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Copyright © S. Jaishankar 2024

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 CONTENTS

Cover

Half-Title Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Contents
List of Abbreviations
Preface
Chapter 1. Presenting a World View
Chapter 2. Foreign Policy and You
Chapter 3. The State of the World
Chapter 4. Back to the Future
Chapter 5. A Transformational Decade
Chapter 6. Making Friends, Influencing People
Chapter 7. Quad: A Grouping Foretold
Chapter 8. Dealing with China
Chapter 9. Re-Imagining Security
Chapter 10. The Roads Not Taken
Chapter 11. Why Bharat Matters
Acknowledgements
Backcover
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AI Artificial Intelligence
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations
AU African Union
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
BIMSTEC Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CARICOM Caribbean Community
CDRI Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure
CELAC Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CEPA Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement
CET Critical and Emerging Technologies
CM Chief Minister
CPEC China–Pakistan Economic Corridor
CTC Counter-Terrorism Committee
EAM External Affairs Minister
ECTA Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FIPIC Forum for India–Pacific Islands Cooperation
FTA Free Trade Agreement
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HADR Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
I2U2 India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, the United States of
America
IAFS India-Africa Forum Summit
IBSA India, Brazil, South Africa
ICWF Indian Community Welfare Fund
IFF Identification Friend or Foe
IGN Intergovernmental Negotiations
IMEC India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor
IPMDA Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness
IOC Indian Ocean Commission
IPOI Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative
IORA Indian Ocean Rim Association
IPEF Indo-Pacific Economic Framework
ISA International Solar Alliance
IT Information Technology
IUU Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
LIFE Lifestyle for Environment
LAC Line of Actual Control
LDC Least Developed Country
LWE Left Wing Extremism
MMPA Migration and Mobility Partnership Agreement
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
ODA Official Development Assistance
O-RAN Open Radio Access Networks
OSOWOG One Sun One World One Grid
PIF Pacific Islands Forum
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PLI Production-Linked Incentive
PoK Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
PRAGATI Pro-Active Governance and Timely Implementation
PRC People’s Republic of China
PM Prime Minister
RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
RIC Russia-India-China
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAGAR Security and Growth for All in the Region
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SCRI Supply Chain Resilience Initiative
SDG Sustainable Development Goals
SME Small and Medium Enterprise
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
SPICE Smart, Precise Impact, Cost-Effective
SR Special Representative
UAE United Arab Emirates
UK United Kingdom
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UN United Nations
UNSC United Nations Security Council
US United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WHO World Health Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
 PREFACE

For the last decade, I have had not just a ringside view of foreign
policymaking, but the privilege to participate in the process as well. As
External Affairs Minister (EAM) and previously as Foreign Secretary and
Ambassador to the US, the analysis, debates and strategizing of this period
are exercises in which I have been deeply involved. It is not my intention to
pen my memoirs, certainly not while still in the midst of discharging
responsibilities. But because this has been a deeply transformational era, it is
also imperative that an objective explanation of the changes is provided to
the public. The analytical world appears to be tangled in its own pre-
conceptions and struggling to grasp developments that do not fit its mould.
The political arena has become exceptionally polemical, with some parties
articulating positions that go against their own grain. The burden of
communicating, in that sense, falls on the actual participants. With an earlier
experience of presenting my thoughts, there was a natural inclination to take
up this challenge. This is the thought process behind this book.
My own background as a diplomat well into a fifth decade biases me in
favour of presenting a clinical picture of the global landscape, its challenges
and complications as well as of the implications for India and a suggested
course of action. This is what I have done for a living all these years. It is not
that we avoid personalities and relationships or underplay their importance.
On the contrary, so much of diplomacy is about chemistry and credibility that
the human factor is always central to an accurate judgement. But what usually
happens is that a vast number of objective and subjective elements are
distilled into an integrated picture, which acquires a relatively dispassionate
character.
In this particular endeavour, I contemplated a world that is struggling
with economic disruptions, the Covid pandemic, the Ukraine conflict, an
exploding West Asia (Middle East) and sharpening great power competition,
and sought to assess India’s prospects in ascending the global hierarchy in
such volatile conditions. That exercise brought home to me how much we
have progressed in the preceding years and how differently we are now seen
as compared to the era before 2014. India has today moved out of the
defensive non-aligned posture, engaging multiple nations on a range of issues
with equal confidence. It is also a greater contributor to solutions, regional
or global. This marks its emergence as vishwa mitra, a partner of the world
that is making a greater difference with each passing year. The New Delhi
G20 Summit not only affirmed our ability to shape the global agenda but also
underlined that other nations value their relationship with us as well.
The problem with a purely detached examination is that it is unable to
convey the full flavour of this transformation. Moreover, it could suggest that
there was an inevitability about it, thereby neglecting the power of ideas and
the importance of leadership. A truly accurate understanding of the journey
we have been through and the possibilities that await us requires a
personalized picture as well. Some of it involves the granular aspects of the
diplomatic process, but much emanates from the personal views and thoughts
of Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi. So, after some hesitation, I decided
to prefix this book with a preface that would give the reader a glimpse of
how policies were formulated and decisions taken.
My personal acquaintance with Narendra Modi began in 2011, when I
was Ambassador in China and he was the Chief Minister (CM) of Gujarat.
While awaiting his visit, I was struck by the meticulousness of preparations
and his interest to assess China’s progress in different fields. It was apparent
to me even then that he envisaged developments in both India and China in
terms of civilizational resurgence. What also stood out was his request for a
political briefing since he did not wish to deviate from what were national
positions while abroad. Terrorism and sovereignty understandably were the
focus, given the agenda of our ties.
It was also my first exposure to a working style that emphasized
comprehensive briefings and constant feedback. My cumulative impression
was one of strong nationalism, great purposefulness and deep attention to
detail. His openness to the ideas and experiences of others was also
manifest. Those few days spent together allowed me to express my own
thoughts on comparative modernization in Asia and gauge his own views. He
was clearly impressed by the economic and technology advancements of
Japan but also by their social cohesion and cultural pride. I also have a
recollection of him speaking well about the leadership quality of Lee Kuan
Yew. It was no surprise that he made it a point to attend his funeral later on in
2015. Occasionally, I have reflected on this first encounter because there
were pointers there about his strong views on terrorism, his forthright manner
of putting across national concerns and his focus on socio-economic
advancement. It also gave me a glimpse of a thinking that, after 2014, would
drive the endeavour towards cultural rebalancing.
The second contact was an indirect one, around the time of the 2014
general election. It was widely speculated even ahead of the counting that
there could be a change of guard. As Ambassador in Washington, D.C., it
was my duty to plan for all contingencies. Discreet preparations were
accordingly made for an early phone conversation between President Barack
Obama and the Indian PM-designate. In this particular case, there was more
than just logistical and protocol issues to worry about. Addressing the
overhang from the past was clearly a significant concern. In the event, this
was effectively finessed. But the episode does bring out PM Modi’s instinct
to put national interest ahead and take a strategic approach towards a
potentially important partner.
Any account of this period must necessarily include a reference to the
Madison Square Garden event in 2014. This is not so much because of the
event in itself but because it began a trend in diaspora connection and public
projection that continues to this day. In my first meeting with PM Modi, the
idea came up in the context of the impact of the diaspora and shaping India’s
image abroad. I was essentially told that the gathering must be organized in
New York in such a manner that its reverberations would first reach
Washington, D.C., and then be a message across the world. Since that
experience, this has emerged as a signature aspect of Modi diplomacy that
has travelled successfully across nations and continents. Leaders of the
democratic world are obviously enthralled and often keen to participate.
From Denmark and Japan to Africa and Australia, this is seen akin to a
political rock concert.
For the diaspora, it has been a motivation and recognition at the same
time. And not least, this has emerged as a high-profile platform to share the
‘India Story’ with the world, constantly refreshing it with updates. This
concern for the diaspora itself emerges from a combination of factors. It
expresses appreciation for their continued contribution to India’s welfare. At
the same time, enthusing them does encourage efforts to make their society of
domicile more interested in India. But there is also the deeper issue of
preparing Indians for the era of a global workplace. This requires facilitating
their mobility, enhancing their ease of living abroad, addressing specific
concerns of students, professionals, etc., and, most important, standing by
them at times of distress. In line with actions in other domains, here too,
declarations have been backed by delivery. The PM has taken a particular
interest in the establishment of online portals, welfare funds and response
systems for such contingencies.
There is a lot that is personal about diplomacy, particularly at the
leadership level. One of the visible achievements of PM Modi has been the
ability to establish the right chemistry with his international peers. It could
vary from Western leaders to Gulf rulers, from democratic politicians to
those less cyclical, and from those proximate to India to others from a very
different ethos. There is no set formula, but one can see that many
relationships emerged from exchange of experiences and respect for
achievements. Like any competitive domain, those who are doing well, be it
in popularity rating, source of ideas or governance delivery, tend to naturally
attract the interest and admiration of others. But it could also be something
more personal or cultural. For example, PM Modi’s discipline of fasting was
a major talking point during his 2014 visit to the US, and even afterwards. It
elicited a lot of curiosity about the underlying outlook as well. Similarly, his
propagation of yoga and his own practice of it was often a subject of
conversation with fellow leaders. And this extended from food habits and
traditional medicine to culture, heritage and history, to the extent that as these
encounters left their impressions, India too ended up occupying greater mind-
space.
Then, there was the influence of ideas and thoughts that PM Modi often
articulated on contemporary issues. The United Nations (UN) Climate
Change Conference (COP21) in Paris in 2015 was such an occasion, where
he surprised many with his fervent advocacy of solar energy. In fact, some
Western leaders came to meet him expecting that they would have to argue
for climate action. They ended up finding India a few steps ahead of their
own beliefs. It is interesting that many of the big thoughts of the last decade in
this domain have come personally from PM Modi, including at the Glasgow
COP26 in 2021.
Another aspect of relevance is how much Modi’s focus on technology has
contributed to forging connections across the world. Initially, it began with
global interest in how his 2014 campaign was shaped by its application. But
soon enough, it extended to governance practices and policy drivers. The
manner in which digital delivery worked for social welfare or Covid
management was certainly noted internationally. Leakages, I was often
reminded, is not a uniquely Indian problem. As we made moves in various
scientific fields, from semiconductors and renewables to drones and aircraft
technology, a tech-friendly PM contributed to the perception of India as a
trusted collaborator.
There are some issues that could be put in the category of core beliefs.
Standing up to terrorism would certainly rank high among them. After my
initial exposure to that in Beijing in 2011, whenever the occasion warranted,
it was made abundantly clear that we would not allow cross-border
terrorism to be normalized under any circumstances. When Uri happened in
2016, there was little doubt among us internally that we would respond in a
fitting manner. I was not in government during Balakot in 2019 but can only
say that it was very much in keeping with character. At the UN, we have
consequently pushed strongly for sanctioning of terrorists. And when others
have sought to block it for some political objective, there has been no
hesitation in calling them out publicly. As a member of the UN Security
Council (UNSC) in October 2022, we organized a meeting of the Counter
Terrorism Committee (CTC) in Mumbai at one of the venues of the 26/11
terror attack. India has also been a strong votary of initiatives like ‘No
Money for Terror’. From a foreign policy perspective, it is, of course,
always advantageous to be functioning with clear objectives and firm
instructions. This was also the case when it came to engaging the world on
the Article 370 issue. A nationalist outlook will naturally produce a
nationalist diplomacy, and it is something that the world will need to get used
to.
Economic priorities at home will always be a powerful driver of
policies abroad. Enabling the flow of resources and absorbing best practices
have acquired even greater priority in recent years. In many ways, PM Modi
has led from the front by engaging entrepreneurs, visiting technology centres
and seeking to promote innovation and skills. In all of this, employment
creation and talent promotion remain his focus. His travels abroad often
feature visits to institutions and activities that are relevant to our national
flagship programmes. One can sense a strong determination to accelerate
India’s growth and build further its comprehensive national power. On
occasion, it can mean going against orthodox thinking and global mantras. A
relevant case was that of joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP) in 2019. Despite considerable pressure, PM Modi took
the courageous call to not accede. Since then, that decision has been more
than amply validated by geopolitical developments. There have been other
trade and economic negotiations that have each presented their dilemmas.
Our positions have been guided by clear-eyed calculation and sound gut
instincts about social consequences.
Yet, it would be a gross mistake to project the Modi government in
protectionist terms. On the contrary, rarely in our history have more strenuous
efforts been made to attract global capital and technology. Where our
partners have offered reasonable terms and met our national interests,
bargains have been struck often at remarkable speed. There is a much
sounder appreciation of the complexity of the global economy, especially of
its intricate supply chains. And the internationalism of outlook has been
demonstrated convincingly, whether it is the Vaccine Maitri, first responder
operations or expanded development partnerships.
If India’s diplomacy appears more nimble and creative now, much of the
credit should go to a leader who has consciously striven to make it more
contemporary and responsive. The whole ‘Neighbourhood First’ thinking
developed from the 2014 swearing-in ceremony and his personal
experiences. This idea of a non-reciprocal and generous policy took time for
a bureaucracy to absorb, but it did finally get through. The Security and
Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) outlook was an effort to break long-
standing silos even within the foreign ministry. When it came to the Gulf,
there were decades of lazy assumptions in India about their lack of interest
that had to be overcome. With Israel and Palestine, we have ended practising
a hyphenation that we resented when applied to us. Moreover, India also
made a distinction between its position on the need for a Palestinian state and
its clear-cut condemnation of terrorism. The focus on opening new embassies
in Africa and engaging more deeply was putting into practice what had been
preached for long. As for the Pacific, till 2014, it was really beyond our
horizons. The aggregate of all these changes, when stitched together with a
cohesive global analysis, presents a very different picture.
While implementing policy is a daily chore, there are decisions taken
from time to time that represent inflection points in the rise of a nation. India
naturally has been subjected to its own set of tests and challenges on this
score. And it has been the decisions taken under difficult circumstances that
have become the hallmark of difference. A significant one was the decision
even in the midst of the Covid lockdown to mobilize and deploy forces on a
large scale in the border areas with China. Tens of thousands of troops with
accompanying equipment were rapidly airlifted in a decisive step. This was
in response to Chinese military movements that violated our long-standing
agreements. Not just that, thereafter, fashioning a diplomatic posture to
convey the abnormality in our ties in a sustained manner was no small matter.
Then, there was the establishment of the Quad and its steady growth, both
in protocol terms and agenda. This, too, was taken forward despite strong
pressures to desist. I have already made a reference to the call taken in
Bangkok to not join the RCEP. When it came to oil purchases from Russia,
India was being publicly pressurized by those who had softened the
consequences for themselves. Each of this was decided by putting the
interests of India first.
There were also occasions that involved larger concerns of a regional or
global nature. One was to take the call to supply vaccines to the Global South
even when vaccination was ongoing in India. Another was the scale and
speed with which India responded to Sri Lanka’s pressing economic needs.
Interestingly, when the I2U2 and India–Middle East–Europe Economic
Corridor (IMEC) initiatives were tabled, we surprised our other partners by
the swiftness of our response, precisely because our analysis of the region
anticipated their coming.
An early exhortation within the Modi government was to get the world to
change its thinking about India. This meant building and demonstrating
capabilities across a wide spectrum. It required us to be involved in key
global debates and be perceived more as part of the solution than the
problem. Another expectation was that India would assume greater
responsibilities and make stronger contributions. From our side, we strove
for better understanding of the various dimensions of transformation of our
society. Our endeavour was also to establish India as a more credible and
trusted partner. Each of these factors became an input into the influence game
that characterizes international relations. Bringing them all together means
creating a different narrative, one that captures the progress while
articulating the future. This is very much central to the projection of the
message of a New India.
The diplomacy of a major country is very arduous, even more so when it
is a rising power. Leadership and conceptual clarity may make it easier to be
executed. But arriving at a comprehensive vision and refreshing that
regularly is no easy task. If our international profile has become sharper in
the last decade, this is the outcome of a series of policies, decisions and
activities. Visions and even goals need strategizing to be realized on the
ground. This means interactions, investments and messaging in a focussed
and sustained manner. What the public sees is an elegant swan; underneath,
there is furious paddling.
The most noticeable feature of PM Modi’s work style is the ability to
constantly integrate the big picture and the smallest of details. He could be as
immersed in briefings about chip wars or energy futures as in handling of
evacuation operations or in the value of a best practice. Every visit, every
speech and every engagement has a meaning; they end up as one part of a
larger mosaic. Some of what is debated and decided responds to the demand
of events. But the more persistent thread is of determinedly charting a
strategic course and adjusting that to the unpredictability of our times. It
would probably surprise many to learn how much time and effort has gone
into that larger exercise over the last decade. The unfolding may look natural
and often spontaneous, but the reality is actually one of continuous planning
and implementation.
The ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of Modi’s foreign policy is there for all to see.
The ‘why’ is a more complex proposition, one that is perhaps sensed
intuitively by the public. Much of it flows from a strongly ingrained belief in
India’s capability to contribute to a better world. It resides in a self-
perception of a well-wisher to the world, for whom the international
community is a family, clearly a more confident posture than in the past. But
that itself is only a facet of a deeper commitment to national rejuvenation and
the resurgence of a civilization. At home, they obviously take the form of
building capabilities, undertaking reform and enhancing the quality of
governance. Abroad, this is expressed in terms of a greater ability to
influence the global agenda. This outlook is able to meld progressive
thinking and embrace of technology comfortably with the traditions and
authenticity of India. And it sees no contradiction in espousing
internationalism abroad while articulating nationalism at home. This is an
India determined to play on the big stage, even change the stage itself where
necessary to advance its interests. Its motivational power at home is
paralleled by a desire to promote understanding beyond its borders.
This book is a collection of 11 essays, all of them interconnected and
some even overlapping. They range from an analysis of the global landscape
to an identification of India’s opportunities. There is the big picture but also
the real practicalities that make up the world. Key relationships are
addressed in detail but the entire global framework is presented as well.
Some forays take us into the past, others into the future. All together, they
seek to explain a decade of change.
India’s quest to ascend the global hierarchy is an endless journey. But as
we take stock of the progress made and anticipate the challenges ahead, it is
certainly reassuring that this is propelled by such deep national commitment
and confidence. Whether drawing strength from its heritage and culture or
approaching challenges with the optimism of democracy and technology, this
is certainly a New India, indeed an India that is able to define its own
interests, articulate its own positions, find its own solutions and advance its
own model. In short, this is an India that is more Bharat.
 Chapter 1.
PRESENTING A WORLD VIEW
Calculations, Culture and Clarity

T
hree years ago, in my earlier book The India Way: Strategies for an
Uncertain World, I had urged that ‘this is a time for us to engage
America, manage China, cultivate Europe, reassure Russia, bring Japan
into play, draw neighbours in, extend the neighbourhood, and expand
traditional constituencies of support’.1 In the period that has passed, much of
this has advanced but, obviously, not equally on all fronts. Some have
progressed smoothly; others have been more complicated than expected. In
the meantime, the world itself has witnessed deeper transformation. The
challenges of a global order in transition have been magnified by the back-to-
back impact of the Covid pandemic, the Ukraine conflict and the fighting in
West Asia.
There is no question that this has now become a much tougher world. For
India specifically, the going has been far from easy. Many of the larger
concerns have impacted it directly. The changed posture of China on the
border, in particular, is a major factor in its strategic calculus. But a
determined leadership and a supportive society are helping it to navigate this
turbulent era. Rising powers seek stability most of all; India must plan to rise
amidst serious unpredictability.
International relations for the last quarter of the century have been
dominated by five phenomena: globalization, rebalancing, multipolarity,
impact of technology and the games that nations have always played.
Globalization, the most fundamental of them, will only intensify, even though
its earlier model of creating dependencies has come under growing
challenge. It has led to rebalancing the relative weight of players in the
world order. That initially unfolded economically, but its political and
cultural facets are now making themselves felt. As it proceeds, rebalancing,
in turn, will create multipolarity. A new lot of more consequential powers
will separate out, joining those dominant since 1945. This is still work in
progress, one could even say in the early stages. Much will increasingly
depend on how and with what agenda combinations of states come together.
Technology, too, has become more of a game-changer than in the past. Its
ability to impact the daily routine is much deeper, as indeed the capability to
weaponize our normal activities, needs and resources. In fact, the pace has
reached a point where we are compelled to think in terms of ‘techades’. And
then there are the perennial games that nations play, expressed through
competitive politics between individual countries or, sometimes, groupings.
Each of these phenomena is a key factor in the fashioning of contemporary
Indian foreign policy, individually as much as cumulatively. Today, India has
to not just prepare for a re-globalization that corrects economic and
technology concentrations but also use that opportunity to strengthen
comprehensive national power.
Given that there is at least as much change as there is continuity in world
politics, it is obvious that our approach cannot be overly reliant on muscle
memory. Certainly, the structural framework and previous experiences have a
critical bearing. But, at the same time, the processes described above that are
continually shaping our current existence need to be given full recognition.
There are important shifts in power between and within states that are also
relevant to the overall calculation. Much of that centres on the US, whose
dominance is clearly not what it was in the past. That it has changed is
indisputable; what it leads to will be still very much a matter of debate. And
recent events have demonstrated that neither its capabilities nor its influence
should be underestimated. Reading its new posture right is a challenge in
itself, especially when it exercises influence in a more off-shore manner.
How invested it is in various regions is a natural question, one juxtaposed
against the growing presence of other nations, especially China.
Political polarization within societies is also a factor that the diplomacy
of many states needs to take into account. Domestic changes, in the US as
much as China, are compelling some countries to recalibrate their posture
accordingly. As geopolitical arenas go, a world long used to thinking of West
Asia and Europe as the central theatres of competition is increasingly looking
at the Indo-Pacific instead. Even distant countries are, therefore, compelled
to come up with their respective Indo-Pacific approaches. The Ukraine
conflict and its energy consequences, significant as they may be, are unlikely
to dilute this development.
 Each of these trends also had their own resonance on Indian foreign
policy. Handling this volatility effectively has required both intensive
strategizing and tactical fine-tuning. Our domestic policies not only ensured
recovery from the pandemic but also, thereafter, became the basis for Covid
diplomacy. In regard to Ukraine, a political posture took into account not
only the imperatives of energy and food security but the broader dynamics of
Eurasia as well. On China, a robust deployment on the border was
accompanied by conscious constraints on cooperation. With Quad partners,
we were one of the few nations who made the transition smoothly between
successive administrations so different from each other. But there were also
important political calls taken at the right time, including the upgradation of
the Quad, creating the I2U2 and devising the IMEC.
The exercise of engaging in multiple directions and constantly balancing
competitive relationships was also tested in this period. Having invested so
much in intensifying cooperation with Europe, harmonizing that with
maintaining traditional ties with Russia was not easy. As the North–South
divide deepened, undertaking the Voice of the Global South Summit at the
commencement of the G20 presidency was a timely move. And when
multipolarity continued to unfold, the broadening of India’s engagement
sought to keep pace.
The factors that drive the choices of nations have also undergone a
profound change in the last few years. Earlier, the established way to
measure the advancement of power was to use more orthodox military and
economic metrics. Our assessment of opportunities was also more predicated
on partnerships between nations. Recent events have, however, introduced
many more parameters to evaluate security and calculate gains. And our
outlook, be it directly economic or more broadly national security, must
adjust accordingly. De-risking the global economy is now a principal
preoccupation. For market economies and democratic polities, this focusses
on establishing more resilient and reliable supply chains. In the digital
domain, we see a parallel emphasis on the importance of trust and
transparency. A more decentralized world economy is increasingly
perceived as the most viable solution to current anxieties. Such sentiments
against economic concentration are only likely to intensify as tech wars
gather greater momentum. We must also accept that interdependence, in itself,
cannot always be an assured basis for international peace and security. Re-
globalization in an open-ended techade will call for trusted collaborations of
a kind that will be a new experience for all of us.

SAGA OF A RISING POWER

It is this scenario that confronts India and the world as they both contemplate
and calculate. We are heading into volatility and upheaval, where mitigation
and navigation go side by side. In fact, the transformation that we long
speculated about is now actually upon us. Externally, India is discovering the
merits of converging with like-minded nations, even while maintaining its
distinct identity. Its domestic journey enables it to offer new terms of
engagement to a growing range of partners. As the most populous nation and
currently the fifth largest economy, its salience is underlined by the manner in
which it conducted the G20 presidency. The interaction between a changing
India and a more dynamic world is clearly novel for both of them. In that
situation, the quality of its leadership will make the difference. I have sought
to capture the various happenings of a world under exceptional stress and
present them as trends against which we assess India’s prospects. Like my
previous effort, this too is intended to contribute to an ongoing debate in an
argumentative society.
Major nations that make an impact on the world do so after a defining
event. It could be a conflict, a revolution or a major economic shift.
Underlying all of them are both a jump in capacities and the character traits
of a new player at that level. In India’s case, its early diplomacy was
eventually constrained by the capability factor. It may have shown up in
national security and political challenges, but was actually a cumulative
outcome of limited progress in socio-economic and technological fields. But
somewhere, there was also the inadequate projection of a great civilization.
India’s progress has been more staggered than others in its peer group.
Today, all these variables are coming together into play as India advances
across multiple fronts in a self-supportive manner. Politics, economics,
demography, culture and ideas make a potent combination. These deep
changes across broad domains are contributing to the creation of the New
India.
The last decade has witnessed an expansion of India’s space and a rise in
its international profile. The mandala of its diplomacy has taken a clear
form, even as the Neighbourhood First policy struck roots and the extended
neighbourhoods advanced in all directions. The global footprint is widening
too, visible as much in Africa and Latin America as in the Pacific and the
Caribbean. Multiple engagements simultaneously with major power centres
have also intensified, though not always without challenges. The Vaccine
Maitri strongly reaffirmed credentials as a champion of the South, just as first
responder operations highlighted our international commitment. Operations
like Kaveri, Ganga, Devi Shakti and Ajay underline that Indians abroad
could count on their government during times of difficulty. And a decade that
began with the advocacy of yoga is appropriately seeing the espousal of Sri
Anna (millets). The journey will continue but this is a time to take stock and
assess what difference we have made. And that exercise will surely bring out
why we matter more to the world.
At the end of the day, foreign policy is very much about clinically
assessing the global landscape and calculating one’s prospects. Only if the
larger picture is accurately read can the risks and benefits of any course of
action be assessed. But no nation plans or acts in a vacuum. It must have a
vision for itself, an architecture in mind and objectives to attain. For both
practical and cultural reasons, these may not always be spelt out explicitly.
But by analysing the world, describing processes and suggesting solutions,
their outlines can nevertheless be discerned. To that extent, this is also a
volume to be read between the lines.
India’s G20 presidency is also instructive in offering insights about how
to navigate current world politics. By relentlessly shining the spotlight on the
concerns of the Global South, we were able to ensure that the G20 returned
to its basic mandate of promoting international growth and development.
Defining priorities in that regard and devising collective solutions were also
objectives that were attained to considerable measure. Faced with the
parallel challenges of East–West polarization and North–South divide, each
was utilized to mitigate the other problem. A firm diplomatic posture that
included some new practices on interim outcomes encouraged consensus to
be reached when it really mattered. Taking the initiative to enable the
permanent membership of the African Union (AU) was notable in itself and
helpful in strengthening the larger narrative.
A takeaway from the G20 Summit in Delhi was the demonstration that the
more ambitious the agenda, the harder it would be for others to play
spoilsport. Equally, by nurturing crucial relationships over a period of time,
all the participants developed stakes in India’s success. Whether it was the
manner in which diplomacy was conducted, culture and heritage projected or
popular participation was encouraged, the G20 presidency was very much an
exercise in the India way.
As a practitioner long associated with our diplomacy, there are two
responsibilities that I seek to discharge through this book. One is to share the
thinking of a rising power with a world that has become increasingly aware
of that happening. The other is to communicate the necessity of accurately
understanding global developments to our own people. Only then can our
nation fully appreciate the opportunities and challenges that lie before it.
These twin exercises are, however, united in their cultural underpinnings.
After all, this foundation influences our approach to the world as a family, as
it does the pluralistic and consultative nature of our society. They shape our
political ethos too, just as they promote our democratic choices. The manner
in which debates are conducted, decisions reached and positions articulated,
all have their own cultural signature. But above all, they bring out the values
and ethics that are at the core of our collective personality.
Sagas of nations, while developed to grip the imagination of their
peoples, are a distillate of wisdom, beliefs and habits. For those whose
cultures and traditions came under pressure in difficult periods of history,
they are also a crucial motivator. The really great tales offer insights that
help to spread influence beyond boundaries and to help propagate messages.
It is, therefore, tempting to draw from them lessons that can be applied to the
contemporary world. Especially in times of turbulence, episodes and
outcomes can provide guidance, offer parallels and strengthen self-belief.
Indeed, because epics serve as an instructive way to view the happenings of
any period, they remain eternally relevant.
Of India’s two major epics, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, it is the
latter that is normally associated with statecraft and diplomacy. There are
many reasons for this perception, among them the storyline itself. But even
that arises from the fact that these two sagas are set in different eras, each
with their own behavioural expectations. The Ramayana, which is the earlier
one, has purity of thought and nobility of conduct as its central message. In
contrast, the Mahabharata is much more a chronicle of human frailty and
pursuance of ambition. In today’s terminology, we would see one as a quest
for the observance of rules and norms, while assessing the other as an
exercise in realpolitik. Since the international order cannot be built on
unrestrained competition, the quest to establish and uphold standards has
always been relevant. This is perhaps even more relevant today in a world
that is so much in ferment. The Ramayana could be studied from that
perspective, highlighting both the merits and challenges of building a rules-
based order.
The ethical dimensions of the Ramayana are exceptionally strong as
compared to not only the Mahabharata but even to the epics of other cultures.
Its grassroots understanding is one of a clear-cut battle of good against evil.
This is why it is celebrated through festivals and fables across much of Asia.
But even within this template, there are complexities, dilemmas and
compulsions that hold lessons for a student of strategy. How goodwill is
leveraged, commitments are made, coalitions are built and choices exercised
are all graphically illustrated by the narrative. In most cases, the decisions
appear obvious, yet, the crucial events have a backstory without which our
understanding is not complete.
In essence, the Ramayana is a saga of a divine force that assumes human
incarnation, Rama, to cleanse the world of evil. In that process, he sets the
norms for personal conduct and promotes good governance. For that reason,
we may see his rule as the epitome of a rules-based order, known as ‘Ram
Rajya’. The narrative, as it unfolds, is understandably much more
complicated than only these propositions. It begins with building strengths
and acquiring capabilities that give Lord Rama, the chief protagonist, his
formidable reputation. While subject to various tests, he is able to handle
them with a dexterity that prepares him for the final challenge. His
relationship with his half-brother Lakshmana is particularly close, though he
also commands the affection of his two other siblings, Bharata and
Shatrughna. The tale is one of political intrigue, as Rama’s stepmother
Kaikeyi invokes one of the two boons given by his father Dasaratha to insist
on Rama’s exile at the very time when he is to be crowned. The abduction,
during his forest exile, of his wife Sita by the demon-king Ravana is the key
event on which subsequent developments are centred.
As Rama prepares a campaign to rescue her, a number of stratagems
emerge, all of which have found their way into folklore. The 10-day battle in
which Rama is ultimately successful is not without its moments of anxiety.
The role of Hanuman as his devotee, emissary, resource person and adviser
is particularly noteworthy. But whether it is the importance of reliable
friends, the challenges of creating coalitions, the dangers of open-ended
commitments, the perils of strategic complacency, the value of effective
diplomacy or the need for informationized warfare, there is much that today’s
world can learn from this era.
Most of all, the story of Lord Rama is an account of a rising power that is
able to harmonize its particular interests with a commitment to doing global
good. The tests that he is subjected to encourage strategic creativity. Many of
the decision points are those of principle, and the choices are, consequently,
less ambiguous. But there are also occasions of self-interest, where the
justification for an action stems from a particular need. Lord Rama’s
intervention in the battle between the monkey-kings Vali and Sugriva,
explained at length later, is a case in point. It is not without its ethical
aspects; it is just that the understanding of ethics is different from its orthodox
assumptions.
Life is rarely a black-and-white choice, and appreciating the
complexities of decision-making is an essential part of grasping international
relations. A major rising power, however, needs more than just an accurate
landscape analysis and the ability to act on it. It must, first of all, be
confident of its own values and beliefs and base its policies on those
convictions. These will draw from the totality of its culture, heritage and
traditions. That is why India can only rise when it is truly Bharat.

1S. Jaishankar, The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World, HarperCollins India, 2020.
 Chapter 2.
FOREIGN POLICY AND YOU
Making a Difference in Your Daily Life

I
ndia may matter to the world and vice versa. But that does not mean we
Indians should not watch out for ourselves. From that national
perspective, what is a ‘good’ foreign policy? Perhaps we over-
complicate the answer by confusing sensible pursuit of interests with
complicated formulations. So, it is important to look beyond the terminology
and validate it through gut answers.
A ‘good’ foreign policy must work for you personally. Your everyday
needs from the world must be better met. Since we are a collective as a
country, our national security must be ensured. As that is done, the pursuit of
our aspirations must be facilitated. Foreign policy, being the link to the
outside, should enable us to draw what we seek. It could be technology,
capital, best practices or work opportunities. And obviously, we would all
like to be strong, look good and feel appreciated.
In the final analysis, good foreign policy must read global trends well and
anticipate what portends for our nation and our people. When the unexpected
happens, it must respond nimbly and effectively. At the same time, it must
message our intentions and project our image positively. Any effort that
ensures these goals has a lot going for it. It does not necessarily need to
sound nice; it must simply pass the smell test.
Put yourself in the shoes of an Indian student who happened to be in
Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Focussed on educational prospects, you are
now caught in the middle of a serious conflict. It is not just you and thousands
more of your fellow nationals, there are millions of Ukrainians who are
trying to get out of the country at the same time. Internal travel is dangerous
and complicated. The borders are even more so due to overcrowding and
congestion. In the conflict-impacted cities, there is even fear regarding the
physical danger of stepping out in the open due to shelling and air strikes.
 This is when you really look to your government for support and
extrication. And indeed, this is when its entire foreign policy apparatus
swings into action as it did through Operation Ganga. It did so by facilitating
transport, including trains and buses. It intervened at the highest levels in
Russia and Ukraine to ensure ceasing of fire for safe passage. It engaged the
border authorities to enable border crossing. And in extreme cases, such as
in the city of Sumy, its representatives even traversed conflict zones to ensure
the necessary logistics for your safety. Once you were out of Ukraine, it
worked with neighbouring governments in Romania, Poland, Hungary and
Slovakia to establish transit camps, utilize air fields and organize the flights
required for a return home. Reflect for a moment on the efforts, interventions
and relationships at various levels, starting from the very top, that were
involved to make all of this happen.
Revisit then Kabul on 15 August 2021. Imagine that, for whatever reason,
you found yourself stranded when the Taliban suddenly took over the city.
Apart from navigating a city now controlled by Taliban checkpoints, you
could well ask how difficult going home could be. Well, a great effort had to
be made by the Indian government. It was as challenging as combining access
to a secured American airbase that was on edge, surrounded by desperate
Afghans and suspicious Taliban; using Tajik rear support for quick response;
accessing Iranian airspace at short notice; and quietly utilizing Gulf
facilitation! Some others were beneficiaries of seats in flights run by the
United States of America (US), the United Kingdom (UK), the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) and France that were delicately negotiated. This might seem
like exceptionally complicated logistics. But it was more than that: behind it
were years of relationships that really delivered at a time of need. Equally
important is that this represented the efficacy of a flexible and pragmatic
Indian policy of multiple engagements.
The Operation Devi Shakti flights from Kabul may have been
extraordinarily stressful, but they were still manageable at short notice. In
terms of numbers involved, India’s response to the demands generated by the
Covid pandemic was much bigger. The Vande Bharat Mission, which brought
back millions of Indians from multiple countries by air, sea and land, is
perhaps the largest recorded evacuation exercise in history. The movement of
people was only the tip of the iceberg. Driving it was a complex and intricate
set of activities that included organizing, gathering, testing, housing and even
feeding those waiting to be repatriated.
 Starting first at Wuhan and then moving on to Italy and beyond, this
involved an intensive engagement with local, provincial and national
authorities. And it covered everybody, from tourists and students to
professionals and workers, even pilgrims, fishermen and seafarers. It was
not limited to Indians coming back. Many staying abroad, in the Gulf, for
instance, were given support directly or by interceding with local
governments. Here, too, the results of cultivation by political leaders and
diplomats paid off.
A more recent example was that of the Indian community caught up in
armed civil strife in Sudan in April 2023. Tensions may have been steadily
building up over the past year, but nevertheless, expatriates are usually
reluctant to leave until the worst case actually happens. In this instance, when
it suddenly did, it put almost 4,000 Indian nationals in jeopardy. Overnight,
the Indian response mobilized by setting up the command centre at home for
what came to be named as Operation Kaveri. At the same time, Indian
aircraft were positioned in Saudi Arabia for short-notice flights, while
Indian naval vessels were sent to the Red Sea. The extrication process was
again incredibly complicated because our nationals were dispersed in small
numbers across a vast area. In the civil war situation, law and order broke
down completely and even basic necessities became difficult to access. The
Indian Embassy worked under the most challenging circumstances, including
the occupation of its premises by a warring party. The solution was to
evacuate as safely, inconspicuously and rapidly as possible, three objectives
that often collided especially in the face of personal and political pressures.
Yet, it was an operation that delivered fully because it was a combination
of a committed official presence on the ground, adept diplomacy with
neighbours and enablers and a detailed SOP that had been honed over years.
Our diplomats and military personnel performed outstandingly, often taking
high personal risks. We saw partners like the Saudis, the British and the
Egyptians go out of their way to help as well. If there is a common thread
among these stressful experiences, it is that of larger dangers that impact
individual lives. And that is, in fact, a predicament all through human history.
When a sage first took Rama and Lakshmana to cleanse his hermitage of evil demons, little
did they realize what that encounter presaged for their lives. It was their first brush with the
forces of darkness, whose full powers they were far from grasping. Indeed, the very Maricha
whom Lord Rama first neutralized came back in the form of a golden deer to deceive him in
his later exile. Years later, in the initial phase of his banishment, he again pledged to protect the
sages of Sharabhanga, perhaps unknowing of where this was to lead him.
There are so many instances of the future being decided by the juxtaposition of
complicated events, be that the fate of the monkey-king Vali or the eagle-king Jatayu. A few like
Maricha sense it but are still powerless to halt the course of destiny. In fact, the triggering event
of King Dasaratha’s boons is an example of an unintended decision leading to unanticipated
consequences. This is also illustrated by the fact that Ravana does not even imagine the
ultimate results of his abduction of Queen Sita.
In our modern world, we, too, live with uncertainties and turbulence. No amount of
anticipation can prepare us fully. Yet, we must always assess, plan and be ready to respond. A
sensible government, which has the welfare of its citizens at the centre of its thinking, will
naturally put in place rules, regulations, mechanisms and practices for unforeseen
contingencies. It would also constantly refine them based on experiences. That is exactly what
has changed in the last decade, and if we look back, it is visible how much of a difference that
has made to our common citizens.

DEALING WITH A GLOBALIZED EXISTENCE

A parallel example in public health during the same period is equally

instructive. When the first wave of Covid hit India in 2020, we scrambled
across the world to procure personal protective equipment (PPE), masks and
ventilators and did so in a seller’s market as the demand far exceeded
supply. Ingredients for the pharmaceutical industry with escalating
requirements were also greatly sought after. Even the inputs for vaccines
came from tens of companies spread out in multiple nations, and they were
subject to the primacy of local demands. Commerce by itself was not
adequate in such circumstances; contacts were needed for effective access
and regulatory approvals. The second wave in 2021 saw a similar spike in
demand for oxygen and specialized medicines from abroad. Locating,
negotiating and contracting supplies became the priority of Indian diplomacy.
And it really bent its back to deliver. These examples may be the products of
extraordinary situations, but they do illustrate what is an undeniable reality.
And it is that our daily life is increasingly influenced by what happens
elsewhere, be they problems or solutions.
 So, the next time you are watching a foreign visit, hearing a discussion on
an important relationship or reading a debate about interests abroad, take it
very seriously. Remember that this may have a direct bearing on your well-
being. Foreign policy matters not just in distress situations. It could literally
determine your security, your job, the quality of your life and, as we
discovered recently, even your health. It shapes what you hold dear: pride,
values, reputation and image. For all these reasons and more, it is important
that you take a greater interest in the world and understand what that could
mean for your prospects.
Let us explore what foreign policy could mean for you personally. If you
are an Indian student, it may be the ease of getting a visa, the ability to travel
during times of Covid and perhaps employment after studies. If you are a
businessperson, it could help you get access to foreign markets, receive
information on regulations and practices, and, where circumstances demand,
obtain assistance to solve problems. For professionals and workers, this may
be visible in ensuring fair employment contracts, a stronger sense of
protection and welfare measures in times of difficulties. For a stranded
tourist, a sympathetic embassy provides much-needed succour and support
and, in more threatening circumstances, even evacuation.
But you do not have to be abroad to need foreign policy; it matters at
home just as much. When it comes to security, external or internal, diplomacy
could be a preventive measure, a mitigator or a problem solver. It can help
raise awareness of a shared threat just as it can find partners against common
dangers. So, if you are a soldier guarding our frontiers or a policeman
grappling with terrorism, a good foreign policy makes your life a little
easier. And then there is the economy, with its search for investment,
technology and best practices, which can be enabled only by foreign policy.
In each of these sectors, foreign relationships can accelerate India’s
progress. Cumulatively, what they do is expand employment and improve
your quality of life. Whether it is the price of cooking oil that is imported or
a smartphone produced collaboratively, a larger policy decision has just
made some difference to your purse. Indeed, if there were any doubts at all
on that score, the pressures and responses coming in the wake of the Ukraine
conflict have set it to rest.
But also reflect for a moment how much the big issues of our times,
pandemic, terrorism and climate change, impact your very existence. Ask
yourself whether we should not have a greater say in the search for solutions.
It also matters to all of us what other nations think of India, our culture and
our way of life. After all, the G20 presidency offers a unique chance to make
the world more conversant with India and our own people more ready to
explore opportunities abroad. Should we not then shape our image and
influence the narrative? At the same time, the challenge is to do so without
opening a way for external forces to interfere in our national debates and
development. These are but a sample of how, in an increasingly connected
world, the attitude, perceptions and interests of others are so relevant. If they
have to be managed and leveraged, then it is all the more necessary for a
sharper realization at home that foreign policy really matters.

DIPLOMACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

For all societies, security ranks foremost in their priorities. The reason is
obvious: it affects the very nature of our collective. This has a territorial
aspect as well as that of safety, law and order and well-being. They are often
connected because together, they determine the national spirit and existence.
India faces more than its fair share of external challenges, in part because
many of our boundaries have not been fully settled. The resulting
contestations are obviously a call on both determination and resources. We
saw that earlier with Pakistan and more recently with China. But they
demand equally that energies be focussed on ensuring optimal positions, on
the ground as much as in negotiations. Given the serious repercussions of
such differences, it is also very relevant to ensuring peace and tranquillity, if
not more.
Diplomacy is a natural partner of defence. Most of the time, it is the first
line; on occasion, it is also the back-up. After all, most military situations do
end up at the conference table! Indeed, the achievements of foreign policy in
stabilizing the neighbourhood are very much the basis for progress and
development at home.
With the world being what it is, self-interest and convergence cannot be
fully counted upon to forecast the behaviour of others, including neighbours.
Neither their ambitions and emotions nor their risk-taking propensity are
always predictable. Few would have anticipated the sharpness of the
downturn that India’s relations with China have taken in the last three years.
Any prudent polity, therefore, backs its posture with capabilities and
deterrence.
 A big responsibility of Indian diplomacy is to create the widest set of
options for such contingencies. This could mean acquisition of defence
equipment and other supportive measures; securing understanding for our
policies and actions from the international community; and, for that matter, in
mitigating or resolving more fraught situations. Let us look at how all of that
has worked in the last few years.
A notable achievement of the Modi government was to conclude and
implement the Land Boundary Agreement with Bangladesh in 2015. In
conjunction with the resolution of maritime differences, this has had a
positive impact on the security situation in the East. More than that, it has
opened up possibilities for economic cooperation and connectivity for the
entire sub-region. The beneficiaries are not just India and Bangladesh with
respect to trade and travel or Nepal and Bhutan for the same but the
northeastern states of India as well, and that also to a very significant degree.
A very different challenge is being faced on our western boundary vis-à-
vis Pakistan. On that front, the initial goal of diplomacy was to expose and
de-legitimize Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism. When counter-actions were
required, as in Uri in 2016 and Balakot in 2019, effective diplomacy ensured
global understanding of India’s actions.
As far as China is concerned, the diplomatic negotiations that are going
on in parallel to the military stand-off since May 2020 illustrate that foreign
and defence policies are really joined at the hip. Here, too, the value of
global support and appreciation is self-evident. The leveraging of a
multipolar world has been particularly visible in terms of weapons and
technologies needed by our defence forces. That a Rafale aircraft acquisition
from France can take place in the same timeframe as that of an MH-60
helicopter or P-8 aircraft from the US, the S-400 missile system from Russia
and SPICE bombs from Israel speaks volumes of our nimbleness. These are
typically accompanied by military exercises and policy exchanges that bring
about greater strategic comfort. In short, diplomacy supports, empowers and
facilitates the national security effort.
Some of this happens on the domestic side as well, even if it is less
obvious. Peace at home has often been troubled by insurgent groups
operating from the neighbourhood. Adept diplomacy, however, has
effectively discouraged neighbours from providing shelter or support. From
time to time, it has taken a little more than that to achieve results. That, too,
has been persuasively justified.
 Separatism, violence and fundamentalism have also been propagated
from destinations afar, misusing the protections of free speech. Canada and
the UK have both witnessed such happenings. These also require vigorous
and continuous countering, since some see preaching violence against others
not to be in discordance with democratic rights. Where arguments and
persuasion yield little result, firmer diplomatic measures may also be
required. Our overall posture does radiate the message that India will no
longer be a punching bag in the politics of others.
Arguments must be met with reason, but polemics clearly demand a more
vehement reply. Extremism and other challenges to governance that find
encouragement from sympathizers, whether in the name of civil society or
identity, need a robust response as well. A world of borderless politics also
generates its own set of concerns that supplement traditions of influence
operations. There are powerful forces with their distinct agenda that
encourage the overriding of democratic choices. Their intolerance of
anything different is manifested in attempts to delegitimize other points of
view. Established newspapers giving UN-sanctioned figures access to their
opinion page or eminent broadcasters doing political hatchet jobs are
indicative of both a mindset and an objective. That there are many effective
tools in play, including the power of technology and influence of civil society
organizations, makes this challenge formidable. When it comes to politics,
the battle of narratives is a perennial exercise. India has to patiently make the
case that its pursuit of national interest is very much in tune with its advocacy
of global good. A large part of the answers lies in the world of argumentation
and in the effectiveness of communication. Diplomacy, thus, has a
responsibility as both the shield and sword of a polity.
Recent global debates about India have implications for our security. As
a federal polity of such extraordinary diversity, the quest to nurture the union
should be most appreciated in our context. Yet, what we find is that efforts to
strengthen national unity, sovereignty and integrity are often undermined by
misrepresenting facts. Surprisingly, improvements in governance,
applications of technology and progress on long-festering issues can be
depicted as detrimental to freedom. Even prominent institutions indulge in
disinformation in pursuit of a cause. History can be airbrushed and
unfavourable events conveniently ignored. In our quest, we have discovered
that political votebanks are a reality strongly beyond our shores as well.
Robustly defending the nation against such undermining is a commitment that
must be recognized.
If this was just a debate, perhaps that would matter less. But it is a harsh
reality at work. Some of it may be ideological, but there is also the
competitive nature of international relations. Bluntly put, there have always
been interests that militate against a strong and united India. In the past, they
exploited every faultline that our society provided: religion, language,
ethnicity and social strata. Today, in a different garb and with new arguments,
they are even more active than before. Perhaps, more of us need to ask
ourselves why separatism in India finds regular support in quarters abroad.
For that matter, how terrorism directed at us is consistently underplayed or
even rationalized. Indeed, why some foreign forums lend themselves so
readily to the denigration of our record and achievements. The task of foreign
policy, when confronted with such calculations and stratagems, is to push
back strongly even while advancing our own narrative.

ACCELERATING NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Since the drive for prosperity is a constant endeavour for all societies, it is
natural that policymaking is also devoted to this goal. The most obvious
expression of that is the promotion of trade and investments. Markets do not
always work by themselves; in reality, pretty much everybody utilizes
encouragement and facilitation. Those with historical handicaps have an even
stronger reason to do so. We are still playing catch-up on industrialization,
technology acquisition and competitiveness and will continue to do so for
some time.
Just building capabilities at home, however, may not be adequate.
Securing business abroad needs information, networking and access. There is
a virtuous cycle at work here, whereby greater trade and economic activity
strengthens skills, capabilities and employment at home. And that, in turn,
constantly updates and tests our mettle. In many ways, foreign policy is an
exercise in competitiveness and its economic facets a reflection in a
particular domain.
In the last few years, India achieved ambitious export goals that would
have been considered unrealistic till just recently. Now, this is not just a
substantial increase in aspiration but one realized as the world economy is
still recovering from the Covid pandemic. The basis for this confidence is a
range of reforms in manufacturing, labour, finance, skills and trade
facilitation. Added to that is a steady improvement in the ease of doing
business. Foreign commercial policy is being tasked to obtain access to
markets and lower trade barriers. This can be done in an orthodox way but
hastened through negotiated understandings, including free-trade agreements
(FTAs) and global supply chains. That may be an objective in itself; its
larger significance for employment and prosperity are obvious.
Increasingly, foreign policy contributes to the creation of new capacities
at home. In Asia, all modernizing economies have single-mindedly focussed
their external interactions on obtaining capital, technology and best practices
from abroad. Japan was the pioneer in this regard during the Meiji era, and
China, after Deng Xiaoping, was the most successful in terms of scale. In the
last few years, India, too, has embraced this mindset. We have notable
examples of benefits to people from endeavours at the enterprise level or in
national projects. It may be information technology (IT) or auto
manufacturing, food production or food processing, metros or bullet train,
space capabilities or nuclear energy: the fruits of foreign collaboration are
there for all to see.
Newer challenges like green growth and climate action have started to
open up more possibilities. Our partners have expanded from the older
industrialized economies to more innovative ones. All this happens because
of our ability to identify, engage, negotiate and leverage opportunities of
interest abroad across many domains. The most effective foreign policy is the
one that focusses and delivers on development.
The resources and opportunities provided by external collaborations
speed up the natural growth of the domestic economy. Valuable as they are,
they do not, however, substitute the continuous nurturing of deep strengths at
home. As we have discovered through experience, confusion on that score
can have damaging consequences.
Three decades ago, India embarked on much needed reforms and opened
up its economy. The benefits of doing so are undisputed. However, in the
name of efficiency and modernity, easy options were taken at the expense of
our small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Instead of building effective
domestic supply chains, we opted for integration and value addition that
were more profitable and less painstaking. Infrastructure projects were given
out to others without any effort to absorb learnings for our own industry. The
pursuit of short-term gains made us lose ambition and, with that, a sense of
strategy. As a result, economic growth did not witness the commensurate
scaling up of skills, strengths and capacities.
In the last decade, we have awoken to the realization that mantras about
globalization, if mindlessly applied, can cause real damage. Not just that, if
economic choices are divorced from a strategic context, it could lead the
country down a very dangerous path. The real debate is not whether we
should be an open or a protected economy. It is whether we are an
employment-centric and capability-driven one or just a profit-obsessed
society content to be a market. Along with vulnerabilities, a dependent
mindset has also been rationalized, which masquerades as globalized
thinking. India’s destiny is bigger than to be just a part of the future of others.
Real growth is not only about GDP increase; it is equally about
infrastructure, supply chains, skills, finance and socio-economic progress.
When we sacrifice the latter for the former, our long-term prospects are
imperilled. We could slide into strategic lock-ins without even being aware.
Foreign policy is surely an instrument to advance our strategic course; it is
equally an insurance that our big picture is the right one.
In an era of more interdependence and interpenetration, it is also
expected that all nations will seek to expand their zones of deep influence
beyond their national boundaries. In the past, trade, finance, military
activities and migration were some of the means to do so. Nowadays, the
role of connectivity and socio-economic collaboration has become more
salient. This is an important realization for a nation like India, whose reach
was constrained by Partition. As we grow in different dimensions, strategic
sense dictates that our prosperity serves as a larger incentive for the entire
region. Realizing this, the Modi government has significantly expanded
connectivity and collaborative initiatives with neighbours. Its results are
evident in new road and rail connections, waterways, port access and transit
rights, power grids and fuel flows, and especially in the movement of people.
South Asia is undergoing a real transformation by encouraging win-win
outcomes and buy-ins by partners. The Neighbourhood First outlook
addresses this challenge in the immediate vicinity, just as parallel policies
do in the extended neighbourhood. India’s support to neighbours during the
Covid period also reflected this very thinking.
Interdependence, however, has its own downside and can be leveraged
unfairly when global norms are cast aside. Exposure to competitive polities,
therefore, needs constant monitoring. We cannot always assume that all
others will play by the rules. For that reason, as an interpreter of the world,
diplomacy is also voice of caution. It informs a society of the risks and
pitfalls even as it explains opportunities. Doing so in a systemic and
organized manner is part of formulating strategy. By its very nature, foreign
policy develops a comprehensive outlook and can guide other sectors. It
could be trade and technology, or education and tourism. Current times, in
particular, require a holistic approach to relationships.

ACCESSING A GLOBAL WORKPLACE

India may be blessed with an enormous human capital. But among the
shortcomings is the inability to utilize that advantage to the fullest. Like many
other aspects of life, that, too, is changing. National campaigns launched after
2014 are addressing a vast range of socio-economic challenges, ranging from
gender discrimination and health to education, skills and employment. In this
period, virtually every domain has seen a change due to progressive
policymaking. Infrastructure growth, manufacturing expansion, smart cities
and labour codes are among the notable examples. Our definition of basic
necessities has changed to include access to water, power, housing and
health. This has consequences not just for our national ambitions but also for
global society.
At a time when demographic constraints are impacting the developed
world, there is a real prospect of Indians gaining significantly in the global
workplace. Till now, that has been self-driven, with policymakers largely
agnostic on this happening. However, a conscious effort at bringing our
human capital into play on the world stage can create a different set of
outcomes.
Employment prospects of Indian students studying in the US, Canada,
Australia and Europe are now prominent in our agenda. Migration and
mobility partnerships have been done with Portugal, UK, Australia, France,
Germany and Italy, even as other European nations are starting to follow suit.
In fact, in the period of Covid-induced uncertainties, the educational interests
of students have become a subject of focus.
In terms of skills, we strive to ensure that Indian talent is treated in a non-
discriminatory manner in the US, Canada, Oceania and Europe. Where they
already reside, community welfare and cultural concerns, too, are a subject
of our attention. The largest numbers with the greatest need are, of course, in
the Gulf. Their well-being is of utmost priority, and that has been fully
reflected in decision-making. The liberal usage of the Indian Community
Welfare Fund (ICWF) speaks of a stronger sense of responsibility towards
them, as do programmes for job training and creating facilities for those in
distress. The agreement on rights of domestic workers signed with Kuwait is
one illustration of our commitment to ensuring a better workplace abroad.
Endeavours to get back social security payments made abroad is another.
Indeed, making it easier to get visas has become much more central to our
diplomatic efforts.
This mindset, in fact, goes back further up the chain, starting from how
much easier it is now to get passports at home. By expanding the application
centres four-fold and simplifying the verification process, the ability to travel
and work abroad has undergone a sea change. Today, new prospects are
opening up for Indian skills as a result of negotiated agreements, be it with
Japan, Europe, the Gulf or Russia. Foreign policy is helping to make the
world much more accessible to the average Indian. And they set out far more
confidently than before, knowing that we have their back in times of
difficulty. The Vande Bharat Mission, which brought back millions of Indians
during the Covid waves, was as much a statement of capability as of
commitment towards our workers and students, seafarers and tourists.
Those who have forayed into the world recently may have grown in
numbers. But let us not forget that contemporary migrants join historically
established communities to create the largest diaspora in the world. It is
natural that their welfare and interest is connected deeply with foreign
policy. As India’s global standing has gone up, they too have reaped the
benefits of association. This is quite apart from the undoubted achievements
that they can legitimately boast of in their lands of domicile. In a more
globalized world, they inevitably emerged as a more effective bridge to
India. At the same time, a confident India has also taken pride in their
successes and not shied away from a visible relationship.
In some ways, the Indian diaspora is quite unique because, in contrast
with those of other societies, its mobility was not driven by turmoil at home.
On the contrary, its bonding with Mother India has grown emotionally
stronger with the advent to power of a more authentic representative. The
2014 event at Madison Square Garden marks a new era in diaspora
connectivity. Its role has acquired greater value at both ends of the chain. For
foreign policy, this may mean some additional responsibilities but surely
provides greater sources of support. As a result, initiatives pertaining to the
diaspora have expanded so as to strengthen its bonding with India.
Sensible foreign policies obviously have to address bread and butter
issues. However, there are bigger questions to consider as well, especially
for large nations. Three contemporary examples of urgent global concerns
are pandemics, terrorism and climate change. No country can really afford to
be oblivious or indifferent to such challenges. Smaller states are impacted;
larger ones even more so. For a nation like India, quite apart from their
direct consequences, there is also the need to shape the direction of global
debate. This, therefore, becomes as much an exercise of responsibility as of
influence.
An examination of the recent record on these matters offers some
learnings. India has been a major factor in global deliberations regarding the
countering of terrorism. If the awareness of those threats is more or the
tolerance is less, our efforts have made no small difference. On climate
change, India not only helped forge a consensus in Paris in 2015 but, in
contrast to many others, has stayed true to its commitments. In Glasgow in
2021, these were taken to an even higher level. The International Solar
Alliance (ISA) and the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI)
are two notable examples of its leadership in climate action. On the
pandemic, its supply of medicines and vaccines and deployment of teams
abroad spoke volumes about its internationalism.
In the decade that has passed, the new energy in India’s endeavours is
evident, notably in PM Modi’s own engagements. Indian diplomacy has
changed profoundly, be it in terms of bilateral visits, collective summits,
development partnerships or opening of embassies. Indian citizens of every
category are more assured that their concerns are addressed and interests
advanced.
The benefits at home of a more proactive approach abroad are equally
visible. On the global stage, India’s greater relevance is being demonstrated
in a variety of ways. Some of it was evident in the conversations and agenda,
especially on terrorism, black money, etc. It was also visible, in outcomes
and initiatives, notably in Paris and Glasgow on climate change. Our
willingness to step forward in disaster-relief situations and to meet the
Covid challenge has also been appreciated by the international community.
Our national persona, be it on democracy, innovation, yoga, millets or
Ayurveda, has gained recognition. We have, in the last few years, steadily
built up the image of a first responder, pharmacy of the world, a reservoir of
talent, climate action leader, development partner and cultural powerhouse.
When 10 ASEAN or five Central Asian leaders (virtually) attend our
Republic Day, 27 European ones engage us together in a meeting or 41
African leaders come to India for a summit, clearly something has changed
for the better. This is the India that took on the presidency of the G20 at a
time when the world was, and continues to be, sharply polarized. It used this
occasion to not only validate an approach of engaging multiple partners but
also speaking up for the Global South.
A stronger and more capable India, one truer to its roots and culture, is a
key factor in the larger rebalancing that characterizes our contemporary
world. At a time when there are many more power centres, our place in a
multipolar order is clearly more assured. In an era that is more globalized,
our talents, capabilities and contribution have a growing value for the rest of
the world. As we celebrate 75 years of independence, there is good cause for
Bharat to be confident about its prospects. But to be so, it is equally
important to be fully aware of the opportunities and challenges that the world
currently presents. And surely, that will happen once we appreciate that
foreign policy really matters to us.
 Chapter 3.
THE STATE OF THE WORLD
Understanding the Landscape

W
hen PM Modi declared in Samarkand in September 2022 that this is
not an era of war, the statement resonated across the world. It did so
naturally because of its immediate context. But the message also
captured the interdependence of our world that has now made conflict very
dangerous for everybody. In a sense, it was a caution as well to others who
may be contemplating their own options. The fact that such a pronouncement
had to be made at all is a reflection on the fragility of the current global
order. That it was in transition was already well recognized. But that this
process could take the forms we are witnessing today was anticipated by
very few.
In 2020, when I wrote The India Way, the world already appeared
uncertain and unpredictable. Little did we know at that time that we hadn’t
seen anything yet. In the years that have passed, we have been traumatized by
the Covid pandemic, impacted by the Ukraine conflict, grappling with a new
level of violence in West Asia, afflicted by frequent climate events and
subjected to serious economic stress. They have aggravated both an East–
West polarization and a North–South divide. If there is continuity with my
earlier endeavour, it is in the underlying phenomenon of how nation states,
still the key concept of international relations, struggle with the problems of
globalization. This applies as well to the main takeaway: that the world
matters for each one of us as never before. As we consider that, the question
confronting every Indian is about what our value, weight and prospects are in
the contemporary era. We do so not knowing what even the immediate future
holds because the pace of technological, economic and social change has
accelerated so much. This is no longer an issue of more variables; we are
really moving into uncharted territory. Naturally, at such a moment, it is
worth reflecting on how our forebears dealt with the uncertainties of their
era. And in that context, analogies from the past certainly offer some
guidance.

The two figures most popularly associated with diplomacy in Indian traditions are
unquestionably Hanuman in the Ramayana and Sri Krishna in the Mahabharata. One is
perceived as an exemplary embodiment of service, who performs his duties undaunted by any
obstacles. The other is regarded more as a strategist and counsellor, a source of wisdom in
difficult moments. Each has his criticality in the given context, and Hanuman is at his best
when confronted with uncertainty and tough odds. The process of a nation’s rise is not unlike
the arduous campaigns which embedded both of them so deeply in our consciousness. In
fact, it is more than a campaign; it is an endless exercise of expanding prospects. And like
Hanuman, it requires true believers and problem solvers who are at it 24x7.
As Lord Rama’s emissary to Lanka, Hanuman’s cleverness in gaining critical intelligence
about an adversary, and even access to the confined queen Sita, were crucial developments.
In addition, he used his mistreatment by the rakshasas, who set his tail on fire, to do them
immeasurable damage by burning the city. But he also developed key insights about Ravana,
his temperament and his advisers. Equally vital is his judgement of Ravana’s brother
Vibheeshana, who alone stood up for him when he was brought before the court. It is
Hanuman’s certification of his integrity that encouraged Rama later to welcome Vibheeshana
after his defection from Ravana. Typically, people tend to think of diplomacy just as mediation.
But in reality, there is so much more to it, including the ability to read competitors, allies and
the landscape correctly.
Hanuman is also noted for his persistence, a quality he demonstrated when his fellow
monkeys were inclined to give up on their search for Queen Sita. His ability to improvise and
solve problems is equally in evidence when he lifts an entire mountain in order to bring back a
single life-saving plant. At the end of the war, he is sent on a delicate mission to inform Bharata
of the outcome and to assess whether he would really welcome Lord Rama’s return to
Ayodhya. Each of these attributes are today the prized quality of a successful diplomat.
A different illustration of the complexities inherent in diplomacy is provided by the monkey-
prince Angada. He, too, was sent by Rama to Ravana’s court in Lanka and cleverly played to
his strengths. In his case, that specifically was his leg, which could not be moved once firmly
planted on the ground. By making it a challenge, he embarrassed those who tried
unsuccessfully to shift his limb. Finally, he humiliated Ravana when the latter tried to reach out
for it and dropped his crown that Angada then picked up and threw it back to Lord Rama. As
an envoy, he not only resists blandishments proffered by Ravana but improvises to make his
points effectively. Denied a seat that is due to him, he is said to have made a chair for himself
by elongating his tail and placing himself on par with the demon-king before him. After all, mind
games are a key element of diplomacy.
A very different kind of skill was displayed by his mother Tara, the wife of the monkey-king
Vali, who was earlier killed by Lord Rama. In the cases of Hanuman and Angada, they were
dealing with Ravana, a haughty and irreconcilable adversary. Their mission was to both obtain
information and leave psychological scars that would affect the morale of the other side. In the
case of Tara, she was confronted with the anger of her current king Sugriva’s allies Rama and
Lakshmana. Sugriva had failed to deliver on his promise to locate Sita once he ascended the
throne after Vali. It was then that Tara was sent to parley with Lakshmana as he approached
Kishkinda, twanging his bowstring to signal his aggressive intentions. Her tactics were astute,
and she initially appeased Lakshmana by admitting to Sugriva’s fickleness. Having done so,
she underlined his devotion to Rama and embroidered reality by highlighting the search for Sita
set into motion just then. Even if it meant taking some liberty with details, her effort at defusing
a conflict between the brothers and the vanaras (monkeys) was successful. If Tara stands out,
it is also because she is an exception to the self-absorption that characterizes her kith and kin.
The three cases may be different from each other in objectives and approaches. But what
brings them together is a shared understanding of the larger task that confronts them. They
have to grasp the enormity of the threat and actively contribute to the search for solutions.
There is both a sensitivity required in respect of the larger environment as well as an
awareness of their own predicament. Strategic choices have to be advanced but in a tactically
astute manner. Honouring of commitments and upholding of principles are essential, but even
these need to be optimized. The complex dynamic between the landscape and the game plan
is always a perennial issue in diplomacy. Getting them both right is the prerequisite for
success.

TOWARDS AN UNCERTAIN, INSECURE FUTURE

Pondering over the complexities of our own times, we might want to start by
reflecting on how a pandemic that first engulfed a distant Chinese city then
went on to completely take over our lives for more than two years. Or how
and why an ongoing conflict in Europe, an entire continent away, is now
affecting our daily life and its costs. And for that matter, the implications that
climate events are having on the many processes that we take for granted. Or
it could be a different kind of trauma, were any of us to be caught up in an act
of terrorism or distantly inspired violence. In some cases, as we saw with
students trapped in Ukraine or travellers stranded during Covid, stresses
might happen when we are out of our country. But in others, be it Covid,
conflict, terrorism or natural disasters, such developments can come right to
our doorstep, sometimes even inside our homes. In the age of globalization,
there is no escape from the world.
That does not mean that we need to be apprehensive about global
developments or defensive in our approach. The flipside of the very
interdependence is that the same world is also full of possibilities. If we
brought back 7 million plus Indians during Covid through the Vande Bharat
Mission, it reminds us that the India of today utilizes the global workplace
extensively. It is equally due to the fact that our talents and skills are now an
intrinsic element of global innovation, manufacturing and services. This is
also reflective of how many Indians travel for personal or professional
purposes. Indeed, these very issues are now central to the priorities of Indian
diplomacy. We strive to ensure better access to our talent, stronger protection
for our workers, greater opportunities for our students and fairer markets for
our businesses.
But the world is not simply about mobility and migration. It is as much
about partnerships, compacts and understandings that serve all parties well.
In fact, a deeper engagement could lead to accelerating our national
development, exploring more markets, procuring resources, improving our
quality of life, expanding employment and, not least, shaping crucial global
issues that determine the future of our planet.
To accurately assess what the world means to us, we must first of all
appreciate that the globalized era in which we live is very much a double-
edged existence. It is hard to separate the vulnerabilities from the
dependence or the risks from the benefits. The very mobility that brought
Covid to our homes was otherwise such an enormous source of livelihood
for so many. The supply chains, which created disruption when they did not
function, were a veritable boon when they actually did. Their complexity
may be now hard to describe, as indeed their salience to critical aspects of
our life. But the Covid era showed us how much we were all dependent on
the cross-border flows of goods and services.
Not surprisingly, India was both a contributor and beneficiary in that
regard. We sent out shipments of vaccines to almost a hundred nations. But
we received ingredients from many of them as well. Nations in the Gulf were
critically dependent on Indian exports for their daily consumption. And that
continued without interruption because there was a deep understanding of
this requirement. This paid off during the medical oxygen crisis in 2021,
when the same countries cited it to make shipments to us.
Indeed, if there is one big lesson for the globalized economy from the
Covid experience, it is that of more capabilities and options. The ‘just-in-
time’ approach with its concentration in a limited geography showed how
vulnerable the world could be in a crisis. De-risking the world economy now
requires a ‘just-in-case’ outlook with more diversified production. Where
India is concerned, this could mean another chance to board the bus of
manufacturing that we had missed a few times before. And this is exactly
what the ‘ease-of-doing-business’ approach and the offer of ‘production-
linked incentives’ are intended to ensure.
The last few years have also encouraged us all to become more
digitalized. We, in India, have a record that is generating widespread respect
for good reasons. The scale of our digital delivery, whether it is in food,
finance, health, pension or social benefits, is very much the talk of the world.
Here, too, the visible efficiency of that transformation has been accompanied
by corresponding risks of data privacy and data security. Where our data
resides and who harvests it matter increasingly. The political sociology of
such residency or processing is no longer irrelevant.
As a result, trust and transparency have become important guiding factors
in digital decision-making. This is even more relevant as we enter a world
increasingly driven by artificial intelligence (AI). The potential of critical
and emerging technologies (CET) also poses its own set of issues. Whether it
is for climate change or strategic concerns, countries have shifted towards
greener and cleaner sources of energy and mobility. The resources,
technologies and production associated with them have their own
concentrations and consequential vulnerabilities. As a result, nations have
made CET a priority for both their national capabilities as well as their
collaborative endeavours.
Beyond the intricacies of supply chains and the vulnerabilities of data
harvesting, there are larger changes underway in international affairs. These
emanate from the weaponization of a broad range of services and activities
that were regarded till now as essentially benign. In recent times, we saw
how trade, connectivity, debt, resources and even tourism became points of
political pressure. The Ukraine conflict has dramatically widened the scope
and intensity of such leveraging. The scale of financial measures, technology
controls, service restrictions and seizure of assets has been truly
breathtaking.
At the same time, it is also an undeniable fact that global rules, regimes
and practices have been gamed for national advantage for decades. In that
scenario, the world of comparative advantage had no chance against
‘unrestricted economics’. The complacency of the previous era has ended
decisively, and each line of questioning now is producing deeply
uncomfortable realizations. Sharpening great power competition is inevitably
enhancing stress factors across multiple domains. And they will not cease
simply because vested interests and political correctness wish to cover them
up. The challenge for many nations, including India, is whether they can be
converted into opportunities.
At one level, today’s uncertainties induce greater caution about
international exposure, whether we consider it from the perspective of
implementing strategy or mitigating vulnerabilities. India happens to have
concerns on both scores. But beyond a point, that cannot be fully hedged
against, since the very nature of our existence now is very globalized. For
each nation, especially the major ones, a set of answers has to be found that
optimize risks and benefits.
This has led to a revival of interest in strategic autonomy, now redefined
as ensuring national capabilities in core and sensitive areas. This process of
adjusting towards a different basis of global interaction has naturally
generated its own outlook. In our own domestic discourse, we know this as
atmanirbhar Bharat, that is, self-reliant India. The digital domain has seen
its own variation of similar compulsions. Events in 2020 sharpened
awareness in India of an exposure that had been built up over decades. The
clean app approach and the embrace of concepts like ‘trusted providers’ and
‘trusted geographies’ are a resulting outcome.
It is a paradox in many ways that while we speak of the advancements of
technology and promise of science, world politics is actually moving ‘back
to the future’. Some of this arises from the expectations placed on
globalization proving to be over-optimistic. This is not to suggest that the
underlying economic interdependence is not well-founded. But widening
differences among and within societies and creation of new global equations
have meant that counter forces of globalization have been set into motion.
Once challenges began to be articulated, the globalization model was not
easy to defend precisely because its benefits were so heavily skewed.
Political expressions of globalization have also created their own
backlash. When self-appointed custodians of correctness sit in judgement
over democratically elected representatives, they cannot expect to be
unchallenged, especially when they have such visible stakes in the preferred
outcomes. To add to that, some countries are advancing aspects of their own
model as an example abroad. Cumulatively, this has led to a situation where
political and social identities have resurfaced strongly, creating inherent
tensions with the nature of economic flows. Because there are so many
moving parts, these predicaments are not easy to resolve.
 Consequently, different nations are struggling to find the right balance,
though the reasons in each case may be different. Some seek to address
regime security, others to protect their technology leads or way of life, and
still more who would like to limit exposure and build capabilities for
themselves. These new forms of competition are likely to be among the
fundamental characteristics of the politics of our era. Our globalized world
is likely to be fractured in some respects and even selectively disengaged in
areas of particular contention. These are some of the inevitabilities for which
India needs to plan intelligently.

REFRESHING ANALYSIS AND POLICY

Such examples may reflect more recent trends, but we cannot forget that old-
fashioned national rivalry also continues to be very much at play. Especially
after 2008, the world has seen a sharper re-balancing and the steady
emergence of multipolarity. The shifting terms of the US engagement with it
in the last decade is a key dimension. The ending of a ‘forever war’ in
Afghanistan only heralded different ways of ensuring American security and
furthering US interests. But the manner in which it did may have signalled
weakness of a kind that was not intended. That, too, is going through a
process of correction.
The rise of China is an equally profound happening, one whose global
consequences are becoming more apparent. That so much of it is taking place
outside established constructs is clearly conceptually challenging for both
policymakers and analysts. Far from being a zero-sum game, these
developments have also opened up space for other players, some essentially
regional and others with greater potential. Clearly, the world perceives India
to be in the latter category. As all of this is unfolding, the Ukraine conflict has
reminded us of the importance of Russia while underlining the strategic
mobilization of Europe. If this matrix already looks complicated, then the
volatility is further compounded by the impact on the developing world of a
range of economic challenges. Throw in a whole lot of pre-existing and
neglected problems. As a result, the world as a whole is staring at a far more
uncertain and insecure future.
Such a prospect clearly calls for greater diplomatic energies and
political creativity. It is even more necessary now to harmonize the pursuit of
national interest with a responsibility for collective good. For a nation like
India, where such a large segment of its population is so vulnerable, it
means, first of all, to mitigate the impact of key negative trends. In doing so,
we not only stand up for our own welfare but speak up on behalf of the
Global South as well. Indeed, a domestic outlook that so strongly advocates
inclusive growth has a natural inclination to display a similar approach
abroad. At the same time, we also have an obvious interest along with the
rest of the Global South in cooling down overheated global politics. This is
obviously not going to happen overnight, yet, we must persevere.
Beyond the immediate compulsions, there are also the structural
challenges of the current world order that confront us. Most of those emanate
from the outcomes of the Second World War and the fashioning of
international architecture in 1945. But they are also underpinned by a few
centuries of Western domination, whose intellectual and cultural facets still
remain prominent. The oldest trick in the diplomatic book is to freeze the
moment to your advantage. This is reflected in cherry-picking events and
outcomes and portraying them as the ‘normal’ or in creating mechanisms and
concepts that are presented as immutable. That, in fact, is what some
countries have done so successfully for the last eight decades. Pursuing
reform in the multilateral domain and ensuring that global decision-making
reflects democratic reality is, therefore, a quest of no small importance.
Allowing the past to influence thinking is, however, not a predicament
that can solely be attributed to others. Sometimes, it is an assumption that we
maintain ourselves because a particular experience continues to resonate.
Thus, even six decades later, the 1962 war with China stirs suspicion of that
country in the public mind. Similarly, our hesitations concerning the West
derive from the memories of the 1947, 1965 and 1971 conflicts. This applies
even on the positive side of the ledger. The 1991 economic reforms, for
example, were impactful enough that the need to build on it was not given
priority till recently. Such complacency contributed, till a decade ago, to
impassivity towards strengthening manufacturing and developing
technologies as well as improving our social indices.
At this stage of its rise, India must have the courage to revisit its past and
draw the right lessons from abroad as much as from home. Sometimes, this is
misinterpreted as political distancing when it is, in fact, an objective audit. It
is not only dangerous to remain a prisoner of our experiences but, even more,
to romanticize them. We now have the ability to shape the landscape more
significantly and must use that more often. It is already expressed in new
concepts like the Indo-Pacific, mechanisms like the Quad or the I2U2 and
initiatives like the ISA. The China challenge can only be countered by
reversing past neglect of the border infrastructure and maintaining
deployments and, indeed, by utilizing the possibilities that global dynamics
can offer. On the economic front, we have to be judicious in picking the FTAs
and frameworks that truly serve our interests. The need to refresh both
analysis and policy will only increase in a turbulent world.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

For any polity, national security has an undeniable primacy. Indians are much
more conscious of this than most since it has been challenged so often in the
last 75 years. In fact, when we evaluate the merits of leadership, it is largely
perceived as a mix of addressing crises and ensuring delivery. A lot of our
foreign policy is devoted to preparing for, obviating, mitigating and reacting
to security threats. Clearly, a time has come that we must decisively address
longstanding vulnerabilities that a competitive world regularly exploits. It
may have been a political surprise in August 2019 that the Article 370 issue
was firmly settled. But the fact is that mainstreaming Jammu & Kashmir was
long overdue, and only vested interests were standing in the way.
We need to equally apply ourselves to the hard task of securing our
borders effectively, including through promotion of Vibrant Villages
Programme. At the same time, as the world penetrates into our daily
existence more prominently, we must develop awareness and responses to
the problems posed by the ‘normal’. These are dangers emanating from the
routine, be it digital, financial, ideological or even mobility-related. Just as
international economics is grappling with the challenges of new practices,
national security, too, must address more contemporary dangers.
A foreign policy that impinges so many aspects of our life understandably
has deeper personal implications on our safety, welfare, prospects and
opportunities. It has transactional and collaborative connotations, especially
in the economic and technology domains. There are, of course, threads of
continuity that run parallel to the compulsions of change. As always, foreign
policy is a constant exercise of building power and exercising influence,
whether for national or collective purpose. It can be a competition of ideas,
values or culture that combine to set forth a vision of our future. Each of
these facets, old and new, co-exist with others perhaps much more
dynamically in an era of interdependence and interpenetration. International
relations are played out in more domains and with greater integration than
before. But precisely because it impacts us so profoundly, each one of us
today has an obligation to take interest in the games that nations play.
While we overcome constraints, hurdles, habits and black swans, it is
particularly necessary for the young generation to appreciate how the world
looks at India now. Indeed, many of the very problems of the last few years
have earned us credit for coming through in the manner in which we did. The
combination of changes in India’s political standing, economic weight,
technological capabilities, cultural influence and the successes of the
diaspora is moving the nation into a higher orbit. Admittedly, there is much
more work to be done. But nevertheless, we see a growing recognition in the
world that India is at last getting its act together. Some observers have
actually said that PM Modi has succeeded in shaking up India in a manner
that could not have been foreseen.
Equally, there is a realization that the big issues of our times cannot be
solved without India’s contribution or participation. This is a moment when
India can reset the terms of its engagement with the world. It is also a
juncture at which we should be prepared to take up greater responsibilities.
The G20 presidency offered an important opportunity to demonstrate that to
the world. By tabling new ideas, shaping the agenda, ensuring a consensus,
fashioning action plans and promoting G20 enlargement, India certainly made
the most of it.
For those who are starting off in life, I can only say that they have every
reason to be more confident. India today has determination, vision as well as
the perseverance to enhance its global standing. Those more experienced and
part of our journey for the last 75 years will appreciate the transformation
underway and value the outcomes that it has generated. But all of them would
certainly share the conviction that today, even as the world enters a new era
of turbulence, we matter more. And with the right leadership, we can
definitely weather the storms and make the most of our opportunities. The
confidence with which we will accomplish all this is one of the defining
characteristics of Bharat.
 Chapter 4.
BACK TO THE FUTURE
As National Security Balances Globalization

T
ill 2014, like the rest of the world, much of India too was lulled by the
soothing sounds of globalization. First came Brexit and its challenge to
the European experiment. Soon thereafter was the election of Donald
Trump and the articulation of America First. A China–US tussle, which was
supposedly only tactical, became truly serious with the passage of time. Each
episode enhanced the realization of the vulnerabilities that economic and
technology concentrations had created. Then came the Covid pandemic,
which thoroughly exposed the hollowing out of so many economies in the
name of global efficiency. A new consensus began to emerge on the
importance of resilient and reliable supply chains, as also on digital trust and
transparency. A legacy issue, meanwhile, ground to an abrupt end with the
hasty exit of American troops from Afghanistan. This was followed by the
Ukraine conflict whose global impact confirmed how deeply integrated we
all now are. And not least, the West Asia tinder box saw our worst fears
realized with a new level of conflagration.
So, we have the revival of all the negatives of global politics that were
thought only recently as anachronistic. Did we really not see it coming? Were
we in denial? Perhaps some combination of both, enhanced by strong vested
interests, their ability to lull the international community and a human
propensity to hope for the best. All that globalization optimists were
convinced was behind us has now returned with a bang. World politics is
struggling with the intense interdependence of technology, finance, trade and
resources coexisting with the overwhelming compulsions of security,
sovereignty, privacy and values. The former pulls us towards developing
closer linkages, while the latter cautions us about its vulnerable
consequences. Navigating these contradictions will surely challenge all our
creativity because the tensions of the present now collide with the prospects
of the future. From its messy outcomes could emerge a different architecture
of international cooperation, one that is more sensitive to values and interests
as much as to employment and culture.
It was not as if the twenty-first century began particularly well. Almost at
its very start, the 9/11 attacks in New York shaped its global direction. Their
consequences then consumed the world for the next two decades. Much of
what unfolded could hardly have been anticipated then, including how the
preoccupations of one power could help open up the pathway for another.
Soon thereafter, an unnecessary conflict in Iraq led to even more
unpredictable outcomes. On the economic front, a world that was recovering
from an Asian financial crisis slid into a global one within a decade.
The entry of China into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001
heralded a model of globalization that was to have profound political and
social repercussions in many societies. Quite a few found themselves unable
to compete for reasons of scale, nature of the model, or against such massive
subsidies. The resulting hollowing out obviously created its own politics in
due course.
As these long trends unfolded, different regions and countries grappled
with their individual challenges and opportunities. Greater sensitivity to
employment, protection of technologies and safeguarding of data in a digital
world were notable concerns. In a more connected existence, their domestic
churnings also began to be reflected more strongly on the global stage.
By the time we reached the end of the second decade, it was clear that the
very fundamentals of the world order were shifting. Trend lines indicated a
movement towards greater turbulence and big power contestation,
challenging assumptions with which we were comfortable. What no one
expected was that an already troubled world would get a ‘once in a century’
shock in the form of a pandemic. When we add the consequences of
Afghanistan and Ukraine, the future looks even more open-ended. It is
certainly a new world out there, quite definitely not a brave one.

SHARPENING GREAT POWER COMPETITION

Prominent among the postulates that have shaped our thinking is the centrality
of the US to the current international system. It is evident, however, that the
two ‘forever wars’ in Afghanistan and Iraq have greatly affected that polity.
That one was marked by conceptual confusion and the other was altogether
avoidable is beside the point. The rationale of both conflicts may continue to
be debated by those still interested. But what is done is done, and the US has
come out much worse.
There was also a parallel economic pressure growing in this very period,
one paradoxically created by the US on itself. The globalization model that
many Americans advocated for so fervently has had a corrosive impact on its
own strengths and capabilities. The last and obviously weakest justification
for its continuation is that of the importance of the dependencies that it has
already created. But the implications for American manufacturing prowess
and technology leads were visible enough to be expressed, first as a political
backlash and, thereafter, as a national security challenge. The Trump
presidency certainly marked a turning point, but many of the debates matured
further during the Biden Administration to emerge as a systemic posture. The
net outcome of these developments is a strategic evolution of the US that is
reflected in a changing stance abroad and different terms of engagement that
it now offers to the world.
This is not a situation that has emerged overnight. On the contrary,
rhetoric notwithstanding, we have seen a growing caution in US power
projection since 2008. In tandem, there have been persistent efforts to
address its overextension. In fact, there is a consistency in this regard over
three Administrations that it may not readily admit to. Whether it is footprint,
extent of involvement or the nature of activities, we are witnessing a very
different America. And this America is moving towards greater realism, both
about itself and the world, as it seeks to achieve global objectives in a more
cost-effective manner. It could assume a broader posture as an off-shore
balancer in more regions in a way that protects its influence without
expanding its risks. This has different aspects, key among them a striving for
a better balance between its domestic revival and its external obligations.
There is a sharper recognition, too, of an emerging multipolarity and
growing strategic autonomy that characterizes the current era. This impels a
quest for new options, even while consolidating old relationships. There is
also not only an acute consciousness of the challenges to its position but a
realization that these have made much headway. The real question is the
ability of the US to reassess and reinvent itself. What this means to the world
is a new kind of diplomacy, one more in tune with an awareness of its
limitations and, consequently, of the value of greater and more contemporary
partnerships.
 Even as all of this happens, the world also witnesses the rise of China.
Indeed, this correlation between the fortunes of the two nations is difficult to
dispute. The emergence of a power at a global level is a unique happening in
any circumstance. That this is a ‘different’ kind of polity, both ideologically
and culturally, enhances the sense of change. The Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) may have borne some similarities, but it never had the
salience to the global economy that China has today. We are, therefore,
contemplating scenarios very different from the post-1945 situation.
The consequences of China’s growing capabilities are particularly
significant because of the extrapolation of its domestic seamlessness to the
world outside. As a result, whether it is connectivity, technology or trade,
there is now an ongoing debate on the changed nature of power and influence.
Separately, we have also seen a sharpening of tensions on territorial issues
across the breadth of Asia. Agreements and understandings of yesteryears
now seem to have developed question marks. India had its own experiences,
especially in 2020, with regard to the border situation.
Time will, of course, provide more answers. But what is evident is that
establishing a multipolar Asia as a foundation of a multipolar world is now
more urgent than before. Obviously, much of this will happen in the backdrop
of intensified great power competition, and understanding how that could
unfold is, therefore, vital. Here too, the Ramayana has some instructive
insights.

Among the backstories of the Ramayana is the competition between two sages, one who can
be regarded as an entrenched power and the other as a rising one. Their rivalry originated in
an attempt by King Kaushika to forcibly seize Sage Vasistha’s particularly productive cow. In
the fight that followed, all his sons and his entire army were destroyed. Kaushika then acquired
formidable weapons through penance but was again unsuccessful in his attacks on Vasistha.
He then intensified his prayers and steadily moved up the ranks of the sages. But in the
process, he discovered that rising was not such an easy task, especially to the summit level.
Moreover, his besetting weakness was a tendency to lose his temper and expend his powers
on the immediate provocation. And those happened to be many, some deriving from his enmity
towards Vasistha, but others being distractions deliberately put in his way. Not content with
being recognized by Lord Brahma as a ‘rajarishi’, he ultimately pushed himself to attain the
highest status of ‘brahmarishi’. But even then, Kaushika was not satisfied until he heard this
recognition from the lips of Vasistha himself.
 This tale of the two sages has some resemblance to developments in current world
affairs. Rising powers are constantly pushing themselves, with the established one as the
standard to be matched. Some may be driven by memories of humiliation, even if others are
more at peace with themselves. In this process of reordering, only gaining the respect of
competitors is not always enough. There is equally a deep desire to be formally acknowledged
as an equal. The fire inside, which drives such a quest, can encourage a mentality of winning
at any cost. And that, today, is understandably the biggest challenge to the establishment of a
rules-based order. Not to forget, entrenched powers such as Sage Vasistha have a deeper
influence that cannot be easily overcome.
If there is another trait that has carried on uninterrupted in history, it is that of political
suspicion. Much as they may deny, even the closest of partners watch each other for contrary
signs. It is a moot question whether the absence of her own son Bharata on the day of Rama’s
coronation added to Queen Kaikeyi’s anxieties about his (and her) future. Certainly, these
thoughts would have been magnified by her evil help Manthara, who had instigated her to make
unreasonable demands by invoking the two boons given by King Dasaratha. This, incidentally,
is also a telling example of how a smaller player with their own agenda can take advantage of
the insecurities of a larger one. We can see that happening in our own neighbourhood.
But personalities aside, the hard realities that underpin international relations are those of
competition and benefits. For all the talk of globalization and common good, nations still
calculate unsentimentally what is to their particular advantage. The world may be changing
but, in some respects, the more it does, the more it remains the same.

BEYOND WESTPHALIAN POLITICS

While it is natural to visualize the developments pertaining to the US and

China in a related manner, it would nevertheless be an oversimplification to
see them as a zero-sum game. To begin with, both of them are aspects of a
larger rebalancing that is taking place in the world. Certainly, they have
impacted each other and there are causal connections. American
retrenchment has provided greater space to Chinese influence, given that it
extends across so many domains. As much of the world put the colonial
period behind, new centres of economic activities inevitably came into
being. Of course, the pace and quality of this transformation was shaped by
political choices, especially of the US.
China may have been a particular beneficiary of the geopolitics of the last
century. But the fact remains that the shortfalls on the American account today
cannot be readily filled by the growth of China’s capabilities. Some of that
reflects from the sheer spread of the US and its extensive grip on the
international order. But there is also the crucial difference in the very nature
of the two polities.
The US has prided itself on its universalism and consciously promoted
these traits. China, in contrast, considers itself singular and its globalization
is not readily converted into universalization. Each will play to its strengths.
In an interesting way, the two will be a study in contrasts. One will make the
most of its openness and diversity while building on its unique ability to
attract global talent; the other has developed formidable strengths by
leveraging the world, even while developing autonomous capabilities
through extraordinary fusion. Paradoxically, a challenge that awaits them
both is to ensure that these very qualities are not exploited by the other.
What is relevant for our purpose is the lessening convergence in their
respective world views. And what that will lead to is a period of uncertainty,
limitations and frictions in world affairs. This will be most evident on global
connects like supply chains and data flows as well as challenges like
maritime security, pandemics and terrorism. After all, we have a situation
where not just the distribution of power has undergone a change, but along
with it the characteristics of those who will now wield greater influence.
Quite apart from their ability to work together or not, how they view
enlightened self-interest and how much that would propel them to contribute
to safeguarding the global commons are the questions that await answers.
It is not just eastwards in the Indo-Pacific that India is witnessing a
radically different situation. Towards the West, the politics of our proximate
region is also undergoing a transformation with the American exit from
Afghanistan. Diplomats in the UN may have articulated the concerns of the
international community in terms of terrorism and radicalization, treatment of
women and minorities, freedom to travel and inclusive governance. But
strategists with an understanding of the region would also be forced to
recognize how open-ended its prospects have become. The balance of
values, ideologies and interests are being carefully weighed by all relevant
parties.
Just beyond, another change in the making arises from the transition in
American Administrations and the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme
and regional influence. Where that finds a landing point is of no small
consequence. Paradoxically, West Asia has witnessed simultaneously a
radical departure from past political battle lines as well as their
intensification. The optimism of the Abraham Accords has been countered by
the terrorist attacks on Israel. The resulting balance, however transitory, is
still far from clear. What can be safely asserted is that this time around, the
very underpinnings of West Asian politics are being transformed.
Quite autonomously, Western liberal politics is also increasingly at odds
with regime comfort in some nations. It has triggered reappraisals that are
enhanced by evolving global dynamics. On its part, the Abraham Accords are
noteworthy not only for their departure from entrenched positions but for the
promise that they hold, especially on economic and connectivity issues. The
I2U2, a new grouping, contains the kernel of ideas that could suggest a
greater Indian involvement. And that need not be the only game in town.
Saudi Arabia’s greater focus on Asia also offers openings for India. This
includes the IMEC initiative with possibilities of cooperation in
connectivity, logistics and energy. Building on a tradition of contacts between
India and Europe that went through Arabia, it represents a ‘return of history’.
In the final analysis, the balance between entrenched politics and emerging
economics will determine the region’s relevance to the world beyond.
Insofar as Europe is concerned, even before the Ukraine shock, it had
started emerging out of its fortress mentality. One sign of that was how
gradually it had become more alive to its interests on a global scale. The
adoption of policies by the European Union (EU) on the Indo-Pacific and on
connectivity was a telling indication. However, the enormity of the Ukraine
crisis obviously radically transformed the security outlook of individual
states, as also of the collective. It fast-forwarded strategic globalism, as
Europe itself chose to define the impact and responses in that framework.
The challenge nevertheless remains that a continent, which fervently believed
in ‘change through trade’ and was supremely clinical about its interests, now
seeks the world’s support and understanding. That it has cushioned itself
from some of the sharper pains while advocating hard options for those much
poorer makes this exercise much more difficult. This was most evident in
regard to energy imports from Russia, though it also extends to other aspects
of commerce.
Even if the smoke clears somewhat, what would be of great interest to
India are Europe’s changed relationships across the Atlantic and towards the
Urals. Both are likely to encourage a re-evaluation of its Asian engagement.
The big imponderables are the future of a German posture so assiduously
built over two decades and how much others will seek to take advantage of
its ongoing dilemma. Where Asia is concerned, European positions will
necessarily be different from the US because it is no longer defending global
supremacy. At the same time, risk awareness has certainly grown in recent
years. In many ways, the outcomes will be a compromise between pressing
compulsions and medium-term calculations.
It is, however, the premier power of our times that is the bellwether of
change. Influential Americans have argued that a less globally dominant US
cannot afford the economically generous stance of the past. Their
reservations are no longer restricted to just free trade agreements but also
extend to the nature of global supply chains. As a result, more innovative
endeavours are made to intensify economic engagements abroad that are
sensitive to the realities at home. An example is the Indo-Pacific Economic
Framework (IPEF), which commenced on the sidelines of the 2022 Quad
Summit in Tokyo and has progressed by the time of the 2023 Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting.
It is not only that the US is looking to realize opportunities differently.
The strategy that it fashioned in respect of the Ukraine conflict has also been
instructive in highlighting the vulnerabilities of our era. Indeed, the entire
game has become one of which party is able to better leverage its hold on the
other. A key question is the American ability to address multiple major
challenges simultaneously. And of course, that is precisely what distinguishes
the dominant power of our times from others. American awareness of
strategic competition is greater, and is combined with domestic compulsions
to build and protect better. The aggregate of these developments, some long
in the making and others more immediate, are truly transformational.
What we are currently experiencing is also being shaped by concerns that
go beyond the orthodox belief in Westphalian politics. Admittedly, the Cold
War saw systemic competition with the goal of asserting superiority of a set
of values over another. But this was balanced by the strong sovereignty
sensitivities of a post-colonial order. Along the way, a broad compromise
was struck where internal affairs were respected, while making exceptions in
a few egregious cases. Even that was heavily tempered by strategic
considerations; all departures from the supposed norm were not treated
equally.
When it came to economics, transactionalism was much greater and
societies were treated like black boxes. At a macro level, economic choices
were not personal; it was just business. What was happening inside the box
was not supposed to be our concern. But as globalization steadily promoted
greater interpenetration of societies, this could no longer be dismissed with
the same degree of complacency. We were letting in players into our lives
who may believe, think and act very differently. It was no longer just a
question of importing their products; in fact, they were now operating in our
territory as well. And while this maybe physical in some respects, a digital
age ensures that AI ranks foremost among our concerns.
Such an exposure naturally raised concerns about transparency and trust.
It understandably bothers us if the restraints and firewalls that are our norm
are not theirs. Not just that, the behavioural shifts in world affairs started to
impact the global structure itself. In more sanguine times, we focussed mainly
on efficiencies and competitiveness. However, as market shares and
interdependence began to get strategically leveraged, the extent of our
exposure also emerged as a national security concern. Such volumes did
exist earlier; it was just that they were not manipulated in the same manner so
prolifically before. There is no question that we have now slipped into a
different culture of diplomacy, one with less inhibitions and greater coercion.
Among the key developments of the last decade has been the weaponizing of
the routine. It could be trade, tourism, connectivity or finance. As a result,
everything needs to be hedged against now. Such anxieties have also fed into
supply-chain concerns. The age of political agnosticism has effectively come
to a close.
Ironically, the turn of events in Afghanistan could be interpreted as going
in the opposite direction. For many, the real problem there was how intrusive
the foreign presence in that country had become with the goal of nation-
building particularly coming under criticism. It is a moot question whether
the foreign presence in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks could have limited
itself without adverse consequences. But even that is probably entering a
false debate. The true challenge was not the ambition of the goals but the
understanding of the landscape. For two decades, the US struggled with the
paradox that the very country that was fuelling the fighting against it was also
the one critical for its logistics. The dilemma was so acute that even the
presence of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan could not bring it to head. This
should not take away from the dexterity with which those cards were played
by the Pakistani military, leaving a generation of American military and
political leaders with scrambled identification, friend or foe (IFF) systems!
Today, however, the world contemplates the opposite quandary. It
desperately hopes that irrespective of developments within the Afghan
society, there would be no negative external implications. Some countries
define that in terms of terrorism and radicalization. Others are more
concerned at the possibility of refugee outflow or treatment of women.
Whatever happens, the truth is that international relations continue to grapple
unsatisfactorily with the problem of reconciling sharply divergent cultures in
a more tightly integrated world.

THE ARRIVAL OF ‘OTHERS’

Some of the frictional aspects of the current situation have spawned their
own discourse on how best to advance interests. In an effort to correct the
outcomes of a less strategic era, there has been a debate about the virtues and
viability of de-coupling. Like most other concepts, it is sensible to avoid
extreme interpretations.
The global economy is today far too interlinked for it to be nationally
separated in a comprehensive way. No society can really afford to see that
happen, which is why it will not. At the same time, there is open talk of
strategic competition that cannot be wished away either. Competitors clearly
are not going to trust each other beyond a point. Any two-way link, be it
trade, resources, connectivity or pipelines, will normally be better leveraged
by the harder state or the one smart enough to have anticipated it. The very
openness that drives creativity and progress also becomes a vulnerability.
The likely repercussions of such attitudes will be to encourage autonomy and
safeguarding in selected areas and, at the same time, to try and develop
redundancy and reliability wherever necessary in other domains. This also
leads to a renewed focus on export controls and technology sharing. Chips
and semiconductors are an obvious example. There will be sociopolitical
consequences as well, as different nations will adjust their procedures and
practices as per a less trusting ethos. From academia to business, from
research to travel, the world will see this impact in the coming decade. On
top of it all, the political economy and orthodox security will continue to
play out.
Who will gain and who will lose when the external environment is less
favourable is an interesting proposition. How power differentials assert
themselves is no less significant. We have already seen that some players
have misread the strategic culture of others, leading to unintended results. A
world that is more united in some respects but struggling deeper in others
will surely be a novel experience.
The response of states is naturally conditioned by changed circumstances
and surroundings. It is, therefore, all the more important that we appreciate
the structural changes underway. The reality is that the loosening in the
architecture created by the limitations of the US and the rise of China has
opened up space for others. We may have two major powers, obviously not
quite at the same level. But even this does not translate into traditional
bipolarity. There are now many more players whose growth is autonomous
and whose weight is increasing. To varying degrees, they will exploit gaps,
just as they will take advantage of competition. Some of that will be
constrained by their biases, affinities and interests. But as a broad pattern,
they will be tempted to make the most of the ambivalence of those more
distant. The diversity of alliance interests could be a contributory factor.
We must also appreciate that alliances themselves are a product of a set
of circumstances. Copying the broad and durable network created by the US
is near impossible. No other power has the capacity to even attempt a serious
replication. But changing times produce different models and the unceasing
process of establishing a global hierarchy will surely find unique
expressions. Economic integration and dependency may now become more
determining factors in the emergence of a new order. The possibility of
alternatives should not be discounted.
A broader spread of power among nations with less structural rigidity is
exactly what defines the arrival of ‘others’ on the world stage. This category
may itself be a spectrum, with some having a longer history of power
projection and some a more immediate relevance. Again, a few could aspire
to be leading powers one day, while some may be simply protecting the leads
of the past. Moreover, a globalized world no longer requires all-round
development of power to make a nation stand out in competition. If some
facets are adequately developed, that in itself provides enough capability to
make a difference. It could be military force, as in the past; natural or
financial resources; a strategic location; a cutting-edge capability; or an
effective platform. A combination of them makes a powerful case for greater
influence.
The prominence of such powers is already expressing itself in greater
regionalism. Whether in Africa, West Asia, the Gulf or Oceania, differences
and disputes are being addressed in a more localized manner. In fact, the
openings provided by the transformation underway are so significant that they
can be leveraged even by smaller nations.
Few regions have displayed this more graphically than West Asia. Its
stronger regionalization has been expressed in conflicts and tensions that are
increasingly driven by resident players, both big and small. While the rest of
the world continues to have significant stakes, their ability and inclination to
intervene is clearly declining. Leveraging of natural resources has long been
a tradition. To this has now been added the innovative applications of
technology. Whether it is from Yemen or Gaza, we are witnessing how long-
standing problems have acquired highly impactful contemporary forms. Much
of this has also fed into regional competition, especially of middle powers.
Numerous players operating with greater agility and less constraints in an
interdependent world make a compelling case for pragmatism. In certain
senses, shared interests can help override ideological or systemic
differences. Whether it is in domains of energy, connectivity or technology,
those who have little else in common have come together for their individual
gains. But here, too, there is a larger structural logic to what is unfolding in
front of us. That the unilateralism of any single power is untenable as a
standard operating principle is obvious by now. The 1990s are well behind
us and cannot be reinvented even by the most powerful of those emerging.
At the same time, the problems of the world have also become so
complicated that no bilateral relationship in itself is adequate to be a regular
solution provider. Theoretically, there is good old multilateralism to which
everyone always pays lip service. But its frailties and shortcomings are even
more openly on display. It is not only anachronistic but functions at the
lowest common denominator, that too with deep deference to vested
interests. This then necessitates arrangements of convenience to assert
themselves.
Such minilateralism is practised in different combinations on various
issues. As it grows, a larger culture of plurilateralism has begun to emerge.
In itself, this is not entirely new. Earlier, a regional explanation provided a
basis for working together. So, we had the EU, ASEAN, SAARC, GCC, etc.,
where proximity was the foundational basis for shared activities. We also
saw nations collaborating on specific issues like maritime security, counter-
terrorism, export controls, non-proliferation and climate change. It could
even be an effort to influence rebalancing and advance multipolarity. And it
went beyond the compulsions of geography. BRICS is one case in point,
where four continents were reflected in one membership.
The difference now is that such groupings can become broader in their
agenda, while also more purposeful in their working. The Quad, in that
sense, is a sign of such changing times. What makes this format more
appealing is that it has much lower overhead costs. There are no treaties,
obligations, establishments or even disciplines that come with better
relationships. It would seem that frugality is also a virtue now in the area of
diplomacy.
When it comes to multipolarity, it is essential that we do not judge this
complicated world by a simple yardstick. The phenomenon itself expresses a
range of credible powers, whose interplay influences the global outcome.
But the fact is that nations have acquired such differential capabilities that
they perform in an increasingly domain-specific manner. Consider how this
appears from the perspective of a nation like India. Political multipolarity
has an obvious set of players, among them the P-5 nations of the UNSC,
collectives like the EU and ASEAN, and those individual states that are
regionally important. Economic multipolarity, however, looks very different
because it is a product of some other factors. India’s most substantial trade
accounts are the hubs of the EU, the US, China, the Gulf and ASEAN. The
equation stacks up still more differently in the case of energy. The key
partners on this score are Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Russia, UAE and the US.
Viewed from the technology perspective, the answers would move much
more in the direction of Western economies. When it comes to mobility and
skills, the Gulf obviously has to be given its due weight, but it is the West that
provides more value addition.
All of this is supplemented by a truly worldwide constituency when it
comes to multilateral outcomes and global issues. Voting patterns of nations
are often characterized by blocs and India’s appeal is accordingly targeted.
This complex picture underlines how much more layered foreign policy
calculations have become in this day and age. A large nation and a rising
power certainly cannot visualize its strategy in linear terms or with limited
variables. And the beauty of our differentiated world is that everybody is
pursuing their own matrix.
The commentary that accompanied the expansion of BRICS in South
Africa in August 2023 merits some observations. Much of it suggested that
the US specifically, and the West generally, were the elephants in the room.
The truth, in fact, was very different. The outcomes were an intricate
negotiation to find common ground among the powers that were actually
there. Each one of them had their own reasons to chart an independent path
and there were overlaps between them. The six invited states (Saudi Arabia,
UAE, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia and Argentina) all have strong and established
relationships with India, as indeed with other BRICS members. Their own
inclinations are very much towards multipolarity.
The occasion also saw a groundswell of pressure on the UNSC reform,
which, therefore, led to a significant evolution in the collective BRICS
position. That both current and potential members have a shared interest in
promoting trade settlements in their national currencies was another point of
convergence. The bottom line is that the international system is today headed
in more independent and multiple directions. Viewing it exclusively through
an anti-Western prism would be misleading.

A POST-COVID WORLD

As challenging as the long view is, nothing really prepared us for the
enormity of the Covid pandemic. It was not the human toll that it took, which
alone was mind-boggling. The disruption it caused to the routine was just
beyond imagination. The reason for this was that the last time something
similar took place, the world was not as tightly connected as we are today.
The difference between the Spanish Flu and Covid is a statement about the
evolution of global society. They influence our expectations of an effective
response, as they do of the benefits of international cooperation. But the
impact cannot be judged just in terms of problems or solutions; it is even
more about mindset.
The implications for international relations are particularly far-reaching.
The Covid experience has challenged the globalization model that had
entrenched itself in the last three decades. The efficiency obsession has been
balanced to a considerable degree by a hedging mentality, and the experience
on the vaccine front has heightened awareness in the Global South about its
interests.
This pandemic may be the most serious in living memory, but it should be
seen as a recurring challenge and not a one-off. It demands cooperation on a
scale that could not have been conceived of earlier. No national capacity,
however large, proved to be adequate. And merely excess volumes from
even the large capacities are not clearly enough to address global needs. A
collective response, by itself, could fall short if it is just an aggregate of the
present capabilities. What we will now have to conceptualize is re-
engineering of the way the world works to respond to such cataclysmic
events. The pandemic has certainly triggered debates on issues like supply
chains, global governance, social responsibility and even ethics. It equally
encourages an objective assessment of the contemporary world, so that we
are better prepared for tomorrow.
As nations contemplate the world, there is no question that Covid has
moved the needle in the direction of fears. This is reflected in national
security acquiring a more expansive definition. In the past, defence, politics
and intelligence drove calculations, with extrapolation into domains like
resources, energy and technology. With some notable exceptions, their
demands were balanced out by the requirements of global exchanges,
economic efficiency and by social habits. These trends, in fact, became
stronger as the globalization mantra took deeper root.
The pandemic, however, saw capabilities leveraged, commitments
dishonoured, supply chains blocked, logistics disrupted and shortages
created. When this applied to PPE, medicines and ventilators, we woke up to
health security. Those who saw their essential supplies under threat now
realized the value of food security. Where economies slowed down due to
material disruptions, we now understood the need for manufacturing security.
Call it buying nationally, middle-class concerns, dual circulation or self-
reliance; its underlying message is not that different. The efficiency of others
may have strengthened bottomlines in good times; they are now seen as too
unreliable for difficult ones.
The nature of the Covid experience has also brought to fore concerns of
transparency. Opacity can no longer be overlooked; it has real implications
for the rest of the world. It was bad enough to be confronted with shortages
and disruptions, worse that they could become pressure points. There are
also worries that the financial distress caused by the pandemic could lead to
new vulnerabilities. Consequently, strategic autonomy is now being debated
as greater self-sufficiency, stronger partnerships and multiplicity of options,
all of which are perceived as integral to risk mitigation. These can have geo-
economic implications in the days ahead.
Behavioural aspects have also played their part. Stresses induced
narrower definitions of self-interest and departures from collective
endeavours. Few practised what they preached; some even stopped
preaching altogether. Inadvertently, insights emerged on the interplay of
culture, interests and values. Pluralistic societies remained more engaged
with the world and solidarity was stronger between them. And those who
saw the world also as a workplace, rather than just a marketplace, had a
deeper interest in remaining connected.
Challenging as they may be, the essential realities of our times cannot be
denied. Our globalization is deep and pervasive and will continue to shape
activities and strategies. What Covid has brought out are some of the
particular risks of its current incarnation. The task before us is to de-risk that,
even while pursuing other objectives, including rapid economic recovery.
Every solution, however, also throws up new problems. The digital
domain that is enabling so much delivery is raising issues of both privacy
and security. That is even more so as AI gathers steam. Critical and emerging
technologies are gaining in salience as revolutions in energy, mobility and
communication unfold. Ensuring that newer supply chains do not enhance
global vulnerabilities is of utmost importance. For India, this is the subject of
engagement bilaterally with the US, trilaterally with Japan and Australia, and
collectively with the Quad. The Trade and Technology Council initiative is a
parallel exercise with the EU.
What is now clear is that the alarm bells set off by the Covid experience
have brought into focus a larger challenge of ensuring trusted collaboration.
The truth is that market economies and democratic societies offer a degree of
reassurance that the international community recognizes as vital to the coming
times. In line with this thinking is a growing realization that Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) choices should not be divorced from strategic directions.
Precisely because much that India has to build lies ahead of it, we have
greater stakes in ensuring the requisite partnerships and accessing the
necessary resources.
India is, however, in it not just for itself. For the Global South that has
barely come to terms with Covid, the Ukraine conflict has added to their
trauma. The 3F (food, fuel and fertilizer) insecurity has been aggravated by
trade and tourism disruptions. Concerns have been intensified by the
perceived insensitivity of the developed towards their predicament. As
homilies on open markets are pronounced while shortages mount, many
legitimately fear that their experiences of vaccine inequity will be repeated
in other domains.
 In this situation, India has to summon its rallying powers in addition to its
production capacity. Even against some headwinds, we have championed the
cause of the economic security of the South. Setting an example in that
respect is itself a powerful message. We stood our ground against
considerable odds when it came to Covid, refusing to sacrifice the interests
of our citizens. Energy security is a different but not dissimilar fight and what
we do has a resonance well beyond.
Let us, therefore, take stock of what we confront. As it is, a world order
into its eighth decade had run its course and is ripe for change. This is driven
both by the national prospects of major powers as well as the cumulative
impact of greater rebalancing and multipolarity. To that is added the
complexity of a more interdependent, tech-centric and borderless world,
where the concepts of power and influence have acquired new meanings.
And this mix now experiences a pandemic that exceeds any in living memory;
a conflict that impacts the most complacent continent and beyond; a power
vacuum in a sensitive region like Afghanistan and both departures and
reaffirmations in a volatile one like West Asia. Some major players have
heightened awareness of their predicament while others have made sharp
assertions of power. This is really a new era of multiple strategic
competitions. As a result, there is truly disorder under the heavens, and it
will take all the fortitude and staying power of a civilizational polity like
Bharat to tackle it effectively.
 Chapter 5.
A TRANSFORMATIONAL DECADE
Laying the Foundations of a Leading Power

I
n 2015, PM Narendra Modi publicly articulated India’s quest to become a
leading power one day. Some treated it as a statement of arrival when it
was actually meant to be an expression of an aspiration. In the decade that
has passed, it has also become clearer that this is now work in serious
progress. While inaugurating the Bharat Mandapam in 2023, the same
thinking was reiterated by the PM in a determination to emerge as the third-
largest global economy. And a year before, in a departure from tradition, he
made a public appeal to think and plan for an entire era, not just a term in
office. This was characterized as Amrit Kaal, a quarter century with its goal
as India’s emergence as a developed nation.
Each of these assertions has a profound foreign-policy implication,
especially because they are being voiced not merely as a broad ambition but
with specific targets and goals for which India is now strategizing. The
achievements of the last decade point to how steadily and systematically the
foundations are being laid for a global footprint.
From his first day in office as the PM, Narendra Modi put his stamp on
the nation’s foreign policy. He demonstrated diplomatic imagination by
inviting neighbouring leaders to his oath-taking ceremony in 2014, a step that
orthodox thinking had not even contemplated. His US visit later that year
served to bring on stage a new kind of public diplomacy. He infused greater
energy into Indian endeavours, reaching out with an intensity and spread that
was so different from his predecessors. In the time that has passed, PM Modi
tabled fresh ideas and initiatives in various geographies and domains,
ranging from energy and climate to counter-terrorism and connectivity. He
has been active on key global issues, often directly shaping the outcomes.
This is not someone who is content with simply extrapolating on what he
inherited. Instead, he has given foreign policy greater strategic clarity,
stronger conceptual basis, heightened activity and better delivery. This was
evident in the manner in which the immediate neighbourhood was
approached and the extended one was engaged. It was also visible in the
assessment of the global order and building stronger relationships with major
power centres. There was then the planned cultivation of middle powers, of
regions and sub-regions. This was paralleled by publicly upholding the
interests of the Global South. The delivery of Indian projects there was
radically improved, making them a visible symbol of a New India. First
responder capabilities were effectively demonstrated, as was the ability to
look after our citizens abroad when in distress. Fresh strategic concepts
emerged, and so did new mechanisms and memberships.
The cumulative results were visible in India’s higher global standing
now. In other circumstances, it could well be called a transformational
decade. But given the ambitious objectives set out, real changes have just
begun. There is still a considerable road to traverse.

Nations and individuals come of age through demonstrations of strength. In the Ramayana, the
relevant episode is the stringing of Shiva’s bow by Rama when he goes to visit Janaka, the
king of Mithila. This was a weapon of extraordinary capability that Shiva himself had given for
safekeeping to Janaka’s ancestor Devaratha, at a particular time when he could not trust
himself to keep his emotions in check. Janaka had decided that he would allow only the person
who could lift and string this bow to marry his daughter Sita. And it was this feat that not only
ensured the marriage of Rama and Sita but announced the arrival of Rama into the world of
warriors. This was immediately tested in a confrontation with Parasurama, a sage who
obsessively fought the warrior community. Rama bested him by capturing and stringing
Vishnu’s bow made by Vishwakarma, the counterpart of Shiva’s bow he had just strung, which
had first come into the possession of Parasurama’s grandfather. These were but the
beginnings, and at every stage of his journey, Lord Rama overcame obstacles to realize his
true potential.
Major tests do not come out of the blue. More often than not, they are preceded by earlier
experiences of a significant nature. That is the natural evolution of people as it is of states. In
Rama’s case, this first happened when sages demanded his services to deal with demons
that were ruining their sacrifices. Rama’s father, Dasaratha, was naturally reluctant to expose
him to such risks but finally consented with great hesitation. This attitude is also a systemic
response in most countries when confronted with new threats.
In Rama’s case, he first had to overcome the female demon Tataka in the Kamasrama
forest. The next encounter in Siddhasrama was with more serious adversaries, the demons
Maricha and Subahu. One was vanquished and the other reduced to ashes. Rama and
Lakshmana then traversed the hermitage of Sage Gautama, where Rama was destined to
revive the former’s wife Ahalya who had been cursed earlier. It was only thereafter that the
brothers proceeded to Mithila to perform the feat with Shiva’s bow.
For a nation like India, it is to be expected that there will be rivers and mountains to cross
as it moves towards becoming a leading power. Some of them could be direct challenges,
others a product of larger circumstances. There could be recurring issues, as indeed Lord
Rama was to experience with the demon Maricha. At the end of the day, the rising of a power
is an exercise in perseverance, endurance and mental strength. If we are to look for a
contemporary reflection of these events where India is concerned, this may be in building its
infrastructure, upgrading its human resources, countering territorial challenges, developing
deep strengths, exercising the nuclear option and improving the quality of governance. As it
moves on to the next stage of its rise, India, too, needs to broaden its vistas, be more aware of
competitors and strengthen its comprehensive national power.

THE NEW MANDALA

In any assessment, it is relatively easy to point to individual events and

outcomes to demonstrate a sense of change. That may not be altogether
without merit, but it cannot be the full story. Even inflection points are just
that; they only serve to highlight a larger trend. Given the scale of what India
is seeking to do over an extended period, it would be completely natural to
expect that there would be a comprehensive approach to achieving its goals.
And indeed, that is exactly what has emerged steadily over this period.
Some facets required an occasion to be unveiled, such as the enunciation
of the SAGAR outlook during a prime ministerial visit to Mauritius in 2015.
In other cases, the rationale followed the action such as the formalization of
the Neighbourhood First policy some months after the 2014 swearing-in
ceremony or, as was the case with ASEAN and beyond, additional layers had
to be added for ‘Look East’ to become ‘Act East’.
But there were also stark strategic decisions, such as the commitment to
propagate the message of Indo-Pacific. Sometimes, particular events were
devised to make a new move, such as the Forum for India–Pacific Islands
Cooperation (FIPIC) summits. On occasion, certain circumstances brought
out latent thinking, a good example being the Voice of Global South Summit
in the aftermath of Covid and Ukraine. As we near the end of a decade, the
overall strategy is obviously very much clearer than it was at the beginning.
The dots have joined into lines, even forming concentric circles of interest.
 What then is the mandala that captures India’s thinking of the world
today? At its core is obviously the immediate neighbourhood, the objects of
attention at Modi’s oath-taking ceremony in 2014. The approach here is to
begin by recognizing that India occupies a unique position in the Subcontinent
by virtue of its size, location and, increasingly, economic weight. It is
obviously in India’s interest that its immediate periphery be stable, secure
and sensitive. Ensuring this in a competitive world will require us to
underwrite the larger region and invest in the connectivity, cooperation and
contacts that make for a more cohesive geography. There are challenges from
both history, sociology and economics to overcome in this pursuit. While
they need to be managed, the heart of the Neighbourhood First policy is for
India to convince its immediate neighbours of the benefits of closer ties and
then proceed to make that happen on the ground. This is essentially what we
have seen unfold since 2014.
Today, we are looking at a distinctly different picture, where trans-border
transmission grids, fuel pipelines, roads, railways and waterways, and
smooth border crossing have become the hallmark of our times. All this is
underpinned by the usage of each other’s capabilities, be it in goods
movement, ports or power generation. It has allowed the entire region to
benefit through larger scale and greater efficiency. The real test of
Neighbourhood First came in Sri Lanka’s economic crisis and India’s
expeditious response has done much to enhance the credibility of its stance.
The second circle of priority is the extended neighbourhood. In every
direction, the Modi government has, by now, laid out an intricate plan of
engagement. In the case of ASEAN and Pacific nations, the upgradation of
cooperation is expressed in domains like security, development and digital.
As a result, the Act East Policy not only deepens India’s presence in
Southeast Asia but also positions it as a launching pad to the Pacific region
and beyond.
Towards the Gulf, the ‘Link West’ approach has seen an unprecedented
intensification of activities in a range of areas. Ties with the UAE, in
particular, have helped to accelerate the pace of progress. Obviously, India
only stands to benefit as others seek to compete. From the days when our
vision of the Gulf was limited to energy and labour, this now extends to
technology, education, innovation, investment and security. Even traditional
areas like energy have witnessed broader Indian participation. Not least, the
Gulf also serves as a bridgehead for greater involvement with Africa.
 To the south, the SAGAR outlook brings together our maritime
neighbours in an integrated manner. Some countries like Sri Lanka and the
Maldives overlap with the Neighbourhood First policy. But others today note
the stronger focus and larger resources that India is prepared to devote. Our
development partnership with Mauritius has emerged as an exemplar in this
context. The underlying maritime cooperation has also become the basis for
an emerging security conclave that encourages more cooperative thinking.
To the north, Connect Central Asia Policy is the last piece of the puzzle
which forges more systemic linkages with culturally comfortable partners.
The agenda here is much more about connectivity, de-radicalization and
development. For many of these states, India offers options that strengthen
their overall positioning.
Clearly, how smoothly India advances in its multiple quests depends on
the nature of its ties with major powers. In certain cases, Europe being one,
constituent segments of a collective also need to be engaged individually.
Many of them have the ability to facilitate this process; some have the ability
to obstruct as well. It is naturally our endeavour to continually create an
optimal mix. And this cannot be done by always staying the middle course or
ducking the difficult problems. Obviously, there is a strong case for both
prudence and perseverance. But there is an even more powerful one for
understanding which relationship serves our interest best on which issues. As
a result, contemporary diplomacy looks far from linear, often ending up in
apparent zigzags. But the real test of its effectiveness is whether it puts India
ahead in the competitive game. And such periodic assessments, therefore,
assume importance in both policy validation and course correction, where
required.
An essential part of preparing for a global footprint is to expand the
breadth of interactions. The truth is that a very large number of nations have
been engaged very perfunctorily by India for many years now. Even today,
there are countries that are receiving an Indian foreign minister for the first
time in their history. Realizing this, our efforts in the last decade have been to
find more efficient ways of conducting global diplomacy.
A vigorous participation in existing mechanisms and the invention of new
ones helps to address this challenge. The Quad and FIPIC in the Indo-Pacific,
the I2U2 in West Asia, and the India–Nordic Summit in Europe are relevant
examples at the highest level. The IMEC is the latest in the list. Those with
ASEAN, the EU, Africa and BRICS have, of course, continued apace. But
these are now also supplemented at ministerial levels by formats with
Central Europe, Caribbean and Central America. As with Europe and the rest
of Asia, we can relate more purposefully to broader geographies like Africa
and Latin America by dealing with sub-regions. The opening of new
embassies, especially in Africa, is part of the same endeavour.
An important source of strength is the growth in investments, trade and
projects of Indian businesses abroad. India is today among the top five
economic partners of many countries of Africa and Latin America. The
movement of our professionals is adding an additional layer to many
relationships. Similarly, development projects supported through grants and
soft loans across 78 nations of the Global South demonstrate capability as
much as a solution to a local need. Quite apart from our national branding, it
is the presence on the ground in so many manifestations that is imprinting
India in the mind space of societies even far away.
The spatial mandala is accompanied by a conceptual one. Indian foreign
policy today recognizes more explicitly the imperatives of national security
in setting priorities and making choices. But security itself is perceived in
much broader and deeper terms. AatmaNirbhar Bharat Abhiyan and Make in
India are neither economic protectionism nor political slogans. They are, in
fact, a quest to build deeper strengths and greater strategic autonomy that is
required by a nation aspiring to be a leading power. Increasingly, economic
security also cohabits with technological security.
The digital domain is its most visible expression, though obviously far
from being the only one. India’s goal is not of moving the needle in the
direction of autarky but, instead, to create the capabilities that would make it
a serious player at a global level. The demand for resilient and reliable
supply chains are a chance that could be exploited with the right policies.
Similarly, the knowledge economy is its big opportunity, and transparent and
trusted data flows assign a value to India that must be fully appreciated.
Participating more intensively in the global economy will not just require
better preparations and the right outlook but also the appropriate human
resources.
Investing in skilling them for contemporary times is now being paralleled
by endeavours to promote Indian talent through start-ups and innovation.
These are not just economic or even social initiatives but strategic steps
laden with deep meaning for international relations. Let us not forget that one
important driver of the transformed India–US relationship was the H1B visa
flow. Addressing the rising aspirations of people at home and realizing
ambitions abroad are but two sides of the same coin.

THE INDIA STORY

While the manner of engaging the world may be more considered, its
effectiveness will really be judged by how the world views us now. It is,
therefore, worthwhile to reflect on the changing external perceptions of India.
Much of this centres on the nation’s economic and technological progress.
We were seen as the global back office for many years, but India has now
surged well past that limited image. The knowledge economy has
increasingly made us the crucial technology partner for many economies. The
talk has now shifted to collaboration in complex fields like defence
manufacturing and semiconductors. Our infrastructure improvements, coupled
with making it easier to do business, have propelled us to become the largest
destination for foreign direct investment (FDI). The Covid experience
established us as the pharmacy of the world. That India handled the Covid
well is widely recognized, but it is the economic bounce-back that is seen as
the more consequential happening.
A lot of the India story discussed abroad revolves around improved
governance. A digital delivery on such an enormous scale has been a
particular source of fascination. Progress on the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDG) front magnifies the sense of a society on the move. The mosaic
is made up of many granules, from vaccines and health industry to 5G stack
and space launches, or indeed, to educational branding or Make in India
outcomes. The G20 presidency has also served to acquaint a wide cross-
section of policymakers and influencers with infrastructure improvement and
governance progress. This emphasis on delivery has led to more effective
implementation of project commitments abroad. That great care is taken to
synchronize budgeting is only proof again of how much diplomacy is an art of
the detail. A successful diaspora certainly adds to this positive view.
There are also leadership factors and decision-making record in play. To
begin with, a sharper strategic clarity has enabled India to prioritize and plan
better. A relevant example is of Neighbourhood First and the seriousness
with which it is implemented on the ground. Another is about overcoming
hesitations of history with the US in particular and the West in general. Here,
too, India has not let changes in Administration deflect it from pursuing its
goals. At the same time, it has ensured that other balances are maintained to
make this a smooth exercise.
Strategic clarity has also been accompanied by strategic communication.
India’s interests and intentions have been steadily messaged in appropriate
forums and adjusted to changing circumstances. It could be about the Indo-
Pacific, critical technologies, Covid-related needs or the Ukraine conflict.
Partners are neither confused about our thinking nor doubtful of our
intentions. A strongly independent stance has also helped India to effectively
navigate a more multipolar and fractured world.
There is also a conscious endeavour to shape global issues, such as
climate action, the pandemic, terrorism and digital infrastructure, and unleash
the full power of ideas, be it in solar energy, disaster resilience, sustainable
lifestyle, food security or even wellness. This has been backed up by
projecting Indian traditions, history and culture more visibly on the global
stage.
New India may be a message at home; it is equally an image abroad. It is
not simply a more powerful and capable India that the world perceives; it is
a more authentic and participative one, at ease as much with its nationalist
spirit as with its international contributions.
The resulting interest in engaging India is today visible in many quarters.
When it comes to matters of technology and economy, there is a growing
perception of our relevance to the challenge of trusted manufacturing. This is
all the more so since those processes have become so intensively data
driven. One aspect of it is the reliability that emanates from our political and
social characteristics. After all, it is evident that we are a political
democracy, pluralistic society and market economy.
Increasingly, the misalignment of global demography and demand is
making our human resources valuable for the international economy in a more
tech-driven era. The establishment of the Trade and Technology Council with
the EU is an indicator of the direction in which the winds are blowing. There
has been even more marked progress with the US on this front, as indeed
with the other two Quad partners.
A different dimension is the contribution we can make to the stability and
security of the global commons, especially in the Indo-Pacific. At the same
time, India is a partner of value in forums like BRICS and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO). Our independent stance always leaves
open participation in any endeavour at conflict mitigation or resolution. The
combination of Covid support, digital delivery and development projects has
also created a deeper constituency in the Global South. It is not lost on the
developing world that we commenced our G20 presidency with the Voice of
the Global South Summit. Nor, for that matter, that we championed the
membership of the AU in the G20.
The last decade has also established convincingly that Indian
development initiatives are truly demand-driven and do not conceal a hidden
agenda. Certainly, India’s ability to straddle the big fissures that global
politics is currently grappling with is part of its overall standing in the
world.

DECODING MODI-ERA DIPLOMACY

We have till now focussed on how India has dealt with the world differently
and the extent to which this, in turn, has shaped global views about India. Our
appreciation, however, would be incomplete if we do not give adequate
attention to the change in the very understanding of what foreign policy is all
about. It may look as a shift in emphasis but is very much more than that.
Foreign policy is now seen as a direct instrument to accelerate national
development and modernization. The flow of technology, capital and best
practices are the ensuing focal points. Wooing the world is expressed in
encouraging investors, especially by making it easier to do business.
Interactions with them are as frequent as those with technology-providers and
high achievers in different domains. AatmaNirbhar Bharat Abhiyan and Make
in India provide an overall framework that facilitate such exercises,
supported by initiatives like Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) on
manufacturing or Gati Shakti in infrastructure.
The quest for technology and best practices is even visible in the PM’s
itinerary abroad, whether it related to a battery storage facility in the US,
river cleaning in South Korea, bullet trains in Japan, skill development in
Singapore, or railway stations in Germany. As this mindset was applied
outwards, it also witnessed the export of projects, products and services that
spoke of India’s improved abilities. This includes a range of infrastructure,
connectivity and public facilities that extend from South Asia to Africa and
Latin America and, not least, a steady increase in defence exports to a
growing list of nations.
 The aggregate result is a developing perception of India as a partner of
growing consequence. This has helped exports and market access abroad,
with beneficial consequences at home. When a PM personally engages with
all his ambassadors in that regard, we really know that India is changing.
In many ways, the operational culture of foreign-policy decision-making
has adjusted to the new era. Central to that endeavour is a conscious effort to
overcome silos by tighter coordination, more intensive strategizing and
stronger feedback. Whether it is global trade negotiations, national security
situations or multilateral concerns of development, the emphasis is on
collective deliberations and decision-making. Starting as it does from
ministers and secretaries, this has had a natural impact on the bureaucracy at
large.
The same outlook is also demonstrated in respect of important partners
and key issues. We see this now in respect of a multi-ministerial interaction
with Singapore, the Trade and Technology Council format with the EU and
the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogues in Defence and External Affairs with key
nations. Behind that process was also a deliberative exercise that sought to
prioritize, maximize and intensify India’s international relationships. It could
be the attention given to leadership-level exchanges, including to the chief
guest for the Republic Day, and how they fit in with the larger game plan.
Where feedback was concerned, the national-level Pro-Active Governance
and Timely Implementation (PRAGATI) exercise was customized for the
objectives of foreign policy. Drilling deep down to specifics enabled delays,
roadblocks and policy obstacles to be identified and addressed. As a result,
many development projects abroad began witnessing more efficient
execution.
The systemic improvements came into full play during Covid, whether it
was in the Vande Bharat Mission or the Vaccine Maitri initiative. They were
demonstrated during evacuation exercises as well, ranging from Yemen and
Nepal to Afghanistan, Ukraine and Sudan.
From 2014, there has also been a strong conviction that India should be
more active in shaping the global agenda. Obviously, some issues of
particular priority for India itself, like terrorism and tax evasion, did not get
the attention they deserved in the councils of the world. There were others
like maritime security on which India could make a crucial contribution. In
due course, when an important debate like the one on connectivity unfolded,
the strong confidence level of the Modi government allowed it to take the
lead. When it came to climate challenges, India, till 2014, was widely
perceived as a reluctant participant. Since then, it has emerged as a credible
champion of both climate action and climate justice by becoming an
exemplar on renewables and advocate of resourcing.
There was also a belief that we were mostly responding to the initiatives
of others rather than putting forward our own thinking. However, whether it
was at the UN, G20 Summits or COP meetings, the flow of ideas turned into
more structured proposals, like the ISA and the CDRI. The creativity
continues, recent examples being One Sun One World One Grid (OSOWOG),
Lifestyle for Environment (LiFE) and the International Year of Millets
(2023). To take the agenda forward, there was an openness to explore new
partners and collaborations where required. The Quad, the I2U2 and the SCO
are relevant examples. As confidence grew in our ability to contribute to
global solutions, it took diverse forms, a collective one like the development
agenda for Africa as well as a unilateral one like the Vaccine Maitri. By dint
of application and imagination, the early thoughts about making our presence
felt more strongly have now become reality.
While addressing practical challenges to India’s progress, much thought
has also been given to branding India in a manner reflecting the rise of a
civilizational state. The truth is that two centuries of colonialism had skewed
the global discourse so drastically in favour of the West that the heritage,
culture and traditions of the rest of the world were relegated to the sidelines.
Part of the responsibility for that predicament also rests with the leadership
of developing societies. They subscribed to equating modernity and
advancement with emulating the West. For reasons both ideological and
political, many of them often ran down their own past.
As a result, the imperative for cultural rebalancing to accompany its
economic and political facets has only grown with times. Prime Minister
Modi has led from the front in this regard. His initiative in 2015 to globally
celebrate yoga has been phenomenally successful. The propagation of our
medical and wellness practices has also gained traction. When it comes to
environment, the advocacy of lifestyle changes is being widely welcomed.
Even food habits are relevant in this regard, reflected in the Indian endeavour
to lead greater cultivation and consumption of millets, our ancient grains.
Some of this is expressed through the optics of how the leadership carries
itself and expresses its views.
 A large part of the challenge that still needs more effective redressal is in
the deeper concepts and entrenched assumptions of contemporary
international relations. That is still work in progress but hopefully one that
will see improvements in the coming years.
Yet another notable feature of the Modi-era diplomacy has been its
people-centric approach. There were multiple drivers for this greater
emphasis on the human factor. One, of course, was the external reflection of a
domestic campaign to improve development indices and extend social
welfare. Supporting Indians abroad is a natural extrapolation of this
approach.
Another is the understanding that India needed to prepare for the
requirements of the knowledge economy. It was essential to envisage a
global workplace, not just a trading place. And that meant working out the
requisite institutional arrangements and practices rather than leaving our
citizens at the mercy of the vagaries of the mobility industry.
Then, there was greater consciousness about the importance and
contribution of Indians abroad, be they students, professionals or those more
settled. Their welfare was envisaged as an obligation that should be
addressed with utmost seriousness. And finally, there was a sense of a
changing India itself. A rising power should not leave its people abroad to
face adversity on their own. Such detachment not only reflects badly on our
standing but could also undermine the faith with which Indians could proceed
abroad.
Instituting robust welfare measures applicable beyond our borders,
extricating our citizens from crisis situations and organizing repatriations as
they happened during the Covid pandemic are all steps in that direction.
Indeed, the transformation begins right at home with radical reforms in the
ease of issuing passports. This was paralleled by initiatives to facilitate
mobility while ensuring that Indians were not treated in a discriminatory
manner. Concluding Migration and Mobility Partnership Agreements
(MMPAs) with countries ranging from Australia to Germany are the policy
reflections of this concern.

DELIVERING ON PARTNERSHIPS

The progress report of the last decade is an encouraging one. Stronger

expressions of diplomatic energies and activities have clearly raised India’s
profile in global councils. Prime Minister Modi, in particular, is perceived
as a global figure who, while advancing his national interest, has a broader
vision and a commitment to collective good. When it comes to the complex
challenges that inevitably arise in world affairs, India is no longer seen as
ducking the tough decisions.
The regional perception in the Subcontinent started to change from 2014.
Understandably, this has not been a linear path, but overall, there is
appreciation for the enormous strides that connectivity, cooperation and
contacts have made. The extended neighbourhood also appreciates India’s
stronger sense of purpose as well as high-level visits happening after such
long gaps. Where the major powers are concerned, they, too, have seen India
prepared to engage more confidently and independently, perhaps in its
engagement with multiple partners on defence, technology and energy or,
indeed, standing its ground firmly when it comes to protecting its national
interests from external pressures.
There is a global dimension to India’s progress, which is no less
important. In myriad ways, we have been active on a range of international
issues that actually shape our contemporary era. Whether it is debt relief,
global minimum tax or fairer market access, India has been a powerful voice
in global conversations. When it comes to terrorism, India’s own counter-
actions and collaboration in restricting terror financing and listing of
sanctioned terrorists have contributed to greater international awareness. We
not only took the debate on maritime security to the UNSC but are
participating in concrete initiatives across the Indo-Pacific, including hosting
a key fusion centre.
One subject on which India made a decisive difference was connectivity.
By taking a comprehensive and clear-cut view of the principles underpinning
it, its policymakers were able to shape the debate in favour of greater
transparency and better viability. But what has affected global perception
most profoundly has been the Indian stance during the Covid pandemic. By
providing vaccines to a 100 partners and medicines and materials to 150
nations, India demonstrated an altogether different level of global
responsibility. The accrued goodwill has clearly helped define its profile at
a time when the world is in transition.
In international cooperation, a lot depends on the willingness to walk the
talk. For decades, we were known for partnering with other nations in their
development efforts, mostly through training and exchanges but also, on
occasion, through projects. In the last decade, this development has been
significantly scaled up. There has been a visible expansion in lines of credit,
grant assistance, capability building, infrastructure and economic projects as
well as human resources enhancement.
But more than this scale, what has really changed is the effectiveness of
delivery. Monitored continuously and supervised strongly, long-pending
projects were brought to successful conclusion and new ones undertaken
with greater professionalism. Connectivity, socio-economic facilities,
logistics and energy in our immediate neighbourhood have been particular
beneficiaries. Post-earthquake projects in Nepal and infrastructure in
Mauritius are prominent examples of the enhanced quality of delivery.
Despite the Covid challenges, India was also able to keep most of its
commitments made to African nations as part of the India-Africa Forum
Summit (IAFS).
During this period, the footprint of India’s international partnerships has
also expanded perceptibly. It now ranges from renewable energy in the
Pacific to community projects in the Caribbean. It could be the refinery in
Mongolia, the Metro Express in Mauritius, a textile factory in Kenya or
water supply in Tanzania, many India-supported endeavours have been game-
changers for the partner countries.
A more vigorous India has been able to forge new relationships that
recognize its growing value. An obvious example is the Quad, which has
facilitated other Indo-Pacific engagements in domains like technology, supply
chains, education, maritime security, etc. When it came to Eurasia, India’s
inclusion in the SCO in 2017 underlined its salience to that grouping’s
agenda. During this period, membership of export control regimes like
Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group and Wassenaar
Arrangement were as significant as plurilateral initiatives led by India,
especially on sustainability. These memberships also spoke of a larger
phenomenon of India’s rise and the response of the world to it. That all 54
African states attended the IAFS Summit, that all 10 ASEAN leaders were
present at the 2018 Republic Day and that India engaged 27 EU countries in
Porto in 2021 and that 125 nations participated in the Voice of Global South
Summit in 2023 are illustrations of where it stands today.
Often, that proposition is tested through elections to international
organizations, and by and large, India has come through successfully. Indeed,
the growing demand for our participation in different forums, engagement in
various formats and presence on multiple occasions are reflective of our
global stock.

FINDING OUR OWN SOLUTIONS

As we come out of Covid, like every other country, India is also assessing its
costs, evaluating its experiences and drawing its lessons. What can be said
with some degree of confidence is that we have weathered the storm better
than many others. Strong fundamentals and considered policies ensure that
India stays very much on course to becoming a leading power in the future.
While much of that is dependent on continuously enhancing capabilities, it is
equally essential that India’s vision of its prospects remain confident. After
all, we have struggled with decades of downsizing, hyphenation, non-
involvement and risk aversion.
The pathway for the future is built on a mindset of fierce independence,
though the challenge is to refresh it for contemporary times. Our ability to
express this outlook has naturally changed with our strengths. Today, we have
many more resources and instruments at our command to achieve national
goals abroad. But even capabilities and aspirations produce results only
when filtered through an accurate understanding of the world in which we
live.
A crucial aspect of diplomacy, therefore, is a comprehensive landscape
analysis, which captures the contradictions and nuances so essential to make
policy choices. At the highest level, it centres on multipolarity and
rebalancing while taking into account the contradictions between major
nations. Drilling down region by region has meant a more granular
appreciation of the issues involved. In all of this, there is the overarching
reality of globalization, the ideologies of which can often mislead us through
simplistic propositions. As we are increasingly discovering, one truth mainly
works for one street.
The quest to develop capacities clearly benefits from domestic reform
and modernization initiatives. This linkage was dumbed down to the
assertion that 8 per cent growth was the best foreign policy! The reality,
however, is that growth gained without transforming the foundations and
framework had in-built limitations. This decade has consequently been a
much more comprehensive effort that departed from established mantras. It
also sought to avoid the pitfalls that were presented by a less strategic
understanding of globalization. India’s decision not to accede to the RCEP
agreement in 2019 was significant in that respect. One important indication
of the changed approach was in its very conceptualization. For the first time,
Indian policymakers started framing the rise of India in terms of an era that is
called the Amrit Kaal. By doing so, they articulate a thinking that is more
long-term, comprehensive and transformational. And the fact is that the
achievements of the last decade justify such a view point.
There is no shortage of indices that would point to the progress of recent
years. And these do not in any way deny the magnitude of challenges that still
confront India. But among them, perhaps it is worth focussing on those that
are directly relevant to India’s rise in the international system. A starting
point is the steep decline in poverty, notable not only because it is among the
more extreme problems facing India but also as it represents a wider drag on
society. Equally important is the Indian middle class, which is expected to
double during the Amrit Kaal, that is, by 2047. The world is surely assessing
these developments, both from contribution and consumption perspectives.
As it studies the quality of India’s human resources, it would also note major
expansion of universities, medical and nursing colleges and engineering and
technical skills. Indeed, there is a change underway in the approaches to
education and skill development that are designed to make them more world-
friendly. The transformation in infrastructure is also underway, reflected in
expansion of highways, railways, airports and digital networks. India is no
longer seen as just limited to services. Even at home, energetic digital
delivery has revolutionized governance and helped prepare the ground for
deeper participation in a range of domains.
By raising the definition of basic amenities and, more importantly,
delivering on them, India is rapidly changing the quality of life of one-sixth
of the world. Depending on the country concerned, it is perceived by them as
an innovator, producer, contributor or exemplar. Each one of these attributes
make it a more attractive partner in international relations.
Developing the boldness and fortitude to advance one’s prospects is
almost as hard as growing actual capabilities. Learning to compete at
increasingly higher levels does require confident leadership and systemic
changes. As stakes get higher, it is also necessary to outthink competitors and
outlast mindgames. Each phase in a power’s rise has different benchmarks
and changing peer groups. Adjusting our ambitions and calculations
constantly will never be easy. In India’s case, we have steadily outgrown the
hyphenation with Pakistan and are being increasingly perceived as sui
generis.
A part of the challenge is also to strike the right understandings on the
optimal terms with the most appropriate partners. How to get the give-and-
take right is crucial. These could be in a field of commerce and investment or
indeed in domains like technology and connectivity. There are always
opportunities to leverage if a nation plays to its strengths. Similarly, it has
additional possibilities that could emerge from global demands of reliable
supply, trusted data or critical technologies.
That said, we cannot be oblivious either to structural obstacles created
by a world order devised more than 75 years ago. The heart of the matter is
that in those crucial years, India was either present nominally on the high
table or not there at all. Especially because of what happened to it in 1947,
India consequently operates in a world where the dice is often loaded against
it. Indeed, its rise in the last seven decades is really a story of changing the
terms of engagement with the world, many of which were particularly
adverse when it started this journey.
The problem is not one that can be quantified economically; it is even
more that of assumptions and narratives. The world order consists of
institutions and practices that are often closely interlocked. They determine
what is politically correct and what is not. And because its key players have
not only built an architecture to serve their purpose but still retain the
influence to promote it, a power like India will have to swim upstream for a
long time to come. Among the most formidable currents it has to navigate are
the challenges emanating from ‘freezing the moment’. This is a widely
practised stratagem by hegemonic powers that seek to make permanent the
advantageous elements of a landscape.
At its broadest level, this is visible in the manner in which the outcomes
of 1945 are utilized to define an international hierarchy. The trick obviously
is to imbue a particular moment with enormous significance and, thereafter,
derive continuous benefit from it. Arguments to make the world more
contemporary are rebutted by conflating them with challenging the original
outcome in question. This, however, is but one example of the larger tussle to
maintain or change the world as we know it today. There are many more,
some limited in scope and others more sweeping. They help to create and
maintain frameworks, operate and defend structures and, crucially, establish
and advance narratives. And they succeed to a great degree because global
behaviour is shaped so much by muscle memory. We are all not just creatures
of habits but followers of norms and believers of storylines.
A combination of these factors conceals the vested interests that underpin
the arrangements of the day. It could be the UN and its working, nuclear non-
proliferation, the selective focus on human rights, the equally calculated
balancing of realpolitik and values, as well as the utilization of Cold War
imagery. Particular moments also serve to define the ‘other’ sharply, such as
after the 9/11 attack. So does the evocation of past conflicts, especially the
last World War. For all these reasons, attempts to reshape global debates and
concepts meet with the fiercest resistance. That is something India must
expect and counter.
As a rising power, India encounters freezing the moment in different
formats. It can come up against institutions and practices that do not give it its
due. That is why it is such a strong proponent of reformed multilateralism. It
can shape its approach to other powers, sometimes to our detriment. This
requires confident thinking to create more up-to-date terms of engagement.
On occasion, impactful moments can lead to such strong perceptions that it
puts pressure on policy to adjust. To a considerable degree, that is the case
with Pakistan after the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack. The Indian public clearly
saw the governmental response as weak-kneed and pushed for a change.
There could even be situations when we will want to move on rapidly
beyond an action. That was certainly the case of the Vajpayee government in
reaching out to key partners soon after the 1998 nuclear tests. It is sometimes
the fate of nations to also inherit the concepts and assumptions of others. The
global understanding of India’s place and influence is a relevant example,
one very much shaped by other powers. It is only in recent years that we have
managed to break out, first of the post-Partition hyphenation and then from the
Indian Ocean box. The reaction to an Indo-Pacific presence is, therefore,
only to be expected. One facet of a transformational decade has been to
overcome this natural inclination to be a prisoner of our own history.
The difficulties of the past need not always be an encumbrance. The
creativity of political leaderships is sometimes demonstrated by an ability to
make it an asset in a changed context. In recent years, our nation has seen a
renewed interest in Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose and the Indian National
Army, as well as in those who resisted British colonialism in an earlier era.
The great tribal leader Birsa Munda and the revolutionary Alluri Sitarama
Raju are two such cases. While such figures may not have been entirely
successful in achieving their immediate objectives, their longer-term impact
as inspirational icons is very apparent today. Imageries from history are, in
fact, extremely powerful in articulating aspirations for the future.
Indeed, when we look back at our own record over the last seven
decades, it is still specific events like the conflicts of 1962, 1965, 1971 and
1999 that stand out as milestones. As India goes about its endeavour to
ascend the international hierarchy, it must play well this game of using
narratives and experiences to establish practices and habits as well.
The messaging out of New Delhi has also been far more energetic on key
issues. Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam (the world is one family) conveys a
commitment to international cooperation; ‘Reformed Multilateralism’
underlines the urgency of addressing the effectiveness of the UN; ‘A World
Free of Terror’ underlines a determination to combat this long-standing
threat; ‘Digital for Development’ speaks of how effective it has been as a
governance tool; ‘Mother of Democracy’ is a reminder that our pluralistic
and consultative traditions go back deep in history; and ‘One World One
Health’ is an assertion of the need for timely, effective and non-
discriminatory responses to global health challenges.
Developing our own lexicon, concepts, mechanisms and ideas and
socializing them in world politics is also a testimony to India’s continued
rise. Their unfolding underlines the reality of India’s vigorous participation
in global platforms.
Within India, there will always be lively arguments about the balance
between continuity and change in our foreign policy. That is only to be
expected and, perhaps, in some ways, is even contributory to the emergence
of new ideas. Normally, when it comes to diplomacy, analysis focusses on
how we see the world and all its complications. Sometimes, it is useful to
invert that and reflect on how the world, on its part, could be visualizing
India and the opportunities there.
India’s rise is a relentless exercise where the sensible only pause to take
stock, never to declare victory. Without neglecting the past, it works best
when our eyes are fixed firmly on the horizons and we read the international
situation right as well as fashion our strategies and tactics accordingly. But to
do all this and more, it is essential that Bharat is true to itself, its interests
and its ambitions.
 Chapter 6.
MAKING FRIENDS, INFLUENCING
PEOPLE
Why India Must Create a Global Constituency

I
n its quest to become a leading power, India has to successfully navigate
the two big contradictions of our times, even while steadily enhancing its
comprehensive national power. One is the East–West divide that has been
sharpened by the Ukraine conflict. The other is the North–South gap that has
been aggravated by Covid, debt, climate change as well as food and energy
insecurity. This is on top of the natural compulsion of a rising power to
maximize its friends and minimize its problems. India’s search for ideal
positioning in the global arena may be an unceasing effort. But those with
larger ambitions must definitely develop reliable partners and assured
sources of support. Their endeavour is also to shape the landscape rather
than just operate in it.
The days when India could stir itself episodically while allowing
processes to make their own progress are now behind us. Our interests are
only expanding with time, and so must our activities and profile. The task
before us is to lay the foundations in the Amrit Kaal for India to not only be a
developed nation but also a leading power. That is why Sabka Saath, Sabka
Vikas (working with all for the progress of all) is as relevant in foreign
policy as in the domestic one. After all, diplomacy is all about making
friends and influencing people. And the scope for a country that has a natural
inclination to treat the world as a family (Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam) is
immense in this regard.
In India, the term ‘Rama–Lakshmana’ is popularly used as an expression for describing
closeness between siblings. But transpose this to the domain of global politics and reflect on
its implications. The fact is that every Rama needs a Lakshmana, someone trustworthy and
vigilant who will share both successes and sorrows. At crucial moments, he provided
courage, counselled composure and steadied his principal. When the demon Viradh
kidnapped Sita in Dandakaranya forest, it was Lakshmana who exhorted a shaken Rama to
take swift counter-action. When Rama vented his frustration after Ravana’s more successful
abduction, it was again his brother who narrated how others dealt with misfortune through
patience and fortitude. Thereafter, as Rama lost his cool with the seagod Varuna, who would
not allow him to cross into Lanka, it was Lakshmana who persuaded him not to intimidate the
god more than necessary. How to build close and reliable partnerships is the perennial task of
diplomacy.
Every nation, however large or powerful, needs such sources of support. They may have
a situational salience but the fact is that once established, such relationships have multiple
ways of making themselves valuable. This is obviously a far cry from the normally
transactional nature of international relations. It requires generosity, care, consideration and,
sometimes, even affection. There is even some place for sentiment in world affairs, illustrated
by that adage of blood being thicker than water. The solidarity of shared experiences is no
weak bond either. India opened its heart through Vaccine Maitri, it was a gesture that will stand
it in good stead for a long time. Indeed, as it rises up the global hierarchy of power, the
requirement for reliable friends will grow, not lessen. The broader the footprint and greater the
interests, the more is the importance of Lakshmanas.
The unstinted devotion of another player may be a relative rarity in real life, but significant
enterprises in global history generally require assembling a larger coalition of support. This is
particularly so when the nature and outcome of endeavours are open-ended. As activities are
taking place far away from one’s zone of familiarity, the value of associates goes up
commensurately. This is further enhanced if they bring a particular skill or contribution to the
collective effort. When confronting a larger or unusual opponent, the need for allies and well-
wishers is still more keenly felt. We have seen this even in modern history, whether we think
back to the World Wars, the Gulf War, Afghanistan or even ongoing situations. In the case of
Rama, he was utterly at a loss to even guess how and where his abducted wife could have
been taken. He finally tracked her through the multiple contributions of well-wishers and allies
of various kinds. It does not always take a combat situation for this to be realized. In the
competitive world of international politics, each friend who stands up in a difficult situation is
one to be prized.
The coalition of vanaras that set out in every direction to gather intelligence is an equally
powerful example of such sentiment. It was the force under Prince Angada, which had gone
south, that learnt of Sita being in the gardens of Lanka. Without the army of monkeys, the
bears and the eagles, Rama perhaps could not have got his bearings right. The need to be
situationally aware when making important decisions is evident.
Often, some challenges may be beyond purely national capabilities and the contribution
that well-wishers can make could be invaluable. Sampati’s extraordinary sight is an analogy for
accessing vital information about competitors and adversaries. And when the time came to
cross the oceans, it was Nala, the bridge-building son of Vishwakarma, who provided the
technology solution. Varuna went against his very nature in promising not to wash over the
bridge that Nala built. This was the result of coercion by Rama, who in his anger, had
threatened to dry up the seas if he was not allowed to cross.
Making friends and influencing people does involve a range of motivating factors, from
incentives and flattery to assistance and threats. For most nations, this is an exceptionally
patient and arduous task and may not be as easy as it seems. Generally speaking, it requires
an astute identification of its components and accommodation among competing interests. On
exceptional occasions, there could even be difficult choices made for larger good. At the heart
of one such case is the most debated action of Lord Rama in the epic. In an ongoing battle
between the two sibling monkey chieftains, Vali and Sugriva, Rama intervened to kill the
former. It was, of course, Vali’s destiny to meet his end by divine hands and his own personal
conduct was clearly not above reproach.
But the episode and its consequences offer important insights into undertaking larger
operations. Viewed from a power perspective, Rama favoured the lesser entity, the younger
brother Sugriva, who was earlier ousted from his position. Common sense indicates that the
weaker side is always more welcoming of intervention and even more inclined to tie its
fortunes on a lasting basis. Having gained the services of Sugriva, it was farseeing of Rama to
maintain the unity of the vanaras by taking Vali’s son, Angada, under his personal protection.
Inspiring his allies to act with alacrity was no easy task either. Predictably, Sugriva went back
to a good life in Kishkinda after assuming the throne, and it required Lakshmana’s anger to
remind him of his obligations.
The entire period when the vanara sena (army) is sent in multiple directions is also an
experience of strategic patience for Rama and Lakshmana. The coalition must not just
assemble but be given time to do its work, often at the speed of its less efficient components.
Sometimes, partners may not be able to deliver in time. That was the case for Rama later on
with Pratardana, the king of Kashi, whose promised legions did not arrive in time to join the
battle in Lanka. But it is to Rama’s credit that he publicly acknowledged their intent. In life, there
is always a next time and diplomacy must never foreclose possibilities.

THE PAST AND THE FUTURE

As it goes about its business of rising in the international order, India has to
bear in mind that the world is continuously changing, as indeed are its ties
with various players. In the early years after Independence, we sought to
build a relationship with the West while creating our decisional space. At the
same time, constituencies in the developing world were nurtured by building
on the obvious empathy of post-colonialism. Cooperation with the Socialist
bloc was explored, with tangible outcomes in the economic and security
spheres. As the pressures of the Cold War grew and Sino-US rapprochement
unfolded, it compelled India to double down on its Soviet relationship. A
large part of its difficulties with the West emanated from the preference that
the latter showed for a military-ruled Pakistan.
It was, therefore, natural that the end of the Cold War would lead to
readjustments on India’s part and of the world towards India. These
processes have gained steady momentum in the quarter of the century that has
passed. Their consolidation has been facilitated by the fact that in the last
decade, New Delhi has shed much of the ideological baggage of the past. The
US, in particular, is seen much more as part of the solution than of the
problem. The diplomatic challenges now are one of advancing new
relationships while retaining earlier ones. And, within that overall mix,
assigning the appropriate weightage to specific ones, so that India gets the
optimal results in a world that is under transformation.
Analysing India’s ties with the five permanent members of the UNSC is a
good place to start an assessment of both its record and its prospects. Those
with the US and China are addressed in further chapters.

The UK: A Contemporary Compact

More than any other relationship, India’s ties with the UK carry the burden of
a complex past. The scars of that period are both material and psychological.
The challenge now is to make history work for the future of the relationship,
where comforts and convergences overcome frictions and fissures.
Interestingly, it began as a symbiotic relationship in the immediate
aftermath of India’s independence. Current generations will probably be
astonished at the extent of influence that the UK wielded in India for the next
two decades. In fact, an Indian leadership anxious to stay out of the Cold War
and keep the US at bay actually perceived the UK as its best foil. So much so
that its radical segment even overcame initial reservations about joining the
Commonwealth, believing that a British association would shield them from
American pressure.
The recent success of the movie RRR is a reminder of how strongly
feelings about the colonial era resonate with the Indian public even today. It
is quite natural that there are sensitivities and wariness in the India–UK
relationship that derive from this period. The partitioning of India may have
left its own deep impact thereafter, but the subsequent India–Pakistan
hyphenation clearly gave it even further life. Starting from 1947, when
Pakistan attacked Jammu & Kashmir, the UK was perceived in New Delhi as
being partial to Pakistan. This view, which grew further from the workings of
the UNSC, was aggravated by the position that the UK took in the 1965 and
1971 conflicts. Britain’s Cold War compulsions, the withdrawal from East of
Suez and accession to the EU gradually eroded the proximity of the initial
years. When it came to developments in Afghanistan after 2001, it did not
escape New Delhi’s notice that Great Britain was the strongest advocate of
dealing with the military leadership in Rawalpindi.
From the Indian perspective, whether it was the exercise of the nuclear
option, a security concern like Afghanistan or the politics of the Indian
subcontinent, British diplomacy was understandably viewed with suspicion.
Moreover, as it gradually came into its own, the desire to put the past behind
was also commensurately stronger in Indian politics. Weakening bonds
between the elites as a result of deeper democratization of India accelerated
the process. By the time Brexit arrived, the case for setting new terms of
engagement was apparent.
While the past continues to cast its shadow, the present is not without its
own complications. British politics is often driven by vote-bank
considerations, though not to the extreme extent of Canada. And this has
given space for secessionist forces targeting India to operate from its soil
and misuse its freedoms. Ideological hostility in influential quarters against
the current dispensation in India has also added to irritants. Some are visibly
so resentful of changes in India that they do not wish to understand the reality.
When the UK claims to have a special bond with India, its impact is all the
more.
However, there is also a parallel reality of the two nations cooperating in
a range of domains. This long-standing duality is one of the characteristics of
the ties; whether the UK would follow the US to comprehensively reset it is
the major question. Till now, the UK has lagged behind, but there is growing
consciousness of the distance that this has created with India. Making
adjustments requires introspection on a range of concerns, from political
sensitivities and security issues to export controls and mobility. That this is
no longer the India of the past should be evident by now. Whether it is
replacing British-era legal codes, expressing its cultural beliefs or asserting
the symbolism of Netaji, times are surely changing. Because of the close past
association, it is particularly incumbent on the UK to appreciate the nature of
this transformation.
On the other hand, it is also essential that Indians approach the future of
this partnership more clinically. They must recognize that the UK has served
as an effective gateway for Indian businesses in Europe and that it hosts a
successful diaspora. Its global influence may not be the same, but it is still
very real in parts of the world. In certain domains, British technology and
capabilities are clearly world-class. From an Indian viewpoint, there is a
case for building further on the convergence that the two countries may
currently have. That answer, once both countries put their mind to it, veers in
a positive direction. This is reflected in their agreed 2030 Roadmap, among
others.
Connecting the two countries and peoples can be pursued through
different avenues, including closer political contacts, deeper economic and
financial exchanges, greater skills and education flows, stronger research and
innovation partnerships, and, of course, by nurturing the living bridge.
Underlying this exercise is how we look at the world and grapple with issues
that both nations confront every day.
The UK is a very different polity in the aftermath of Brexit. And some of
these changes are precisely those that can provide impetus to a more
contemporary partnership. Greater national control has allowed the UK to
contemplate an Enhanced Trade Partnership with India. An agreement on a
migration and mobility partnership helps to match demand, demographics and
talent. The UK’s Integrated Review locates it as a Euro-Atlantic actor, but
with an increasing stake in the Indo-Pacific. That makes a compelling
argument for a stronger understanding with India.
From India’s viewpoint, there are many UKs that we seek to engage
simultaneously: the Global Britain, the Atlantic UK, the post-European one,
the City of London, the diaspora one, the innovation and education UK, and,
of course, the strategic one. The internal balance among them has clearly
shifted as a result of Brexit and the global aspect is now much more at the
forefront. While refreshing their ties, India and the UK cannot ignore the
issues carried forward from their history. But their conversation in the future
will necessarily be different. In the final analysis, the true test of a transition
to a new era will be in the ability to work together both on issues of the
Indian subcontinent and the larger global stage.

Russia: A Steady Partnership

The story with Russia (erstwhile USSR) has been very different. A power
that was suspicious of the Indian national movement, often to the point of
being downright hostile, developed increasing shared interests as post-
Independence diplomacy took root. This picked up after 1953–54, especially
once Pakistan joined US-led alliance systems. Many political parties in our
country also viewed the USSR as a progressive force. For an India
increasingly worried about the Western arming of its neighbour, the
relationship was both an insurance policy and an active contributor to our
national strengths. It grew to a level where Russia’s role, then as the USSR,
was critical to a strategic inflection point in the Indian subcontinent in 1971.
The resulting goodwill, combined with a continuing sensitivity to India’s
interests, has kept these ties steady despite global tumult. Even the break-up
of the USSR had limited impact, with the two nations re-discovering their
mutual priority within a decade.
Today, it is this Indian relationship with Russia that is most on the global
radar. In terms of significance, it compares in many respects to that with the
US and China. Its economic content may be less, but for India, it has
enormous strategic and security relevance. The unintended consequences of
an unforeseen conflict, however, have paradoxically hastened some
possibilities long under discussion. As a result, Russia could well emerge as
a primary supplier of resources at the very time that India ramps up its
economic growth and expands such needs.
The irony today about the partnership is that it is the subject of attention
not because it has changed but because it has not. In fact, ties between Russia
and India have been among the steadiest of the major relationships in the
world after the Second World War. Each country has seen ups and downs in
its ties with many other partners. Yet, for a variety of reasons, both have
managed to insulate their own relationship from the volatility of global
events. It appears that the logic of geopolitics combined with the mutuality of
benefits have provided an exceptionally strong ballast to their ties.
If relations have been stable, this is not to say that either nation has
remained static as a polity or even as a society. In the last quarter of a
century, India has grown to emerge as the fifth largest economy, a nuclear
weapon power, a technology centre, a reservoir of global talent and an active
shaper of international debates. Its interests and influence have grown well
beyond the Subcontinent.
Russia has, meanwhile, defined itself more nationally, with the
accompanying changes in orientation and priorities. Its inherent character as
a Eurasian power and its global status make it salient to the world order.
Russia has also demonstrated an ability to influence outcomes across regions
and issues. Its importance in domains like energy, resources and technology
remains noteworthy.
 The last three decades have seen the autonomous evolution of both Russia
and India. They may have forged partnerships with others that may not
always be convergent. Their own bilateral balance and equation have also
developed with time. Yet, there appears to be a continued intersection of
interests built on a legacy of goodwill that shapes their thinking about each
other. What has made a difference is that they have taken great care even in a
changing world not to act in a manner that adversely affects the core interests
of the other. Preserving that is obviously crucial.
Though coming from different histories and geographies, India and Russia
conceptually share a commitment to a multipolar world and have gravitated
towards its establishment as a global modus vivendi. Their understanding of
that may not be exactly the same when applied across geographies. Precisely
because Russia is a Eurasian power, it is essential for India that it
appreciates a multipolar world must have a multipolar Asia at its core. The
operating principle of such a world is the legitimate pursuit of partnerships
without seeking exclusivity. Two nations that have such a strong sense of
independence should have less difficulty in appreciating the intent of the
other. While Russia has stakes in the larger direction of global change, it is
also a polity that has deep interests in the current international architecture.
An important aspect of the future of our ties is the extent to which this
accommodates India’s rise.
Given the history of their ties, Indians would have expectations of
Russian support, including on the reform of the UNSC. The Ukraine conflict
has also led Russia to reassess its traditional focus westwards. Its
consequential shift towards Asia is already visible on the economic front.
For India, that will broaden an engagement that, till now, was almost
exclusively reliant on the triad of military, nuclear and space cooperation.
In the coming years, the focus with Russia can be expected to shift,
capturing its Asian facets more and more. The outlines of that have started to
emerge. It could be connectivity like the International North–South Transport
Corridor or the Chennai–Vladivostok maritime route and greater Indian
involvement in the Russian Far East, or perhaps closer collaboration in
Central Asia and the Arctic. All in all, India–Russia ties are poised for
evolution even as they maintain their trajectory.
In very different ways, the British and Russian relationships evoke
emotions with the Indian public. But policy, while not impervious to
sentiment, is finally driven by empirical facts and a cost–benefit analysis. As
India takes stock of a transforming landscape and seeks to chart its way
forward, adjustments are only to the expected.

France: The Third Way

In contrast to the UK and Russia, France is a relatively newer diplomatic
discovery, one whose colonial past has receded more in public
consciousness. The minimal overhang of history offers it opportunities, just
as its focus encourages growth of select domains.
For two decades now, this relationship has been steadily advancing, free
from surprises and shifts triggered by external factors. The two nations not
only share values and beliefs but put considerable emphasis on building
national capabilities. Both of them navigated the Cold War era trying to
maximize their strategic space. In modern times, they have developed strong
convergences that go back to the 1950s. Since then, succeeding generations
of French platforms and equipment have been an integral part of the Indian
military force. India, therefore, has good reasons to see it as a major partner
for its national security.
France was also an important influence in the development of India’s
strategic thinking, especially its nuclear-force posture. Indeed, the very
concept of credible minimum deterrence was derived from the learnings of
the French experience. Not just that, after the 1998 nuclear tests, this nation
was the first nuclear power to show an understanding of our strategic
compulsions. So, it was no surprise that PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee made
Paris his first bilateral stop after the nuclear tests. Along with President
Jacques Chirac, he launched the strategic partnership between our two
countries that still serves us well till today. French support played an
important role in India getting an exemption from the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) in 2008 to resume international cooperation in civil nuclear
energy.
In the UNSC and other international forums, where competing and
complex sets of interests affect choices, France has been a consistent partner.
Our synergies have enabled us, for example, to be more effective in
mobilizing UN action against terrorism and terrorist groups. France has also
been a forthright supporter of India’s case for permanent membership of the
UNSC.
 In the past few years, the uncertainties and disequilibrium of a world in
transition have encouraged a stronger sense of common strategic purpose.
Among the current priorities, one is to cooperate more closely in the Indo-
Pacific, where India is in the middle and France present at its bookends. It is
revealing that the two nations have entered into trilaterals with Australia and
the UAE recently.
For India, in recent years, ties with France fit the challenge of ‘right-
sizing’ its crucial partners. A nation that espouses the Third Way also holds
an intuitive appeal to an independent-minded India. Its autonomy and self-
reliance resonate strongly, as does its reticence on bringing in larger
concerns. Once the two nations consciously decided to make this a
foundation, their collaboration grew steadily over multiple regimes. As a
result, in the pursuit of its larger aspirations, India has found in France
another significant player committed to multipolarity.
However, while the long-standing insistence by both India and France to
maintain their decisional freedom may produce convergences, each will have
its own perspective. After all, they are located in very different geographies
that will naturally decide both priorities and interests.
Like every other relationship, this one, too, will require assiduous
tending. What should give most cause for optimism is that they have actually
set out a perspective of cooperation for Horizon 2047.
The P-3 examples of the UK, Russia and France may be contrasting, but
they do bring out the intrinsic value of the relationships. The fact is that
permanent members of the UNSC have an importance much beyond that body.
Nurturing these ties is, therefore, all the more important as India’s interests
unfold across the world.

RESETTING WITH THE WEST

Since international relations is simultaneously a collective and national

activity, it is perhaps worthwhile to assess India’s approach to the West as a
whole. Understandably, some of that remains coloured by the experience of
colonialism. That said, it is also a fact that this era has facilitated elite
bonding to a considerable degree.
The one Western country that could have escaped the colonial taint was
the US. It, however, blotted its copybook in India by strongly aligning with
the Pakistani military and, thereafter, with China. These negatives were
nevertheless set off against the substantive economic, technological and
societal linkages that were built up after India’s independence. Interestingly,
even the political frictions were sometimes mitigated by circumstances. India
may not have always been treated as a friend but was not regarded as a foe
either.
The very same nations that evoked anxiety through their geopolitics were
the ones that stepped forward after the 1962 conflict with China. Their
contribution to infrastructure creation and agricultural self-sufficiency also
cannot be underestimated. Our stance towards the Western bloc as a whole
was influenced by the totality of these experiences and considerations.
Looking back, it is telling that for the first few decades, India’s preferred
partners in the Anglosphere were the UK and Canada. Indeed, much of its
early international forays took place in tandem with them, the mediations on
Korea and Vietnam being prominent examples. The US was, of course, an
overwhelming presence, but one long regarded with suspicion due to our
ideological proclivities as much as strategic calculations.
A measurement of the distance that India’s foreign policy has travelled
over 75 years is also in changed attitudes in this respect. The more we got
beyond the romanticism of the early years and viewed the world through the
lens of hard realities, the greater was the merit that was discovered in
partners hitherto kept at a distance. This was accelerated when India started
looking eastwards and developing an Indo-Pacific agenda. As a result, it is
now the US and Australia that are assessed as having critical value,
including at the Quad. If there is a pointer here, it is that the alignment of
geopolitical outlook is so central to the development of ties. Indo-Pacific
strategies now offer a contemporary pathway in that regard.
Challenges, however, are not with just individual nations. India’s
relationship with the West as a whole needs an objective evaluation. In many
ways, this group is a natural partner because its members share the attributes
of a pluralistic society, democratic polity and market economy. Yet, this very
commonness can also create its own frictions. The continuing hegemonism
visible in many quarters in the West leads to an excessive advocacy of their
particular practices and convictions. Often, it is lost on them that others have
different traditions, practices and yardsticks, and that the West itself would
not necessarily come out well if they were evaluated objectively and
publicly. Moreover, these attitudes do not stop at advocacy and extend to
promoting an actionable agenda as well. That comes into conflict with post-
colonial polities like India, which are reasserting their identities and
standing their ground.
There are developmental frictions as well, as those more advanced seek
to protect their leads. This is evident in the domains of trade, climate, patents
and cross-border transactions, among others. At the heart of the contestation
with the West is the tension between those who have dominated for long and
others who now seek to challenge. The promotion of a rules-based order is
regularly advocated, just as respect for the UN Charter is frequently invoked.
But for all the talk, it is still largely Western nations that shape the agenda
and define the norms. A fairer and less selective application of rules in
various domains is, therefore, very much part of rebalancing. If global
conversations have become more animated of late, much of it emanates from
the courage to call out what is unacceptable. But for all these differences, the
fact remains that those Asian nations have progressed fastest who have done
so in partnership with the West.
For India, there are lessons to be learnt from how East and Southeast
Asian nations leveraged geopolitics to accelerate national development. This
is particularly relevant in our contemporary era of polarization. After all, no
relationship is conducted without context, and the immediate one must inform
India’s choices even more than the distant.
In the discourses of Delhi, the term ‘strategic autonomy’ is usually
defined as keeping a distance from the West, especially the US. The irony is
that this has led us instead to develop deep dependencies elsewhere. The
same logic applied in the case of non-alignment too. As we now move into a
capable and confident era, it is important that our outlook is determined more
by our interests and less by our insecurities.
Going by common sense, Indians must ask themselves which geographies
give better access to their products and talents. As a long-term trend, there is
also a fit between Western demand and Indian demographics that will help
shape the global knowledge economy. Political choices, therefore, should not
be divorced from those of economics, sociology or culture. There may be a
process of subtle contestation between India and a world largely shaped by
the West. Some of that may also show up in hedging, a phenomenon well
established in the political domain. But here too, there are good reasons to be
discerning and deliberate, rather than allow an attitude to become a strategy.
India may be non-West but must realize that there is little profit in being anti-
West.
 Certainly, a calculation to broaden partners and ensure maximum benefits
is an obvious one. But increasingly, in a tech-driven world, not all choices
can be straddled or sidestepped. This is particularly so in respect of the
digital domain and critical and emerging technologies. And while engaged in
that exercise, the global scenario itself must also be clinically assessed from
our perspective. Convergences and contradictions can be systemic in certain
domains.
Developing affinities with the West will definitely pay well in the era of
the knowledge economy. It is, therefore, crucial that we approach the larger
issue as much with our heads as with our hearts. Eventually, new compacts
will come into being that could more accurately reflect rebalancing and
multipolarity.
The attention that the Modi government has devoted to building ties with
Europe is a significant departure from the passivity of the preceding decades.
Earlier, Indian diplomacy mostly concentrated on larger states, especially the
UK, France and Germany. This continues to a certain degree, but there is now
a more sustained focus on the EU as a collective body, and also sub-regions
and smaller states. Regular India–EU summits have done much to change the
atmosphere, leading to the resumption of FTA negotiations.
For India, Germany is clearly the account where there is visible space for
further growth. Till now, much of that country’s attention has been on other
parts of Asia. That could well change somewhat in the light of new strategic
circumstances. Indeed, it is the progress with the India–Germany relationship
which could make the difference with that of the EU as a whole.
Among the sub-regions, the Nordic engagement has been particularly
prominent, delivering results in the political and economic domains. The
Mediterranean one, including Italy and Greece, has been less collective but
still enthusiastic and impactful. It could acquire a new significance in the
context of IMEC. The MMPA with Portugal was particularly timely in
catalysing the rest of the EU.
Reinforcing relations with Central and Eastern Europe remains a work in
progress, and different formats are being explored. Indian energies have also
been expended in the Baltic and the Caucasus, including through the opening
of embassies.
Handling the East–West contradiction is today one of the major
challenges for Indian diplomacy. But the East is not a simple proposition for
India. After the first decade of Independence, that has never been India’s
preference. Its relationship with Russia has been qualitatively different from
its ties with China. It is clearly not helpful for India if the two are perceived
to be in the same basket. From time to time, efforts have been made to
advance such an analysis and India, on its part, has refused to be drawn in.
There has been no competitive element at all in its relationship with Russia.
On the contrary, it is the continuous consideration that the two countries have
extended to each other that has been the foundation of their partnership.
Where China is concerned, it is a very different story, in part due to the
unresolved boundary question. Therefore, India’s geopolitical posture will
not be amenable to the extrapolation of the Indo-Pacific into Europe, and it is
essential that we get the West to understand this logic of strategy.
While countries are naturally impelled by their national interest, it is also
true that this positioning can help to mitigate global frictions when the time
comes. This has been already evident in the workings of the G20 and some
other international platforms. Indeed, it could even be asserted that calming
the global discourse and stabilizing the global economy is in itself a
contribution to common good.

THE AFRICAN SOLIDARITY

When PM Modi announced at the New Delhi G20 Summit the membership of
the AU in that body, it was a very special moment for India–Africa ties. A
year before, he had made that commitment in Bali and, thereafter, took it up
personally and seriously with other G20 leaders. To many African countries,
it was natural that India should step forward and advance their cause.
Yet, the fact remains that the story of India–Africa relations is a relatively
uncommented one. It is often forgotten that there is a really long history of
contacts, whether fostered by the dhow or the caravan. The period of Western
colonialism added its own texture, creating the beginnings of an Indian
diaspora in that continent. The subsequent independence struggles have
generated a unique solidarity that is still on display in global forums.
As with many other regions, what was a steady but unremarkable
relationship got a quantum jump due to PM Modi’s personal interest. Perhaps
this also reflected the extensive contacts that his home state of Gujarat had
with this region. A clear approach to cooperation with the continent was
articulated by him in July 2018 in an address to the Ugandan Parliament. Its
essence was that India would respond to Africa’s priorities, demands and
needs rather than unilaterally propose an agenda. Since 2014, there have
been 34 outgoing visits by the Indian president, vice president and PM to
Africa, and more than a hundred incoming ones at the same level. The IAFS
of 2015 laid out particularly ambitious targets for cooperation.
A decade later, despite the interruption by Covid, much of that was
agreed upon has been delivered in terms of projects, capabilities, training
and exchanges. Apart from practical collaboration, the solidarity with Africa
is best expressed by how strongly India has pushed for its membership of the
G20.
To date, India has done about 200 projects in Africa, with 65 more under
execution and 81 in the works. Many of these projects were the first of their
kind in Africa. Some are truly iconic in nature such as the Tema–Mpakadan
Railway and Presidential Palace in Ghana, National Assembly building in
Gambia, the Rivatex textile factory in Kenya, the Metro Express project in
Mauritius and the Mahatma Gandhi International Convention Centre in Niger.
The narrative in other related domains has also been encouraging. More
than 40,000 scholarships have been extended since the last IAFS meeting. A
pan-Africa e-network launched a decade ago is supplemented by the e-
VidyaBharti and e-ArogyaBharti initiatives on distant education and health
respectively. We are today Africa’s fourth-largest trade partner and fifth-
largest investor. India’s contribution of vaccines, medicines and equipment
was particularly crucial during the Covid pandemic. The discussion is
increasingly now on digital delivery, green growth and affordable health as
the three themes of future development collaboration.

THE BRIDGES NOT TOO FAR

While Africa has been the main focus of lines of credit and grant assistance,
India’s growing footprint in Latin America is also worth noting. From being
perceived as a faraway destination, that continent is gaining salience as a
supplier of energy, natural resources and food. Its expanding middle class are
natural customers for Indian products in pharmaceuticals and vehicles. The
Indian IT industry is also firmly entrenched in the Latin American market. If
the overall trade turnover is growing so rapidly, then the seriousness of our
presence cannot be ignored. Currently, India is among the top five trade
partners of both Brazil and Argentina. Indian investments are growing apace
in diverse sectors, matching the strengthening political collaboration. In the
task of making friends and influencing people, Latin America is no longer a
bridge too far.
The example of Pacific Islands is a reflection of how much India’s reach
has extended in the last decade. But it is equally a reminder of what awaits
it: a more intensified engagement with regions that are not proximate. Within
this period, India has undertaken three summit-level meetings with Pacific
Island countries, the most recent being in 2023 in Papua New Guinea. While
the warmth of that reception got public attention, what is also important to
appreciate is a development agenda that is demand-driven. Much of it
focussed on the acute health priorities of the Pacific region. Indian
commitments included a super-speciality hospital in Fiji, Jaipur Foot camps,
dialysis units and sea ambulances in all member states and centres for supply
of cost-effective pharmaceuticals. The digital deficit was also sought to be
bridged by creating an IT hub in Papua New Guinea. A warehouse to host
geo-spatial data sets was launched, alongside a centre for sustainable coastal
and ocean research. Ongoing endeavours at solarization and community skill-
building will also be taken forward.
Many Pacific nations were vocally appreciative of Indian assistance
during the Covid pandemic, and all of them clearly saw merit in its climate-
action initiatives. That Indian calculations have started to focus on a region
where there were previously only tenuous contacts obviously speaks of an
expanding horizon. But it also underlines how integrated global politics has
now become and the importance of extending one’s hand generously.
In a different quarter of the world, a similar story has begun to unfold in
respect of the Caribbean Community, where there is a significant diaspora as
well. Here again, a long-standing but low-key relationship is being energized
through development projects, larger investments, enhanced trade and
focussed capacity building. Enabling this through a politically-led framework
is also beginning to yield results. The Covid pandemic provided an
opportunity for India to display solidarity in a manner that will resonate for
long.

NEIGHBOURHOOD: TRULY FIRST

Even as it spreads its wings, a rising India must remain focussed on its
immediate neighbourhood and the extended one. The current decade has seen
a radical improvement in India’s linkages as a result of the Neighbourhood
First policy. Whether it is rail, road, air or waterway connectivity; supply of
energy; restoration of heritage; construction of housing; or expansion of
capacities, India has demonstrated the value of its friendship. Neighbours are
increasingly realizing that India can be a source of prosperity for them as
well. In difficult times, especially during Covid, their well-being was greatly
enhanced by contributions from India. Those who faced serious balance of
payments crisis, like Sri Lanka, could also turn to India for support. As a
result, the sense of regional togetherness has grown steadily.
That has also been the case with the regions a little more extended from
India. ASEAN has discovered in India a firm advocate of its centrality and
cohesion. The agenda of cooperation has widened to cover connectivity,
development assistance, research and education, as well as security. The
Gulf has seen a degree of attention that has been missing for the last four
decades. The stresses of the Covid period have only intensified this growing
closeness. The levels of investment, trade and strategic collaboration have
improved markedly.
With Central Asia, too, the template of comprehensive engagement
announced in 2022 has opened up possibilities in a wide range of domains.
Indian capacities and partners are being explored with a much greater sense
of enthusiasm.
As for the island neighbours of the Indian Ocean, they have seen India
come through in both difficult and routine times. The overall picture that
emerges is now of an India that is more engaged, more responsible, more
contributive and, therefore, more reliable.

GLOBAL SOUTH AND GLOBAL GOOD

As it ascends the international hierarchy, India speaks not just for itself but
for a larger Global South constituency as well. The last few years have been
particularly tough on developing countries. The impact of Covid was much
harder, whether in terms of health accessibility or affordability. That they
were then subjected to travel restraints added insult to injury. Already fragile
economies reeled under the weight of lockdowns and disruptions, made
worse by growing debt and declining trade. The knock-on effects of the
Ukraine conflict have added to the woes, especially when it comes to 3F
prices. In many regions, terrorism has been endemic along with its economic
costs. Developing societies are also more vulnerable to extreme climate
events that we are witnessing with greater frequency. Whether it is the 2030
Agenda or climate commitments, there is growing concern about the ability to
sustain progress.
In all of this, India is widely perceived to be an exemplar in many areas.
Developing countries also expect a nation like India to articulate their
concerns in forums where they may not be present. For India, this is both a
moral responsibility as well as an expression of global strategy. After all, the
re-balancing process will extend beyond its current beneficiaries, and India
is well served by investing deeply in the Global South.
There are also occasions when friends are won and opinions influenced
by doing greater good. Some of it again may be directly relevant to national
interest. But there is more expected of India as its capabilities grow. In
recent years, we have been effective in providing succour in situations
ranging from the Türkiye and Nepal earthquakes and Yemen civil war to
mudslides in Sri Lanka and floods in Mozambique. The Covid period too
saw intensification in international collaboration, be it the Vaccine Maitri for
100 partners, supply of medicines or equipment to 150 countries, or indeed
the deployment of Indian personnel in the Maldives, Mauritius, Madagascar,
Seychelles, Comoros and Kuwait.
Beyond emergency situations, however, India can help make the world
safer and more secure by contributing to the well-being of the global
commons. This could take the form of the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative
(IPOI) that India announced at the East Asia Summit in 2019. This has since
gathered momentum with a growing list of partnering nations. It could be the
Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), which
will focus on challenges like illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU)
fishing. Or indeed the Quad itself, which has taken on responsibilities
ranging from collaborative connectivity and pandemic response to emerging
and critical technologies. There are also practical examples of demonstrating
climate action in which India has played a crucial role. The same spirit
drives India’s championing of the International Year of Millets. This could
have substantial implications for food security and greener agriculture,
especially for Africa.
Many elements of the logic that drives India’s engagement with Africa
also apply to its larger approach to the Global South. There is a broad
message of empathy and solidarity, but their expressions could be specific to
the region or the country involved. It is visible in multilateral forums through
platforms like the G-77, Non-Aligned Movement or the L.69 Group. With
Small Island Developing States, this is evident in development projects,
renewable energy spread and disaster resilience efforts.
At a time when much of the world has fallen back to a nationalism of an
earlier era, enlightened Indian interests dictate that it puts even greater
emphasis on internationalism. This is made easier by the fact that in Indian
tradition, there has never been tension between the two. The presidency of
the G20 provides just the right platform for this message to be driven home.
It is not just that important bilateral relations have started to get the
attention that they long deserved. There are also more innovative group
engagements at various levels. In the immediate and extended neighbourhood,
we can see that in the East Asia Summit platforms, Bay of Bengal Initiative
for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Indian
Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and a
Central Asia collective engagement. Beyond that, there are the IAFS, the
Arab League dialogue, the SCO, the Pacific Islands Forum, the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) and Community of Latin American and Caribbean
States (CELAC). Dealings with Europe have acquired a new intensity, not
just with the EU but also with constituent members like the Nordic countries
or the Slavkov format. The Commonwealth remains a long-standing
commitment while the G20 has evolved into a growing priority. All of these
are backed up by a plethora of ad hoc arrangements, like the BRICS, RIC,
IBSA, Quad, I2U2 and multiple trilaterals. In addition, there are some key
bilaterals and certain specific regions that will determine the smoothness of
India’s rise.
India has now entered a new phase of a multi-vector engagement that
seeks to maximize outcomes and benefits. Its results have heightened its
profile and changed its image. As a consequence, it is today perceived as a
source of ideas, a champion of causes, a driver of initiatives and an advocate
of consensus. No country or region is now seen as irrelevant to India’s global
calculus. Each of these examples highlights the importance of making friends
and influencing people. This generous, intensive and enlightened engagement
with the world is key to Bharat’s journey towards becoming a leading power.
 Chapter 7.
QUAD: A GROUPING FORETOLD
When Common Good Requires Fresh Thinking

T
he importance of the Indo-Pacific as a theatre and the Quad as a
diplomatic platform is increasingly being recognized. Some may be
interested in their novelty; others may think of them as real global
change that is underway. Understandably, they have been the subject of
debate and, in some quarters, even of polemics. Both subjects predate the
Covid pandemic but have been shaped by it. We intuitively know that it has
taken considerable diplomatic energy and determination to realize them.
With its meetings raised to a summit level, the Quad is no longer a
bureaucratic mechanism but, instead, a gathering key to national interests. As
we contemplate how this came about so rapidly, the more perceptive would
appreciate that these were developments just waiting to happen. Indeed, this
is a tale of a grouping foretold. But even for that to happen, it required global
trends to intersect with strategic clarity and bold leadership. A steady course
was equally important as the understandable resistance to a break from the
past also unfolded.

After Lord Rama was sent into a forest exile on the eve of his coronation, he thereafter met up
with his half-brother Bharata, in whose favour that decision was made. Their meeting (known
famously as Bharata Milap) is, of course, a favourite subject for artistic and cultural depiction in
the ages since. The hunter-king Guha, on whose lands this encounter takes place, observed
the gathering of the four brothers (as the twins Lakshmana and Shatrugana were also there).
He marvelled that despite each having their own interests and perspectives, they displayed
very visible affection towards each other. It was not that there were no differences or tensions
amongst them. Lakshmana, in particular, was deeply aggrieved at the invoking of the boons by
Bharata’s mother Kaikeyi and that continued to influence his outlook.
 But once they come together, the distrust that would be natural in other circumstances
was dissipated by their innate bonding. They realized, too, that their collective solidarity had a
larger purpose because it resonated throughout the kingdom and allowed them to render their
expected service. The ability of those who share values and beliefs to come together for
greater good should, therefore, never be underestimated. Particularly once they have learnt to
accommodate differences and appreciate a larger purpose, the groundwork is laid for a lasting
convergence.
If we are now to consider the campaign underway to recover Queen Sita, Lord Rama
brought together a diverse group of players to advance a shared objective. Naturally, the other
side made all efforts to sow dissension among this differentiated group. In this particular case,
Ravana sent the sorcerer Suka to create discord between monkeys and men. However, Suka
failed to achieve his objective, as his insinuations that men do not treat other creatures fairly
was strongly rebutted by the monkeys. In fact, his efforts end up counterproductively, bringing
into open the conflict of interests of monkeys and demons in the forests that they inhabit
together.
Ravana made another attempt with the monkey-prince Angada, invoking what he claimed
was a deep friendship with his father Vali. He sought to exploit what would normally be a
grudge, since Lord Rama had killed Angada’s father. This too failed, as much a result of self-
awareness on the prince’s part as of the mutual confidence that was steadily encouraged by
Rama. In its own way, the Ramayana is also a tale of the power of comfort and convergence
as it is of the importance of global good.

THE CHANGING BIG PICTURE

In many ways, I bear personal testimony to the evolution of the Quad. This
goes back to 2005–06 as witness to the early efforts to develop it that were
particularly driven by Japan. After the 2007 effort, many of us shared the
disappointment of an aborted venture. It was, however, typical of an era of
ambivalence. A decade later, we were now in a position to both assess the
changed geopolitical landscape and learn from the lessons of the past. A
meeting at the Foreign Secretary’s level in New York in 2017 was a signal
that our leaderships had decided to give a new life to an old idea. The
difference was also that Quad members now had greater clarity about global
deficits and a stronger resolve to contribute. This was probably true of all
but most marked in the case of India.
By 2019, the consensus was developing that the time had come to raise
the group to a political level. I now had the privilege of participating as the
EAM. The 2020 meeting of the Quad foreign ministers in Japan was
particularly significant, taking place as it did in the midst of Covid. Just
when the professional pessimists were beginning to pronounce on its
prospects again, the logic of strategy asserted itself in 2021. The shared
desire to ensure a safer global commons and strengthen Indo-Pacific stability
was appreciated at the highest levels of the four governments. The practice of
holding summits of Quad leaders took off, developing rapidly in the coming
years. Clearly, the Quad has now come of age.
In the bigger picture, the Quad certainly represents an example of the
direction in which the world is currently moving. But to see only the outcome
and remain oblivious to the reasons that drove it would be to assume that
major developments happen out of the blue, which, of course, they don’t.
The truth is that a large part of the explanation lies in the corrections that
Indian foreign policy made after the Cold War. The changes in its strategic
calculations allowed three major relationships, those with the US, Japan and
Australia, to unfold more naturally and fully. This journey was not without its
issues, India’s own nuclear posture and economic positions, as well as the
priority given by the others to Pakistan among them. When events unfolded,
additional incentives for relationship-building appeared. Concern for
regional stability and cooperation on global issues acquired greater salience.
The last three decades also brought out the importance of values in
international relations. The convergence of these major relationships on the
critical challenges of our time was inevitable. And it is the resulting fusion
that we now know as the Quad.
Those who ponder about the changes in the Indo-Pacific geography might
find it instructive to compare them to developments in Europe three decades
ago. It is something of a paradox that even though Asia has been more
dynamic than Europe, its regional architecture is far more conservative. Part
of the explanation lies in the fact that Europe was very much at the heart of
the Cold War and felt its termination more directly. The fall of the Berlin
Wall opened up the ground for strategic experimentation that has led to the
expanded EU as we know it now.
In contrast, there was no such seminal development in Asia. On the
contrary, this was an era of steady economic progress and an accompanying
political stasis. Moreover, the region had a much vaster expanse with greater
diversity and a less collective persona than Europe. In fact, there were
distinct sub-regions, such as Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, the Indian
subcontinent and Oceania, each with their particular characteristics and
history.
 Prosperity also unfolded at a differential pace, both between and within
these sub-regions. Till recently, they did not perceive an overarching
scenario that required a shared response. To the extent that when they needed
an agreed meeting point, it was provided by ASEAN-driven platforms. Most
importantly, the deep underpinning to the larger stability provided by a
pervasive presence of American power has helped to keep the theatre steady
till now. It is the revisiting of many of these assumptions and attitudes now
that has started to shape the emergence of the Indo-Pacific.
To begin with, there is the reality of the repositioning of the US. Some of
it may be reflected in its changed resources and commitments, but there is
also the relative growth of competitors and the increasing complexity of
challenges. Both the landscape and the tasking demand a response that cannot
be the same as before. Call it ‘America First’ or a foreign policy for the
middle class, there is widespread recognition of a new era. Where the
differences lie within the US are in respect of the vision, attitude and
strategy. These are not just divergent but very consequential in their impact
on the rest of the world.
The US is undeniably the premier power of our times and will remain so.
Indeed, such is its centrality to the current order that be it an ally, a
competitor, the agnostic or the undecided, none of us can really be indifferent
to its posture. There are different ways by which the US is coming to terms
with its constraints and its challenges. And, as we have all seen since 2008,
that has not exactly followed a predictable path. Some of the US’s answers
lie in reprioritizing; some in a more mobile and affordable footprint; and
some perhaps in more tools of influence. Building a technology and financial
edge has long worked for it and maintaining that against stiffer competition
will be another national response. Where the US, as an entrenched power, is
understandably struggling is in respect of new manifestations of exerting
influence and wielding power. As an open society, it is not easy to deal with
rivals with command polities. It not only has inherent vulnerabilities but also
structural constraints while practising these contemporary forms of
competition.
But what is important to recognize is that in its own unique way, the
American polity is going through a serious introspection. That could well
result in a different method of engaging the world. Among its policy changes
are a greater emphasis on burden sharing and openness to partners beyond
established relationships. Its search for global solutions leads it to
contemplate a new form of plurilateralism.
The second big driver of the changes we see around us is, of course, the
growth of Chinese power. There are three autonomous aspects to this
phenomenon that need considered analysis. The first is the enormous
expansion of Chinese capabilities in virtually every field. The second is a
projection pattern that changed beginning with 2009 and, more vigorously,
after 2012. The third, and this was particularly apparent during the pandemic,
is China’s deep relevance to the global economy. These trends obviously
cannot be viewed in isolation and must also be seen in terms of their
implications for others. They have propelled global economic and strategic
rebalancing, that too in a radical manner.
The US, as the dominant power of the day, is the most affected on both
scores. Equally, the changes have had an influence on the rules and practices
of the current order, management of the global commons and on the nature of
world politics itself. None of that is surprising given that the combined
import of these developments has been multiplied by their focussed
leveraging for strategic purposes. That seamlessness exhibited abroad by
China is a reflection of both a tightly integrated worldview and its domestic
outlook.
So, let us be clear that this is not just about the rise of simply another
power, however major. We have entered a new phase in international
relations and the full impact of China’s re-emergence will be felt more than
those of major powers before it. And naturally, the reverberations are
strongest in its immediate vicinity.
These developments centring on the US and China are largely responsible
for the concept of the Indo-Pacific taking root so rapidly. They have
fundamentally shaken the old order but not yet created a new one. The region
has come to grudgingly appreciate that it can neither be insulated from their
relationship nor indeed indifferent to what it portends for global goods. What
this has in common with a very dissimilar situation in Europe a generation
ago is that sharp geopolitical changes are redefining the very contours of the
landscape. In Europe, it happened when American power was at its peak,
encouraging a generosity that overcame the cautions of that continent’s
history. In the Indo-Pacific, it is a very different story, where it is the relative
limitations of American abilities that has triggered a rethinking on the part of
all parties.
 Both, in their own ways, have encouraged a greater sense of collectivism.
It was also inevitable that such a significant transformation in the relative
weight, influence and behaviour of players should lead to a re-imagining of
the arena itself. The irony is that those who are projected as taking the lead
are actually coming to terms with a scenario that the fortunes of others have
helped create.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACT EAST

There is more than adequate evidence of how integrated economic and

cultural activities have been between the Indian and the Pacific oceans in
history. By its very nature, the maritime domain supersedes artificial barriers
and manmade lines. Whether it is trade or faith, mobility or practices,
monuments or relationships, we know that the energies of its community
traversed the waters over the ages with great comfort.
Assigning labels and restricting activities is a relatively modern
phenomenon. In this particular case, the sharp differentiation within the Indo-
Pacific was very much the result of the 1945 outcomes. In fact, it has a
specific American signature to it that is highlighted by the milestones of its
preoccupations in the Far East. Among them are the Second World War itself,
the revolution in China, the Korean War, the revival of Japan and the Vietnam
War.
As a result, it was quickly forgotten that much of what happened in that
theatre was actually driven by forces residing in the Indian Ocean. To that
extent, there is again a similarity to the Europe of the previous era. The
interests of one great power distort the entire landscape and create concepts
for its convenience. But here, too, the wheel of history has started to turn, and
the old normal is reasserting itself.
The Indo-Pacific debate has, on occasion, been marked by charges of
Cold War thinking. In fact, the truth is the very opposite. That is not
surprising given that such rhetoric comes from the very quarters who seek to
freeze the advantages of 1945. The Indo-Pacific suggests integration and
plurality; its denial means division and dominance. And criticism is really
meant to advance classic Cold War goals of constraining freedom of choice
and exerting pressure to conform. In fact, to see the Indo-Pacific in binary
terms when the interests of many are involved is a dead giveaway. The
Indian Ocean may have been relegated to being a strategic backwater for
seven decades after the Second World War. But today, it is not only a critical
global lifeline but one smoothly fusing into the waters of the Pacific. The
actions of the major powers active in the Indo-Pacific speak volumes of their
integrated vision. So, if we judge nations by what they do rather than what
they preach, the picture is quite clear.
At the end of the day, the compulsions of interdependence and
interpenetration have triumphed over outdated definitions. Concerns about
the well-being of the global commons were also a factor. Contemporary
challenges required like-minded nations to work together, especially once the
US acknowledged the difficulties of going alone. The Indo-Pacific, in that
sense, represents the reality of globalization as much as it does the results of
rebalancing.
A significant contribution to the change in landscape has been made by
India’s Act East policy. Three decades ago, India adopted a more open
economic model that helped forge closer ties with the ASEAN and Northeast
Asia. In due course, this opening acquired other dimensions, including those
of connectivity, security, education and societal exchanges. The domains of
activity may be different, but starting from the 1990s, India’s ties with
ASEAN, Japan, South Korea and China have developed far greater substance
and, consequently, higher priority. Australia was a subsequent happening, but
political and security convergences allowed this relationship to play catch-
up.
What began for India as a solution for an economic crisis has finally
ended up as a strategic correction. Today, India trades with, travels to and
interacts with the East much more than it has done since its independence.
Here, too, there is a falling back to history as there is a long tradition of
Indian maritime activity and presence, going all the way up to the Fujian
coast of China. Those who have been to the temples of Angkor Wat,
Borobudur or My Son will certainly attest to these linkages.
As we consider the emerging Indo-Pacific, its policy consequences
obviously drive the strategic debate. From India’s perspective, its embedding
in ASEAN-led structures over decades has created a regular and comfortable
interface with all the players. In fact, as India’s vistas kept broadening
eastwards, economic stakes were supplemented by political and security
relationships with those partners that nursed common interests. It could be a
global forum like the G-20 or a regional one like the IORA, all of them
provided additional opportunities for greater socialization. Even otherwise,
those with a similar outlook and shared values tend to congregate together.
But when the entire region grapples with new issues and different capacities,
then those inclinations become stronger.
At the heart of the Quad, however, is a level of comfort generated by a
marked improvement in multiple sets of relationships. This is enhanced by a
stronger sense of common purpose in the face of regional and global
challenges. Obviously, the collective ease is based on shared interests and
some similar characteristics. But all of this also happened because the
resistance to reforming international organizations and limitations of regional
ones compelled a search for practical solutions. They, in essence, made the
case for the Quad.

A TALE OF THREE TIES

The origins of the Quad actually go back to the coordination among the same
four countries who responded to the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean.
Subsequent conversations led to a diplomatic gathering of their
representatives in 2007. This did not progress further as none of the
participants were really prepared to invest sufficient political capital in the
initiative at that point of time.
The natural question, therefore, is what changed between 2007 and 2017
when the Quad, now in a more serious incarnation, assembled in New York.
The current Quad did not come out of nowhere. It was an accumulated
product of multiple developments, among them the complementary
capabilities of key players, a more integrated arena and a greater openness to
look beyond orthodox constructs.
But the real shift was in the enormous progress that some of the relevant
bilateral ties had made in this very decade. The other three nations already
had strong relationships with each other, though these too deepened
discernibly in this period. What they did not have in 2007 was the degree of
convergence and cooperation with India, which they had attained by 2017.
Equally important was a leadership in our country that did not subject its
national interests to the test of ideological preference.
This was particularly notable in regard to ties between India and the US.
Those with Japan followed some distance behind. There was admittedly a
greater time lag with Australia, since ties with India warmed up only after
the 2014 political changes. It is in the story of these changed relationships
that we must seek the explanation for the rapid development of the Quad. In
the case of Japan and Australia, the relationship that India had was much
thinner both in content and scope. Where the US was concerned, there were
some sectoral strengths in an overall substantive but differentiated
engagement. But even these had their limitations.
In the last decade, India’s systemic interface with its Quad partners
expanded very significantly. It extended across many more domains and
enabled a full spectrum engagement with them. Naturally, the challenges and
opportunities were different in each case. But as they gained traction, lessons
and experiences from one were helpful to the advancement of the others.

The Rediscovery of America

Let us start with the US. The current phase of ties with India can be traced
back to President Bill Clinton’s visit in 2000. The background may have
been of the effective management of the political consequences of the 1998
nuclear tests. But the driver was more a coming together in a globalizing
world. It is essential that this starting point be duly recognized because it
confirms that India and the US upgraded their engagement seeing an intrinsic
value in doing so. This was the era of the dotcom revolution and H1B visa.
American dominance was quite pronounced globally and there was really no
‘balance of power’ argument that was driving the changes. It was, in fact, the
improving prosperity, expanding talent and a larger global exposure of India
that made it a better partner in American eyes.
In many ways, this was a natural progression of the relationship once the
constraints of the Cold War era receded. Suggesting, as some do, that these
ties do not have their own merit and must necessarily be directed against
others is a mind game being played to discredit both the relationship and the
Quad. This is all the more contestable, given how those making such charges
have leveraged their own relationship with the US so enthusiastically in the
past when it suited them. Obviously, when a judgement is proffered by a
party with a stake in the outcome, it must be seen for what it is.
Progress in India–US ties accelerated during the Bush administration,
which correctly identified the nuclear impediment as a major obstacle to
serious cooperation. By this time, both sides wanted a more normal
relationship, freed from the encumbrances of the past. Therefore, they
proceeded determinedly in that direction, successfully addressing the
domestic political challenges to that process. This was also a moment when
authoritative US studies focussed more strongly on the global relevance of
India’s human resources. Pretty much across the board, cooperative trends
gathered momentum in a positive atmosphere. It was visible in defence, civil
aviation, science and technology, trade and mobility.
The successful conclusion of the India–US nuclear deal widened the
pathway to greater shared endeavours. That five successive American
presidents, who were so different from each other, have been united in their
pursuit of better ties with India has been a real game-changer. This
consistency holds true at the Indian end as well. As a result, a relationship
that was earlier notable for its argumentation and distancing has undergone a
sea change.
There are many ways of capturing the transformation that has been
underway for more than a decade. Trade is one obvious indicator, and it has
expanded fivefold in the last 15 years. Investment is much harder to
accurately define in national terms, but it has clearly multiplied in this
period. The flow of talent is relevant because technology forms such a key
element of the ties. The H category of visas, which enabled techies to move
between the two countries, almost doubled in the last decade-and-a-half. So,
too, has the number of students from India.
In some domains, this progress can be expressed through decisions and
agreements. That a country that bought no American defence platforms from
1965 for four decades should now operate C-130, C-17 and P-8 aircraft, as
well as Apache, Chinook and MH-60R helicopters, is not a mean
achievement. Indeed, the security dimension of the relationship should be
judged by more than defence trade. Policy exchanges and military exercises
also testify to this shift, as do the multiple agreements that promote closer
coordination. The mechanisms and dialogues today span a very wide range
of subjects, from counter-terrorism and cyber security to climate action and
energy, from space cooperation and health to education and homeland
security.
What has changed further is that while the focus till 2014 was to remove
obstacles to cooperation, the endeavour after that has been to ambitiously
realize its expanding potential. Prime Minister Modi’s 2023 State visit to the
US, in that sense, marks a new phase of ties. The expanding agenda of
cooperation and its growing relevance to key global debates underlines how
far the relationship has now come. While important in themselves, the
understanding on transfer of technology for jet engines and the collaborative
steps in the semiconductor domain hold a symbolism far beyond. American
business is beginning to overcome its long-standing scepticism about India,
just as its military is learning to work with a non-alliance culture. Its
strategic community is displaying a better understanding of India’s value as
its technology sector appreciates the significance of closer collaboration.
Truly, the relationship has now moved into a higher orbit.
Although the ties have undergone a profound change, some of the
divergences of the past need to be borne in mind to navigate the future in a
better way. A large part of the contradiction between the interests of the two
nations arose from the traditional American approach to the Indian
subcontinent. The interest in hyphenating India and Pakistan and seeking to
influence their bilateral dealings has been an entrenched attitude. The
deliberate permissiveness with regard to Pakistan’s nuclear programme in
the 1980–90s was its most extreme manifestation. The US presence in
Afghanistan also created new factors of regional dependency that were not in
harmony with its India relationship.
Moreover, the global outlook of the US was often on a different
wavelength from the security and economic interests of India. Even on the
nuclear account, the 2005 understanding did not always set to rest more
doctrinaire American advocacy in that domain. It was also natural that the
worldview, policies and diplomacy of two partners, one developed and the
other still developing, would differ on a range of socio-economic issues. Nor
was it unexpected that a dominant prescriptive polity should rub against a
sensitive sovereignty-conscious society.
Indeed, some of these very traits combined to create challenges for the
relationship in 2013–14. But structural changes underway, along with policy
optimism, came together to ensure that ties returned to their upward
trajectory and stayed that way. It is not that the two nations do not have
differences; what has changed is the willingness to nevertheless find common
ground and pursue mutual advantage. Indeed, it has been an example of how
an open-minded appreciation of contemporary changes has refashioned a
pre-existing relationship.
The breadth and intensity of cooperation over the last decade has been
truly impressive. It is, of course, driven by much more frequent engagement
at the leadership level, and by more comfortable conversations. This is
supported at the cabinet and sub-cabinet levels through regular interactions
on a wider scale. New mechanisms and dialogues have sprung up in every
field of activity. Foundational agreements, contemporary frameworks and a
larger volume of activity are all part of the change. And wherever that is
quantifiable, trade, investments, students, visas, exchanges, the numbers tell
their own story.
What started as an evolutionary exercise with a limited objective has not
only mushroomed rapidly but is now developing increasingly higher levels of
ambition. From the bilateral and regional agendas, ties have matured to cover
a broader canvas and a more complex agenda. That the two nations are
partnering each other in quadrilateral and trilateral groupings is a statement
of how far their relations have come.
It is particularly notable that this growth enjoys strong societal support.
There is, of course, the Indian diaspora factor in the US and the
Congressional support. Because so much of the relationship is driven by so
many constituencies of civil society, it can also be effervescent at times.
Today, the strength of the bilateral ties encourages the two nations to work
together beyond the narrower confines of their national interest.
Even as this unfolds, India and the US will also have to recognize that
they approach the world from different vantage points, histories, culture and
levels of development. From an Indian perspective, the US as a global power
can, on occasion, have interests that are in contradiction with its own. Nor
may it always share our priorities and perspectives. This naturally will be
mirror imaged on the American side as well, especially as India’s influence
and footprint expands. It is, therefore, all the more important that strong
levels of comfort are established at this juncture. Because willy-nilly, the
two countries will have much more to do with each other in the times to
come.

Rising with the Sun

The two decades that witnessed such significant developments in respect of
the US also saw steady progress with Japan. Challenges for India on this
account were, however, very different. Unlike the US, Japan did not have a
pronounced history of leaning towards Pakistan during the Cold War. It was,
of course, given to some degree of hyphenation like much of the Western
world.
 But for reasons rooted in history and culture, there was always a
partiality in Japanese politics towards India. Respect for an ancient
civilization was widely shared, and the immediate post-War period actually
witnessed political warmth between the leaderships. Indian policies
conveyed their sympathy for Japan’s predicament, and the dissenting voice of
Justice Radhabinod Pal at the Tokyo Tribunal was subtly appreciated.
On its part, Japan supported India’s socio-economic goals through
substantial levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Within the
Western camp, on a range of issues, it was among the friendlier voices. The
paradox of the relationship, in fact, was that the very lack of problems also
limited policy attention.
As with many other states, India–Japan ties also felt the implications of
what befell India during this period. Economically, a traditionally broad
presence of Japanese companies failed to strike deep roots in the absence of
a welcoming environment. They gravitated instead to Southeast Asia and,
thereafter, to China, lowering India steadily in terms of Japanese priorities.
Even when economic reforms were introduced in 1991, the Japanese
business community responded with great caution, expressed in a demand
that the enabling environment should come up to their expectations.
The thinness of the interface was not limited only to business, it also
extended to the supportive activities that Japan normally encouraged.
Whether it was education, culture or travel, the two nations continued to
remain distant, even if pleasantly. The political domain was not helpful in
this period either. There were already the compulsions of the Cold War that
pulled the two countries in opposing directions. India’s defeat in 1962 in the
border conflict with China had obviously damaged its standing as well, and
its economic struggles thereafter strengthened a negative stereotype.
Sometimes, situations get worse before getting better. This happened in
the instant case when India’s nuclear tests in 1998 shook the ties out of their
complacency. It is understandable, given its history, that Japan should react
strongly to that development. What was, however, perplexing to the Indian
side was its sweeping disregard of the security compulsions of the other
party. This was aggravated by the fact that Japan had not hesitated to ensure
its own security through a treaty arrangement with a nuclear power. Relations
really took a dip when Japanese policymakers of that period decided to lead
the charge against India in international forums.
 The resulting freeze in the relationship ended up providing an opportunity
for both nations to introspect on its value. And from that exercise emerged a
new phase of our bilateral ties. Just as President Clinton’s visit marked the
breakthrough in one relationship, that of PM Yoshiro Mori did in the other.
And interestingly, while President George W. Bush took it to a higher level in
regard to the US, PM Shinzo Abe did so even more personally in respect of
Japan. His famous ‘The Confluence of Two Seas’ speech to the Indian
Parliament in 2007 was not only a turning point for the bilateral relationship
but an early vision of what emerged as the Indo-Pacific. The context for that
unfolding is also worth recalling.
A decade-and-a-half ago, Japan, too, was contemplating an increasingly
uncertain external environment that required it to contemplate greater
responsibilities. Given its complex history, this naturally was accompanied
by an involved domestic debate. A society with a broader agenda and taking
a greater interest in world affairs will understandably look for more partners.
India, no longer distanced by the Cold War, offered obvious attraction. Some
of this was a regional convergence, some a shared quest for better UN
representation and some a natural empathy of democratic societies. So here,
too, the bilateral wheels began to move on their own logic. As they gathered
greater traction, vistas of cooperation also opened up.
Between India and Japan now, the political messaging is strong,
underlined by a practice of annual summits since 2006. Despite changes in
administrations on both ends, the pace of cooperation has not slackened. As
in the case of the US, this continuity is the strongest proof of structural
change. The official description of the relationship has continuously grown,
titled most recently in 2014 as a Special Strategic and Global Partnership.
Trade may have remained limited despite a Comprehensive Economic
Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2011, but Japanese investments in India
have expanded both in sectors and volume. Japan ranks fifth as a source of
investment and more ambitious goals were set during PM Fumio Kishida’s
visit in 2022.
The economic partnership as a whole has intensified, whether we
consider currency swaps or development assistance. In fact, the ODA has
more than doubled in the last decade itself, with disbursement touching ¥328
billion in 2021–22. Its implementation record has been impressive, boasting
so far of six metro rails in key Indian cities and a number of other major
connectivity projects. What has also changed is a Japanese inclination to
shape a more conducive infrastructure, expressed in its support for industrial
and freight corridors. There are ongoing dialogues now in energy, space,
steel, textile, start-up funding, digital skills and healthcare, among others.
The high-speed rail project from Mumbai to Ahmedabad stands out as the
flagship initiative. Given its ripple impact, it can even be envisaged as the
third technology revolution, following upon that of the Maruti-Suzuki car and
the Delhi Metro. Similarly, while the ODA cooperation is a long-standing
one, the Act East Forum established in 2017 specifically targets improved
connectivity for India’s Northeast.
But it is those familiar with the intricacies of Japanese society who are
more likely to appreciate the progress with India. The yardsticks for that are
examples of cooperation in domains of particular sensitivity. The 2016
agreement to cooperate on civil nuclear energy is an even more telling
illustration of the growing comfort. No less significant are the series of
understandings in the domain of defence and security. The 2014 agreement on
defence cooperation was followed by those on equipment transfers and
information protection in 2015, naval cooperation in 2018 and reciprocal
supplies and services in 2020. Policy exchanges in defence have been
supported by staff talks between services as well as bilateral and plurilateral
military exercises. As with the US, India holds 2+2 ministerial meetings with
Japan since 2019. Again, the bilateral comfort is beginning to be transposed
on a wider canvas, starting predictably with the US and Australia.

Building a New Mateship

The relationship that has developed most visibly in recent times is that with
Australia. Indeed, within a short space of time, it has narrowed the gap that
stood out in comparison to the other two Quad members. As in the case of the
US and Japan, the 1998 nuclear tests did impact ties and the road to recovery
was also not an easy one. But the Australian relationship also carried its own
unique challenges. It says something about India’s priorities that the first
prime ministerial visit took two full decades after independence, that of
Indira Gandhi in 1968.
In many ways, Australia tended to be the most distant of the Anglosphere
partners. It displayed the attitude of the US to issues east of India and the
approach of the UK to concerns on the west. On the other hand, the
Commonwealth framework ensured that there were steady exchanges in a
large number of domains, including defence, commerce, training and
education. What was a substantial but not high-profile relationship also took
a marked dip in 1998. Australia took the lead in calling for a special session
of the Conference on Disarmament and co-sponsored a resolution in the
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) condemning India’s nuclear tests.
More significantly, it suspended defence cooperation and froze official
contacts. The story was, in many ways, very similar to that of Japan.
It took a year for the two sides to step back from the confrontational
posture. The visit of Deputy PM Tim Fisher in 1999 could be credited as the
beginning of the thaw. In a sense, Australia was ahead of Japan in repairing
its ties, evidenced in the visits of Foreign Minister Alexander Downer and
PM John Howard in March and July 2000 respectively. The return to
normalcy progressed steadily and was accelerated somewhat by the tail
winds of the 2005 nuclear deal. But the reality nevertheless was that neither
nation devoted the political attention to the other which was required to take
ties to a higher level.
Certainly, on the Indian side, there was a continued perception that
Australia had neither de-hyphenated its subcontinental relationships nor
emerged from a general disinterest about the region. not matched the US or
even Japan in. So, for almost a decade more, the progress of ties was left
largely to civil society and market forces. It took the two-way visits of PMs
Tony Abbott and Narendra Modi in 2014 to open the gates for cooperation
that was so long delayed.
That ties developed so rapidly once political leadership came into play
only underlines the extent of the structural convergence. The ambitions that
guide this exercise are best explained by An India Economic Strategy to
2035 Report released by the Australian side and the Australia Economic
Strategy issued by India. A trade of $20 billion plus and investments around
$25 billion stand to benefit with a free trade arrangement whose initial phase
has commenced. Australia is a major educational destination for Indian
students, who now number in excess of 100,000. The Indian community, the
second most rapidly growing one, is a source of strength for both societies.
But it is really in the realm of politics and strategy that the transformation
has been most evident. Much of the growing convergence has been driven by
concerns about the region’s stability, prosperity and security. The deficit in
global goods has sought to be addressed by India and Australia working
together bilaterally as well as in larger forums. This reflects their shared
concerns about respect for international law and a rules-based order. The
two countries may have long interacted in ASEAN-led forums, the
Commonwealth, IORA, etc. But stronger leadership bonding and more open
exchanges have brought out the mutual benefits of closer cooperation and
coordination. Australia has been an early and vigorous supporter of India’s
IPOI. In fact, the big change has been the realization that a stronger bilateral
relationship today allows the two nations to contribute much more effectively
at a regional and a global level.
The new intensity in the interactions has been on display at the highest
level, despite multiple changes at the Australian end. It is notable that their
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership covers an annual meeting of PMs, a
foreign minister’s dialogue, a 2+2 ministerial mechanism, a trade ministerial
commission, an education council, an energy dialogue and sectoral working
groups. Clearly, the days of attention deficit are now over for good. Recent
agreements range from maritime collaboration, defence science exchanges
and mutual logistics support to cooperation in cyber-enabled critical
technology, critical and strategic minerals, water resources management,
migration and mobility, vocational education and training, as well as public
administration and governance.
Some milestones do bring out the interactive dynamic between the
bilateral and the regional facets of the relationship. Greater political
confidence and deeper defence cooperation, for example, contributed to
Australia joining Exercise Malabar. A better understanding on the space
applications front led to the Australian support for the temporary Telemetry
Tracking and Command Centre for the Gaganyaan Mission. A shared concern
about trade reliability and economic volatility encouraged a partnership on
the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI), along with Japan. The
conclusion of the Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA) in
2022 was not just a trade deal; it was an expression of systemic confidence
as well. It also says a lot that Australian universities have been the first to
take advantage of India’s New Education Policy to set up establishments in
the country.
As with US and Japan, a change in leadership reaffirmed in the Tokyo
Quad Summit that cooperation was now proofed strongly in respect of
political developments. Indeed, the enthusiasm of each successive
government more than matched those of its predecessors.
INTENTIONS OVERCOME HESITATIONS

In assessing the Indo-Pacific, there are also dimensions that are autonomous
of such bilateral matters, as indeed of the Quad. Prominent among them is the
IPOI, announced by PM Modi in 2019 at the East Asia Summit. This is
envisaged as an open, non-treaty-based, inclusive platform for cooperation in
the region. Structure-light and cooperation-heavy, it is intended to work in
tandem with other mechanisms like the ASEAN, IORA, BIMSTEC, IOC, PIF,
etc. Its seven pillars include maritime security, maritime ecology; maritime
resources; capacity building and resource sharing; disaster risk reduction and
management; science, technology and academic cooperation; and trade
connectivity and maritime transport. So far, Australia has agreed to lead the
maritime ecology pillar, Japan the connectivity one, France and Indonesia the
maritime resources, Singapore the science and technology one, and the UK
the maritime security pillar.
How the IPOI will develop remains to be seen. But it is certainly an
example of fresh thinking on regional partnerships that has the potential to
move cooperation in the Indo-Pacific forward. That ASEAN, the EU and
individual nations have all tabled their own outlook, vision and approaches
augurs well for the future. It is also an interesting thought that as India’s
global footprint steadily grows, it intersects with the interests of its Quad
partners. A telling case is that of India’s engagement with the Pacific Island
nations. Relationships between like-minded countries tend to be naturally
supportive beyond the confines of their actual interaction. And the complex
challenges of the contemporary world certainly can use more effective
international cooperation.
India is establishing IT labs in these Pacific Island societies and
promoting solar electrification. Women solar engineers called Solar Mamas
have also been trained. Apart from climate-related projects, Indian grant
assistance supports community development, agricultural equipment,
computers and LED bulbs for schools, dialysis machines, portable saw mills
as well as construction of sea wall and coral farms. As noted elsewhere, the
level of cooperation is being significantly upgraded as a consequence of the
2023 FIPIC Summit, especially in the domains of health, education and
space.
India has responded to natural calamities, including cyclones Yasa, Gita,
Hola and Winston, and dispatched vaccines for Covid to Fiji and Nauru
bilaterally, as also to Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands through the
COVAX initiative. There is a historical connect in particular with Fiji that
can be the foundation of a modern collaboration. All these factors came
together at the third FIPIC Summit that was held in Papua New Guinea in
2023.
The Quad nations are all democratic polities, market economies and
pluralistic societies. Apart from that natural understanding, similarity in the
structural aspects of their relationships has helped to foster the platform. In
each case, there are regular bilateral meetings at the summit level, designated
formally as annual in the case of Australia and Japan. All the ties now
include a 2+2 defence and foreign ministers’ interaction. Again, all four
countries are members of ASEAN-led forums, including the East Asia
Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence
Ministers’ Meeting. They also strongly subscribe to the centrality of ASEAN
insofar as the Indo-Pacific is concerned. Between them, they are involved in
multiple trilateral combinations with other partners, such as Indonesia and
France.
In many ways, the ease of working together has been increased by other
experiences, whether they are bilateral or more collective. That all of them
offer mutual logistics support and work on white shipping obviously enables
better maritime security coordination. Their shared view of United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982 as the constitution of the
seas is no less relevant. Similarly, three of them (Japan, Australia and India)
being members of the SCRI and the IPOI makes a difference. The working of
the Quad takes into account the consequences of globalization and
requirements of the global commons. There is undoubtedly a strong shared
interest in the oceanic domain as all members are maritime powers. In fact,
well before the revival of the Quad, some of them were conducting the
Malabar Exercise among themselves. And the same convergence is also
underlined in the support they expressed together in Tokyo in 2022 for the
IPMDA. But significant as this may be, any one-dimensional projection does
injustice to a group that can make a serious contribution to larger welfare. It
is, therefore, essential to have informed visibility of the entire Quad
landscape. And it does span a growing range of issues.
Where critical and emerging technologies are concerned, the Quad
adopted principles on technology design, development, governance and use
in 2021. It urged that democratic values and human rights shape the design,
governance and application of technologies. The adoption of the Open Radio
Access Network (O-RAN) Action Plan encouraged a diverse, open and
interoperable telecommunication ecosystem. This was followed by an
agreement to facilitate exchanges and align closely on O-RAN testing
activities. The Quad obviously has an interest in the expansive deployment of
O-RAN across the Indo-Pacific.
In parallel, there have been discussions on the global semiconductor
value chain. That the Quad members have come up with a common statement
on technology supply chain principles says much for the importance they
attach to this domain. Given the twin concerns of supply chain resilience and
digital trust, it is natural that the Quad should be heavily focussed on the
future of trusted collaboration. Progress in this domain will only further
underline its salience in contemporary global architecture.
Climate action has been another significant area of attention. Here, too,
the Quad has sought to apply itself to practical initiatives. The green shipping
network between the four aspires to decarbonize the shipping value chain
and to establish green corridors in the Indo-Pacific. India has a particular
interest in exploring collaboration on green hydrogen and to dovetail it with
its national mission. The Quad has also partnered with the CDRI in its
adaptation and resilient activities. This is aimed at collectively advancing
climate monitoring and disaster risk reduction in the Indo-Pacific.
Infrastructure has been a natural focus, given the widespread unease
generated by strategically led connectivity initiatives. Given the nature of the
challenge, much of the deliberations are on debt management and debt
sustainability. The development assistance institutions are coordinating on
promoting sustainable and alternative financing. There is a clear recognition
that high standard infrastructure based on transparency and market viability
should be promoted for the larger benefit of the region.
In the light of the pandemic, it was to only be expected that the Quad
would come together in its vaccine supply endeavours. The group cooperated
to expand manufacturing capacity of World Health Organization (WHO)-
approved vaccines and collaborate with COVAX to track demand, as also
with WHO to overcome vaccine hesitancy. On its part, India has provided
more than half a million ‘Made in India’ vaccine doses to Cambodia and
Thailand under the Quad Vaccine Partnership. Other notable areas of
cooperation have been the Quad Data Satellite Portal and the STEM
fellowships. The analysis on climate change risks and sustainable use of
oceans and marine resources is high on the Quad agenda.
An important outcome from the Tokyo Summit in 2022 was the
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) partnership for the
Indo-Pacific. This has a symbolic resonance, given the 2004 tsunami
cooperation. These initial agreements have now led to the finalization of the
Quad’s standard operating procedures. At a time when climate events are
proliferating and global responses are declining, this will fill a significant
gap.
By the time the Quad leaders assembled in Hiroshima in May 2023, they
were ready to jointly articulate their most comprehensive collective outlook
to date. This included a detailed agenda that addressed climate action, supply
chains, pandemic and health concerns, infrastructure, education, connectivity,
digital capabilities, standards, R&D, cyber and space technologies and
maritime domain awareness. They issued three statements of principles: on
clean energy supply chains, critical and emerging technology standards, and
secure software. Their global and regional perspectives, while reiterating
many known positions, clearly highlighted where the convergences were
strongest. As each year, indeed each meeting, widens the ambit of
cooperation, it is increasingly clear that Quad is here not just to stay but to
grow steadily.
An interesting feature of the evolution of the Quad, and it is still
continuing, is how the comfort levels are constantly encouraging exploration
of new areas. In early 2023, this was visible in domains ranging from
maritime security, multilateralism, counter-terrorism and HADR. When it
came to the IORA, the Quad members committed to working more intensively
together, as they visibly did in the 2023 Colombo meet. The Maritime
Security Working Group similarly met in the US to take more practical steps,
even as the IPMDA started to take shape.
On multilateralism, the Quad supported for the first time the Inter-
Governmental Negotiations (IGN) process on Security Council reforms. It
agreed to address attempts to subvert the UN and international system and to
take forward the 2030 Agenda for SDG without prioritizing a narrow set of
goals.
A different cluster of issues illustrate the contribution that the Quad can
make to keep the world and itself safer, secure and protected. On counter-
terrorism, starting with policy exchanges and experience sharing, the
potential for mutual benefit was rapidly explored. A working group was
established even as the focus on the use of emerging and evolving
technologies in terrorism sharpened. Cyber security is also evolving as a
productive arena of work. Sharing model approaches, encouraging
development of talent, ensuring supply chain resilience and security and
networking industries are its prominent facets.
The objective of the Quad, in the words of PM Modi, is to do global
good. The need for that to be a collaborative effort is self-evident. It is
equally natural that nations with significant capacities and shared interests
would step forward in response to the need of the day. That India should be
one of them makes sense, given how much it has grown on both scores.
Indeed, its presence imbues the Quad with greater credibility because it does
not carry a history of alliances. But for this to happen through partnerships
with the three Quad countries was not always a given.
It can unfold today because painstaking efforts were made over many
years to strengthen the bilateral relationships, which are the real building
blocks. But even that, by itself, was not adequate. It took considerable
openness of mind in all the Quad leaderships to envisage collaboration in a
more contemporary manner.
Indeed, the Quad is proof that PM Modi walked the talk in declaring his
intention to overcome hesitations of history. Similarly, the other three nations
took a leap of faith beyond the orthodoxies of alliances. Since 2017,
practical progress has validated the relevance of this sensible approach.
If the Quad is to continue growing, we must also be cognizant of what we
should not seek to do. Trying to straitjacket it, subject it to stress tests or
impose congruence over convergence are all harmful, not helpful. The Quad
works precisely because it is flexible and understanding, a welcome
supersession of the rigidities of the Cold War era. Therefore, efforts to set
expectations that are modelled on the relationship that the US had with its
Western partners should be resisted. Nor should we readily accept the
opposite paradigm, that of a purely transactional arrangement. Each one of
the Quad partners has its own culture and tradition, but the fact is that there is
a strong democratic overlap. Fortunately, the governments in question have
all shown a maturity that would, hopefully, also percolate more deeply into
the public discourse.
The Quad is the aggregate of the progress India has made in key
relationships over two decades. It is also an assertion of going beyond
traditional confines and set working habits. That it has opened up so many
new vistas should only encourage us to intensify it further. This coming
together for an agreed agenda powered by a shared outlook is manifestly a
statement of practical goodness. It is, at the same time, a revelation how a
crucial landscape, when examined by a Bharat with clearer eyes, will help
find its own solutions.
 Chapter 8.
DEALING WITH CHINA
Appreciating the Importance of Realism

T
here are few debates on the merits of realpolitik versus ideology that
would match the conversations in India about China. Not surprisingly, it
can also become one of nationalism versus internationalism, however
misplaced the latter may be in this case. This starts from our early years of
independence, meanders through an era of conflict, witnesses the subsequent
normalization, and finally arrives at the choice between a ‘Chindia’ outlook
and an ‘India First’ one. The impact of the border events in 2020 have
recently revived this argument, contributing to a growing awareness of the
complexity of the challenge before India. As a result, facets like trade,
investment, technology and even contacts have begun to be viewed from an
integrated perspective. The current state of the relationship is clearly
unnatural; what its future holds seems ripe for debate.
In essence, the competing perspectives derive from the differing
viewpoints set out in 1950 by PM Jawaharlal Nehru and his deputy, Sardar
Vallabhbhai Patel. The latter was as hard-nosed as they come and least
susceptible to protestations from neighbours that diverged from ground
reality. In his estimation, India had done everything to allay China’s
apprehensions, but that country regarded us with suspicion and scepticism,
perhaps mixed with a little hostility. Patel cautioned that for the first time
after centuries, India’s defence had to concentrate on two fronts
simultaneously. And his view of China was that it had definite ambitions and
aims that shaped its thinking about India in a less-than-friendly way.
In contrast, Nehru felt that Patel was overly suspicious and stated in a
note to him on 18 November 1950 that it was inconceivable that China would
‘undertake a wild adventure across the Himalayas’. Guided by a positive
predisposition towards a leftist regime, he also felt that it is exceedingly
unlikely that India may have to face any real military invasion from China in
the foreseeable future. He appeared to take at face value the repeated
references by China desiring friendship. To those who felt otherwise, he
warned against losing our sense of perspective and giving way to
unreasoning fears.
Each one eventually was to temper their view with some realization of
the complications of a modus vivendi. The choice of words in what was an
internal debate is obviously not quite diplomatic. But their gut instincts
nevertheless were articulated quite clearly. One bet on a world of left-wing
romanticism; the other voted for time-tested calculations about neighbours,
especially big ones.
There were naturally multiple expressions of this divergence in
approach, and that played out in the ensuing decades. As competition and
even conflict characterized certain periods, public attitudes also started to
take root accordingly. These may or may not have been shared by the
governments of the day. Some displayed a consideration that was at variance
with popular sentiment or even sought to shape opinion by advancing new
objectives. Others were more hard-headed and would not let difficult issues
be brushed under the carpet. Whatever the nuances, the defining imagery of
diplomatic complacency remains the 1954 Panchsheel declaration.
If there is a common thread in the tendency to expect best-case scenarios,
it is the optimism of a particular brand of Indian internationalism. One
illustration of this Nehruvian approach was in the debate about permanent
membership of the UNSC. Whether it was feasible to successfully assert our
claim at that point of time is an issue in itself, and would we have been
granted the same consideration had roles been reversed is a corollary to it.
But there was not even an attempt by India to leverage this issue for national
gain, either with China bilaterally or with other major powers. It appeared
that the basics of diplomacy had given way to the influence of ideology.
Instead, Nehru’s decision in 1955 was to declare that India was not in a hurry
to enter the Security Council at that time, even though it ought to be there. The
first step, instead, was for China to take its rightful place. After that, the
question of India could be considered separately. And no surprise, far from
reciprocating Nehru’s ‘China First’ policy, we are still waiting for that
country to express support for our own similar ambitions!
A very different situation reveals how deeply this mindset was divorced
from ground realities. It was November 1962 and Sela and Bomdila had
fallen to the advancing Chinese forces. As the then PM sought American
help, he tellingly conveyed to the US President that because of its wider
implications in the global context, India did not seek more comprehensive
assistance. Apparently, we gave precedence to keeping distance from the
West than to the defence of the nation! It is this lack of realism that has long
dogged our approach to dealing with China. And it is precisely in this
domain that we now see the difference.
If the positions and protestations of China got traction with an earlier
generation, the state of Indian politics indicates that it is not altogether a
vestige of the past. The previous driving factor was a desire to make
common cause in the international arena. It was very much propelled by non-
Western solidarity and Asian togetherness, more than tinged by ideological
proclivity. Since then, public opinion has hardened and the earlier inclination
to be excessively trusting is not maintainable. The world, too, is more
transactional, and there have been decades of experience that influence
thinking in India and China about each other.
How does the contemporary Nehruvian then approach the relationship? In
times of stress as we currently are, like Nehru, the inclination is to indulge in
ultra-nationalist rhetoric. This is done even while being in denial of the 1962
outcomes, when not actually misportraying it as something more recent. But
ideology, habits and connections die hard. So, it is apparently necessary to
have a double messaging, one for the more credulous within India and
another for a different audience abroad. It is the latter that encourages them to
advocate the view that China prizes harmony above all, without questioning
why that does not apply to its neighbours. It also leads to admiration of the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), while overlooking its violation of India’s
sovereignty. There are less-than-subtle suggestions of China’s unstoppability
by describing its rise as a force of nature and ill-concealed sympathy for its
model of economic growth and technology appropriation.
But it is the actions more than the articulation of these Chindians that are
of deeper concern. By consciously underrating the China challenge, any sense
of preparation in India was undermined; till the change of 2014. The neglect
of the border infrastructure was paralleled by an unwillingness to accelerate
industrialization and create deep strengths. Even now, ‘Make in India’
endeavours are attacked by them while ostensibly expressing concern at the
trade imbalance with China. The combination of politics, policies and
populism lowered our national guard and still continues to target our national
morale. Not surprisingly, this is about as far as we can be from the traditions
of realism.
In the years that have passed, the Nehru–Patel dichotomy of approaches
has continued within the Indian system. It finds resonance in each era through
the issues of the day, from the boundary question and border areas
management to FTAs and technology issues. Not all of the debate is restricted
to its bilateral format. Understandably, given the influence of the two
countries, it spills over into the global arena just as easily. Issues like
connectivity, debt, development and maritime claims have also become
contentious. Overall, there is no question that many of them today are being
approached with a higher degree of thought about their implications. The era
when Indian policymakers were sanguine about the ‘String of Pearls’ did
finally end in 2014.
But there is also a fundamental issue of defining national interests clearly,
defending them vigorously and appreciating the nature of power. Asian or
even developing world solidarity may have its place, but it was never
enough to counter the competitive instincts of a neighbour. Indeed, it is this
kernel of the 1950 debate that continues to be relevant.
Today, there are animated conversations across the world on how best to
engage China. Naturally, this is even more intense in India, given our
proximity as well as the border events of 2020 and thereafter. Polemical
positions within India may be driven by political tactics; it is the underlying
policies and actions that speak for actual thinking. The true stance of various
political forces vis-à-vis China is not episodic, whatever may be the
temporary posture. The realists among them hold a worldview that stresses
building national capabilities, which puts key concerns like terrorism firmly
on the table, calls out actions on unsustainable debt and opaque connectivity,
and approaches global developments with national security foremost in mind.
It is precisely this approach that will push for upgrading the boundary
infrastructure, as it has after 2014. In addition, they would deploy an Indian
5G stack, understand the value of critical and emerging technologies, and, not
least, seek from the turbulence of our current era better solutions for our
advancement.
Indeed, the nature of the challenges we faced predicate that India’s
analysis continuously monitors how the rest of the world is responding. Much
of what the world faces today has come out of miscalculation on the part of
some powers and its intelligent usage by others. But the course of history is
far from linear, and even major nations are not impervious to becoming
complacent or making errors. In fact, a common failing is to seek immediate
gains at the cost of larger credibility. The realist, therefore, has to
objectively analyse the state of play while being sceptical about the
inevitability of events and trends. It is on this score that our epics may shed
some light.

In world affairs, as indeed in human relationships, parties tend to help others out of goodwill,
generosity or calculation. In real life, one can often spill into the other. The trigger of the
Ramayana narrative is actually an act of exceptional trust, the two boons that King Dasaratha
gave to his wife Kaikeyi on the battlefield. While involved in a war between the asura Sambara
and the king of the gods Indra, Dasaratha was rescued by her when severely wounded in a
night attack. It was these promises that Kaikeyi invoked to send Rama to his exile in the jungle
and demand that her own son Bharata be crowned king.
If we consider the boons to be latent capabilities that were exercised when the time came,
this episode is an object lesson on injudicious sharing. In recent decades, international
relations have also witnessed how countries and economies were built up, perhaps less as an
act of gratitude and more as one of utility. This was especially visible in the last years of the
Cold War, when it came to exercising military and other pressures through third parties. But a
lack of understanding of the players involved led to long-term consequences.
The Western world found that the Islamic card that it played against the USSR came back
to haunt them within a decade. And when it comes to strategic understandings, the economic
benefits that China obtained became the foundation for the upturning of the global order and
the contemporary competition that we witness now. India, too, carries the consequences of its
own past dealings. Its strong advocacy of Chinese interests in the 1950s was obviously not
repaid in kind. It is bad enough to forget that gratitude has a short shelf-life in diplomacy; it is
even more so when basics of diplomatic calculation are overridden by misplaced beliefs of
political solidarity.
In personal terms, vulnerabilities are often created as a result of thoughtlessness. On
occasion, it could also be an emotional response to a challenge. To some degree, that could
be extrapolated to explain the behaviour of nation-states as well. But a more credible
explanation can be found in the mindset of strategic complacency that polities and rulers often
display.
A telling example is the case of the key antagonist, the demon-king Ravana of Lanka. In
that era, exceptional figures performed the most exacting penance that could be rewarded by
their wishes being granted by the Gods. In this case, Ravana was given the boon of invincibility
by the creator Brahma. But in his arrogance, he invoked it only against what he saw as likely
threats, devas and gandharvas, asuras and kinnaras, nagas and rakshasas, all creatures
other than men. He left out humankind because he could not even envisage that such puny
beings could be threatening. And it was for that reason that Lord Vishnu took a human form,
that of Lord Rama, to kill Ravana.
The issue here is the threat that was overlooked, which thereby created a window of
vulnerability. There is another lesson, too, from Ravana’s behavioural characteristics and that,
paradoxically, is the attitude of those who feel wronged by history. He is badgered by his
advisers to regain their dominant status in Lanka, a land that was once ruled by his maternal
grandfather Sumali. Ravana consequently begins by displacing his elder brother Kuber, who
comes from a different stock. But it then becomes an endless quest, powered by a sense of
entitlement and absence of restraint. There are important learnings here for entrenched and
rising powers alike, both in charting a path and in managing their ambitions. Total security will
always be a fruitless quest.
A different example presents itself much earlier in the epic, when Bharata and
accompanying sages try to persuade Rama to return to Ayodhya after the death of King
Dasaratha. The sage Jabali makes a particularly impassioned appeal, underlining that the
promise that Rama made to his father was no longer binding after the latter’s demise. This
provokes Rama’s anger and he questions how trust would be maintained if vows were so
lightly discarded. The sages appreciate his stance while confessing that they had to make
their best effort to bring him back. The point eventually is about credibility, not just as a
personal virtue but as a larger systemic underpinning. If states do not honour agreements and
adhere to obligations, they must weigh any tactical gains against the larger damage that they
have done to their reputation.

A MULTIDIMENSIONAL CHALLENGE

The Galwan clash between China and India in June 2020 saw the first
fatalities on their border in 45 years. It was not just the underpinning of
peace and tranquillity that was shattered as a result. Working assumptions
about their relationship built up over four decades were now suddenly
questionable. China’s disregard for established agreements, which led to this
turn of events, also has its own further implications. But even as India gears
up to take on a new level of concerns on its northern borders, there are
cascading questions posed by China’s posture. Together, these immediate
developments and long-term concerns create a multidimensional challenge to
Indian foreign policy.
Among the many issues that India has to address in its endeavour to
ascend in the world order, the relationship with China undoubtedly presents
the most complex problem. On the one hand, the parallel but differential rise
of the two polities constitutes the core of global re-balancing. Willy-nilly, the
two countries have ended up creating greater space in the international
architecture. Together, they are drivers of what was touted in more optimistic
days as heralding an ‘Asian century’. At one time, there was even talk of
concluding a bilateral FTA, a discussion that was set to rest only after 2013.
On some aspects of the development debate, they find themselves on the
same side.
Yet, an intractable boundary dispute and different politico-economic
models have created a competitive narrative in this very period. That they
are immediate neighbours has added to the intricacy of their ties. A common
periphery and balance of power have also contributed to a sense of rivalry. It
is also a reality that China’s reach and influence has extended significantly
during this period. A lack of appreciation of this aspect 15 years ago has
added to our vulnerability in the Indian Ocean.
From the Indian perspective, the answers are in a combination of realms,
many of them centring on building our national strengths and upgrading our
infrastructure. But there is also a conceptual transformation underway in the
diplomatic approach. The global landscape today offers many more
opportunities for India to leverage, once it goes back to the realist tradition.
The serious debate about the future of this relationship today dwells on
how to establish the most advantageous modus vivendi. Because it is an
immediate neighbour, China’s rapid growth has been particularly impactful,
both on the balance with India as well as its presence in their common and
near periphery. Moreover, for various reasons, China has not given the same
regard to India’s rise as the rest of the world. In their ties, the present is very
much shaped by the past, whether we speak of the ground situation, national
power or even sentiment. And the past is not without its share of problems.
At the same time, their cumulative effect on the established world order
is creating greater openings for its change. The fact is that neither can wish
the other away and both clearly have the ability to run the long race. Even
otherwise, they had to take the rest of the world into consideration when it
came to calculations about each other. Perhaps, this is more so in the current
global scenario. If and how they come to terms seriously will not only shape
the prospects of the two countries but that of the continent, and perhaps even
the world now.
Most Indians are familiar with the modern history of our bilateral ties.
Perhaps not everyone may know every nuance of how it evolved. But
generally, people have a sense of the ups and downs of this relationship. The
first decade of the 1950s can only be described as one of Indian naiveté. On
multiple issues, Indian foreign policy took up China’s cause to an extent that
it impacted its own relationship with the West. What is important to note is
that this criticism, whether on bilateral or global issues, is not a
retrospective one but offered even as events were then unfolding.
After the 1962 border conflict, India and China exchanged ambassadors
only in 1976, a decision taken by the Indira Gandhi government. It then took
till 1988 for the first Indian prime ministerial visit to China after 1954, that
of Rajiv Gandhi. And indeed, the re-building of our ties was actually a very
painstaking endeavour. This, if you think about it, is something of a paradox.
Because, do remember that India was among the early nations to actually
recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC). However, the quality of our
ties in many ways was determined by the border conflict and the three distant
decades thereafter.
It took a conscious effort on the part of both nations to orchestrate a
recovery and restore a sense of normalcy. As a result, for the next many
years, interactions and exchanges grew steadily in many areas. China became
one of our largest trading partners; a very significant source of investment,
even of technology; a participant in projects and infrastructure building; and
a substantial destination for tourism and education. As for the border areas, a
detailed and practical set of understandings and agreements focussed on their
management, even as negotiations were conducted on the resolution of the
boundary dispute.
The advancement of India–China ties since 1988 was obviously
predicated on ensuring that peace and tranquillity in the border areas would
be maintained and that the Line of Actual Control (LAC) observed and
respected by both sides. For this reason, it was agreed in 1993 that no
activities of either side shall overstep the LAC; that the two sides shall keep
military forces along the LAC to a level compatible with good relations; and
that prior notification for military exercises near the LAC would be given.
In 1996, these commitments were not only reaffirmed but further
developed through additional provisions. It was decided that the two sides
would reduce or limit the number of army, border defence and paramilitary
forces along the LAC and exchange data accordingly. More importantly, it
was explicitly recognized that large-scale military exercises involving more
than one division (15,000 troops) would not be held in close proximity to the
LAC. If that were to be conducted, the strategic direction of the main force
involved shall not be towards the other side. The 1996 agreement also
provided for prior notification if exercises involving more than one brigade
(5,000 troops) were to take place. This would include date of completion of
the exercise and de-induction of the troops involved.
At the same time, the 1993 agreement to jointly check and determine
segments of the LAC with differing perceptions was upgraded to a shared
objective of speeding up the process of clarification and confirmation of the
LAC. Not just that, there were subsequently detailed understandings in 2005
and 2013 on handling situations of friction, if they were to arise.
In the years that passed, we obviously did not make significant progress
on arriving at a common understanding of the alignment of the LAC in the
India–China border areas. The appointment of Special Representatives (SRs)
in 2003 did intensify the engagement, not just on the boundary question but on
the larger relationship as well. A specific mechanism was also established in
2012 to address issues pertaining to the border areas. But all the while, there
was also increasing construction of border infrastructure and depth-area
logistics on the Chinese side. In contrast, the belief then in India was that our
own border areas were best left undeveloped. This turned out to be a serious
misjudgement that has cost us dearly.
Since 2014, there have been better efforts by India to reduce this very
considerable infrastructure gap that had developed over three decades.
Greater commitments raised the budget to four times the previous level. A
better road-building record, which doubled construction and tripled
tunnelling, was also indicative of improvement. Nevertheless, the
infrastructure differential remains significant and, as we have seen in 2020,
consequential. It, therefore, takes considerable operational ingenuity to make
up for the lapses of the previous decades.
For all the differences and disagreements India and China may have had
on the boundary, the central fact was that border areas remained
fundamentally peaceful between 1975 and 2020. That is why the events in
Galwan have so profoundly disturbed the relationship. They signalled a
disregard for commitments about minimizing troop levels, informing about
their deployment and movement, and respecting the status quo. The
combination of these steps heightened the associated risks of breaching peace
and tranquillity, with the results that we all know well by now. The impact
this has had on both public and political opinions in India has been profound.
Significantly, India has never received a credible explanation for the
change in China’s stance nor convincing reasons for massing of troops in the
border areas. It is a different matter that our own forces have responded
appropriately and held their own in challenging circumstances. The issue
before us is what the Chinese posture signals, how it evolves and what
implications it may have for the future of our ties.
Even before 2020, the India–China relationship witnessed decisions and
events that reflected the duality of coexistence and competition. We saw
trade grow dramatically, though its one-sided nature made it increasingly
controversial. In sectors like power and telecommunications, Chinese
companies successfully obtained access to India and built impressive market
shares. The number of Indian students in China grew, as indeed did Indian
tourists who visited there.
In the global arena, India and China made common cause on some
developmental and economic issues, notably in climate change (UNFCCC)
and trade (WTO). Our membership of plurilateral groups like BRICS and
RIC was also a meeting point.
Yet, when it came to interests and aspirations, many of the divergences
were also apparent. China started the practice of issuing stapled visas for
residents of Jammu & Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh. Their reluctance to
deal with India’s military command in the northern sector led to the freezing
of exchanges for some time. Water-marking of Chinese passports covered
Indian provinces within their boundaries in an attempt to assert claims.
Border area frictions continued to grow as China’s infrastructure steadily
advanced.
In India, these multiple realities naturally fed an increasingly animated
debate. There was a powerful lobby that not only advocated deepening ties
but even exempting China from the limited security scrutiny that was then in
place. To some, such expanded cooperation was a compensation for the
improvement in India–US ties that was then taking place. This perhaps was
buttressed by a natural proclivity to build on a Nehruvian outlook to China,
as much as to the world. Discussions on the boundary question were,
therefore, publicly projected far more positively than the actual progress
justified. And as trade expanded, active proponents in its favour came into
their own.
Yet, the systemic response remained much more cognizant of hard
realities, seeking to put in place filters of various kinds, pushing back on
boundary-related issues and increasingly highlighting the trade deficit. The
last was effective insofar as the commitment to an FTA was finally
abandoned.
 As both India and China moved into a more confident era, their inter se
relationship also witnessed additional issues of difference. This was visible
in 2013 when the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was first
announced. Frictions in border areas continued to grow, though they
remained below a certain threshold till 2020. China’s blocking of UN listing
of Pakistani terrorists involved in attacks on India became a matter of
growing controversy. As the CPEC advanced, becoming part of the BRI, the
violation of Indian sovereignty was deemed unacceptable. China’s
opposition to Indian membership of the NSG created another problem, hardly
mitigated by its undermining of any efforts towards UN reform. And when it
came to trade, promises of better market access looked less and less credible
in the absence of delivery.
As the aggregate consequences of these developments began to be felt,
the two nations sought at the SCO Summit in Astana in 2017 to limit damage
by not allowing differences to become disputes. At the same time, they tried
to explore the factors of stability in the relationship. Subsequent summits in
Wuhan and Mamallapuram were largely in that direction. But far from
mitigating differences, they have ended up witnessing a relationship under
exceptional stress as a result of the events of 2020.

LESSONS FROM THE PAST

Given the gravity of its state now, it is natural that those who study the
relationship will be particularly concerned where our ties are heading. It is
hard to offer a definitive answer at this point in time. Whether it is our
immediate concerns or more distant prospects, the fact is that the
development of our ties can only be based on mutuality. Indeed, the three
mutuals, mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interests, are its
determining factors. There are discussions underway through various
mechanisms on disengagement at the border areas. Many of the close-up
deployments of the two sides in frictional areas have been resolved on the
basis of equal and mutual security. But any that remain and the larger issue of
de-escalation will continue to cast their shadow on bilateral cooperation.
It is untenable to suggest that there can be a return to ‘business as usual’
for the larger relationship when the situation in the border areas is far from
normal. Looking beyond, when a neighbour prepares, trains and exhorts, it is
wise to focus on the capability rather than the professed intent, especially in
a culture where public rhetoric is taken seriously. At the minimum, therefore,
whatever engagement is feasible has to be undertaken with eyes extremely
wide open.
In that context, the Indian side has to draw lessons even from the near
past when it comes to handling China. To begin with, the public
characterization of our ties is important. By describing it as a ‘strategic
partnership’ in 2005, there was conceptual confusion about its real nature.
Clearly, this description sat ill with unresolved boundary differences,
growing transgressions and competitive neighbourhood activities. In fact,
what it led to was the very complacency that made India underestimate the
implications of Chinese-built ports in Hambantota and Gwadar.
Similarly, ritualistic reaffirmations of territorial integrity could not
continue in a one-sided way. A balance has therefore been introduced. The
neglect of the border infrastructure also spoke of a casual attitude towards
the boundary dispute till 2014. Even more concerning was the underplaying
of Sino-Pakistani cooperation in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), until the
current Indian government took a firm stand in 2017 on the BRI. Despite that,
there are some from the old order who still advocate softening our stance.
On the economic side, it would appear astounding to many now that an
FTA with China could even be contemplated. In such an atmosphere,
informed scrutiny of activities within our country was not easy. The collapse
of the Quad in 2007 in face of China’s objections sent its own message,
making its revival a decade later that much harder. The very term ‘Chindia’
that was in vogue a decade earlier, with all its Nehruvian connotations,
underlines why the loss of strategic clarity can be so damaging.
Given how severely developments since 2020 have eroded confidence
and trust, it is obvious that stabilizing ties is the first order of the day. How to
embark on that endeavour is best captured by certain propositions that reflect
both experience and expectations. To begin with, agreements already
reached, such as those of 1993 and 1996, must be adhered to in their entirety,
in letter as much as in spirit. Cherry-picking individual provisions are hardly
likely to advance the objective of finding common ground.
Where the border areas are concerned, the LAC must be strictly observed
and respected; any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo cannot be
countenanced. We cannot be in denial that peace and tranquillity in the border
areas is the foundational basis for development of relations in other domains.
If they are disturbed, so inevitably will the rest of the relationship. This is
quite apart from the issue of progress in the boundary negotiations that are
being separately held. Attempts to conflate one for the other will inevitably
be seen through; it will never obfuscate the problems created by the
developments of 2020.
While both nations are committed to a multipolar world, there should be
an acceptance that a multipolar Asia is one of its essential constituents.
Obviously, each nation will have its own interests, concerns and priorities,
but sensitivity to them has to be shown by both sides. At the end of the day,
relationships between major states are reciprocal in nature. As rising
powers, each will have their own set of aspirations and their pursuit too
cannot be ignored. There will always be divergences and differences but
their management is essential to our ties. And finally, civilizational states
like India and China must always take the long view. Departures from these
axioms, as we witnessed in 2020, have serious implications.
For a variety of reasons, it is common for the Chinese to speak today of
‘international relations in the new era’. There is much that this terminology
signifies, as is often the case with them. Whether we agree or not, what is
undeniable is that the world order has now entered a very different phase
from how it was envisaged after 1945. Without exaggeration, the rise of
China is the most profound change in global politics since that of the US and
the USSR after the Second World War. It has not just implications and
lessons but significant policy consequences, especially for neighbours. India,
therefore, would also do well to regard its own relationship with China as
also having entered a new era. If there were any doubts on this score, the
changed Chinese posture in the border areas has demonstrated that
graphically. India is historically used to thinking of a Chinese presence to its
north. For the last two decades, China is also rapidly growing as a maritime
power, and we will also have to anticipate activities in the south.
Since there is so much flux underway, this might also be an opportune
moment to reflect on how China and India have approached each other
traditionally and whether there are indeed takeaways for the Indian side.
Looking back at seven decades of engagement, it would be fair to state
that India has essentially taken a bilateral approach in respect of outstanding
issues with China. There are many reasons for this, including a sense of
Asian solidarity and a suspicion of third-party interests that emanated from
other experiences. Brief exceptions to this are mostly in circumstances when
PM Nehru was compelled to turn to the US and UK after Bomdila fell to the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 1962. To some extent, the post-1971
relationship with the USSR also encouraged India to look at its relationship
with China in the larger global context. But these were not lasting, and after
1988, India reverted to the earlier tradition of engagement without
leveraging. Underlying this narrow view was also a belief that problems
between the two countries were resolvable in the near term.
On its part, India has been remarkably consistent and steady in its
approach to the resolution of differences, including on the boundary question.
As a result, Indians have generally been less contextualized in their approach
and do not readily correlate the relationship with developments in larger
world politics. There was neither an inclination to practise balance of power
nor indeed an appetite for using opportunities presented by international
developments. Nehru’s own excessive caution in 1962 was one illustration
of this belief. In fact, Indian policy in the past has exhibited such a degree of
self-restraint that it led inadvertently to the expectation that others can have
influence, if not a veto, over its choices. That era, too, ended in 2014.
The Chinese approach to India has been quite contrasting. While there
have undoubtedly been sentiments of Asian commonness expressed from time
to time, these have not obfuscated time-tested approaches to dealing with
neighbours. So much so that Pakistan’s membership of Western military
alliances was overlooked by China in the 1950–60s as part of a balancing
strategy. A decade later, this was taken to higher levels through nuclear and
missile collaboration that specifically targeted India. When it comes to
bilateral negotiations, China has focussed on differentials rather than on
maintaining the logic of its positions. There have been radical shifts in its
stance, especially in regard to its claims and priorities on the boundary
question.
Overall, it can be asserted that in keeping with its fundamental world
view, contemporary China has treated its relationship with India as a subset
of a larger engagement with the world. Modulations accordingly reflect not
just the bilateral dynamic but the global situation as a whole.
It is worthwhile to dwell for a moment here on the relevance of the West
in the unfolding of India–China relations. This is often the subject of Chinese
polemics, and Indians then tend to go on the defensive. There is no question
that given its dominance, the West has been very much a factor of
calculations for both parties. But the record shows that it is actually China
that has been more active in bringing it into play.
 For two decades after the PRC was founded, India’s ties with the West
were relatively much better, though there were issues of divergence. Indeed,
China itself was key among them, especially between India and the US during
the Nehru–Krishna Menon period. It was, therefore, something of an irony
that as ties worsened over the border dispute, China’s portrayal of India’s
relationship with the West started to change. When we finally did turn to the
West, it was actually only as Chinese forces overwhelmed Indian defences in
November 1962. Yet within a decade, it was China that made a sharp about-
turn through its rapprochement with the US, reflected in the visits of Henry
Kissinger and Richard Nixon. The resulting China–Pakistan–US triangle,
thereafter, posed a serious challenge that could be answered only through the
Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971.
It is noteworthy that in pursuance of its interests, China had no hesitation
in establishing global coordination with the Western bloc. There was a time
when it even publicly advocated the formation of a ‘single line’ of nations in
the same latitude (China, the US, Japan and Europe) to counter the USSR and
its friends. Vietnam was kept in check through direct pressure and India,
more indirectly, through Pakistan. This was the history that was sought to be
put behind when India and China came to terms pragmatically in 1988.
But it is still one worth recalling for many reasons. To start with, China
had built up enough constituencies of support in the West to insulate its
economic cooperation from whatever political differences may crop up from
time to time. This allowed it to reap economic and technological rewards
while still engaging in political disputation. India must, therefore, fall neither
for a simplistic description of national contradictions nor assume a zero-sum
game between China and the West. Then, for all the homilies that are now
handed out about the evil intentions of the West, Indians would do well to
remember the advocacy of a China–US G2 last decade. Given inconstancy of
policies, these are tendencies that must never be entirely disregarded. After
all, a little more than a decade ago, China was making common cause with
the US on South Asia. In contrast to China’s swing from one extreme to the
other, India has maintained a stable and evolutionary approach to the West.
How, when and to what extent India should engage the West is its national
prerogative. The expectation that we must conform to the ups and downs of
another nation’s policy is unrealistic and unjustified. And, of course,
previous events have demonstrated that when they so wish, India and China
can keep their ties on a positive trajectory and insulated from other
relationships. Expressing anxieties about the West should not become a cover
to constrain the legitimate interests and choices of the other party. Therefore,
when such arguments are advanced, the best response is to place a mirror in
the room!

PREPARING FOR A DIFFICULT ERA

India and China are quite distinct in their persona and behaviour, even though
they are neighbours. As it is not a command polity, public opinion plays a
much greater role in India’s perception of its external relationships. It is not
only more quickly exercised but when that happens, also slower to forget.
Factors like faith and values have a relevance that is not readily appreciated
by those who do not share them. Moreover, reactions are less determined by
cost–benefit analysis, and perceptions tend to be more permanent. The
interplay of internal politics with foreign policy can also be complicated in a
democratic and pluralistic society like India. We may be seeing public
reversals in the traditional stance of political players who embraced China
earlier on matters ranging from security to economics. But transient politics
should not let us hide the deeper truths. Insofar as border areas are
concerned, the outcomes of 1962 and continuous neglect of the infrastructure
have to be effectively addressed through determined responses. And that is
exactly the exercise underway.
When it comes to the border, India stands significantly disadvantaged by
the topography. The nature of the terrain makes the boundary far harder to
secure from the south than from the north. This is further compounded by the
outcome of the 1962 war. In many sectors, China vastly benefited by the
38,000 sq. km. territory that it gained during the conflict. In fact, even recent
developments like the bridge building across Pangong Tso and establishment
of border villages take place in areas whose control passed into their hands
60 years ago. And the infrastructure neglect till 2014 compounded this
predicament.
India, therefore, needs to factor in these legacy complications while
refashioning a response for a more difficult era. Some of that is to step up its
efforts on the ground, some to explore effective technology options. Given
the manifest commitment to defend its interests, an optimal combination will
always emerge to be continually refreshed. All of that has come into sharper
focus for a government that is fully seized of the magnitude of the challenges
before it.
The second issue is that of comprehensive national power. Naturally,
there are outcomes that reflect the lack of purpose on the Indian side till
2014. Technology and tactics can offer some compensations on their own
score. India is, therefore, compelled to imaginatively address the problem of
dealing with a powerful adversary. Policymakers of the past may shirk their
responsibility, but the record is there for all of us to see. Indeed, we have
already noted a radical shift in the positioning of many who advocated a very
different outlook in office.
The sensible response, of course, is to build deep strengths as rapidly as
possible, where necessary, in partnership with others. The current
geopolitical scenario offers more possibilities in this respect. But there must
be both the full awareness and the greater determination to exploit such
opportunities. Nothing is more important than securing our borders.
There are even larger developments pertaining to India’s status that feed
into the problems of our times. We are all aware how much Partition
diminished our strategic stature. But what it also did was create the basis for
a subcontinental balance of power. And even worse, the incomplete exercise
of sovereignty in Jammu & Kashmir in 1948 allowed a physical contiguity
that is now a matter of deep concern. Ideological blinkers were responsible
for the wilful neglect of the first principles of international relations in the
past. Even open Sino-Pakistan collaboration since 1963 has consistently
been underestimated, failing to prepare us for what was to come next. When
the CPEC was unveiled as part of the BRI, its forthright rejection by India
was second-guessed publicly by some in the country. Excuses were advanced
and workarounds sought to be invented, all the while ignoring a clear
message from China.
In its current state, it is natural that there will be a debate in the
relationship about ways of mitigation. An issue that presents itself is whether
intensive economics is an effective answer to complicated politics. There
was a period when significant sections of opinion in India believed in such
possibilities. When China was described as a ‘strategic partner’ in 2005,
this was in the expectation that the optimistic view of ties would prevail.
In the last decade-and-a-half, those hopes have been belied. Economics
has hardly helped in stabilizing politics and, to add insult to injury, actually
become a cause of problems in itself. One part of it is the reality of global
supply chains that emanate so much from China, but the other is the fact that
we have made it so hard till recently to undertake manufacturing in India.
Indeed, there are influential voices that still argue that this is neither the
competence nor the destiny of India! The result is that market-access
challenges and a mounting deficit have made trade with China increasingly
problematic. This is fuelled by the contrasting shares that technology and
digital businesses have in each other’s markets. The irony is that those who
claim to be concerned are the very parties responsible for this predicament.
Indians must realize that only a sustained effort in building domestic
alternatives can rectify the situation. But there is no doubt that the Covid
pandemic has heightened awareness of the risks of such massive external
exposure. This has only been accentuated by the concerns emanating from the
escalated friction in the border areas. ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ has now
emerged as much as an expression of strategic response as of economic
capability. Even though there is a strong proclivity in India to deal with
China more bilaterally, some of the global debates of our times do intrude
into the ties. This is particularly so in respect of domains like supply chains,
technology, data and connectivity. In fact, the more global China becomes, the
more these larger discussions will shape the response of its interlocutors.
Like the rest of the world, India, too, is grappling with the reality that the
established economic models are unable to cater to the realities of the day. It
is clear that the logic of comparative advantage does not work with respect
to those who are autonomous of market forces. And obviously, the world is
simply not geared to take on the challenge of unrestricted competition, when
every factor of production and consumption can be leveraged.
Where India is concerned, it is only a departure from an established way
of doing business that can yield results. And there are transformations
underway, that of resilience and reliability when it comes to supply chains
and trust and transparency when it comes to data. These offer real
possibilities to build greater national capacities in various fields.
In the interim, it is essential that India is cautious about exposing its
economy more substantially to unfair trade. This is not protectionism but
economic self-defence. Resisting the lure of quick fixes is also necessary to
build up domestic supply chains. When it comes to global competition,
India’s choices are best made in terms of what serves its interests well.
These considerations must guide its choice of partners on connectivity
initiatives and technology development as well.
 The ability of India and China to cooperate in multilateral and
plurilateral forums has naturally had some effect on their ties. Even now,
there are some regional, developmental and political platforms that they co-
inhabit. At the same time, the last decade has seen the emergence of new
mechanisms dedicated to promoting the welfare of the global commons
where the interests of the two neighbours diverge. It is helpful for the overall
India–China relationship if the sum total of their diplomatic activities
remains on the positive side of the ledger. But this is not that easy to realize
given the differences on display when it comes to the expansion of the NSG,
reform of the UN or the spread of the BRI.
Accommodating the rise of others while in the midst of your own cannot
be easy. When it comes to strengthening multipolarity, India will obviously
first evaluate how much of it applies in Asia itself. Similarly, when it comes
to rebalancing, Indian choices will lean towards those options that accelerate
its growth. But what should be clear is that a nation like India, which long
viewed sovereign equality as a fundamental principle of international
relations, will continue to do so in the times ahead.
Seen from a narrow bilateral perspective, it is not unexpected that the
rise of India has been underplayed by China. Efforts to structurally shape its
shared neighbourhood is naturally of deep interest to us. Prominent among
that has been the BRI, one of whose corridors, we have noted, violates
India’s sovereignty. The maritime space is also beginning to undergo a
noticeable transformation, one clearly not to India’s benefit.
In all of this, the global commons has been left to the commitment of like-
minded partners who share a sense of responsibility. India’s interests and
influence have widened eastwards at this very time. The conceptualization of
the Indo-Pacific and the emergence of the Quad are examples of a
contemporary response to emerging demands. They also underline the
importance of not according a veto to others on sovereign choices.
When it comes to India–China relations, references are often made to it
being the foundation of an Asian century. This goes back to some remarks that
were made by Deng Xiaoping more than three decades ago. Events of the last
few years, however, point to the converse reality that their inability to get
along can jeopardize such prospects. The search for a modus vivendi,
therefore, becomes a quest for multipolarity in Asia. And that, in turn, has
evolved into a larger debate about exercise of choices, concerns about the
global commons, respect for international law, and an engagement on the
basis of sovereign equality. In its economic dimension, there is a parallel
debate underway on the need for fair trade, the importance of equal
opportunities, the compulsions of risk mitigation, and building resilient and
reliable supply chains while promoting trust and transparency.
In the games that nations play, political romanticism and cultural pride
can often become manipulative cards. Forging a united front against the West
and suggesting that Asia must be for Asians are tried-and-tested tactics that
appeal to the insecurity of the post-colonial world. The reality, however, is
remorselessly unsentimental and much more competitive. In a globalized
world, keeping others out while seeking access to their regions is unrealistic.
In a strategic one, partners should be chosen on interests and not on the basis
of sentiments or prejudices. A more culturally assured India would surely
see the difference.
India’s answers for a more balanced and stable relationship with China
lie in a range of options across multiple domains. Given the developments of
2020, they obviously centre around an effective defence of the border. This
was undertaken even in the midst of Covid. A fitter and more technology-
enabled military is evidently the need of the day. Peace and tranquillity on
the border areas clearly remain the basis for normal relations. This is far
from equating it with resolving the boundary question. The reality is that even
this lower bar was breached in 2020! Economically, further progress in
expanding manufacturing and promoting ‘atmanirbhar Bharat’ is key.
Internationally, building more relationships and promoting understanding of
its interests will strengthen India. We must continue to compete effectively,
especially in our immediate periphery.
Establishing a stable balance between India and China after 2020 is not
easy. If that has to emerge, it can only become sustainable on the basis of
three mutuals. The international situation could even contribute to that
process, as India strives to find an optimal positioning in the East–West and
North–South divides. But there has to be an acceptance of multipolarity in
Asia. The last few years have been a period of serious challenge, both for the
relationship and for the prospects of the continent. The continuation of
tensions will have its consequences. New normals of posture will inevitably
lead to new normals of strategy. Whether a long-term view of their ties will
prevail is the big question.
The India–China relationship is now truly at a crossroads. The national
will, policy confidence, global relationships and growing capabilities of
India are on display. Choices that are made will have profound
repercussions, not just for the two nations but for the entire world.
Respecting the three mutuals and applying the resulting propositions to the
growth of their ties may help both nations to make the right decisions. That is
best done when the relationship is approached with clinical analysis, global
strategy and delivery on the ground. It is only when our approach to China is
steeped in realism that we will strengthen our image before the world as
Bharat.
 Chapter 9.
RE-IMAGINING SECURITY
Adjusting Habits to Contemporary Times

C
orrosion is now the new competition. In a world of constraints and
risks, nations now penetrate and influence rather than directly confront
each other. So, if the threats are different, our defences must be too.
And that starts with greater awareness of our times. There was an era when
we thought of security essentially as policing, law and order, intelligence and
investigation. We would stretch it understandably to counter-insurgency,
counter-terrorism and border defences. As an extreme case, our thoughts
perhaps extended to military conflict. Today, however, you might want to
think that through again. Life is not what it used to be; neither are its
challenges.
It is not that these entrenched problems have become less; it is quite the
contrary. It is that even as we remain focussed on the abnormal, the ‘normal’
has taken very concerning forms. Every day, all around us, activities and
interactions are happening that put our polity and society at risk. Unless we
wake up to how much globalization can impact our security, a day may come
when we will find ourselves compromised beyond redemption. More
powerful nations are struggling with their own versions of this predicament.
Our world has changed profoundly and so, too, must our sense of
security. This means looking at the variables of global politics and
appreciate what it really means to be in an interdependent and
interpenetrative world. The ‘knowledge economy’ that we are now getting
accustomed to can generate new metrics of power. The strongest today is
increasingly defined as the smartest. And as the epics would confirm, this is
not altogether unprecedented.
Knowledge is power and, in critical situations, often more than that. In a competitive world, this
puts a premium on intelligence, assessments and understanding. In a battlefield situation,
insights and information can be a veritable trump card. And indeed, this is exactly what we see
unfolding in the Ramayana.
The battle between Lakshmana and Indrajit, Ravana’s son, is considered in many ways to
be the turning point before the final denouement. Its setting is preceded by a ‘psy-ops’, where
Indrajit created a virtual Sita and killed her in the presence of the monkey army. He then sought
to use the resulting confusion to complete an asuric sacrifice that would make him invincible. It
is here that knowledge makes a difference. His uncle Vibheeshana understood exactly what he
was doing and counselled Rama accordingly. Lakshmana was sent to Nikumbhila to prevent
the completion of the sacrifice. After battling for three days and nights, he killed Indrajit by using
the Indrastra.
There is also a preceding encounter with another son of Ravana, the giant Atikaya, where
inside information makes a difference. Struggling to hold his end up in the duel, Lakshmana
was advised by Vayu that only the Brahmashakti can kill this demon, which it did, much to his
relief. Indeed, Rama himself was the beneficiary of his charioteer Matali’s advice to use the
Brahmastra against Ravana at the crucial moment of their battle. Clearly, informationized
warfare provides not just an edge but can be a complete game-changer.
If there is an underestimated character in Ramayana, it is Ravana’s younger brother
Vibheeshana. Perhaps his disassociation from the parent clan, even for virtuous reasons, left
a taint in the public mind. But the fact remains that at the turning points of this saga, he made a
crucial contribution. This was something that Lord Rama understood and anticipated when he
welcomed him into his ranks despite the reservations of his advisers. He sensed
Vibheeshana’s ambition to replace Ravana and, significantly, crowned him as the king of
Lanka before the battle began. Apparently, regime change has a long history!
On his part, Vibheeshana provided invaluable information through a network built by his
allies Anal, Sampati, Pramati and Panas. It was to him that Rama continuously turned for
tactical intelligence during the course of the war. And when Rama and Lakshmana were
disabled by Indrajit using the Nagapash, it was Vibheeshana who gained time for their
recovery. Adopting from the ranks of adversaries is always a tricky situation. There are inbuilt
doubts and suspicions to that process. But as Lord Rama demonstrated, it really pays off
when this is not just sound judgment in the beginning but also the courage to stick to that call
through trying times.
A related aspect is the power of the narrative. If assiduously built up, it becomes the basis
for dominance, where even the will to resist can be weakened. Ravana is generally regarded
as invincible until he was defeated by Rama. The reality, however, was a little different, and it is
to Ravana’s credit that he was able to create such an effective reputation. That he defeated
virtually all his contemporaries was crucial in this projection. So, too, was the fact that his son
Meghanada was able to vanquish the king of gods (Indra), thereby earning the sobriquet
Indrajit. But it was also true that, on occasion, Ravana was bested in combat and forced to
accept that outcome. Among those who defeated him was Vali, when Ravana sought to
capture him in the midst of his meditations. There was also an encounter with King Kartavirya
Arjuna of Mahishmati that went rather badly. They both happened to be immersing themselves
in the Ganga at the same time, and Arjuna’s activities interrupted Ravana in the midst of his
worship. In the ensuing battle, Ravana was captured and taken back as a prisoner to
Mahishmati. It finally took the intervention of his grandfather, Sage Pulastya, to secure his
release. In both cases, Ravana not only beat a retreat but came to a compromise with his
adversaries.
Sometimes, even great powers realize their limitations and arrive at accommodations.
Expending energy on ‘forever wars’ or trapped in an infructuous conflict is neither prudent nor
rewarding. Growing power is always accelerated by smarter calculations and course
corrections. But most of all, Ravana’s reputation underlines the power of narratives and how
they can become a potent weapon in themselves.

UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITY CONUNDRUM

As a start, let us reflect on the changes that are not always sharply perceived,
and then understand how much of our challenges really reside below the
waterline. Does it really take acts of violence or spilling blood for a
happening to be assessed as injurious? A lot of our security threats are
gradual and corrosive, not necessarily blunt trauma. If our nation’s unity and
integrity is weakened and alternative loyalties created, should we remain
indifferent? If sympathy, succour and support are given abroad to separatists
in the name of democratic freedoms, should we display equanimity? When
national development, especially critical infrastructure, is impeded, do we
show indifference? When influence operations are undertaken to shape
societal thinking, can we really afford to be complacent? If policy choices
for an open economy lead to de-industrialization and external dependence,
what does it say for our future? Strategic autonomy can only come from
strategic security.
Much of the security debate now revolves around exposure, penetration
and vulnerabilities. This is the new world where normal activities can so
easily be transformed into malevolent intent. Raising such issues is not a case
for tightening control, strengthening authority or turning our backs to the
world. It is, in fact, a plea to wake up, prepare, augment, and most of all, not
let our defences down.
Indian society is continually seized with the challenges of security,
perhaps more than many of its contemporaries. Like the rest of the world, it
faces conventional and non-conventional threats of a broad range. Law and
order issues and even internal security are obviously more complex in a
large, pluralistic and diverse polity. Concerns about terrorism are
particularly sharp since India has experienced unrelenting violence from
across its borders. Externally, the task of securing unsettled boundaries has
always been an exacting one. That current generations have direct memories
of multiple conflicts also shapes our thinking.
Each of these aspects naturally requires an upgraded response. But there
are significant concerns as well that are embedded in our increasingly
connected existence. Because they are intrinsic to the engagement with the
world, there is no getting away from these problems. When it comes to
security, doing more and doing better is no longer enough. India needs to do
things differently and that means thinking differently. Enhancing security
today requires re-imagining it.
Those who spend their lives dealing with national security perhaps
appreciate more readily how much our very definition of that term has
evolved. Change is driven by the impact of globalization on all societies, the
penetration of technology into our daily lives and a more competitive global
scenario. What, where, when and how threats emanate is as complicated to
anticipate as the manner in which we need to respond, protect and counter.
We are required to not only deal with a more intricate framework in which
threats are assessed but do so with greater variables. Together, they ensure
that the normal has become increasingly unpredictable and that the uneventful
is but an exception.
At the heart of the security conundrum is the seamlessness created by the
fusion of economic interdependence and technological interpenetration. They
have facilitated the flow of information, ideas and ideologies in a manner
previously inconceivable. There are the human aspects as well, pertaining to
the extent of observance of rules and norms. We cannot be oblivious of the
paradox that while our existence is more capability-driven, we are more
vulnerable at the same time. The very factors that hold so much promise for
growth and prosperity are also the source of anxiety in the wrong hands.
Understanding why security issues need to be approached beyond the
orthodox construct springs from these particular realizations. India is a polity
that not only values its engagement with the world but is actively seeking to
expand it. In fact, the drivers of progress at home link us more deeply every
day to a range of factors outside. The task before us is, therefore, to arrive at
optimal solutions that maximize benefits while minimizing risks. The era
when this could be done through physical controls is now well behind us.
Instead, the requirement is to comprehend, anticipate, prepare and out-think
whatever problems the nation is likely to encounter. To do that effectively, it
is absolutely vital to develop an accurate and updated understanding of what
the world is really about. And today, our existence is shaped by a set of
trends and happenings whose externality does not in any way mitigate their
deep domestic relevance.
Any objective global assessment now has to recognize the prospect of
uninhibited competition among nations, especially the major ones. What that
essentially means is that they have not only developed many more
capabilities and influence but are also more inclined to exercise them. It is
expressed through visible linking of sectors that were generally regarded as
autonomous. Business, energy and finance are treated as intrinsic to strategy,
as are sports, tourism, education and politics. Norms and firewalls have
fallen by the wayside in that process, as have assumptions of what is fair or
acceptable. Some of this transformation is structural, but it is strengthened by
changes that are behavioural. Globalization and technology would reflect the
former; nationalism and unilateralism the latter. The world has seen a sharp
increase in risk-taking propensities. No country can remain uninvolved or
unaffected, and India is no exception. The bottom line is that our external
environment is now much more hazardous.
But the home front is no less challenged, since the phenomenon of
borderless politics has erased that comfort too. Many of the same forces also
contribute to it, but the variables stack up differently. The ability and the
inclination to pronounce on, influence and direct developments in other
societies are clearly on the rise. Like established globalization, borderless
politics is also played to the benefit of a few. But as in that case, it also
shares the advantage of being marketed as in the interest of many. Its
expressions range across every medium of opinion formulation and image
shaping. Through shaping narratives and argumentation, it seeks to both
legitimize and de-legitimize. This may be a broader phenomenon, but that
should not obfuscate its security implications. After all, it can disenchant or
disturb, or on occasion, incite and encourage challenges. Indeed, motivating
beliefs are often backed by a flow of accompanying resources to make them
more actionable. It is, therefore, a naïve polity that does not monitor external
transactions and when required, regulate them.
Significantly, Western nations are as active as non-democratic ones in
this respect, whether legislatively, through intelligence or by administrative
action. When India is sometimes targeted on that score, the irony is that such
criticism often comes from those with more stringent monitoring practices.
Like many other developments, borderless politics, too, spans a broad
spectrum. At one end, there is a desire to assist fellow travellers and those
with shared benefits and interests. On the other extreme are endeavours that
lead to radicalization, violent extremism or even terrorism.
Then there is the securitizing of the routine. We tend to think of dangers
and vulnerabilities as arising from unusual situations: a conflict, a clash, a
disturbance or preparations for them. But modern life has taken us into a web
of technologies, activities and instruments that can be utilized without the
user or the target even being aware. Every day, in myriad ways, we are
exposed to risks of different kinds. The most obvious example is that of data
and the processes that help generate it. How data is harvested and AI is
developed is one of the most intense areas of global contestation. It could be
digital transactions and the cyber world that have become so much more
salient in our daily routine or the critical infrastructure on which a society is
so dependent.
In fact, the Covid experience taught us how even domains unconnected
with technology can enhance our vulnerability. In a world of supply chains,
shortages can emerge at sensitive moments in key areas. This may be the
outcome of logistical disruption, but equally of a planned strategy. As a
result, global concerns have focussed more on resilient, reliable and
redundant supply chains and, in the digital world, on greater trust and
transparency.
The real problem, however, is the weaponization of everything. In recent
years, the world has recognized how domains like trade, finance, investment
and logistics can be leveraged for strategic purposes. Indeed, market shares
and sectoral dominance have been created with that very end in mind. Some
nations have put forward entire initiatives that advance objectives that
remain hidden until it is too late. Others have been starker, like in the
application of sanctions as means of pressure.
Once the mindset of weaponization sets in, almost nothing is safe. It can
be directing or withholding the flow of tourists, the supply of raw materials
and components or exercising the power of a large vendor or customer. When
the market economy is subjugated to non-market goals, we then realize how
the normal has added to fragility. In truth, the world has long lived in a
twilight zone where rules were manipulated for globalization gains. Now that
the chickens are coming home to roost, we are belatedly waking up to the
resulting concerns. Ironically, when strategy demands, even espousers of
free-market virtues are prepared to give their principles a short shrift.
Security assessments, therefore, now require a comprehension of how
dependencies are created and exploited. There is also an understandable
trend among polities with greater security consciousness to scrutinize
investment inflows and business takeovers.
On top of all this is the now increasingly recognized power of big tech
companies, whose market capitalization often exceeds the GDP of nations.
This is not just about the mammoth size of the relevant enterprises. Nor is it
necessary to enter a debate about the politics and ethics of their influence. As
realists, we can be neither oblivious to their relevance in our daily life nor
impervious to the outcomes that they can help influence. Concerns about
privacy and commerce have now mutated into something much larger. We are
used to State and non-State actors. But enterprises with their own mega-
interests are breaking new ground in modern international relations.
The problem that society at large faces is that these enterprises seek to
work on their own agenda and norms. Moreover, recent events have
underlined that even strong States find it tough to fully gauge, leave alone
control, enterprises of this scale. Such entities can even provide capabilities
that are normally associated with governments or stake out their own line of
geopolitics. Businesses betting against governments and nations is not new in
itself. But the manner in which they do so has been facilitated by our way of
life. We cannot be blind to these winds of change.

WAR BY OTHER MEANS

It can be justifiably argued that every society’s understanding of security

matures, whether spatially or otherwise. Distant threats became more real
and imminent as mobility improved. Those who mastered such techniques on
an impactful scale became dominant; the rest were their victims.
We, in India, of course know it as part of the Panipat syndrome and,
thereafter, the colonial experience. History offers many telling examples
elsewhere. The modern era, however, has taken this to a completely different
level. For, in effect, globalization and technology have, between them, erased
distances and, thereby, create unprecedented challenges.
 The old way was to contemplate military capabilities or coercive acts
that were instrumental in creating outcomes, balances and influence. Even
then, human relationships and financial transactions that were more humdrum
and repetitive made a crucial difference. Imperialism advanced by
combining all of this effectively. But today, the latter two are more potent in
the penetration of societies through the course of normal activities and in
creating options, leaving it to be decided when and whether they are to be
exercised.
The most underestimated concerns are, therefore, what take place as
routine in daily life. From the security perspective, globalization should be
assessed for the interpenetration and interdependence that it embodies. And
that, in turn, underlines that distance is no longer a safeguard. After all, we
have all discovered that self-radicalization can happen without leaving
home. Globalization has not only brought the world to our doorstep, it has
also carried the accompanying opportunities and anxieties with it. The more
technology-centric our life becomes, the more serious the challenges will be.
Even as this spectrum of vulnerability widens, our expectation of what
constitutes adequate protection is also expanding. National security was
traditionally viewed largely in narrow military, policing and legal terms,
highlighting the assumption that threats were both far away and well-defined.
But neither hold true any longer. Furthermore, experiences of dependence and
pressure, such as of technology and finance, as also of food or fuel, have
rekindled a global debate on the merits of strategic autonomy. Bringing
economic security to the heart of national security has been facilitated by the
rise of China, the changed American discourse, impact of Covid, the Ukraine
conflict and the Middle East violence. It has given more weight to livelihood
concerns as opposed to profitability considerations.
This steady expansion of what impinges on collective comfort levels has
added sharper edges to every nation’s calculation. Indeed, disruption itself
has become the driver for constantly evolving definitions of security. The
value that partnerships and cooperative arrangements now offer as
reassurance has increased in value.
Changes are not just structural; they can also be behavioural. We must
recognize the inflection points of the last two decades in this context. These
include the 2008 global financial crisis and changed leadership styles in
many power centres. It continues all the way to the Covid pandemic and the
Ukraine conflict. All in all, we are seeing heightened competition in global
politics led by major powers. There is less questioning now when nations
use every instrument of influence at their command to advance their interests.
In the past, such tools were visualized as a spectrum, with application of
force as one extreme and the power of example as the other. There were
practical options that emerged in between, and even their use was tempered
by shared interests and common restraint. Perhaps these have not always
worked. Whether it was the selective use of force or the application of
sanctions, those who had an edge have often chosen to use it. But as a whole,
the belief in globalization tended to be a discouragement to adventurism.
However, as stakes rose and contradictions sharpened, major powers have
displayed the mentality of ‘war by other means’. What characterizes our
times is a willingness to be far more muscular and unabashed in using the
toolbox of influence and capability. That it also contains more tools only
encourages the practice further. In fact, we are seeing that approach develop
to a point of exploiting many aspects of our globalized life and its activities.
Trade was always political, but is much more so today. Market shares are
being openly leveraged for political messaging, whether by buyers or sellers.
Monopolies, whether of goods or technology, are being even more ruthlessly
exploited. Finance is equally potent, be it the power of currencies or the
desperation of debt. Connectivity has acquired a growing connotation of
linkage and dependency, assisted by lack of transparency and market
viability. Technology, in fact, takes it to a new level because it can be
harnessed even more intrusively. As for data, this offers a unique insight into
the very mindset of societies. Even the flow of tourism, when it is directed,
becomes a card in the influence game. All of these are ‘normal’ facets of
interdependence, often entered into without adequate thought or due
diligence.
But competitive politics is not just an exercise in leveraging or coercion;
it is equally one of inducements. As a result, projects, activities and
interactions all represent avenues to promote and exercise influence. We see
that across a broad swath ranging from education and business to media and
entertainment. That interpenetration is now so natural and extensive makes
these possibilities that much easier.
Encouraging acquiescence or engineering change is as old as politics.
The modern nation-state provides the analytical construct for this to be
played out as international relations. In its most extreme form, these
endeavours are aimed at asserting control by subjugating others. Reality,
however, rarely reaches that level. It is more often expressed as acquiring
and sharpening instruments of influence. In a way, it is work continuously in
progress. The more dominant nations, by definition, are more active in
offense while the vast majority are focussed mainly on defence. Creating a
global order is one outcome of this exercise since it establishes mechanisms
that regulate behaviour and legitimize demands. Depending on the domain,
standards can have great utility by making the capabilities of a few the
aspirations of many.
In the evolution of societies, progress in the security world and that in
everyday life have always been connected to each other. Advances in one are
naturally transposed on the other, whether we speak of materials,
communication, platforms or activities. What has often begun in laboratories
or businesses has ended up in armouries. Equally, commercializing security
inventions or discoveries has been successful over the ages. However, as the
world has become more globalized, the lines separating the two are
becoming fainter. Some of this reflects the more integrated nature of
technology; others derive from a deliberate civil–military fusion. In some
nations, in a situation where less is taken at face value, we must be aware
that economic activities cannot only enhance security capabilities but can
even be driven by them. Where business ends and security begins is no
longer easy to distinguish.
Behaviour, too, can be shaped by setting norms and establishing etiquette.
That is why rule-making and rule-observance have become so central to
debates in international politics today. But the rules of the game are often
inadequate to either advance interests or establish an effective defence. It
becomes even more complicated when the rules are non-existent, disputed or
simply disregarded. Therefore, serious polities naturally concentrate on
building capabilities rather than assuming intent. India, too, must recognize
clearly that the former can be insurance on the latter. The basis for assured
security lies in deeper strengths, a realization that has separated the bigger
powers from the rest.
This is particularly pertinent to India because our industrial and
manufacturing capacities have not kept pace with the overall growth. Even as
we endeavour to introduce corrections, the logic for advocating rules and
norms remains generally strong. In the foreseeable future, we are more likely
to be injured than to gain from their absence. Smaller nations that do not have
our resilience will have no choice but to bend before a few power centres.
Even between major powers, rules could prevent the instability that is in no
one’s interest. At the same time, there is a developing awareness that in
domains like the digital one, rule-making can be used to freeze the leads of
established players. Increasing capabilities, therefore, needs to be
accompanied by bolder policymaking and building narratives.
Shaping opinions and conditioning thinking are integral aspects of
political contestation. If the domain of information has assumed a higher
profile now, it does not imply only recognition of its salience but also the
availability of new tools. The anachronism of propaganda may have now
yielded place to an industry driven by technology and data, but like many
other practices in vogue, we should not forget that this too has its history.
Controlling the narrative is always a fight and technology has made it far
more complex. Those responsible for law, order and security have to
struggle with it every day. It can distort, motivate, alarm, confuse and
mislead, sometimes all at the same time. But do not forget the impact of the
routine: what we read, see and hear all the time. Think about it: these are
also processes of acceptance or rejection at work. The forces that drive them
often extend beyond nation-states and traditional definitions of power and
influence. On occasion, they could root strongly for the status quo and be
sensitive to departures from it. The vehement opposition from select quarters
to the change in respect of Article 370 is a case to point. But they may
equally make the case for radicalism, or perhaps even extremism in a more
acceptable form. We see their hand at work as well when cross-border
terrorism is depicted as just a more vigorous form of post-Partition
differences.
In fact, the very image of nations is often moulded with an agenda in
mind. Data protectionism is an argument used to trivialize digital delivery
and justify data monetization. In the same vein, the concept of ‘big emitters’
seeks to evade historical responsibility. Either way, entrenched elites will
monitor and resist the kind of rebalancing that gives emerging societies the
confidence to define their own interests.
As with standards in the material field, rising powers typically face
narrative challenges from the established views of early movers. In the
world of ideas, they seek to define political correctness and make that
universal. Often, external interests are strongly aligned with local elite with
whom there is a mutual understanding. Our own experience in recent years
has revealed how good governance can be distorted as excessive state
control or how anarchy and worse are justified as exercise of democratic
rights. A polity that is oblivious to such practices is a society in danger.
The globalized era encouraged the promotion of an integrated broad truth,
magnified by well-crafted echo chambers. The unfolding of multipolarity has,
however, brought back the natural diversity of our planet. In the ensuing
competition, there is always the possibility of both misunderstanding and
misrepresentation. Since so much in security derives from perception, we
cannot be impervious to the shaping of our image. If we expect an easy
passage up the global hierarchy of power, we will be deluding ourselves.
How to define norms, where to shine the spotlight, which parts of reality are
picked, these are all par for the course. So, too, are the adjectives used in
reporting, the free pass from fact-checking and the selectivity of judgement.
But knowing full well the bias and interests, it is still a contest that we have
to enter with zest and vigour. Creating and propagating our own narratives is,
therefore, of great importance. Sections of the world have their views, but
we should not be intimidated from having a view on those views. Swimming
upstream is the karma of all rising powers.

THE ROAD AHEAD

Building adequate state capacities to deal with a more complex security

matrix is a common challenge for larger nations. The very tools that allow us
to render more effective services can also help to secure our people better.
As with more orthodox external threats, conducting security policy in an
informationized environment is the task for which we need to prepare fully. It
will have its own challenges and debates, but the direction that we need to
move in is difficult to dispute.
The world may have changed in many ways, but an incessant challenge
that India grapples with is that of terrorism. That the dangers it poses to the
international community are realized is a matter of satisfaction. But to the
extent that compromises are made for political gains or regional strategy, it is
a reminder of the task that remains. As a primary victim, we cannot expect
that others will fight for our cause if we do not do so ourselves. Mobilizing
world opinion must be accompanied by a robust defence of our own
interests. In the realm of ideas, it is also important that the trap of
normalizing terrorism must continue to be resisted vigorously. We must
ensure a brand differentiation between two neighbours who each produce
their own brand of IT graduates: one on information technology, and the other
on international terrorism.
Security has many dimensions, and promoting socio-economic
development is one whose worth is increasingly appreciated. As its impact
is felt more deeply, challenges diminish accordingly. India is now seriously
focussed on achieving its SDG targets. Precisely because the benefits are so
self-evident, there are also ongoing attempts to obstruct development and
delay progress. The resistance to road-building in Left Wing Extremism
(LWE)-affected areas is one obvious example. But if national prospects are
undermined or border area infrastructure paralysed, then it is a worry of an
even greater magnitude. As the record shows, this can come in many forms
and appearances, some openly negative while others take the cover of public
good. While noting the centrality of these endeavours to our prospects, it is
imperative that we give due priority to ensuring uninterrupted progress.
The digital domain has a special resonance when it comes to
development, especially after the Covid experience. Passport issual was an
early field of change, but we can now see that governance itself has
undergone a transformation. Given the enormous Indian digital market, it is
natural that there is a competition in harvesting the data generated. Smart
networks and services in different areas are also a subject of contests.
Sensitivity to protecting digital services and data is obviously not unique to
India. Like many others, we, too, are evaluating the vulnerabilities enhanced
by new technologies. India’s endeavour is to find the optimal landing ground
that addresses its multiple concerns. These include data protection for
citizens, making it easier to do business, ensuring the public interest of
efficient governance and safeguarding national security.
A similar sensitivity to telecommunications was a much-awaited step. It
will encourage a broader effort to make our security outlook more
contemporary. Health security was another important revelation from the
Covid experience. Today, we may be exporters of many products and,
indeed, a key producer of vaccines. But none of this should obscure the
danger of a large society like India depending on others for basic needs. The
attitude of states at a time of extreme stress offers lessons that we ignore at
our peril. But if we get it right, it can facilitate the building of capacities that
trigger their own virtuous cycle.
An active debate is underway on the nature of India’s economic
engagement with the world. No one seriously doubts the reality of
globalization or questions the need to interact with other economies. The key
issue is the terms negotiated by India. Foreign-trade liberalization should not
be practised at the cost of fair competition in our own markets. And
unfortunately, that is exactly what we have seen in the past. The subsidizing
of production and denial of market access in other parts of the world have
made it very difficult to compete. If critical production is no longer viable,
then it is not a matter of trade policy but a concern of national security. Let us
be clear: India can only be consequential abroad if it has adequate capacities
at home. It is not our fate to be just a market for goods or a generator of data
for others. A rising India will only really advance when it is an atmanirbhar
Bharat.
India’s emergence on the world stage has been an exceptionally eventful
journey. And external challenges have been as formidable as the internal
consolidation process. The traumatic Partition left consequences, some of
which are being addressed only now. And through all this, those opposed to
the re-emergence of India have done their best to make that process difficult.
Terrorism, radicalism and separatism have been used on multiple occasions.
We have been through difficult years but came through stronger due to the
sacrifices of our people. The takeaway is the need to deter our diversity
being projected as fault lines. Strengthening national sentiment, by itself, may
not discourage such continuing endeavours. That we are an open society also
means that there are more opportunities for mischief. Eternal vigilance, in
our case, is not just the price of liberty but of national unity as well.
India’s rise in the global order is not merely an ascendance on the ladder
of power. It is simultaneously a transformation of a civilizational society into
a modern nation-state. Securing borders and improving governance are no
longer enough; they are just the foundation on which many other capabilities
need to be developed. As is often the case in India, different eras will
coexist, even in the domain of security. In the coming period, our concerns
will gradually become more global. But we must not lack the boldness to
seek some of the solutions there as well. Just as we prepare for contingencies
at home, we must develop habits of cooperation abroad.
If the world carried the burden of pre-existing conditions before it was
hit by the pandemic, India was no exception. The conventional narrative in
that regard tends to focus on issues of finance and trade, with some social
and political problems added for good measure. But a truly self-critical
assessment of the last quarter century would raise deeper questions about our
very understanding of reform and globalization. It is often said that in India,
we make the changes we must rather than the changes we should. In other
words, we react to the crisis of the moment and slip back into a default
position of complacency once that appears addressed. And the truth is that
this is pretty much what has happened to us since the early 1990s.
Debates on reform have focussed largely on different aspects of the
economy, industry and commerce, which is perhaps natural if we recall that
the triggering crisis was one of balance of payments. But the undeniable
reality is that large swathes of economic, social and human activity were left
untouched. Whether it was agriculture or labour, education or administration,
the power of vested interests kept the impulses of further reform well at bay.
Our human development indices then naturally did not improve as much as
they could have, and requirements of urbanization remained as ineffectively
addressed as the demands of rural growth. Not just that, the absence of
progress across the social front began to tell increasingly even on the
economic one.
This domestic scenario was mirrored by an external strategy that has
hardly enhanced India’s competitiveness. In the pursuit of globalization, we
have been driven by short-term calculations and tactical gains. India
imported to consume, trade and profit rather than to absorb, innovate and
produce. The contrast with East Asia could not be starker. The over-
leveraging of low-cost options from outside obviously eroded domestic
manufacturing. Quite unconsciously, we began to perceive in the efficiencies
of others a solution for our own limitations. And with that, the cause of
reform remained at a level that was comfortable for the order of the day. If
self-assessments remained positive, it was because they were based on
benchmarking ourselves against our own past rather than vis-à-vis
competitors. By the second decade of this century, these realities have caught
up with us. It has led to a growing realization that globalization without a
strategy is like driving without a destination. And the true yardstick for
reform can only be its impact on comprehensive national power.
Policymakers across the world dealing with the impact of the pandemic
are now focussed on economic and social recovery. Nations have made
decisions in line with their particular circumstances, many conscious that the
real challenges still lie ahead. Addressing both lives and livelihood has been
an overarching concern for all.
 Expectedly, this is India’s primary preoccupation too at this time. The
pathway to recovery, however, also has steps of resilience that reflect the
pandemic experience. These could be in terms of the more direct concerns,
as in the health and pharmaceutical sectors. Or they could be broader,
covering domestic manufacturing, distribution and consumption. Rapidly
creating a pandemic response infrastructure and meeting huge socio-
economic needs during a crisis have created a new level of expectations,
perhaps more than we realize. If the Indian public has shown commendable
fortitude and discipline in the face of adversity, it is in no small measure due
to leadership and motivation. However, it is essential to think through
strategies that would hasten to put the scars of the pandemic behind us.
In a sense, a foundation for that has been laid by a set of initiatives since
2014. National campaigns addressed a wide range of challenges that were
traditionally excluded from the debate on reform. They range from financial
inclusion to digital delivery, both on a mass scale; from power and water for
all to affordable housing; education and toilets for girls to sanitation and
cleanliness; urban planning and rural incomes to accelerating infrastructure
building; digitization and formalization to skills development; as well as
promoting start-ups, entrepreneurship and innovation. The message was of
improving human development indices, leapfrogging using digital tools,
empowering the aspirational, and expanding opportunities and benefits. No
less important was the fact that transformation was brought about through
mobilizing and motivating society at large. By doing so, it finally put behind
us the colonial mindset that the people and the government are two different
entities. This commitment to societal transformation is clearly appreciated by
the public at large.
We must have no illusions about the fact that the road ahead will be a
long and arduous one. Looking at the horizon, there are lessons from
experiences of others that India needs to imbibe, whether in terms of human
resources, social infrastructure or economic capabilities. Basic amenities of
power, water and housing can no longer be treated as a luxury. Nor can
education, healthcare, skills and employment remain optional for some. In
particular, a greater focus on technology and manufacturing is central to
India’s prospects. Digitization could well hold the key to the credible
emergence of social welfare in a nation with stretched resources. Let us
understand that in a world where trade wars and technology battles are likely
to be more commonplace, de-industrialization is truly akin to unilateral
disarmament. Therefore, making it easier to do business is not just an
economic objective, it has enormous social and even strategic implications.
In the final analysis, it is central to the rapid strengthening of India’s
comprehensive national power. As far as reform is concerned, India would
truly arrive when we internalize that this is an endless process with ever-
widening application.
Challenges for national growth and development are not limited to socio-
economic domains. Addressing governance deficits and implementation
shortcomings are a major part of the solution. The problem, of course, comes
in many forms and variations. They range from outdated policies and
inadequate frameworks to casual implementation or even downright neglect.
At the end of the day, it is as much about capabilities as it is about
strategizing. If we bemoan the limitations of border infrastructure, we must
ask ourselves the reasons for their current state. Quite apart from a deliberate
neglect, the periphery will reflect in large measure the capabilities, or their
limits, in the heartland. Leaving parts of the country underdeveloped or
under-governed has its obvious risks, more so at the border. It also cannot be
that we rise to special challenges, while neglecting the daily routine.
Safeguarding borders, after all, is a 24x7 exercise, not only a crisis-driven
response.
Our own debates in regard to national security need to recognize this
value of putting in place the requisite structures and systems. Advocating
sweeping solutions without laying the groundwork may be dramatic politics;
it is not serious policy. On the contrary, our recent experience through the
Gati Shakti initiative shows how much the national infrastructure can
advance through stronger focus and integration. Breaking down silos and
ensuring a more integrated governance process is just as important to
national security. Underlying it is, of course, a basic willingness to fully
recognize the challenges that the nation faces. By playing down issues like
cross-border terrorism or competitive geopolitics, there has been a tendency
to look away from the hard choices. In a more difficult world, that is going to
be less possible.
Building Bharat is not a matter of falling back on our past; it is primarily
about re-imagining our future.
 Chapter 10.
THE ROADS NOT TAKEN
Recalling Leaders, Revisiting History

I
t is not often that we reflect on what we inherit. But even when we do,
there is an inclination to think of the choices made as the only ones
possible. Obviously, that cannot always be the case. It is, therefore, useful
to regularly revisit the past, especially with regard to strategic assessments.
Much of what was long assumed to be the tenets of Indian foreign policy is
actually the predilection of the first PM, Jawaharlal Nehru. And this was so
because he comprehensively dominated the scene for two decades. But the
truth is also that in the early period after Independence, there were vigorous
debates even in this domain. A lot of this was driven by his peers, including
those who did not share Nehru’s ideological bent of mind.
Three relationships, those with Pakistan, China and the US, featured
strongly in the argumentation. Overall, Nehru’s critics felt that he harboured a
sense of false internationalism that came at the cost of national interest. On
Pakistan and also on Israel, they believed he was driven by an appeasement
that was an important facet of a domestic political strategy. On China, he was
perceived by them as displaying misplaced and impractical idealism that
ignored the primary logic of statecraft. And where the US was concerned, his
views appeared to be an extrapolation of a left-wing antipathy that was so
popular in certain circles of the UK. Because these relationships are today
the focus of change, it is important for the public to be more familiar with the
critical viewpoints. After all, some of the roads not taken then are now being
traversed.
Looking back, it is also interesting to note that diverging perspectives
were not limited to a narrow group. On the contrary, they ranged from his
own deputy Sardar Patel, who passed away early after Independence, to
other cabinet colleagues like Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee and Dr B.R.
Ambedkar, who both quit to found their own political parties. In Parliament,
criticism of foreign policy was often voiced by Opposition leaders like J.B.
Kripalani, Ram Manohar Lohia, Deendayal Upadhyaya and Minoo Masani.
But there were differences within Nehru’s government as well, most notably
on China, as ties with that country worsened. Current generations would
perhaps be surprised at the salience of foreign-policy issues in driving
domestic politics, both within the ruling Congress party as well as in the
founding of alternatives.
One reason to go back in history is precisely because differing political
viewpoints gained ground to the point of one of them (the BJP) eventually
coming to power. Another is that the very issues of debate then are still the
focus of challenges and opportunities now. Whether we could have created
different outcomes is, therefore, not an entirely academic issue. But as
Nehruvian beliefs used to be projected as a norm and others as deviations,
these contestations are surely worth recognizing.
The conviction that Third World-centred solidarity would be a force
strong enough to overcome any contradiction between newly emerging
governments would be quixotic at best of times. But when actually practiced
by a serving PM vis-à-vis an immediate neighbour, it became downright
dangerous. This led to downplaying signals and actions in the 1950s that had
implications for our security and well-being. We expended political capital
espousing the cause of a neighbour who finally turned on us. And, at times,
we even deluded ourselves that we had influence over their thinking!
To evaluate such policies, it is worthwhile to reflect on the basis for this
supposed solidarity. At its heart was the conviction that there were
sentiments and forces stronger than nationalism and powerful enough to
overcome cultural identities. Those who hold such views tend to believe that
others do so as well, especially if they belong to a similar school of thinking.
It was this display of false internationalism that worried Nehru’s peer group
and led them to voice their concerns. The critique came with considerable
variation in intensity, arguments and even the issues. Because they did not
necessarily prevail at that point of time does not make their viewpoint
irrelevant, especially if subsequent events demonstrated validity.
The standing of those asserting competing points of view is also material.
Many of them were truly stalwarts of the independence struggle and some
distinguished themselves in the Constitution-making process as well. It is
also worth noting that Patel and Mookerjee directly shaped the map of India
as we know it today. Obviously, we have to appreciate the compulsions of
that period to also grasp the factors driving decisions. But, somewhere in all
that, there are learnings from the voices of dissent as we try to find new
solutions to old problems. Whether it is the standing of the leaders
concerned, the intensity of their differences or the importance of the issues,
there are good reasons for us to look back at their urgings with fresh eyes.

If there is a symbol of loyalty and sacrifice in India’s folklore, it is the elderly eagle-king Jatayu.
He was very old and virtually blind when Sita was abducted by Ravana. Yet, as the demon-king
crossed his path, Jatayu gave his all to prevent evil from happening. He attacked Ravana with
his talons, broke his bow with his beak and brought down his chariot. But in the combat, he
was bested by the abductor, who chopped off his wings and eventually left him to bleed and
die. But before he did, Rama and Lakshmana found him and learnt who was responsible for
the kidnapping of Sita. On his demise, the last rites were performed by Rama, who was truly
moved by the sacrifice of Jatayu.
Thereafter, it was his elder brother Sampati who made the difference. The monkey
contingent under Prince Angada was beginning to despair about finding Sita. As they spoke
about Jatayu’s fate, Sampati who overheard them came to their assistance. He used his
extraordinary eyesight to locate Sita, although she was imprisoned far away in Ravana’s
garden in Lanka. It was this ‘over-the-horizon’ visibility that then allowed Lord Rama and the
monkeys to now make their plans.
In India’s case, too, those with experience and wisdom had insights to offer. Some of our
leaders of that era contributed to national security by challenging decisions, even at great
personal cost. Their loyalty was no less than that of Jatayu. And their insights, as we now
appreciate all the more, as valuable as that of Sampati. We owe it to them and to ourselves to
revisit their counsel.

PATEL AND NEW INDIA

In recent years, Patel has featured more prominently in our national debates
and discussions on security. Part of the reason is the change in our political
circumstances that allows him to be brought back from the shadows. But
equally, it is a reflection of our times when hard challenges and multiple
uncertainties have highlighted the importance of leadership. More than any
other figure of contemporary India, Patel symbolizes strategic clarity and
decisive action in the midst of difficulties. Not just that, he is also closely
associated with nation-building and systemic reform. For all these reasons,
he emerges as a natural inspiration for New India.
Seventy-five years ago, both the world and India were experiencing a
different kind of turbulence, one no less in its seriousness. The Second World
War had just ended, comprehensively overturning the global order. New
centres of dominance emerged with very different interests and outlook.
Forces set into motion, many predating the conflict, eventually ended
colonial rule in many parts of the globe. At home, of course, the endurance
and determination of our independence struggle finally prevailed. But it did
so at the cost of the partition of our country, with all its accompanying
consequences.
This was the context when Patel ascended the leadership stage and took
on the immediate challenges of nation-building. He was already recognized
as among our pre-eminent leaders, admired for his political vision as much
as for his organizational skills. On the assumption of power, he took on the
most daunting responsibilities of governance, characteristically setting his
personal interests aside. It is generally agreed that he was the preferred
leader of his own organization, but he eventually yielded to the choice of
Mahatma Gandhi in that regard. And it is this period of his national
leadership that holds the most relevant lessons for us today.
In the popular mind, Patel is seen as responsible for the accession of
Jammu & Kashmir, Hyderabad and Junagadh. In reality, his contribution was
even greater. In fact, these examples, challenging as they were, took place on
a firm foundation that he had laid through a set of high-stakes and fast-paced
negotiations with many other Princely States. To those unfamiliar, it is
necessary to underline that even some southern Princely States were reluctant
initially to sign the Instrument of Accession. Certain British officials from the
Political Department deliberately encouraged many rulers to hold out,
suggesting that a ‘third force’ created through aggregation could be viable.
As a result, each state had to be individually and painstakingly engaged. In
that process, some actually went to the very brink. Those geographically
more contiguous to West Pakistan were tempted by Jinnah’s ostensibly
generous offers. It finally took the enormous pressure exerted by Patel to
ensure their accession. There were smaller principalities that were being
difficult too, often instigated from behind by larger ones. It was only in early
August 1947 that the tide turned decisively.
 Two negotiations that continued after Independence under Patel’s direct
oversight were those pertaining to Junagarh and Hyderabad. Interestingly,
both of them threw up the possibility of going to the UN, but Patel prevented
it decisively. Because these events happened within India, we tend to think of
them as politics rather than diplomacy. But as V.P. Menon has so ably
chronicled, the exercise involved the toughest negotiations we can imagine.
And whether it is in their objectives, strategy or tactics, they remain worthy
of deep study even today.
That there were differences between Nehru and Patel on referring the
invasion of Jammu & Kashmir to the UN is a well-known fact. Indeed, that
was only one aspect of a larger divergence on handling the issue. This
eventually saw Nehru divest Patel of the responsibility in the cabinet for
Jammu & Kashmir and hand it over instead to Gopalaswami Ayyangar. On
China, I have already examined how the two leaders reacted differently to its
professed posture vis-à-vis India. But for all this, the discipline that the
government, Parliament and politics impose ensured that much of the
disagreement remained restricted to their internal correspondence. In
response to Nehru’s sensitivity to criticism on foreign policy, Patel gave him
an assurance that he would limit the forum of expression to cabinet meetings.
Rather than focussing on what has been already highlighted, it may be
worthwhile to explore some other views that are less known publicly. One
relates to the difficult navigation of the Cold War era by Indian foreign
policy. Significantly, on such issues, Patel was often the voice of moderation
and caution. He felt that there was little to gain by excessively antagonizing
Western powers, especially when India’s direct interests were not at stake.
The issue was not so much about specific choices and positions but more a
discomfort with a larger attitude. From time to time, they found echo in
positions that were also taken at that time by C. Rajagopalachari. As India–
China ties worsened at the end of the 1950s, foreign policy views were
asserted more independently by serving members of the Nehru cabinet. The
point to appreciate is not whether they were right or wrong in their
immediate stance. It is more that they came out of a stronger sense of national
interest rather than an ephemeral sentiment of global solidarity.
There are two live issues right now in respect of Indian diplomacy on
which Patel offered his views in his lifetime. One pertains to the US, and he
obviously had a much less suspicious view than Nehru. In 1948, a year
before the latter paid his first visit to that country, Patel opined that the US
actually held the key to the international situation. He felt that without
American cooperation, it would be difficult for India to industrialize
significantly. Keeping that in mind, he made out a more India-centric case for
collaboration than Nehru, whose overall assessment was more coloured by
the need to create a non-aligned front. Two years later, in one of his last
public appearances, Patel pointedly remarked that many people believed that
India should not take American help because it would lose prestige and be
perceived as joining a bloc. He felt that India was quite capable of realizing
its own interest and position. In that sense, the origins of an ‘India First’
outlook go back many decades, though it clearly took a nationalist ideology
to bring it back to life now.
The other issue pertains to the hesitation in recognizing Israel and
establishing full diplomatic relations. Patel was clearly uncomfortable with
the vote-bank pressures on Nehru and believed that this should not be given a
determining say over the making of national policy. As with some other
foreign policy issues, his thinking did not prevail, and it was not until PM
Modi’s 2017 visit to Israel that this issue was finally put to rest.
The quest for a more perfect union is one that is pursued by all diverse
societies and federal polities. Indeed, if there is one area in which Patel left
an indelible imprint, it is in national integration. As a civilization that values
unity in diversity, it is vital that we nurture the bonds that bind us together.
Our journey in the last 75 years has not been without its obstacles. If we have
successfully surmounted them, it is, in large part, due to a national
determination that emanates from the Sardar’s legacy.
But there are issues left over from his era in which neglect had been
rationalized to great measure over the years. Catering to vested interests or
ignoring ground realities cannot serve us well. World politics is extremely
competitive and others are constantly looking for weaknesses within. Our
deep underlying pluralism that harmonizes so much diversity is our
civilizational strength, not just a contemporary creation. We know this
instinctively, though some parts of the world may struggle to understand.
An India that is true to its roots will always be strong and resilient. Our
thinking is best driven by self-belief and national awareness. Sardar Patel
presciently cautioned us in 1948 against submitting our positions to the
interests and judgement of others. That holds true as much now as it did then.

THE MOOKERJEE ALTERNATIVE

If Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel pursued his beliefs and commitments while
functioning within the government, that was not the case with his
contemporary Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee. There are many facets to his
contributions that are worthy of discussion. After all, he was a notable
educationist, an influential political personality, a leader in providing
humanitarian relief and an ardent espouser of our culture and traditions.
Above all, he was a fierce nationalist and one quintessentially Indian, who
approached his nation and its prospects through that perspective.
Our focus is naturally on those activities that were critical to the
direction of immediate post-Independence India. Many became the basis for
a cohesive and alternative way of thinking in this country. These expressions
of nationalism drove a debate over many decades about the nature of our
politics and governance. They also influenced our view about development
and progress, including on how best to stand on our own feet. And of course,
they shaped our approach to engaging the neighbourhood particularly and the
world at large. At one level, each of them may look like a different domain.
But the truth is that they represented a holistic worldview, and, in real life,
each was inseparable from the other.
The question that is most deeply associated with Mookerjee is that of the
accession of Jammu & Kashmir and the ensuing debate about that process
and its implications. His position is, of course, summed up by the famous
slogan: ‘Ek Desh mein do Vidhan, do pradhan, do nishan, nahi chalenge
[There cannot be two Constitutions, two PMs and two flags in one nation].’
In Parliament and outside, Mookerjee brought up concerns of balkanization
and the weakening of the Indian polity as a result. He flagged the
implications of contesting sovereignty, claiming competitive status and
restricting the display of national symbols. These issues no longer require
any further elucidation after so many years and so many experiences. We all
know how damaging it has been economically, developmentally, socially and
in terms of national security when Jammu & Kashmir were not fully
integrated into the mainstream. When that was decisively rectified on 5
August 2019, obviously our national integration emerged that much stronger.
But from a foreign-policy perspective, what is worth examining is how this
issue was taken advantage of by external powers vis-à-vis India.
Such an assessment is not a retrospective view. Even in 1953, Mookerjee
conveyed to PM Nehru that his handling of the Kashmir problem had neither
enhanced our international prestige nor won us wide international support
and sympathy. On the contrary, he felt that it had created ‘complications’ at
home as well as abroad. He, therefore, urged Nehru to re-examine policy
dispassionately rather than be carried away by ‘false internationalism’. This
reference to complications abroad must be noted because that is precisely
what came to preoccupy Indian diplomacy for the period thereafter. As
Mookerjee was to state in Parliament, India went to the Security Council on
the question of aggression, not on the question of accession. How this was
distorted by interested powers is a parallel that he draws in a manner similar
to Patel’s caution.
With the passage of time, the diplomatic consequences of the early
misjudgements on Jammu & Kashmir have receded from public memory. It is
possible that the gen-next is even unaware of the pressures that our country
faced. Yet, this must be recalled in order to fully appreciate the significance
of what was done in respect of Article 370 in 2019. The global manipulation
of the Jammu & Kashmir situation is worth examining in some detail. This
would explain what Mookerjee meant when he spoke of complications.
In December 1947, India referred the matter to the UN under Article 35
of the UN Charter as a threat to international peace and security created by
Pakistan’s support to the invaders. There is a separate debate on whether this
was the best pathway that India could have chosen at that time. But there is
no need to get into that discussion. What we should bear in mind is that the
British-appointed Governor General had, two months earlier, accepted the
Instrument of Accession in regard to Jammu & Kashmir under the relevant
legal provisions. But this did not stop major world powers from taking
advantage of an opening that the situation provided.
As the recent colonial power, the UK was in the lead. It was also the one
with the strongest post-Partition agenda and, therefore, the most mischievous.
The UK influenced the passing of a Security Council resolution calling on
both India and Pakistan to refrain from any acts that would aggravate the
situation. In effect, the aggressor and the victim were put on par. Declassified
records indicate that there was a clear strategy in the Commonwealth
Relations Office to bring in Pakistani troops and balance out India.
The next step was a move through Belgium, as the president of the
Security Council, to establish a three-nation commission. In that process,
India’s main request that Pakistan refrain from assisting the invaders was
conveniently dropped. The further sleight of hand happened when the title of
the resolution itself was changed from ‘Jammu & Kashmir Question’ to the
‘India–Pakistan Question’. Canada took over from Belgium and carried the
Western agenda forward by pressing for a Pakistani military presence in
place of the invaders if they withdrew. Matters reached a stage where India
threatened to leave the Commonwealth in protest against such bias.
As the stakes rose higher, the US and other Western allies also got drawn
deeper into the game. Intense pressures were exerted over the next few years,
including the threat to withhold assistance to India. The turning point, of
course, was a 1957 UK–US draft resolution that ended up being vetoed by
the USSR.
India’s defeat in the 1962 conflict with China saw a renewal of such
efforts in the next decade. The Harriman-Sandys Mission of 1963 that sought
to arbitrate on Jammu & Kashmir was the most serious of these endeavours.
If they failed, it was less due to intent and more because of global
circumstances and India’s resistance. The illegal 1963 China–Pakistan
agreement on Shaksgam Valley made it awkward for Western nations to make
common cause with Pakistan beyond a point. But by 1965, Western partiality
for Pakistan reasserted itself through their efforts on suppressing its
responsibility for initiating the conflict.
Although this issue moved purely to the bilateral format as a result of the
Shimla Agreement of 1972, attempts to interfere in Jammu & Kashmir
nevertheless continued. This happened publicly during the Clinton
Administration. Even the reaction of Western powers to our 1998 nuclear
tests tried to link it to this issue. While the Bush Administration moderated
this somewhat, there were nevertheless conversations behind closed doors.
Barack Obama also brought up Kashmir during his presidential campaign and
there was a debate about the US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke’s remit that
bears recalling.
Such diplomatic endeavours aside, what has hurt our interests more are
the actual violations of sovereignty and territorial integrity by China. It began
in 1963 and kept increasing through connectivity projects that later
developed into the so-called CPEC. Each of these efforts has been countered
and will continue to be so. But keeping all this in mind, we must appreciate
that in mainstreaming Jammu & Kashmir, we have not just strengthened
national integrity but also enhanced national security. And this is absolutely
vital as India raises its profile on the global stage. Certainly, our Western
partners today are much more understanding. But let that not cloud the fact
that the real change has been in our own position that draws inspiration from
Dr S.P. Mookerjee.

A question closely related to the mishandling of the Jammu & Kashmir issue
is that of India’s misreading of Pakistan, its intent and its policies. This, too,
is a long-standing issue that has cast its shadow for many decades on our
well-being and security. And here, too, there has been a decisive shift in
Indian thinking.
In Mookerjee’s case, the matter acquired particular salience because it
was the cause for his resignation from the Union Cabinet. He shared his
assessment candidly with Parliament in 1950, diagnosing the prevalent
attitude to Pakistan in words that still resonate with all of us. In essence,
Mookerjee viewed Nehru’s approach as weak, halting and inconsistent. In
his reading, India’s inaction or goodness has been interpreted by Pakistan as
weakness. In fact, according to him, it has made the latter more and more
intransigent, made India suffer all that much more and even lowered it in the
estimation of its own people. On every important occasion, Mookerjee
asserted that India has remained defensive and failed to expose or counteract
the designs of Pakistan aimed at it. This could well be the natural thoughts of
the average Indian citizen in the aftermath of the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai!
When it came to displaying strategic clarity about Pakistan, there is no
question that Patel and Mookerjee stand out. Apart from the accession of
Jammu & Kashmir and treatment of minorities, this was most notably on
display where Mookerjee was concerned in regard to his own province of
Bengal. Once the concept of partitioning India was accepted by the Congress,
the key question became the future of Bengal, Punjab and Assam. Each of
them had to be individually partitioned if the entire state was not to go to
Pakistan on the basis of a tenuous majority. It was to this cause that
Mookerjee then devoted his energies, ensuring that the metropolis of Calcutta
(now Kolkata) and as much of Bengal as possible stayed with India.
Obviously, this had direct implications for the fate of Assam and even of the
Northeast. To that end, he convened meetings of a cross-section of society
and led a public agitation that compelled a positive outcome.
Today, we cannot even contemplate the consequences of a different
result, leave alone what it could have meant for the conduct of our foreign
policy. Mookerjee did in the east what Patel did in the north and the west. In
that sense, the India of today is very much their creation.
While there is a larger point that Mookerjee was making with reference
to our approach to Pakistan, his specific analysis of the Nehru–Liaquat Pact
of 1950 is also relevant even today. Let us not forget that this understanding
was the precipitating factor for his resignation. He underlined that the pact
tried to ignore the basic implications of an intolerant State; that the declared
positions of the Pakistani government undermined any sense of minority
security; and that an ultra-communal administration was giving life to these
policies.
There is much that Mookerjee had warned about the treatment of
minorities that came true in the decades that passed. He perceptively noted
that there was a general impression that India and Pakistan have failed to
protect their minorities. The fact, however, is the exact opposite.
Mookerjee’s view was that in some sections of the foreign press, a hostile
propaganda has also been carried on. He believed that this was a libel on
India and the truth, he felt, had to be made known to everyone who desire to
know it. Apparently, some things have not changed in some quarters!
Mookerjee’s remarks on the India–Pakistan equation are of greatest long-
term relevance. He predicted much of what has gone wrong, not just in the
pact but on the broader ties with Pakistan. In that process, he identified the
key conceptual shortcomings very clearly, especially that India and Pakistan
are made to appear equally guilty, while Pakistan was in fact the aggressor.
Moreover, he pointed out that when Pakistan violated agreements, there was
no remedy open to India. He, therefore, felt that there must be sanctions built
into any understanding, an approach that would have served India well had it
been seriously followed. Seven decades after these insights on Pakistan, it is
essential that we reflect on the judgement that Mookerjee bequeathed to us.
This is all the more so as the equivalence between India and Pakistan that
was so troubling even in the initial years after Independence morphed into a
persistent hyphenation. For decades, India and Pakistan were uttered in the
same breath and their differences made to look like a natural agenda left over
from Partition. There were even periods when a military regime in our
neighbouring country was held out as an example of development! The 1971
outcome obviously changed much of this, but not as decisively as India
would have hoped. Pakistan kept trying to create an artificial balance and
was actively supported in that endeavour by both China and Western nations.
This even went to the extent of assisting and facilitating its nuclear and
missile programmes. And worse still, Pakistan increasingly resorted to
cross-border terrorism to bring India to the table.
If truth be told, our own policies were not sufficiently robust to firmly
discourage this approach either. Instead of confronting the cross-border
nature of terrorism emanating from Pakistan, we even appeared to be open at
Havana and Sharm El-Sheikh to a narrative that suggested that both India and
Pakistan were victims of terrorism. This was exactly the false equivalence
that Mookerjee cautioned us about in his time.
So, what is the answer? We have seen that unfold over the last decade in
a variety of ways. To begin with, this means a clear position on the
unacceptability of cross-border terrorism. It is obviously not in our national
interest that we normalize terrorism by carrying on with the rest of the
relationship as usual. That message has been sent loud and clear. Where
egregious actions of cross-border terrorism are concerned, the operations at
Uri and Balakot are as much a shift in our thinking as in our action.
It is also important to mobilize the international community through
advocacy and awareness creation. Only then can we be successful in
delegitimizing terrorism. As a result of our diligent efforts, there is
widespread understanding today that this is not a threat to India alone. That
the UNSC’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) held a meeting at a 26/11
site in Mumbai was a statement of no small significance. It is also our
endeavour to get global platforms and conferences, whether we speak of the
G20, meetings like ‘No Money for Terror’ or bilateral and plurilateral
mechanisms, to keep the spotlight strongly on such threats. The listing
process created by the UNSC 1267 Sanctions Committee has its own
importance. And there are no prizes for guessing which country features
prominently in it!

Another domain where Mookerjee’s views remain an inspiration is that of

cultural diplomacy. As the president of the Maha Bodhi Society of India,
Mookerjee was also the driving force in forging links with Buddhist nations,
especially neighbours. He played a personal role in the return of holy relics
from the UK and their display in Southeast Asia, including Myanmar. Today,
those initiatives are being further developed through recent activities like the
Dharma-Dhamma conferences, restoration of the Ananda Temple in Bagan,
solarification of Buddhist sites in Sri Lanka and digitization of manuscripts
in Mongolia’s Gandan monastery. Indeed, the importance we attach to our
Buddhist heritage was only underlined by the visit of G20 Development
Ministers to Sarnath. Obviously, Mookerjee’s cultural interests were much
broader and must be assessed in terms of its relevance to the anti-colonial
struggle. Our endeavours at deepening cultural rebalancing would surely
resonate with his views about the salience of that domain.

DR AMBEDKAR AND ‘INDIA FIRST’

Among the founding fathers of modern India, Dr B.R. Ambedkar is widely

recognized as the architect of India’s Constitution and the strongest voice for
social justice and inclusiveness. He was different from many of his
contemporaries in being exposed to American society through his educational
experiences. As the first Minister of Law and Justice, he served in the
cabinet of independent India for little more than four years. When he resigned
in September 1951, the main reasons were his dissatisfaction on a range of
issues pertaining to social reform. But interestingly, Ambedkar also shared
with Parliament his ‘actual anxiety and even worry’ about the directions of
foreign policy. In his view, few countries wished us ill at the time when we
attained independence. However, within four years, he felt that we had
alienated much of the world and that this was visible in the lack of support
for India at the UN.
Ambedkar, on that occasion, quoted two realists in a manner that is
relevant even today. One was Bismarck, with the observation that politics is
not a game of realizing the ideal; it is the game of the possible. The other was
George Bernard Shaw, to the effect that while good ideals are good, one must
not forget that it is often dangerous to be too good! It would seem that even
by 1951, important Indian leaders were already alarmed by the
impracticality of our diplomatic outlook.
Among Ambedkar’s specific grievances in this regard, one pertained to
the handling of the US, which he articulated in 1951 in the ‘Election
Manifesto of the Scheduled Castes Federation’ that had a section devoted to
problems of foreign policy. Like Patel, who had passed away a year before,
Ambedkar too was concerned about Nehru’s outlook towards China. But,
perhaps due to intervening events, he was now connecting it to India–US ties.
In essence, Ambedkar asked why India was fighting China’s battle for
permanent membership of the UNSC. In his view, this championing by India
had created antagonism with the US and jeopardized the prospect of getting
financial and technical resources from that country.
In what we would unquestionably recognize today as a declaration of
‘India First’, Dr Ambedkar sharply emphasizes that India’s first duty should
be to herself. In his view, instead of trying to make China a member of the
UNSC, India should get itself recognized instead. His characterization of the
Nehruvian approach was of it being quixotic, if not suicidal. And his remedy
was that India should focus on building its own strength instead of
championing the interests of other Asian states. On another occasion, he
expressed the same sentiments in his assertion that the keynote of our foreign
policy appeared to be to solve the problems of others rather than of
ourselves.
Like many of his generation, Ambedkar was obviously deeply conversant
with international affairs and visibly invested in its formulation. His plea
was clearly not one of turning India’s back on the world but instead of
making choices that would be primarily driven by our country’s gains. In that
sense, his endeavour was to get the balance between our national interest and
international posture. And like many contemporaries, he appeared to believe
that Nehru was leaning far too much in the direction of the latter at the
expense of the former.
Ambedkar, too, shared the sense that India was being naïve in its
unquestioning acceptance of the principles of Panchsheel. His own view was
that they had no place in politics; nor did he believe that China, in its heart of
hearts, differed on this matter. In a revealing parliamentary discussion in
August 1954 where he laid out his viewpoint, Ambedkar also made a strong
case for an interest-based diplomacy. He questioned what he termed Nehru’s
advocacy of ‘Asia for Asiatics’, suggesting that greater weight should be
given to political values. It is surely not without reason that seven decades
later, this debate is still very much in vogue.

MASANI’S PERSPECTIVE

There are many examples of what we may consider to be current issues

actually being debated in our history. Those I have cited above give some
flavour of what our past holds, if only political correctness does not stand in
the way of objective exploration. Among the long-held tenets of Indian
foreign policy is that of non-alignment. Even though it has a particular global
context, this has sought to be made into an immutable concept. That India’s
capabilities now allow it to move beyond defensive options is often lost on
those who treat policy debates as theological ones. But precisely because it
is invoked so often, a critical viewpoint is also worth recognizing.
Few questioned the predicaments that the practice of non-alignment could
create for India more graphically than M.R. Masani in 1959. And he did so,
understandably, as the threat from China loomed large. Masani essentially
asked whether our approach had brought us to a point where we were unable
to repel effectively an attack on our own territory. Related to that, he
suggested that by keeping a distance from the West, we were not even able to
equip our forces adequately. But more fundamentally, he was concerned that
India’s capacity to recognize a dangerous neighbour had somehow got
impaired. Its domestic reflection was discouraging our own people from
even displaying patriotism. In effect, Masani was bringing out that non-
alignment, while working in good times, was less productive in tough ones.
Keeping a distance from others also meant that they too kept their own when
they wished. Masani believed that non-alignment was not inconsistent with
the capacity to recognize a dangerous neighbour and take measures
accordingly. Significantly, much of what he said tallied with Nehru’s
hesitation to engage Western powers even as China advanced into India in
November 1962.
As with the other examples, this debate, too, is worth revisiting because
of endeavours to put India under pressure. When others extol our
independence and strategic autonomy, it is not always meant for India’s good.
They seek instead to influence our thinking in a manner that constrains our
options. In that quest, it is natural that they would use our own past against
us. And how can we blame them, when such tactics succeeded as recently as
2007 when it came to the Quad? Strengthening a sense of independence or
even autonomy does not necessarily mean staying at the centre or not making
commitments. There is an inherent flexibility in that exercise, which
somehow got lost when policy became dogmatic. Even today, tactical
nimbleness and strategic creativity have a value that cannot be overstated.
At the end of the day, strategic clarity means both a sound understanding
of the international environment as well a clear-eyed view of it from our
national perspective. There have been shortcomings on both scores in our
early periods after Independence and we paid a high price for it.
From the road taken, we must learn that national security can never take
second place, least of all to the quest for prestige. In the final analysis, hard
power will always score over soft power. Ideally, the two should be in lock-
step, so that capabilities and influence grow side by side. But the desire for
acceptance, particularly by competitors, should never become a significant
driver of diplomacy. This realization from past experiences now drives
India’s attitude towards world politics in general and our regional concerns
in particular. As always, the wisdom and foresight of our tallest leaders
serve as an inspiration for building Bharat.
 Chapter 11.
WHY BHARAT MATTERS
Grasping Our Value, Expressing Our Confidence

T
he successful landing of Chandrayaan-3 on the moon coincided with the
BRICS Summit in South Africa. Predictably, that extraordinary
achievement dominated the proceedings. Leaders of the Global South
expressed pride that one of them was capable of such a feat. This is but one
example of how much India is impacting the world today.
A few weeks later, the G20 Summit in New Delhi unanimously produced
a substantive outcome. This diplomatic accomplishment was paralleled by
the admission of the AU as a permanent member, that too at India’s initiative.
Here again, there was a larger resonance of these developments. In the years
before, India’s Vaccine Maitri effort provided health access for many small
countries, otherwise forgotten in the pandemic. Three very different
examples in very diverse domains have one message: that India matters to the
world more and more.
A new generation of more globally aware Indians naturally debates our
weight in world affairs. One way at approaching the issue is to consider why
and how India matters to others. The answers are not always that simple,
though they could start with the common-sense proposition that India has
always mattered in some way. After all, such a large landmass with so many
people and that rich a history and culture would naturally have made its
impression. By its very existence, India occupies global mind-space and its
growing vigour would only expand that appreciation. The questions now are
really of the extent to which its revival is shaping the world order and what
that portends for the future. This means choices, policies, leadership,
delivery and, not least, an awareness of who we are and how we assert our
collective persona.
In popular parlance, Hanuman is synonymous with devotion, perseverance and strength. The
irony, of course, is that Hanuman himself does not know the full extent of his own powers. As
Agastya revealed to Rama, this was the result of his antics in early youth that troubled many
sages in the midst of their meditation. Hanuman was, therefore, cursed to be forgetful until
divine duties require otherwise. As the epic unfolds and Hanuman takes on increasing
responsibilities, his own self-awareness enhances commensurately. At key junctures, he is
indeed the saviour of the situation. When Sita was abducted and a search mission was set
into motion, Sugriva divided his army and sent them in all four directions under experienced
leaders. Vinata, Sushena and Shatabali were tasked with leading the forces to the east, west
and north respectively. But it was Hanuman, along with Angada, who was given the
responsibility of going south, which was perceived as the most promising prospect. Just as
Angada was giving up on the task, Hanuman exhorted him to keep faith and persevere.
As he stepped forward during various stages of the epic, his true potential was displayed
for the world to see. When Lakshmana was struck down in battle and could only be revived by
the medicinal plant Vishalyakarani, Hanuman was sent to the Dronagiri Mountain to gather it.
Unable to identify the plant specifically in day time, he picked up the entire mountain and
brought it for the more discerning monkey-chieftain Sushena to pick the right herb. As many
other occasions testify, Hanuman is determined, innovative, outcome-oriented and self-
confident.
The legend of Hanuman could well be the story of India in the last decade. The more we
do, the more we believe we can do. It is this self-discovery that has made India so different in
recent years and set it on a course that has major implications for the global order.

A DEMOCRACY THAT DELIVERS

India can matter by just being there, as a market place, as a contested ground,
a resource or a platform. Indeed, as it did during colonial times. This breeds
a survival mentality that, at best, can graduate to a transactional one. But
India can also matter through the power of its ideas and actions as an engine
of the global economy, a hub of innovation or a democracy that delivers. That
is the course of destiny, and its ambitious path requires deep determination
and strong perseverance. The debates within our society will decide which
road is finally taken. As a nation, choices are becoming increasingly stark.
The progress of the last decade points to hope and optimism, while the old
order highlights our insecurities and underlines the divides.
 Indians, of course, must be conscious that the world has a lot riding on
our decisions. Those who wish us well will endeavour to cooperate. Others
who see our rise less favourably will obstruct, if not do worse. Either way,
we must be prepared for those who will participate in our discourse, even
intervene in pursuit of their interests. As discussed earlier, it is vital that we
do not open ourselves to the external shaping of our prospects. India
certainly matters to its own people, and for that very reason, we must recall
from history why our future must not be decided by those outside.
The place that India has long occupied in global thinking is manifest in
the obsessive search for trade routes to it. They may have initially taken
European explorers to the American continent. But when the explorers finally
reached India by sea, even more significant consequences unfolded. Using it
as an effective base, Europe was able to thereafter dominate the rest of Asia.
In fact, even China’s fate in the nineteenth century was very much shaped by
the outcomes in India.
Not surprisingly, this centrality of India worked the other way around as
well. Its independence set in motion a larger decolonization process that
became the basis for the contemporary global order. Decades later, India’s
economic progress contributes to a rebalancing and multipolarity that is still
unfolding. These may be some illustrations of an argument on why India
matters. Pondering over its past importance certainly helps to gauge its future
relevance.
Part of why India counts is obvious. For a start, it represents a sixth of
humanity. So, its successes and shortcomings have clear global connotations.
But for Partition, India, and not China, would have been the largest society in
living memory. The case for India is, however, more than just one of
demography. For it is among the few civilizational states that has survived
the ravages of history. Such polities are distinguished by a different level of
culture and heritage, with accompanying attitudes and mindset as well. They
take the long view, especially in regard to global issues. Many of their goals
and objectives also build on traditions that are not readily shared by
contemporary peers. Simply put, there is not only a scale and history but an
exceptionalism about India that makes it matter.
Societies can be relevant as a playing field for others or they can be
players by themselves. The colonial era with its ruthless extractive culture
presented that sharp choice in the last few centuries. You were either a
victim or an assailant; there was no middle ground. However, the progress of
contemporary times has provided the basis for change beyond that binary. It
is not merely a platitude to state that this is now an era of greater
cooperation. New activities and energies emerged from the freedom of
nations to be taken forward by comparative advantage. In due course, their
political importance increased in world affairs. In doing so, countries
transcended their earlier predicament and became factors of influence. Large
ones, in particular, regained their natural weight and salience in the
calculations of others. Their choices and actions started to determine not only
their own prospects but also those of others. This could be from a set of
capabilities, a reservoir of resources, the quality of talent, the importance of
location or even national will and leadership.
It is the entirety of this matrix that is shaping the rise of India. As our
nation completes 75 years of independence, Indians should examine their
prospects against a global context that has been equally transformational. The
world undoubtedly offers vastly more opportunities, but that is also
embedded with new responsibilities. India matters because these cannot be
separated, and it counts on both scores.
While size and population are obvious indices of a nation’s potential,
neither is a self-fulfilling criterion by itself. Our own past history is proof of
that assertion. There are others, too, whose political standing has been below
par despite these attributes. And, in contrast, there are much smaller nations
that have punched way above their weight. The core of global rebalancing
has been the revival of China, India and some others in the Global South that
have made their long-standing characteristics count more through national
revival. A key factor is the pace and nature of development, including the
enhancement of human resource quality.
In this respect, recent happenings are a source of hope for India. There is,
after 2014, a holistic commitment to achieving social development goals
through dedicated campaigns covering every segment. They include better
health and immunization, reducing gender gaps, expanding educational access
and coverage, promoting skills to fostering talent and innovation, making it
easier to do business and creating greater employment opportunities. The
resulting inclusive growth will naturally contribute to strengthening
capabilities and expanding the marketplace. But just as notable will be its
impact on the global workplace, and this really matters for the world.
A knowledge economy like India putting such a premium on human
resources makes it imperative, for itself as much as for the world, to focus on
realizing SDG targets by 2030. It is clear from the national campaigns
initiated after 2014 that these 17 SDG defined by the UN are indeed among
the government’s key objectives. And this has continued despite the Covid
challenge. Take the Jan Dhan–Aadhaar–Mobile (JAM) trinity that has
empowered millions of vulnerable by providing banking and digital services.
In a similar way, the expanding health coverage demonstrates that this need
not just be the prerogative of the developed. The Beti Bachao Beti Padhao
scheme for girls’ education also has such sweeping societal implications,
and so does the Jal Jeevan Mission to bring tap water to homes, the Digital
India network to bring masses online and the Ujjwala programme to replace
burning firewood with cooking gas. These are examples of the ability to
address long-standing challenges in a lasting manner. The aggregate impact
of these campaigns is improving the socio-economic welfare of a significant
proportion of humanity. Why India matters is because its record of progress
would determine global success in meeting the SDG Agenda 2030.
Not all readily appreciate that it is India’s political choices that have
enabled democratic values to achieve a near universal status. Till we took
the call, these practices were widely perceived as the prerogative of
developed countries only. It, of course, was enabled by the fact that
democratic traditions are deeply rooted in Indian history and culture. But this
aspect was not asserted even by India in earlier years, and its modern
incarnation was depicted for years as an anomaly. So much so that opinions
in the West were quite comfortable recommending military rule as a better
governance solution for the ‘less worthy’. Our own region provided the most
telling examples in that regard, with Pakistan touted for years as a preferred
partner. In fact, India made a difference not just by building a modern
democratic polity under testing economic conditions but by drawing on its
own heritage of pluralism to do so. Unlike many other societies, India never
put a premium on uniformity. On the contrary, its innate unity, which was
expressed through diversity, is the real basis of its culture of confabulation.
In contrast to challenges faced by others in recent years, India’s
credentials have only become stronger with time. Whether it is in terms of
electoral participation or broadening of political representation, the
effectiveness of the democratic process is only more apparent. This is no
mean achievement, given the alienation caused by globalization and the
disaffection fomented by disinformation. In our case, we are seeing an
increased vigour of democratic activities and debates, supported by the
validation of power transfers. And we can confidently state that unlike in
some other places, at least our election results are not doubted! It can, in fact,
truly be said that democracy is not just doing well but better than ever before.
In an argumentative society like India, political debates often take the
form of polemics. A globalized existence means that they can even spill
beyond our borders. But for those who see first-hand how consistently our
people expand their freedoms, it is evident that India’s value has grown in
the eyes of the world because it is not only a political exercise at home but
also a democratic assertion of a resurgent society.
When the virtues of an open society are being rediscovered, it is not
enough to be a democracy. We have surely been one for 75 years in a narrow
sense and, in truth, very much longer societally. It is even more important to
be a democracy that delivers. It is on this score that the last decade has been
so critical. A genuine passion for good governance, combined with effective
application of technology tools, has started to transform the socio-economic
landscape. And the world can only marvel at the scale and intensity of the
transformation.
By firmly establishing a digital backbone across the country, 800 million
plus Indians received food support and half of them also received money in
their bank accounts during the Covid pandemic. Think about the enormity of
this effort: it is like supporting the entire European and American populations
at the same time. Indeed, each one of the programmes and schemes has been
carried out on a magnitude that approximates the population of a major
nation. The Jan Dhan initiative is like banking the US and Mexico at one go;
the Saubhagya scheme is like electrifying all of Russia; Ujjwala is equivalent
to changing the cooking fuel for all of Germany; and the Awas Yojana is like
housing all of Japan. Examples could be cited in other areas like clean water,
health coverage and farm support. The direct benefit transfers (DBTs) from
India’s digitalization have also ended a long tradition of leakages. The 2
billion plus vaccinations too are a feat in themselves. Perhaps the biggest
lesson is how these initiatives have helped to democratize technology and
empower the masses. India matters because it not only symbolizes good
governance; its digital public infrastructure has a larger relevance to the
world.
Developed nations may gladly recognize such progress in a polity that
they have long viewed as an underperformer. It certainly opens up new
avenues of collaboration. But developing countries see it as experiences that
are directly applicable to them, especially when they are executed on such a
large canvas.
That India has now become a laboratory, a training ground, a driver of
innovation and invention as well as a field of demonstration heightens its
relevance. The Covid pandemic brought out its contribution as the pharmacy
of the world. Its digital skill and start-ups are generating a steady stream of
technologies and services. Its impact on business outcomes is as strong as on
public delivery. In fact, key global challenges like climate action are likely to
be more effectively addressed if India emerges as an exemplar. Its
leapfrogging potential will make a real difference when realized. Similarly,
the rapid progress of Make in India in different domains can validate how
much more can be made with the world and for the world. The scale, scope
and competitiveness that we can bring to bear have all the markings of an
additional engine of growth. India matters both as an inspiration and as a key
factor in decentralized globalization.

SIGNIFICANCE OF ITS TALENT

The last few years have seen a surge in India’s self-confidence. A generation
that is surer of itself naturally has higher aspirations. For talent to be
translated into capabilities, it is necessary to create the mechanisms,
institutions and practices. Large nations, in particular, require deep strengths.
If there has been a major shortcoming in India’s post-1991 performance, it
has been in the inadequacy of that level of capabilities. Contentment with
corporate profitability overrode any commitment to create resilient domestic
supply chains. That growth was insufficiently reflected in expansion of
employment spoke for itself. Reform itself was conceptualized in narrow
terms to serve a limited constituency.
As the nation now shifts gears to upgrade the human resources chain as
well as step up manufacturing and innovation, a new range of prospects has
opened up, from established domains like chemicals and textiles to
contemporary ones like electronic hardware, semiconductors and
pharmaceuticals. The determined effort underway to better realize its
potential can make a difference. The manufacturing of Apple products in
India may be just one example, but it is surely a powerful statement. India
will only matter if it makes a greater contribution to global production and
reliable supply chains.
 The enormity of India’s human potential has long been undervalued, even
within the country. Let us look at what is already a reality. There are
currently 32 million Indian nationals and persons of Indian origin (PIOs)
living and working abroad. The US is home to about 4.5 million, many of
whom are important to technology and innovation. Twice that number,
approximately 9 million, resides in the Gulf and keeps their economies
going. Commonwealth societies like the UK, Canada, South Africa and
Australia account for another 5 million plus. It could be larger or smaller
nations, nearer or distant ones, historical emigration or recent movements.
Indians matter because they are truly global.
The pervasive spread of the Indian community has been a natural
accompaniment of globalization. It is obvious to associate it with skills and
talents in various geographies. The million plus Indian students who are
studying abroad are also going to increase in number. They and their
domestic counterparts are being wooed through mobility partnerships offered
by the developed economies. So, as the world moves towards higher skills
and tougher demographics while India itself improves the quality of its
human resources, the demand–supply fit has an increasingly powerful logic.
Recent agreements with Portugal, Australia, Austria, Germany, Japan, the
UK, Italy and France are harbingers of this change. India matters because
with each passing year, it will become a bigger factor in the global
workplace.
In such a scenario, the obligation on India to take care of its own has
grown steadily. It is not only that their presence abroad is greater but that the
expectations of its people are too. We often tend to see that as a reflection of
stronger national capabilities, and that is not wrong. But equally, there has to
be the political will to deploy resources, especially in high-risk situations.
Among the significant shifts in India’s diplomatic posture is the inclination to
undertake operations abroad for the welfare of its citizens. These often
involve use of military assets. The most recent, of course, were Operations
Ajay, Kaveri and Ganga that brought back our nationals from Israel, Sudan
and Ukraine respectively. Of much greater magnitude was the Vande Bharat
Mission, perhaps the largest such in history, through which its citizens abroad
came home during Covid. There were many others, ranging from the Yemen
conflict and Nepal earthquake to the South Sudan violence and Kabul’s
capture.
 Together, they signify not only a more frequent activity in comparison to
India’s own past but also when assessed against the proclivity of other states.
The generous usage of funds abroad to mitigate distress situations affirms this
mindset. India matters because it is not only pulling its own weight abroad
more but extending a helping hand to others while doing so.

EXPANDING STRATEGIC HORIZONS

International relations understandably assign a great importance to

geography. The Indian peninsula has a visible centrality to the ocean that is
named after it. That this sea space is also a particularly active arena of
maritime projection makes it even more significant. There is a continental
dimension to India’s presence as well. Without its active participation, no
trans-Asia connectivity initiative can really take off. After all, it provides the
contiguous link between Southeast Asia and the Gulf. Location confers a
centrality to India, quite apart from the potential global power that has risen
just before it. Management of their overlapping peripheries becomes an
onerous responsibility. That many of India’s other immediate neighbours also
share people-to-people and cultural ties adds to the complexity that policy
has to address on a sustained basis. How well India leverages its geography
is a considerable part of its relevance to the world. To the extent that it is
able to influence the Indian Ocean and participate in the Indo-Pacific, its
global stock will rise commensurately. And if its prosperity and progress
serve as a lifting tide for the larger subcontinent, then this would be even
more consequential.
History may be a mixed blessing for most states, but making the best of it
is nevertheless still a policy compulsion. In India’s case, Partition not only
reduced its stature but also cut it off from proximate regions where it had
long enjoyed respect and influence. In recent years, reclaiming its strategic
legacy has been a major endeavour. The graduation from Look East into an
Act East policy highlighted the seriousness of connectivity and security
interests in Southeast Asia. It was also the first step towards defining an
extended neighbourhood.
In the last eight years, a parallel effort was made in the Gulf to rebuild
other long-standing associations that have been disrupted. After decades of
limiting those ties to energy and emigration, India is working at creating full
spectrum relationships. Stronger economic linkages are being buttressed by
closer security coordination. The IMEC could be a harbinger of a new era.
A third initiative is currently underway and has its own basis, this time
aimed at Central Asia. Here, overcoming the impediment of connectivity is
central to dealing with a region with such visible cultural affinity. Of course,
with regard to the sea space to its south, the 2015 SAGAR doctrine initiated
a reach-out to islands whose future is so closely intertwined with India.
Returning to history and recognizing our extended neighbourhoods is another
reason why India matters.
Political constraints can not only limit the pursuit of national interest but
also shrink strategic horizons. To a considerable extent, that had happened in
the case of India. As we strive to go beyond the previous framework, it is
only natural that the cultural legacies should start to regain salience. The
most obvious of these are in respect of Southeast Asia, where centuries of
exchanges produced a rich shared heritage. These are visible even today in
significant monuments and living arts. Consequently, a new archaeological
find in My Son or a conservation project in Angkor Wat, Ta Prohm and
Bagan affirms the understandable desire to build further on the past. Towards
the East, the extent of the Indian cultural reach goes all the way to South
Korea. It is but natural that the cultural revival of Ayodhya should strike a
strong chord in that society.
Turning to the West, the expressions of our common history may be a little
different but no less a part of societal mores. An energetic culture of trade
picks up on old comfort to build new links very quickly. There is an equally
intuitive appreciation of the cultural practices of its partners as well. The
construction of a temple in Abu Dhabi is symbolic of its time-honoured
relationship with Indian society.
The connection in the north to the Eurasian landmass is similarly
significant. The spread of Buddhism through the continent carried its own
intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic messages. This legacy endures and the
endeavour is really to ensure it flowers again. Dedicated efforts have been
made in that direction in the last few years, once Indian policy broadened to
appreciate its necessity.
The sensitivity to nurturing India’s cultural footprint over the ages is now
visible in focussed efforts to promote cooperation in heritage conservation. It
is not just the rising metrics of power that count; it is also the accompanying
cultural and intellectual resurrection that is key to global rebalancing. India
matters on that account due to its unique contributions.

THE WORLD AS A FAMILY

If from the recesses of history there have emerged factors that enhance
India’s relevance, this could be the case for more contemporary periods as
well. Here, too, the impediments were only in our own minds, conditioned
by the politics of the day. Take the events of the last century. Indian
contribution to both World Wars was significant, to a point of deciding the
outcome in some theatres. Over a million Indians participated in the first one,
serving in Europe, the Mediterranean, West Asia and Africa. The bicycle
troops in Somme and the turbaned ones entering through the Jaffa Gate in
Jerusalem are among the iconic images of that era. But it is only in recent
years that the valour and sacrifice of these soldiers has entered public
consciousness. Unburdened by agendas, PM Modi set the record straight and
honoured them at memorials like Neuve Chapelle and Haifa. Our public
naturally then began to take notice. Initiatives are now underway to create
historical trails of the campaigns of our servicemen abroad.
This applies in equal measure to the Second World War, when as many as
two-and-a-half million Indians took up arms. In this case, the contribution
was notable on both sides, with the Netaji-led Indian National Army firing
up the cause of freedom. It also extended to major logistical efforts.
Countries like China and Russia were kept supplied through the Himalayan
hump and the Persian corridor respectively. When an Indian military
contingent marched through the Red Square in Moscow in June 2020, this
was a reminder of India’s contribution to the eventual victory. The stabilizing
role that the Indian armed forces played from East and Southeast Asia to
West Asia and Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War is no less
notable.
It is this tradition of global service that became the foundation for the
country to emerge as a leader in UN Peacekeeping Operations. From that,
India has now evolved into an effective first responder in regional crisis
situations. India matters because it can make a real difference to global
needs.
In recent times, India has heightened its international profile and
displayed greater diplomatic energies. Regions and nations that were long
neglected at the leadership level have been intensively engaged. Countries in
the Gulf like the UAE got a prime ministerial visit after a gap of three
decades and Bahrain the first ever in 2019. Similarly, Central Asian states
like Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan waited for two decades and a key partner
like Australia even longer, for 28 years! Even neighbours Sri Lanka and
Nepal hosted an Indian PM bilaterally after long breaks. These endeavours
have been supported by more systemic linkages across multiple domains. On
important issues at global gatherings, India’s voice has been stronger and
effective.
But at the end of the day, much depends on the overall posture adopted by
us. When our national security is at risk, it is essential to stake out positions
and back our bets. If we were serious that there is no longer tolerance for
terrorism, then an Uri or a Balakot had to happen. If our northern borders are
threatened by China, then Covid or no Covid, the Indian armed forces will be
counter-deployed. Even otherwise, a rising India must continuously push the
envelope to expand its space. The pursuit of national interest is respected the
world over, even by competitors. Doing what it takes is even more critical
when it comes to core interests. This may apply to the safeguarding of its
territorial integrity and sovereignty, combating terrorism, pursuing its
economic interests and, indeed, in responding to global challenges.
Participation in the Quad is a recent example that has certainly enhanced
India’s standing in the world. Similarly, its stance on the Ukraine conflict
resonates strongly with much of the Global South. We speak for them on
energy security, food inflation and trade disruptions. India matters when it
displays confidence, independence and determination.
Owing to its very uniqueness, India is not an easily replicable model. But
it does offer experiences for others who are facing similar challenges.
Indeed, the more it rises, the greater is the value of its achievements. The
world recognizes both the singularity and the relevance of India’s progress.
Put aside those who harbour political prejudices; the rest get it that a
civilizational state rising again will display its own personality. It will speak
and think for itself, radiating how it is rooted in its own culture. The more
assured India is, the more expressive it will be. Only then can it overcome
the image of being a poor cousin mired in its colonial history.
In this endeavour, India is uniquely positioned to bridge modernity and
tradition. It will be more impactful by embracing its heritage, not by
diminishing it. A combination of cultural beliefs and modernizing agenda
helps address many current dilemmas. Its historical characteristics are a
source of strength once they are approached with confidence. For example,
the appreciation of pluralism is as much a derivative of long-standing social
practices as of a constitutional mandate. Similarly, stronger nationalism at
home coexists traditionally with enthusiastic internationalism abroad. Rising
India wants to engage the world more, not less. India matters when it is more
authentically India.
Given its growing political stature and economic abilities, India has to
credibly address the expectations that the world has of it. And this has to
begin in its immediate neighbourhood. Those who are physically and
historically close to it will naturally turn to India, especially during moments
of difficulties. These could be natural disasters or man-made situations,
political and economic. The challenges arise, however, when expectations of
India are selectively articulated. Neighbours would naturally like it to
modulate its presence as per their convenience.
From the Indian perspective, it is not always easy to get the balance right.
Doing too much looks intrusive; showing reticence can be taken as
indifference, if not weakness. Or losing out to a competitive power. The
politics of every partner is a significant variable and context often drives
calculations.
The optimal Indian strategy is, therefore, to rise above the day-to-day
developments and create structural linkages. For this to happen, a
combination of non-reciprocal, generous and patient policies have to come
together. They must connect societies at a fundamental level, facilitating
infrastructure development, socio-economic initiatives and political comfort.
Those ingredients of connectivity, commerce and contacts are the core of
India’s Neighbourhood First approach. It was equally evident in the manner
in which India stepped forward to support Sri Lanka during its economic
crisis. In the final analysis, regionalism can only be built if key players are
prepared to go the extra mile. And India matters because it alone has that
ability in the Subcontinent.
As India’s profile rises, its policymakers are also discovering that
expectations of other nations are not confined to our immediate vicinity. Ever
since its independence triggered global decolonization, India has carried the
responsibility of speaking for a larger constituency. The Global South
watches its positions and performance carefully, drawing conclusions from
both. In the early days, these were centred on consolidating independence
and rebuilding the economy. With the passage of time, more issues of greater
complexity have come to occupy the agenda.
The Covid pandemic was the most recent of these, highlighting the
challenges of accessibility and affordability of vaccines. Climate action has
been a more long-standing concern, with the consistent evasion of financial
commitments by the developed countries. The non-tariff barriers on trade and
the various forms of protectionism using non-trade considerations are an
even longer struggle. Obviously, on many of these issues, India has its own
interests at play. But, as it demonstrated through the Vaccine Maitri initiative,
it was willing to assist others even in the midst of its own challenges. It was
this timing that much of the world recognized as a statement of solidarity.
Rebuilding the world order after two centuries of colonialism will not be
easy. But India matters because a large part of the Global South believes that
it is there for them.
In the last decade, a long tradition of South–South cooperation has
developed into something deeper. It captures domains where Indian
capabilities have a direct relevance for the aspirations of Africa, Latin
America and even the rest of Asia. Some of that has taken the form of
development projects in energy, digital, manufacturing, education and
connectivity. That has been supported by exchanges of experiences and best
practices, including training. It is not just the immediate benefits of these
endeavours that matter. They help create more options for the Global South,
giving them the leverage to deal with the rest of the world on stronger terms.
On assuming the G20 presidency, the effort at ascertaining the views of
125 nations through the Voice of the Global South Summit was also an
initiative that spoke volumes of our mindset. Admittedly, India has an
emotional connect with these nations. Whether it is the rise of Africa or the
sustainable growth of least developed countries (LDCs), the resulting
rebalancing is very much to India’s strategic advantage.
In that context, especially since 2014, India has taken active steps to
empower the Global South. Lines of credit and grant assistance have been
vehicles to execute socio-economic projects of varying levels of magnitude.
These range from power plants, dams and transmission lines to public
buildings, housing projects, rail and road links, agricultural processing and
IT centres. While many have been undertaken at a national scale, hundreds of
smaller initiatives at the community level have had an equally effective
impact. The creation of assets and facilities has also been supported by
extensive training and imparting of best practices.
What differentiates India’s endeavours is a conscious policy of
responding to the priorities and needs of the partner country involved. Prime
Minister Modi’s articulation of the Kampala Principles of development
partnership in 2018 really set our country apart. Unlike cases where such
initiatives have been driven by extractive objectives, India’s efforts are
aimed more at ensuring self-reliance; and the partners appreciate it. India
matters to the Global South because there are few others who have taken
such an approach.
India also matters by displaying its own distinctive characteristics. As its
capabilities and influence grow, its representatives are often asked in other
parts of the world why it would not emulate the behavioural pattern of those
who have risen before it. Obviously, such queries emanate from people who
are unfamiliar with India’s DNA.
It is essential, therefore, that India differentiates itself by highlighting its
own national qualities, beliefs and traditions. The most basic of them is its
inherent pluralism, one that allows its unity to be expressed in diversity.
Flowing from that is its democratic ethos. This is not just a trait to be
practised at home but equally one visible in consultations abroad. Adherence
to laws and rules is another important point to emphasize with an
international audience. As a corollary, we are not a polity given to pursuing
coercive approaches or seeking one-sided gains. Indeed, the sum total of
India’s engagement with the global community over multiple decades, if not
more, is of treating the world as a family. Nowhere is that more visible than
in periods of stress, such as the tribulations of recent years.

NEW INDIA AND THE GLOBAL AGENDA

How, then, is India faring on the world stage? The world is not what it was
even a few years ago. That process of rebalancing was perhaps inevitable,
even though its pace and quality were outcomes of political choices. The
contribution that India has made to this rebalancing has not been small. At a
symbolic level, it is recognized in the establishment of the G20 as a premier
global grouping. This superseded a purely Western combination of G7 that
lost its primacy after the 2008 global financial crisis. But the change of
power distribution has many facets and expressions. It may be visible in
economic activities, trade and investment figures, technological capabilities
and market shares. But it is also evident in the debates of the day, such as on
climate change, terrorism, black money and taxation as well as the pandemic.
India has emerged as a more influential voice in these conversations, as it
has done on the consequences of the Ukraine conflict. And then there is the
question of shouldering responsibilities, including beyond its shores. The
record of addressing humanitarian and disaster situations since 2014 has
clearly established India’s reputation as a first responder in the Indian Ocean
and its littorals, and with Türkiye, even beyond. The ambit of India’s
activities has also increased, towards the Indo-Pacific in the East and to the
Gulf and Africa in the West. What India is saying, doing and shaping is a
powerful reason why it matters.
This image has been sharpened by the independence of thought and action
that India has displayed during the course of its ongoing rise. Maximizing
freedom of choice has historically been an Indian approach. At times, it is
done by keeping a distance; sometimes, perhaps better by voicing opinions.
But, on occasion, it is also served by working with others on specific issues
and designated theatres. After all, why should we not take advantage of
convergences with other powers to advance our objectives?
Given that India has such a broad range of interests, it can only bridge
contradictions through a multi-vector approach. In other words, the nature of
the partners will depend on the nature of the problem. Others will try and
restrict that freedom, seeking to impose a veto on our choices. We saw that in
respect of Quad. India should never succumb to such pressures or hedge for
the sake of hedging. The compass of national interest will guide us unerringly
if we do not get distracted by ideological reservations or hidden agendas.
The cultivation of such flexibility is all the more important because India
will come to acquire a more leading position in the coming decades. And
bear in mind that this is not happening in isolation. Other powers, especially
those of a middle plus capability and a regional dominance, also have
similar aspirations. The multiplicity of power centres is an increasingly
visible characteristic of our times. India matters because it is central to the
emergence of multipolarity, whether in Asia or in the world.
We are also once again in times when the importance of norms and
behaviour has assumed greater significance. There are few nations who
would not assert their commitment to international law or respect for
agreements and regimes to which they are party. But actual observance can
be quite another matter. The example that has captured attention in recent
times pertains to the UNCLOS 1982 and its application in the South China
Sea. India took a principled approach to this matter by underlining that it
supported freedom of navigation and overflight as well as unimpeded
commerce, based on principles of international law as reflected in the
UNCLOS. It also urged all parties to show utmost respect for the UNCLOS,
which establishes the international legal order of the seas and oceans. More
importantly, India led by the power of example when it accepted an
arbitration verdict on its own maritime boundary dispute with Bangladesh.
Another debate that has also featured in contemporary consciousness
relates to the relevance of connectivity to world politics. Here, too, India has
been among the earliest to enunciate an objective and fair position. In
essence, it declared that connectivity initiatives must be based on recognized
international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency
and equality. They must be financially responsible, avoid creating an
unsustainable debt burden, balance ecological and environmental protection,
transparently assess costs and have a local ownership. Connectivity projects
must be pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty and territorial
integrity.
While respect for international law is essential to any global order, it is
also evident that following its letter but not spirit has had damaging
consequences. When systems are gamed and the underlying principles skirted
through semantics, clearly the world emerges the worse for it. It is no
accident that in the light of recent experiences, there is a global interest in a
rules-based order. This is not to be treated as a derogation of law but as
going beyond it to promote norms. India matters as an advocate of a rules-
based order.
Once we agree that India does matter, the issue that naturally follows is
what it takes to ensure it matters more. That naturally is the focus of its
national security strategy and foreign policy. The answer in such cases often
begins at home. A nation that sets its house in order clearly counts for more
in the global discourse. Some of that pertains to the quality of governance,
some to the development of capabilities. Any progress in addressing long-
standing vulnerabilities, such as in Jammu & Kashmir, is naturally welcome.
Where its periphery is concerned, stronger structural linkages expand the
space for India’s activities. A more integrated region offers the benefit to all
but not least to the largest player. This can be best realized through
highlighting the attraction of cooperation as well as the costs of alienation.
The extended neighbourhoods that represent the next circle also need
sustained attention. It is only if they are treated with the priority of immediate
neighbours that India can widen its reach. That they are not so proximate also
means a more bespoke policy. With the rest of the world, working with all
the major powers gives India the most advantage.
But India’s own growing footprint is also being driven by demands of
engagement from the world. Given its institutional limitations, an efficient
method of engagement is to develop more group interfaces. We see that
happening as India interacts collectively with ASEAN, the EU, Eurasia,
Africa, the Gulf, Pacific Islands, the Caribbean and the Nordic states. These
are being increasingly supplemented by plurilateral groupings like the Quad,
the I2U2 and BRICS. The bottom line is that India has, at last, broken out of
the box that its competitors helped devise. A 360-degree engagement is one
more reason why India matters.
For a country that has the history, scale and ambition of India, the games
that nations play have to be developed to a higher level. Understanding and
exploiting global dynamics is a critical aspect of that exercise. And this is
exceptionally challenging because the world is in the midst of a fundamental
transition. The reality of an unfolding multipolarity is tempered by the
frictions of a more bipolar overlay. On many questions, the narrative can also
be shaped by a larger set of players of varying sizes. As a consequence, India
has to simultaneously pursue a range of approaches, some of which may
appear contradictory on surface.
As a foundational goal, it must strive to promote greater multipolarity and
stronger rebalancing. That will happen faster if it has many well-wishers
who perceive India’s rise as being in their strategic interest. Harnessing the
calculations of others is clearly a useful tactic but one to be practised with
both prudence and self-confidence. The obverse is no less important, and
standing up to intimidation and pressures is part of our maturing. Not least,
there has to be a reasonable expectation that a rising power will be tested.
The quality of leadership and the ability to perform better on the ground is
certainly helping to set India apart.
That India matters and will matter more with the passage of time can be
convincingly asserted. Like so many other developments in politics and
history, it must never be taken as preordained. There will always be doubters
among us who cannot believe that our nation can even dare to think big.
There are vested interests, too, that will masquerade as political correctness
and global consensus. We have seen for too long attempts to distance us from
our history, traditions and culture. At the end of the day, much will ride on
our national unity and collective purpose. Being a serious global player
requires ambition and strategy to be backed by initiative, perseverance and
energy. Our own people and leadership must embrace their destiny to realize
their aspirations. Keeping the faith and getting down to work are good ways
to demonstrate it.
Why India matters should also be approached from the perspective of to
whom it matters. As a larger factor in international affairs, it clearly features
more prominently in the calculations of the rest of the world. At a time of
global transition, this is particularly relevant to the larger states that are
seeking to shape that process. Obviously, a rising India would also matter
more to its competitors. Those who took India’s limitations and shortcomings
as a given will surely now reassess its progress and prospects. For India’s
neighbours, the benefits and comfort of being proximate to a generous and
non-reciprocal polity are becoming increasingly apparent. For the rest of the
Global South, a more powerful India is, if anything, even better.
Overall, the international community today engages India with greater
enthusiasm and expectations. That is something that Indians should assess by
themselves and from which they must draw conclusions. There will always
be the polemicists and critics, but even for them, an India that will not bend
to ideological bullying and be deflected from its course is one that they will
have to take more seriously.
How does India look to the world today? It is among the few large
economies with a robust recovery underway. We are fifth in the world, likely
to be third by the end of the decade. It is a polity that, over the last decade,
has shown the will to take tough decisions and embark on serious reforms.
We are making big strides on human-centric development, digital public
goods and green growth. India has stayed strong during the Covid storm and
even gone out to help others. When its national security has been challenged,
it has stood its ground firmly. Breaking from the past, it is showing zero-
tolerance for terrorism. It is an India that knows how to take care of its
people abroad as well. This New India shapes the global agenda and
influences its outcomes. Now, it is perceived as the consensus-builder and
voice of reason in a polarized world. At the same time, as the Voice of the
Global South Summit demonstrated, others trust us to put forward their case.
This is an India of ideas and initiatives, one that articulates the creativity and
innovation of our youth.
A civilizational state is once again regaining its place in the comity of
nations. It is doing so in a unique way, encouraging partnerships through its
responsibilities, contributions and accomplishments. The world knows that
this rise will unfold in consonance with its traditions and ethos. Obviously,
its democratic values, pluralistic society and economic outlook will resonate
more strongly. But they would be underpinned by deep-rooted beliefs and
vast experience from a complex past and present. It is no coincidence that as
policymaking is driven by those more grounded, long-standing challenges are
addressed effectively. They may range from leaving no one behind to
democratizing technology and promoting sustainability. Achievements, be
they in space, health, start-ups or sports have instilled a new sense of pride,
especially among the younger generation. And that is buttressed by a sharper
awareness of heritage and the value we add to global progress.
It may be a society on the move but clearly one with a long view of its
own prospects and that of the world. And it stands ready to set contemporary
terms of engagement with others. Its outlook is deeply international and built
around an age-old conviction of the world as one family. With each passing
day, it is becoming clearer that India matters because it is Bharat.
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many who have contributed to this writing, be they individuals,
organizations or platforms. My particular gratitude goes to those colleagues
and friends who have helped me frame my thoughts on a complex set of
issues and then to express them in words. My family should be appreciated
for putting up with all that comes with the process of writing a book. My
publisher, Rupa Publications, has been exceptionally patient in awaiting this
effort, and that too deserves to be recognized.