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Etextbook PDF For Management Control Systems 4th Edition by Kenneth Merchant
Etextbook PDF For Management Control Systems 4th Edition by Kenneth Merchant
Fourth Edition
BRIEF CONTENTS
SECTION I
The Control Function of Management SECTION V
Corporate Governance, Important
1 Management and Control 3 Control-Related Roles, and Ethics
SECTION IV
Performance Measurement Issues
and Their Effects
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CONTENTS
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Contents
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Contents
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Contents
xii
PREFACE
This text provides materials for a comprehensive course using this material with pre-work experience students
on management control systems (MCSs). MCSs are is that some of the cases might be too challenging. That
defined broadly to include everything managers do to said, there are several suitable candidates to select
help ensure that their organization’s strategies and from among the set of cases at the end of each chapter
plans are carried out or, if conditions warrant, are mod- to tailor to various audiences and/or to achieve various
ified. Thus, the text could also be used in any course course objectives (see also below).
that focuses on topics related to the back end of the This text is different from other MCS texts in a num-
management process, such as strategy implementation ber of important ways. First, the basic organizing
or execution. framework is different. The first major module dis-
Because management control is a core function of cusses management controls based on the object of
management, all students interested in business or control: results, actions, or personnel/culture. The
management can benefit from this text. However, object-of-control framework has considerable advan-
courses based on the materials presented here should tages over other possible organizing frameworks. It has
be particularly useful for those who are, or aspire to be, clean, clearly distinguishable categories. It is also rela-
managers, management consultants, financial special- tively all-inclusive in the sense that the reader can
ists (e.g. controllers, budget analysts, auditors), or relate many management controls and other control
human resource specialists (e.g. personnel directors, classifications and theories (for example, proactive vs.
compensation consultants). reactive controls, prevention vs. detection controls,
This edition includes 70 cases for classroom use. and agency theory concepts such as adverse selection
Case studies that stimulate learning through the analy- and monitoring vs. incentives) to it. It is also intuitive;
sis of complex situations such as those often faced in that is, students can easily see that managers must
the “real world” are generally recognized to be perhaps make choices from among these categories of manage-
the best pedagogical conduit for teaching a MCSs ment control. Thus, using the object-of-control focus,
course. Because MCSs, the contexts in which they oper- the text is structured around a framework that
ate, and the outcomes they produce, are complex and describes the core management control problems that
multidimensional, simple problems and exercises can- need to be addressed, the MCSs that can be used to
not capture the essence of the issues managers face in address those problems, and the outcomes that can be
designing and using MCSs. Students must develop the produced, both positive (intended) and negative (unin-
thinking processes that will guide them successfully tended).
through decision tasks with multiple embedded issues, Second, the treatment of management control is
incomplete information, and large amounts of rela- broad. Like all MCS textbooks, this text focuses inten-
tively unstructured information. They must learn to sively on the use and effects of financial performance
develop problem-finding skills as well as critical think- measures and associated results controls, which are in
ing and problem-solving skills, and they must learn common use at managerial levels in many organizations.
how to articulate and defend their ideas. Case analyses, However, it also provides a broader treatment of manage-
discussions, and presentations provide an effective ment controls (organized around the object-of-control
method for simulating these tasks in a classroom. framework) to put the financial results controls in proper
Although the text was designed primarily for use perspective. For example, the text describes many situa-
with graduate students and practicing professionals, it tions where financial results controls are not effective
can be, and has been, used successfully with under- and discusses the alternatives that managers can use in
graduate students who have had a prior management those situations (such as nonfinancial performance indi-
accounting course. All that should be recognized when cators or greater reliance on stronger cultures).
xiii
Preface
Third, the text provides considerable discussion on coverage of the latest MCS topics and issues, such as
the causes and remedies of the most common and seri- related to stress testing of budgets; mitigating man-
ous management control-related problems, including agement myopia; balancing sustainable value crea-
the implications of issues of uncontrollability on man- tion; motivating ethical behaviors; and using the
ager’s behaviors; the tendency of managers to adopt a EVATM or Balanced Scorecard measurement systems
short-term horizon in their decision-making; and man- or alternative budgeting approaches, just to name a
agers’ and employees’ propensities to engage in distor- few.
tive “gameplaying” evidencing misalignment with ● The cases are descriptive of the operations and
organizational objectives. issues faced by companies located in many different
Fourth, the text provides a whole chapter of ethics countries and regions around the world, including
coverage. There are many management control-related Asia, Europe, Latin America, Oceania, as well as
ethical issues, and both erstwhile and recent scandals North America.
across industries, including the automobile and bank-
ing sectors, but also the public and not-for-profit sec- The cases permit the exploration of the manage-
tors, clearly suggest the need to develop managers’ and ment control issues in a broad range of settings.
prospective managers’ ethical reasoning skills more Included are cases on both large and small firms, man-
fully. Related to this is coverage of corporate govern- ufacturing and service firms, domestic-focused and
ance, to which we also devote a chapter. multinational firms, and for-profit and not-for-profit
Fifth, the important concepts, theories, and issues organizations. The cases present issues faced by per-
are not discussed just in abstract terms. They are illus- sonnel in both line and staff roles at corporate, divi-
trated with a large number of real-world examples, far sional, and functional levels of the organization, as
more than typically included in any other MCS text- well as by members of boards of directors. Instructors
book. The examples make the textual discussion more can use this set of cases to teach a management control
concrete and bring the subject to life. course that is broad in scope or one that is more nar-
Finally, the mix of cases provided here is different rowly focused (for example, MCSs in service organiza-
from those included in other MCS textbooks in four tions by focusing on the cases from the retail, financial,
important ways: healthcare, education and other service sectors).
The cases provide considerable scheduling flexibility.
● Nearly all of the cases are real (that is, they describe
Most of the cases cut across multiple topic areas because
the facts of an actual situation) although some of them
MCSs are inherently multidimensional. For example,
are disguised (that is, they do not use the company’s
the classroom focus for the Statoil case in Chapter 11
real name and/or use scaled figures/data to avoid iden-
might be on performance measurement, as Statoil uses
tification or to protect data confidentiality). The rela-
a key-performance-indicator (KPI) structure that is
tively small number of cases that do not describe the
“balanced scorecard”-like. Or it could be on Statoil’s
(disguised) facts of an actual situation are “vignettes”
planning and budgeting system, which separates the
that are, even so, almost always based on an observed
functions of target setting, forecasting and resource
situation but do not describe all of it. Instead, they
allocation using the principles of “Beyond Budgeting.”
focus on a particular (narrower) issue. Reality (and
To illustrate the latter further or in more depth, Statoil
lack of disguise where possible) enhance student inter-
could be followed (or preceded) by the Mainfreight
est and learning about, for example, types of indus-
case, which offers ample opportunity for students to dis-
tries, companies, and organizational roles.
cuss and critically challenge the idea of beyond budget-
● Most of the cases (except the vignettes) include rich ing. In that context, both cases could be taught related
descriptions of the context within which the MCSs to the subject matter in Chapter 8 on planning and budg-
are operating. The descriptions give students oppor- eting instead of with Chapter 11. Yet, there are still suf-
tunities to try to identify and address management ficient cases listed with Chapter 11 to focus on remedies
control problems and issues within the multidimen- to the myopia problem, such as the new Johansen’s case
sional situations within which practicing managers that describes a retail company that has adopted a bal-
cope with them. anced scorecard-based performance evaluation system.
● Most of the cases are of relatively recent vintage, Students also have to consider the industry characteris-
and the set of cases has been chosen to ensure tics, the organization structure, the characteristics of
xiv
Preface
the people in key positions, and the company’s history Engineering Group (an ESOP, or “employee stock own-
(e.g. a recent merger), so instructors can choose to use ership plan,” company), or in relevant control-related
the Statoil case, say, when they wish to focus on the roles, such as corporate risk officers (Andrew G. Scav-
effects of one or more of these factors on the design of ell, CRO).
MCSs. As a consequence, the ordering of the cases is not In developing the materials for this fourth edition,
intended to be rigid. Many alternatives are possible. A we have benefited from the insightful comments, help-
case overview sheet in the accompanying Instructors ful suggestions, and cases of many people. Ken owes
Manual to this text provides a matrix that helps instruc- special thanks to the two professors who served as his
tors disentangle the various relevant topics for which mentors at the Harvard Business School: William
each case could be fruitfully used. Bruns and Richard Vancil. Ken also appreciates the
In this fourth edition, we made various updates, valuable research assistance from Michelle Spaulding.
most obviously in those areas where the world has been And Wim is especially grateful to Olivia Hanyue Luo
moving fast during the past few years, particularly for her capable research assistance. At Pearson Educa-
since the 2008–2009 financial crisis and subsequent tion, we are indebted to Commissioning Editors Caitlin
economic recession. This includes changes in incentive Lisle and Rebecca Pedley for their support of this revi-
systems (Chapter 9), cor porate gover nance sion project from start to finish. Finally, Abhishek
(Chapter 13), and also ethics-related concerns Agarwal of Aptara and Matthew Van Atta made very
(Chapter 15). Throughout the text, we incorporated detailed and helpful suggestions in copyediting the
recent research findings and updated the survey statis- manuscript.
tics and examples provided. We also added some new, We thank the Asia Case Research Center at the Uni-
exciting cases. Twenty-one of the 70 cases included in versity of Hong Kong for granting permission to use two
this edition are new, and an additional 12 were revised of their Poon Kam Kai Series cases (PCL and Sunshine
or brought up to date. Some of the new cases cover rela- Fashion). We appreciate Darden Business Publishing’s
tively recent and/or perennially pivotal topics, such as help with their permission for use of the Johansen’s case,
“mobile monitoring” of employees (Witsky and Associ- and we also thank Winnie O’Grady for letting us use the
ates, Inc.); planning and budgeting f lexibility Mainfreight case. Finally, we thank our co-authors on
(Wessanen N.V.); alternatives to traditional budgeting several cases included in this text, the names of whom
(Mainfreight); project management (The Stimson are listed with the cases.
Company); comprehensive multi-criteria performance In closing, we wish to acknowledge that there is cer-
evaluations (Johansen’s); “hands-on” relative perfor- tainly no one best way to convey the rich subjects related
mance evaluations using real-world data (Fine Harvest to MCSs. We have presented one useful framework in
Restaurant Group); as well as crucial ethical considera- the best way we know how, but we welcome comments
tions (Ethics@Cisco). Others were intended to address about the content or organization of the text, or regard-
the topics in new and different settings, such as King ing any errors or omissions. Please direct them to us.
xv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We are grateful to the following for permission to repro- Times (January 31, 2003), p. B5 (Morin, M.). Extract
duce copyright material: on page 16 from ‘German Regulator Warns Deutsche
Bank on Commodity Trading’, The Financial Times
Figures (June 19, 2014), © The Financial Times Limited, All
Figures 7.1, 7.2, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 14.1, and 14.2: from Rights Reserved. Extract on page 17: from ‘Rio Tinto
Modern Management Control Systems: Text and Cases, Shifts to Driverless Trucks in Australia’, The Financial
Prentice Hall (Merchant, K. A. 1998), pp. 308, 309, Times (October 19, 2015), © The Financial Times Lim-
388, 390, 391, 640, and 642, respectively; MER- ited, All Rights Reserved. Extract on page 87: from
CHANT, KENNETH A., MODERN MANAGEMENT ‘Manage Like a Spymaster’, The Economist (August 29,
CONTROL SYSTEMS: TEXT & CASES, 1st Ed., © 1998. 2015), online at econ.st/1U8j8KK, The Economist by
Reprinted and electronically reproduced by permission ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER LTD.; reproduced with per-
of Pearson Education, Inc., New York, NY. mission of ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER LTD. in the for-
mat Educational/Instructional Program via Copyright
Tables Clearance Center. Extract on page 88: from Association
Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, 7.1, 7.2, 9.1, 10.1, 10.2, of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2014, online at www.
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1998), pp. 30, 31, 130, 166, 224, 253, 303, 306, 427, ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER LTD.; reproduced with per-
545, 546, 547, p. 547, and 548, respectively; MER- mission of ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER LTD. in the for-
CHANT, KENNETH A., MODERN MANAGEMENT mat Educational/Instructional Program via Copyright
CONTROL SYSTEMS: TEXT & CASES, 1st Ed., © 1998. Clearance Center. Extract on page 100: from ‘Method
Reprinted and electronically reproduced by permission in the Madness of the Alibaba Cult’, The Financial Times
of Pearson Education, Inc., New York, NY. (September 7, 2014). Extract on page 131: from ‘Tesco
Monitors Employees with Motorola Armbands’,
Text Business Week (February 13, 2013), online at www.
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Ones Pushing Ethical Boundaries’, The Financial Times tors-employees-with-motorola-arm-bands. Extract on
(September 25, 2015), © The Financial Times Limited, page 132: from Report to the Nations on Occupational
All Rights Reserved. Extracts on pages 5 and 6: from Fraud and Abuse 2014 Global Fraud Study, Association
‘Atlanta’s Schools – the Reckoning’, The Economist of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2014, online at www.
(April 6, 2013), online at www.economist.com. Extract acfe.com/rttn/docs/2014 -report-to-nations.pdf.
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Toshiba’, The Financial Times (July 16, 2015), © The Complacency? Kill Your Stupid Rules’, Forbes (October
Financial Times Limited, All Rights Reserved. Extract 30, 2013) with the permission of Lisa Bodell, CEO
on page 6: from ‘Scathing Report Says Toshiba CEOs futurethink, author of Why Simple Wins. Case Study on
Had Role in Accounting Scandal‘, The Financial Times page 183: This case was prepared by Grace Loo (Lao)
(July 20, 2015), © The Financial Times Limited, All under the supervision of Professor Neale O’Connor,
Rights Reserved. Extract on page 6: from ‘Deutsche Copyright © by The Asia Case Research Centre, The
Bank in $6bn “Fat Finger” Slip-Up’, The Financial Times University of Hong Kong. Extract on page 188: from
(October 19, 2015), © The Financial Times Limited, ‘CFO Insights: Can Internal Audit Be a Command
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Accused of INS Shredding Spree’, The Los Angeles tt/1OidCMB. Extract on page 189: from ‘Banks Increase
xvi
Acknowledgements
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1FmAXiS. Extract on page 194: from ‘Tesco’s Account- Financial Times Limited, All Rights Reserved. Extracts
ing Problems Not So Funny’, The Economist (October 27, on page 439 and 497: from ‘Top Managers’ Pay Reveals
2014), The Economist by ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER Weak Link to Value’, The Financial Times (December
LTD., reproduced with permission of ECONOMIST 28, 2014), online at on.ft.com/1FmAXiS. Extract on
NEWSPAPER LTD. in the format Educational/Instruc- page 487: from ‘The Accounting Wizardry behind
tional Program via Copyright Clearance Center. Extract Banks’ Strong Earnings’, Bloomberg (January 14, 2014),
on page 200: from ‘Insiders and Outsiders’, The Econo- online at bloom.bg/1mc0IcA. Extract on page 488:
mist (November 18, 2010), pp. 7–9, The Economist by from ‘Unicorns Beware: Markets Get It Wrong on Tech
ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER LTD., reproduced with per- Valuations’, The Financial Times (November 13, 2015),
mission of ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER LTD. in the for- online at on.ft.com/1FmAXiS, © The Financial Times
mat Educational/Instructional Program via Copyright Limited, All Rights Reserved. Extract on page 489:
Clearance Center. Case Study on page 205: prepared by from ‘China Seeks End to Gold Medal Fixation’, The
Grace Loo under the supervision of Professor Neale Financial Times (January 27, 2015), online at on.ft.
O’Connor, Copyright © by The Asia Case Research com/1FmAXiS, © The Financial Times Limited, All
Centre, The University of Hong Kong. Extract on page Rights Reserved. Extract on page 489: from ‘HSBC Suf-
238: from ‘How Corporate Culture Affects the Bottom fers 20% Fall in Profits’, The Financial Times (May 7,
Line’, Duke’s Fuqua School of Business News Release 2014), online at on.ft.com/1FmAXiS, © The Financial
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id=2805602. Extract on page 238: from ‘VW Needs Limited, All Rights Reserved. Extract on page 491:
More Therapy to Change Its Flawed Mindset’, The from ‘Fidelity Challenges Companies on Long-term
Financial Times (December 14, 2015), online Incentives’, The Financial Times (September 22, 2013),
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ited, All Rights Reserved. Extract on page 240: from Limited, All Rights Reserved. Case Study on page 516:
‘Will the Affordable Care Act Affect Doctors? Yes’, The Copyright 2016 by the University of Virginia Darden
Heritage Foundation (June 26, 2013), online at www. School Foundation, Charlottesville, VA; All Rights
heritage.org (Moffit, R. E., PhD). Extract on page 326: Reserved. Case Study on page 526: Copyright © Win-
from ‘The Quantified Serf’, The Economist (March 7, nie O’Grady; All Rights Reserved. Extract on page 669:
2015), The Economist by ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER from ‘New Code of Conduct for Internal Auditors’, The
LTD., reproduced with permission of ECONOMIST Financial Times (September 9, 2012), online at on.ft.
NEWSPAPER LTD. in the format Educational/Instruc- com/1FmAXiS, © The Financial Times Limited, All
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www.planbudgetforecast.com. Extract on page 392: PAPER LTD., reproduced with permission of ECONO-
from ‘Executives Ask: How and Why Should Firms and MIST NEWSPAPER LTD. in the format Educational/
Their Employees Set Goals’, Academy of Management Instructional Program via Copyright Clearance Center.
Executive, 18, no. 4 (November 2004), pp. 122–3 (Kerr, Extract on page 722: from ‘Credit Suisse Spooked by
S. 2004). Extract on page 406: from ‘Bonuses and the What Lurks Within’, The Financial Times (March 25,
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xvii
Acknowledgements
Reserved Worldwide, License numbers 4032150712139 Street Journal, Copyright © 2015 Dow Jones & Com-
and 4032150524598. Extract on page 755: from ‘Sus- pany, Inc., All Rights Reserved Worldwide, License num-
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xviii
SECTION I
The Control Function
of Management
1
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CHAPTER 1
Management and Control
● The computerized system operated by UBS to assist in risk management was not effective in
controlling the risk of unauthorized trading.
● The trade capture and processing system had significant deficiencies, which Adoboli
exploited in order to conceal his unauthorized trading. The system allowed trades to be
booked to an internal counterparty without sufficient details, there were no effective meth-
ods in place to detect trades at material off-market prices, and there was a lack of integration
between systems.
● There was an understanding amongst personnel supporting the trading desk that the opera-
tions division’s main role was that of facilitation. They focused mainly on efficiency as
opposed to risk control, and they did not adequately challenge the front office.
● There was inadequate front office supervision. The supervision arrangements were poorly
executed and ineffective.
● The trading desk breached the risk limits set for their desk without being disciplined for
doing so. These limits represented a key control and defined the maximum level of risk that
the desk could enter into at a given time. This created a situation in which risk taking was not
actively discouraged or penalized by those with supervisory responsibility.
Chapter 1 • Management and Control
● Failing to investigate the underlying reasons for the substantial increase in profitability of
the desk despite the fact that this could not be explained by reference to the end-of-day risk
positions.
● Profit and loss suspensions to the value of $1.6 billion were requested by Adoboli, and these
were accepted without challenge or escalation. The combined factors of unexplained profit-
ability and loss suspensions should have indicated the need for greater scrutiny.
The FSA report concluded that these failings were particularly serious because:8
● Market confidence was put at risk, given the sudden announcement to the market and size of
the losses announced. Negative announcements, such as this, put at risk the confidence
which investors have in financial markets.
● The systems and controls failings revealed serious weaknesses in the firm’s procedures,
management systems and internal controls.
● The failings enabled Adoboli to commit financial crime.
Global regulators have similarly exposed flaws in banks’ internal control systems that
allowed traders to manipulate interest rates, such as LIBOR, around the world.9 To add, Stuart
Gulliver, the chief executive of HSBC, the largest financial institution in Europe, admitted that
“our anti-money-laundering controls should have been stronger and more effective, and we
failed to spot and deal with unacceptable behavior.”10
The press headlines to which these examples are selectively referenced speak for themselves.
Of course, not all banks have been entangled in each and every issue. However, that the list of
those being caught in these nets has been so long, sparing few, is surprising for organizations
whose reputations are among their most valuable assets. Failures of this type and magnitude
also damage the integrity of the wider market and financial system on a global scale. But these
failures have also been costly money-wise, where the wave of fines and lawsuits that has swept
through the financial sector since the financial crisis has cost big banks a whopping $260 bil-
lion, according to research from Morgan Stanley. The report also suggests that “actions taken
by banks to prevent future litigation issues include everything from changing remuneration
[compensation] policies [which we discuss under the rubric of results controls in Chapter 2 and
incentive systems in Chapter 9] to a greater focus on ‘non-financial metrics’ [Chapter 11], adding
compliance staff [Chapters 3 and 14], to elevating chief risk officers to boards [Chapter 13] and
using ‘robo-surveillance’ in trading rooms [a form of action controls which we discuss in Chap-
ter 3]” (brackets added).11 Clearly, the issues illustrated here touch on, and cut across, many of
the issues we discuss in this text.
To add, though, here is a quote from a Financial Times columnist that builds nicely on the
above but extends it to other sectors:
It turns out that bankers may not be alone. The traders who rigged Libor and foreign
exchange rates cheated clients out of money. Volkswagen, we now know, deliberately
polluted our air. The carmaker had a choice: install additional emissions cleaning equip-
ment; admit that its diesel cars were not very fuel efficient; or spew out illegal amounts of
nitrogen oxide. It chose the last of these options, and covered it up by designing soft-
ware to deceive the US regulators. […] This round-the-world tour of fraud also takes in
Toshiba. The nuclear-to-semiconductor conglomerate was hit by a record fine from
Japan’s stock exchange and ordered to improve its governance and internal controls, in
the wake of a $2bn accounting scandal. […] Not even the tech industry has proved
immune. European researchers revealed this week that Google has been charging adver-
tisers for having their ads seen on YouTube, even when fraud-detection systems discover
that the ‘viewer’ is a robot. That practice is clearly not in the same league as rate-rigging,
4
Management and Control
years of accounting fraud or emission test deceit. But the disclosure reinforces a grow-
ing sense that companies around the world are pushing ethical boundaries [which we
discuss in Chapter 15].12
Another article commented that the issues at VW were predictable because of VW’s lax board-
room controls (which we discuss in Chapter 13) and its peculiar corporate culture (Chapter 3):
“The scandal clearly also has to do with structural issues at VW … There have been warnings
about VW’s corporate governance for years, but they didn’t take it to heart and now you see the
result,” says Alexander Juschus, director at IVOX, the German proxy adviser.13
Effective cultures, structures, and controls are quintessential as the above examples suggest,
but not only in the for-profit sector, as the next example illustrates (we discuss non-profit organ-
izations in Chapter 16). Consider the case of an award-winning teacher who at the time headed
Atlanta’s public schools, and who had been praised by the American Association of School
Administrators for the significant gains in student achievement she had overseen, where Atlan-
ta’s schoolchildren made sizable gains on the standardized tests used to determine yearly pro-
gress. At one school, for instance, the share of 13-year-olds who passed the test’s maths section
rose from 24% to 86%, and the share of those who “exceeded expectations” rose from 1% to
46% – both in a single year. However,
[…] the state of Georgia alleges that those remarkable leaps rested on neither pedagogy
nor determined study, but something far more invidious: cheating. A report by a special
investigative team […] found widespread evidence of cheating […]. Sometimes teachers
gave pupils the correct answers. Sometimes they erased pupils’ answers after the test and
filled in the correct ones themselves. The investigative team ferreted out cheating by ana-
lyzing erasure marks on test sheets. They flagged classrooms with an average number of
wrong-to-right erasures more than three standard deviations above the state average. The
chance of that occurring randomly is one in 370. More than half of Atlanta’s elementary and
middle schools had such classrooms, and many had erasures more than 20 to 50 standard
deviations above the norm. Of the 178 teachers accused of having taken part in the cheat-
ing, 82 confessed. [The head], said the report, either knew or should have known what was
going on. […] Prosecutors did not charge [the head] with taking part in the cheating, but
with putting “unreasonable pressure” on principals and teachers to do well, and for creat-
ing “an environment where achieving the desired end result was more important than the
students’ education.”14
This is an example of results controls (Chapter 2) and, clearly, not only the functional but also the
behavioral displacements that they can create (Chapters 5 and 11), in part due to target pressure
(Chapter 8), but also employees’ and organizations’ moral failures (Chapters 3 and 15).
Excessive target pressure was also identified as a culprit in the accounting scandal at Toshiba
that was mentioned in passing earlier:
In April 2015, an improper accounting scandal came to light that inflated profits by well
over $1bn at Toshiba, the Japanese industrial conglomerate, which makes laptops, mem-
ory chips and nuclear reactors. A panel of external lawyers and accountants that was
appointed to investigate was said to have uncovered emails showing that Hisao Tanaka,
chief executive, and Norio Sasaki, former chief executive and then vice-chairman,
“instructed employees to delay the booking of costs to make the financial figures look bet-
ter” […] and that “the problems were worsened by reporting procedures for projects that
were time-consuming and old-fashioned. Some of the paperwork was being done by junior
employees in their first few years at the company.” Experts further commented that “the
accounting issues at Toshiba also exposed concerns around Japanese corporate govern-
ance practices [which we discuss in Chapter 13], including the weak role of external
5
Chapter 1 • Management and Control
directors and the extensive power that many former chief executives continue to exer-
cise.”15 The scathing panel report also detailed what it said “were ‘institutional’ accounting
malpractices [Chapter 5] and a corporate culture [Chapter 3] in which employees were
afraid to speak out against bosses’ push for increasingly unachievable profits [Chapter 8].
[…] Pressures to meet aggressive, short-term profit targets [Chapter 11] – known as ‘the
challenge’ – existed from the presidency of Atsutoshi Nishida, who headed the company
from 2005 to 2009 and remained an adviser. Those pressures escalated as the company’s
earnings deteriorated in the wake of the global financial crisis and […] the Fukushima
nuclear accident. The panel declared that Mr. Tanaka and Mr. Sasaki were aware that prof-
its were being inflated and did not take any action to end the improper accounting. In some
instances, the report added, top executives pressured employees to achieve their targets
with suggestions that the company may withdraw from underperforming businesses if they
were not met. But the panel found no evidence any of the three current and former chief
executives had given specific instructions to division chiefs to inflate profit figures.”16 They
described a corporate culture – one of exerting pressure on employees to meet aggres-
sive, short-term profit targets spanning three generations of chief executives – in which
employees were afraid to speak out against bosses when they pushed for unrealistic earn-
ings targets.17
Shareholders and customers are obvious victims of the current flood of bad news. They
are seeing their investments shrink, having their cars recalled and paying too much for
goods and services. But there is another set of losers: the employees and shareholders of
the companies that try to play fair. Back in the early 2000s, a company called WorldCom
upended the telecommunications industry by repeatedly posting profit margins that its
rivals simply could not match. Five big groups, including AT&T, responded by slashing
about 5 per cent of their combined workforces – more than 20,000 jobs. In 2002, WorldCom
was exposed as the US’s largest accounting fraud and its chief executive sentenced to jail.
However, the employees who were laid off at rival companies did not get their jobs back.18
[…] the scandal’s real casualties are Atlanta’s schoolchildren. Schools that cheated their
way to false improvements lost federal funds which could have been used to make actual
improvements. Because of their apparently high test scores, struggling pupils were denied
the help they needed and deserved. A generation of Atlanta’s students have, in fact, been
left behind.19
We discuss these impacts in the light of organizations’ corporate social responsibility and their
concerns about sustainability and the wider stakeholder communities in Chapter 16.
Not all control failures are as consequential, or of similar magnitude, as the examples listed
above; yet they can, and do, inflict costs and/or embarrassment. For example,
[…] this happened when Deutsche Bank paid $6 billion to a hedge fund client by mistake in
a ‘fat finger’ trade, where a junior member of the bank’s forex sales team, while his boss
was on holiday, processed a gross value instead of a net value, meaning that the trade had
‘too many zeroes’. Whereas the bank recovered the money from the U.S. hedge fund the
next day, the incident was “an embarrassing blow to the bank” and it also “raised fresh
questions about Deutsche’s operational controls and risk management.” The $6bn error
6
Management and Control
also raised questions about why it was not spotted under the bank’s ‘four eyes principle’
[an action control discussed in Chapter 3], requiring every trade to be reviewed by another
person before being processed.20
Other examples of this type also occur in the public sector and do not always involve money
being inadvertently wired. This happened at the Bank of England (BoE), where its head of press
mistakenly sent an email to the media revealing that officials were quietly researching the
impact of Britain’s exit from the European Union, a major blunder given the secrecy of this
study. What had caused this mistake? The “auto-complete” tool in BoE’s internal email service.
The BoE confirmed that following this incident, it had switched off auto-complete from its email
system – that is, staff now have to write the full name of the recipient of their email messages
rather than being automatically proposed through the Outlook auto-complete functionality –
“to preserve the security of its data.”21
Employees do not always have to steal or engage in fraudulent activities to cause harm.
Sometimes it suffices to just “fall asleep.” This happened when a bank teller was making a pay-
ment of €64.20, but as he fell asleep, he left his finger on the number 2 key, accidentally putting
through a payment of €22,222,222.22. The payment almost went through when the supervisor
who was supposed to be looking out for such mistakes allegedly failed to notice and approved
the transaction. The mistake was spotted only by another colleague who managed to correct it
before it was too late.22 As we will see, this is an example of a rather simple internal control
procedure. We discuss internal controls as one type of what we call action controls in Chapter 3,
and we discuss how tightly they should be applied in Chapter 4. The example further illustrates
that not every control problem involves fraud, yet adequate control systems must also be able to
prevent mistakes. Furthermore, when there are irregularities or control breaches, money or
incentives like bonuses are not always the motive for the wrongdoing. For example,
[…] two clerical workers at the Laguna Niguel, California-based service center of the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) were accused of destroying thousands of
immigration documents, including visa applications, passports, and other papers. Accord-
ing to the probe, the clerks started shredding unprocessed paperwork after an inventory
revealed a processing backlog of about 90,000 documents. A month later, the backlog was
reported to be zero. The shredding allegedly went on for about another month to keep the
backlog at zero, until INS officials discovered the shredding spree during an evening
shift.23
Although it is not entirely clear what the clerks’ motives were, there were no bonuses
involved here, and maybe they were concerned about keeping their job and/or also not doing
their job well or being lazy and cutting corners. Nonetheless, their actions were completely
inappropriate, and thus proper control systems are needed to mitigate such undesirable
behaviors.
However, more controls should not always be equated with better controls. When copious
MCSs are stifling, they can exacerbate rather than mitigate control problems. We discuss this
further in Chapters 4 and 5, where we consider not only direct, explicit, more easily quantifia-
ble, out-of-pocket costs, but also various types of indirect, implicit costs of tightening the con-
trols. For example, when financial irregularities were discovered at Eurostat, the European
Commission’s statistical service, it was not immediately clear whether these had occurred for
the personal enrichment of those involved; instead, some argued that the “secret accounts” may
at least initially have been set up to give Eurostat a way to pay for research quickly without
going through the Commission’s cumbersome procedures. Ironically, then, while the Commis-
sion had elaborate procedures to prevent financial fraud, these procedures may not only have
proved insufficient (because they clearly could be circumvented), they may actually have made
7
Chapter 1 • Management and Control
the problem worse. Because tortuous form-filling was required to request funds, requesters had
to jump through a number of bureaucratic hoops to get anything approved, and funds delivery
was notoriously slow, commission officials and staff may have taken to cutting corners and find-
ing “creative” ways to expedite the process. Of course, these “work-arounds” should be a red
flag for possible exploitation and potential improprieties, too.24
By this point, it should be no surprise that we are claiming, but also that it is widely accepted,
that good MCSs are important. Comparing the books and articles written on management con-
trol is difficult, however, because much of the MCS language is imprecise. The term “control” as
it applies to a management function does not have a universally accepted definition. An old, nar-
row view of a MCS is that of a simple cybernetic or regulating system involving a single feedback
loop analogous to a thermostat that measures the temperature, compares the measurement with
the desired standard, and, if necessary, takes a corrective action (turn on, or off, a furnace or air
conditioner). In a MCS feedback loop, managers measure performance, compare that measure-
ment with a pre-set performance standard, and, if necessary, take corrective actions.25
In this text, however, we take a broader view. Many management controls in common use,
such as direct supervision, employee selection and retention, and codes of conduct, do not
focus on measured performance. They focus instead on encouraging, enabling, or sometimes
forcing employees to act in the organization’s best interest. This is consistent with the observa-
tion that all the above examples have one key question in common: how can organizations of
all types ensure that their employees up and down the hierarchy carry out their jobs and
responsibilities properly? Moreover, some management controls are proactive rather than
reactive. Proactive means that the controls are designed to prevent problems before the organi-
zation suffers any adverse effects on performance. Examples of proactive controls include
planning processes, required expenditure approvals, segregation of duties, and restricted
access. Management control, then, includes all the devices or systems that managers use to
ensure the behaviors and decisions of their employees are consistent with the organization’s
objectives and strategies. The systems themselves are commonly referred to as management
control systems (MCSs).
Designed properly, MCSs influence employees’ behaviors in desirable ways and, conse-
quently, increase the probability that the organization will achieve its goals. Thus, the primary
function of management control is to influence behaviors in desirable ways. The benefit of man-
agement control is the increased probability that the organization’s objectives will be achieved.
Management control is the back end of the management process. This can be seen from the
various ways in which the broad topic of management is disaggregated.
Management
The literature includes many definitions of management. All relate to the processes of organiz-
ing resources and directing activities for the purpose of achieving organizational objectives.
Inevitably, those who study and teach management have broken the broad subject into smaller,
more discernable elements. Table 1.1 shows the most prominent classification schemes. The
first column identifies the primary management functions of the value chain: product or service
development, operations (manufacturing products or performing/delivering services), market-
ing/sales (finding buyers and making sure the products and services fulfill customer needs),
and finance (raising money). Virtually every management school offers courses focused on only
one, or only part of one, of these primary management functions.
8
Management and control
Finance Information
Source: K. A. Merchant, Modern Management Control Systems: Text and Cases (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998), p. 3.
The second column of Table 1.1 identifies the major types of resources with which managers
must work: people, money, machines, and information. Management schools also offer courses
organized using this classification. These courses are often called human resource manage-
ment, accounting and finance, production and operations management, and information sys-
tems, respectively. These are sometimes also referred to as the support management functions. 26
The term management control appears in the third column of Table 1.1, which separates the man-
agement functions along a process involving objective setting, strategy formulation, and manage-
ment control. Control, then, is the back end of the management process. The way we use the term
management control in this text has the same meaning as the terms execution and strategy imple-
mentation. In most organizations, focusing on improving MCSs will provide higher payoffs than
will focusing on improving strategy. A Fortune study showed that 7 out of 10 CEOs who fail do so not
because of bad strategy, but because of bad execution.27 The above examples reinforce this, too.
Many management courses, including business policy, strategic management, and manage-
ment control systems, focus on elements of the management process. To focus on the control
function of management, we must distinguish it from objective setting and strategy formulation.
Objective setting
Knowledge of objectives is a prerequisite for the design of any MCS and, indeed, for any pur-
poseful activities. Objectives do not have to be quantified and do not have to be financial,
although that is how they are commonly thought of in for-profit organizations. A not-for-
profit organization’s primary objective might be to provide shelter for homeless people, for
example; but even in these organizations, there have been calls to express the achievement
of these objectives in financial or quasi-financial terms, such as social return on invest-
ment. 28 However, many for-profit organizations also have nonfinancial objectives, such as
related to sustainability or personnel development and well-being (see Chapter 16). In any
organization, however, employees must have a basic understanding of what the organiza-
tion is trying to accomplish. Otherwise, no one could claim that any of the employees’ actions
are purposive, and no one could ever support a claim that the organization was successful.
In most organizations, the objectives are known. That is not to say that all employees always
agree unanimously as to how to balance their organizations’ responsibilities to all of their
stakeholders, including owners (equity holders), debtholders, employees, suppliers, customers,
and the society at large. They rarely do.29 That said, organizations develop explicit or implicit
compromise mechanisms to resolve conflicts among stakeholders and reach some level of
agreement about the objectives they will pursue. As Jason Luckhurst, managing director of
Practicus, a UK-based project-management recruitment firm, argues:
[To achieve organizational success], it takes a clear vision around which the entire busi-
ness [can] be designed, [and I] think it is something you should be able to communicate
9
Chapter 1 • Management and Control
simply to everyone, whether a client or [an employee]. Having a simple and easily under-
stood statement of intent is vital for setting clear objectives and targets.30
Strategy formulation
Having set the firm’s strategic intentions or objectives, strategies then define how organizations
should use their resources to meet these objectives. A well-conceived strategy guides employees
in successfully pursuing their organization’s objectives; it conveys to employees what they are
supposed to be doing. Or, as Mr. Luckhurst at Practicus states:
All the planning in areas as diverse as marketing, branding, financing and training, is
designed around [our] objective – as are [our] incentive [systems]. We have a detailed road
map, but it starts with a simple vision that everyone can understand and buy into. Every-
thing else we do comes on the back of those goals. In effect, we can reverse-engineer the
business to those objectives.31
Many organizations develop formal strategies through systematic, often elaborate, planning
processes (which we discuss further in Chapter 8). Put differently, they have what can be called
an intended strategy. However, strategies can sometimes be left largely unspecified. As such,
some organizations do not have formal, written strategies; instead they try to respond to oppor-
tunities that present themselves. Major elements of these organizations’ strategies emerge from
a series of interactions between management, employees, and the environment; from decisions
made spontaneously; and from local experimentation designed to learn what works well. None-
theless, if some decision-making consistency exists, a strategy can be said to have been formed,
regardless of whether managers planned or even intended that particular consistency. In that
sense, strategic visions sometimes come about through dynamic organizational processes
rather than through formalized strategic planning.32
Not even the most elaborate strategic visions and statements are complete to the point where
they detail every desired action and contemplate every possible contingency. However, for pur-
poses of designing MCSs, it is useful to have strategies that are as specific and detailed as pos-
sible, if those strategies can be kept current. The formal strategic statements make it easier for
management both to identify the feasible management control alternatives and to implement
them effectively. The management controls can be targeted to the organization’s critical success
factors, such as developing new products, keeping costs down, or growing market share, rather
than aiming more generally at improving profitability in otherwise largely unspecified ways.
Formal strategic statements are not a sufficient condition for success, however. As Adrian
Grace, managing director of Bank of Scotland – Corporate, states:
I have seen businesses with 400-page documents outlining their strategy and it’s clear
they should have spent less time outlining the vision and more time thinking about how
they will deliver on it. You can have the best vision in the world but if you can’t put it into
effect, you are wasting your time.33
It is on the execution side of the management process that MCSs play a critical role. Jason
Luckhurst explained:
The difference between merely having a strategic vision and achieving strategic success is
having a detailed understanding of what that vision means for every level of the business –
how much funding you need, the branding and marketing strategy, which channels you will
develop, how many people you need in which areas and when and what the organizational
structure will be. It is also important to revisit the vision often and be aware of how close
you are to achieving it at any given stage. This helps everyone in the company to stay
focused.34
10
Management and control
Management control
Management control focuses on execution, and it involves addressing the general question: Are
our employees likely to behave appropriately? This question can be decomposed into several
parts:
Finally, if the answer to any of these questions is negative, what can be done to solve the man-
agement control problems? All organizations who must rely on their employees to accomplish
organizational objectives must deal with these basic management control issues. Addressing
management control issues, therefore, involves reflecting on how to influence, direct, or align
employees’ behaviors toward the achievement of organizational objectives consistent with the
espoused strategy.
From a management control perspective, strategies should be viewed as useful but not
absolutely necessary to the proper design of MCSs. When strategies are formulated more
clearly, more control alternatives become feasible, and it becomes easier to implement each
form of management control effectively. Managers can, however, design and operate some
types of MCSs without having a clear strategy in mind. As Adrian Grace, managing director
of Bank of Scotland – Corporate, proffers: “If you don’t have [a strategy] but you know how to
deliver, you might still make it. Success in business is 25% strategy but 75% execution.” 35
Or, the other way around, to devise a strategy and write it down is one thing; it is another
thing entirely to make the plan work in practice. That said, there is some evidence that
organizations with formal systems for managing the execution of strategy outperform those
that do not. 36
Behavioral emphasis
Management control involves managers taking steps to help ensure that the employees do what
is best for the organization. This is an important purpose because it is people in the organiza-
tion who make things happen. Management controls are necessary to guard against the possi-
bilities that people will do something the organization does not want them to do, or fail to do
something they should do. For example, aiming to achieve greater cost control is open to ques-
tion without reference to people because costs do not control themselves; people control them.
As many examples throughout the text will illustrate, employees can work against or around
systems, thereby leaving many objectives unmet or producing unintended consequences.
This behavioral orientation has long been recognized by practitioners. For example, Roman
Stanek, chief executive of GoodData in San Francisco, a business analytics company, acknowl-
edged that:
Having a vision and having confidence doesn’t mean anything unless you’re able to com-
municate it to your team […]. The ability to communicate well didn’t come easily for me. I
always assumed that everybody would see things the same way I see them, and now I
understand it takes a lot of time to get people aligned.37
If all employees could always be relied on to do what is best for the organization, there would be
no need for a MCS. But employees are sometimes unable or unwilling to act in the organization’s
best interest, so managers must take steps to guard against the occurrence of undesirable
behaviors and encourage desirable behaviors.
11
Chapter 1 • Management and Control
Given the behavioral focus of controls, the next logical question to ask is: What is it about the
employees on whom the organization must rely that creates the need to implement MCSs? The
causes of the needs for control can be classified into three main categories: lack of direction,
motivational problems, and personal limitations.
Lack of direction
Some employees perform inadequately simply because they do not know what the organiza-
tion wants from them. When this lack of direction occurs, the likelihood of the desired behav-
iors occurring will be haphazard or random. Thus, one function of management control
involves informing employees as to how they can direct their contributions to the fulfillment
of organizational objectives. Indeed, this is also the key point that came through in the quote
from Stanek above.
Lack of direction is not a trivial issue in many organizations, although it is often taken for
granted (as the quote from Stanek also suggests). For example, survey evidence collected by
KPMG, a big-four professional services company providing audit, tax, and advisory services,
from approximately 4,000 US employees spanning all levels of job responsibility across a wide
range of industries and organizational sizes revealed that 55% of the sample respondents had a
lack of understanding of the standards that apply to their jobs. 38 Moreover, a study of 414
World-at-Work members in mostly managerial positions at large North-American companies
suggested that 81% of the respondents believe that senior managers in their organizations
understand the value drivers of their business strategy; 46% say that middle management
understands these drivers; but just 13% believe non-management employees understand them.
This indicates that organizational goals are not cascading down to all levels in the organization.
And while 79% of the respondents in this study believed that their employees’ goals are aligned
with organizational goals, 44% also stated that employees set goals based on their own views
rather than direction from leadership.39
Another survey from KPMG asked what factors might cause managers and employees to
engage in misconduct, which, as we will see across several chapters in this text, is an impor-
tant management control problem. The answer, in fifth place and mentioned by 59% of the
respondents, was “a lack of understanding of the standards that apply to their jobs.”40 Another
survey of 5,000 respondents, including “techies” (e.g. software developers or engineers), indi-
cated that only 28% of the techies said they understood their companies’ vision compared with
(also only) 43% of non-techies.41 And, in a university one of the authors of this text is familiar
with, a staff survey revealed that only half of the employees responded affirmatively to the
question whether “they had a clear understanding of the purpose and objectives of [the univer-
sity],” whereas (also only) 68% said this to be the case for the objectives of their department.42
All told, then, it should not be taken for granted that employees have a clear understanding of
direction. To the contrary, the survey evidence suggests that a lack of direction may be quite a
common occurrence.
Motivational problems
Even if employees understand what is expected of them, some do not perform as the organi
zation expects because of motivational problems. Motivational problems are common
because individual and organizational objectives do not naturally coincide – individuals are
self-interested.
12
Causes of management control problems
Employees sometimes act in their own personal interest at the expense of their organiza-
tion’s interest. Frederick Taylor, one of the major figures in the scientific management movement
that took place in the early twentieth century, wrote: “Hardly a competent worker can be found
who does not devote a considerable amount of time to studying just how slowly he can work and
still convince his employer that he is going at a good pace.”43 Such effort aversion and other self-
interested behaviors are still a problem today. Gary Gill, the author of KPMG’s Fraud Barometer
for Australia, believes that broad economic conditions have a significant effect on fraud levels:
“It goes up following a boom period. People want to maintain their standard of living, even if it
means criminal activity.”44 Another survey suggests that fraud is on the increase in the United
Kingdom’s public sector as austerity programs imply personnel reductions and fewer resources
being spent on internal controls, according to a report from PwC, a big-four competitor of
KPMG.45
Overall, survey evidence suggests that wasting, mismanaging, and misappropriating organi-
zational resources, among other types of employee misconduct, are prevalent in most organiza-
tions.46 Even ostensibly inconsequential forms of wasting time on the job can have high costs.
Surfing the Internet while on the job, for example, has been estimated to have cost US employ-
ers in the billions of dollars per year.47 All told, survey participants in the most recent report by
the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners estimated that the typical organization loses 5%
of its annual revenue to fraud. Applied to the estimated 2014 Gross World Product, this figure
translates to a potential global fraud loss of more than $3.7 trillion.48 Staggering as these statis-
tics may be, they suggest that it should not be taken for granted that employees will always reli-
ably act with the best interest of their organizations in mind. Because of this, the costs to
organizations are nontrivial, to say the least.
Indeed, the most serious forms of employees’ misdirected behaviors, such as fraud, can have
severe impacts, including deteriorated employee morale, impaired business relations, lost rev-
enues from damaged reputations, investments in improving control procedures, legal fees and
settlements of litigation, fines and penalties to regulatory agencies, and losses from plummet-
ing stock prices. Many of the examples that we included at the start of this chapter illustrate
this,49 and various fraud or integrity surveys, some of which have been conducted over many
years by major organizations, reinforce this with statistics.50
These huge fraud costs can be traced back to human weaknesses but also, and importantly,
as we will see later in this text, to the lack of effective MCSs. Anecdotal assertions abound. For
example, one manager claimed, rather brashly, that “every single person in your [business] is
trying to steal from you.”51 Another manager’s estimate, while more measured, still suggests
that:
Between 10 and 20% of a company’s employees will steal anything that isn’t nailed down.
Another 20% will never steal; they would say it is morally wrong. The vast majority of peo-
ple are situationally honest; they won’t steal if there are proper controls.52
Regardless of these opinions, one might argue that “stealing” is a rather literal, peculiar, and
perhaps too extreme or negative type of behavior to illustrate self-interest. Taking “stealing”
less literally, many other forms of misaligned behaviors occur when employees, for example,
manipulate their performance reports, either by falsifying the data or by taking decisions that
artificially boost performance, with the intention of earning higher, but undeserved, incentive
pay (see also Chapter 15). The most common cause of this is reported to be pressure to do
“whatever it takes” to meet business targets.53 This goes to the heart of results controls (which
we discuss in Chapter 2) and related performance targets (Chapter 8) and incentives (Chapter 9).
Well-designed MCSs are needed to protect organizations against these behaviors.
However, in addition to focusing on how MCSs can be used to prevent or mitigate these
negative or dysfunctional behaviors, this text’s emphasis is also, even primarily, on how MCSs
13
Chapter 1 • Management and Control
can be employed to motivate positive or productive behaviors; that is, how they encourage
employees to work consistently hard to accomplish organizational objectives. As we will dis-
cuss further below, whenever feasible, motivation should be the primary focus of effective
MCSs, most commonly brought about through results controls (Chapter 2) while also providing
any necessary behavioral constraints and/or mitigating any behavioral displacements through
a well-designed combination or “configuration” of action and personnel/cultural controls
(Chapter 3).54
Personal limitations
The final behavioral problem that MCSs must address occurs when employees who know
what is expected of them, and may be highly motivated to perform well, are simply unable to
perform well because of any number of other limitations. Some of these limitations are per-
son-specific. They may be caused by a lack of aptitude, training, experience, stamina, or
knowledge for the tasks at hand. An example is the too-common situation where employees
are promoted above their level of competence; that is, when employees are “over their
heads.” Sometimes jobs are just not designed properly, causing even the most physically fit
and apt employees to become tired or stressed, leading to on-the-job accidents and decision
errors.
Regarding lack of training, for example, Illinois-based Ace Hardware was forced to restate
its earnings for four fiscal years because of a $152 million accounting error made by a poorly
trained employee, who incorrectly entered accounts in ledgers in the Finance department at
the company’s headquarters. Ace CEO Ray Griffith stated: “We are embarrassed by it. We did
not provide the training, oversight or checks and balances to help that person do (the) job.”55
Errors such as these are not uncommon. For example, when Bank of America, a global US-
based bank, disclosed that it had made a significant error in the way it calculates a crucial
measure of its financial health, which led the bank to report that it had $4 billion more capital
than it actually had, the error raised serious questions about the “quality of its accounting
employees.”56 Similarly, at Tesco, the largest UK supermarket chain, when it announced to
have overstated its expected profits by £250 million, one commentator observed that “even if
there was no fraudulent intent and the problems stem from a misunderstanding of the rules
[…], the apparent scale of the error suggests that, at the very least, Tesco’s internal controls
need a thorough overhaul.”57
Moreover, research in psychology and behavioral economics suggests that all individuals,
even intelligent, well-trained, and experienced ones, face limitations in their abilities to per-
ceive new problems, to remember important facts, and to process information properly (or
rationally). In looking at the future, it has been shown, for example, that people tend to overes-
timate the likelihood of common events and events that have occurred relatively recently (both
of which are easier to remember) as compared with relatively rare events and those that have
not occurred recently. Such biases may, for example, affect employees’ propensities to assess
risks by biasing their estimates of either the likelihood or impact, or both, of certain risk events.
Sometimes training can be used to reduce the severity of these limitations. Nonetheless, these
limitations are a problem because they reduce the probability that employees will make
the correct decisions or that they will correctly assess the problems about which decisions
should be made.58
These three management control problems – lack of direction, motivational problems, and
personal limitations – can obviously occur simultaneously and in any combination. However,
all that is required to call for the necessity of effective MCSs is that at least one of these prob-
lems occurs, which will almost inevitably be the case in complex organizations as the above
arguments and examples have suggested.
14
Control problem avoidance
To have a high probability of success, organizations must therefore maintain good management
control. Good control means that management can be reasonably confident that no major
unpleasant surprises will occur. The label out of control is used to describe a situation where
there is a high probability of poor performance, either overall or in a specific performance area,
despite having a sound strategy in place.
However, even good management control still allows for some probability of failure because
perfect control does not exist except perhaps in very unusual circumstances. Perfect control
would require complete assurance that all control systems are foolproof and all individuals on
whom the organization must rely always act in the best way possible. Perfect control is obvi-
ously not a realistic expectation because it is virtually impossible to install MCSs so well
designed that they guarantee good behaviors. Furthermore, because MCSs are costly, it is
rarely, if ever, cost effective to try and implement enough controls even to approach the ideal-
ized perfect control.
The cost of not having a perfect control system can be called a control loss. It is the difference
between the performance that is theoretically possible given the strategy selected and the per-
formance that can be reasonably expected with the MCSs in place. More or better MCSs should
be implemented only if the benefits by which they would reduce the control loss exceed the
costs. Except in cases where the consequences of failure are incalculable, optimal control can be
said to have been achieved if the control losses are expected to be smaller than the cost of imple-
menting more controls. Because of control costs, perfect control is rarely the optimal outcome
(or even conceivable). The benchmark, therefore, is adequate control rather than perfect con-
trol, except again in cases where failure is not an option and where control must be uncompro-
misingly focused on avoiding failure at any cost (such as in nuclear plants).
Assessing whether good control has been achieved must be future-oriented and objectives-
driven. It must be future-oriented because the goal is to have no unpleasant surprises in the
future; the past is not relevant except as a guide to the future, such as in terms of experiences or
lessons learned from control failures. It must be objectives-driven because the objectives repre-
sent what the organization seeks to attain. Nonetheless, assessing whether good control has
been achieved is difficult and subjective. It is difficult because the adequacy of management
control must be measured against a future that is inevitably difficult to predict, as are predic-
tions of possible unintended consequences of the controls. Good control also is not established
over an activity or entity with multiple objectives unless performance on all significant dimen-
sions has been considered. As difficult as this assessment of management control is, however, it
should be done because organizational success depends on good MCSs.
As the examples at the beginning of this chapter illustrate, organizations that fail to imple-
ment adequate MCSs can suffer loss or impairment of assets, deficient revenues, excessive costs,
inaccurate records, or reports that can lead to poor decisions, legal sanctions, or business dis-
ruptions. At the extreme, organizations that do not control performance on one or more critical
dimensions can fail.
15
Chapter 1 • Management and Control
Organizations can never avoid all their control problems, but they can often avoid some of them
by limiting exposure to certain types of problems and problem sources, or by reducing the max-
imum potential loss if the problems occur. Four prominent avoidance strategies are activity
elimination, automation, centralization, and risk sharing.
Activity elimination
Managers can sometimes avoid the control problems associated with a particular entity or
activity by turning over the potential risks, and the associated profits, to a third party through
such mechanisms as subcontracting, licensing agreements, or divestment. This form of avoid-
ance is called activity elimination.
Managers who are not able to control certain activities, perhaps because they do not have the
required resources, because they do not have a good understanding of the required processes,
or because they face legal or structural limitations, are those most likely to eliminate activities.
Here is an example:
When the German financial regulator ordered Deutsche Bank “to do more to ensure that
commodity prices cannot be manipulated by its traders,” the bank responded that it “has
since shut trading desks dedicated to energy, agriculture, dry bulk and freight and base
metals. Other commodity businesses have been transferred to Deutsche’s non-core bank
where they will be wound down or sold, while some parts remain active,” adding that “we
significantly scaled back our commodities business and exited entirely non-precious met-
als trading. As we have previously said, we continue to cooperate with authorities in their
industrywide review of certain benchmarks and are investing to further improve our control
environment.”59
When managers do not wish to avoid completely an area that they cannot control well, they are
wise at least to limit their investments, and hence (some of) their risks, in that area. An example is
cloud computing, which means that companies obtain computing resources (processing, storage,
messaging, databases, and so on) from outside, and pay only for what they use, rather than
develop their own computing infrastructure and run their own systems. With the increase in
demand for servers to store and process data, many companies would need to multiply their
server capacity manyfold, for which they sometimes have neither the money nor the skills, nor the
interest, because doing so falls outside of most companies’ core competencies. By using cloud
computing services, firms can leave all that to be managed by those who have the competencies
and, hence, can provide essential control over the process. Whereas this does not eliminate all
risks, it partially avoids some control problems related to data management and all that it entails.
Indeed, many companies have been expanding their use of cloud services, with growing
numbers running systems such as email services, human resources, and administrative pro-
cesses via the cloud, as well as data storage and backup. James Petter, UK managing director of
EMC, the data storage and software group, said: “Organizations move to the cloud for a number
of reasons, but they most often relate to agility, control and efficiency” (italics added). “More
than just hosting services, the cloud is ensuring availability and performance, protecting data
and helping businesses with change management by deploying functions and lessening disrup-
tion,” Joe King, senior vice-president at JDA, the supply chain software group, added.60
The economics-based literature that focuses on whether specific activities (transactions) can
be controlled more effectively through markets (external) or through organizational hierarchies
(internal) is known as transaction cost economics. A detailed examination of the theories and
evidence in this field of study is outside the scope of this text.61 We just note that the cost/benefit
tradeoffs of dealing with management control issues internally do not always favor arms-length,
market-based transactions or inter-organizational arrangements, and thus a careful balance has
16
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DANCE ON STILTS AT THE GIRLS’ UNYAGO, NIUCHI
I see increasing reason to believe that the view formed some time
back as to the origin of the Makonde bush is the correct one. I have
no doubt that it is not a natural product, but the result of human
occupation. Those parts of the high country where man—as a very
slight amount of practice enables the eye to perceive at once—has not
yet penetrated with axe and hoe, are still occupied by a splendid
timber forest quite able to sustain a comparison with our mixed
forests in Germany. But wherever man has once built his hut or tilled
his field, this horrible bush springs up. Every phase of this process
may be seen in the course of a couple of hours’ walk along the main
road. From the bush to right or left, one hears the sound of the axe—
not from one spot only, but from several directions at once. A few
steps further on, we can see what is taking place. The brush has been
cut down and piled up in heaps to the height of a yard or more,
between which the trunks of the large trees stand up like the last
pillars of a magnificent ruined building. These, too, present a
melancholy spectacle: the destructive Makonde have ringed them—
cut a broad strip of bark all round to ensure their dying off—and also
piled up pyramids of brush round them. Father and son, mother and
son-in-law, are chopping away perseveringly in the background—too
busy, almost, to look round at the white stranger, who usually excites
so much interest. If you pass by the same place a week later, the piles
of brushwood have disappeared and a thick layer of ashes has taken
the place of the green forest. The large trees stretch their
smouldering trunks and branches in dumb accusation to heaven—if
they have not already fallen and been more or less reduced to ashes,
perhaps only showing as a white stripe on the dark ground.
This work of destruction is carried out by the Makonde alike on the
virgin forest and on the bush which has sprung up on sites already
cultivated and deserted. In the second case they are saved the trouble
of burning the large trees, these being entirely absent in the
secondary bush.
After burning this piece of forest ground and loosening it with the
hoe, the native sows his corn and plants his vegetables. All over the
country, he goes in for bed-culture, which requires, and, in fact,
receives, the most careful attention. Weeds are nowhere tolerated in
the south of German East Africa. The crops may fail on the plains,
where droughts are frequent, but never on the plateau with its
abundant rains and heavy dews. Its fortunate inhabitants even have
the satisfaction of seeing the proud Wayao and Wamakua working
for them as labourers, driven by hunger to serve where they were
accustomed to rule.
But the light, sandy soil is soon exhausted, and would yield no
harvest the second year if cultivated twice running. This fact has
been familiar to the native for ages; consequently he provides in
time, and, while his crop is growing, prepares the next plot with axe
and firebrand. Next year he plants this with his various crops and
lets the first piece lie fallow. For a short time it remains waste and
desolate; then nature steps in to repair the destruction wrought by
man; a thousand new growths spring out of the exhausted soil, and
even the old stumps put forth fresh shoots. Next year the new growth
is up to one’s knees, and in a few years more it is that terrible,
impenetrable bush, which maintains its position till the black
occupier of the land has made the round of all the available sites and
come back to his starting point.
The Makonde are, body and soul, so to speak, one with this bush.
According to my Yao informants, indeed, their name means nothing
else but “bush people.” Their own tradition says that they have been
settled up here for a very long time, but to my surprise they laid great
stress on an original immigration. Their old homes were in the
south-east, near Mikindani and the mouth of the Rovuma, whence
their peaceful forefathers were driven by the continual raids of the
Sakalavas from Madagascar and the warlike Shirazis[47] of the coast,
to take refuge on the almost inaccessible plateau. I have studied
African ethnology for twenty years, but the fact that changes of
population in this apparently quiet and peaceable corner of the earth
could have been occasioned by outside enterprises taking place on
the high seas, was completely new to me. It is, no doubt, however,
correct.
The charming tribal legend of the Makonde—besides informing us
of other interesting matters—explains why they have to live in the
thickest of the bush and a long way from the edge of the plateau,
instead of making their permanent homes beside the purling brooks
and springs of the low country.
“The place where the tribe originated is Mahuta, on the southern
side of the plateau towards the Rovuma, where of old time there was
nothing but thick bush. Out of this bush came a man who never
washed himself or shaved his head, and who ate and drank but little.
He went out and made a human figure from the wood of a tree
growing in the open country, which he took home to his abode in the
bush and there set it upright. In the night this image came to life and
was a woman. The man and woman went down together to the
Rovuma to wash themselves. Here the woman gave birth to a still-
born child. They left that place and passed over the high land into the
valley of the Mbemkuru, where the woman had another child, which
was also born dead. Then they returned to the high bush country of
Mahuta, where the third child was born, which lived and grew up. In
course of time, the couple had many more children, and called
themselves Wamatanda. These were the ancestral stock of the
Makonde, also called Wamakonde,[48] i.e., aborigines. Their
forefather, the man from the bush, gave his children the command to
bury their dead upright, in memory of the mother of their race who
was cut out of wood and awoke to life when standing upright. He also
warned them against settling in the valleys and near large streams,
for sickness and death dwelt there. They were to make it a rule to
have their huts at least an hour’s walk from the nearest watering-
place; then their children would thrive and escape illness.”
The explanation of the name Makonde given by my informants is
somewhat different from that contained in the above legend, which I
extract from a little book (small, but packed with information), by
Pater Adams, entitled Lindi und sein Hinterland. Otherwise, my
results agree exactly with the statements of the legend. Washing?
Hapana—there is no such thing. Why should they do so? As it is, the
supply of water scarcely suffices for cooking and drinking; other
people do not wash, so why should the Makonde distinguish himself
by such needless eccentricity? As for shaving the head, the short,
woolly crop scarcely needs it,[49] so the second ancestral precept is
likewise easy enough to follow. Beyond this, however, there is
nothing ridiculous in the ancestor’s advice. I have obtained from
various local artists a fairly large number of figures carved in wood,
ranging from fifteen to twenty-three inches in height, and
representing women belonging to the great group of the Mavia,
Makonde, and Matambwe tribes. The carving is remarkably well
done and renders the female type with great accuracy, especially the
keloid ornamentation, to be described later on. As to the object and
meaning of their works the sculptors either could or (more probably)
would tell me nothing, and I was forced to content myself with the
scanty information vouchsafed by one man, who said that the figures
were merely intended to represent the nembo—the artificial
deformations of pelele, ear-discs, and keloids. The legend recorded
by Pater Adams places these figures in a new light. They must surely
be more than mere dolls; and we may even venture to assume that
they are—though the majority of present-day Makonde are probably
unaware of the fact—representations of the tribal ancestress.
The references in the legend to the descent from Mahuta to the
Rovuma, and to a journey across the highlands into the Mbekuru
valley, undoubtedly indicate the previous history of the tribe, the
travels of the ancestral pair typifying the migrations of their
descendants. The descent to the neighbouring Rovuma valley, with
its extraordinary fertility and great abundance of game, is intelligible
at a glance—but the crossing of the Lukuledi depression, the ascent
to the Rondo Plateau and the descent to the Mbemkuru, also lie
within the bounds of probability, for all these districts have exactly
the same character as the extreme south. Now, however, comes a
point of especial interest for our bacteriological age. The primitive
Makonde did not enjoy their lives in the marshy river-valleys.
Disease raged among them, and many died. It was only after they
had returned to their original home near Mahuta, that the health
conditions of these people improved. We are very apt to think of the
African as a stupid person whose ignorance of nature is only equalled
by his fear of it, and who looks on all mishaps as caused by evil
spirits and malignant natural powers. It is much more correct to
assume in this case that the people very early learnt to distinguish
districts infested with malaria from those where it is absent.
This knowledge is crystallized in the
ancestral warning against settling in the
valleys and near the great waters, the
dwelling-places of disease and death. At the
same time, for security against the hostile
Mavia south of the Rovuma, it was enacted
that every settlement must be not less than a
certain distance from the southern edge of the
plateau. Such in fact is their mode of life at the
present day. It is not such a bad one, and
certainly they are both safer and more
comfortable than the Makua, the recent
intruders from the south, who have made USUAL METHOD OF
good their footing on the western edge of the CLOSING HUT-DOOR
plateau, extending over a fairly wide belt of
country. Neither Makua nor Makonde show in their dwellings
anything of the size and comeliness of the Yao houses in the plain,
especially at Masasi, Chingulungulu and Zuza’s. Jumbe Chauro, a
Makonde hamlet not far from Newala, on the road to Mahuta, is the
most important settlement of the tribe I have yet seen, and has fairly
spacious huts. But how slovenly is their construction compared with
the palatial residences of the elephant-hunters living in the plain.
The roofs are still more untidy than in the general run of huts during
the dry season, the walls show here and there the scanty beginnings
or the lamentable remains of the mud plastering, and the interior is a
veritable dog-kennel; dirt, dust and disorder everywhere. A few huts
only show any attempt at division into rooms, and this consists
merely of very roughly-made bamboo partitions. In one point alone
have I noticed any indication of progress—in the method of fastening
the door. Houses all over the south are secured in a simple but
ingenious manner. The door consists of a set of stout pieces of wood
or bamboo, tied with bark-string to two cross-pieces, and moving in
two grooves round one of the door-posts, so as to open inwards. If
the owner wishes to leave home, he takes two logs as thick as a man’s
upper arm and about a yard long. One of these is placed obliquely
against the middle of the door from the inside, so as to form an angle
of from 60° to 75° with the ground. He then places the second piece
horizontally across the first, pressing it downward with all his might.
It is kept in place by two strong posts planted in the ground a few
inches inside the door. This fastening is absolutely safe, but of course
cannot be applied to both doors at once, otherwise how could the
owner leave or enter his house? I have not yet succeeded in finding
out how the back door is fastened.