Self and Identity Intro
Self and Identity Intro
Psychoanalysis challenged the way we think about self and identity: it attributes behav-
iour to complex dynamics that are hidden deep within the person’s sense of who they are.
Earlier in the text (see Chapter 3; also see Chapter 5), we explored the theory of social rep-
resentations – a theory that invoked psychoanalysis as an example of how a novel idea or
analysis can entirely change the way that people think about their world (e.g. Moscovici,
1961; see Lorenzi-Cioldi & Clémence, 2001).
Together, these and other social, political and cultural changes caused people to think
about self and identity as complex and problematic. Theories of self and identity propa-
gated and flourished in this fertile soil.
Psychodynamic self
Freud (e.g. 1921) believed that unsocialised and selfish libidinal impulses (the id) are repressed
and kept in check by internalised societal norms (the superego), but that, from time to time
and in strange and peculiar ways, repressed impulses surface. Freud’s view of the self is one
in which you can only truly know yourself, or indeed others, when special procedures, such
as hypnosis or psychotherapy, are employed to reveal repressed thoughts. His ideas about
self, identity and personality are far-reaching in social psychology: for example, Adorno,
Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford’s (1950) influential authoritarian personality
theory of prejudice is a psychodynamic theory (see Chapter 10).
Collective self
It was not always like this. In the early days of social psychology, things were very different
(see Farr, 1996; Hogg & Williams, 2000). Wilhelm Wundt was the founder of psychology as
an experimental science, and he proposed that social psychology was the study of:
those mental products which are created by a community of human life and are, therefore,
inexplicable in terms merely of individual consciousness since they presuppose the recipro-
cal action of many.
Wundt (1916, p. 3)
120 Chapter 4 Self and identity
Wundt’s social psychology dealt with collective phenomena, such as language, religion,
customs and myth, which, according to Wundt, could not be understood in terms of the
psychology of the isolated individual. Emile Durkheim (1898), one of the founding fathers
of sociology, was influenced by Wundt’s interest in collective life and also maintained that
collective phenomena could not be explained in terms of individual psychology.
The view that the self draws its properties from groups is shared by many other early
social psychologists: for example, early theorists of collective behaviour and the crowd (e.g.
LeBon, 1908; Tarde, 1901; Trotter, 1919; see also Chapter 11). Notably, William McDougall,
in his book The Group Mind (McDougall, 1920), argued that out of the interaction of indi-
viduals there arose a ‘group mind’, which had a reality and existence that was qualitatively
distinct from the isolated individuals making up the group. There was a collective self that
was grounded in group life. Although phrased in rather quaint old-fashioned language, this
idea has a direct line of descent to subsequent experimental social psychology which con-
firms that human interaction has emergent properties that endure and influence other peo-
ple: for example, Muzafer Sherif’s (1936) research on how norms emerge from interaction
and are internalised to influence behaviour, and some of Solomon Asch’s (1952) research on
conformity to norms.
Since the early 1980s there has been a revival of interest in the notion of a collective self,
largely initiated by European research on the emergence of social representations out of
social interaction (e.g. Farr & Moscovici, 1984; Lorenzi-Cioldi & Clémence, 2001; see
Chapters 3, 5, 7 and 8), and on the role of social identity in group processes and intergroup
behaviour (e.g. Tajfel & Turner, 1986; also see Hogg, 2006; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; dis-
cussed later in this chapter but covered fully in Chapter 11).
others. We are effective only if we can take the role of the other and thus see ourselves as
others (ultimately, society) do. In this way, we construct a self-concept that reflects the soci-
ety we live in; we are socially constituted.
Symbolic interactionism offers a quite sophisticated and complex model of how the self
is formed. And yet it generates a very straightforward prediction. Because forming our con-
cept of self comes from seeing ourselves as others see us (the idea of the looking-glass self), Looking-glass self
how we view ourselves should be closely shadowed by how others view us. Shrauger and The self derived from seeing
ourselves as others see us.
Schoeneman (1979) reviewed sixty-two studies to see if this was true. What they found was
that people did not tend to see themselves as others saw them but instead saw themselves as
they thought others saw them. For a more recent example of research on the looking-glass
self, see Box 4.1 and Figure 4.1.
One implication of the idea that people do not see themselves as others see them, but
instead see themselves as they think others see them, is that we do not actually take the role
of the other in constructing a sense of self. An alternative reading is that the communication
process in social interaction is noisy and inaccurate. It is influenced by a range of
Dianne Tice (1992) conducted an experiment where behaviour. (This was a ruse, since there was no one actu-
undergraduate students were asked to act as ‘stimulus per- ally monitoring the students.) In the next phase, they were
sons’ for postgraduate clinical psychology trainees. Their asked to rate themselves in terms of how responsive they
task was to use an intercom system to answer verbal ques- really were. They made their ratings on a 25-point scale
tions in a way that would reflect an aspect of their person- ranging from 1 (stable = not responsive) to 25
ality. Effectively, they were to describe themselves so that (responsive).
they would come across as either consistently emotionally Tice intended the public condition to be the one that
stable (implying not responsive) or emotionally responsive would engage the looking-glass self. As predicted, subse-
in different situations. quent descriptions of self were more radically altered
There were two experimental conditions: (a) a private under public conditions than private conditions (see
condition where the students believed no one was watch- Figure 4.1) – suggesting that the students did not see
ing them, and (b) a public condition where they believed a themselves as others saw them, but instead as they thought
clinical psychology trainee was closely monitoring their others saw them.
122 Chapter 4 Self and identity
20 Private
Public
Self-awareness
If the truth be known, you do not spend all your time thinking about yourself. Self-awareness
comes and goes for different reasons and has an array of consequences. Although I am sure
you can all think of people who appear to think only of themselves almost all the time (we
discuss narcissism later in this chapter)!
In their book A Theory of Objective Self-Awareness, Shelley Duval and Robert Wicklund
(1972) argued that self-awareness is a state in which you are aware of yourself as an object,
much as you might be aware of a tree or another person. When you are objectively self-aware,
you make comparisons between how you actually are and how you would like to be – an ideal,
a goal or some other standard. The outcome of this comparison is often a sense that you have
shortcomings, along with negative emotions associated with this recognition. People then try to
overcome their shortcomings by bringing the self closer into line with ideal standards. This can
be very difficult, leading people to give up trying and thus feel even worse about themselves.
Objective self-awareness is generated by anything that focuses your attention on yourself
as an object: for example, being in front of an audience (see Chapter 6) or catching your
image in a mirror. Indeed, a very popular method for raising self-awareness in laboratory
studies is actually to place participants in front of a mirror. Charles Carver and Michael
Self-knowledge 123
Self-knowledge
When people are self-aware, what are they aware of? What do we know about ourselves, and
how do we gain a sense of who we are? Self-knowledge is constructed in much the same way
and through many of the same processes as we construct representations of other people.
We looked at some of these general processes when we discussed social thinking and attri-
bution in Chapters 2 and 3.
Schema
Self-schemas Cognitive structure that
represents knowledge about
Earlier (see Chapter 2) we saw how information about other people is stored in the form a concept or type of
stimulus, including its
of a schema. We cognitively store information about the self in a similar but more com- attributes and the relations
plex and varied way – as separate context-specific nodes where different contexts activate among those attributes.
124 Chapter 4 Self and identity
An ideal self
‘Wow! So how do
I look?’
different nodes and thus, effectively, different aspects of self (Breckler, Pratkanis, &
McCann, 1991; Higgins, Van Hook, & Dorfman, 1988). You are probably now itching to
ask, ‘So . . . where in the brain is the self?’ Well, research suggests that no single brain sys-
tem or area of the brain is, of itself, responsible for one’s sense of self. Instead, the experi-
ence of self emerges from widely distributed brain activity across the medial prefrontal
and medial precuneus cortex of the brain (e.g. Saxe, Moran, Scholz, & Gabrieli, 2006).
The self-concept is neither a singular, static, lump-like entity nor a simple averaged view
of the self – it is complex and multi-faceted, with a large number of discrete self-schemas
(Markus, 1977; Markus & Wurf, 1987). People tend to have clear conceptions of themselves
(i.e. self-schemas) on some dimensions but not others – i.e. they are schematic on some but
aschematic on others. People are self-schematic on dimensions that are important to them,
on which they think they are extreme and on which they are certain the opposite does not
hold. For example, if you think you are sophisticated, and being sophisticated is important
to you, then you are self-schematic on that dimension – it is part of your self-concept. If you
do not think you are sophisticated, and if this does not bother you, then being sophisticated
is not one of your self-schemas.
Most people have a complex self-concept with a relatively large number of discrete self-
schemas. Patricia Linville (1985, 1987; see ‘Many selves, multiple identities’ in this chapter)
has suggested that this variety helps to buffer people from the negative impact of life events by
making sure that there are always self-schemas from which they can derive a sense of satisfac-
tion. People can be quite strategic in how they use their self-schemas – Linville used a colour-
ful phrase to describe what we usually do: ‘don’t put all your eggs in one cognitive basket’.
Self-schemas that are rigidly compartmentalised have disadvantages (Showers, 1992). If
some self-schemas are very negative and some are very positive, events may cause extreme
mood swings according to whether a positive or negative self-schema is primed. Generally,
more integrated self-schemas are preferable. For example, if James believes that he is a won-
derful cook but an awful musician, he has compartmentalised self-schemas – contexts that
prime one or the other self-schema will produce very positive or very negative moods. Contrast
this with Sally, who believes she is a reasonably good cook but not a great musician. She has
self-schemas where the boundaries are less clear – context effects on mood will be less extreme.
Self-knowledge 125
Self-schemas influence information processing and behaviour in much the same way as
schemas about other people (Markus & Sentis, 1982): self-schematic information is more
readily noticed, is overrepresented in cognition and is associated with longer processing
time. Self-schemas do not only describe how we are. Markus and Nurius (1986) have sug-
gested that we have an array of possible selves – future-oriented schemas of what we would
like to become, or what we fear we might become. For example, a postgraduate student may
have future selves as a university lecturer or a rock musician.
Another perspective is offered by Higgins’s (1987) self-discrepancy theory. Higgins sug- Self-discrepancy theory
gests that we have three types of self-schema: Higgins’s theory about the
consequences of making
1 actual self – how we currently are; actual – ideal and actual –
‘ought’ self-comparisons
2 ideal self – how we would like to be; that reveal
3 ‘ought’ self – how we think we should be. self-discrepancies.
The ideal self and the ought self are ‘self-guides’, but they mobilise different types of self-
related behaviours. The same goal – for example, prosperity – can be constructed as an ideal
(we strive to be prosperous) or an ‘ought’ (we strive to avoid not being prosperous).
Discrepancies between actual and ideal or ‘ought’ motivate change to reduce the discrep-
ancy – in this way we engage in self-regulation. (In Chapter 13 we discuss self-regulation in Self-regulation
the context of close relationships.) Furthermore, these self-discrepancies make us emotion- Strategies that we use to
match our behaviour to an
ally vulnerable. When we fail to resolve an actual–ideal discrepancy, we feel dejected (e.g. ideal or ‘ought’ standard.
disappointed, dissatisfied, sad); when we fail to resolve an actual–ought discrepancy, we feel
agitated (e.g. anxiety, threat, fear). Read how Higgins and his colleagues tested self-discrep-
ancy theory in Box 4.2 and Figure 4.2.
Tory Higgins and his colleagues measured self-discrepancy after a priming procedure. For their ‘ideal’ prime they were
by comparing the differences between attributes of the asked to discuss their own and their parents’ hopes for
actual self with those of either the ideal self or those of the them; for their ‘ought’ prime they discussed their own and
‘ought’ self (Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986). their parents’ beliefs about their duties and obligations.
They administered questionnaires to identify students It was hypothesised that an actual–ideal discrepancy
who were either high in both kinds of discrepancies or else would lead to feeling dejected (but not agitated), whereas
low in both. Several weeks later, the same students partici- an actual–’ought’ discrepancy would lead to feeling agi-
pated in an experiment in which emotions that reflected tated (but not dejected). These predictions were sup-
dejection or agitation were measured, both before and ported, as the results in Figure 4.2 show.
6 Dejection
Agitation
4
Change in emotion
Lockwood and her associates found that people who are promotion-focused look for inspi-
ration to positive role models who emphasise strategies for achieving success (Lockwood,
Jordan, & Kunda, 2002). Such people also show elevated motivation and persistence on
tasks that are framed in terms of gains and non-gains (Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998).
People who are prevention-focused behave quite differently – they recall information relating
to the avoidance of failure by others, are most inspired by negative role models who high-
light strategies for avoiding failure, and exhibit motivation and persistence on tasks that are
framed in terms of losses and non-losses.
Regulatory focus theory has also been explored in the context of intergroup relations and
how people feel about and behave towards their ingroup and relevant outgroups (e.g. Jonas,
Sassenberg, & Scheepers, 2010; see Chapter 11). For example, studies have shown that in
intergroup contexts, a measured or manipulated promotion focus strengthens positive emo-
tion-related bias and behavioural tendencies towards the ingroup, while a prevention focus
strengthens more negative emotion-related bias and behavioural tendencies against the out-
group (Shah, Brazy, & Higgins, 2004).
Self-knowledge 127
ute our own behaviour internally. So, for example, I know that I enjoy eating curry
because, if given the opportunity, I eat curry of my own free will and in preference to
other foods, and not everyone likes curry – I am able to make an internal attribution for
my behaviour.
How we perceive ourselves can also be based on simply imagining ourselves behaving in a
particular way (Anderson & Godfrey, 1987). For example, sports psychologist Caroline van
Gyn and her colleagues divided runners into two groups; one group practised power training
on exercise bikes, the other did not. Half of each group used imagery (i.e. also imagined
themselves sprint training), whereas the others did not. Of course, the sweaty business of
power training itself improved subsequent performance; but, remarkably, those who imag-
ined themselves sprint training did better than those who did not. The researchers concluded
that imagery had affected self-conception, which in turn produced performance that was
consistent with that self-conception (Van Gyn, Wenger, & Gaul, 1990).
Self-attributions have implications for motivation. If someone is induced to perform a
task by either enormous rewards or fearsome penalties, task performance is attributed exter-
nally and thus motivation to perform is reduced. If there are minimal or no external factors
to which performance can be attributed, we cannot easily avoid attributing performance
internally to enjoyment or commitment, so motivation increases. This has been called the
overjustification effect (see Figure 4.3), for which there is now substantial evidence (Deci & Overjustification effect
Ryan, 1985). In the absence of obvious
external determinants of our
For example, Mark Lepper and his colleagues had nursery-school children draw pictures.
behaviour, we assume that
Some of the children drew of their own free will, while the rest were induced to draw with we freely choose the
the promise of a reward, which they were subsequently given. A few days later, the children behaviour because we
were unobtrusively observed playing; the children who had previously been rewarded for enjoy it.
drawing spent half as much time drawing as did the other group. Those who had received no
extrinsic reward seemed to have greater intrinsic interest in drawing (Lepper, Greene, &
Nisbett, 1973).
A review by John Condry (1977) concludes that introducing external rewards may back-
fire by reducing motivation and enjoyment of a task that was previously intrinsically moti-
vated. The educational implications are obvious. Parents love to tell their children stories,
and they encourage the young ones to enjoy stories by learning to read themselves. However,
if reading is accompanied by rewards, the children’s intrinsic joy is put at risk. So, is it pos-
sible for rewards to play any useful role? The answer is yes. The trick is to reduce reliance on
rewards that are task-contingent and make more use of those that are performance-
contingent. Even a task that people find boring can be enlivened when they shift their atten-
tion to features of their performance (Sansone, Weir, Harpster, & Morgan, 1992). Consider
how you look for ways to maintain interest in a monotonous physical fitness programme,
especially when you have to exercise alone. You could, of course, listen to music or watch
television. However, a performance-contingent strategy is to set targets using measures such
as ‘distance’ covered on an exercycle, checking your heart rate and how many calories you
expended.
128 Chapter 4 Self and identity
Downward comparisons also occur between groups. Groups try to compare themselves
with inferior groups in order to feel that ‘we’ are better than ‘them’. Intergroup relations are
largely a social comparison-based struggle for evaluative superiority of one’s own group
over relevant outgroups (see Hogg, 2000c; Hogg & Gaffney, 2014; Turner, 1975). Because we
tend to describe and evaluate ourselves in terms of groups we belong to, this process
enhances self-evaluation and self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1986 – see Chapter 11).
Sport provides a perfect context in which the outcome of this process can be seen. Few
Portuguese will not have felt enormously positive when their team beat France, the host
nation, in the finals of the 2016 UEFA European Championship. Bob Cialdini and his col-
leagues have referred to this phenomenon as ‘basking in reflected glory’, or BIRGing (Cialdini BIRGing
et al., 1976). To illustrate the effect, they conducted experiments in which they raised or Basking in Reflected Glory;
that is, name-dropping to
lowered self-esteem via feedback on a general knowledge test; and student participants were
link yourself with desirable
then, seemingly incidentally, asked about the outcome of a recent football game. Participants people or groups and thus
who had had their self-esteem lowered tended to associate themselves with winning and not improve other people’s
with losing teams – they tended to refer to the teams as ‘we’ in the former case and as ‘they’ impression of you.
in the latter.
Social identity
Types of self and identity That part of the self-concept
that derives from our
membership in social
Social identity theorists (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) have argued that there are two broad classes
groups.
of identity that define different types of self:
Personal identity
1 social identity, which defines self in terms of group memberships; The self defined in terms of
unique personal attributes
2 personal identity, which defines self in terms of idiosyncratic traits and close personal or unique interpersonal
relationships. relationships.
130 Chapter 4 Self and identity
Table 4.1 Self and self-attributes as a function of level of identity (social versus personal) and type
of attributes (identity versus relationship)
Identity attributes Relationship attributes
Social identity Collective self Collective relational self
Attributes shared with others that Attributes that define how the self as
differentiate the individual from a an ingroup member relates to specific
specific outgroup, or from others as ingroup or outgroup
outgroups in general. members.
Personal identity Individual self Individual relational self
Attributes unique to self that Attributes that define how the self as a
differentiate the individual from unique individual relates to others as
specific individuals, or from other individuals.
individuals in general.
asking them loaded questions that made them search through their stock of self-knowledge
for information that presented the self in a different light (Fazio, Effrein, & Falender, 1981).
Other researchers have found, time and time again, that experimental procedures that
focus on group membership lead people to act very differently from procedures that focus on
individuality and interpersonal relationships. Consider ‘minimal group’ studies in which
participants are either (a) identified as individuals or (b) explicitly categorized, randomly or
by some minimal or trivial criterion as group members (Tajfel, 1970; see Diehl, 1990, and
Chapter 11). A consistent finding is that being categorized makes people discriminate
against an outgroup, conform to ingroup norms, express attitudes and feelings that favour
the ingroup, and indicate a sense of belonging and loyalty to the ingroup. Furthermore,
these effects of minimal group categorization are generally very fast and automatic (Otten
& Wentura, 1999).
The idea that we have many selves, and that contextual factors bring different selves into
play, has a number of ramifications. Social constructionists have suggested that the self is
entirely situation-dependent. An extreme form of this position argues that we do not carry
self-knowledge around in our heads as cognitive representations at all; rather, we construct
disposable selves through talk (e.g. Potter & Wetherell, 1987; see the discussion of discourse
analysis in Chapters 1 and 15). A less extreme version has been proposed by Penny Oakes
(e.g. Oakes, Haslam, & Reynolds, 1999), who does not emphasise the role of talk but still
maintains that self-conception is highly context-dependent. A middle way is to argue that
people do have cognitive representations of the self that they carry in their heads as organis-
ing principles for perception, categorization and action, but that these representations are
temporarily or more enduringly modified by situational factors (e.g. Abrams & Hogg, 2001;
Turner, Reynolds, Haslam, & Veenstra, 2006).
In search of self-coherence
That we have many selves needs to be placed in perspective. Although we may have a diver-
sity of relatively discrete selves, we also have a quest: to find and maintain a reasonably
integrated picture of who we are. Self-conceptual coherence provides us with a continuing
theme for our lives – an ‘autobiography’ that weaves our various identities and selves
together into a whole person. People who have highly fragmented selves (e.g. some people
with schizophrenia, amnesia or Alzheimer’s disease) find it extraordinarily difficult to func-
tion effectively.
People use many strategies to construct a coherent sense of self (Baumeister, 1998). Here
are some that you may have used yourself:
● Restrict your life to a limited set of contexts. Because different selves come into play as
contexts keep changing, you will protect yourself from self-conceptual clashes.
● Keep revising and integrating your ‘autobiography’ to accommodate new identities.
Along the way, get rid of any worrisome inconsistencies. In effect, you are rewriting your
history to make it work to your advantage (Greenwald, 1980).
● Attribute changes in the self externally to changing circumstances, rather than internally
to fundamental changes in who you are. This is an application of the actor–observer Actor–observer effect
effect (Jones and Nisbett, 1972; see also Chapter 3). Tendency to attribute our
own behaviours externally
We can also develop a self-schema that embodies a core set of attributes that we feel dis- and others’ behaviours
internally.
tinguishes us from all other people – that makes us unique (Markus, 1977; see ‘Self-schemas’
discussed earlier in this chapter). We then tend to recognise these attributes disproportion-
ately in all our selves, providing thematic consistency that delivers a sense of a stable and
unitary self (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987).
In summary, people find ways to construct their lives such that their self-conceptions
appear steady and coherent.
132 Chapter 4 Self and identity
Social identity
salience
The wearing of the kilt is
a mark of nationalism,
commitment to the
cause and a resolve to
act in unison in times
of stress.
Self-motives
Because selves and identities are critical reference points for leading a well-adapted life, peo-
ple are enthusiastically motivated to secure self-knowledge. Entire industries are based on
this search for knowledge, ranging from personality tests to dubious practices such as
Self-motives 135
astrology and palmistry. However, people do not go about this search in a dispassionate way;
they have preferences for what they would like to know about themselves and can be dis-
mayed when the quest unearths things they did not expect or did not want to find.
Social psychologists have identified three classes of motive that interact to influence self-
construction and the search for self-knowledge:
● self-assessment motivates pursuit of valid information about self;
● self-verification motivates pursuit of information that is consistent with our own self-image;
● self-enhancement motivates pursuit of information that makes us look good.
Self-enhancement
Self-enhancement
Above all else, we like to learn good things about ourselves – we seek new favourable knowl-
The motivation to develop
edge about ourselves as well as revise pre-existing but unfavourable views of ourselves. We and promote a favourable
are guided by a self-enhancement motive (e.g. Kunda, 1990). This motive to promote image of self.
Self-affirmation theory
‘Way to go, man!’
136 Chapter 4 Self and identity
self-positivity has a mirror motive, self-protection, which fends off self-negativity. Research
suggests that self-enhancement functions operate routinely and relatively globally, but that
self-protection functions are usually occasioned only by an event or series of events that
threatens a specific self-related interest (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009).
One manifestation of the self-enhancement motive is described by self-affirmation
Self-affirmation theory theory (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988). People strive publicly to affirm positive
The theory that people aspects of who they are; this can be done blatantly by boasting or more subtly through
reduce the impact of threat
to their self-concept by
rationalisation or dropping hints. The urge to self-affirm is particularly strong when an
focusing on and affirming aspect of one’s self-esteem has been damaged. So, for example, if someone claims you are a
their competence in some lousy artist, you might retort that while that might be true, you are an excellent dancer. Self-
other area. affirmation rests on people’s need to maintain a global image of themselves as being compe-
tent, good, coherent, unitary, stable, capable of free choice, capable of controlling important
outcomes and so on. Ultimately, we like to be viewed as moral beings – and so we engage in
a range of behaviours aimed at establishing and even asserting our moral credentials
(Merritt, Effron, Fein, Savitsky, Tuller, & Monin, 2012; Monin & Miller, 2001). Box 4.3
describes research by Claude Steele (1975) in which self-affirmation processes were studied
in the context of religious adherence.
Which motive is more fundamental and more likely to prevail in the pursuit of self-
knowledge – self-assessment, self-verification or self-enhancement? In a series of six experi-
ments, Constantine Sedikides (1993) pitted the three motives against one another. He used a
self-reflection task where participants can ask themselves more or less diagnostic questions
focusing on different aspects of themselves – the asking of more diagnostic questions indi-
cates greater self-reflection, and the focus of self-reflection differs depending on what
self-motive is operating:
● Self-assessment – greater self-reflection on peripheral than central traits of self, whether
the attribute is desirable or not, indicates a drive to find out more about self (people
already have knowledge about traits that are central for them).
● Self-verification – greater self-reflection on central than on peripheral traits, whether the
attribute is positive or not, indicates a drive to confirm what one already knows about
oneself.
Claude Steele (1975) reported a study in Salt Lake City in knowledge that, as members of their community, they
which Mormon women who were at home during the day were either:
were telephoned by a female researcher posing as a com-
● un-cooperative with community projects (a direct
munity member. The researcher asked the women if they
threat to a core component of their self-concept), or
would be willing to list everything in their kitchen to assist
● un-concerned about driver safety and care (a threat to a
the development of a community food cooperative; those
relatively irrelevant component of their self-concept), or
who agreed would be called back the following week.
● cooperative with community projects (positive rein-
Because community cooperation is a very strong ethic
forcement of their self-concept).
among Mormons, about 50 per cent of women agreed to
this time-consuming request. Consistent with self-affirmation theory, the two threats
In addition to this baseline condition, there were three greatly increased the probability that women would sub-
other conditions in the study arising from a previous call, sequently agree to help the food cooperative – about 95
two days earlier, by an entirely unrelated researcher pos- per cent of women agreed to help. Among women who
ing as a pollster. In the course of this previous call, the had been given positive reinforcement of their self-
pollster mentioned in passing that it was common concept, 65 per cent agreed to help the cooperative.
Self-esteem 137
You may have noticed how people (perhaps you!) are ● They try to dismiss interpersonal criticism as being
inclined to boost themselves. Think about all the ways you motivated by prejudice (e.g. Crocker & Major, 1989).
might do this . . . then read on. Here are some of the tricks ● They perform a biased search of self-knowledge to sup-
that people get up to – do they seem familiar to you? port a favourable self-image (e.g. Kunda & Sanitoso,
1989).
● They take credit for their successes but deny blame for
● They place a favourable spin on the meaning of ambig-
their failures (e.g. Zuckerman, 1979); this is one of the
uous traits that define self (e.g. Dunning, Meyerowitz, &
self-serving biases (see Chapter 3).
Holzberg, 1989).
● They forget failure feedback more readily than success
● They persuade themselves that their flaws are widely
or praise (e.g. Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1976).
shared human attributes but that their qualities are rare
● They accept praise uncritically but receive criticism
and distinctive (e.g. Campbell, 1986).
sceptically (e.g. Kunda, 1990).
Self-esteem
Why are people so strongly motivated to think well of themselves – to self-enhance? Research
suggests that people generally have a rosy sense of self – they see, or try to see, themselves
through ‘rose-tinted spectacles’. For example, people who are threatened or distracted often
display what Del Paulhus and Karen Levitt (1987) called automatic egotism – a widely favour-
able self-image. In their review of a link between illusions and a sense of well-being, Shelley
Taylor and Jonathon Brown (1988) concluded that people normally overestimate their good
points, overestimate their control over events and are unrealistically optimistic. Sedikides and
Gregg (2003) call these three characteristics of human thought the self-enhancing triad.
For example, a study conducted in an American setting found that very low-achieving stu-
dents (in the bottom 12 per cent) thought they were relatively high achievers (in the top 38 per
cent) (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). According to Patricia Cross (1977), your lecturers show
positivity bias too, with 94 per cent convinced that their teaching ability is above average! The
tendency to overestimate our good points is well documented in research (Brown, 2012;
Guenther & Alicke, 2010; Williams & Gilovich, 2012) and is referred to as the above-average-
effect. See Box 4.5 and Figure 4.5 for an applied example of this bias among young drivers.