-
tive because of a co-pilot vacancy. The circumstances surrounding the loss
of one crew underlined one of the major fallacies of the programt that is,
the haste to become operational. The Chief of SOG Air Operations
119
stated:
"They flew the mission during extremely marginal
weather and hit Monkey Mountain [near Danang AB] ...
We felt that mission shouldn't go and the Air Section
at Nha Trang was opposed to it. ~owever, the people in
Saigon in the 0P€rations Section felt that the weather·
was not too bad to complete the mission and they gave
the go-ahead. This was aile of the problems that we
had during the "first part of the entire mission--pres-
sure from Washington to get the miSsion going; to take
it over from CAS as fast as possible and we believe
that the people in Washington did not have a proper
appreciation for the inadequacy of crews caused by
the_delays in getting them to us ... " ·
p(TO IIPB) By 1966 the problems of the VNAF training program had be-
come such a hardship that the SOG Deputy Chief of the Operations Branch
disqualified the one remaining VNAF aircrew and cancelled plans for send-
ing additional crews to the United States for tra.ining. Earller actions by
the Chief of SOG through the Chief of Staff of VNAF had not rectified the
situation. Stopping the VNAF program " had .minimal impact on operations
s·ince the Chinese aircrews had attained a high degree of proficiency by
that time.
62
particul~rly necessary for protection of aircrews and aircraft which were
·exposed to the high riskof falling into enemy hands. Loss of an aircraft
and capture of ·an ·aircrew possibly could cause an incident of international .
propor:tions; it could cause great embarrassment to the United States
Government. Hence, security precautions remained stringent requirements
throughout the existence of SOG. Deception devices and techniques were
refined continually in reaction to more concerted defensive efforts by
the enemy. Cover stories were fitted to mission requirements, crew and
aircraft configurations, and US policies governing the US invo·lvement in
SEA. ·
ez(TJ rtre) . fhe enemy developed and employed various systems to detect
-aircraft overflying North Vietnam, ranging from rather primitive means of
posting sky watchers to more sophisticated monitoring by using advanced
Soviet radar ·equipment. -Heavy Hook aircrews necessarily used multiple
pro·cedures to disguise their presence and location. They held radio trans-
missions to a minimum and sporadically alter~d flight paths. Flying low-
level, the crews used terrain-masking effects to minimize exposure to
. 120
enemy radar nets. ·They sometimes made bogus drops.
(
1
£ N~Q) Prior to take-off on a combat mission, the aircraft and
aircrew were sterilized of markings and documents which might identify
the United States as sponso~ of the mission. (After the US began bombing
operations over North Vietnam, however, such~recautions were not taken.
They wore Air Force flight uniforms and the aircraft carried US markings.)
When missions were to stage out of Nakhon Phanom for heliborne insertion,
Heavy Hook planners would attempt to combine a logistics mission with the
'\ •,
63
'• . the enemy of an impending agent infiltration. Of course, all coordination
121
•ii
of planning was handled through secure communications channels .
.,{JO 11118) . After the Heavy Hook aircraft was airborne, the crew had
special equ~pment on board which they used to complement deceptive flight
maneuvers. Warning receivers alerted the crew of radars employed for AAA,
•il SAM", and airborne intercept which were trained on the aircraft.
warning receivers indicated the bearings, signal types, and signal strengths
of enemy radars.
Other
•
. 122
location of the aircraft. '
Security and deception measures served a definite purpose:
•
z(:JH IIFB)
•
0
Heavy Hook cover stories was the Office of the Special Assistant for
State Department, White House, Public Affairs Office under the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, and appropriate Ser-
123
vice component headquarters.
aU£ ri~D) According. to the initial cover story for the Heavy Hook
'' . ,·.
program, the aircraft were on loan to the'Vietnamese Air Force' from the
64
'• Chinese Air. Force. During non-mission periods, the air~raft were located
at Saigon; they carried VNAF markings. Markings were removed for missions .
reporters.
a(T~ liFO) P. SOG message dispatched on 7 September 1964 defined the
conditions under which an overt rescue attempt was authorized for a Heavy
Hook.aircrew. SAR efforts were permitted when the aircraft was downed
ov,er international waters, frien~ly terri tory, or Laotian territory where
the threat was considered minimal. The announced rationale for US in-
", ' ·,
' '
volvement in the rescue attempt was for 11 humanitarian purposes." ·If an
idrcraft,were lost over North Vietnam, no official US statement
would be made except in response to a North Vietnamese accusation. The
official response was "no US aircraft was involved." The South Vietnamese
Government was to deny deliberate penetration of NVN and make counter-
charges against enemy penetration. It was .to accuse NVN of the .. barbaric
125
act of shooting at a harmless and lost transport aircraft in distress."
#(TO llli8) 1:; situations when an aircrew was unable to fly their air-
craft to a friendly base from a combat mission over North Vietnam, they
were to attempt to bail out in the Gulf of Tonkin at least 20 miles off-
shore or in a SAFE area in laos. If unable to clear hostile territory,
.
Time permitting, the crew was to drop all agents
and supply bundles in remote a.reas, jettison any other payload material,
126
-
and destroy flight plans, maps, and ECM equipment.
.e(IE tWO) Ig November 1965 MACV promulgated its first cover story
tional guidance was required. In early 1967 COMUSMACV, with the assis-
·tance of the American Embassy, Vientiane, contrived a cover story for USAF
aircr.ews attired in USAF flight uniforms on board Heavy Hook aircraft with
. ·\\ '·._ I
66
operations (Psyops) mission, the aircrew was to attempt to jettison all Psyops
material. If unable to do so, it was to state that the aircraft was on a
routine Fact Sheet (unclassified Psyops Program) mission. If the aircraft
had no Psyops material on board, the crew was to state that it was diverted
stories was the drafting of a bogus contract between MACV and China Air-
line~, whereby CAL agreed to provide flight crews and maintenance personnel
•
I
to support MACV in conducting logistics and ferry missions involving
~ C-123 aircraft based in South Vietnam. Although this contract was designed
•• t9 ~ubstantiate the Heavy Hook cover story, it was not referenced in the
-
cover story until after a SOG review in 1_969 pointed out the shortcoming .
., such as aircraft location, Saigon ·instead of Nha ·;-Trang, and aircraft mark-
ings, VNAF instea~ of USAF. A major critici~m was directed against the
•
' 129·
The overall conclusion of the study stated the following:
Existing cover stories may assi·st-in explaining the
rw· presence of an aircraft and/or aircrew in a politically
sensitive area but will not permit plausible denial of
Lll
sponsorship .
.,•
(TO UFi) The fallibility of cover stories was, in fact, cited much
67
It is recognized that under the given set of opera-
tional circumstances it is virtually impossible to com-
pose a ·story that wi l1 adequately cover all emergencies
~nd incidents. However, in order to delay the opposi-
tion's establishing firm facts as to the real nature
of the missions [Heavy Hook] and to provide the crew and
passengers with an alternative to (a) immediate execu-
tion, or (b) stating the truth ... It is not expected
that a cover story will permanently deceive the opposi-
tion nor discourage them from eventually bringing pub-
lic charges which are close to the truth.
68
• the year, howevet:', CINCPAC, providing additional justification, supported
a MACV proposal to use Combat Spear aircraft in support of OPLAN 34A
operations as outlined in the "C-l30E Sky Hook Study,. completed on 27
September. The JCS concurred and on 31 March 1966 notified CINCPAC of
approval of the request, directing the Air Force to deploy four aircraft
133
to PACOM.
· e (T8 liP'S) Tile Combat Spear aircraft were assigned to Detachment 1,
314th Tactical Airlift Wing at Ching Chang Kuan Air Base, Taiwan, until
December 1966. They were then reassi.gned to the 15th Special Operations
Squadron (SOS) at Nha Trang Air Base, RVN. The first logistics support
mission was flown in support of Shin-ing Brass on 20 October 1966; the first
-Psyops leaflet drop mission was flown on 3 November; and the first OPLAN 34A
134
resupply and ~~ent delivery mission was flown on 25 December.
,, • '·
The C-130 was capable of significantly higher speed,
decreasing the.exposure time in hostile territory. ··
' \
69
• · The C-130's radar and terra in avoidance equipment
enabled a contour low-level profile rather than merely
••
a low altitude mission capability. It could be op.era-
ted in valleys out of line of sight of Early Warning
(EW) radar and fire control systems.
•
• The C-130 had the capacity for expansion of ECM equip-
ment to cope with the improving air defenses in NVN.
The C-123 had exhausted its stretch-out capability due
to limited payload capacity. ·
(Is "ED) After the C-130 aircraft arrived in-theater, SOG immediately
•
put them to work in reducing. the logistics backlog-- logistics support
requirements had tripled since the commencement of Shining Brass opera-
tions. The C-130's greater allowable cargo .load was its most immediate
advantage over the C-123~ A SOG officer related .the si.tuation in an in-
136 "-
terview:
There was a tremendous backlog of logistic supplies to
be moved ... Most 'of the cargo could be airlifted by 7AF
outfits. However, because of classification of some of
the cargo, it was very difficult to have the material
people at that point in time make a complete switch
into the 7AF system. As a result, MACSOG hauled tremen-
dous tonnages with MACSOG available aircraft .... [After]
the C-130's arrived and helped reduce the bqcklog, we
were able to identify cargo that was to be handled
strictly by 7AF. However, all special cargo continued
to be handled with C-123 and C-130 SOG aircraft [and
a C-45 and C-47 on contract from CAL]. ~
ns DIFN Itre C-130 Is improved ACL also enhanced combat missions over
•
NVN by eliminating the need to restage or refuel at Thai bases, as in
the case of C-123's. Furthermore, several Psyops leaflet drops could be
accomplished on one sortie. The C-130 could_dispense approximately five
million leaflets on one mission, whereas the C-123 could dispense only
half that amount.
a (IE ti•Q) Although the C-130 possessed more advanced navigational and
\\ .
ECM equipment, greater accuracy in aerial' delivery and improved
70
survivability in the NVN air defense environment could not be demonstrated.
Both ·aircraft were constrained by similar conditions of lunar illumina-
tion and cloud cover during agent resupply/reinforcement missions. Nor-
mally, acceptable conditions prevailed only four or fivenights a month.
Too, ~oth aircraft flew under the same JCS restriction against flight within
effective ranges of known SAM-and AAA sites. Therefore, advantages of
the C-130's ECM equipment, such as additional power output and a more auto-
137
mated chaff dispensing system, were of little importance.
,...(+8 hi B) Although a distinction of capabilities was made to justify
acquisition of the C-130, the differences of capabilities between the C-123
and C-130 was not normally a primary- consideration in the selection of an
caircraft to support a particular OPLAN 34A agent mission. An equitable
alltication of_ flying hours to both the 15th SOS and First Flight ·Detach-
. ment ·and satisfaction of user preferences were more corrmon criteria used
in aircraft selection. After the development of HALO insertion methods in
1967, however, the higher flight ceiling of the C-130 .became a valid con-
138
sideration in the selection of an aircraft to support a HALO mission.
e(TO UP'B) · zDespite the disadvantages of the (-123 aircraft, it also had
139
some advantages, as noted by the MACSOG Documentation Study:
Although the C-130 had advantages of greater speed,
range and capacity, it was more expensive· to operate
and difficult to maintain. When used at FOls [Forward
Operating Locations], the C-123 had advantages of rugged
construction and easier maintenance. There was little
·· advantage to the C-130 so long as low level terrain
masking techniques were used, a 3000-pound payload was
the maximum, and staging bases were available.
Another advantage of the Heavy Hook aircraft, although not inherent in the
- air~rat:t,was the Chines-e aircrew capability,diminishing the··likelihood
. ' 140 \
of exposing US sponsorship of air operations over NVN.-
7l
Combat Spear-.:.cover, Security, and Deception (U)
"'I iii B) .,.lie Combat Spear cover story was promulgated in May 1966.
·In many respects, it resembled the Heavy Hook cover story, omitting any
_guidance· re1ating to VNAF and CAF aircrews. The aircraft carried USAF
markings; its crew wore standard USAF flight uniforms. In the event of
~n incident over friendly territory, downed aircrews and any agent team
members accompanying them were to state that they were flying a routine
airlift mission in South Vietnam when diverted. The diversion was to
participate in a search mission initiated after receipt of an international
distress call from an unidentified aircraft. · Similarly, 'for incidents
over hostile territory, ai'rcrews were to state that they were on an
-authorized SAR mission for downed US aircrews. Agent team members were
selected as part of the rescue team because of their linguistic qualifica-
tions. For incidents occurring when the aircrew was flying a Psyops
leaflet drop mission, the crew was instructed to jettison all Psyops material
and state that they were on a SAR mission. If unable to rid the airplane
of such evidence, the crew. was to say that they were flying a routine Fact
141 ·;-
Sheet mission .
. il(lfB IIFB) Deception devices and techniques were similar to those used
on the Heavy Hook aircraft. "' safe and, hopefully, undetected
The key to
penetration of enemy territory was painstakingly detailed flight planning
which e~~ablished ingress and egress .routes earefully avoiding populated
and high threat areas. This required optimal use of terrain masking against
.. enemy .radar. If the aircraft encountered a threat', the crew had a choice
of evasive maneuvers and, ECM tactics to employ.
\' ·.
Since ECM tactics and
72
z(S "59) According to the Tactical Air CoiTilland Manual outlining
procedures for Combat Talon aircrews, an aircraft encountering an un-
expected AAA threat should turn to a heading that would immediately
increase the range between the threat and the aircraft. In some situa-
tions, however, depending on the effectiveness of repeaters, weather
conditions, type and effectiveness of enemy firing, and so on, rapid
changes· in altitude and heading were not netessarily the best reac-
142
tion. ·
11(5 Iii b) Aircrews regarded the SAM threat with apprehension. The
73
• &E&Rif
•
Aircr·aft Utilization~-Heavy Hook and Lombat Spear (U)
e( I 3 iii U) . ii@&vy Hook and Combat Spear aircraft performed three prin-
•
degraded the air support to OPLAN 341:\ teams were maintenance problems,
-failure to establish contact with ground teams, and inaccurate aerial de-
• liveries. During that first year 30 successful Psyops missions were flown,
while logistics airlift accounted for 656,000 pounds of SOG cargo .
145
workhorse for SOG air operations during the following year, although Combat
..
Spear and high performance aircraft, such as F-4s and A-ls, were used to
support airborne and psychological operations. In 1966 First Flight
successfully accomplished 16 resupply and infiltration missions out of Bl
-ld
cancellations and aborts. Maintenance difficulties and failure to estab-
lish contact with targeted teams caused, resp_ectively, 14 and 8 percent
..
of the aborts and cancellations. Forty-two out of 68 Psyops missions
were flown successfully, yielding a substantial increase over the previous
year's Psyops effo.rt. The most dramatic increase in air support, however,
.. \' ·.
resulted from a surge in logistics requirements. H'eavy Hook a·ircraft,
•
74
•
••• together with CAL C-45 and C-47 airct'dft, transported 4,891,228 pounds of
. .
~argo and 13,893 passengers .
. a. gg 'Wpt 6
146
- scheduled deliveries.
substantially.
The number of Psyops missions during the year grew
First Flight performed 23 out of 28 scheduled Psyops mis-
- .
sions, and the 15th SOG accomplished 44 out of 67 scheduled. By this time
most of the resupply missions were assigned to high performance aircraft.
Then, with expansion of Shining Brass and the commencement of Daniel Boone
operations, logistics airlift incre'ased rapidly. During the year Heavy
·Hook, Combat Spear, and CAL contract air.craft moved 10,738,580 pounds of
cargo and 25,016 passengers. (One unique logistic requirement levied on
SOG Air Operations during 1967 was to devise a free-fall aerial delivery
method to drop rice to Cambod~an troops. From an altitude of 1,000 feet,
the aircraft dropped triple-bagged rice; fully 97 percent of the ric~ was
147
recoverable.)
(TI lifO) Figures on aircraft utilization i~ 1968 reflected diminished
75
(JbN§Q' · Jp 1968, a.ircraft utili ~ation came under study by the MACV
Ad Hoc Evaluation Group. ·Regarding Heavy Hook and Combat Spear aircraft,
149
the group concluded:
The current resources, both in personnel and aircraft,
far exceed those required to s·atisfy MACSOG's airlift
requirements. Three C-130 mission-configured aircraft
(7.15 mi-llion dollars each) can provide current and
projected combat mission support, to include training
f1 i ghts for crew and ground teams. One C-130 standard
cargo aircraft {2.15 million dollars) when supplemented
· by the one C-45 Tradewind and one C-47 aircraft, on
contract from CAL, ean provide the required logistic
support for MACSOG. Better projection of logistic
planning coupled with a shift to common-user airlift.
for routine cargo can absorb any short-fall.
(??HEll itudy of declining aircraft utilization, resulting from re-
duced combat mission commitments, 'also focused attention on the problem of
maintaining aircrew proficiency. A letter from the 15th SOS, dated 14 August
150
196B, described the problem:
Our recent operational commitments have not permitted
us to maintain the high state of proficiency and
readiness possessed by our aircrews upon completion
of Combat Talon training. Frequent logistic support
sorties and infrequent combat missions have not pro-
vided enough current crew exposure in all areas of the
Combat Spear mission.
The same letter contained a proposal to implement a training program at
Clark Air Base (AB), to include Fulton Recovery System pickups, low-level
..
terrain-following flights, and Black Baron* exercises.
trl) Later in the year, on 1 November, representatives from Detach-
ment 4~_405th Tactical Fighter w·;ng, First·night Detachment, 15th SOS,
621st Tactical Air Control Squadron signed a Joint Memorandum of Agreement.
-This agreement outlined the Black Baron training program as it was to be
• the s~me period was the Red Baron program in which SOG C-123s and C-130s
were to make repeated runs against simulated AAA sites. land-based, gun-
• laying radar sites were to attempt "lock-on" and "tracking" of the aircraft,
•
and the aircrew of the targeted aircraft was to perform evasive maneuvers
and to use all available electronic countermeasure·s. Strategic Air Com-
mand Combat Skyspot radars situated in SVN were identified for Combat
r!l Spear training, and Chinese radars located in Taiwan were selected for
•
..
Heavy Hook training .
~If} In 1969, both the 15th SOS and First flight Detachment began
• of Combat Spear flight time, for example, revealed that 79 percent of total
•
flying hours were devoted .to logistics support, 10 percent to combat sup-
port missions, 6 percent to training missions, arid the remaining 4 percent
152
•
to maintenance flights .
c(JQ fiFO) Mission figures for 1969 showed that Heavy Hook and Combat
77
'• and Combat Spear aircrews practiced low-level terraio-following flight.
Combat Spear aircrews demonstrated the Fulton system on six occasions
a
1969.
153
_.,iris~'M'S~P+)~S~everal
. factors adversely affected aircraft utilization in
Aircraft ava i1 abi 1ity rates for both the C-123 and C- 130 decreased
for training with the 12th Tactical"fighter Wing at Cam Ranh Bay AB proved
-to be less satisfactory because of other operational commitments of the
154
F-4 units.
-WE
•
IIFB) In 1970 the number of combat support missions flown by First
Flight and 15th SOS increased significantlyi due in part to the Allied
incursion into.Cambodia and the increased support ·requirements for the
agent training program at Long Thanh. Heavy Hook aircraft were used for
27 combat missions without an abort: three agent"infiltrations in Laos,
three Psyops leaflet delivery missions in Laos, and 21 resupply and re-
hearsal team drops in South V~etnam a~d C~mbodia. Combat Spear aircraft
were used for a similar mix of missions; 18 of 21 scheduled combat mis-
sions were flown. Logistic airlift also incr-eased as a result of higher
"in-commission" and availability of aircraft rates. Heavy Hook trans-
ported 3,258,697 pounds of cargo and 22,460 passengers; Combat Spear car-
155
ried 4,874,600 pounds of cargo and 23,515 passengers.
'' ·. '
78
if
• intercep~or
programs in 1970.
aircraft participation, 1 imited aircrev-1 proficiency training
First Flight conducted only one Black Baron training
• session~ and 15th SOS accomplished nine such training missions. Both
•
units conti'nued Red Baron training; Heavy Hook crews participated in 14
exercises in conjunction with phase maintenance checks in Taiw.an, and
•
.
practiced low-level terrain-following flights in the Philippines about
once every three months,and Heavy Hook crews conducted the same type of
maneuvers in Taiwan approximately once every·six weeks. Fulton Recovery
System pickups continued to constitute part of the Combat Spear training
156
·throughout the year.
(TO ill B) In 1971, First Flight Detachment and the 90th SOS (the 15th
SOS ~as rede~ignated as the 90th SOS in October 1970) increased their unit
flying time, primarily as a result of acquisition of expanded Psyops mis-
sions. ·On 25 January the 90th SOS assumed responsibility for aerial de-
livery of leaflets on specified targeis in Laos, Cambodia, and South Viet-
nam under the program names of Frantic G.oat, Fountain Pen, and Brown
'
. ~tallion. (The latter program commenced on 16 May.) In August, First
Flight Detachment took charge of Psyops program previously accomplishe~ by
Candlestick aircraft staging out of Nakhon Phanom. This program.entailed
dispensing of leaflets over the Ho·Chi Minh trail complex; it was nick-
named the·Trail Campaign. In all, the 90th SOS successfully completed 226
combat missions (including Psyops missions) of 282 scheduled missions
in 1971. First Flight Detachment successfully accomplished 51 combat mis-
'' \. . \
sions during the year. The mission figures for 1971 for both'the 90th SOS
79
and First Flight Detachment included an increase in the number of in-
filtration and resupply missions. Overall logistics airlift during the
year reflected a decrease in tonnages, due mainly to greater reliance on
834th Air Division air assets. Statistics depicting the training efforts
during 1971 were presented in flying hours rather than missions. Hence,
they are not helpful in establishing a trend of training based on pre-
157
vious years' data.
80
o( 5 iii B) Beginning in 1970 and extending into 1971, the Air Force
I
, actually surfaced until 1970, Air Force planners had evidenced concern over
the utilization of the UW-configured C-130 aircraft as early as the summer
of 1969. a CiNCPACAF message, dated 12 August 1969, revealed that the
use of Combat Spear aircraft had come under close examination from October
1968 to July 1969. PACAF analysis showed that 81 percent of the 90th SOS
flying time was devoted to combat sup"port (logistics) missions, whereas
only seven percent was committed to combat missions and about eight per-
162
cent to training missions. The analysis Jncluded the estimation that
75 percent of the combat support mission flying time could have been
163
handled by aircraft in the Common User Airlift System.
et(i IIPB) The 1970 MACSOG History stated that 7th Air Force proposed
,, . ·. ..
relocation of the Combat Spear unit as ea'rly as January 1970.' Earliest
81
first-hand documentation, however, is a 17 April letter from the Commander,
164
7AF to COMUSMACV, which stated:
"Examination of this unit [15th SOS], in terms of its
essentiality as an element of MACV strength, leads to
the conclusion that, in the present and likely future
c6ntext of limitations on_U.S. force structure in SEA,
it is marginally productive:
"a. It is special mission, contingency-oriented as
opposed to the multi-purpose, firepower orientation of
tactical units subject to withdrawal now and in the
future.
"b. ·It requires space and supporting personnel and .
facilities at Nha Trang which will impede expansion of
the VNAF under the I&M [Improvemen-t and Modernization]
program.
"c. Relocation in-country· (i.e., to Cam Ranh Bay) re-
quires extraordinary preparation and investment.
"d. For the last eight months, the hours flown were less
than one percent combat, 20 percent mission peculiar
(sensitive combat support), with the remainder being
routine logistic support which can be acc.omplished by the
MACV in-country airlift system, Air America, or dedicated
off-shore support.
"In my view there is insufficient justification to main-
tain this unit at Nha Trang or to move it elsewhere in
SEA. I question the essentiality of its contingency mis-
. sian in competition with other units i~ an austere force
structure; however, retention and relocation off-shore
(Taiwan) may be warranted~"
As a conclusion to the di scuss.i on, th~ Commander, 7AF recommended that
COMUSMACV concur on one of two proposals. The first proposal was, as a
minimum, to relocat~ the 15th SOS to an off-shore location. The second
proposal was deactivation of the unit if further joint examination war-
ranted. COMUSMACV did not agree to either proposal.
:zUS Ill B)R Rather than dampening the attempt to relocate the 15th SOS,
82
echelons of command. The Commander in Chieft PACAF (CINCPACAF) dispatched
a message o~ 15 May 1970 stating that the time might be propitious for
165
the CSAF to intercede with the JCS on the matter .
•·~,•T•s•'•I.F•f•}.-10• 21 May 1970t a CSAF Memorandum was presented to the JCS .
•
It contained a brief historical sketch of the Combat Spear aircraft and
presented statistics similar to those contained in the earlier PACAF
analysis. The memorandum also pointed out peculiar problems regarding·
166
aircraft safety and aircrew proficiency training:
"These expensive and highly sophisticated aircraft are
vulnerable to enemy ground attack while located in their
present enviroRment; .. lt is .extrem~ly difficult, if not
impossible, to.replace them under budgetary constraints ...
'"~
84
·- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.
frorilCINCPAC to the Chairman, JCS requested an abrupt stop to any attempts
170
to change the location af the 15th SOS.
1972, closing out its operation shortly before the deactivation of MACSOG.
Although earlier attempts by the Air Force to withdraw the unit from South
Vietnam \'/ere unsuccessful, these attempts did focus high level attention
on the unit and enabled the Air Force to acquire more comprehensive manage-
ment information.
Part II: Rotary Wing A~sets (U)
..0£ tiSpt Il?e employment of USAF helicopter forces in Southeast Asia
arose out of considerable controversy in both dipJomatic and inter-Service
arenas. Even after the deployment of USAF helicopters in SEA, particu-
larly during their expanding role in support of special operations, con-
tention surrounded the USAF involvement in helicopter operations.
85
172
-
subordinate thereto. (CSA and CSAF agree that this does
not include rotary wing aircraft employed;by Air Force
SAW [Speci a1 Air ~Jarfare] and SAR forces and rotary wing
•
administrative mission support aircraft .....
t (£ IFI) Later clarification was added as an addendum to the agree-
"173
ment in May 1967:
11 SAH rotary wing aircraft - armed if required - will be
employed to train foreign air forces in the operation
and employment-of helicopters and to support U.S. Air
Force forces, 6ther government agencies, and ~ndigenous
forces only when operating· without U.S. Army advisors
11
or not under U.S. Army contra 1.
.labilfiillj!'li§li?f-)-.Prior to the agreement cited above, the Air Force had initia-
ted efforts in South Vietnam to develop a professionally trained and well-
equipped helicopter force in the VNAF. A field training unit from Stead
AFB, Nevada arrived in Saigon in June 1964. Up to and during that time,
however,- the buildup of helicopter forces receiv-ed low priority due to the
higher priority placed on enhancing a tactical styike capability.
IlliTE IIEB:l Jhe major- impetus for the dep 1oyment of helicopters to SEA
86
COMUSMACV, Commander, US Military Assistance Commarid, Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI),
and the American Embassy in Thailand. The probable rationale for assigning
·the mission to the Air Force was to ensure that US involvement in Thailand
continue .at a low profile. Strong pressure exerted by Air Force to obtain
·the mission undoubtedly influenced the outcome. A CINCPACAF message,
175
dated 9 April 1966, reflected CSAF views on the matter:
'' ... It should be recognized that the.JCS decision on this
helicopter augmentation with the 606th ACS [Air Corrmando
Squadron]. presents the USAF with a unique opportunity to
demonstrate its. abi 1ity to operate rotary wing aircraft
in the USAF SAW force."
dii The USAF CH-3 and UH-lF crews·and aircraft involved in the
IIFB)
..
Thai operation achieved notable success before their politically-directed
-withdrawal from Thailand in January 1967. The US Ambassador to Thailand
176
commented on the impact of the program:
"The work of these helicopters has shown dramatically to
the Thais not only the need but the practicality of unify-
ing the region. These 25 helicopters had a catalytic af-
fect on the Thai counterinsurgency effort which cquld not
have been produced by several years of vastly more expensive
and more diffused direct assistance. The results are evident
everywhere -- in getting governors out in their provinces;
accelerating the· fielding of medical and information teams;
and stimulating further deployment·of Thai security forces
into critical areas ... "
· aBE "FE) .The degree of success ~chieved in the Thai operation, the
COMUSMACV message which stated that: "The increasing tempo and scope of
87
US/SAW operations place the highest pl'iority on utilization of armed
177
. UH-lF aircraft. In that same message, COMUSMACV had requested that the
arming of those USAF helicopters be completed on a priority basis to permit
thei.r earliest possible employment in support of MACSOG cross-border
178 .
operations.
(ll liFE) . {vidence of Air Force interest in this mission was contained
179
in a CSAF message to CINCPACAF in January 1967. It stated:
The value of and increasing need for a vertical lift
11
. 88
...A
• MACV (MACSOG) has so far ind·icated no resistance to
use of AF gunships support SAW operations. 7AF also
advised that SAW trained crews are undergoing refresher
training on UW in/exfiltration tactics and use of
side mounted miniguns installed in four SAW modified
UH-1Fs.
" ... 7AF is pressing with AF MACSOG personnel use these
helicopters as gunships. Rationale in urging immediate
employment is to cite •accompl ished fact• should opposi-
tion to using AF helicopters as gunships SAW operations
arise later ...
a (II 1171) The major argument to be advanced against Army allegations
of a breach of the CSA-CSAF Agreement by the Air Force was to cite the
fact that MACSOG was a Joint UW Task Force, not under Army control. In.
retrospect, this rationale did not appear to be entirely-cogent. An End
"-
of Tour Report (written by the 20th SOS Commander from October 1967 to
April 1968) contained a more candid appraisal of the USAF helicopter role
with_regard to the CSA-CSAF Agreement. It noted that the Air Force employ-
ment of the UH-lF was considered to be outside of the scope of the agree-
ment between the CSA and CSAF. The approved employment of USAF SAW rotary
wing a·ircraft (including armed helicopters) included training of foreign
air forces, support to USAF forces, and other gov~rnment agencies and
indigenous forces,but only when operating without US Army advisors or not
under US Army control. The op.eration . . with 5th Special Forces Group
units for SOG, the report stated, was clearly Army advi~ed·and Army con-
trolled:
u(TI lint) Qespite the controversy surrounding the USAF helicopter role,
the Air Force proceeded rapidly to employ its rotary wing assets in South-
east Asia. Attention is now directed toward the primary USAF helicopter
- which ~pported MACSOG, the UH-lF, and the unit which controlled these
' \
ai.rcraft, the 20th Helicopter Squadron (renamed the 20th Special Operations
squadron on 1 Aug ·1968).
89
• The UH~l Helicopter (U)
4(131hlb) The assets required to initiate modification and employment
of USAF helicopters in a special operations role were obtained from SAC.
(SAC used helicopters for. missile ·site support.) Thirty-nine aircraft
were configured for a UW role .. Twenty-one were identified for the 20th
SOS, five for the Tactical Air Command Combat Cre\'1 Training School, three
for USAF Southern Command, and the remainder for an advanced attrition
reserve. Concurrent with the acquisition and modification of SAC UH-lF
helicopters, Air Force planners saw the need for a follow-on ~ircraft and
began planning for the t"!in-engined "N" model. The Air Force requested
18.1.
79 "N" model "Hueys" at a cost of 42..million dollars .
. (IS ''59) Although the CH-3 helicopter had some advantages over the
UH-1 and did provide some support to ~~CSOG, selection of the UH-1 as the
primary USAF ·helicopter to support MACSOG was based on several factors.
CAS requirements in laos and the newly developed Igloo White program,
which emp 1aced sensors a1ong enemy 1ogi sti cs routes, P.l aced heavy demands
on the.existing CH-3 force in SEA. Furthermore, the installation and
maintenance of numerous conmunications and navigational aid sites, namely
Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) sites, throughout laos, RVN, and Thailand
182
required extensive CH-3 he 1i1 ift supp6rt. Disadvantages of the CH-3
in comparison to the UH-1 were its.lack of armament and its requirement
183
for a larger landing zone.
#IS-itFS) ~e first deployment of UH-lF models to SEA followed
shortly after the CSA-CSAF Agreement. Four of these aircraft were armed.
After completion of the Royal Thai Air Force training program, these assets
" .
were transferred to the 20th SOS operating sites located in South Viet-
nam.
90
Inception and Organization of the 20th Helicopter Squadron (U)
a(JS IIFI) ilk Department of the Air Force directed activation of the
•
Ajr Division at Tan Son Nhut AB in Saigon, it came from Eglin AFB, Florida .
The unit possessed eight CH-3C helicopters arid 20 co~bat crews, each
-11!1
184
tions. Crews were detached to Cam Ranh Bay, Thailand, and Danang.
e (Is t!SR) Tl:e unit's headquarters element was later relocated to Nha
Trang and managed four flights located at three operating locations •
• Three flights were stationed at Udorn RTAFB and were devoted primarily
-to CAS support, counterinsurgency activities-, and transportation. "E"
91
V "58)· By July 1967, the unit had 13 UH-lF helicopter deployed at
.Nha Trang, Tan Son Nhut, and Kontum. From 1 July to 30 September 1967,
•
more than 63 tons of cargo and 5,314 passengers, and expended 389,000
. 187'
rounds of ammunition .
• from the main operating base, compounded the problem of helicopter short-
ages .
...._. Nevertheless.tbe "Green Hornets" increased the level of opera-
•
Visual Reconnaissance 66
Army Base Defense 21
Tactical Movement 257
• 43
Unarmed UH-lF:
IU b)
Infiltration 148
ifhe highlight of the last quarter of 1967 was a change in
• terruptions, remained the primary FOL of the 20th SOS until its withdrawal
from the RVN in early 1972. The probable reason for the move to BMT was
to enhance SOG operations into Cambodian territory. The effect of the
move on the 20th SOS was alleviation of aircraft shortages and associated
logistic·problems, since BMT was significantly closer to the main support
189
base
,, at Nha
\.,
Trang. , ...
92
I SEERif 1
• "Green Hornet" Operations - 1968 (U)_
'
1111
Jj O'Ett $he "Green Hornets" saw much more direct combat action in
early 1968. Reaction to the Communist Tet Offensive accounted for most
of the increase by diverting support from the primary mission: SOG cross-
1111 border operations. In the first three months of 1968, equipped with 15
• UH-lFs, the unit more than doubled the sortie level of the previous quarter •
Armed· helicopters fired some 834,000 rounds of'ammunition and launched
•
[I
over 2,000 rockets; the first figure represented nearly a three-fold in-
crease, and the second figure a seven-fold increase, over expenditures
during the previous quar~er.
190
• conventio.nal air assault role. Extracts from the 20th Helicopter Squadron
191
•
Historical Report describe this type of support:
" ... The gunships were first scrambled before dawn on 30
January. They fired on suspected mortar concentrations.
• Later that day two gunships drove VC [Viet Cong] and NVA
troops from a stream of refugees and killed.six of the
enemy as confirmed by FAC's. Before the day was over, the
•Ill
gunships tookpart in an assault on an estimated two
companies of NVA, dropping, 28 more of the enemy according
to FAC's... At 0330 hours on 2 February 1968, a gunship
element was launched to attack observed enemy mortar .
positions. Anenemy position was observed firing and
was immediately attacked an'd destroyed by the gunships.
A few minutes later, the flight was advised that an ARVN
compound was under heavy attack 2 miles west of Ban Me
Ill Thuot . . . . The gunships put their initial fire at 50
meters inside the perimeter and o~ succeeding passes
worked outward to drive the enemy outside the compound ... "
. c:t(A UFB) · Buring the spring of 1968, the 20th Helicopter Squadron re-
93
• &liCRiT 1
• liliElllEY
I four troop carrier helicopters (commonly called "slicks"), and two spare
192
helicopters (one gunship and one slick).
I a's ''FBJ 6upport to Daniel Boone operations, compared to other mission,
attenuated further during the spring~ The 20th Helicopter Squadron
I rendered support to Daniel Boone operations on only nine days during a
•
sions, but did perform many insertions and extractions inside ·the RVN .
&(I IIFB) From 1 July through 30 September 1968, the newly-designated
• 20th SOS was able to increase its Stipport to MACSOG so that it represented
-approximately half of the squadron's total effort. It retained ten air-
• jumped !lOtably.
ately:
Aircraft damages and crewmember injuries rose proportion-
forty hits from enemy groundfire were sustained,and five crew-
•
. 194
members were wounded.
•
k'S-%PB,....The· following account of an emergency extraction alludes
to the hazards of such an operation ahd underscores the requirements for
~
[ground team's] position and directed them eastward, to-
ward a landing zone. After cresting a hill and starting
'' ·, down slope, the team made contact with hosti 1e forces in
a trench and bunker complex. After exchanging fire'with
94
• SECRET ,
sli&&I\Ef •
•' the enemy, the team ret rea ted to the west. . . . [UH-1 F]
crews arrived and protected the team with mini-gun
and rocket fire. The FAC directed the team toward a
•
continued to deliver ordnance on known enemy positions
and were drawing automatic weapons fire from the· north,
east, and south of the team. The two gunships were getting
low on fuel and, prior to.being relieved by guns 3 and 4,
•
EJI
and to a hover aboye the bomb crater. The crater was too
. small to permit landing, so a rope ladder pickup ~as
made. As the team climbed the rope ladder, Gunihips 3 and
4 made repeated mini-gun passes overhead to suppress
the automatic weapons fire ... Du~ing the last five
minutes of the_pickup, the FAC received fire from heavy
·
• atR
craft.
Ill B)
· full~scale
In the ensuing months of 1968 the "Green Hornets" resumed
supp~rt to MACSOG. During this period the unit lost two air-
On 26 November, one gunship was downed by enemy groundfire during
an emergency extraction operation. The next day, a slick registered the
second loss when it crashed during an infiltration mission. These losses
portended an attrition problem which emerged in 1;g59 and severely jeopar-
. ·196
dized the Air Force SAW helicopter role.
95
;a SEEREJ '
l&€ftET
'• J:B 'lEI) The first loss in 1969 occurred on 3 January when a slick
2-
attempted a pickup of a beleagured reconnaissance team after an initial
• ..\
attempt by the same aircraft encountered intense groundfire. The second
•
combat loss of the year occurred during an extraction attempt on 13 Feb-
ruary; a gunship burst into flames and crashed after being hit by ground-
• .
Commander~ the 14th Special Operations Wing (14th SOW) Deputy Conmander
for Special Operations (DCSO), the 14th SOW Deputy Commander for Materiel,
the 20th SOS Flight Surgeon, the 20th SOS Maintenance Officer, two door
197.
gunners, and the Bell Helicopter Company Technical Representative.
(5 t!SS) · Jhe succeeding squadron commander of the unit described the
cumulative effect of these losses as .. unbearable ... He further explained:
.. Unbearable,.because it has severely taxed the already limited resources
, 198
of men and aircraft assigned... The 20th SOS Historical Report elabo-
199
rated on these problems:
..... our replacement aircraft have been obtained in the
past by levying a demand on Strategic Air Command UH-lF
inventories. This source of aircraft nas been cut off.
Alternative sources, such as aircraft assigned to Tan Son
Nhut Air Base and Udorn Air Base, Thailand could be brought
to Vietnam; but this would require us to drop our missions
and commitments at these locations. No solution to this
problem ~as yet been found.
As our aircraft losses mount, crew training suffers in
11
96
., S!CitET L
iiQttET
•
·of 1969 in the. face of heavy flying commitments and frequent emergency
extractions. Two slicks crashed on 13 and 21 April as a result of enemy
•
r!l
The unit was forced to request, and was granted, a partial stand-down for
the purpose of conducting con~entrated training. During the ien-day re-
prieve, Army helicopters. filled in for the 20th SOS helicopters at Ban Me
• Thuot. · In May and June respectively, four helicopters were received in-
- eluding two helicopters for the Udorn detachment. The latter transfer of
• . posed that the two remaining UH-lFs at Udorn be moved.to Vietnam after
September .
201
• . Jj IIFI) all series of engine failures in July and August accounted for
numerous.aircraft incidents and three aircraft losses -- on 14 July, 19
July, and 25 August. The downward trend in engine reliability led to
suspensions in 20th SOS flying activities, as reflected by flying time
statistics: 763.7 hours in July; 563.5 hour.s in August; 223.9 hours in
September, of which a major portion was Functional Check Flight time. By
the end of August, the 20th SOS was unable to support the MACSOG mission
at Ban Me Thuot, an operation which normally required 600 flying hours per
" ·. ' 202
month. Army helicopters· then replaced the Green Hornets.
11 11
'
97
~-SEC ilft!T · ,
•
supplies from Nha· Trang .
.,~
fS "52} Eventually, the unit's maintenance problems were remedied .
•
those located at Nha Trang. The sizable increase in maintenance personnel
permitted the estab 1i shment of a thorough inspection and repair program
• cil IIFI) During the maintenance -ordeal, correspondence among the Com-
•
mander, 7AF,.CINCPACAF, and CSAF indicated uncertainty as to the future
role of the 20th SOS. Finally the Air Staff recommended retention of the
gunship-only role, keeping in mind that later attempt~ would be made to
regain the slick role. The only alternative to this course of action was
to relinguish the entire mission. The 20th SOS then resumed gunship opera-
205
tions out of Ban·Me Thuot on 1 December 1969.
Js iii 8) · In early i970, 7AF rece!'ived indications that the MACSOG
Commander was contemplating a request to MACV that Army aviation assume
responsibility for support of special operatjons in lieu of the 20th SOS,
unless the 20th SOS could fulfill both gunship and airlift helicopter
206
requirements. At that time the 20th SOS had only 12 possessed aircraft,
the minimum number of UH-lFs required to maintain the gunship-only support
,, ·. ~··
98
F SEEREf 7
'ili€1\ET- _
207
•
~
to PACAF in later February stating tht: dilemma:
Heretofore, it was felt that the Air Force could
11
•
limited helicopter support of MACSOG. The basic ques-
tion is: Does the Air Force want to retain this mis-
sion of helicopter support of MACSOG operations or
does the Air Frirce prefer to cede this mission to
• Army aviation?"
The message included a request for additional aircraft if continuation of
a· rs t!EN · Finally, in May 1970, CINCPACAF and the Commander, 7AF backed
the Air Staff position to continue support of MACSOG. The Air Staff pro-
posal noted the ramifications from default of the mission support: de-
fault surely would have precluded a later claim by the Air Force for this
type of mission. Too, the fact that the 42 milli-on dollar investment in
the "N" model was near "pay-off" was certainly a consideration in the
decision. The 20th SOS received the ~eplace~ent aircraft required to
sustain mission support until the arrival of the UH-lN.
99
• &E&RiT 1
thei r airc raft without susta ining danKtge.
for regain~ng the USAF slick mission for Cambodian
•••'•ll'lllll's•a~al•'llllllnllf'pes
5
Presidenti.al edic t
cros s-bo rder oper ation s, however, were dashed by the
US helic opte r
which banned Americans from Cambodia afte r 30 June 1970~
s were replaced
gunship support was stil l perm itted , but the Army slick
nning in July , the only
by VNAF H-34 helic opte rs known as "King Bees." Begi
of Cambodian cros s-
US UH-lF troop carr ier helic opte rs flyin g in support
gunships and VNAF
border oper ation s were those.accompanying USAF UH-lF
as rescue airc raft , due to the limi ted lift
H-34 helic opte rs to serve 200
.
capa bilit ies of the H-34.
occasions
aM"ED) SOG subsequently reque.sted permission on several
but each requ est was
-to use US troo plift helic opte rs in the Cambodian AO,
numbers of airc raft
denied. After the 20th ·sos had received suff icien t
attempted to move the
to provide a·combined slick and gunship package, SOG
unit 's airc raft uti-
unit 's FOL from Ban Me Thuot to Pleiku to enhance the
to the move, it late r
lizat ion rate. · Although 7AF initi ally was amenable
disapproved it.
mber 1970.
The main oper ating base, however, was moved in Septe
1(1 liFO)
at a more opportune
The relo catio n from Tuy Hoa to Cam Ranh Bay occurred
This reloc ation had
time than the prio r move from Nha Tra:ng to Tuy Hoa.
ort of MACSOG. Air-
littl e, if any, adverse affe ct on oper ation s in supp
htly , however, be-
craf t maintenance and aircrew train ing did SJJffer slig
relat ions hips re-
cause of the requirement to esta blish new host -tena nt
desig nate and obta in
garding supply, maintenance, and oper ation s, and to
ties in adjustment to
tact ical clear ance for new train ing area s. Diff icul
,, •.
al and phase-in of
the new site were inte nsif ied by the concurrent arriv
-209
t~e firs t UH-lN mode ls.
loo
'I&Cil&T
Jpi UFO). Tie€ first UH-lN models arrived at Cam Ranh Bay in late Novem-
ber 1970. Flight testing began in December and total conversion to the
twin-engined model was completed by March 1971. The new helicopte r had
severa 1 advantages ·over the UH- 1 F mode 1. The two engines offered greater
security as well as enhancing the power output. Inct·eased power output per-
were tasked. 11
Green Hornet 11 crews again began flying out of Tan Son Nhut,
performing routine administr ative support missions for. 7AF and MACV and assist-
ing in ·trainin g reconnaissance teams at. nearby Camp Long Thanh. The unit
restarted training in slicks and finally was able~ to provide a complete
helicopte r of four gunships and four slicks for a short-dur ation
packag~
~ 211
mission staged out of Dapang during September 1971.
(E rlfQ) The temporary mission launched from Danang proved to be the
highlight of 20th SOS operation s during the waning period of the unit's
existence . The unit provided over 1,000 sorties in an intensive operation
,in areas where groundfir e was usually entounter ed on each mission. Not
101
was lost to mechanical failures and only one aircraft was downed by ground-
212
fire.
102
• The detachments then reviewed all a,vailable target data, including aerial
'• photography, and held briefings for their staffs and reconnaissance teams .
The FAC who was knowledgeable of the target area usually participated in
•
this phase of planning by suggesting possible landing zones and insertion
213
tactics.
• af 5
t!EP) . From an aviation standpoint, the actual mission began with a
visual reconnaissance flight over the target are(i. A successful VR was the
tiFB) · !Jsing the E'AC for the VR mission was normally preferred. This
method minimized the chance of forewarning enemy security elements of an
-impending insertion. Too, the FAC was most familiar with the area and
could plot mo!'e accurately the prospective LZs on a 1:50,000 scale map.
The selection ofthe landing zones, both primary and alternates, was made
during the VR with the assistance of the reconnaissance ·team leader, who
almost always flew on the VR. This decision, of course, required that the
· FAC be thoroughly familiar. with helicopter capabilities, limitations, and
tactics.
::z4£ tiFQ) The· Air Mission Commander, the senior helicopter pilot at
the. launch site, would sometimes perform the VR mission in the command
and control h~licopter. Again, the reconnaissance team leader was carried
on the mission. A 20th SOS manual on tactics, however, recommended that
a minimum of three -- optimally four -- helicopters conduct the VR. A
flight of four helicopters, two gunships and two slicks, would allegedly
appear to be more routine to enemy.security elements than would a single ship.
'' •, '
103
offered a rescue capability in the event that an aircraft were downed.
Normal crew composition on this type of VR consisted of two insertion
pilot~, the C&C helicopter pilot, ~nd two members of the reconnaissance
I 214 .
team.
I (E DIED) U.e ideal VR consisted of a single look -- one overflight to
pick out the primary and alternate LZs. · This was a difficult task. Large
I clearings were not always go()l LZs, since the enemy watched them closely
lit and sometimes employed boobytraps. Areas near rivers normally lay near
enemy logistic routes, hence near enemy concentrations. Small clearings
•If
enemy forces, but the thick vegeta~inn constituted a hazard to insertion
. )
·helicopters and sometimes immobilized the gr.ound teams. Due to the presence
. \
for helicopter pilots, team leader, and FACs to e-stablish take-off times,
checkpoints, orbit points, final approach azimuth, flight formation, emer-
•
and ground teams then separately refined their portions of pl~nning, co-
ordinating closely with .each other. Planning touched on the most minute
. 215
details; flexibility and imagination were essential.
Z{C-14FD} 6n the day of the mission, the final pre-mission briefing
was conducted at the launch site. It included such items as current weather
" .
conditfons, latest intelligence informati'on, ground-aircrew stgnaling
104
• Q8NFI8ENTIAI:s e
=&8NFI8iN·Tiulsl
procedures, and so forth. After completion of comprehensive flight plan-
ning ~nd preflight checks of the aircraft, the mission was ready to launch.
The FAC took off first. After flying over the area to ensure that weather
permitted an insertion, he transmitted a "go-ahead" for the launch of
the helicopter package .
.ts 'IFQ) Ihe helicopter package typically included seven aircraft:
one slick acting as the command and control ship and as a rescue heli_.
copter; one slick which carried the reconnaissance team; another slick -to
transport the rest of the reconnaissance team (if a 12~man team) and
serve as a medical rescue aircraft; and four-gunships for armed escort.
Two gunships were considered sufficient if two others were availabl~
216
·within 20 minutes flight time to the target area .
..-{C-141 15) The command and contro 1 he 1i copter usually launched
first. The:other slicks launche~ next, followed by the
gunships. The helicopters proceeded to the rendezvous point in a loose,
nonstandard formation, commonly with the slicks in the front and gunships
in the rear. The rendezvo.us point most often was located three to five
. 217
kilometers from the landing zone.
t4t!EI\PD~ Fl i'ght to the rend~zvous point was normally at a safe
<""~
altitude, in excess of 1500 feet above the ground. If enemy forces occu-
pied high terrain which dominated the area of operations, however, the
advantages of a low-level flight were considered. In the absence of
prominent landmarks and roads, and with the scarcity of TACAN sites,
navigation was difficult -- particularly when cloud ceilings descended.
,, --~O~fi~F~B~)~F~~
.
the ~ime the helicopters arrived at the rendezvous
point until the time the reconnaissance team was implaced in the LZ,
105
18NFIB£NTIAL •
•r•eOMPIDt.t~'lltls a
•I tactics and techniques varied
tion and the units involved.
mark~dly, depending on the tactical situa-
Infiltl·ations controlled by Command and
• would insert the reconnaissance team immediately after the firing pass .
Command and Control Central sometimes sent slicks into the landing zone
~
•
L.a
followed by gunships on the same azimuth, allowing rapid and accurate
reaction by the gunships against any groundfire directed against the
slicks. Conm1and and Con:trol South occasionally elected to send a slick
•• into the LZ alone, directing the gunships to an orbit point away from
-the landing zone. On other occasions gunshi.ps flew a figure "8" pattern
•••
218
over the LZ while the slick was unloading the reconnaissance team.
·" tiF9)' ;ll;lthough some tactics were modified according to the situa-
tion, a 20th SOS manual outlined certain basic flying techniques which
•
fered the best combination of aircrew visibility of the
terrain and its protection from enemy groundfire.
"
• Descent should be as rapid as possible without going
• •
into full autorotation .
Terrain features should be used tQconceal the heli-
•
copter .
• Airspeed should be maintained between 80 to 100 knots
•rl
until final approach .
" '
*Tactital Air Navigation.
106
~ • E8NFI8iNTI.txL
C8NFIDINJ'Al •
•
vent settling with power .
• Take-off from the LZshouTd be slow and vertical until
obstacles are cleared. Departure flight should be at
•
would descend in an evasive flight path. Keeping the L_l in sight or .
using a reference point for locating the LZ, the insertion pilot would
• the release point, five to ten kilometers from the landing zone.
insertion aircraft commander controlled the operation, he would then pro-
If the
• ceed toward the landing zone, usually with gunships in trailing positions.
•~ of the final approach route and maintained a separation from the inser-
tion aircraft of about one kilometer.
+t 141 D)
220
•,. C8NFIDINTI.Jtla
107
"'
j
'8N FIBE NTI!ll
• copter escort, would search for another LZ while the FAC orC&C helicopter
221
•
acted only as an observer~
• territory inevitably alerted ·the enemy, false insertion tactics were de-
veloped. The purpose of such tactics was to deceive the enemy or force
• had to be weighed carefully, since -the risk was nearly_ equal to that
- encountered in actual insertions .
•
the fo 11 owing:
t Insert using low-level tactics; fake into another LZ
•
using high-level tactics .
• Insert using high-level tactics; fake a low-level inser-
tion .
-•
!
• All aircraft start in a trail formation with the inser-
tion aircraft in the number two position. The insertion
aircraft lands, unloads, and joins the formation in one
of the followup positions.
..
a(€ tlf8) After an actual insertion in which reconnaissance team mem-
bers successfully de boarded the aircraft, the slicks and gunships would
'' I
•
\, ,..
fly to an orbit point and remain there at a safe altitude. The launch
•
-108
• CONIIDINTIAL
'• officer would release the aircraf't af'ver receiving notification from
the reconnaissance team that they were in good condition and had not
•
223
been compr:omised.
• .
•
break contact, an exfiltration operation ccm~enced. Extractions resembled
insertions in many ways; the ·major differences during the extraction were
•
224
not afforded a comprehensive briefing.
J,b flf8) The FAC usually controlled the exfi ltration, both for sche-
• duled and emergency extractions. The FAC pinpointed the location of the
• zz(O nro). The helicopter gunships normally la:unched before the slicks.
They flew to an orbit point which was much closer to the designated LZ
•
proceeded to the LZ to check and secure it. The extraction helicopter
commander closely monitored radio transmissiqns and fle~1 over the LZ at
a safe altitude to assess the terrain, enemy groundfire, and the ground
team's status and location. This familiarization precluded delay in
beginning an approach to the LZ after the gunships passed a "go-ahead."
,,
109
COPJFIBE~JTIAL ,
•
Timing was critical, particularly in emergency extr·actions. Entering the
LZ before the gunships had suppressed or subdued enemy groundfire was
·suicidal, and descending too long after the gunships cleared the area
225
allowed the enemy to recover and open fire again.
(0 fiFB) 'fhe LZ selected for a routine exfiltration was normally
large enough to permit the helicopte~ to land. The LZ used for an
emergency extraction, however, more frequently required the helicopter to
hover, suspending special equipment such as Stabo rigs, McGuire rigs, or
rope ladctet·s to the ground team. During the latter type of exfiltration,
the slick was usually un~ble to maintain a hover with the full team on
board. Hence, additional extractiOR helicopters were needed. The sue-
- ceeding helicopters would remain at high altitude, observing- the landing
zone, and would attempt to enter the LZ immediately after the preceding
heliCopter departed it.· Departure from the LZ during extractions was
the same as departure during insertions. Extraction pilots had to be
exceedingly cautious since operations were often conducted in confined
. . 226
areas, with the gunships flying over the lZ at low altitude.
€8NFIBEN,IJlli ,
••.a 8
(6 IIF8)
in nature.
• €8NFIBE-ITIA'
iiohe weapons system of tile UH-lF and the UH-lN was defensive
This helicopter was no substitute for tactical air power, nor
• troops, for limited duration and within an area that was not extremely
hostile. It could be used offensively only against "soft 11 targets such
•
u(O IIF8) The USAF gunship's most formidable weapon was its two printle-
mounted miniguns manned by two door gunners. Carrying 12,000 ro.unds of
7.62 millimeter ammunition, the aircraft,could si1nultaneously shower bul-
Q lets at the rate of 2,000 to 4,000 rounds per minute from each gun. From
•
'
an altitude of 1,500 feet, the heli~opter could hold its fire within 150
- feet of a target, a capability which proved -to be advantageous for i niti a1
• suppressive fire during the helicopter's descent toward the landing zone.
At low-level· flight, the miniguns obviously were more potent and enhanced
• ·.
by their wide degree of coverage. The guns could be aimed forward,
•
triggered by the pilot or co-pilot, or they could be operated by the door .
gunners with a coverage from 90 degrees forward to 30 degrees aft of the
•
aircraft. The guns could fire downward to an angle
~
of depression as great
227
as 70 degrees,.or upward, to an angle of elev~tion of about 5 degrees. *
•.a -x-~n 1971, the 20th SOS began field testing· pintle-mounted 40mm grenade
launchers in place of the 7.62mm miniguns; however, due to the degraded
accura~y of fire and increased hazards of the new armament, the minigun
remained as the primary .weapon system. ' \
lll
CONFI8iN,IAk •
• CCIMPID!!4TIAI!s
'••• procedure in the 20th SOS for armed helicopter escort was for two gun-
ships to trail the insertion slick to the LZ at a distance of 500 to
• 1000 meters, the distance depending on the expected time that the slick
•
would be in the LZ. A slow insertion, for example, required greater
spacing between the slick and gunships. Gunships avoided the slick's
• flight path due to the hazards ·of groundfire from enemy elements alerted
by the first passover .
enabled continuous
While the slick was in the LZ, the gunships provided
coverage by using a variety of flight patterns.
cover~ge,
Simply orbiting the LZ
but made the gunships vulnerable to ground-
.
Another method
• was. to fly an .. S.. pattern, passing by the LZ to one side, reversing, fly-
228
•
ing 6ver the ·Lz, then reversing to the exit heading .
(6 IH B) In approaching the extraction point, the gunships normally
• made a 11 tear-drop 11 type of descent toward the LZ, keep.ing the ground team
in sight at all times. This type of descent permitted the delivery of
• ordnance if the team were .in contact. In such a Situation the lead gun-
•
ship might have cleared the area with minigun fire, and after it departed
the line of fire the second gunship might have launched a salvo of
••• rockets. Firing passes were flown either directly over the reconnaissance
·team or between it and the enemy forces in cuntact .
229
c(G fiFQ.).. The actual tactics and flight patterns used by Air For.ce
' CCNPIDI!NTIAI:a
112
• ·provided the best coverage to the ground team while minimizing exposure
-to groundfire .
230
• ... ltPB.) A 20th SOS manual on tactics cited the figure "8" pattern
• tern could be established directly over the ground team, permitting dual
gun firing, or offset from the team position, allowing mixed rocket and
• .
minigun attacks. Turns at the end of fi-ring passes had to be varied to
•
avoid repeated firing passes along one· flight path .
z(G PIFB) Another attack pattern used by·Air Force gunship pilots vias
•tf
'
the oval, or "racetrack," pattern. '-Agai.n timing and spacing were impor-
-tant. One helicopter was positioned to start a firing pass as soon as
the other rolled off. This pattern allowed mixed minigun and rocket fire
and was most effective against point targets.· As in the figure "8" pat-
. 231
tern, turning angles were varied to avoid stereotyped attack passes.
rzteiiQFO) I he 20th SOS also used both circular and clover-leaf pat-
terns, primarily for checking the securit¥ of an LZ. · When groundfire was
. encountered, changing to either the figure "8 11 of oval pattern was usually
considered the be.st attack technique. A MACV-published manual, however,
noted that a circular pattern was used for attack when the enemy was loca-
ted in one direction from the reconnaissance team and one minigun had
malfunctioned. The same manual stated that the clover-leaf pattern was
232
useful in providing 360 degrees of cover for a surrounded team.
cf'd-111 B,._If helicopter gunships were unable to suppress the enemy
113
was to have the ground team disengage, while helicopter gunships covered
233
their backtrail with fire .
•
sometimes continued firing against enemy elements or proceeded with the
slick helicopters to an orbit point directed by the FAC .
•
..,(o lfJ D) Another impOl~tant aspect of UW helicopter operations was
the conduct of insertions and extractions during darkness. Night opera-
tions provided _superior concealment; however~ such operations were dan-
gerous. SOG was never able to surmount the immense dif-ficulties and·
night operations were conducted only infrequently. Normally, only an ex-
treme emergency _justified the risk, and then an emergency extraction would
use !3rtifiCial illumination since the fear of compromising the team was
234
no longer paramount.
4'JENPO) Interest in night op~rations really emerged in 1969, when
planning began for conducting this type of operation in Cambodia. The
terrain in the Cambodian Area of Operations (AO) ;.was considered more
suitable than the. rugged terrain in the. Laotian AO. A MACSOG conference
on night helicopter operations, conve.ned in July 1969, outlined some major
problent areas: establishment of the criteria for selecting landing and
drop zones, setting minimal weather standards, providing means to maintain
. 235
aircrews• visual references, aircrew training requirements, etc.
z(TB UFB) The most significant problem was finding landing zones that
were suitable for night operations. Most of the sizable LZs in the
CamlJodian AO were the result of clearing by 11 Slash and burn" agricultural
. ' '
114
methods. The ash on such zones was stirred' into the air by the helicopter
rotar wash, severely reducing visibility and endangering helicopter
flight. Navigation in darkness over the flat area of the ·Ao was a diffi-
cult task in the absence of easily identified ground checkpoints. Further-
inore, LZs had to be closer to mobile launch sites, since maneuvedng into
236
LZs at night required much more time .
...nc flfil5) weather was the second most important consideration in
planning night insertion. Although no minimum standards were set for
exfiltration, night insertion missions were not recommended when the
cloud ceiling was below 3000 feet and visibility was less than 5 miles.
Any cloud cover at all restricted n~tural illumination from the moon and
237
·stars.
z(T9 ltr5) *'he most prevalent means for providing artificial lighting
(during extractions only) was dropping flares from either fixed wing or
rotary wing aircraft. Fixed wing aircraft were preferred since they
could carry more flares and orbit longer. A shortcoming of flares was
that their descent and drift presented moving shadows to helicopter pilots.
Also, flares which prematurely burned out constitUted a hazard in that
they might drift into helicopter rotor blades. Xenon searchlights and
several types of starlight scopes wer~ tested. Unfortunately, search~
li~hts made the illuminating aircraft vulnerable to ene~y groundfire, and
115
.
• night operations.
a continuous alert
Augmentation would also have been required to maintain
capability~ ~Hthout manning .increases, implementation
of night operations would have forced a reduction in the number of teams
in the field. Additionally, helicopter losses wou~d have increased be-
cause of the drastic decrease in the margin of error in piloting the air-
craft. For example, an engine failure during night operations would in
most cases result in the loss of the helicopter, whereas during daylight
operations chances for recovering the aircraft were reasonably good.
" '·
116
•S!Citlf 1
•• s '8NFI81~ttTII!I
CHAPTl:R V
COM~1AND AND CONTROL (U)
a
•I.· (' "FP) 'wtangling the web of command and control relationships
with regard to SOG air operations is, indeed, a difficult endeavor.
first step toward understanding the planning, organizing, coordinating,
The
•I
tionof "command and control."
(P flf8) eo111mand and control is an arrangement employed by a commander
to perform essential management functibns. Jhis arrangement embodies
command relationships, p~rsonnel, and facilities -- dyna_mic < .
component~
I
"-..
enabling the commander to translate objectives and instructions into
. 239
action which will produce the desired results. Stated differently,
~ when US forces are involved in a war, command and control consists of
•II control actions, and the second isan extensive and reliable communica-
tions system from the joint headquarters to Washington DC and from the
joint headquarters to forces in the field.
. 240 ;.
•
the pow~r to direct action or to use resources to accomplish assigned
responsibility.
(U) Command entails a broad degree of authority. It is defined in
~- JCS,Pub 1 as follows:
241
• • E8NFIBENTIAL
117
"Command includes the authority and responsibility for
effectively using available resources and for planning
the employment of, organizing, directing, coordfnating,
and control"ling military forces for the accomplishment
of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility
for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned
personnel."
(U) The standard definition of operational command (used synonymously
242
with operational control in this study) is the following:
"These functions of command involving the composition
of subordinate for~es, the assignment of tasks, the
designation of objectives and the authoritative direc-
tion necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational
command should be exercised by the use of the assigned
normal organizatinnal units through their responsible
commanders or through the commanders of subordinate
forces established by the commander exercising· opera-
tioRal command. It does rtvt include such matters as
administration, discipline, internal organization, and
unit training, except when a subordinate commander re-
quests assistance."
Simply stated; command carries with it authority over and res pons i bil ity
for all activities and needs of subordinate units. Operational command
-means partial authority or pat·tial responsibility.
u(TO hi D) Outlining the UW command and control arrangement, esp_e-
cially the evolution of that arrangement, present~ unique problems.
Conduct of UW activities, due to political sensitivities, required con-
siderable coordination with agencies I').Ormally peripheral to the military
chain of command. Political sensitivities also included deliberate ef-
forts to disguise lines of authority. For example, in many documents
classified at the Secret level, MACSOG was described as a staff agency
of MACV. Actually, MACSOG was an operational agency, but that fact was
highly classified. Some lines of authority were overt, such as the rela-
- tiorl~hip between the 15th SOS, 14th DESO,"'and 14th SOW; however, other
lines of authority were-covert, such as the relationship between 15th SOS,
118
• Air Operations Group, and MACSOG.
a (E UFB) file lack of detailed documentation· on .command and control
•..
Early Approval Procedures for Air Operations (U)
..(Te flf8) Prior to 14 October 1964, the CIA handled the routing and
approval of OPLAN 34A air missions. On that· date the Department of
·Defense assumed responsibility for obtaining appropriate· clearances for
•
--~
the conduct of air ope·rati ons. The process began with a monthly opera-
tions schedule, submitted by COMUSMACV approximately 10 days before the
period began._· This schedule, incorporating CINCPAC's comments, went to
the JCS. SACSA,'the action agency for such matters, would obtain approval
through coordination with the Deputy Secretary of Defense (a member of
the 303 Committee), the Department of State, and the CI.A as required.
Approval of this schedule -represented final Washington
·:- authority for execu-
ting missions. However, 24 hours prior to execution of each mission,
COMUSMACV would obtain political clearance from the American Ambassador,
Saigon. Concurrently, a notice of intent was sent to the JCS, who in
turn would inform the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central In-
telligence, and the Secretary of State. The 24-hour requirement was
later reduced to 12 hours and the National Military Command Center was
charged with the responsibility for electrically transmitting notices of intent
to 't:he·.appropriate offic'es.
119
-(TE JlfB) 6nee the mission launched, MACV would continue to submit
launch, recovery, abort, and spot reports. Almost all of these were by
Flash precedence. After completi.on of a mission, an after action report
. relayed aircrew debriefings. This report contained the reasons and
rationale for any departure from the planned sequence of events.
(IS NED) The procedures cited above pertained to missions which were
considered within the scope of already approved mission concepts. In
early 1966 the JCS delegated to CINCPAC the authority to approve and
execute specific· OPLAN 34A air missions falling within that category.
Approval for new mission.concepts, such as the use of helicopters for the
infiltration of agents into North Vt~tnam, continued to rest with Washing-
·ton offices. Once a precedent was firmly established, CINCPAC received
approval authority for that type of mission.·
.:.(TC PIF8) Common criticism of the command and control system, as
related by interviews contained in the MACSOG Documentation Study, was
that tight Washington control hampered the conduct of oper-ations, espe-
cially impeding timeliness. Additionally, there was a need for a more
integrated organization in Washington since .both tAS and MACSOG were con-
ducting covert operations in close proximity to each other. One senior
243
Air Force dfficer stated:
"If we are to participate in clandestine type operations,
we need a national level planning and coordinating
agency for that purpose. The actual planning of such op-
. · erations can be accomplished more effectively in the
field; the Washington level organization should consist
primarily of the agencies needed to ensure the requisite
coordination with other operations and to obtain the neces-
sary approval for conducting the particular clandestine
operations... ·
"
Another individual, a senior Navy officer~ cited some specific problems
244
. existing in OSACSA: .
120
• The Special Operations Division [SOD] of OSACSA, charged
11
121
'• aircrews, both in Chinese and English to ensure no misunderstanding as
t9 what was required. The unit designated a staging officer, the mis-
•
il
sion commander, who was responsible for ensuring preparation of the air-
craft and for monitoring the mission from beginning to end.
a (TS flf8) The mission was monitored by a CIA station located in the
122
its ass-ets under the operational control of MACSOG. 7AF officials demons-
trated particular anxiety regarding the necessity for Air Force supervi-
sion in such areas as tactics, flying.safety, and crew protection.
az(To· UPB) Jllf~llough specific command and control procedures before
1968 were not clearly evident from the available d6cumentation, various
interviews and official evaluations contained in the MACSOG Documentation
Study generally indicated where responsibilities rested and problems
existed. A senior Marine officer assigned to MACSOG in 1966 and 1967
246
stated:
.. Early in MACSOG's operations, the execution of air mis-
sions was controlled almost exclusively by MAGSOG. Later
we learned that our messag~s concerning air operations
were not being disseminated to the proper people. More-
over, some of our maritime operatidns were being inter-
fered with by friendly aircraft. Finally, 7AF insisted
on coordinating all flying activities, including those
of MACSOG. This improved coordination and control of
missions."
(IE tlfi) An Air Force officer assigned to MACSOG during the same
, -period further related difficulties in command and control and specifically
247
cited problems in the relationship between MACSOG and 7AF:
"We had communications difficulties from our facility in
Saigon in handling air operations which originated from
bases removed from the Saigon .complex. Because of secu-
rity requirements and the lack of hot line facilities,
in many cases our hands were tied in coordinating air
operations plans. This resulted in our recommendation to
have an air operations command post which would have hot
line communications direct to air facilities and the
base camps from which forces would launch.
" ... From an Air Force standpoint, comn1and relations were
rather tenuous for a while. Main missions were laid on
with very short notice. This caused us a great deal of
anxiety in attempting to get the support from 7AF. On
many occasions,. the 7AF frag's for the next day's combat
\\
operations were already cut. 7Af would have to divet:"t
air assets from· laid-on strikes .... As might be expected,
7AF was const~ntly badgering us for better advanced ·
planning."
123
:#fl!'JZN/0}. liFe inability of ~ir r•or-ce personnel to obtain knowledge
concerning SOG operations was not limited to· headquarters eleme-nts and
key.staff personnel. For exan1ple, the airborne operations officers aboard
the Airborne Command Post (ABCCC) aircraft were responsible for allocating
air assets to cross-border support when such requirements exceeded the
~ormal sortie levels.A CINCPAC Joint Survey Team Report noted the need
248
for SOG-briefed individ~als on the ABCCC:
"For cross-border operations, SOG is allocated six A-lE
sorties per day. ~owever, this fixed allocation is not
sufficient in many cases. In such cases, the Tiger
Hound Airborne Command Post is requested to provide addi-
tional tactical air support. There have been times when
ll this support was not forthcoming or excessively delayed.
In order to in~ure that the airborne operations officer
•••
can properly assess the request for air suppo.rt, he should
be given a full and complete briefing on cross-border
operations. Although this will not insure Tacair sup-
port is always provided when required, it will insure
that the request is given proper consideration vis~a-vis
other requests for air support."
•
Memorandum of Understanding, signed by the Chief of·Staff, 7AF and Chief,
MACSOG on 26 October 1967. Most notably, the agfeement established the
• position of the Deputy Commander for Special Operations under the 14th ·
Special Operations Wing. In MACSOG terminology, the DCSO was called the
•
. 249
Commander, Air Studies Group (later changed to Air Operations Group).
•
(6 PIFQ) Three units were assigned to tbe DCSO: First Flight Detach-
ment; Detachment 1, 314th Tactical ·Airlift Wing (subsequently designated
.. the 15th SOS and 90th SOS); and 20th Helicopter Squadron. The UW-con-
figured C-123 and C-130 aircraft and associated personnel were placed
•
"
124
under the di~ect supervision and operational control of the OCSO. The
20th.Helicopter Squadron, an integral part of the 14th SOW, was not exclu-
sively dedicated to support of MACSOG, hence/ the OCSO was given responsi-
bility for supervising and controlling only those elements and activities
125
'
• however; indicated that it was not
tionship between itself and MACSOG.
hi~hly satisfied with the working rela-
A 7AF staff study conducted in
July 1968 pointed out several problem areas. The study specifically
criticized the 1967 Memorandutn of Understanding insofar that it addressed
only administrative matters and not the broad spectrum of 7AF support of
MACSOG activities. It further noted that 7AF/MACSOG problems frequently
could not be resolved in the absence of mutually agreed upon directives.
Consequently~ MACV was.asked.to arbitrate. MACV, in turn, requested that
.7AF, in coordination with MACSOG, prepare a memorandum of agreement to
formalize procedures to assure systematic and effective support of SOG
252 .
missions .
..(s tlF8) Meetings among 7AF staff agencies and between 7AF and MACSOG
ensued during the spring and summer of 1968. Due to the lack of know-
ledge in regard to these unique operations, 7AF had difficulty in select-
ing an agency to monitor SOG operations. Planning finally progressed
to the stage that a formalized agreement was reached in September 1968.
(U) The DCSO scathingly rebuked the revised agreement, which con-
sisted of approximately 40 pages and spelled out 1n great detail the pro-
cedures to be followed. Its one serious mistake, he stated, was the fail-
ure to coordinate the draft wi.th either the Commander, 14th SOW or the
DCSO prior to publication. He was i~ked because the Chief, MACSOG as~
126
UNCLA t:iSIFIED
" ... While this did not lessen the amount of control
the 14th SOW Commander was able to exert over his DCSO,
it did, in the eyes of ~tACSOG, give the Chief, MACSOG
a more powerful voi-ce in dictating to the DCSO how air
resources would be employed. The Chief, MACSOG being
an Army officer had little concept of air doctrine
and even less knowledge of the basic principles that
govern the employment of air forces in combat. This
lack of knowl~dge and expertise did not prevent him
from trying to influence tactics used, over-commit
air resources beyond thei t~ support capability, and
in general, disregard basic planning factors regarding
maintenance capabi]ity, supply lines, replacement parts,
and programmed flying hours. In addition, at times he
insisted that critical air resources be used for mis-
sions that could better be performed by other types of
aircraft whose availability was not limited.
"In fulfilling my responsibilities to the Ait..-Force
·for insuring air resource~ under my control were pro-
perly employed, I ran head on into a conflict with
Chief, MACSOG over matters described above. It was
clearly implied to me that my refusal to violate Air
Force principles and directives was a great disappoint-
ment to those for whom I worked ...
"The lesson to be learned from the foregoing is clear
and simple. An officer with ER writing authority
holds an enormous power over those individuals whose
ERs he prepares. Thus, an ambitious officer placed in
a position where he se'rves two masters will be sorely
tempted to favor the one who prepares his ER. With
the extreme secretiveness which surrounds MACSOG acti-
vities, it is well within the realm of'possibility
that aircraft could be employed improperly and no one
would be the wiser ... The solution to this undesir-
able situation is to place responsibility for prepara-
tion of the DCSO ER back in" Air Force channels. The
DCSO s hou 1d be respons i b1e to the 14th SOW Conmmnder
for providing air support to MACSOG to the maximum
extent of his capability. MACSOG, if dissatisfied
with the OCSO' s performance, should make this fact
·· known to the 14th SOW Commander for appropriate ac-
tion. The 14th SOW Commander is, the individual in
the proper position to evaluate the performance of
his immediate staff and would thus be able to objec-
tively evaluate the validity of MACSOG's complaints."
"
'
127
UNCLASSIFIED
CONfiDINTIIJ'= •
Post-1968 Command and Control Considerations (U)
•
· .,J,r tlli'Q) As stated earlier, a dearth of information detailing. com-
mand and control relationships after 1968 prevents further coverage of the
• a natural sequel to this report. Such a study holds promise for identifying
•
lessons of potentially great significance to future UW activities .
[!I
"
128
·coNFIBENTIAL
S&.CI'~&T
CHAPTLR VI
CONCLUSIONS (U)
129
· SECRET ·
·Air Force malaise was er:tgendered by suspicion that air assets, C-130s and
c-.123s, \oJere abused {many missions were not essential but were flown for
expediency or pleasure where common-use airlift would have sufficed.)
..(s PIFB) Thus, as evidenced during the Vietnam conflict, there is a
need to keep UW activities removed from conventional military planning. As
a result, there may be criticism that the UW program does not support the
needs of conventional military forces. ·rhis only serves to underscore the
fact that the program is designed to support strateg-ic, more than tactical
objectives, and to pursue political, as well as military goals. Accord-
ingly, UW forces must be.oriented to unconventional military thinking,
must be separated from conventional'-forces, and should not have to compete
-with conventional forces for resources. Finally, management of UW forces
should rest with an agency which is oriented towards strategic (as well
as tactical) and political (as well as military) objectives.
~ tlf8) One controversial aspect of control of UW forces was the
scope of involvement of high-level policy-makers. Operatives in SOG criti-
cized the officious nature of Washington in UW operations. From their view-
point, such criticism was valid. For example,. it impaired flexibility in
planning operations and, at times, induced unsuccessful missions because
reaction to fleeting intelligence was·: delayed by the lack of Washington•s
(or another level•s) political approval. On the other hand, it does seem
important to have such sensitive operations tmder the close scrutiny of
Washington policy-makers. What is needed is an arrangement which would take
advantage of on-scene expertise and provide rapid response, while at the
same time providing the ~ppropriate level of control at the Washington level.
"
•(T3 14fr5) Another controversial aspect of UW forces relates to cost
130
• concepts. Emphasis should be placed on cost-effectiveness -- in direct
•
conflict to the MACV Ad Hoc Group's statement to the contt~ary. To
counteract an enemy whose war philosophy is based on Mao's "Protracted
•
·thus cutting operating expenses by about· seventeen-fold. Further, with-
drawal from exploitation operations reduces costs substantially.
{1 5 tiFQ) 8ne military alternative which would reduce both the visi-
:1 bility and the involvement of US personnel, offer greater benefits, and
•
' .
would be in consonance with the Nixbfl Doctrine \'JOuld be to place greater
•
-reliance on the use of indigenous or third country national forces. (In
·such cases, the scope of operations and secrecy may be managed better by
•.I should be obvious that support of these troops is much- less costly than
supporting American troops and that disclosure of their activities is
less likely. The First Flight experience in working with third country
•.I nationals has demonstrated that this modus of operandi, although handicap-
ped by language barriers, can be an outstanding success even during a
dangerous, difficult, and sophisticated mission.
~Te flf8) ·Regarding the secrecy aspect o.f UW activities, beyond the
Ml realm of a purely military evaluation, certain political realities have
become evident. In observing the public and Congressional reaction to
~ the furtive involvement in Cambodia and Laos, it is apparent that when such
'' ·. . ..
II operations assume too great a magnitude, hiding the scope from'decision-
II 131
•• makers and voters may be considered i1mnoral. When the conflict in question
becomes sufficiently large, it warrants candid revelation of the situa-
• tion to Congress and the public. Further, the rationale. for secrecy
•
should initially be carefully analyzed; and subsequently reevaluated. In
Southeast Asia, in the initi~l stages of th~ war, the major reason for
• secrecy may well have been to disguise US intentions from foreign countries
and the enemy so as to minimize the possibility of confrontation with a
•n major power bloc; in later years, however, the cloak of secrecy was donned
to hide operations from the news media, Congress, and the public.
•(Ti PIF8) In conclusion, US Unconventional Warfare operations in the
..
• · Vietnam conflict sh6uld not be used'as a model for the future direction of
-uw activities. The validity of the basic concepts used to govern the em-
•
"
132
UNCLASSIFIED
..
FOOTNOTE~) ( U)
1. (TS). Study; "MACSOG Documentation Study (U)", OSA CSA, Pacific Area
Conmand, 1969. Hereafter cited as Doc Study.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. I bid.
5. (U) Cooper, Chester L., "The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam", Dodd,
Mead & Co., New York, 1970.
6. Ibid & Fall, Bernard B., "Two Vietnams", 1963.
7. ( U) Cooper.
8. (U) Fall.
9. (U) Cooper.
13. Ibid.
14. (U) Cooper & Pent Papers.
••
21. Ibid.
22." Ibid .
133
• UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIF:IED
.
•
24 . Ibid & Cooper.
25 . (TS) Doc Study.
• 26.
27 .
(S) Project CHECO Report, USAF Support of Special Forces in SEA, 10 Mar 69.
• 28. I bid.
•0
29 . Ibid ..
30. I bid.
31. Ibid.
32. ( U) Ltr, President Bi em to President John. F. Kennedy, re 1eased 15 Dec 61 .
• 33. (U) Ltr, President John F. Kennedy to President Diem, released 15 Dec 61.
•
34. (U) Pent Papers & Cooper .
35. (TS) Doc-Study & (U) Pent Papers .
• 36.
37.
38.
Ibid.
Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. lbi d.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. I l:?i d.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47 "'' Xbid.
48. I bid.
134
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
'• 49. Ibid.
•
50 . Ibid.
51. Ibid.
• 52.
53 .
Ibid.
lbi d.
• 54. Ibid.
•tl
55. Ibid & (TS) History: 1965 Command History, USMACV, Mil Hi.st Branch, Office
of Sec., Joint and Staff, early 1966.
56. Ibid.
•
58. (TS) Doc Study & 1965 Command History .
59. (TS) Doc Study .
• 60. Ibid.
61 . . Ibid .
• 62. Ibid.
•
63. (TS) History: 1966 Command History, USMACV, Mil Hist Branch, Office of
Sec., Joint and Staff, 19 Apr 67·& 1967 MACSOG History.
-
64 . . Ibid.
·;.-
65. Ibid.
-.. 66.
67.
68.
(TS)
Ibid .
I bid.
Doc Study.
•
69. I bid.
135
UNCLASSIFIED
Ibid ..
- SEGI~El~
73.
74. I bid.
76. Ibid.
77. I bid.
78. Ibid.
1!1 81.
82.
Ibid.
• 83.
84.
85.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid .
• 86.
87.
Ibid.
Ibid .
• 88. Ibid.
• 89.
90.
Ibid .
Ibid.
- 91.
92.
I bid.
Ibid & (TS) 1968 MACSOG History.
- 93. Ibid.
(T~) History: 1969 History of MACSOG-751 (C), MACV Air Studies Group, DCSO,
-
94.
30 Jan 70.
95. (TS) Msg, COHUSMACV, "PW Recovery Efforts in SVN,.Laos, and Cambodia (S),
060325Z Jun 71 .
- 6E6REl
136
=
UNCLAS-'SIFIED
• 97. Ibid.
•Iii
98. Ibid .
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid & Msg, CINCPACAF, Aircraft Mishap Investigation and Reporting (U),
•
041705Z Feb 72 (TS) .
•a . 103.
104.
lOS.·
(TS) History: 1964 MACV .Command History, MACV, early 1965, Annex A.
Ibid.
•
106. I bid & (TS) Doc Study.
,,
107. {TS) Doc Study.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
II 112. Ibid.
• 113. {TS) Interview by Captain Thomas Abbey with Col Rose, Cmdr, First Flight
Detachn1ent, undated. ;,
•
114 . . {TS) Doc Study.
115. Ibid .
•II 116.
117.
118.
I bid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
119. Ibid.
1\ 120.,, I bid.
• 121. Ibid.
137
'
• UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLA.S!iiFIED
• 122. Ibid.
•
123. Ibid .
124. Ibid .
• · 125.
126.
127.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
128. Ibid.
· 129 .. Ibid.
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid.
135. (TS) Study~ "C-l30E Sky Hook Study", MACV, 27 Sep 65.
136. (TS) Doc Study, L/Col Kenneth W. McNiven) USAF~ Sep 66 - Sep 67.
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid.
142. (S) Manual, "C-130 Aircrew Operational Procedures (Combat TALON) (U)",
TACM 55-130, TAC, 25 Sep 70. -
143. Ibid.
144. Ibid.
UNCLASSIFIED
- CONFI DI~NTIAL
• 147.
148.
(TS) History: 1967 ~ MACSOG Histo•·y, no date available.
•
150. (TS) Ltr, 15 SOS, "Combat Spear Continuation Traininq (U)", 14 Aug 68 .
151. · (TS) Ltr, Memorandum of Agreement (between Det 4 (405th TPW), First
Flight Detachment ~15 SOS), and 621st TACS), 1 Nov 68 .
•d . 153.
154.
155.
Ibid .
Ibid.
(TS) History: History of Air Studies Group (MACSOG-75), US Military Assis-
tance Command, Vietnam~ 1 January 1970- 31 December 1970 (C).
- 156.
157.
Ibid.
(TS) History: History of" Air Studies Group .(MACSOG-75), US Military
•
Assistance Comnand, Vietnam, l January 1971 - 31 December 1971 (C) .
158. _(TS) Doc·study, Appendix A & (TS) Msg {Subj: Participation in Special
missioni (U), · CINCPAC 032146Z Feb 68 .
• ! 159. (TS) Msg, JCS (Sub: Special Air Assets (U)), 262220Z Jul 68 .
• 160.
161.
(TS) Msg, CINCPAC (Subj: Cost of Special Mission~ {U)), 070349Z Aug 68.
- . 162.
163.
164.
(TS) Msg.: CINCPACAF, "Combat Spear {U)", 120251Z Aug 69.
Ibid.
(S) Ltr, Commander 7AF to COMUSMACV, "15 Special Operations Squadron and
the First Flight {Special Element) at Nha Trang (U) & (TS msg, CINCPACAF,
"Relocation of Units (U), 15 May 70.
165. (TS) Background Paper, "Pyatt Talking Paper on Combat Spear", 15 Oct 70.
167. Ibid.
- 168." (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, "Combat Spear (C-130E) Aircraft (C)", Ol0531Z Ju1 70.
'
139
CONFIBENTIAL
.. UNCLASSIFIED
• 169 .. {TS) "Pyatt Paper on Combat Spear".
•il
170. Ibid .
171. (TS) Briefing, "Helicopter Briefing (U)", to Gen Meyer, 21 May 70.
172. (S) Memo of Agreement: Initial Agreement Between Chief of Staff, US
Army and Chief of Staff, US Air Force, 6 Apr 66.
•
173. Ibid, Annex, 19 May 67 .
174. (TS) Project CHECO Report, The USAF Helicopter in SEA (U), 4 Dec 68 .
• "175.
176.
Ibid.
Ibid .
• 177. Ibid.
• 178.
_ l79.
Ibid .
(TS) Msg, CSAF to CINCPACAF, Jan 67 .
• 180. (TS) Msg, CINCPACAF to CSAF (Subj: AF Helicopters in U\~ Role {U)), Feb 67.
181. ·(TS) Talking Paper: "Talking Paper on Special Operations Helicopters in
• 182.
RVN (U)", AF/XOOSO, Major Cutler, 24 Jul 70 .
•
184.
;,.
October 1967 -
185. (S) His tory: Hi stori ca 1 Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron, 1
31 December 1967 .
• 186.
187.
(S) History: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Sq~adron, 1 January -
31 March 1967.
(S) Histo~y: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron, 1 July 1967-
30 September 1967.
188. (S) 20 SOS Oct 67 - Dec 67 Hi story.
189. Ibid.
190. (S) History: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron, 1 January -.
" 3] March 1968.
140
UNCLASSIFIED
··UNCLASSIFIED
• 191.
192.
Ibid.
(S) History: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron, 1 April - 30
•
Jime 1968. ·
193. Ibid .
• 195.
196.
Ibid., pp. 9, 10.
•
30 December 1968 .
1 January -
197. (S) History: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron,
31 March 1969.
[I 198. I bid .
•
'..,_
199. I bid.
1 April·-
200. (S) History: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron,
•
30 June 1969 .
201. I bid .
•;-· 202.
203.
204.
(S) History: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron, 1 July - 31
September 1 969. ( S) .
I bid.
I bid .
• 205.
206.
Ibid.
(S) Staff Summary Sheet: 11
20th SOS Helicopter Operations (U)
11
7AF/TACWFP,
• 207~
8 Feb 70.
(S) Msg, 7AF, 11 20th SOS UH-lP Helicopter Operations (U)", 240810Z Feb 70 .
•d 208.
209.
210.
(S) History: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron, 1 July -
30 September 1970.
(S) 20 SOS, History, Jul - Sep 70.
(S) History: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron, 1 Oct- 31 Dec
1970 .
I . 211." (S) History: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron, 1 Jul- 30 Sep
1971.
141
'
• UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
'-II 212. Ibid & (S) History: Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron, 1 Oct-
31 Dec 1971.
213. (TS') Doc Study, Tab D to Annex 0 to Appendix B (SOPs) . .
II 214. (C) Draft Manual, ,.SAW (SEA) Helicopter Operations and Tactics (U)
11
•
20 SOS, undated. Hereafter cited as 20 SOS Tactics Manual (U) .
215 . I bid.
• 216. I bid ..
•
217 . Ibid.
218. lbi d.
•If
'
221. I bid.
•
•
• 229. (C) Manual,. 11 Guide ·for Helicopter Tactics and Techniques for Use with
•
Reconnaissance Teams (U) 11 , Hq MACV, 12 Oct 70, Ch. 7. Hereafter cited
as MACV Tactics Manual (U). , ·
•II
.230. Ibid .
231. (C). 20 SOS Tactics Manual.
II 234;
"
(C) 20 SOS Tactics Manual, Section 3-9.
• UNCLASSIFIED
142
UNCLA~SIFIED
'• 235.
236.
(TS) Memo, "Helicopter Night Operations (U)", MACSOG 32, 4 Aug 69 .
Ibid .
• 237. Ibid.
•
238 . Ibid.
239. (S) Project CHECO Report, Command and Control, 1966-1968 (U), Hq PACAF,
L/C Robert M. Burch, 1 Aug 69, p. 1.
• 240. (TS) Project CHECO Report,.Command and Control, 1965 (U), Mr. Kenneth
Sams, 15 Dec 66, p. l .
•
[I
241.
242.
(U) Publication, JCS Pub 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms, JCS, 3 Sep 74.
(U) Manual, AFM ll-1, "US Air Force G1ossary of Standardized Terms", 1
Jan 73, p. 150.
..
• '243.
- 244.
(TS) Doc Study .
Ibid .
• 245. I bid.
•
246. I bid .
247. I bid .
• 248.
249.
I bid.
(S). Memo: Memorandum of Understanding (BebJeen 7AF and MACSOG) (U), 7AF,
•
26 Oct 67. ·
250. Ibid .
• 251. (U) EOT Report, Col David C. Collins, Dep Comm for Spec Air Ops, 14 SOW,
FOUO, AFEO, undated, p. 2. "'
•II 252 . (TS) Study (SubJ: 7AF/MACSOG Relationships (U)), 7AF, July 1968. (TS)
\\
. '
143
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
'• AAA
GLOSSARY
Anti-Aircraft Artillery
• AB
ABCCC
ACS
Airbase
Airborne Battlefield Command &Control System
Air Commando Squadron
• ADS
AFB
AO
Aerial Delivery System
Air Force Base
Area of Operations
•
ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASTD Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
•
:1
BMT
CAF
CAL
CAS
Ban Me Thuot·
•
C&C Command &Control
CHECO Contemporary Hi stor1"ta 1 Ex ami nation of Combat Operations
CHI NAT Chinese Nationalist
•
CI Counterinsurgency
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CINCPAC Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
CINCPACAF Con~ander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces
• GOMUSMACV
CSA
CSAF
Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Chief of Staff, Army
Chief of Staff, Air Force
• DASC
DCSO
Direct Air Support Center
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
• DIA
DOD
DRV
Defense Intelligence Agency
Department of Defense
Democratic Republic of Vietnam
~
• ECM
.·
Electronic Countermeasures
•
E&E Escape & Evasion
EF Exploitation Forces
ER (Officer) Effectiveness Report
EW Electronic Warfare
•I
"
145
UNCLASSI-FIED:
UNCLASSIFIED
Ill .
• JCS
JPRC
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Personnel Recovery Center
• LOC
LZ
Line of Communication
landing Zone
•ld MAAG
MACSOG
MACV
t~ACVSOG
Military Assistance and Advisory Group
Mil itat'Y Assistance Command (Vietnam), Studies and
Observation Group
Militat·y_Assistance Command, .vietnam
Militat~y Assistance-Command, Vietnam, Studies and
•
Observation Grou~
MIA Missing in Action
Ill
!
RVN
RVNAF
Republic of Vietnam
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
"
146
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLAf~SIFIED
•
SLAM
SMM Saigon Military Mission
SOD Special Operations Division
SOG Studies and Observation Group
• sos
SOW
STO
Special Operations Squadron
Special Operations Wing
Strategic Technical Directorate
•:I
.STRATA Short Term Roadwatch and Target Acquisition
SVN South Vietnam
• uw
- U5ARV
Unconventional Warfare
US Army, Republic of Vietnam.
• VNAF
vc
(South) Vietnamese Air Force
•II
Vi·etcong
VR Visual Reconnaissance
•II
•I
••I "
147
I UNCLASSIFIED