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2024-02!15!23A745 - Reply Iso Application To S. Ct. For Stay of D.C. Circuit Mandate
2024-02!15!23A745 - Reply Iso Application To S. Ct. For Stay of D.C. Circuit Mandate
23A745
grant certiorari in this case. He now insists, with a straight face, that the Court should
somehow not grant certiorari on the same issues. Logical consistency is absent from the
Special Counsel’s response (“Opp.”), and he provides no convincing reason to deny the
ARGUMENT
In a few short lines, the brevity of which speaks volumes, the Special Counsel argues
that “[t]he Nation has a compelling interest in the prompt resolution of this case.” Opp. 34-
35. But he relies on generic statements about “the public’s interest in seeing this case
resolved in a timely manner,” id., at 35, and the need to avoid undue delay “[i]n all criminal
cases,” id. at 34. The Special Counsel offers no explanation why that supposedly “compelling
interest” requires the immediate return of the mandate to the district court to set this matter
for trial “likely … in three months or less from receiving the mandate.” Id. at 35.
The omission is glaring. There are overwhelming reasons why the case should not go
to trial “in three months or less.” Id. The case involves almost 13 million pages of discovery,
thousands of hours of video footage, and hundreds of potential witnesses. With any other
defendant, it would be virtually unthinkable for the case to go to trial so soon, and “wildly
unfair” to do so.1 Moreover, two of the four counts against President Trump allege
1 “If this were any other defendant than Donald Trump, the rush to trial—which cannot
possibly give the Trump legal team adequate time to prepare its defense—would be deemed
wildly unfair.” Jack Goldsmith, The Consequences of Jack Smith’s Rush to Trial, Lawfare
(Feb. 14, 2024), https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-consequences-of-jack-smith's-rush-
to-trial. The Special Counsel’s attempt to conduct trial at warp speed is “an absurd request
given that the defense team must review over 13 million pages of documentary evidence and
thousands of hours of video footage provided by prosecutors.” Elie Honig, The Word Jack
Smith Will Never Say, N.Y. MAG. – INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 19, 2024).
1
“conspiracy and substantive violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2),” Opp. 5—a statute whose
interpretation this Court will consider this Term in Fischer v. United States, No. 23-5572
(cert. granted Dec. 13, 2023). Again, it makes no sense to conduct a complex criminal trial
while a case is pending in this Court that might invalidate half the charges in the indictment.
Goldsmith, supra n.1. Further, forcing President Trump to go to trial before his claim of
immunity is resolved on appeal contradicts this Court’s instruction that such claims are
“effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 526 (1985). The Special Counsel’s request for this Court to end the stay threatens this
Court’s jurisdiction to decide the same issues that the Special Counsel urged it is “imperative”
Moreover, such delays are a routine feature of interlocutory appeals, and they are
299 U.S. 248, 256 (1936). “[P]retrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly justifiable.”
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 656 (1992). “[T]here are important public interests
in the process of appellate review,” even when “the interests served by appellate review may
sometimes stand in opposition to the right to a speedy trial.” United States v. Loud Hawk,
474 U.S. 302, 313 (1986). That right to a speedy trial belongs to the defendant, not, as the
immunity will require careful and deliberate review of myriad historical sources and could
even require additional fact-finding below. See, e.g., Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F.4th 1, 5
(D.C. Cir. 2023). Thus, “[a] right to interlocutory appeal of the [immunity] issue without an
automatic stay of district court proceedings is … like a lock without a key, a bat without a
ball, a computer without a keyboard—in other words, not especially sensible.” Coinbase, Inc.
2
As before, there is no mystery about the Special Counsel’s motivation. Commentators
across the political spectrum point to the obvious—the Special Counsel seeks to bring
President Trump to trial and to secure a conviction before the November election in which
President Trump is the leading candidate against President Biden. See, e.g., Goldsmith,
supra n.1 (“Smith’s timing decisions clearly have a ‘purpose of affecting’ the presidential
election….”); Honig, supra n.1 (noting that the Special Counsel “wants his case tried before
the election” and that “if [his] goal is to prevent his subject from winning an election, that’s
straight-up, blood-and-guts political”); Byron York, X (Feb. 14, 2024)2 (“Why does Jack Smith
keep urging courts to speed up the Trump trial without mentioning that he, Smith, is racing
This Court need not disregard what is obvious to everyone else. Dep’t of Com. v. New
York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2019). Like his December petition, the Special Counsel’s latest
filing raises a compelling inference of a political motive—the motivation to influence the 2024
Presidential election by bringing the leading Republican candidate to trial before November
5, 2024. The Special Counsel’s “timing decisions are influenced by the election and,
ultimately, by politics and political outcomes. And that is wrong.” Goldsmith, supra n.1.
Pursuing that partisan motivation twists the Special Counsel into logical knots, as he now
begs this Court not to decide issues that, two months ago, he begged the Court to decide. It
also contradicts the longstanding traditions of the Department of Justice, which provide that
“[f]ederal prosecutors and agents may never select the timing of any action … for the purpose
of affecting any election, or for the purpose of giving an advantage or disadvantage to any
candidate or political party. Such a purpose is inconsistent with the Department’s mission
2https://twitter.com/byronyork/status/1757956537178276070?s=46&t=_f6dRwauxFe0T9kW
XV2Hyg.
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and with the Principles of Federal Prosecution.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Manual § 9-
memorandum on the same topic, which provides that “partisan politics must play no role in
for all Department Employees re Election Year Sensitivities (May 25, 2022),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/22089098-attorney-general-memorandum-
The Special Counsel cites the recent expedited consideration of Trump v. Anderson,
No. 23-719, Opp. 38, but that case involved an accelerated decision before an upcoming
primary election, a quintessential case for expedited treatment to avoid the appearance of
election interference. See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4-6 (2006). “There is no such
rationale here.” Goldsmith, supra. Instead, “the only conceivable rationales” for the Special
Counsel’s position are “the political ones that have motivated [the Special Counsel] to rush
to trial” at every stage of this proceeding. Id. The Special Counsel’s rationale “cannot avoid
the appearance of partisanship.” BIO in No. 23-624, at 22. The government took nearly three
years to file baseless charges against President Trump, and it now clamors to bring him to
trial in “three months or less,” Opp. 35, against every legal and prudential consideration.
The Court should not countenance the Special Counsel’s partisan maneuvering.
The Special Counsel largely ignores the first stay factor – the likelihood that the Court
will grant certiorari. Instead, he devotes the bulk of his brief to arguing that there is no “fair
prospect” that the opinion below would be reversed. Opp. 9-35. His arguments are
unconvincing, and his errors vividly demonstrate the hazards of over-hasty briefing.
4
A. Marbury v. Madison and the Executive Vesting Clause.
Under the Executive Vesting Clause, the courts may not sit in judgment over a
President’s official acts. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. Here, the Special Counsel—contradicting
his position below—concedes that the indictment charges President Trump for his official
acts. Opp. 2 (admitting that the indictment charges the use of “official power”). This
concession is fatal. Under Marbury v. Madison, a President’s official acts “can never be
The Special Counsel has no answer to Marbury, which reflects the self-evident
meaning of the Executive Vesting Clause. See id. at 165-66. The Special Counsel’s shifting
attempts to distinguish the case are unconvincing. In the court below, the Special Counsel
argued that Marbury “addressed the reviewability of acts of Executive Branch officers in
general, not the President in particular.” C.A. Resp.Br. 15. This argument is indefensible,
because Marbury plainly addresses the official acts of the President; subordinate officials are
discussed as carrying out the President’s official decisions. 5 U.S. at 165-66. The D.C. Circuit
then crafted its own distinction, holding that the President’s purported obligation to comply
with all “generally applicable criminal laws” constitutes a “ministerial duty” under Marbury
and its progeny. App’x 25A. This distinction is untenable as well. Complying with criminal
law cannot plausibly be described as “ministerial” action that admits of no “discretion,” Stay
App. 16-19; and this Court’s longstanding doctrine holds that “generally applicable” statutes
will not be construed to cover the President absent a clear statement from Congress because
buried near the end of its analysis. Opp. 30-31. The Special Counsel admits that “a
President’s official acts are not subject to the injunctive power of Article III courts,” id. at 31,
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but he argues that, under Marbury, this immunity vanishes once that President leaves office,
whereupon Article III courts can place him on trial and order him imprisoned on the basis of
the same official acts. Id. at 31. This third attempt to distinguish Marbury is the least
convincing of all. To begin with, it contradicts the plain language of Marbury, which dictates
that the President’s official acts “can never be examinable by the courts,” 5 U.S. at 166
(emphasis added)—not “are examinable immediately once the President leaves office.”
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion is repeated and emphatic on this point. “[W]hatever
opinion may be entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still
there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion.” Id. When it comes to the
President’s discretionary acts, “the decision of the executive is conclusive.” Id. “By the
constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain important political
powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his
country in his political character, and to his own conscience.” Id. at 165-66. “An
extravagance, so absurd and excessive, could not have been entertained for a moment….
Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to
the executive, can never be made in this court.” Id. at 170 (emphasis added).
The Special Counsel cites no authority for his attempted, newly manufactured
involves a logical “leap” and a transparent “non sequitur.” Opp. 31. According to the Special
Counsel, the separation of powers prevents Article III courts from sitting in judgment over a
President’s official acts except when it would be most intrusive to do so. On this view, the
courts may not enjoin a sitting President from ongoing criminal behavior—or even declare
that such behavior is illegal—but, as soon as he is out of office, the courts may seize him and
send him to prison for it. This rule also authorizes a President’s political opponents to
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effectively blackmail and extort him while in office, using the threat of prosecution as a
weapon to influence his official decisions. Unsurprisingly, this argument directly contradicts
Marbury’s categorical statement that the official acts are “never … examinable.” 5 U.S. at
166. It also contradicts Justice Story’s opinion in Martin v. Mott, which rejected the notion
that “the legality of the orders of the President would depend, not on his own judgment of the
facts, but upon the finding of those facts upon the proofs submitted to a jury.” 25 U.S. 19, 33
(1827) (emphasis added). “It is no answer that such a power may be abused, for there is no
power which is not susceptible of abuse. The remedy for this … is to be found in the
constitution itself,” i.e., impeachment and Senate trial. Id. At 32. The President “is
accountable only to his country, and to his own conscience. His decision, in relation to these
powers, is subject to no control; and his discretion, when exercised, is conclusive.” 3 J. STORY,
Constitution on this point. The Clause states that “the Party convicted” upon impeachment
“shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment,
according to Law.” U.S. CONST. art. I. § 3, cl.7 (emphasis added). The Clause’s reference to
the “Party convicted” demonstrates that a “Party acquitted” is not subject to criminal
prosecution. Id. The binary nature of impeachment proceedings—in which conviction and
acquittal are the two possible outcomes—supports this interpretation. Mentioning one but
not the other of two alternative outcomes indicates that the latter is not included. See
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS
107 (2012) (“When a car dealer promises a low financing rate to ‘purchasers with good credit,’
it is entirely clear that the rate is not available to purchasers with spotty credit.”). This
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interpretation also reflects the Constitution’s common-law background, under which criminal
immunity for the Chief Executive was the well-established default rule, to which the
subordinate officials (not the President) before they are impeached and convicted. Opp. 24-
25. But this Court has “long recognized that the scope of Presidential immunity from judicial
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 826 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). The Special Counsel never explains why a historical practice that is at odds with
the Constitution’s text should be extended to the President. Id. Moreover, the Department
of Justice explains that this difference in treatment between the President and lesser officials
was, in fact, the understanding of the Founders. “[T]he discussion of the Impeachment
Judgment Clause in the [Constitutional] convention focused almost exclusively on the Office
of the President, and the Framers did not debate the question whether impeachment
Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 U.S. Op. O.L.C. 222, 2000 WL
33711291 (2000) (“OLC Memo”), at *9 (quotation marks omitted). “To the extent that the
convention did debate the timing of impeachment relative to indictment, … the convention
records ‘show that the Framers contemplated that this sequence should be mandatory only as
The Special Counsel also argues that criminal immunity would “collapse our system
of separated powers by placing the President beyond the reach of all three Branches.” Opp.
11. The opposite is true. The Impeachment Judgment Clause places the criminal prosecution
8
of a President within “the reach of all three Branches.” Id. The House must impeach, the
Senate must convict, and only then may Article III courts proceed.
Evidence of the Constitution’s original meaning from the Founders provides powerful
support for criminal immunity. Alexander Hamilton wrote repeatedly that the President
could not be prosecuted until “afterwards,” “after,” and “subsequent” to his impeachment and
conviction by the Senate. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 65, 69, 77. The Special Counsel incorrectly
suggests that Hamilton was referring only to the immunity of a sitting President, and that
the immunity for a President’s official acts vanishes once the President leaves office, even if
he is not impeached and convicted. Opp. 27. Hamilton says the opposite—he writes, not only
that criminal prosecution must come “after” and “subsequent” to Senate conviction, but also
As Justice Alito recently noted, “[t]he plain implication” of the Impeachment Judgment
Clause, as elucidated by Hamilton, “is that criminal prosecution, like removal from the
Presidency and disqualification from other offices, is a consequence that can come about only
after the Senate’s judgment….” Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2444 (2020) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). So also, Attorney General Charles Lee “declare[d] … that the
President is not amenable to any court of judicature for the exercise of his high functions, but
is responsible only in the mode pointed out in the constitution,” i.e., impeachment. 5 U.S. at
149. As noted above, Chief Justice Marshall endorsed that view as the holding of the Court
in Marbury, and Justice Story adopted it in his Commentaries and Martin, 25 U.S. at 32-33.
Against this historical consensus, the Special Counsel cites two authorities—James
Wilson and James Iredell, Opp. 26-27—but neither provides him any support. James Wilson
stated that, “far from being above the laws, [the President] is amenable to them in his private
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character as a citizen, and in his public character by impeachment.” Clinton v. Jones, 520
U.S. 681, 696 (1997) (emphasis added) (quoting 2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 480 (2d ed. 1863)). That is exactly President Trump’s position here. The
President may be prosecuted for his private conduct (whether or not committed while he was
in office), but that in his “public character,” i.e., the official acts in question here, he must be
James Iredell’s views also support President Trump. The Special Counsel provides a
brief quote from Iredell, Opp. 26-27, but elsewhere, Iredell noted that impeachment involves
“objects” that “cannot be easily reached by an ordinary tribunal,” so that Senate conviction is
first required before an official can be “further liable to a trial at common law.” 4 The Debates
in the Several State Conventions on the on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 113-14
(Jonathan Elliot ed. 1836). As “Gov. Johnston observed, ... men who were in very high offices
could not be come at by the ordinary course of justice; but when called before this high
tribunal [the House of Representatives] and convicted, they would be stripped of their
dignity, and reduced to the rank of their fellow-citizens, and then the courts of common law
The 234-year tradition of not prosecuting Presidents provides “[p]erhaps the most
telling indication” that the power to prosecute a President for his official acts does not exist.
Seila Law, LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2201 (2020); Stay App. 21-22. The Special
The Special Counsel argues that “[t]he absence of any such absolute immunity claim
throughout our history weighs heavily against its novel recognition now.” Opp. 29 (emphasis
added) (citing Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2201 (2020)). This argument ignores historical reality.
10
No former President has asserted absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for official
acts because, until 2023, no President was ever prosecuted for official acts. The immunity
claim was never raised because there was no prosecution in which to raise it. The relevant
historical “absence,” id., is not the absence of the claim, but the absence of any prosecution
in which to raise such a claim—despite centuries of political motive and opportunity to bring
The Special Counsel relies on the pardon of President Nixon and the non-prosecution
agreement with President Clinton to argue that Presidents are not immune from conduct
committed while in office. Opp. 21-22, 27-29. These historical examples are inapposite
because both involved Presidents who were under criminal investigation for private conduct.
As this Court has observed, President Clinton was under investigation for “unofficial
conduct,” Clinton, 520 U.S. at 694 (italics in original)—i.e., alleged perjury and obstruction
of justice in a private lawsuit arising from alleged private conduct before he became
President. President Nixon, likewise, was under investigation for a wide range of private
conduct. See, e.g., The Legal Aftermath: Citizen Nixon and the Law, TIME (Aug. 19, 1974),
upon leaving office, President Nixon faced possible criminal charges for “subornation of
perjury, tax fraud, misprision of a felony, [and] misuse of Government funds for his private
home”). Because the Special Counsel fails to distinguish between official acts and “unofficial
conduct” for which a President may not be immune even if he performs it while in office,
Clinton, 520 U.S. at 694, these historical examples provide him no support.3
3 In fact, President Ford’s decision to pardon President Nixon strongly reinforces the
historical norm against prosecuting former Presidents. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,
745 (1982). In his pardon statement, President Ford emphasized the divisive nature of a
prosecution of the former President. Statement of President Ford (Sept. 8, 1974),
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0067/1563096.pdf. He stated that,
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E. Policy Considerations Rooted in the Separation of Powers.
To argue that the threat of prosecution presents no chilling effect, the Special Counsel
relies heavily on the procedural safeguards that attend criminal prosecution and the
Special Counsel’s conduct in this case refutes his own argument. The government waited
nearly three years to charge President Trump, and now the Special Counsel violates every
norm in a desperate, partisan attempt to bring President Trump to trial before the November
5, 2024, election and thus influence the election’s outcome. See supra, Part I. So much for
Moreover, both the Founders and the OLC Memo contradict the conclusion that, when
it comes to the trial of a President, courts should indulge the presumption that such
proceedings will be apolitical. As Hamilton emphasized, “those offenses which proceed from
the misconduct of public men … are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be
denominated POLITICAL….” THE FEDERALIST NO. 65. “The prosecution of them, for this
reason, will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide it into
parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused. In many cases it will connect itself
with the pre-existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence, and
interest on one side or on the other; and in such cases there will always be the greatest danger
that the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the
“[a]fter years of bitter controversy and divisive national debate, … many months and perhaps
more years will have to pass before Richard Nixon could hope to obtain a fair trial by jury in
any jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. at 4. President Ford determined that “ugly
passions would again be aroused, our people would again be polarized in their opinions, and
the credibility of our free institutions of government would again be challenged.” Id. at 5.
He concluded that the criminal prosecution of the President would “prolong the bad dreams
that continue to reopen a chapter that is closed.” Id. at 6. In the face of public outrage,
President Ford made the same determination as the Founders: that prosecutors and Article
III courts should not conduct the trial of a former President.
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real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.” Id. Thus, the Constitutional “convention …
thought the Senate the most fit depositary of this important trust,” id., and rejected “the
Likewise, the OLC Memo states that the prosecution of a President is “necessarily”
and “unavoidably political.” 2000 WL 33711291, at *7. The OLC Memo emphasizes “the
stigma arising both from the initiation of a criminal prosecution and … from the need to
respond to such charges from the judicial process” as formidable burdens, id. at *22—all of
which are imposed regardless of procedural protections. Further, the OLC Memo highlights
how “incongruous” it is for a “jury of twelve” to “undertake the ‘unavoidably political’ task of
rendering judgment in a criminal proceeding against the President.” Id. at *7. Without
immunity from criminal prosecution for official acts, the Presidency will cease to function
Presidential criminal immunity does not exist, App’x 20A, the Special Counsel repeatedly
suggests that the Court might adopt a rule denying immunity that is crafted to the facts of
this case. In other words, the Special Counsel suggests, the Court should hold that President
Trump lacks immunity based on the indictment’s alleged conduct, while implying that other
Presidents would continue to enjoy it. Opp. 2, 9, 11, 16, 20, 21 n.7; see also D.C. Cir. Oral
Arg. Tr. 49:18-22 (Special Counsel admitting that President Obama’s “drone strike” where
“civilians were killed … might be the kind of place in which the Court would properly
recognize some kind of immunity”). The Court should not adopt this gerrymandered
approach to Presidential immunity, one that has the hallmarks of a bill of attainder, and it
could not do so without contravening one of its strongest lines of precedent. The Special
Counsel’s Trump-only theory of immunity turns on his claim that the conduct alleged against
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President Trump was performed for an allegedly improper motive or purpose—i.e., the
allegedly improper purpose of staying in office. See Opp. 2, 9, 11, 16, 20, 21 n.7.
First, that allegation is incorrect. Second, this Court has repeatedly held that
immunity determinations do not turn on an allegedly improper motive or purpose. After all,
every claim of immunity is raised against charges of allegedly improper motive or purpose.
See, e.g., Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 756 (rejecting a rule that would permit “an inquiry into the
President’s motives” as “highly intrusive”); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Barr v.
Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959) (“The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the
privilege.”) (citation omitted); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896) (holding that
immunity does not turn on “any personal motive that might be alleged to have prompted his
action”); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 354 (1871) (holding that immunity “cannot be affected
by any consideration of the motives with which the acts are done”); see also, e.g., Gregoire v.
Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, J.).
In short, in assessing whether immunity applies, courts must look to the “nature of
the act itself.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). The allegedly improper manner
or purpose of the alleged acts is not relevant. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 756. The Special
Counsel’s attempt to gerrymander a denial of immunity that would affect President Trump
alone cannot be squared with this Court’s precedents and our Constitution as a whole.
Lacking legal or historical support, the Special Counsel wraps his argument in the
mantra that criminal immunity would supposedly place the President “above the law.” Opp.
19-20. As this Court has observed, “[t]his contention is rhetorically chilling but wholly
unjustified.” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 758 n.41. “The remedy of impeachment demonstrates
that the President remains accountable under law for his misdeeds in office.” Id. The U.S.
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Senate, not the Special Counsel, has the constitutional authority, political accountability,
and institutional competence to determine whether the public interest justifies the
designed to consider and reflect the interests of the entire nation, and individual Members of
Congress must ultimately account for their decisions to their constituencies.” OLC Memo,
2000 WL 33711291 at *27. “By contrast, the most important decisions in the process of
criminal prosecution would lie in the hands of unaccountable grand and petit jurors,
deliberating in secret, perhaps influenced by regional or other concerns not shared by the
general polity, guided by a prosecutor who is only indirectly accountable to the public.” Id.
***
This Court should stay the D.C. Circuit’s mandate pending the filing and disposition
of an en banc petition in the D.C. Circuit and, if necessary, a petition for certiorari in this
case. The panel opinion departed from its usual practice of withholding its mandate pending
the filing of such a petition. App’x 58A. This decision was ill-considered. En banc review is
a vital component of the lower-court percolation that assists this Court, as the example of
Nixon v. Sirica demonstrates. 487 F.2d 700, 700-22 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc); Stay App. 38-
39. There is no compelling reason to disallow en banc review in this case. Supra Part I.
In addition, the Court should also reject the Special Counsel’s request for briefing on
an extraordinarily compressed timetable. Opp. 37. The issues in this appeal stand among
the most complex, sensitive, and momentous that this Court will be called upon to decide. So
far, they have been the subject of briefing on extremely compressed schedules, and that has
caused various misstatements of law both by the Special Counsel and the lower courts. The
CONCLUSION
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February 15, 2024 Respectfully submitted,
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