JPPI Investigation Report - 3.7.2024

JPPI INVESTIGATIONS LLC
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CEDAR CREEK TX 78612
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INVESTIGATIVE REPORT
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
WORK PRODUCT --- PREPARED IN
ANTICIPATION
OF LITIGATION AND/OR FOR USE IN TRIAL
City of Uvalde, TX
City Attorney Paul J. Tarski of Tarski Law
JPPI Case # 2022_07_15 Uvalde
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UPD Internal Investigation
Background of Investigator 6
Contributors 6
Background Facts 7
In memoriam 8
Scope of Investigation 9
Evidence and reports reviewed for this investigation: 10
Uvalde Police Department 10
Texas Department of Public Safety Uvalde police officer statements 10
Uvalde County District Attorney Christina Mitchell 10
United States Border Patrol – Documents and evidence 12
The Department of Justice Report was released in January 2024. 13
Uvalde Police Officer and Dispatcher interviews conducted by Investigator Jesse Prado 13
Investigative Summary 15
1. Analysis of Active Shooter Policy 17
Introduction: 17
Active Shooter Model Policy 18
Comparison IACP Model Policy: 18
Procedures: 19
Contact Officer / Team: 20
Rescue Task Force / Rescue Team: 20
Unified Command: 20
Community Notification: 20
Debriefing: 21
Training: 21
Comparison Texas Police Chiefs Association Model Policy: 21
Active Shooter Response: 21
Concepts and Principles: 22
Follow-On Responders: 22
Post-Event: 22
OIS Investigations: 22
Media Inquiry: 22
Additional Uvalde Police Department Policies: 22
Uvalde Police Department’s Standard Operational Procedures: 23
2. Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Uvalde Police Department and the Uvalde
Consolidated Independent School District Police Department 25
Key Points 25
Texas Education Code, Subchapter C. Law And Order 26
Section 37.081. School District Peace Officers, School Resource Officers, and Security
Personnel. 26
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Section 37.0812. Training Policy: School District Peace Officers and School Resource Officers.
26
Texas Occupations Code 26
Section 1701.601. Definition 26
3. Review of the Uvalde contact team’s actions 27
The decision to wait for shields and the moment that UCISD Chief Arredondo (IC) gave the plan
to clear rooms and negotiate, superseding Lt. Javier Martinez’ plan to move forward when the
shield arrived. 42
4. Analysis of Active Shooter Response for School-Based Law Enforcement, Texas Commission on
law Enforcement, Course #2195 50
Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department 50
Scenario-Based Training Section: 53
Texas Basic Peace Officer Course: 54
5. Review of officers that entered the building. 55
6. Review of the perimeter team - officers that did not enter the building but assisted on the call
including 552 Diaz Street. 62
7. Review of Communications Unit / Dispatchers 68
8. Review of Command – Acting Chief Lt. Mariano Pargas 71
9. Uvalde Police Officer interview summaries 76
Interview of Uvalde Police Chief Daniel Rodriguez by outside investigator Jesse Prado 78
Interview of Uvalde Police Lieutenant Mariano Pargas by outside investigator Jesse Prado 83
Interview of Uvalde Police Sergeant Donald Page by outside investigator Jesse Prado 89
Interview of Uvalde Police Dispatcher Jeanna Santellanez by outside investigator Jesse Prado 96
Interview of Uvalde Police Dispatcher Myra Landry by outside investigator Jesse Prado 99
Interview of Uvalde Police Dispatcher Samantha Diaz by outside investigator Jesse Prado 101
Interview of Uvalde Police Sergeant Telescoro Daniel Coronado by outside investigator Jesse
Prado 103
Interview of Uvalde Police Staff Sergeant Edwardo Canales by outside investigator Jesse Prado
107
Interview of Uvalde Police Lieutenant Javier Martinez by outside investigator Jesse Prado 113
Interview of Uvalde Police Officer Jesus Mendoza by outside investigator Jesse Prado 118
Interview of Uvalde Police Detective Renato Lualemaga by outside investigator Jesse Prado 121
Interview of Uvalde Police Detective Hoshi Cantu by outside investigator Jesse Prado 125
Interview of Uvalde Police Detective Ronald Rodriguez by outside investigator Jesse Prado 128
Interview of Uvalde Police Officer Lee Ann Cantu by outside investigator Jesse Prado 133
Interview of Uvalde Police Corporal Gregory Villa by outside investigator Jesse Prado 135
Interview of Uvalde Police Officer Randy Hill by outside investigator Jesse Prado 138
Interview of Uvalde Police Officer Daniel Martinez by outside investigator Jesse Prado 140
Interview of Uvalde Police Corporal Ramon Morin Jr. by outside investigator Jesse Prado 142
Interview of Uvalde Police Officer Max Dorflinger by outside investigator Jesse Prado 144
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Interview of Uvalde Police Officer Daniel Ruiz by outside investigator Jesse Prado 147
Interview of Uvalde Police Officer Jessica Zamora by outside investigator Jesse Prado 149
Interview of Uvalde Police Officer Joe Zamora by outside investigator Jesse Prado 151
Interview of Uvalde Police Sgt. Julian Arredondo by outside investigator Jesse Prado 153
Interview of Uvalde Police Lieutenant Juan Martinez by outside investigator Jesse Prado 154
Interview of Uvalde Police Sergeant Bobby Ruiz Sr. by outside investigator Jesse Prado 156
Interview of Uvalde Police Corporal Joshua Perez by outside investigator Jesse Prado 158
Interview of Uvalde Police Detective Louis Landry by outside investigator Jesse Prado 160
Interview of Uvalde Police Officer Ventura Chapa by outside investigator Jesse Prado 163
Interview of Uvalde Fire Marshal Juan M. Hernandez by outside investigator Jesse Prado 165
10. Recommendations: 167
Review of the Uvalde contact team’s actions 167
Lieutenant Javier Martinez 167
Staff Sergeant Eduardo Canales 167
Detective Louis Landry 167
Officer Ventura Chapa 168
Lieutenant Mariano Pargas 168
Detective Renato Lualemaga 168
Sergeant Donald Page 168
Sergeant Daniel Coronado 168
Review of Officer’s actions that entered the building during the incident. 169
Officer Randy Hill 169
Corporal Ramon Morin 169
Officer Jesus Mendoza 169
Corporal Gregory Villa 169
Detective Ronald Rodriguez 169
Officer Max Dorflinger 170
City of Uvalde Fire Marshal Juan M. Hernandez 170
Review of Perimeter team - Officers that did not enter the building but assisted on the call
including 552 Diaz Street. 170
Det. Hoshi Cantu Cantu 170
Cpl. Joshua Perez 170
Sgt. Bobby Ruiz Sr. 170
Lt. Juan Martinez 170
Sgt. Julian Arredondo 171
Officer Joe Zamora 171
Officer Jessica Zamora 171
Officer Daniel Ruiz 171
Officer Daniel Martinez 171
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Officer Lee Ann Cantu 171
Review of Communications / Dispatchers 171
Jeanna Santellanes 171
Samantha Diaz 172
Myra Landry 172
Review of Uvalde Police Command 172
Acting Chief Lt. Mariano Pargas 172
Chief Daniel Rodriguez 173
Tactical & Training Conclusions and Recommendations 175
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Background of Investigator
Jesse Prado's career spans over three decades of law enforcement, from his early days as a cadet
at the Austin Police Department Academy in 1989 to his rise through the ranks. Graduating in
November of the same year, Prado's performance in the demanding East Austin Patrol Division
quickly led to his transfer to the Organized Crime Division in 1993. There, he developed his
investigative skills in specialized units such as Narcotics Interdiction, the Austin Violent Crimes
Fugitive Task Force, and the Narcotics Conspiracy Unit, collaborating closely with federal agencies
(FBI, DEA, Customs, ICE, DPS, IRS, ATF, US Marshal Service, United States Attorney’s Office, and
the U.S. Secret Service) on large-scale investigations.
Prado's exceptional dedication and effectiveness garnered him numerous commendations

throughout his career, notably the Meritorious Unit Citations recognizing his commitment to
teamwork and excellence. Retiring honorably from the Austin Police Department in 2013, Prado
seamlessly transitioned into the private sector, founding JPPI Investigations L.L.C. in Cedar Creek,
Bastrop County, Texas. As Owner/Manager, he continues to leverage his unmatched expertise to
assist clients in navigating complex investigative challenges with integrity and professionalism.
Contributors
Others that contributed to this investigation report were:
Donald Baker, MBA (Retired), an honorably retired commander from the Austin Police
Department with a distinguished 35-year career in law enforcement, with extensive experience
at both the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department and Austin Police Department, Austin,
Texas. He has over 15 years in command-level roles, overseeing operations in key divisions such
as highway enforcement, professional standards (internal affairs and risk management),
organized crime, patrol, and criminal investigations. He is a graduate of the FBI’s National
Academy and the Police Executive Research Foundation’s Senior Management Institute for
Police.
Paul Ford
Paul Ford's professional background spans both public service and the private sector. His law
enforcement career commenced in 1985 with the Austin Police Department, where he served in
various capacities including patrol, SWAT, and as a detective. During his tenure with the SWAT
team, he notably held roles as the unit’s training coordinator and team leader. Demonstrating
his commitment to tactical innovation and high training standards, he developed the
Department’s Homicide in Progress School (HIPS) in response to the Columbine High School
Massacre. It was one of the first active department-wide shooter training programs in the United
States. His leadership was pivotal in reorganizing and expanding the Texas Tactical Police Officer's
Association, where he served as Secretary, Vice President, and Editor of Command Magazine,
earning the Association’s Excellence Award in 1999. Transitioning to the private sector in 2000,
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Paul excelled in technical, sales, and marketing management roles with organizations such as
Global Enforcement Review, Defense Technology Corporation of America, and Combined
Systems, Inc. With an extensive tactical training resume, he has authored over 20 articles on
police tactics and equipment, and he has continued to develop and present tactical courses
extensively in the United States and around the world and has been recognized as a subject
matter expert in less-lethal weapons in legal proceedings. Currently, he holds the position of Vice
President of Sales & Marketing for a leading manufacturer of less-lethal weapons.
Background Facts
On July 15th, 2022, I, Jesse Prado, was contacted by City of Uvalde Attorney Paul J. Tarski of Tarski
Law, located at 205 N. Getty St. Uvalde, Tx 78801, to conduct an internal investigation of the
Uvalde Police Department’s response to the Robb Elementary School shooting on May 24th, 2022.
On May 24th, 2022, a 911 call was made by witnesses to report a one vehicle crash at 11:29 am
after a male crashed his vehicle just outside of school property. The Uvalde Police Department
was one of the first of multiple agencies that responded to Robb Elementary School located at
715 Old Carrizo Rd. Uvalde TX 78801. The driver/gunman then shot at people coming to help him.
The gunman, armed with an AR-15 assault rifle, got onto school property firing his weapon at the
school from the school yard. The gunman then entered the 4th grade building and went directly
to rooms 111 and 112, where he entered the classrooms that had teachers and students.
The gunman began shooting at students and teachers, injuring many and murdering the following
nineteen children and two teachers of the Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District’s
Robb Elementary School:
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In memoriam
Eva Mireles, 44
Nevaeh Alyssa Bravo, 10
Jacklyn “Jackie” Cazares, 9
Makenna Lee Elrod, 10
Jose Flores Jr., 10
Eliahna “Ellie” Amyah Garcia, 9
Uziyah Sergio Garcia, 10
Amerie Jo Garza, 10
Xavier James Lopez, 10
Jayce Carmelo Luevanos, 10
Tess Marie Mata, 10
Maranda Mathis, 11
Alithia Haven Ramirez, 10
Annabell Guadalupe Rodriguez, 10
Maite Yuleana Rodriguez, 10
Alexandria “Lexi” Aniyah Rubio, 10
Layla Marie Salazar, 11
Jalilah Nicole Silguero, 10
Eliahna Cruz Torres, 10
Rojelio Fernandez Torres, 10
Irma Linda Garcia, 48
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Scope of Investigation
On July 21st, 2022, I submitted a letter of engagement outlining the scope of service as an Internal
Investigation. The investigative services included:
● Interviews of witnesses and officers

● Evidence collection and analysis
● Preparation of memoranda and reports
● Review of departmental policies, written orders, and procedures
The goal of this investigation was to review the actions of the City of Uvalde police officers and
dispatchers to determine if the Uvalde Police Department violated policy, during their response
to the scene of the mass shooting at Robb Elementary School.
Twenty-eight Uvalde Police officers, and three Uvalde Police Department dispatchers
participated in the response to Robb Elementary School and their actions that day are the focus
of this investigation. Several officers have since separated from the Uvalde Police Department.
This internal investigation is to determine if currently employed officers’ actions were within
policy. Lieutenant Mariano Pargas cooperated in this investigation until the time of his retirement
which was several days after his internal interview with me, which occurred in November of 2022.
Although Lt. Pargas is currently retired, we conducted a thorough review of his actions on May
24th, 2022, since he was acting chief on the day of the incident. A conclusion of Lt. Pargas’ review
is included.
This report is written for the City of Uvalde Attorney Paul J. Tarski of Tarski Law. I did not receive
any investigative guidance or direction on this case. Tarski Law and Denton Navarro Rocha Bernal
& Zech, PC, now Denton Navarro Rodriguez Bernal Santee & Zech, P.C. remained neutral in my
investigation and how I conducted this investigation. Their main role has been to supply me with
the evidence in this case that I requested to complete the investigation. I utilized a vacant, private
office and conference room within The Law Office of Paul J. Tarski located at 205 N. Getty Street,
Uvalde TX. 78801, for a majority of the interviews. Mr. Tarski and his staff were not able to listen
to the interviews and every employee was represented by their attorneys.
This investigation includes a thorough examination of the evidence, statements, and reports
made available to me to conduct a fair and impartial review of the actions of every Uvalde Police
employee that engaged in this incident. Steps were taken in my office to minimize exposure to
news, and any outside source of information that may not be direct evidence.
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Evidence and reports reviewed for this investigation:
Uvalde Police Department

The Uvalde Police Department provided a hard drive containing all documentation and
information regarding this case which included memos, reports, body cam videos, training
records, policies, phone calls and radio traffic.
U.P.D. also included body cam and patrol car videos for the following officers:
● Officer Daniel Martinez
● Officer Jesus Mendoza
● Officer Joe Zamora
● Officer Justin Mendoza
● Officer Randy Hill
● Sergeant Daniel Coronado
● Staff Sergeant Eduardo Canales
Texas Department of Public Safety Uvalde police officer statements
On July 28th, I signed a Non-disclosure Agreement through DNRB&Z PC attorney Clarissa

Rodriguez, regarding statements I was given access to review. The statements were of the
Uvalde Police Officers taken by the Department of Public Safety Ranger Division regarding the
Robb School Shooting. I was not allowed to use these statements in my report or investigation.
I reviewed them only to have an idea as to what role the officer giving the statement to D.P.S.
had. I also used them to play back to the officers for their recollection prior to my interview
with them. Officers were not allowed to copy or record their statements.
The Texas Rangers immediately answered my calls and questions. The DOJ Report stated that
UPD’s internal investigation has been hampered by a lack of access to evidence that TXDPS was
in possession of and not willing to share.1 The TXDPS is not able to share their evidence but is
willing to share. I learned from the Texas Rangers that they are not able to give me the
information because the Uvalde County District Attorney does not allow them to. The Texas
Rangers have been honorable, professional, helpful, and are following the order of the Uvalde
District Attorney.
Uvalde County District Attorney Christina Mitchell
This internal investigation has been hindered by the lack of cooperation from the Uvalde
County District Attorney.
1
DOJ Report Chapter 4 Observation 15 page 188
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Early on with this case the City of Uvalde through Mr. Tarski, expressed that it was their
intention to conduct a complete and parallel investigation with the internal investigation and
the criminal investigation that the Texas Rangers were assigned to. This is normally the policy
for many agencies. Conducting parallel investigations is referenced in the DOJ Report.2
I knew that there was an enormous amount of information, evidence, reports, documents, and
witness statements in this case. Most agencies share information. I scheduled to meet with the
Border Patrol to gather the information they had. The Border Patrol Agents (BPA) were
prepared to give me a drive that contained timelines and videos such as the hallway video.
Upon my arrival the BPA advised me that District Attorney Mitchell told them not to give me
the drive. The BPA did give me a thorough briefing on the case and a general review of the work
and timelines that had been done so far.
As an outside investigator, I did not have enough knowledge or information about this case to
thoroughly review it without evidence. Some of the most crucial pieces of evidence in this case
were a timeline that was put together by analysts, a copy of the hallway video, all videos of
officer’s body cams and statements from officers in the hallway. The CCTV footage and
schoolteacher interviews were important to review as well. The timeline that I saw at the
Border Patrol Office included notes for every entry by the second.
After meeting with Ms. Mitchell and the attorney helping her, Mr. Turner, Ms. Mitchell
expressed to me that she was angry with Mayor McLaughlin for releasing videos to the public
and believed that I must give any evidence that she gave me for review, to Mayor McLaughlin if
he requested the evidence from me.
Ms. Mitchell only gave permission for me to view the information in the U.S. Border Patrol
office, but I could not make copies and an agent had to sit with me while I reviewed it. I could
only take handwritten notes.
I examined some of the timeline, which had over 5000 entries on an Excel document along with
investigative notes with each entry. I spent several hours going through a few minutes of time
that occurred on May 24th, 2022. The BPA and I concluded that it would take me six months or
so to be able to review and hand write the information, rather than seconds to make a copy.
The BPA also had active cases on the border that they would have to investigate and could not
guarantee that they would be able to stay with me during the investigation if they were called
out to a crime scene.
Ms. Mitchell did not want me to start interviews of the officers until she received the
completed report by the Texas Rangers. I honored that until October 31 st, 2022. I had
attempted to negotiate receiving evidence by offering NDAs, but it eventually led to meetings
where a lawsuit was suggested by Ms. Mitchell in order to have a judge order her to give me
2
DOJ Report Chapter 4 Observation 11 page 188
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the requested information. That negotiation eventually broke down and the City of Uvalde filed
a lawsuit in an attempt to get the information to me.
I have spent my career working side by side with state and federal prosecuting attorneys and I
felt that there was enough division within the District Attorney and the City of Uvalde. During a
pretrial meeting I offered to drop the suit and Ms. Mitchell agreed to give me a timeline and
evidence that she thought would be useful in my investigation.
This meant that I would only receive what the Uvalde County District Attorney believed I
needed to conduct a thorough and complete investigative review of the officers’ actions.
I received the following from the Uvalde District Attorney in a packet.

● The Uvalde Police package that Uvalde Police had given me.3 6/13/2023
● DPS Trooper statements and some body cam footage. 6/23/2023
● United States Border Patrol Agent Statements. 6/23/2023
● Two Texas Parks and Wildlife Game Warden statements and body cams. 6/23/2023
● Witness statements from one teacher and one UCISD officer. 6/23/2023
● The timeline, over 5000 entries in an excel document without the investigative notes.
Without the investigative notes, I had to identify every entry which was listed by the
second and locate what occurred to add the notes. This work had already been done by
analysts but was not included in the timeline she provided to me. Piecing this together
was incredibly time-consuming.
I never received the original hallway video and was told by the DA to use the one on the
internet because that is the one, they were using in her office.
I never received an investigative report from DPS on the case.
I did not receive the CCTV footage from the school or the funeral home.
I did not receive the Uvalde County Sheriff BWC video.
The ALERRT report noted that they had received all of the items I requested to conduct their
report on the incident.
Ms. Mitchell stated that I would have to get consent from the UCISD and any other agency such
as the Sheriff’s department to obtain a copy of their videos or statements even though the
Rangers had this as part of their work product and Ms. Mitchell had already given me two
statements from UCISD.
United States Border Patrol – Documents and evidence
The United States Border Patrol has consistently provided me with assistance and have spent
the time to sit and watch me as I reviewed documents and statements while I wrote notes by
hand. They have followed the request of the District Attorney and not handed anything over. I
3
See 1) on page 5 of this report
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was able to look at statements and write notes. The United States Border Patrol have been
honorable and maintained a high level of professionalism.
The Department of Justice Report was released in January 2024.
This report was detailed and provided me with an accurate timeline. It is the last document that
I reviewed which corroborates much of the information on the timeline that I pieced together.
This report also had information regarding some physical evidence that I was not aware of and
not provided by the Uvalde County District Attorney.
Uvalde Police Officer and Dispatcher interviews conducted by Investigator Jesse

Prado
The Ranger division requested that officers not write an offense report regarding this incident
and for the officers to note in the Uvalde Police Department report writing system that the
officer’s statements were submitted to the Texas Rangers.
The Uvalde Police Officers followed the request of the Texas Rangers and did not write reports
or document their actions and observations during this incident in their report writing system.
Many of the officers did not have a Body Worn Camera (BWC) that day.
Officers that were not interviewed by the Rangers did write reports into the system under
Offense / Incident Report #291345.
Written reports will be more detailed when the officer can sit down and write it out the way they
recalled the incident. This written report is normally done within a few days of the incident if not
on the same day as the incident, so it is fresh in their memory.
On October 31st, 2022, I decided to begin the interviews with the involved officers and
dispatchers, although it was against the wishes of the Uvalde County District Attorney. I had a
concern that five months had past, and the officer’s recollection of detail may be distorted. I
was also waiting for the requested evidence from the U.C. D.A. and her to approve the
interviews of the officers. I waited in good faith for the D.A. to give me the evidence that I had
requested.
I did not begin to receive evidence and statements in this case from the District Attorney until
the summer of 2023. This meant that had I followed her request I would not have done the
interviews until after a year of the incident date. I never received all the requested information
from the D.A. Since there was no written report, these interviews should have occurred in a
quick and reasonable period of the date of incident.
During this investigation I Interviewed the involved Uvalde Police Officers and Staff. All the
people interviewed had at least one attorney present. Officers Michael Wally, James Calliham,
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Juan Saucedo, Det. Jose Rodriguez, and Fred De La Cruz no longer worked for the Uvalde Police
Department at the time of the interviews and did not participate in the interviews.
The employees received notices in accordance with Government Code 614 Subchapter B and
were ordered to provide a response under Garrity. All interviews were audio recorded:
● Chief Daniel Rodriguez
● Lt. Mariano Pargas
● Sgt. Donald Page
● Dispatcher Jeanna Santellanez
● Dispatcher Myra Landry
● Sgt. Daniel Coronado
● Dispatcher Samantha Diaz
● Staff Sgt. Eduardo Canales
● Lt. Javier Martinez
● Det. Renato Lualemaga
● Det. Hoshi Cantu
● Det. Ronald Rodriguez
● Officer Lee Ann Cantu
● Cpl. Greg Villa
● Cpl. Ramon Morin Jr.
● Officer Max Dorflinger
● Officer Daniel Ruiz
● Officer Jessica Zamora
● Sgt. Julian Arredondo
● Lt. Juan Martinez
● Sgt. Bobby Ruiz Sr.
● Officer Joshua Perez
● Officer Louis Landry
● Officer Ventura Chapa
● City of Uvalde Fire Marshal Juan Hernandez
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Investigative Summary
On May 24th, 2022, a mass shooting occurred at Robb Elementary School located at 715 Old
Carrizo Rd. Uvalde, Texas. Many failures in the response by law enforcement have been
documented and the goal of this report was to investigate every Uvalde police officer’s actions
and decisions to determine if Uvalde Police Policies or S.O.Ps were violated. The Uvalde police
dispatchers were also included in this investigation. An emphasis was placed on the initial
responding officers.
This investigation was broken down into ten sections.
1) Analysis of Active Shooter Policy
2) Memorandum of Understanding between Uvalde Police and Uvalde Consolidated

Independent School District Police - Key points
3) Review of the Uvalde contact team’s actions

● SSgt. Eduardo Canales
● Det. Louis Landry
4) Analysis of Active Shooter Response for School-Based Law Enforcement
5) Review of Officer’s actions that entered the building during the incident.
● Cpl. Ramon Morin
● Cpl. Gregory Villa
● Fire Marshal Juan M. Hernandez
6) Review of Perimeter team - Officers that did not enter the building but assisted on the
call including 552 Diaz Street.
● Cpl. Joshua Perez
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7) Review of Communications / Dispatchers

● Jeanna Santellanes
● Samantha Diaz
● Myra Landry
8) Review of Uvalde Police Command

● Acting Chief Lt. Mariano Pargas
● Chief Daniel Rodriguez – not present during the incident.
9) Uvalde Police Officer interview summaries
10) Recommendations
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1. Analysis of Active Shooter Policy
Introduction:
The landscape of law enforcement's response to active shooter incidents has undergone a
significant transformation over the years, shaped by tragic events that forced authorities to
reevaluate and adapt their operational philosophies. This evolution is evident when examining
pivotal incidents such as the University of Texas Tower Shooting in 1966, the Columbine High
School Shooting in 1999, and the Pulse Nightclub Shooting in Orlando in 2016. Each of these
incidents brought about a profound shift in law enforcement tactics, strategies, and
coordination, influencing the development of contemporary active shooter response protocols.
The University of Texas Tower Shooting in 1966 marked a watershed moment in the history of
law enforcement response to mass shootings. Charles Whitman's deadly rampage from the
iconic tower forced authorities to confront the challenges of dealing with an active shooter in a
public space. The incident prompted law enforcement agencies to reassess their preparedness
for such rare but high-impact events, leading to the realization that specialized training and
coordination were essential to mitigate the impact of similar incidents in the future.
The tragic events at Columbine High School in 1999 further underscored the need for a
paradigm shift in active shooter response. The prolonged and chaotic nature of the incident,
coupled with the inadequacy of existing strategies, prompted law enforcement agencies
nationwide to rethink their approaches. This seminal event highlighted the importance of rapid
and aggressive intervention, as well as the necessity for specialized units to be trained to
confront and neutralize active shooters.
In 2016, the Pulse Nightclub Shooting in Orlando brought new challenges and considerations to
the forefront. The incident, which targeted a crowded nightclub during a mass gathering,
emphasized the need for law enforcement to adapt its strategies to diverse environments and
circumstances. The Pulse shooting prompted a reevaluation of response tactics to address the
unique challenges posed by incidents in crowded, dynamic spaces, barricaded shooter with
hostages and injured victims, influencing the development of protocols tailored for such
scenarios.
The aftermath of these incidents led to the establishment of standardized active shooter
response protocols, emphasizing the importance of rapid deployment, immediate engagement,
and the coordination of multi-agency resources. The evolution of law enforcement's
operational philosophy in handling active shooter incidents reflects a commitment to
continuous improvement and adaptation in the face of evolving threats. This historical
perspective serves as a foundation for understanding the contemporary strategies employed by
law enforcement agencies to protect the public and minimize the impact of active shooter
incidents.
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Active Shooter Model Policy
Active shooter policies across the United States vary by specific law enforcement agencies.
There is not a single best practice model active shooter policy recognized as a national
standard. In 2018 the International Association of Chiefs of Police published their Active
Shooter Model Policy (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2018). The disclaimer for
the IACP Law Enforcement Policy Center states it includes most current information and
professional opinions on the issue but gives a cautionary statement that no model policy is able
to meet the needs of a given law enforcement agency. Each agency must establish policies
consistent with their state and local laws within the expectations of their community and
resources.
This report analyzes the Uvalde Police Department’s policy, 8.6 Active Shooter Response, in
comparison to the IACP Law Enforcement Policy Center’s Active Shooter Model Policy
(International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2018).
Comparison IACP Model Policy:

The overall format and content of the Uvalde Police Department’s Policy 8.6, Active Shooter
Response (Uvalde Police Department, 2015) is similar to the IACP Law Enforcement Policy
Center’s Active Shooter policy (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2018). Both policies
set out the policy, the purpose, and definitions in the first three sections.
Purpose:
The purpose section of both policies shares a common primary objective, which is to respond to
active shooter situations with the aim of limiting serious injuries or loss of life. The IACP model
policy has a broader scope as it explicitly mentions the policy applies to all situations with an
ongoing deadly threat, including firearms, vehicles, explosives, and knives. The Uvalde policy’s
purpose statement is more concise and direct in stating its purpose governing the response and
activities associated with active shooter events.
Policy:
Both policies emphasize the need for immediate action by officers when facing active shooter
situations with ongoing deadly force, where delay could result in injury or death. Both policies
share the intent to respond, contain, and stop threats, as well as administer aid to victims. They
both stress the importance of officers intervening rapidly to eliminate the threat. Rapid
intervention by officers when faced with ongoing or reasonably likely continuation of deadly
force, with the goal of preventing additional deaths or injuries is authorized by both policies.
Definitions:
The definition section of both policies have similarities with a few of the listed terms. Both
provide a similar definition of an “Active Shooting” / “Active Shooter,” involving armed
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individuals using or reasonably likely to use deadly force, resulting in injury, death, or imminent
threat of death or serious bodily harm.
They also emphasize the need for immediate and forceful responses by officers in active
shooter situations based on a reasonable belief that failure to act swiftly could lead to further
death or serious bodily injury, “Immediate Action” / “Rapid Intervention.”
Both policies define the concept of “Contact Officer or Team” / “Contact Team,” consisting of
the first officers at the scene tasked with the intent of locating and stopping or neutralizing the
threat.
They both include the concept of the “Rescue Task Force (RTF) or “Rescue and Recovery Team”
as a team or group of police, fire, and EMS personnel tasked with providing initial medical care
and evacuation of persons from the hazardous area.
The IACP model policy provides more detailed definitions for various terms that are not
included in Uvalde’s policies. The additional terms include "Casualty Collection Point (CCP),"
"Cold Zone," "Hot Zone," "Inner Perimeter," "Outer Perimeter," "Staging Area," "Unified
Command (UC)," and "Warm Zone." Uvalde defines “Tactical Combat Care (TCCC) in its policy
as the immediate and limited care needed prior to movement of a person to more advanced
care.
IACP model policy has a more detailed explanation of the Incident Commander’s
responsibilities, including the development of strategies and tactics, ordering, and releasing
resources, and overall authority and responsibility for incident operations. Uvalde’s policy has a
brief definition of the first arriving supervisor (not a part of a contact team) who takes
command of the scene.
The IACP model policy introduces the concept of a "Staging Area" and explains "Unified
Command (UC)" in more detail, highlighting its use when multiple agencies have jurisdiction or
incidents across political jurisdictions. Uvalde policy does not explicitly mention these concepts.
Uvalde’s policy places more emphasis on officer roles during an active shooter incident, where
the IACP model policy provides a more extensive list of definitions, covering various aspects of
incident response, incident command, and operational zones.
Procedures:
Both policy procedures sections share the common goal of responding effectively to an active
shooter situation and the importance of accurate information and prompt response to mitigate
the threat.
The situational assessment segment of the IACP model policy focuses on the on-scene
assessment by dispatched responders or officers. It addresses the immediate actions officers
should take upon arriving at the incident scene, emphasizing the importance of a quick
evaluation of the situation. Whereas the Uvalde policy procedure section focuses on the initial
19 | Page
information received by dispatch personnel and highlights the need to be alert to the possibility
of an active shooter event developing from a less severe call. It focuses more on the
dispatcher’s role. It also stresses the importance of implementing mutual aid agreements with
other agencies and collaborating with recovery agencies after the incident.
The “Immediate Action by Officers” segment focuses on the possibility of an individual officer
taking immediate action based on their assessment of the threat. The decision to intervene is
left to the officer’s judgment and capability. The Uvalde segment focuses on a systematic
approach where all on-duty sworn personnel respond urgently to an active shooter call. The
emphasis is on a coordinated response by uniformed personnel.
The IACP model policy grants individual officers the authority to make immediate intervention
decisions based on their assessment and training, with the emphasis on the individual’s
capability to effectively intervene. The Uvalde policy establishes a chain of command,
designating the first responding supervisor as the Incident Commander if they are not needed
as part of the contact team. That supervisor is responsible for coordinating the overall
response, including the deployment of rescue teams, until relieved by a higher-ranking or
assigned Incident Commander.
Contact Officer / Team:

Both policies focus on the primary objective of stopping further violence. IACP model policy
suggests deploying only one contact officer or team initially, with additional deployments
directed by the Incident Commander for tactical advantage. The Uvalde policy recommends
forming a single team of the first two to five arriving officers, entering the structure together.
The decision to enter without a full team is based on specific criteria, such as the presence of an
immediate threat and proximity to a cover officer and is the officer equipped to respond to the
threat.
Rescue Task Force / Rescue Team:

The policies both address the critical stage of providing care for and evacuating victims of an
active shooter incident. The policies provide the rescue teams to be composed of officers,
firefighters, and/or medical personnel and with security teams to provide for their safety.
Unified Command:
Both policies address the establishment of command during an incident, the IACP model policy
provides a more detailed and comprehensive set of actions and responsibilities for the Incident
Commander, emphasizing a coordinated approach involving various agencies. The Uvalde
policy is more concise, focusing on the initial priorities of the Incident Commander and the
importance of training for department supervisors in the Incident Command process.
20 | Page
Community Notification:
The IACP model policy has a broader scope of communications to include warnings during
active shooter situations, alerts about law enforcement activity and potential road closures,
and specific directions for individuals at the scene. The Uvalde policy is limited to a single
statement that requests for information from the media should be funneled through the Public
Information Officer (PIO) or the Incident Commander (IC) for coordination.
Debriefing:
The IACP model policy addresses the need for a debriefing as soon as reasonable after the
incident. Uvalde policy does not specifically address the topic of a debriefing.
Training:
The IACP model policy addresses an agency that shall provide active shooter training to all
sworn and civilian personnel, to include simulation exercises conducted in schools and other
facilities with other agencies. The Uvalde policy does not specifically address the topic of active
shooter training, besides the component that the department will provide training to all
department supervisors on the Incident Command process and priorities for command.
Both policies are silent on the topic of the dynamic of when an active mobile shooter either
intentionally or by circumstances barricades themselves with hostages in a confined space
creating a tactical disadvantage for responding contact officers and/or teams.
Comparison Texas Police Chiefs Association Model Policy:

Uvalde’s policy 8.6 Active Shooter Response (Uvalde Police Department, 2015) references Texas
Best Practices (TBD) Policies 6.01, 6.02, 6.07, 7.34, and 8.07. The Texas Best Practices is a
program administered by the Texas Police Chiefs Association as part of the TPCAF Accreditation
Program (Texas Police Chiefs Association, 2024).
Policy:
Both policies share the core principles of responding, containing, and stopping threats for an
active shooter incident.
Purpose:
The sections are identical.

Definitions:
The Texas Police Chiefs Association’s policy does not have a definition section.
Procedures:
21 | Page
The Texas Police Chiefs Association’s policy is limited in this section to “Notifications” and
“Mutual Aid.” The Uvalde policy addresses in more depth the items in the “Initial Dispatch”
section.
Active Shooter Response:

Both policies recognize the need for the first responding officer(s) to respond to the active
shooting location.
Concepts and Principles:

The Texas Police Chiefs Association’s policy identifies items for “Safe, effective responses to
active shooters are designed around concepts and principles. The first responding officers
should:
1. Stay together as much as possible and enter the involved structure quickly.
2. Maximize communication by staying in close contact with other first
responders.
3. Maximize threat coverage by addressing all angles.
4. Visually search involved areas using 540 degrees of coverage around and
above the team.
5. Evaluate rooms from the threshold (commonly referred to as slicing the pie).
6. Differentiate between deliberate and direct-to-threat speeds and use the
appropriate speed for the circumstances.
7. Use cover-contact principles when taking suspects into custody.” (Texas Police
Chiefs Association, 2024. p2)
Follow-On Responders:
This section of the Texas Police Chiefs Association’s policy is similar in content to the Uvalde’s
policy “Rescue Team” section.
Post-Event:
This section of the Texas Police Chiefs Association’s policy addresses items for a “SIM model
(Security / Immediate Action Plan / Medical). No comparable item in Uvalde policy.
OIS Investigations:
In the aftermath of an active shooter incident if officers discharge a weapon, then an agency
will implement its officer involved shooting policy and follow-up investigation. The topic is not
addressed in Uvalde’s policy.
22 | Page
Media Inquiry:
Both policies have similar content for the media topic. The Texas Police Chiefs Association adds
the consideration for establishing a media staging location that is not within the vicinity of the
active shooter incident.
Additional Uvalde Police Department Policies:

Uvalde policy 8.1 Unusual Occurrences and Special Events (Uvalde Police Department, 2013, p.
2) specifically identifies hostage taking where the victim is held after police arrival and incidents
with barricaded persons with an emergency response team callout as “Unusual Police
Incidents.” An active shooter event would also be included as an unusual police incident due to
subsection (e) “Other major incident where more than three units and a supervisor are
utilized.”
The policy also addresses a debriefing in the form of an after-action report. The after-action
report is due within 10 days of completion of the unusual occurrence event.
Uvalde policy 8.3 Special Weapons and Tactics Team (Uvalde Police Department, 2013, p.1)
addresses the Special Weapons and Tactics Team (S.W.A.T.) to be a resource for the handling of
critical or unusual police incidents. Two of the definitions included in the policy are “Hostage
Situations” and “Barricade Situations.” The policy defines a hostage situation as, “the holding
of any person(s) against their will by an armed or potentially armed suspect.” It defines
barricade situations as, “a standoff created by an armed or potentially armed suspect in any
location, whether fortified or not, who is refusing to comply with police demands for
surrender.”
The policy also addresses special equipment issued to the S.W.A.T. team members to include
“Breaching Tools and Ammunition: items such as rams, pry bars, hydraulic or electronic
machines, special frangible shotgun rounds, etc. which are designed to force entry into
barricaded or secured areas.” (Uvalde Police Department, 2013, p. 9).
Uvalde Police Department’s Standard Operational Procedures:

The Uvalde Patrol Division Standard Operational Procedures (Uvalde Police Department, 2013,
pp. 11 -13) addresses active shooter incident in Section IV. Patrol Field Tactics and Operational
Procedures (A) “Active Shooter Incident.” The SOPs are a condensed version of the Active
Shooter Response policy (Uvalde Police Department, 2015). The first section states,
1. It is the policy of this department to protect life by any legal means possible. Officers
responding to an active shooter incident shall accomplish this goal by immediately using
any legal means at their disposal to make contact with the active shooter and stop him.
This may include arrest, containment, or use of deadly force.
2. The philosophy driving this policy recognizes that the active shooter must be stopped
before he can destroy any more innocent lives. This shall be the duty and responsibility
23 | Page
of the initial responding officers, and they shall use all legal means to accomplish it. The
prioritization of activities, in their order of importance IS:
a. Stop the active shooter
b. Rescue the victims
c. Provide medical assistance
d. Preserve the crime scene.
3. While it is important to provide medical treatment to the wounded, it is our duty as
law enforcement officers to first protect all innocent life by stopping the actions of the
active shooter.
The “Procedure” section establishes the contact team, the first responding officers, up to four,
shall form up and immediately search for the active shooter. “The focus is to make contact as
soon as possible and stop the active shooter by arrest, containment, or use of deadly force.”
The SOP suggests the officers should make entry at a location other than the main entrance, if
possible, due to possible barricades, explosives, or an ambush situation.
The SOP reinforces the policy that the first command officer on the scene, who is not part of a
contact or rescue team, will be the incident commander, and will establish a command post,
and initiate incident command operations (Uvalde Police Department, 2013, p. 13).
In conclusion, the combination of Uvalde’s various policies and standard operational
procedures are consistent with model policies established by the International Chief of Police
Association and the Texas Police Chiefs Association. Both of those organizations are recognized
as sources for updated information and best practices within the law enforcement community.
Both organizations have disclaimers acknowledging that these model policies may not be
universally applicable to the needs of every law enforcement agency. Law enforcement
agencies remain dedicated to fostering a culture of continuous improvement, ensuring the
highest level of effectiveness, transparency, and public trust in their public safety service and
response.
24 | Page
2. Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Uvalde Police
Department and the Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police
Department
Key Points
Date agreement entered into: August 5, 2019.
Texas Education Code, Subchapter C. Law and Order, Section 37.081 addresses school district
peace officers, school resource officers, and security personnel. The board of trustees for the
Uvalde Independent School District created their own police department as authorized by the
statute. They additionally entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the City
of Uvalde Police Department on August 5, 2019.
The MOU does not establish a school resource officer program involving full time employees of
the City of Uvalde Police Department. The intent of the MOU is to outline “reasonable
communication and coordination efforts among the department and the agencies” (City of
Uvalde, 2019, p. 1).
The MOU establishes that both the Uvalde Police Department, and the Uvalde Independent
School District Police Department are committed to serving the community effectively and
efficiently working through mutual cooperation.
Uvalde CISD Police Department has the primary duty to respond to and investigate all crimes,
committed by or against district students, employees, or the general public on or near district
property, during regular school hours.
Uvalde Police Department will generally cover the calls for service or issues during evenings,
weekends, and some holidays, when the Uvalde CISD Police Department normally does not
have officers working.
The Uvalde Police Department may refer criminal cases committed against district property,
committed by or against district students, employees, or the general public on or near district
property to Uvalde CISD Police Department for investigation.
Both departments are responsible for open communication to better serve the community and
schools.
Both departments are responsible for making all reasonable attempts to coordinate activities,
which impact the other department.
25 | Page
Establishes a “Liaison Officer” who is responsible for reporting directly to both Chief of Police
for the respective departments.
The MOU can be modified as needed but shall be in writing and mutually agreed upon.
The investigator was not provided with any amendment or written modification of this MOU.
Texas Education Code, Subchapter C. Law And Order
Section 37.081. School District Peace Officers, School Resource Officers, and Security
Personnel.
The Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District’s board of trustees decided to establish their own
police department to provide the services for the school district. The MOU entered into by the City of
Uvalde Police Department and the Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District did not create a
provision for the establishment of full-time peace officers employed by the City of Uvalde Police
Department to work as school resource officers as defined under Section 37.081. The MOU specifically
addresses the statute requirement in Section 37.081 (g), “A school district police department and the
law enforcement agencies with which it has overlapping jurisdiction shall enter into a memorandum of
understanding that outlines reasonable communication and coordination efforts between the
department and the agencies.” The “department” in the text is referring to the school district’s police
department. The “agencies” would be the other overlapping law enforcement agencies, such as the
Uvalde Police Department and possibly the Uvalde County Sheriff’s Department (not sure if an MOU
exists).
Section 37.081 (f) establishes that the chief of police of the school district police department is
responsible for the supervision of the department and the school district’s police officers.
Section 37.0812. Training Policy: School District Peace Officers and School Resource Officers.
Subsection (a) establishes a school district peace officer or school resource officer shall complete an
active shooter response training program approved by the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement at
least once in each four-year period.
Subsection (c) must ensure the training provider is certified under Section 1701.2515, Texas Occupations
Code, to provide the active shooter training.
Texas Occupations Code
Section 1701.601. Definition

A school resource officer is defined as “a peace officer who is assigned by the officer’s employing
political subdivision to provide a police presence at a public school, safety or drug education to students
of a public school, or other similar services. The term does not include a peace officer who provides law
enforcement at: (1) a public school only for extracurricular activities; or (2) a public school even only for
extracurricular activities.” (State of Texas, 2024).
26 | Page
3. Review of the Uvalde contact team’s actions
● SSgt. Eduardo Canales
● Det. Louis Landry
11:29 am to 11:35 am Review of first officers on scene through the time entry was made into
the fourth-grade building through the northwest doors and the south doors.
11:29 am
A witness called Uvalde 911 from the funeral home to say that a vehicle had crashed, the driver
had exited the vehicle with a gun, and shot at the funeral home employees. The caller stated
that the subject was on the school campus.
The call was dispatched to 715 Old Carrizo Rd of a crash and the caller advised the subject has a
gun. “Be advised shots fired, shots fired.”4 This is the address of Robb Elementary School.
Every on-duty Uvalde Police Officer responded to the call, including all officers at the police
station.5
A second call came in from a UCISD employee stating that the subject had fired shots and was
headed to the school.6
11:30 am
UPD dispatcher broadcast that subject had jumped the fence and was in the school yard.
Officer asks the dispatcher if Robb School was notified.
11:31 am
Sgt. Coronado requests that the school shut down.7
Dispatcher broadcast the description as black and jeans.
11:32 am – 11:34:59 am
4
UPD radio traffic
5
Jppi investigation
6
UPD 911 calls
7
UPD radio traffic
27 | Page
Radio traffic - Officer advises shots fired at Robb School. Officer Jesus Mendoza and Officer Juan
Saucedo arrive on scene.
Radio traffic – the caller advised the shooter to be in the back of the school and to take cover.
An officer advised the west side of the school by the cars. The subject was wearing all black.
Officer Jesus Mendoza states that as he was arriving, he heard shots being fired and believed
that he was being shot at. He stopped his car on Geraldine as he came off of Evans Street.
Officer Mendoza did not see the crash site. Officer Mendoza did not have his AR-15 rifle with
him. Officer Saucedo drove up and parked his car to provide cover for Officer Mendoza.8
Officer Chapa arrived and was told to take cover by Sgt. Coronado who thought they were
being shot at. Officer Chapa was not issued an AR-15 at that time.9
Sgt. Coronado stated that he drove up and saw Officers Saucedo and Jesus Mendoza crouched
down behind their unit that was facing east on Geraldine. Sgt. Coronado stopped his unit facing
south and heard gunshots. Sgt. Coronado believed they were being shot at. Sgt. Coronado did
not see the truck in the ditch and questioned the officers where the shots were coming from.
Sgt. Coronado began to look and noticed that he did not hear the whistling of the rounds or the
vehicles taking hits. Sgt. Coronado had seen children briefly in the school yard when he exited
his car. There were so many rounds being fired he believed the officers were engaged in a gun
battle. Sgt. Coronado believed the shooter had a rifle because of its distinctive sound. 10
It was later learned the shooter was firing shots into the school from the west side of the
building.11
It was also learned later that a Hell Fire Trigger system was located in room 111 that allows a
semi-automatic firearm to fire rounds at an increased rate.12
Sgt. Coronado stated that he heard the funeral home employees yelling that the shooter was
running to the school or at the school. There was panic in their hand gestures.
Officer Saucedo told Sgt. Coronado that he thought he saw the shooter and requested
permission to fire. Officer Saucedo had an AR-15. A number of things immediately went
through Sgt. Coronado’s mind including how he could approve the shot if he (Sgt. Coronado)
could not see the shooter. Sgt. Coronado thought it was okay if officers were being shot at and
unable to return fire, but he did not want to risk the life of a child.
8
Officer Mendoza interview with Prado
9
Officer Chapa interview with Prado
10
Sgt. Coronado interview with Prado
11
DOJ report page 19
12
DOJ report page 180
28 | Page
Sgt. Coronado heard the employees yelling that the shooter was running. He then drove his car
to the front of the school, on Old Carrizo Rd. Sgt. Coronado jumped the curb and parked on the
grass to cut off the shooter. He later learned that the person Officer Saucedo saw was a Coach
and not the shooter. No shots from the officers were fired.13
SSgt. Canales stated that he left the police department and was behind Lt. Pargas in a train of
police cars. SSgt. Canales heard on his radio that the subject was running towards the school.
Sgt. Canales called his wife and learned their 4th grade child was in the last building in the back.
Upon arrival Lt. Pargas told him that shots were being fired towards the direction of the school.
SSgt. Canales retrieved his AR-15 and extra magazines then staged with Lt. Martinez.14
Lt. Pargas stated that he arrived at the school area at the same time as SSgt. Canales, parking
near Perez St. at Geraldine St. Lt. Pargas saw Officer Saucedo and another officer taking cover
behind their units and believed they were being shot at. Officer Saucedo had an AR-15. Lt.
Pargas put his vest on at the same time as SSgt. Canales. Lt. Pargas focused his attention on the
funeral home staff who were screaming that the shooter had gone into the school and was
shooting in the school. Lt. Pargas does not recall if he said, on the radio, the shooter had gotten
into the school because of radio traffic. Lt. Pargas recognized that this was an active shooter
and only thought of entering to find the shooter. Lt. Pargas could hear the muffled rapid-fire
shots in the school.15
Officer Saucedo separated from the Uvalde Police Department, and I did not interview him.
Radio traffic - officer announces that it looked like he made it into the building. (Lt. Pargas)
Radio traffic – officer asks to notify school police. Officer responds that units are there. (I
understood this to be UCISD units)
The shooter entered the building at 11:33 am. The shooter then went directly to the vestibule
at room 111 and 112 firing shots at the door. The shooter is out of view of the camera while in
the vestibule area then comes back into view in the hallway. The shooter then appears to enter
Room 111.16
Det. Lualemaga stated that he heard people screaming that the shooter had gone into the
school as he was preparing to go in with the other officers. Det. Lualemaga only had his duty
pistol. He recalled that Lt. Martinez did not put his vest on properly as they began moving
towards the northwest door. Det. Lualemaga could hear muffled gunshots coming from inside
13
14
Sgt. Canales interview with Prado
15
Lt. Pargas’s interview with Prado
16
DOJ Report page 21
29 | Page
the building. Det. Lualemaga only recalled Lt. Martinez, Det. Landry with him. He later
remembered Officer Chapa and SSgt. Canales were also there.17
Det. Landry had arrived with Det. Lualemaga and staged behind the car with his AR-15 and one
extra magazine. Det. Landry prepared and moved toward the building with Lt. Martinez, SSgt.
Canales and Det. Lualemaga. He also heard the witnesses yelling the subject was in the
school.18
Lt. Martinez stated that upon arrival, he retrieved his vest from the trunk of his car and recalled
running to the northwest door with SSgt. Canales. He did not have a handheld radio due to a
shortage on patrol and had his duty weapon, a Glock 22. He did not recall anyone else with
them. Lt. Martinez heard gunshots as they approached the door.19
Officer Chapa moved to Lt. Martinez, Det. Lualemaga and Det. Landry’s position on the street
as they were staging, when Sgt. Coronado drove to the front of the school. Officer Chapa stated
all four men put on body armor.20
First four officers that initially entered the closed and unlocked South door 11:35:47 am
(estimated time)
● UCISD Officer Adrian Gonzales
● UCISD Police Chief Pete Arredondo
Sgt. Page drove to the south side of the building after UCISD Officer Adrian Gonzales waved him
down. The other officers were staging and preparing to move to the Northwest door. Sgt. Page
parked behind Officer Rodriguez, in the grass, on the south side of the building. Sgt. Page met
with Officer Gonzales and began hearing constant gunfire in the building. Officer Gonzales told
Sgt. Page the shooter had to be in the building. Both men then drew their pistols and went into
the building through the unlocked south door.21
UCISD Officer Gonzales was the first officer on the south side and had passed the shooter while
he drove up.22 Officer Gonzales was the first officer on campus and the first officer to enter the
building from the south side with Sgt. Page. UCISD Officer Gonzales and UCISD Officer Ruben
Ruiz were the instructors of Active Shooter Training Mandate course TCOLE #2195 on March 21,
2022. Johnny Field was the Academy Coordinator for this class.23
17
Det. Lualemaga interview with Prado
18
Det. Landry interview with Prado
19
Lt. Martinez interview with Prado
20
Officer Chapa interview with Prado
21
Sgt. Page interview with Prado
22
JPPI investigation
23
JPPI investigation and Sgt. Coronado BWC
30 | Page
Sgt. Coronado stated that it was his intention to cut off the shooter who he believed was
running through the school while the other officers would flank him, when he drove to the
front of the school. Sgt. Coronado saw Chief Arredondo who teamed up with him while they ran
onto school property.24
Sgt. Coronado and Chief Arredondo were in a covered walkway moving west bound toward the
4th grade building when Sgt. Coronado remembered to turn on his BWC. Sgt. Coronado’s BWC
was found to be 28 seconds ahead of actual time by DPS analysts. Sgt. Coronado’s intent was to
find the shooter and eliminate him.25 Sgt. Coronado’s BWC shows him entering the building
from the unlocked south door at 11:36:09.
Sgt. Coronado entered the building after Chief Arredondo, Sgt. Page, and Officer Gonzales.
When the shots were fired at the officers, he remembered Lt. Martinez grabbing the back of his
head. Sgt. Coronado heard the shooter was right inside a door and needed to inform dispatch.
He then went outside to get on the radio.26
Twenty-eight attempts were made to transmit on the radios from inside the building, while
they approached the classrooms before the officers were shot.27
Sgt. Coronado’s BWC shows Sgt. Page is seen near a tree moving toward the building on the
south side. A female teacher opened her classroom door and said, “He’s inside the 4 th grade
building”. Chief Arredondo was ahead of Sgt. Coronado as they ran towards the 4 th Grade
building. Sgt. Coronado yelled at Sgt. Page and UCISD Officer Gonzales to be careful he might be
in that building. Sgt. Coronado then advises via radio that the subject is believed to be in the
building but as he is speaking gunshots are heard. Sgt. Coronado yells shots fired and yells at
the officers closer to the south door to get inside. Sgt. Page and Officer Gonzales are seen at
the south door entering with Chief Arredondo entering third and Sgt. Coronado fourth. 28
Sgt. Page stated that as they entered, the shooting continued, and the hallway was filled with
smoke. Sgt. Page was not sure if it was gun smoke or sheet rock or a combination. Sgt. Page
believes he and Officer Gonzales entered before Lt. Martinez and SSgt. Canales.
Sgt. Page realized the shots were being fired from classroom 111 and 112. His ALERRT training
taught him to go to the gunfire. Sgt. Page crossed in front of Officer Gonzales and made it to
the south side of the vestibule. Sgt. Page had a clear view of the door of room 112, which was
full of bullet holes and the window was shot out. Sgt. Page said that officers on both sides of
the hallway went directly to the gunfire.
24
25
26
27
Sgt. Canales BWC
28
Sgt. Coronado BWC
31 | Page
The room was dark and quiet. Lt. Martinez and SSgt. Canales had entered from the north side of
the hallway and were moving toward Sgt. Page.
Sgt. Page had signaled to them that the shooter was in 111 or 112. He did not want to put
himself in front of the door to 111 which he could not see.29
Sgt. Page stated that the teachers are taught to turn off lights. Sgt. Page last took active shooter
training in 2011 or 2012 with Texas DPS SWAT. Sgt. Page recalled that different school districts
may instruct teachers differently as to what to do in an active shooter scenario. Sgt. Page was
taught to take the threat out, but in training the lights were on and the classroom doors were
open. Sgt. Page stated that DPS taught them to go in quickly and cut the pie for the element of
surprise and not to do a “peekaboo”.
Sgt. Page recalled a training scenario of the shooter in a classroom, but the doors were not locked,
and the lights were not off. Sgt. Page recalled learning not to “peekaboo” because he was shot
in the face by the wax bullets during training. They were trained to cut the pie and stay out of the
“fatal funnel” (doorway).30
Sgt. Page planned to go into room 112 because of the bullet holes; they did not know if the
doors were locked but assumed they were because of school policy and active shooter training.
Sgt. Page believes that SSgt. Canales’ radio beeping gave up their location.
After the shots were fired at them, Sgt. Page thought Lt. Martinez was shot and began yelling
out if he was ok. Sgt. Page saw two rounds go through the sheet rock where he had been
standing as he moved back. He did not know how the shooter was able to see Lt. Martinez and
SSgt. Canales, because they were about eight feet away from the door.
Sgt. Page saw that the .223 rounds went through the wood and sheetrock. He learned the
shooter had an AR-15 when he saw the casings on the ground. Sgt. Page did not have his rifle
rated vest on and took a position in the closest vestibule which was at the doors to 103 and
104.
Chief Arredondo was at the vestibule for room 109 and 110. Sgt. Page described it as being so
quiet that he could hear himself breathing. Sgt. Page asked Chief Arredondo if there was any
other way in, to which Chief Arredondo replied there was not. Sgt. Page did not know what
happened to Officer Gonzales until he saw Sgt. Canales BWC showing Sgt. Page alone with Chief
Arredondo. Officer Gonzales exited the building and then took a position on the exterior
southeast corner.
29
30
32 | Page
Chief Arredondo went into unlocked classroom 110 and Sgt. Page then asked him if there were
any kids in there. Chief Arredondo answered, no, at approximately 11:37 am. Children were
later located in that class when evacuations started.31
Sgt. Page answered a phone call from Texas Ranger Kindell and requested help with shields,
equipment, and rifles; he and Chief Arredondo only had pistols. Ranger Kindell said he was
getting the assets including DPS Swat.
Sgt. Page described the shooter as “Camping,” which is a term commonly used in video games
where the shooter takes a tactical advantage from a fixed position, aiming his weapon at the
point of entry “fatal funnel” and shoots everyone entering the “fatal funnel.” No one gave Sgt.
Page any direction from the south side, and he did not know what was happening on the north
side. He did see Chief Arredondo use hand signals to get a rifle on the south side. Sgt. Page did
not know if there were children in the class but realized the suspect was shooting at something
in the room. Sgt. Page stated that ALERRT training never simulated a person in a fixed position
waiting on you.
Sgt. Page was replaced by Cpl. Villa and then went outside to meet with Ranger Kindell. He
stayed in the area of the south door when Sgt. Coronado asked him to check classroom 102. He
did and saw a teacher and her children pop up. At 11:58 am Sgt. Page ran outside and began
evacuations through the windows.
Sgt. Coronado BWC the moments after officers are shot at, someone is heard requesting SWAT.
Sgt. Coronado steps out of the building to use the radio. SSgt. Canales was in the middle of his
transmission when Sgt. Coronado’s radio began to receive the transmission. Sgt. Canales is
heard requesting SWAT on the radio.
Sgt. Coronado begins to transmit, and a voice is heard that he is contained in this office. Sgt.
Coronado stated it was an ISD Officer who stated that.32 Officer Gonzales had come out at the
same time as Sgt. Coronado leaving Sgt. Page and Chief Arredondo in the southside of the hall.
The following are some radio transmissions and events captured on Sgt. Coronado’s body cam:
● 11:37:53 am Sgt. Coronado “We have him contained” in the west side of the property
facing east. “Have a male subject with an AR.”
422 - also get EMS possible officer shot.
● 11:38:54 am What is the location of the officer down.
422 - responds Geraldine and Grove
● 11:38:54 am (Sheriff)- Ems also needed 555 Diaz St. Stat.
● 11:39:26 am Sgt. Coronado - also any available unit bring shields from the PD.
● 11:39:39 am Lt. Pargas requests any agency available to help.
31
32
33 | Page
● 11:40:06 am Sgt. Coronado - contact DPS for Helicopter and if they have any ballistic
shields to make location.
● 11:40:26 am Sgt. Coronado – the male subject is in the school on the west side of the
building.
He is contained. We have multiple officers inside the building.
Believe he is barricaded in one of the offices.
Male subject is still shooting.
Detective Cantu asks what is needed from the PD.
Sgt. Coronado – whatever we have. Flash bangs if we have any.
Det. Cantu asks if it is locked (referring to storage locker in the patrol room)
Sgt. Coronado answers to use the Halligan tool to break it.
● 11:41 am SSgt. Canales on radio requests to have the school check if Ms. Mireles is in
class or somewhere else.
Sgt. Coronado verbally tells Officer Gonzales, who uses his school radio and then
broadcasts that Ms. Mireles is in class. Both men comment that it is Ruben Ruiz’ wife.
● 11:42 am Dispatch advises 401 (Chief Arredondo) has the shooter in room 111 and 112
and is armed with a rifle. Chief Arredondo is requesting SWAT by the funeral home.
● 11:44 am unit 402 (Lt. Hernandez) advises he has 2 deputies on the east side of the
buildings.
● 11:46 am Sgt. Coronado requested the Border Patrol be notified.
● 11:48 am Sgt. Coronado radios dispatch to lockdown all schools.
● 11:48 am Cpl. Gregory Villa, two deputies, and a Border Patrol Agent come to the south
side with Sgt. Coronado.
● 11:49 am Det. Cantu advises that she cannot get through traffic and has shields.
● 11:50 am Corporal Villa (in person) tells the deputies about checking the backpack then
goes into the building with his rifle.
● 11:50 am Officer states that 401, Chief Arredondo, is in the room with the shooter.
● 11:50 am a deputy (in person) tells Cpl. Villa to tell them to get out of the hallway. Sgt.
Coronado tells them to wait because the Chief is in there and in charge. An officer says
that BORTAC is ready to go. Sgt. Coronado says if he (Chief Arredondo) has contact with
him (shooter), they will wait until BORTAC stacks up.
● 11:51 am 304 Lt. Pargas radio requests to have EMS check out an officer; they are at a
funeral home.
● 11:52 am Det. Cantu radios for help with crowd control at the funeral home on radio.
Sgt. Coronado tells units over radio to help with crowd control near the funeral home.
● 11:53 am Sgt. Page exits the south side of the building stating that the ranger should be
coming up and goes towards the teacher’s parking lot. Sgt. Coronado says, “Yeah but we
got BORTAC.” Sgt. Page states that the shooter is in 111 or 112. Sgt. Coronado believed
Chief Arredondo contacted the shooter, but Sgt. Page makes it clear no one has
contacted the shooter.
● 11:56 am Sgt. Coronado makes the comment “what are we doing here?”
34 | Page
● 11:56 am Sgt. Page asks if anyone on the south side has been hit and any kids. Sgt.
Coronado answers they do not know about that or any kids. Sgt. Page says that
everything is closed, and the kids are not in there.
● 11:57 am Sgt. Coronado asks Sgt. Page to look inside the first classroom in the
southwest corner of the building because there are rounds through the window.
● 11:58 am Dispatcher - announces that BORTAC is enroute.
Sgt. Coronado stated that he was suspicious that there were no children in the building and
wanted Sgt. Page to take a look in the classroom.33
Sgt. Page then comes running out and evacuations of the south side of the building began at
about 11:58 am from room 102 that had an unlocked door.34
At 11:55 am Chief Arredondo had informed Constable Field of a plan to clear the rooms near
111 and 112 to begin negotiations.35 This was a significant event because it was the first plan
that was announced to the U.P.D. officers, who were in the hallway from the Incident
commander, Chief Arredondo.
The first seven officers entered the closed and unlocked Northwest door at 11:35:59 am
● SSgt. Canales
● Det. Landry
● Officer Chapa
● Lt. Pargas
● Det. Lualemaga
● UCISD Officer Ruben Ruiz
Hallway video36 shows the officers opening the northwest door about 2:45 minutes after the
shooter entered. Lt. Martinez went directly up to the vestibule, nine seconds from the time he
opened the unlocked door.
Lt. Javier Martinez recalled staying close to the wall while approaching the rooms near the
smoke. He stopped at the corner of the vestibule. Lt. Martinez's view was only through the door
window of room 111. Sgt. Page and Chief Arredondo were on the south side of the vestibule
which Lt. Martinez believed gave them a view of room 112. Lt. Martinez could not see into the
room because it was dark, and the hallway lights were on. Lt. Martinez saw that the door
33
34
Sgt. Coronado BWC
35
UPD officer Justin Mendoza BWC
36
Hallway video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I3poHE3nOb8
35 | Page
opened outward. 37 Lt. Martinez and SSgt. Canales were there for about 49 seconds when they
began to take fire.38 Lt. Martinez turned to take cover and was struck in the back of the head
and in the arm with shrapnel. He did not know about the shrapnel to his arm until after.
Lt. Martinez immediately began bleeding from his head wound. He retreated to the T-
intersection.39
Lt. Martinez had been to active shooter training (ALERRT) and knew that teachers should have
lights off, doors locked and children off to one side. Lt. Martinez was the prior SWAT
Commander.40
At 11:37:50 Lt. Martinez points to Det. Landry in a downward motion while Det. Landry is
aiming down the hall. Det. Landry lowers his AR-15 as Lt. Martinez gets in front of him and
walks to the double doors that separates the hallway and comes back after about a minute.41
Lt. Martinez stated that his plan for his first approach was to shoot the suspect and take him
out but needed to see him first. He knew that the shooter was in one of the two rooms and did
not want to expose himself without knowing where the shooter was first.
Lt. Martinez did not know the rooms were adjoining and did not hear anything at all. On his
second approach Lt. Martinez wanted to look in one more time and was hoping someone
would go with him but no one did.42 At 11:40:21 Lt. Martinez moved forward a third time to the
hallway double doors then came back.43
Lt. Martinez left briefly to get EMS to look at his head wound, he saw numerous agencies
present including Ranger Kindell. Lt. Martinez returned and noticed many officers in the
hallway. Some officers were trying to get the teacher to open the door to the room closest to
the northwest door. Lt. Martinez identified himself at the door and the teacher came out.
Lt. Martinez saw Constable Field, Constable Zamora, JJ Suarez, along with other officers and
decided to go to the southside of the hallway. He saw DPS investigator Valenzuela, ex Uvalde
Police, looking at the backpack that belonged to the shooter. It contained many magazines.
Lt. Martinez then goes to the southside and is handed an AR-15 by Sgt. Page. Lt. Martinez
entered and saw Chief Arredondo, Officer Villa, Chief Arredondo, and Sgt. Coronado. He then
heard someone say they needed to get the kids out. Lt. Martinez went outside and assisted
with breaking windows to evacuate students.
37
38
39
Lt. Martinez interview with Prado and hallway video
40
41
42
43
Hallway Video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I3poHE3nOb8
36 | Page
The officer’s recollection in the lineup entering from the northwest door is not consistent with
the hallway video.
SSgt. Canales BWC
● Officer Ruiz states that it is his wife’s classroom when SSgt. Canales and Lt. Martinez get
back to the T-intersection after being shot.
● SSgt. Canales steps outside checking his wound and speaks to D.P.S. at the northwest
door while he checks his wound.
● SSgt. Canales tells the Trooper that he is shooting in the classroom then says they have
to get in there, several times. SSgt. Canales did not recall this, or hearing Officer Ruiz say
it was his wife’s classroom.44
● SSgt. Canales radios their location and shots fired.
● Lt. Pargas looks at SSgt. Canales bleeding ear.
● A Border Patrol Agent enters with SSgt. Canales towards the T-intersection and Officer
Ruiz states for the second time it is his wife’s classroom.
● Another round is fired.
● SSgt. Canales steps back outside and calls his U.S. Marshall’s task force unit requesting
help and rifle shields.
SSgt. Canales recalled seeing the shooter’s backpack on the ground as they approached the
northwest door. Upon entry he and Lt. Martinez went in towards the smoke. He did not see the
.223 casings but understood Sgt. Page saw .223 casings. Sgt. Canales did not know what room
his fourth-grade child was in. His child later told him bullets went into his classroom (unclear
which room, but it was a room with a substitute teacher.)
SSgt. Canales noticed there was no noise coming from rooms 111 or 112, only complete silence.
Sgt. Page was closer to room 111 and they were closer to room 112. He could see Chief
Arredondo, ISD Officer Gonzales and Sgt. Coronado on the south side. The door to room 111
was damaged and they could not see door 112. The radio repeater was not working and making
a steady short tone every time someone keyed their microphone out of the repeater’s range.
SSgt. Canales saw that Lt. Martinez had placed his body in view of the door to room 111, and
that is when four shots were fired from room 111. Sgt. Page described Lt. Martinez
approximately 8 feet away from the door.
SSgt. Canales was the SWAT Commander for Uvalde Police Department, but there had been
very little training since Covid. They did not have the proper equipment and many of the items
they did have were expired. They have a few expired flash bangs, and no one was certified on
them. They had done a raffle to order BDUs and planned training with BORTAC when Covid hit.
Their last training was April of 2021. Sgt. Canales has never been to an ALERRT training but did
44
SSgt. Canales interview with Prado
37 | Page
attend the active shooter training that was taught by ISD Officers Gonzales and Ruben Ruiz on
March 21st, 2022.
SSgt. Canales did not encounter any unlocked (interior) doors in the hallway and knew at one
point that they were looking for the keys to get in. The rounds that were fired by the shooter
were going through the walls. SSgt. Canales called the U.S. Marshall’s task force, that he is a
part of, and requested assistance and shields.
At the time of the breach into classroom 111, SSgt. Canales, who was in a separate stack, saw
the BORTAC commander open the door to room 111 with a key. He then accidentally let the
door go causing it to almost close again, but the commander caught it. BORTAC used Marshall’s
shield for the entry. BORTAC did not have rifle rated shields.
Entry was made and SSgt. Canales saw the body of the shooter at the doorway to the closet
which reinforced his and Sgt. Page’s belief that the shooter was camping. The classroom was
dark, and the hallway was lit which meant the shooter could see out and could not be seen.
SSgt. Canales never thought the children would be hiding in the dark and not yelling or
screaming.
Sgt. Canales later learned that his child was in a room that was unlocked with a substitute
teacher throughout the entire time a few doors down. A substitute teacher does not lock doors
but SSgt. Canales believes that the exterior doors should have been locked. Sgt. Canales also
believes that they would have encountered the shooter in the hall or outside if the doors were
locked. He knows the teachers and children followed their training.
SSgt. Canales said that Chief Arredondo and Constable Field spent a lot of time on the phone.
He was not sure who was in charge, but Chief Arredondo was making hand signals to
communicate to the northside. Once BORTAC arrived they took the lead, but it seemed to take
a long time.
SSgt. Canales never thought about whether the door was locked or not. During the incident he
never thought about how the shooter got in.
While they waited for a drone, SSgt. Canales called his wife who told him that their son had
escaped through a window and was now inside someone’s home near the school.
Det. Landry entered the northwest door third and moved to the T-intersection hearing shots as
they went in. He could smell gunpowder and saw smoke in the middle of the hallway. Det.
Landry then moved to the hallway double doors and stopped when Lt. Martinez and SSgt.
Canales reached the vestibule in front of him looking for the shooter. Shots were fired at the
officers who then moved back to the T-intersection. Det Landry was concerned about the
crossfire with the officers on the other side of the hall.
Det. Landry went outside and saw Deputy Ybarra in full gear with a shield. He informed Deputy
Ybarra that the shooter had an AR and Deputy Ybarra set the shield down saying it was useless.
38 | Page
Det. Landry then went to the south side of the building and saw the backpack that was later
found to contain magazines.
Det. Landry went into the south side of the hallway and saw Chief Arredondo who told him to
check classrooms for children. Det. Landry then entered a classroom and located the teacher
and children. He decided that the window was the best way out. Officers then broke windows
and he helped the children to the officers outside. The classes were evacuated through
windows. Like most of the officers interviewed, Det. Landry did not have a concept of time.
Det. Landry recalled the entry team stacked then stopped waiting for a key right after more
shots were fired. Det. Landry was certain that if the shooter had seen the stack having to deal
with the door, he would shoot just like he did on their initial attempt.
Det. Landry knew the school policy was that all doors were to be locked during the day. Their
belief was that the doors were locked. Det. Landry is a member of what he considers a part-
time SWAT team. He has been through three SWAT schools, basic, advanced and hostage
rescue through Charlie Mike Enterprises.
Det. Landry has been to the Level one ALERRT and all the training scenarios had open doors or
open hallway areas to confront the shooter. This included a training he attended three weeks
prior to my interview with him.45
Det. Lualemaga described his entry with the other three officers to the T-intersection. Det.
Lualemaga was fourth in line and thought he was closer to them until he saw the Hallway
footage and realized he was not right behind them, remaining near the T-intersection. Det.
Lualemaga explained that the scene was difficult to process and did not recall many details. He
remembered the shooting and Lt. Martinez and SSgt. Canales were injured. Det. Lualemaga
never saw children but knew they were on campus because of the cars in the lot. Det.
Lualemaga recalled active shooter training without having to negotiate doors. He was never
trained in breaching a door.
Det. Lualemaga recalled other officers coming in after the initial shots. He later assisted in
clearing classes on the north side when he encountered open doors, but they did not have
children in those rooms. Det. Lualemaga heard Officer Ruiz state that it was his wife’s
classroom, and he (Officer Ruiz) did not know what to do. Det. Lualemaga did not know if
Officer Ruiz thought she was in the classroom or not but heard him say later that she was not
responding. No one knew if the classes had been cleared, which prompted the beginning of the
search on the northeast side with two troopers. Det. Lualemaga then left the building to clear
other buildings locating and evacuating students.
Det. Lualemaga had a potentially dangerous encounter with a teacher that was prepared to
sacrifice herself for her children. Det. Lualemaga stated they were clearing the cafeteria that
45
Det. Landry interview with Prado and Hallway video
39 | Page
had a stage, when a woman, possibly a teacher, came out carrying an item that she was going
to use as a weapon to strike Det. Lualemaga. The officers yelled they were police, and she
stopped once she realized who they were. The unknown teacher or staff member led them to
an area where she was keeping approximately three classes of children. The officers left them
in the cafeteria with instructions to lock the doors until they returned.
Lt. Pargas entered the northwest door behind the officers that had just entered. The gunfire
had stopped by the time he entered, and he could see the smoke in the hallway. Lt. Pargas was
concerned that there were back doors that the shooter could come out of at any time. Lt.
Pargas did not know if there were any children in the building at the moment. The shooter then
fired at the officers. Lt. Pargas saw Lt. Martinez coming back holding his head in disbelief that
he had been hit. SSgt. Canales was also bleeding from his ear and appeared to be in disbelief as
well. Lt. Pargas wanted to get Lt. Martinez out for medical treatment, but Lt. Martinez would
not come out. Lt. Martinez was the previous SWAT commander and SSgt. Canales was the
current SWAT commander.
Lt. Pargas recalled Constable Field and Constable Zamora present with JJ Suarez. JJ Suarez did
not have a vest on, and Lt. Pargas retrieved one from his car for Suarez. Lt. Pargas did not think
about who was in charge of the scene because he had seen Chief Arredondo and knew it was
the school officer’s jurisdiction and the school police were in charge. His belief is supported by
the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by and between the City of Uvalde Police
Department and the Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department.
Lt. Pargas had never been in this building and thought the vestibule was a hallway leading to
other classrooms. Lt. Pargas (acting Chief) was unsure of the extent of the injuries to the
officers. He eventually had to order Lt. Martinez out to get checked by EMS and took him to
EMS. Lt. Martinez returned to the hallway after EMS saw him.
Lt. Pargas learned that it was Officer Ruiz’ wife’s class when he returned from EMS. Officer Ruiz
stated that she was shot and was dying. Lt. Pargas noticed that Officer Ruiz had placed his
finger in the trigger guard of his gun and had a concerning look on his face.
Det. Ronald Rodriguez was attempting to take the gun away at the same time. Det. Rodriguez is
a close friend of Ruiz and his statement to me about Officer Ruiz finger placement was similar
to Lt. Pargas’s statement. Lt. Pargas took Officer Ruiz to his Tahoe and left him with UCISD Lt.
Hernandez.
Lt. Pargas received a call from Chief Rodriguez, who was out of town on vacation in Arizona,
and asked him what the plan was. Lt. Pargas said he did not know, and Chief Rodriguez told him
to start working on a command post.
Lt. Pargas stated that in his opinion no one had made entry into the classroom because the
shooting had stopped. Someone had radioed that it was a barricaded subject in an office, but
others said it was a classroom.
40 | Page
Lt. Pargas learned of the second crime scene on Diaz, from Lt. Juan Martinez who had come in
while on a week’s vacation. Lt. Pargas sent Det. Lualemaga and Rodriguez to 552 Diaz Street.
Lt. Pargas had to deal with crowd control because people were trying to get to the ambulances,
and some were out of control.
Lt. Pargas assisted with children being evacuated from classrooms in the west building.
Lt. Pargas knew he had the SWAT Commander, SSgt. Canales, the backup SWAT Commander,
Det. Landry, and the ex-SWAT Commander, Lt. Javier Martinez in the hallway with Chief
Arredondo. He believed they would make the necessary decisions to enter. Lt. Pargas did not
interfere with any plans in the hallway because he knew the chief and tactically trained officers
were in the hallway. Lt. Pargas was dealing with everything on the outside like EMS, calling for
agencies’ help, the perimeter, and buses. It was unknown what role UCISD Lt. Hernandez had,
as the second-in-command at the scene for UCISD police department.
Lt. Pargas met with Lt. Juan Martinez at the funeral home to set up a command post. The
parking lot was full of parents and the funeral home was taking names of parents.
Lt. Pargas recalled students calling from the classroom to 911 that there were injured children
in the classroom. By this time Lt. Pargas saw many agencies had responded. He recalled seeing
DPS regional Director Escalon with a group of DPS and Border Patrol agents who said they were
setting up a command post. A Texas Ranger was on site as well.
Lt. Pargas informed me that UCISD Officer Adrian Gonzales was also SWAT trained when he
worked at Uvalde PD. Lt. Pargas’ opinion as to why entry was not made was because of lack of
breaching tools. The officers thought the door was locked because they were looking for keys.
Lt. Pargas never felt that anyone took control of the scene even when the Ranger arrived. Lt.
Pargas also believed that the minute everyone heard “Barricaded” the response changed from
active shooter to barricaded subject.
Lt. Pargas believed that Chief Arredondo and the SWAT Commander would be the ones to make
command and tactical decisions in the hallway. It was Chief Arredondo’s jurisdiction, and they
had the training. Chief Arredondo appeared to be on the phone a lot, but Lt. Pargas did not
know who he was speaking to.
Officer Chapa entered the northwest door and witnessed the shots being fired at the officers.
He recalled checking the girl’s restroom but not the boy’s restroom. Other officers from
different agencies began arriving, including the academy instructors. Officer Chapa maintained
a position in the hallway.46
46
Officer Chapa statement to Prado
41 | Page
The decision to wait for shields and the moment that UCISD Chief Arredondo (IC) gave the
plan to clear rooms and negotiate, superseding Lt. Javier Martinez’ plan to move forward
when the shield arrived.
After the entry into the hallway was made, officers moved quickly to Room 111 and 112 where
the smoke was and where they believed the shooter was located. According to SSgt. Canales, as
soon as Lt. Javier Martinez exposed himself to room 111, he was shot at without ever seeing
the suspect. According to Sgt. Page, Lt. Martinez was at least eight feet away from the door to
room 111. Uvalde officers were shot at and hit by shrapnel then retreated back to the T-
intersection. At the same time the southside retreated to the closest vestibules on either side
of the hallway.
Lt. Martinez and SSgt. Canales were the most experienced and highest-ranking Uvalde Police
Officers that were the initial contact officers. They also happened to be first and second from
the northside. Both men retreated and stated they did not know how they were going to get
into the room to stop the shooter without shields. SSgt. Canales exited the building to radio for
shields and equipment. Det. Hoshi Cantu was closest to the police station and although 8 ½
months pregnant, she located a custodian who loaded her car.
Their biggest issue facing Lt. Martinez and SSgt. Canales was how they were going to be able to
get past the eight-foot distance to the door, from the corner or edge of the vestibule. They
were obviously in the line of sight of the shooter and unable to acquire a line of sight on the
shooter with the classroom dark. Lt. Martinez did not realize the door was locked until the
search for the keys started. His thought process was not getting past the door but getting to the
door and he did not believe he could do this effectively, without a shield.
View of doors from approximately 12’ to 15’ of room 111 on the right
42 | Page
Example of dark classroom
Example of view of lighted hallway from inside a classroom

Based on what had just happened, the officers would have to travel a distance of at least eight
feet under a barrage of fire, to get to the door, then negotiate the opening of the door to gain
entry. This would have to be done without being able to see the person shooting at them or
being able to shoot back, blindly, into the room. An approach from the south would expose the
officers from half that distance to door 111 or the full distance of eight feet to door 112.
43 | Page
With the ISD police present it was reasonable to believe that they would have access to every
room in the school. It is my belief that Chief Arredondo believed he had a key to the classroom
because he had someone bring his keys. Officers and teachers have described door checks in
the past but not how the officers gained entry to conduct door checks if they encountered
locked doors.
At 11:52 am the pistol-rated shields were near campus property with UPD Det. Cantu, who was
stuck in traffic. Lt. Martinez stated they need to get into the classroom. An unknown officer
believed to be, Constable Zamora, tells Lt. Martinez to “wait, Javier wait.” Constable Field
stated that there is no active shooting.47 This statement appeared to be in support of the officer
telling Lt. Martinez to wait and implied that since the shooter was not pulling the trigger, he
was not an active shooter.
On March 21, 2022, UCISD gave an eight-hour course through the Southwest Texas Junior
College Law Enforcement Training Academy. This course was titled SBLE Active Shooter Training
Mandate. TCOLE #2195. Officer Adrian Gonzalez signed the certificate as the instructor. The
Academy Coordinator was signed by Constable Johnny Field. SSgt. Canales attended the class
that he said was taught by UCISD Officer Ruiz and UCISD Officer Gonzalez.
47
UPD Officer Justin Mendoza BWC
44 | Page
Lt. Pargas stated that Officer Gonzalez was on the SWAT team when he was with Uvalde P.D.
When Constable Field arrived, every officer associated with instruction of the most recent
active shooter training, was present.
Officer Ruiz was understandably not mentally prepared after realizing it was his wife’s
classroom. UCISD Lt. Hernandez, second-in-command after UCISD Chief Arredondo, was also
present outside the building. Constable Zamora, who is listed as a law enforcement academy
instructor at SWTJC and known to the officers as an instructor, was present in the hallway.
This investigation is unclear what Lt. Hernandez's role was. Lt. Hernandez and the school
officers were in possession of school district radios, which meant that they would have
communication from the hallway to a command post. Lt. Pargas was walking back and forth
from the funeral home to stay informed.
11:55 am Constable Field who had been on the phone with Chief Arredondo announced they
are going to clear the rooms next to 111 and 112 then start negotiations.48 This is the first plan
that was relayed to the officers on the northside of the hallway called by the incident
commander, Chief Arredondo.
The general belief was that BORTAC would make entry when they arrived. Lt. Martinez’ plan
was to approach when the shield arrived but this plan from the incident commander at 11:55
am, coming through training coordinator, overrode Lt. Martinez‘ plan. Until 11:55 am, no other
plan or direction had been offered or suggested. There was confusion among some as to who
was in command, but Lt. Pargas had no doubt he knew about the MOU and whose jurisdiction
the school fell under.
Police officers are accustomed to following a strict chain of command. In this instance the
highest-ranking officer with jurisdiction over the school, UCISD Chief Arredondo, also the
incident commander, announced a plan to clear classes and negotiate. Constable Field, who is
the Southwest Texas Junior College Academy Coordinator, was on the phone with Chief
Arredondo. Many officers look up to academy instructors for guidance. The academy
instructors who give the training are often considered experts. Constable Field is respected, and
it would be reasonable for an officer or group of officers, not in command of the incident, to
follow lawful orders from the incident commander and the training academy coordinator, even
if they may not agree with the order.
The officers following the orders would not have a way to know what was discussed in the
planning, between Chief Arredondo and Constable Field, which is an example of why officers
must trust and follow that chain of command or in this instance the Incident commander.
48
UPD Officer Justin Mendoza BWC
45 | Page
Without the order from Chief Arredondo, Lt. Martinez’ plan was to wait for the shield to
proceed to the door. Lt. Martinez would reasonably believe that the ISD police had access to
every room and how he would enter was not a thought to him at the time.
SSgt. Canales displayed an extraordinarily high level of discipline and focus. SSgt. Canales had
been injured, he knew he had a child in this same hallway and did not know what room his child
was in.
Evacuations and time leading to breaching the classroom.

*Timeline was established based on information from the DOJ report and gathered as part of
the JPPI investigation.
11:56 am UCISD Officer Ruiz announced that his wife had been shot and was escorted out by Lt.
Pargas and Det. Rodriguez.
11:57 am Evacuations of classrooms begin once students are found to be in classroom 102 on
the south side.
12:09 pm Chief Arredondo is waiting for a master key for 109.
I did not interview the UCISD officers, and it is unknown how they entered the fourth-grade
building without the keys to do door checks.
12:15 pm BORTAC Acting Commander Paul Guerrero arrived.49
12:16 pm Chief Arredondo states that room 109 must be cleared before entry.
12:17 pm Lt. Pargas assigned Lt. Juan Martinez to set up a Command Post.
12:18 pm Constable Zamora attempted to use Sgt. Coronado’s knife to open a door but was
unable to do so just after Chief Arredondo tried to use his keys.
12:20 pm A second shield arrived.50 This shield was not rifle rated.
12:21 pm Four shots are fired. The officers stacked, then proceeded towards the room from the
north, led by BORTAC Acting Commander Paul Guerrero, stopping short of rooms 111 and
112.51
Commander Guerrero had practiced prying a door open with a Halligan tool and determined it
would take too long, dangerously exposing officers to gunfire from in the classroom. Agent
49
DOJ Timeline
50
SSgt. Canales BWC
51
Hallway video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I3poHE3nOb8 & Agent Paul Guerrero statement
46 | Page
Guerrero requested a master key. One master key set had been tried on the southside of the
building with Chief Arredondo.52
12:23 pm Commander Guerrero is given keys.
12:24 pm Commander Guerrero tries the keys on a closet, and it does not work.
12:26 pm Classroom 109 is cleared.
12:27 pm Chief Arredondo gives the go ahead and breach order.
12:30 pm The rifle rated shield arrives from the U.S. Marshals.
12:32 pm Commander Guerrero leaves to retrieve a breaching tool from his car, while keys
were being searched for.
12:35 pm Commander Guerrero comes back from his car with a Halligan tool.
12:36 pm A Texas Ranger comes in with a different key and it works on the closet. This would
be the third set of keys tried on the doors.
12:37 pm Additional BORTAC team members arrive. Commander Guerrero sends someone to
set up as a sniper. A drone was used to try and get a better view of the inside of the classrooms,
it was not successful.
12:43 pm Chief Arredondo stated on the phone that they needed a key to breach and learns,
the key is on the other side.
12:48 pm The entry team approaches the door and Commander Guerrero uses the key to open
the door. Entry is made and by 12:50 pm it is announced that the shooter is down.
52
USBP Commander Guerrero statement
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The door to classroom 111
The general belief was that the door to 111 was locked. Chief Arredondo also believed that he
had a master key because he sent someone to get his keys. Officers would reasonably believe
that the school police would have access to every door with a lock in the district. The door to
room 111 was either unlocked or the latch was stuck in the door when the shooter entered
111.
Commander Guerrero stated he practiced on another door with the Halligan tool and realized
that it would take too long to get into the door.53 I observed the space between the door and
the jamb, on a different door and I recognized from training and experience that the Halligan
tool would need to be tapped with a sledgehammer or battering ram to force it into the space
between the door and the jamb enough to pry it open.
The ALERRT investigative report stated that they went into Robb Elementary School and used a
Stanley Fat Maxx to pry open a door in three to four seconds. They noted that there was a
substantial risk of serious bodily injury or death to officers if this breach were to be performed
without a ballistic shield.
The UCISD did not consent for me to go into the school to assess a door. My intent was to use
the actual tools that were available to the officers on the day of the incident. I had a team of
experienced and inexperienced breachers to use the tools available to UPD, which was a
Halligan tool, a sledgehammer, and a shield to evaluate on a door.
I believe that the shield being held up could have hindered the person trying to wedge the
Halligan tool in the jamb if they had no training for this. I learned from the City Attorney that
UCISD would not cooperate without an order from a Federal Judge to do this. It is well known
the school is going to be demolished.
Commander Guerrero stated that he believed he unlocked the door with the key when they
made entry.
The description of the problem with the latch was it would get stuck to the paint inside the
door. This would mean that the door could be pulled open without having to turn the handle.
Basically, the same effect as if there was a magnetic sheet over the door jamb fitting for the
latch.54
It would then take hits to make the latch come out and function properly into the fitting. The
door taking rounds from the AR-15 could have had the same result as hitting it with a hand,
which would support Commander Guerrero’s belief that he unlocked a locked door.
53
USBP Commander Guerrero statement
54
DPS interview of witness
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The DOJ report stated that it was the opinion of the CIR team that the door was unlocked the
entire time.
It is my opinion that Commander Guerrero was accurate in his assessment of the door vs. the
Halligan tool. I firmly believe that his conviction about unlocking the door is true. Commander
Guerrero is well trained, experienced, and part of a specialized unit. Commander Guerrero was
also present and did the job of opening the door. I believe that Commander Guerrero’s
personal experience with opening the door carries a preponderance against the opinion that
door 111 was unlocked. The DOJ report is correct on footnote 409 that the door being locked or
unlocked is inconclusive, as it was never tried before the key was turned.
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4. Analysis of Active Shooter Response for School-Based Law Enforcement,
Texas Commission on law Enforcement, Course #2195
Texas school district peace officers and school resource officers are mandated to complete an
active shooter response training program approved by the Texas Commission on Law
Enforcement (TCOLE) at least once every four-year period in accordance with Texas Education
Code, Section 37.0812 (State of Texas, 2024). The mandate was established with the passage of
House Bill 2195, Texas Legislature 86th Regular Session (State of Texas, 2019). The legislation
also requires a school district to include a policy for responding to an active shooter emergency
in its multi hazard emergency operations plan. “The school district may use any available
community resources in developing the policy…” (State of Texas, 2019).
Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department
The Southwest Texas Junior College Law Enforcement Training Academy hosted an 8-hour SBLE
Active Shooter Training Mandate class (TCOLE #2195) on March 21, 2022. Uvalde Police Officer
Daniel L. Ruiz, Jesus Mendoza, and SSgt. Eduardo Canales attended the course and received a
certificate of completion. The academy coordinator was Johnny J. Field, and the instructor was
Adrian Gonzalez (Uvalde ISD officer).55
The training was consistent with the TCOLE lesson plan and course learning objectives as
established in course #2195. The training curriculum specifically denotes, “Note to Trainers: It
is the responsibility of the training coordinator to ensure this curriculum and its materials are
kept up to date. Refer to curriculum and legal resources for changes in subject matter or laws
relating to this topic as well as the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement website at
www.tcole.texas.gov for edits due to course review.” (Texas Commission on Law Enforcement,
2020, p. 2).
According to the lesson plan the prerequisites for an instructor for the course are to be a
certified TCOLE instructor and/or subject matter expert in active shooter response, Special
Weapons and Tactics, reality based training or similar tactical training.
Learning objective 1.3 establishes the student will be able to compare/contrast an active
shooter event and a hostage or barricade crisis. The lesson guide states,
A hostage crisis develops when one or more criminals hold people against their will and
try to hold off the authorities by force, threatening to kill the hostages if provoked or
55
Both Johnny Field and Uvalde ISD Officer Adrian Gonzalez were on site at Robb Elementary during the active
shooter event.
50 | Page
attacked. Typically, the party of the hostage-taker(s) will issue demands to the forces
keeping him/her, or them, surrounded. In cases where the hostage situation was
improvised as a desperate attempt to avoid capture, the demands usually revolve
around exchanging the lives of the hostages for transport to safety. A simple barricade
crisis develops when an armed actor(s) isolates themselves with little or no ability to
harm innocent others. Barricaded subjects pose the greatest threat when attempts are
made to enter the space and subdue them.
An event that starts as an active shooter event can easily morph into a
hostage crisis and vice versa. The patrol response and search tactics for
dealing with active shooters and hostage/barricade situations are starkly
different. (Texas Commission On Law Enforcement, 2020, pp. 6 -7).
Learning objective 2.2 specifies the student will be able to identify expectations for school-
based law enforcement officers during an active shooter event. The first is the priority of life. It
states,
First responders to the active shooter scene will usually be required to place themselves
in harm’s way and display uncommon acts of courage to save the innocent. First
responders must understand and accept the role of “Protector” and be prepared to
meet violence with controlled aggression. The Priority of Life Scale is used to guide first
responders during the critical decision making process that is required to effectively
neutralize any threats. As first responders we must recognize that innocent life must be
defended. A first responder unwilling to place the lives of the innocent above their own
safety should consider another career field. (Texas Commission On Law Enforcement,
2020, pp. 8).
The learning objective further states,
This scale does not suggest that any first responder approach the mission with reckless
abandon for safety. The first responder using effective tactics coupled with situational
awareness can isolate, distract, and neutralize the actor(s), while mitigating the loss of
innocent life. (Texas Commission On Law Enforcement, 2020, p. 8).
The ”Priority of Life Scale” lists the priorities as #1 innocent civilians, #2 first responders, #3
offenders. The lesson plan further establishes the three primary goals in responding to an
active shooter event as,
ISOLATE – Drive or segregate the attacker in an area where their capacity to harm
students, staff or visitors is minimized until more first responders arrive.
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DISTRACT – Engage the attacker so that they have a diminished capacity to hurt
students, staff, or visitors. If they are engaged with the officer(s) they will be less
capable of hurting innocents. It also buys time for students, staff and visitors to
implement their Avoid-Deny-Defend (ADD) strategies.
NEUTRALIZE – Take away the attacker’s capacity to harm other people. This may include
the use of deadly force, disabling an attacker, or disarming an attacker and taking them
into custody. (Texas Commission On Law Enforcement, 2020, p.9).
The objective continues with,
Achieving any of these three goals is an acceptable outcome. For example, if an officer
forces an attacker into a room or area where they are isolated, cannot escape, and can
do no more harm to students, staff, or visitors, the officer is not obligated to enter the
room to deal with the attacker. They should maintain the isolation until other first
responders arrive, treating the situation as a barricaded subject. If a school-based
officer were to drive the attacker from the campus, the officer has no obligation to
pursue the attacker away from the school. He/she should communicate the attacker’s
last known location and direction to responders then start assisting the injured. An
appropriate response for a school-based officer would be to remain at the school and
ensure the attacker does not return.
Several officers have been criticized after events such as the shooting in Parkland, FL for
a perceived failure to respond. Video footage of an officer “staging” outside the building
while the attack in Parkland was going on drew a great deal of public criticism. There has
been significant public and legislative debate about sanctioning peace officers who fail
to act to stop the carnage during active shooter events at schools. Citizens have a
reasonable expectation that police officers are willing to take risks to reduce casualties
during active shooter event. Part of the reasoning behind House Bill 2195 was to ensure
that Texas school-based law enforcement officers receive training specific to their role
in stopping school shootings. (Texas Commission On Law Enforcement, 2020, p.9).
Lesson objective 2.3 provides a list of three priorities the responding officers should be working
with during an active shooter event. The first is “Stop the Killing” which focuses on locating and
confronting the shooter(s). The second priority is “Stop the Dying,” once the threat has been
“isolated, distracted, and/or neutralized,” medical aid should be provided to those injured at
the scene. The third priority is to “Evacuate the Injured” as soon as the scene is rendered
secure, and move the injured to medical facilities for proper treatment.
As part of lesson objective 3.3 the student has to demonstrate proper threshold evaluation. The
objective states,
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Threshold Evaluation is a technique used to search a majority of a room prior to
entering into the room. This technique can aid in getting the officer critical intelligence
that is normally lacking during a rapid response. This technique also helps the first
responders, who may have never worked or trained with each other prior to the
incident, time to observe, orient, and decide upon a course of action more effectively
than just running into a room blindly. During reality-based training scenarios, first
responders who choose to rush in blind usually become part of the problem rather than
a solution to the problem. Threshold evaluation can be conducted both at an extremely
slow pace if nothing is driving the officer to believe the shooter is inside the room or
possibly laying in ambush, to an extremely dynamic response if shots are heard coming
from inside the room.
Once the decision is made to enter a room, the officer must do so in a manner that
minimizes the time spent in the doorway. Doorways are commonly called fatal funnels
because they are easy ambush points. Dynamic Entry is used to dominate the room
using speed, surprise, and violence of action. Dynamic entry is an extremely effective
tactic; however, it is also a perishable skill that requires a great amount of training and
teamwork to stay proficient. (Texas Commission On Law Enforcement, 2020, pp. 9 -10).
Scenario-Based Training Section:
The course requires students to successfully complete and be evaluated on a minimum of three
training scenarios. TCOLE course #2195 includes five different scenarios based on different past
actual active shooter events.
None of the five scenarios provide a situation where the active shooter is in a closed confined
location within the school. Scenario #4 is set up to have the active shooter “retreat to room
and stay inside until officer(s) approach and engage.” One of the role play officers will suffer a
gunshot wound to the arm and will retreat backwards out of the hallway, leaving a solo officer
to respond. The scenario set up instructions state, “Suspect will give an angle for officer to fire
from the hallway” (Texas Commission On Law Enforcement, 2020, p.26).
An element of the scenario-based training evaluator guide for threshold evaluation states,
Clear room prior to entry (Slicing the Pie)- Check to see officers are clearing as much of
the room from the hallway before going in. Officers should not be right up on the door
(angles) and should be about 6 feet away. Officers should be using reflective surfaces
inside the room to gather as much intel in the room as possible (screens, monitors, décor,
and other surfaces), (Texas Commission On Law Enforcement, 2020, p. 21).
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The training scenarios do not task a student with an active shooter who has a barricaded
tactical advantage with the complexities of determining how to properly open an access way
into the room to confront the shooter or how to safely cross the threshold in a non-open
environment situation.
Recommendation: Include content to cover complex situations involving closed or locked rooms
with little to no visual cues prior to entry by responding officer(s). Consider the actual situation
officers were confronted with in the response to the active shooter in the Pulse nightclub in
Orlando, Florida in 2016.
According to a critical incident report published by the US Department of Justice, titled “Rescue,
Response, and Resilience: A Critical Incident Review of the Orlando Public Safety Response to the
Attack on the Pulse Nightclub” (Straub et al., 2017), the events during the active shooter in the
Pulse nightclub was determined to change from an active shooter to a barricaded suspect with
hostages, to potential terrorism with the threats of explosive devices.
The Texas Commission on Law Enforcement’s Active Shooter Response for School-Based Law
Enforcement course #2195 (Texas Commission On Law Enforcement, 2020), does not include
any mention of the terms “breach”, “breaching”, or “locked”. The curriculum broadly addresses
the issue of a difference between an active shooter event and a hostage or barricade crisis but
does not provide the instructor or students with content on how to handle the difference or
when a situation transitions between one or the other.
Texas Basic Peace Officer Course:
Active shooter training has been incorporated into the Texas Basic Peace Officers training
requirements since 2005. It was added to the patrol procedures section to be included in all
new police officer training as part of their basic academy training. It is currently included in the
Basic Peace Officer Course 736 in the objectives in Module R “Active Shooter Response” to
require the successful completion of ALERRT Level 1 training (Texas Commission on Law
Enforcement, 2024, p. 25).
In 2023, the 88th Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill 1852 requiring the Texas Commission on
Law Enforcement to establish an active shooter training program of not less than 16 hours to be
mandatory for all licensed Texas peace officers or reserve law enforcement officers, as part of
their continuing education they received once every 24 months after their initial commission.56
56
Not all officers that responded to Robb Elementary had updated active shooter training. It was not statutorily
required for officers not working for a school district or in a school resource officer capacity. Some peace officers
54 | Page
5. Review of officers that entered the building.
The following group of officers were documented as entering the building and provided
support.
● Cpl. Ramon Morin
● Cpl. Gregory Villa
● Fire Marshal Juan M. Hernandez
The following review of the officer’s actions is from their statements and body worn cameras. I
was not provided with CCTV footage from the school’s exterior or interior cameras.
Officer Jesus Mendoza57 was previously documented in this report because he was the first
unit to pull up on Geraldine St. and believed he was being shot at. Officer Mendoza exited his
vehicle and took cover recognizing it was a rifle and not a pistol. Officer Saucedo arrived and
used his unit to cover Officer Mendoza. Sgt. Coronado arrived and received a request from
Officer Saucedo to fire at a person that was dressed similar to the description. Sgt. Coronado
did not see the shooter but heard from the witnesses that the shooter was running.
Sgt. Coronado drove to the front of the school with Officer Mendoza following. They were
ordered to set up a perimeter and expected the shooter to be running at them. Sgt. Coronado
called out shots fired, and Officer Jesus Mendoza teamed with Officer Justin Mendoza and
moved onto campus. They saw a DPS Trooper and other officers stacking at the east entrance
to the fourth-grade building. Officer Jesus Mendoza recalled Constables Field, Zamora,
instructors Beto Diaz and JJ Suarez.
Officer Jesus Mendoza did attend the Active Shooter training on March 21 st, 2022, and said the
training had scenarios but not with a locked door. He understood that every door was supposed
to be locked with lights off.
The northeast door stack made entry at about 11:41 am according to Officer Mendoza’s body
cam. Officer Medoza posted at the east door as he was the last in the stack. Cpl. Villa requested
that another AR-15 go inside. Officer Justin Mendoza then entered with his AR-15. Officer Jesus
Mendoza acquired Officer Saucedo’s AR-15 which he gave to Cpl. Villa.
Officer Mendoza then recalled clearing four to six rooms on the northeast side of the building.
He did not encounter any children or teachers but saw a child come out of the restroom and a
did not have the training as part of their academy basic peace officer course due to completion prior to it being
incorporated into the curriculum.
57
Officer Jesus Mendoza statement and BWC
55 | Page
teacher out of the classroom. He stated that the only classroom he encountered that was
locked was the one that the teacher came out of.
Officer Mendoza heard some shots fired after the classrooms were cleared and someone in the
hall said he was not actively shooting once the shots stopped. Officer Mendoza placed himself
in a third stack in the building when they were waiting for keys. He was then asked to help
move cars from the street and took himself out of the stack.
After the entry was made Officer Mendoza briefly went back into the building then ran to EMS
to retrieve a stretcher for Officer Ruiz’ wife.
Later, Officer Mendoza took the call to the High School with Officer Chapa. They were allowed
in and began clearing the school. He went to the Civic Center for security after the High School
was released.
Officer Mendoza felt there was confusion on information going out, like Chief Arredondo with
the shooter. He also felt that they were not trained in breaching, to deal with a shooter in a
locked classroom.
Officer Mendoza was concerned that he did not remember some facts when interviewed by the
Rangers.
Officer Randy Hill arrived at the front of the school at the same time as Sgt. Coronado and Chief
Arredondo. Officer Hill began to go onto campus with Sgt. Coronado’s group. After shots fired
were called out, he was ordered by Cpl. Villa to set up a perimeter and take the north side of
the building. Officer Hill was concerned because he had heard an officer was shot.
Officer Hill saw multiple agencies entering the building. Officers from various departments were
arriving and he went towards the building. Officer Hill entered through the east side door to
help. He assisted in clearing classrooms and witnessed a teacher and student come out through
the east door. Officer Hill remained at the east door until Lt. Juan Martinez ordered him to
assist with crowd control at the funeral home.
Officer Hill did not use force and stated that the crowd was loud but compliant. Officer Hill was
wearing a BWC and does not know what happened to it. He believes he accidentally turned it
on and then intentionally pressed the button to turn it on but actually turned it off because it
was already on.
Cpl. Ramon Morin Jr. is a Uvalde SWAT team member and was off duty when he heard about
the incident. Cpl. Morin went home to put on his uniform and grab his rifle. He then drove to
the Robb Elementary School and entered campus from the front of the building. Cpl. Morin
took a position to the east of the exterior of the building and was told to move because of the
crossfire. He had attempted to call Cpl. Villa but there was no answer. He eventually made it to
the east door and posted there.
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While he was at the door, he heard a female voice and began checking rooms. A female was
located in a classroom and was instructed to go to Old Carrizo Rd. Once the entry was made
Cpl. Morin saw the EMTs working in the hallway and maintained his position at the east door
with Det. Lualemaga. Det. Lualemaga was then given an assignment by Lt. Pargas and left.
Cpl. Morin was asked by a Texas Ranger to keep the east door secured and not to allow anyone
in or out. Cpl. Morin remained there for about 45 minutes until relieved by a trooper.
Cpl. Morin responded to the high school for security but picked up a unit from the P.D. first. He
does not recall who gave him the assignment but said it may have been Lt. Juan Martinez. He
teamed up with a trooper at the high school looking for suspicious activity until all students
were released.
Cpl. Villa is a SWAT team member and did not load his AR-15 into his patrol car on the day of
the incident. Cpl. Villa did not recall exactly why that morning, but it was not normal for him.
Cpl. Villa received the call and arrived at the front of the school. He was confused because he
heard the guy ran towards the school but never saw the accident on Old Carrizo Rd. Cpl. Villa
understood the crash was on Old Carrizo Rd.
Cpl. Villa then got onto school property by jumping an eight-foot fence with Officer Saucedo.
They teamed with Trooper Elizondo Hooks when they heard Sgt. Coronado broadcast shots
fired but they did not hear shots. Officer Saucedo asked for the location on the radio. Cpl. Villa
saw officers forming a stack at the east door which included Constable Field, Becco Diaz and
Constable Zamora.
Cpl. Villa was on the east side of the building when he saw Officer Adrian Gonzales who told
him to stay away from the windows. Cpl. Villa had heard some shots while outside the building.
Cpl. Villa told Trooper Elizondo Hooks and Officer Saucedo to cover the east side of the building.
He then stacked with the constables and went into the building.
Cpl. Villa noticed very little communication in the hallway, and no one was moving since an
officer was hit. He also noticed officers appeared to have dazed looks. Cpl. Villa noticed Sgt.
Page holding a position in the hallway without a rifle. Cpl. Villa suggested relieving him but did
not get an answer. He then acquired a rifle and went to the south side with two deputies. They
met with Sgt. Coronado who told him to relieve Sgt. Page. Cpl. Villa relieved Sgt. Page and
remained in the same position covering the vestibule until entry was made. His radio was not
working in the hallway, he turned it off to stay quiet.
Cpl. Villa heard four shots while he was in position. He was never given the plan but knew that
it was formed on the north side of the hallway. Cpl. Villa received active shooter training
through Charlie Mike enterprises but was never taught what teachers were supposed to do. He
saw Chief Arredondo put tables in the hallway, which confused him. Cpl. Villa saw Chief
Arredondo try to negotiate with the shooter and repeated the Chief’s words in Spanish. Cpl.
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Villa believed the doors were locked because Sgt. Canales and Lt. Martinez were shot checking
them.
Cpl. Villa and Officer De La Cruz used a pistol rated shield for cover when the BORTAC team
made entry. Cpl. Villa went into room 112 to help but everyone was instructed to leave the
building.
Cpl. Villa left through the northwest side and did not see a coordination of command. He did
not know who was in charge.
Cpl. Villa did not have his BWC because it was charging and had issues with the batteries. He
was assigned to the high school and picked up his AR-15 from the P.D. on the way.
Det. Ronald Rodriguez was off duty at the time of the incident and heard about the shooting
through his mother. He contacted Lt. Pargas who told him to come in quickly. He got dressed
and drove one mile to the school. Det. Rodriguez went to the northwest door where he spent
most of his time.
Det. Rodriguez met with Lt. Hernandez who asked him to go to his UCISD car and retrieve his
keys to the school. Det. Rodriguez retrieved the keys which were on a red lanyard. Det.
Rodriguez then received a call from the SAPD SWAT unit asking for information. He told them
that the subject was barricaded in a room. SAPD said they were two hours away.
Det. Rodriguez said he had heard the broadcast on the radio saying the shooter was barricaded
in a classroom.
Det. Rodriguez saw Officer Ruiz who had told him that it was Eva’s classroom. At that time
Officer Ruiz did not know if she was in the room. Officer Ruiz was standing next to Det.
Rodriguez when he received the call from Eva saying she was in the room and hurt. Det.
Rodriguez did not hear the conversation because Officer Ruiz took a few steps away. Det.
Rodriguez and Officer Ruiz are good friends. Officer Ruiz blurted out that she was hurt then
nudged past Det. Rodriguez and stormed into the building. Other officers stopped him from
continuing in.
Det. Rodriguez pinned Officer Ruiz against the wall and noticed that Officer Ruiz had a dead
stare and would not snap out of it. Det. Rodriguez asked him for his gun. Det. Rodriguez
recognized that Officer Ruiz was not mentally ready to go, especially knowing him so well.
Det. Rodriguez made the decision to disarm Officer Ruiz, who was holding his pistol in his right
hand. Officer Ruiz was holding the weapon in a secure manner. Det. Rodriguez saw his finger
was very close to the trigger and not extended outside of the trigger guard.
Det. Rodriguez believed that Officer Ruiz’ finger had a slight bend towards the trigger of the
weapon. He believed that the officers around may be in danger because of Officer Ruiz mental
state and then pried the gun out of Officer Ruiz’ hand.
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No one told Det. Rodriguez to do this, but he felt it was a safety issue and did it. Officer Ruiz
maintained a blank look on his face throughout. Det. Rodriguez cleared the weapon and placed
it in his cargo pocket.
I handed Det. Rodriguez my cleared Glock 43x and although it was not the same weapon, asked
him to display how he recalled the placement of Officer Ruiz finger and photographed it. I had
recognized that it was a critical moment to disarm a sworn officer. The following is a
photograph showing Det. Rodriguez recollection of Officer Ruiz finger placement showing a gap
between the finger and the weapon:
I located a portion of the video from Officer Mendoza’s body cam that showed Officer Ruiz
repositioning his weapon from his left to right hand and it appeared his middle finger was very
close to the inside of the trigger guard with the muzzle pointed at Constable Field. The Border
Patrol Agent in red was looking at the weapon. This is not what Det. Rodriguez saw because he
was behind Officer Ruiz who was obviously distraught.58
58
Officer Justin Mendoza BWC
59 | Page
Det. Rodriguez realized this was the first time he knew that someone was in the classroom. He
assisted in the evacuations of students and brought a stretcher for the wounded teacher.
Officers breached the rooms and Det. Rodriguez assisted two children into an ambulance.
Det. Rodriguez stated that the medics had a plan to go in to assess first, but officers started
bringing some casualties out. He saw Ms. Mireles being attended to by EMS.
A call came out at the high school. Det. Rodriguez had Officer Ruiz’ school radio and called the
school that said everything was okay. Officers were able to slow down while on their way.
Det. Rodriguez was assigned to the command post after the building was sealed. He and Lt.
Pargas then left to check on the officers on Diaz St.
Officer Max Dorflinger had worked the night shift and was asleep when he turned on his radio.
He did not recall how he found out about the incident. Officer Dorflinger arrived and assisted in
crowd control. He told parents to stay off school property and they verbally contested him.
Officer Dorflinger recalled hearing on the radio that Chief Arredondo was in the room with the
shooter. Parents then questioned why he was not in the school and Officer Dorflinger recalled
telling them that it was because he was dealing with them.
Other officers and the district attorney investigators arrived on campus and began helping as
children were being evacuated. One person that Det. Dorflinger knew, stated that he would go
through Officer Dorflinger if Officer Dorflinger did not move. D.E.A. arrived and began assisting
with the perimeter.
Officer Dorflinger saw Deputy Gonzalez who gave him a crate with what was believed to be
flash bangs. Officer Dorflinger later learned that they were stinger grenades that throw out
rubber pellets.
Officer Dorflinger took the crate into the hallway and then noticed they were not flashbangs.
Commander Guerrero asked for gas and at about that time Lt. Pargas came in and stated that a
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child was on the phone with multiple victims in the room. Officer Dorflinger estimated about 14
officers heard this.
Officer Dorflinger obtained gas and gas masks from Deputy Gonzalez. Officer Dorflinger stayed
in the hallway looking at a map that Game Warden Gassaway had when four shots were fired.
Officer Dorflinger yelled out to hold radio traffic but did not realize the radios were not working
in the building.
Officer Dorflinger then assisted with moving patrol cars to make space for ambulances. Officer
Dorflinger had to break a unit window to enter the car and move it.
Officer Dorflinger assisted with children who had some minor injuries coming out of the
building. Officer Dorflinger described a chaotic scene with parents trying to get to the children.
A command post had not been set up yet and there may have been up to several hundred
people. The U.S. Marshals arrived and had to threaten to tase a person in the crowd.
During this time an off-duty Border Patrol Agent with a large shotgun came up and asked how
he could help. Officer Dorflinger did not allow him because he had nothing identifying himself
as a police officer.
After the buses left, they found a large number of children still in the funeral home and had to
get the buses back to get the children. UCISD Officer Gonzalez showed Officer Dorflinger a
social media message that someone had posted threatening violence at the high school. This
caused the high school to shut down.
Fire Marshal Juan Hernandez was on a call when he heard about the incident. He then arrived
and parked near the front of the school. He was in possession of his AR-15 when he got on to
the school campus. F.M. Hernandez then worked his way to a stack that had formed on the
northeast door of the building where Officer Justin Mendoza was. F.M. Hernandez made entry
with his stack and went to the T-intersection. He saw SSgt. Canales and Lt. Martinez along with
others. He then inspected the wound on Lt. Martinez and told Lt. Martinez that he needed
medical attention. Lt. Martinez refused to leave for a medical assessment. F.M. Hernandez took
a position with his rifle aimed down the hall as other agencies began arriving.
F.M. Hernandez saw Chief Arredondo hand signal for officers with rifles to go to the southside.
F.M. Hernandez has been to basic SWAT training in 2013. He switched out with a deputy when
Officer Ruiz came in and said his wife was shot. F.M. Hernandez asked if she had kids with her,
but Officer Ruiz did not know.
F.M. Hernandez noticed a backpack on the ground that DPS Trooper Colton opened and
discovered 30 round magazines.
F.M. Hernandez went to the southside and saw two BP agents helping an injured teacher. He
then entered the southside and began testing keys that had been given to Chief Arredondo but
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did not work. F.M. Hernandez never heard children in the classrooms and remembered that it
was also lunchtime.
F.M. Hernandez heard when the officers breached the classroom. He entered the classroom
and described the scene. He left when the building was shut down.
F.M. Hernandez responded to the call at the high school and assisted in releasing the students.
6. Review of the perimeter team - officers that did not enter the building but
assisted on the call including 552 Diaz Street.

● Cpl. Joshua Perez
Det. Hoshi Cantu was on limited duty, in the office, on the day of the incident. Det. Cantu was
in the later stages of pregnancy and had restrictions not allowing her to carry a gun and not to
put herself in any dangerous situations.
Det. Cantu recognized the gravity of the call and was the last sworn officer in the police station
after every officer left for Robb Elementary. Det. Cantu contacted fellow SWAT team member
Cpl. De La Cruz who is her brother-in-law and father to a child attending Robb Elementary.
Det. Cantu grabbed her duty weapon and began to drive to the school when she heard on the
radio a request for shields and a battering ram. Det. Cantu had the custodian load her car
because she was physically unable to. She then drove to the school and stopped by the gate to
the teacher’s parking lot where Officer Calliham picked up the gear.
Det. Cantu then decided to stay and help because she saw the trouble officers were having with
crowd control and parents blocking the streets. Det. Cantu knew her limitations because she
was 8 ½ months pregnant. She wore her ballistic vest over her dress and took a position to
assist the officers with crowd control. Det. Cantu then heard officers asking if the shooter had
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been identified. Det. Cantu knew everyone was occupied and went to the registered location of
the truck in the crash with Officer Calliham at 552 Diaz St.
Det. Cantu met with a Spanish speaking female and asked who the truck belonged to. The
female stated she did not know why he shot her. The lady named the shooter and pointed to an
older man at the door stating he was the shooter’s grandfather. The grandfather gave the
shooter’s full name and stated that the shooter lived there.
Det. Cantu did not know the grandmother was shot there and the house was a crime scene.
Det. Cantu thought she had been shot at the school. The grandfather said he was enroute to
the hospital in San Antonio. Det. Cantu met with a neighbor who gave a description of the
shooter.
Det. Cantu went back to the school and assisted in moving cars to make room for the
ambulances. Someone in the crowd said shots were fired and the crowd began ducking. She
saw two children come out of the school with bloody clothes that did not appear to be their
own blood.
Det. Cantu learned from her sister that her nephew was picked up at the Civic Center. Det.
Cantu checked on a private school and learned that Officer De La Cruz had a heat-related
episode. Det. Cantu checked in with Lt. Pargas before going home.
I questioned Det. Cantu about her decision to violate the restricted duty order. Det. Cantu said
she was given rules about what she could and could not do, while on limited duty. Det. Cantu
stated that no one else was at the police station and she did not ask for permission because she
recognized the gravity of the situation. She felt it was the right thing to do. Det. Cantu also
stated that Lt. Pargas had told her to go back to the office, but she did not. Lt. Pargas did not
recall giving her this order.
Det. Cantu said she just could not get behind a desk with what was going on.
Cpl. Joshua Perez had worked the night shift and was sleeping when he heard the call. Cpl.
Perez had a child at Robb Elementary. He was asked to come in by Sgt. Julian Arredondo. Cpl.
Perez met Sgt. Arredondo at the funeral home and assisted with crowd control. He was given a
list of 90 students by UCISD Officer Gonzalez that were in the funeral home waiting for
transport to the Civic Center. Cpl. Perez remained at the funeral home until he was assigned to
go to a school at Mueller and Park Street with Sgt. Arredondo.
Cpl. Perez described confusion about the suspect in custody or down when the entry was made.
Cpl. Perez did not know if there were injuries or casualties until it was over. Cpl. Perez recalled
being called a liar by the crowd because he did not know. Cpl. Perez did not know about his
own child during this event. His child was in the playground during the start of the shooting.
Cpl. Perez went on duty for his night shift after he was released from school duty.
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Sgt. Bobby Ruiz Sr. had worked the night shift and was sleeping when he received the news
about the incident at Robb Elementary. Sgt. Ruiz contacted Cpl. De La Cruz (SWAT), Officer Joe
Zamora and Officer Daniel Ruiz. Lt. Juan Martinez ordered them to the southside of the
campus. Sgt. Ruiz arrived to the southside and met with retired Deputy Price who had shown
up to assist. Sgt. Ruiz remained in the south lot until the children were evacuated. While the
children were coming out Sgt. Ruiz’ granddaughter ran up to him and he quickly checked her
body for injuries then sent her to the bus.
Sgt. Ruiz was needed at the funeral home and on his way encountered a distraught
grandmother and calmed her by telling her that he too had a grandchild there. Sgt. Ruiz then
witnessed a parent running in an attempt to get around the officers. Sgt. Ruiz stated that
Officer Joe Zamora caught and handcuffed the subject, but I learned later that it was another
agency that handcuffed the parent. The parent was released once he calmed down.
Lt. Juan Martinez then requested help at the Civic Center where Sgt. Ruiz responded but was
never able to break on the radio to tell Lt. Juan Martinez because of the heavy radio traffic.
After the entry was made Cpl. De La Cruz told him they had an assignment to secure the
shooter's residence at 552 Diaz St.
Sgt. Ruiz, Officer Zamora, and Cpl. De La Cruz made entry into the house and secured it, locating
a crime scene inside. They did not locate a victim but later learned the victim was the shooter’s
grandmother. They met with an upset female at the house. Sgt. Ruiz overheard the female
claiming the shooter had been suicidal and she had tried speaking to him the night before.
D.A. Mitchell arrived with investigators at Diaz St. Sgt. Ruiz was sent to the high school and
assisted with the student’s release. Sgt. Ruiz had to call EMS to assist Cpl. De La Cruz who
suffered from a heat-related event.
Lt. Juan Martinez was on an approved vacation when he received a call from Sgt. Bobby Ruiz
about the incident then came in. Lt. Martinez received a call from Lt. Pargas who told him that
they were trying to set up the command post at the funeral home. The gunman was still inside
with firearms when he arrived.
Lt. Juan Martinez saw that nothing had been set up yet and UPD Officer Wally, a negotiator,
was attempting to get information on the shooter. Lt. Pargas and Mayor McLaughlin were there
but no other agencies were present yet. The scene then became chaotic with people requesting
streets to be blocked off, officers needing water, vehicles needing to be moved and agencies
requesting to be stationed. The radio channel was flooded with traffic and people speaking
were not identified.
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Lt. Juan Martinez stated that he and Lt. Pargas attempted to set up the command post as with
the other agencies involved but it did not happen until after the entry was made. Lt. Martinez
stated that UPD followed their chain of command. When he attempted to notify the different
agencies, the officers would direct him to go speak to a different person.
Lt. Pargas was going back and forth from the funeral home to the school, everyone had trouble
with the radio and agencies had no direction. Lt. Pargas was able to take care of UPD but not of
the oncoming agencies.
DPS Captain Escalon took over the case once the shooter was down. Lt. Juan Martinez then went
to a support position and became a liaison.
Lt. Juan Martinez believes that the biggest failure in the coordination of the command post was
communication between the agencies. Even coordinating with the principals of the school was
not timely because the school principals were locked down as the scene was still active. The
principals did not show up to the command post.
Lt. Juan Martinez does not recall when he learned children were injured in the class or how he
learned.
Lt. Juan Martinez wrote a supplement to this incident stating that it was his belief that UCISD
Chief Arredondo was in command of the situation because of jurisdiction, rank, and training.
Ranger Kindell also told Lt. Martinez that Chief Arredondo was the incident commander.
Sgt. Julian Arredondo had worked the night shift and was sleeping when his wife called him.
Sgt. Arredondo was called in and called Officer Perez to respond to the scene. Sgt. Arredondo
was sent to the funeral home because the children were there, and they were setting up a
triage at the funeral home. When he arrived, he posted at the front of the funeral home to
keep people out. Sgt. Arredondo saw the crowd out of control and the Border Patrol having
problems with them. Sgt. Arredondo was then sent to Benson Street School where they ended
their day.
Officer Joe Zamora had worked the night shift and was sleeping when his wife woke him up
because of many sirens in the area. He received a call from his Sergeant, Bobby Ruiz, to go in.
Officer Joe Zamora then called Officer Ruiz and they met at the police station. They arrived at
Robb Elementary and saw many parents who were upset. Officer Joe Zamora checked in at the
northwest door and was told he was not needed at the building. He then worked crowd control
and moved cars for EMS to have space. Some parents were more hostile, but Officer Zamora
never had to get physical with anyone.
Officer Zamora was then ordered to go to 552 Diaz St. where he observed blood drops on the
driveway. He informed Cpl. De La Cruz who decided to force entry. They located a crime scene
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in the house, but no one was injured inside. They secured the house and waited to be relieved.
Officer Zamora met with the shooter’s aunt at the residence.
Officer Jessica Zamora is the PIO for the Uvalde Police Department and had reported to work
on May 24th, 2022, but was called by her child’s school that he had fallen and broken his arm.
She clocked out and took him to the hospital at about 10:30 am. She was at the hospital when
the call at Robb Elementary was broadcast.
Officer Zamora then called Lt. Juan Martinez who told her the information he had and to go in
when she could. Officer Zamora then made a generic post to inform the community to avoid
the area because of a large police presence (not the exact wording).
Officer Zamora does not recall contacting Chief Rodriguez because he was out of state. Officer
Zamora informed the hospital staff of the situation to prepare them and called a family
member to stay with her child.
Officer Jessica Zamora reported to Lt. Juan Martinez at the command post and was ordered to
direct parents to reunification at the Civic Center.
Lt. Martinez asked Officer Zamora to locate Lt. Pargas but did not recall why. At that moment,
an EMS Paramedic grabbed her by the vest and shook her. The Paramedic told her that they
were bringing out the bodies and needed to stop.
Officer Zamora explained that everything went blurry after that. She does not know if she
notified the officers and felt she went into shock.
Officer Zamora assisted at the funeral home and had to prepare for a press conference. She
recalled feeling weak because she had not eaten, and her son was still in the hospital. She
stayed on duty until about 8:00 pm
Officer Daniel Ruiz had worked the night before and was sleeping when his phone woke him up
with the news. Officer Ruiz had two boys at Robb Elementary and one was in Ms. Mireles’ class.
Officer Ruiz did not know that his ex-wife had taken the boys after the awards ceremony.
Officer Ruiz was called in and met with Officer Joe Zamora at the P.D. then reported to Robb
Elementary School. Officer Ruiz saw the officers at his son’s building and learned that it was Ms.
Mireles’ class about 45 minutes after he had arrived. Officer Ruiz had left his phone in his car
and was unable to get it because of the crowd he had to keep back.
Officer Ruiz was then ordered to go to 552 Diaz Street with Cpl. De La Cruz and was able to get
his phone. He then found out his sons were at home.
Officer Ruiz was at 552 Diaz for about 20 minutes and spoke to the shooter’s aunt, who was
extremely upset.
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Officer Ruiz then responded to the high school and was released after the students were
released.
Officer Daniel Martinez was on a regularly scheduled day off and at a doctor’s appointment
when he heard about the incident. He then went home and put his uniform on and responded
to the scene. Officer Martinez arrived at the intersection of Evans and Geraldine where he met
with a Border Patrol Agent who requested his assistance in blocking the road. Officer Martinez
held this post only allowing emergency vehicles through.
Officer Martinez encountered the grandfather of the shooter and told him that he did not know
what was going on and was assisting. Officer Martinez then encountered Mr. Joe Garcia who
stated that he could not find his wife Irma Garcia. Officer Martinez told Mr. Garcia to check the
Civic Center. They exchanged numbers and Officer Martinez promised to call him if he had any
updates.
Officer Martinez was then assigned to Morales Middle School until the students were released.
Officer Martinez checked in on the radio and never received orders. He assisted where he was
needed.
The Border Patrol Agent who requested assistance gave him instructions and left without
notifying Officer Martinez. Officer Martinez never knew what happened until he saw the press
conference with the Governor.
Officer Lee Ann Cantu was not on duty and on a regularly scheduled day off working, an
approved, off duty contract in Gillette Texas. Officer Cantu was contacted by Officer Wally who
stated she was needed as a negotiator. Officer Cantu had a son in the third grade who was in
the awards ceremony that she was not able to attend. Her son pleaded with her to go home
after the ceremony, and she reluctantly allowed him to go home with her sister 38 minutes
before the lockdown.
Officer Cantu left her post and drove towards Uvalde two hours away. She was concerned
because her daughter attended Morales Middle School and it was on lock down. Officer Cantu
was able to locate a cousin who picked up her daughter. Lt. Pargas assigned her to the house on
Diaz Street when she arrived at 4:45 pm. The officers on scene appeared physically exhausted
and she gave them her drinks. They instructed her to keep everyone away, which she did
without taking any enforcement action until she was relieved at about 9:30 pm
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7. Review of Communications Unit / Dispatchers
Jeanna Santellanes was on duty and working with Samantha Diaz on the console on the day of
the incident. Myra Landry is the supervisor for the dispatchers. At the time of this interview
Samantha Diaz was in the police academy and was going to join the Uvalde Police Department
Patrol Division when she graduated.
Ms. Santellanes described four landlines going into communications. The console is the
Computer Aided Dispatch system that is set up with the radios and 911 system. Ms. Santellanes
has only reviewed a few calls from the incident because it is triggering for her. Ms. Santellanes
took the initial 911 call that came in as the accident.
Ms. Santellanes and her colleagues were incredibly busy dealing with a large volume of calls
and radio traffic. Ms. Santellanes first learned that there were children in the classroom when
“Chloe” called 911 from inside the classroom. Ms. Santellanes had also received a call from the
teacher who was hiding in her classroom. Chloe’s call was the first time anyone knew that there
were casualties. Ms. Santellanes tried to broadcast this, trying to make sure the officers knew
but she recalled that someone had an open mic. She did not recall anyone acknowledging her
information, but someone had said go ahead.
Ms. Santellanes believed that Ms. Diaz had called Lt. Pargas or Sgt. Coronado. Ms. Santellanes
believes she put the information out on Chloe about five times but did not get an
acknowledgement. Chloe confirmed that her teacher was dead and there were nine alive.
Ms. Santellanes was dealing with calls and radio traffic and at the same time had the longest
open mic she had ever experienced. She coordinated with agencies and EMS. She believed that
the Border Patrol Agents patching into their radio system caused the main problem with the
radio system.
Myra Landry is the supervisor of the Uvalde Police Dispatchers, and she was in the dispatcher
room when the first call came in. Ms. Landry recalls taking several phone calls as they were
overwhelmed in the office. She recalled getting a call from the Robb School Assistant Principal
asking if EMS was on the way. She also remembered receiving a call from a child or lady who
was whispering. She believed they mentioned room 111. She then heard another voice asking
who the caller was talking to and the phone was disconnected. The second voice sounded like
an adult.
Ms. Landry learned about the child calling from room 112 from Ms. Santellanez. Ms. Landry also
relayed the information over the radio but does not recall being acknowledged. She believes
that it did come out. Ms. Landry stated Samantha Diaz spoke to Lt. Pargas over the phone and
told him about the children in 112.
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Samantha Diaz was on duty in the dispatcher room when she took one of the initial calls about
the crash and the caller said that shots were fired as the officers were pulling up. Ms. Diaz also
took the call from the teacher, who stated the shooter was coming towards the school. Ms.
Diaz said a caller stated that the kids were running and said he had a gun not a rifle.
Ms. Diaz also took the call from the teacher who barricaded herself in a class. This is when Ms.
Diaz first realized there were people in classes.
Ms. Diaz believed that they were breaking/transmitting out on the radio, but they were not
being acknowledged when they broadcast out that there were victims. Ms. Diaz spoke to Lt.
Pargas and told him about the victims alive and deceased. Border Patrol had patched in and
there was an open mic at the time she told Lt. Pargas.
Ms. Diaz also spoke to Chief Arredondo and understood, from his conversation, that he was in
the room with the shooter.
We conducted a thorough review of the calls and radio traffic from Uvalde Dispatchers while
reviewing the dispatcher’s performance. A retired Austin / Travis County Dispatcher assisted in
reviewing the calls and radio traffic. We acknowledge that the radios were not working
properly, and the dispatcher team was overwhelmed with calls and radio traffic. There was also
an open mic for an unusually long period of time.
We located the following sixteen transmissions that were not relayed/acknowledged by the
dispatchers that may have helped the officers:
113054 Address of the crash was given but the name of the school was left out.
113145 Dispatcher did not repeat traffic, “shots fired, shots fired”, at Robb School
113355 Dispatcher did not repeat or acknowledge traffic to call school pd and units already at
Robb School
113516 Dispatcher did not repeat 705 on south side he may be inside the building.
113533 Dispatcher did not repeat the female was shot in the head on Diaz.
113733 Dispatcher did not repeat, shots fired.
113733 Unit says shots fired in the building / unable to hear what building / dispatcher does not
ask what building or to repeat.
113854 Dispatcher did not acknowledge unit asking for EMS on Diaz
120321 Dispatcher did not advise out of county units responding.
120812 Dispatcher did not repeat armed parents on scene.
121417 Dispatcher did not repeat info on backpack found with ammunition.
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124737 Dispatcher did not repeat units making entry.
124958 Radio Traffic was allowed while breaching.
125040 Dispatcher did not repeat the subject down.
125256 Dispatcher did not repeat for EMS to approach from Southeast.
125322 Dispatcher did not repeat to make sure the perimeter is clear, no families.
125547 Unit asks for EMS dispatcher did not acknowledge.
The dispatch / communications team was under enormous stress. They also had the duty of
radio communication with EMS and Fire.
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8. Review of Command – Acting Chief Lt. Mariano Pargas
Chief Daniel Rodriguez was included in this investigation although he was not present. His only
involvement with the incident was a short conversation with Lt. Pargas that lasted about three
minutes. During this conversation Chief Rodriguez told Lt. Pargas to set up a command post.
Chief Rodriguez cooperated completely and created a timeline of events and calls he engaged
in, which he turned in to me and are in his statement summary.
Lt. Mariano Pargas – Acting Chief.
Lt. Pargas was assigned to be acting chief on Monday May 23, 2022, because Chief Rodriguez
was going to be out of town. Chief Rodriguez stated that he rotated the lieutenants into Acting
Chief and this time it was Lt. Pargas’ turn.
Lt. Pargas arrived and was the fifth person to enter the building. Lt. Pargas was present when
Lt. Javier Martinez and SSgt. Canales were shot during their approach to the classroom.
Lt. Pargas had his second-in-command, Lt. Javier Martinez, in the building and was injured but
still mobile. The third-in-command was SSgt. Canales, who was also injured and mobile.
Lt. Pargas knew the following people were in the hallway:
● UCISD Chief Arredondo
● SSgt. Canales - UPD SWAT commander
● Lt. Javier Martinez - ex SWAT commander and second in command this day
● Det. Landry - backup SWAT commander
● UCISD Officer Gonzales who went through SWAT training when he was employed by
UPD.
Lt. Pargas stated that he had no doubt that Chief Arredondo was in charge in the hallway
because the school is in UCISD police jurisdiction. Lt. Pargas’s belief is supported by the MOU
between the Uvalde Police Department and the Uvalde Consolidated Independent School
District.
Lt. Pargas may or may not have known but every person involved in the instruction of the most
recent active shooter training sponsored by the UCISD Police was present at the time the initial
entry into the building was made except for Constable Field.
The radios were not working inside the building and Lt. Pargas placed himself in a position to be
able to listen to the needs of the hallway and attempt to coordinate the officers outside the
building with crowd control and other agencies showing up.
Lt. Pargas was unsure of the extent of the injuries to the officers. He eventually had to order Lt.
Martinez out and personally took him to get checked by EMS.
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11:55 am Constable Field concludes a call with IC Chief Arredondo and announces a plan to
clear the classrooms near 111 and 112 and negotiate. As previously noted, this was significant
because it was the first plan that IC Arredondo gave, and it placed Lt. Javier Martinez in a
support role since he was waiting for the shields to arrive.
11:56 am UCISD Officer Ruiz announced that his wife was shot. Lt. Pargas assisted in taking
Officer Ruiz out of the building and witnessed Det. Rodriguez prying his gun away. Lt. Pargas
took Officer Ruiz to his UPD Tahoe and left him with UCISD Lt. Hernandez.
11:57 am Children were found, and evacuations started through the windows. This became
chaotic and Lt. Pargas assisted with some evacuations.
12:17 am Lt. Pargas contacted Lt. Juan Martinez, who has training in emergency management,
to set up the command post at the funeral home, after Ranger Kindell advised him to set one
up.59
Lt. Juan Martinez would later state that he did not have enough bodies to set it up because of
crowd control. Lt. Pargas met with Lt. Juan Martinez at the funeral home and Mayor
McLaughlin was present at one point. The parking lot was full of parents and the funeral home
was taking names of parents.
Lt. Juan Martinez stated that he and Lt. Pargas attempted to set up the command post with the
other agencies involved but it did not happen until after the entry was made. Lt. Martinez
stated that UPD followed their chain of command. When he attempted to notify the different
agencies, the officers would direct him to go speak to a different person. As previously stated in
this report, it is unknown what role UCISD Lt. Hernandez had in this case.
Lt. Juan Martinez stated that Lt. Pargas was going back and forth from the funeral home to the
school, everyone had trouble with the radio and agencies had no direction. Lt. Pargas was able
to take care of UPD but not of the oncoming agencies.
Lt. Pargas learned of the second crime scene on Diaz, from Lt. Juan Martinez. Lt. Pargas sent
Det. Lualemaga and Rodriguez to 552 Diaz Street.
Lt. Pargas stated that in his opinion no one had made entry into the classroom because the
shooting had stopped. Someone had radioed that it was a barricaded subject in an office, but
others said it was a classroom.
Lt. Pargas felt he had the best UPD officers for the job in the hallway with the Incident
Commander Chief Arredondo. Lt. Pargas believed that Chief Arredondo and the SWAT
Commander would be the ones to “call the shots” in the hallway.
59
DOJ report
72 | Page
Lt. Pargas is not tactically trained and relied on the expertise of the incident commander and
the highest-ranking UPD SWAT officers, which included the second-in-command, to make any
tactical decisions necessary.
Lt. Pargas believed it was Chief Arredondo’s jurisdiction, and they had the training. Lt. Pargas
trusted decisions in the hallway to Chief Arredondo and the SWAT officers inside.
Lt. Pargas never felt that anyone took over the scene even when the Ranger arrived. Lt. Pargas
also believed that the minute everyone heard “barricaded” the response changed from active
shooter to barricaded subject.
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The following are some of the factors and circumstances officers faced in the hallway:
● Officers tried twenty-eight times to transmit through on the radio when they were in
the hall initially approaching the rooms.60 The dispatchers and responding officers were
not able to hear them because the radio would give a tone that the repeater was not
working.
● Officers were possibly facing a rapid-fire weapon, and it was later learned that a Hell
Fire Trigger system was located on the ground in the classroom.61 I later learned that it
was possible for the Hell Fire Trigger system to come loose and fall out due to the
weapon shaking during operation, if “Grip Tight” was not used, but I have not read the
report analyzing this as a fact.62
● Upon approaching, officers tried to look inside the rooms and could not see in.
● The room was dark, and the hallway was lit.
● The shooter was able to see the officers when they were eight feet away from the door
to room 111, without being seen and shot two of the initial contact team officers.
● The two officers that were hit were not down but were the leaders of the Uvalde SWAT
team.
● The .223 rounds went through the doors, sheetrock, and wood.
● The door was closed and presumed locked.
● Sgt. Coronado radioed that the suspect was contained in the building. He later
broadcasted that the subject was barricaded in one of the offices. UCISD Officer
Gonzalez could be heard in the background on Sgt. Coronado’s BWC giving Sgt.
Coronado information to broadcast.
● Officers did not have the tools they believed they needed to make an entry. They
requested SWAT, ballistic shields, and DPS to bring shields if they had them.
● Initially officers did not believe children were in the classrooms on the north side
because the doors that were open did not have students and they did not hear noise.
On the south side Chief Arredondo entered one dark, unlocked classroom, and stated
students were not present but there were students present and hiding.
● The issue with getting into the room was how they were going to do it if the shooter is
able to shoot them when they get within eight feet of the door without a shield. Sgt.
Page was also concerned that the shooter could take out officers then get past the
officers and continue.
● Uvalde Police had three of their SWAT team present in the hallway. Lt. Martinez was the
previous SWAT commander, SSgt. Canales was the current SWAT team commander, and
Det. Landry was a SWAT team back-up commander. Although they had not trained
consistently since before COVID (2020), they were the leadership of the SWAT team and
60
JPPI investigation
61
DOJ report page 180
62
Honorably Retired Bell County Constable Thomas Prado has examined and handled the Hell Fire Trigger system
and only offered an opinion on how he believed it could disengage from the AR-15.
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had the most experience with Uvalde Pd., even though that was limited. SSgt. Canales
and Sgt. Coronado called for shields when they were able to get outside to use the
radios, because they recognized that this approach to the door was not possible without
cover.
● Every UCISD officer that instructed the active shooter training and instructors from the
police academy were present. I was not provided any information by the Uvalde Police
Officers interviewed, that any of the UCISD Officers and trainers gave suggestions to the
initial contact team and entry team possible options of how to best make entry into the
classroom.
● Chief Arredondo gave an order at 11:55 am that they were going to clear classes and
negotiate with the shooter. Until this point Lt. Martinez was just waiting for the shield to
arrive to move forward. Lt. Martinez expressed the urgency to approach the classes but
was told to wait by an officer, I believe to be Constable Zamora. Constable Field stated
he was not shooting at the moment.
● The key to the door was not located until just before entry was made. The key was
provided by a school custodian. It is reasonable to believe that the UCISD Police would
have keys or immediate access to every room. It was discovered that they did not have
the keys when they tried to unlock classroom 109. It is unknown if Chief Arredondo
checked the interior doors between 110 and 109.
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9. Uvalde Police Officer interview summaries
The officer’s interviews were protected by Garrity, and all were represented by their attorneys
during their questioning.
The Ranger division requested that no offense report be written in the Uvalde Police
Department report writing system and to notate in the report that the officer’s statements
were submitted to the Texas Rangers.
All of the officers were asked if they had shown up to work on May 24, 2022, rested and ready
for duty. All officers answered that they did not have any alcoholic beverages the night before
with the exception of one officer that could not remember but assured me, he did not get
intoxicated the night before work. I also questioned the officers about any personal
involvement they may have had with Robb Elementary that could have contributed to their
stress or decision making.
The interview summaries that are documented do not contain all comments made in the
interviews and may not be in chronological order of their statements to me. The Uvalde officers
and staff were answering specific questions about an incident that occurred at least five
months prior to their interviews.
The following are facts about the officer’s personal involvement with Robb Elementary School
that I learned about during their interviews:63
● SSgt. Canales – had a child in the fourth grade that was in a classroom on the same side
of room 111 during the incident. His classroom was unlocked because a substitute
teacher was assigned to the room that day. He did not know what room his child was in
until near the end of the incident when he learned his child was in a house nearby and
had escaped through a window.
● Det. Landry – has a stepson whose sister died in one of the classrooms.
● Officer Chapa – Chapa’s sister was a certified second grade teacher and was present on
the day of the incident.
● Lt. Pargas – had a grandson attending class that Lt. Pargas was supposed to go to the
awards ceremony but was not able to because of work duties.
● Sgt. Page – had a daughter attending the third grade. Lt. Javier Martinez was praying
over a child when Sgt. Page requested permission to check on his child after the entry
was made.
● Sgt. Coronado – learned after the incident he had a family member attending class.
● Fire Marshal Hernandez – had a grandson attending the third grade.
● Det. Ronald Rodriguez – had a cousin married to a teacher working there but he did not
recall that on the day of the incident.
63
Officers’ interviews with Prado
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● Cpl. Greg Villa – had a cousin by marriage that died in the classroom.
● Det. Cantu – had a nephew in a different wing that is the son of her sister and Officer De
La Cruz
● Officer Perez – had a child in the third grade that was in the yard when the shooting
began.
● Sgt. Ruiz – had a granddaughter in the third grade, who came up to him during
evacuations while he was posted on the front parking area.
● Sgt. Arredondo – had nieces and nephews at Robb Elementary
● Officer Joe Zamora – had a nephew that was not in school on this day.
● Officer Jessica Zamora – had a nephew but did not know until after the incident.
● Officer Ruiz – had two sons at Robb Elementary School. One was in Ms. Mireles’ class,
and he did not know that they were taken home after the awards ceremony until after
the incident. He had left his phone in the patrol car and could not get to it because of
the crowd being out of control.
● Officer Hill – had a daughter in the third grade but went home after the awards
ceremony.
● Officer Lee Ann Cantu – had a son in the third grade that day. Her second cousin’s child
died that day.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Chief Daniel Rodriguez by outside investigator Jesse Prado
Date of interview October 31st, 2022. Length of interview 1:34.
Chief Rodriguez was the first person I spoke to in this case, and I asked him questions that were
outside of his involvement, to get a general briefing, since I had refrained from watching news
on this incident.
Attorney Norman Giles of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP was present for Chief Rodriguez.
The following is a summary of the interview in response to my questions:
Daniel Shane Rodriguez is forty-eight years old and has been with the Uvalde Police Department
for twenty-five years. Chief Rodriguez was appointed as chief on April 20th, 2018. Chief Rodriguez
was the lieutenant of operations prior to becoming chief of police and has been the chief for the
last four- and one-half years.
The Uvalde Police Department had about forty sworn officers on the day of the incident on May
24th,2022. Chief Rodriguez recalls three or four reserve officers in the department at that time.
The reserve officers are issued a badge but no uniform and are required to come in for about 16
hours per month. Their duties are usually with training.
Chief Rodriguez rotates lieutenants to acting chief when he is gone to give them all experience.
On May 24th, 2022, Chief Rodriguez was on an approved vacation out of state and had assigned
Lt. Mariano Pargas as Acting Chief.
Chief Rodriguez was with some family and friends in Phoenix Arizona on his second or third day
out of an eight-day vacation and on a golf course when he received a call just after 9:30 am
Phoenix time, from PIO Jessica Zamora. Chief Rodriguez had only had coffee that morning.
PIO Zamora informed Chief Rodriguez of the active shooter at Robb Elementary and that
everyone was going out to the scene. PIO Zamora was at the hospital at the time of the call with
her son who had been injured in an unrelated incident. PIO Zamora did not know if there were
any injuries at the time of the initial call.
Lt. Javier Martinez and Sgt. Donald Page kept up with training records which included active
shooter training. Some officers had recently attended a training hosted by the UCISD a few
months prior to May 24th, 2022.
Chief Rodriguez attempted to call Chief Arredondo, but he did not answer and believed that Chief
Arredondo knew since there was no answer. Chief Rodriguez then attempted to contact Acting
Chief, Lt. Pargas and did not recall how many attempts he made to contact him, but they did
eventually connect. Chief Rodriguez recalled Lt. Pargas stating that there was a shooter inside
the school. Chief Rodriguez believed that Lt. Pargas said there were a lot of officers there and
other agencies coming. Chief Rodriguez then told Lt. Pargas to keep him updated and begin to
set up an incident command location. The call was brief, less than two minutes.
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Chief Rodriguez felt helpless and began to try and figure out how to get out of Phoenix. Chief
Rodriguez was playing with two other people and left in his cart to make calls and attempt to
leave Phoenix.
Chief Rodriguez stated that Lt. Pargas has been acting chief before and Chief Rodriguez normally
assigns one of the lieutenants to acting chief if he leaves town. The purpose of this is to make
decisions in his absence and keep a chain of command.
Chief Rodriguez stated that knowing that the CISD Chief was present he would expect that the
Uvalde Police would be there to assist in any way, which is stated in the Memorandum of
Understanding.
Chief Rodriguez personal guess on the mindset of the officers on scene would be that the ISD
Police Chief is here and in charge of his jurisdiction, but it is just a guess because Chief Rodriguez
was not present.
Chief Rodriguez learned about how many were deceased within an hour after the entry but did
not know the names other than Ms. Mireles because she was Officer Ruiz’ wife.
The reunification took place at the civic center and Chief Rodriguez then began receiving media
calls. Chief Rodriguez did not have many facts of the case and the following day he flew back to
San Antonio then to Uvalde and arrived during the last ten minutes of Governor Abbott’s press
conference. Lt. Pargas was receiving medical attention during this press conference due to nearly
fainting. Lt. Pargas has been in good health and is the most senior Lieutenant in the department.
Lt. Pargas was not chosen to be acting chief because of seniority but because he was next up on
the list.
Chief Rodriguez spoke to Lt. Pargas about his order to set up the command post a few days later
when Lt. Pargas had recovered. Lt. Pargas stated that when he went to the funeral home to set
up the command post, DPS and others including the Mayor and a city councilman were there. Lt.
Pargas felt that DPS would be in charge of the command post. Lt. Pargas also stated that the FBI
was there as well. This was prior to breaching classroom 112. The District Attorney arrived at the
command post and announced that the Texas Rangers would conduct the investigation and take
over after the shooter was killed.
Chief Rodriguez is not aware of any violations of Uvalde Police Department Policies, but he had
not investigated and would not know for sure until the investigation was completed. Lt. Pargas
not setting up the command post is one of Chief Rodriguez’ questions.
Lt. Pargas was placed on administrative leave on or about July 16 th, 2022, according to Mr. Giles
and Chief Rodriguez recollection.
Chief Rodriguez does not know of or believe that any leaks to the media have come from within
the Police Department. Chief Rodriguez was not interviewed by any investigators but did speak
to the House Committee regarding school policy but not the actual incident.
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Chief Rodriguez stated that he learned the radios were not working inside the schools and it may
be a repeater issue. Chief Rodriguez stated that the ISD Officers use the Uvalde PD dispatchers
and radio channels. The ISD Officers also have a second school radio.
Chief Rodriguez never heard of any schools being left unsecured, but the Police Department does
not deal with that and would not have received those reports.
Chief Rodriguez stated that the Ranger division requested that officers not write a report on the
police reporting system and officers gave their statements to the Rangers rather than write it,
which is something he had never seen before. One of the police lieutenants told Chief Rodriguez
that the Rangers had requested they not enter a detailed report in their reporting system and to
notate that they had already given it to the D.P.S. Texas Rangers.
During this interview Chief Rodriguez recalled that he had listed a call log of the events during
the time of the incident, and it is listed as follows:
Timeline of incoming and outgoing calls on May 24, 2022

NOTE: The times on this timeline are Phoenix, Arizona time, which is two hours behind Central
time. For example, the first time on this timeline is 9:43 am, but in Uvalde, Texas it was 11:43 am
P 9:43 am Call from my spouse (1 minute). I don’t believe I spoke with her.
P 9:43 am Call from my civilian administrative assistant, John Guerra, who told me there was an
active shooter at Robb Elementary who was inside a school building. John told me there were
several agencies on scene and that he could hear gunshots. I cautioned John to be careful and
stay out of the way of law enforcement’s duties.
P 9:45 am Call to city hall (2 minutes). If I remember correctly, I spoke with City Manager Vince
DiPiazza and informed him of the reported ongoing active shooter at Robb Elementary School. I
informed Mr. DiPiazza that I would update him as I was updated.
P 9:47 am I attempted to call U.C.I.S.D. Police Chief Pete Arredondo, but there was no answer.
P 9:48 am I called acting Officer In Charge Lieutenant Mariano Pargas to get an update. During
our conversation, I directed Lt. Pargas to get a Command Post set up. My reasoning behind the
command post was to gather department heads from each agency there to better deal with the
incident at hand. Another reason was to have department heads coordinate obtaining other
resources such as transportation, mutual aid, etc. (3 minutes).
P 9:50 am Call from a personal friend asking what was going on. I said I was waiting for updates,
and I could not talk at the time.
P 9:51 am I again attempted to call Chief Arredondo but got no answer.
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P 9:51 am I called City Hall and spoke with Mr. DiPiazza. I don’t recall all of our conversation, but
I remember telling him that I was waiting for updated information from personnel on the scene.
P 9:56 am I attempted to call Lt. Juan Martinez, but there was no answer.
P 9:57 am Call back from Lt. Juan Martinez who stated he was responding to Robb Elementary to
assist there. (less than 1 minute).
P 10:01 am I called Public Information Officer Jessica Zamora to see if she had any update. Officer
Zamora told me she was at the hospital with her son, who had broken his arm. She said she was
monitoring the police radio transmissions and that if she heard any new information, she would
inform me.
P 10:11 am Call from P.I.O. Zamora. If I remember correctly, Officer Zamora informed me that she
anticipated there will be several victims and that one of the victims would likely be U.C.I.S.D. P.D.
Officer Ruben Ruiz’s spouse. Again, I asked to be informed of available updates as the incident
continued.
P 10:12 am Call from Administrative Assistant Guerra, who provided an update. He told me the
shooter was inside the school building and that there were several agencies on the scene. John
also told me that Lt. Pargas delegated Mr. Guerra to help inform officers from other agencies to
have their vehicles moved due to buses coming in. Mr. Guerra also told me that Lt. Pargas had
requested markers, boards, and water for the command post.
P 10:13 am Call from John Meyer, with the Frio County Sheriff’s Office. He informed me he was
on scene to help. I directed him to contact Lt. Pargas to see what he needed help with.
P 10:19 am Call from P.I.O. Zamora who provided an update. I believe Officer Zamora was on
scene at the time of this call. She reported that the shooter was still in a school classroom. She
said there were reportedly an unknown number of victims.
P 10:27 am Another call from P.I.O. Zamora. I don’t recall what this call was about, but it was
most likely an update to the incident. (1 minute).
P 10:35 am Call from Fred Garza, Chief of Police for the City of Eagle Pass, Texas. He informed me
he was sending officers to assist. I remember telling him that I was not in town, but that they can
make the location to assist wherever they were needed.
P 10:43 am Call from my spouse (1 minute). I don’t recall what we talked about.
P 10:43 am Call from P.I.O. Zamora (2 minutes). Probably providing an update, but don’t recall
specifically what we discussed.
P 10:59 am Call from Lt. Pargas. He informed me that the shooter was shot and killed when entry
was made into the classroom. Lt. Pargas also informed me there were numerous deceased
children, but he didn’t yet have a count.
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P 11:00 am Call from P.I.O. Zamora. She also informed me that entry had been made into the
classroom in which the shooter was located and that he was shot and killed. Officer Zamora told
me there were several deceased children, and possibly teachers. Officer Zamora told me that Eva
Mireles, who was U.C.I.S.D. PD Officer Ruben Ruiz’s spouse, was in critical condition.
P 11:03 am I called City Manager DiPiazza and informed him of the updated information that had
been reported to me. (5 minutes).
Chief Rodriguez was stuck in Phoenix and attempted to plead with Southwest Airlines to get him
on the next flight back. Chief Rodriguez stated who he was and because of overbooking the
Airline’s earliest availability was the following morning.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Lieutenant Mariano Pargas by outside investigator Jesse Prado
Date of interview November 15th, 2022. Length of interview 2:00.
Attorney Norman Giles of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP was present for Lt. Pargas.
Lieutenant Mariano Pargas retired on November 17th, 2022, from the Uvalde Police Department.
I played Lt. Pargas’s interviews with the Texas Rangers that were conducted soon after the events
on May 24th, 2022, to assist his recollection. The initial Ranger interview was 13 minutes, and the
follow-up interview was 27 minutes.
The following is a summary of Lt. Pargas’s interview which was in response to my questions:
Mariano Pargas Jr., 65 years of age, is currently the C.I.D. Lieutenant. Lt. Pargas has 18 years of
service with the Uvalde Police Department and 22 years total law enforcement experience.
Lt. Pargas stated that on May 24th, he was the Acting Chief of Police, which is also referred to as
the Officer in Charge (OIC) of the Police Department. The assignment of Acting Chief started on
Monday May 23rd, 2022.
Lt. Pargas had a granddaughter at Robb Elementary School on the day of the incident.
On Tuesday May 24th, 2022, Lt. Pargas arrived at work at 8:00 am, wearing a blue shirt with his
department issued Glock .40 caliber in a holster on his hip.
Lt. Pargas has been through active shooter training in the past, but it had been between 10 or 15
years ago because his son was one of the actors and was young. The training was at the high
school. ( I did not locate a certificate or the hours in his TCOLE training records.)
Lt. Pargas believes that the resource officers oversaw the class because they did not have ISD
Police at the time. Lt. Pargas was never trained for tactical entries such as warrant service type
entry or SWAT.
Lt. Pargas drives an unmarked take home Tahoe and carries his CID equipment and vest. Lt.
Pargas does not have a city issued AR-15 but has his own that he is qualified with. He did not
have it that day. Lt. Pargas has a tactical rifle vest that he carries in his vehicle.
On the day of the incident Detectives Lualemaga, Landry, Rodriguez, and Cantu (now Cantu) were
working.
Lt. Pargas recalled someone saying they had a 1050 (Crash) on Grove and Geraldine St. with a
man possibly with a gun or rifle but Lt. Pargas did not remember at the time of this interview.
Lt. Pargas began running towards the doorway and saw that Operation’s Sergeant Donald Page
and Operational Lt. Javier Martinez were also running. Detectives Landry and Lualemaga were
behind Lt. Pargas going out the doors. Detective Hoshi Cantu was on light duty because of a
pregnancy. They all left at about the same time in their vehicles.
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Lt. Pargas has two relatives within the police department. One is Sgt. Julian Arredondo, and the
other is Sgt. Bobby Ruiz. Both are his nephews, one by marriage. Sgt. Ruiz is his sister’s son and
Sgt. Arredondo is married to his sister’s daughter. Both Sergeants were off duty. Lt. Pargas knows
the school and has a granddaughter that attends Robb Elementary School. Lt. Pargas’s
granddaughter was 9 years old and is the child of his daughter. Lt. Pargas knew she was in school
because of an awards ceremony that Lt. Pargas tried to attend but was unable to because of
work. Lt. Pargas’ wife went to the ceremony. Mrs. Wally is the teacher of his granddaughter.
Lt. Pargas recalled an officer saying “shots fired” over the radio as Lt. Pargas was arriving at the
school. Lt. Pargas initially thought officers in the street were being shot at because they had taken
cover behind their police car. Lt. Pargas remembered one of the officers was Juan Saucedo, who
he believed had an AR-15.
Staff Sgt. Canales stopped in front of Lt. Pargas, who also stopped and got his vest out. Lt. Pargas
then focused on a male in front of the funeral home who said the shooter went into the school
and was shooting inside the school. The gun had not been described yet. Officers were on the
radio and Lt. Pargas does not remember if he transmitted on the radio that the subject went into
the building.
Lt. Pargas recognized the situation as an active shooter in the school and his only thought at that
point was to get into the school to find the shooter. Lt. Pargas could remember the muffled rapid
pops from gunfire as he was running from his Tahoe to enter the school. Lt. Pargas did not have
a handheld radio with him. Lt. Pargas went to the back door (northwest door) of the 4 th Grade
Hall because he had spotted other officers there. Lt. Pargas went into the building after a Uvalde
Officer opened an unlocked door to enter the hallway. Lt. Pargas does not remember who the
officer was.
The gunfire stopped by the time Lt. Pargas entered the building. Lt. Pargas observed the smoke
in the hallway and was told it was sheet rock. Lt. Pargas was concerned that there were back
doors to the classroom that the shooter could come out of at any time.
Lt. Pargas did not know if there were any children in the building at this early moment. After
shots were fired at the officers, Lt. Pargas saw Lt. Javier Martinez coming back saying he had been
hit and was holding his head. Lt. Martinez appeared to be in disbelief that he had been hit. Lt.
Pargas has known Lt. Martinez for many years. Lt. Pargas did not see the wound because Staff
Sgt. Canales was coming back saying he had also been hit and had blood in his ear. Canales also
had an expression of disbelief at being shot.
Lt. Pargas attempted to get Lt. Martinez out for medical treatment, but he would not come out.
Lt. Martinez is the ex-SWAT Commander and had turned those duties over to SSgt. Canales. Lt.
Pargas remembered officer Justin Mendoza and Detective Landry present. Lt. Pargas also recalled
Constable Zamora, Constable Field, and JJ Suarez present. Suarez did not have a vest on, and Lt.
Pargas went to his vehicle to retrieve a vest for him. Suarez works at the college police academy.
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Lt. Pargas did not think about who was in charge of the scene but when he saw Chief Arredondo,
he knew they were under the school police jurisdiction and the school police would be in charge.
Lt. Pargas had never been in the building and did not realize the classrooms were there, thinking
there was a hallway leading to other classrooms. Lt. Pargas could see Chief Arredondo and Sgt.
Page on the south side and the rest were on the north side of the classrooms.
Lt. Pargas was not sure of the extent of the injuries to his officers and was trying to get them
evaluated. Both Lt. Martinez and Sgt. Canales were still able to continue. Lt. Pargas then got EMS
to check on the injuries by ordering Lt. Martinez out to E.M.S. Lt. Martinez returned after the
checkup.
When Lt. Pargas got back after taking Lt. Martinez to EMS, UCISD Officer Ruiz stated it was his
wife’s classroom. Lt. Pargas stated that Officer Ruiz had been one of the UPD detectives before
his move to the school district. Officer Ruiz did not have his gun in his hand but did have his phone
when Lt. Pargas initially saw him. Officer Ruiz made the statement with other officers around
including Detective Ronald Rodriguez who had come in from off duty.
Lt. Pargas believes UCISD Officer Ruiz walked up and told SSgt. Canales that it was Officer Ruiz’s
wife’s class. Lt. Pargas recalled Officer Ruiz stating that it was her class, she had been shot, and
was dying. Lt. Pargas recalled that Detective Rodriguez had Officer Ruiz by the hand and was
trying to take the gun away from him. Lt. Pargas did not know what Ruiz was going to do but he
had seen Officer Ruiz finger in the trigger of the weapon. Lt. Pargas was concerned about the
look on Officer Ruiz face with his finger in the trigger of the gun. Detective Rodriguez was able to
safely take control of the gun and put it in his pocket.
Lt. Pargas then took Officer Ruiz out to his Tahoe and left him with the school Lieutenant, Mike
Hernandez.
Lt. Pargas then recalled getting a call from Chief Daniel Rodriguez, who was in Arizona. Chief
Rodriguez asked him what the plan was, and Lt. Pargas said he did not know at that point. Chief
Rodriguez then said to start working on a command post.
Lt. Pargas stated that in his opinion no one had made entry into the room because the shooting
had stopped, the room was dark, and no one knew if kids were hostages. Someone stated over
the radio that it was a barricaded subject in an office, but others stated it was a classroom.
Lt. Pargas was concerned during this interview that his chronological order was not correct.
Lt. Pargas recalled taking another officer’s radio but did not recall if he called Lt. Juan Martinez
by radio or phone to get the command post set up.
Lt. Juan Martinez has training in emergency management and Lt. Pargas thought the funeral
home was a good place to set up the command post. Lt. Pargas met Lt. Martinez at the funeral
home, and they were met by the witness that told Lt. Pargas about the shooter. This witness was
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at the door as he was taking the names of parents. The parking lot was full of parents and family
at this time.
Lt. Pargas recalled the Mayor and Officer Wally in the funeral home working on identifying the
shooter. Lt. Pargas recalled coming out of the funeral home and seeing other agencies had
arrived. Lt. Pargas had dispatch contact medical assistance from anywhere to go to the school.
Lt. Pargas stated that he also remembered that students had called in saying there were injured
people in the classroom. Lt. Juan Martinez asked if anyone was at the second crime scene on Diaz
St., which was the first time Lt. Pargas knew that there was a second crime scene.
Lt. Pargas sent two detectives, Lualemaga and Rodriguez out to Diaz Street. Lt. Pargas knew and
officers stated they had to go into the room. Lt. Pargas knew that there were many officers
including DPS, a Texas Ranger and Border Patrol at the school with Chief Arredondo.
Lt. Pargas began to go back to the school but heard that there were too many officers inside and
went back to the funeral home. Lt. Pargas saw DPS Officer Victor Escalon with a group of DPS and
Border Patrol who said they were setting up the Command Post.
Lt. Pargas stated he began to coordinate officers for crowd control, because people were trying
to get to the ambulances and the crowd was out of control.
Lt. Pargas also began to coordinate with the school buses.
They had also begun to evacuate the children in close proximity, which he helped do, before
going to the funeral home. Lt. Pargas recalled that children in nearby classrooms were located
and evacuated. Lt. Pargas knew that the bullets had gone through the sheetrock because Lt.
Martinez had told him.
It became a priority to evacuate the children who were in immediate danger from bullets going
through the sheetrock.
Lt. Pargas stated that by the time they began evacuating children they had gotten 911 calls that
made it clear injured children were in the classrooms where the shooter was in.
Lt. Pargas was dealing with the evacuation of the children, and he knew that he had two SWAT
members in the hallway with the backup SWAT Commander Det. Landry. Lt. Pargas believed that
the SWAT unit would take over the situation at the scene. Lt. Pargas believed that the SWAT
Commander in this situation would make any decision to enter because they are there and have
the entry training. Lt. Pargas had previously stated that Chief Arredondo was there with the SWAT
Officers in the hallway as well.
The information about children inside was being passed along to the officers in the hallway.
Lt. Pargas did not interfere with any plans in the hallway because he knew the ISD Police Chief
and tactically trained officers were in the hallway. Lt. Pargas was handling everything else outside
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the building like EMS, and getting other agencies, as well as the perimeter. He also helped
coordinate the bus situation for the evacuated children and a second crime scene on Diaz Street.
Lt. Pargas saw DPS Rangers, D.A. Busbee and one of her investigators were present. Lt. Pargas
believed that after the shooter had been taken down Ms. Busbee announced the Rangers would
take over the investigation. Lt. Pargas spoke to one Ranger and asked about his two detectives
at the first crime scene on Diaz. The Ranger told Lt. Pargas to have his detectives process the
scene, but the detectives told Lt. Pargas that they were told by a different Ranger to leave it for
them.
Lt. Pargas’ opinion was that the biggest reason for not entering the classroom was the lack of
proper equipment that the officers needed to make the entry. Lt. Pargas stated that they could
not see in the room and did not know where the shooter was, which is what kept them from
going in. Lt. Pargas is not entry trained but it was his belief. Lt. Pargas heard multiple times from
officers that they needed to get in but thinks they did not make the entry because of the lack of
equipment to breach the door.
Lt. Pargas believes that the officers thought the doors were locked because he remembered
officers were looking for the keys to get in. Lt. Pargas knew ISD Officer Adrian Gonzales was SWAT
trained because he worked for the UPD before moving to the school. Lt. Pargas did not recall
seeing Officer Gonzales in the school, but he could have been on the other side with Chief
Arredondo.
Lt. Pargas never heard anyone say do not make a move to attempt entry. Lt. Pargas never felt as
if anyone took charge of the scene, even after Ranger Kendall arrived.
Lt. Pargas believes that the minute they heard barricade the response changed from active
shooter to barricaded subject. Lt. Pargas did not know who called out the barricaded subject.
The training that Lt. Pargas recalled was an active shooter response at the high school but outside
the school not in a classroom or in a building. As CID Lieutenant he does not get the regular
training like patrol.
Lt. Pargas would not have stopped any team from going into the classroom because they would
have known if they had what they needed at the time to do it.
Lt. Pargas believes that Chief Arredondo and the SWAT Commander would be the ones to make
the call in the hallway, because it is the school officer’s jurisdiction, and they have the training.
The radios were not working properly in the building. They were unable to get a good
conversation on the radio. Chief Arredondo appeared to be on the phone, but Lt. Pargas did not
know with whom. Lt. Pargas knew the Chief had communication with Lt. Martinez and Sgt.
Canales. No one gave an order to go in.
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Lt. Pargas did not see Lt. Javier Martinez walk back to the door alone after being shot and then
come back, he did see it in a video. Lt. Pargas believed that someone should have gone with Lt.
Martinez.
Lt. Pargas heard the information about children calling from the radio but did not remember how
he first heard it.
The officers on the outside or perimeter were not in communication with officers in the building
because they were dealing with crowd control. Lt. Pargas was not aware of what was going on in
the hallway while he was outside. The command post had many agencies and children in the
funeral home which he helped get evacuated on buses.
Lt. Pargas did not go back into the building once it was announced that they had too many officers
inside. Lt. Pargas felt from the beginning that they needed to make entry, but the lack of
equipment is what he feels kept them out. Lt. Pargas did not have the training but would have
gone in with the officers if they could have.
Lt. Pargas noted on the video that he saw BORTAC lined up to go in, but still waited 20 minutes
while they were lined up. The Marshal service brought in the proper shield.
Lt. Pargas understood he was placed on administrative leave for not setting up the command
post but started the process with Lt. Juan Martinez. There were many agencies in the funeral
home that appeared to be setting up, but he did not know them. Lt. Pargas stayed busy
coordinating the EMS and dealing with the perimeter issues as well as the children’s evacuation
on buses. Lt. Pargas has never been trained in setting up a command post.
Lt. Pargas stated that once DPS Officer Escalon arrived everyone followed him.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Sergeant Donald Page by outside investigator Jesse Prado
Date of interview November 22nd, 2022. Length of interview 1:45:40.
Attorney Randy Lopez of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP was present for Sgt. Page.
I played Sgt. Page’s interviews with the Texas Rangers that were conducted soon after the events
on May 24th, 2022, to assist his recollection. The initial Ranger interview was 43 minutes, and the
follow-up interview was 54 minutes. The Ranger division requested that no offense report be
written in the Uvalde Police Department report writing system and to notate in the report that
the officer’s statements were submitted to the Texas Rangers.
The following is a summary of Sgt, Page’s interview which was in response to my questions:
Sgt. Page is 40 years old and has been with the Uvalde Police Department for 16 years and has a
total of 18 plus years of total law enforcement experience. Sgt. Page is the operations sergeant
and oversees dispatch, evidence technician and animal control. Sgt. Page also does the internal
investigations, keeps track of training and orders vehicles, camera equipment etc. Sgt. Page had
a daughter in the 3rd grade at Robb Elementary on the day of the shooting.
Sgt. Page arrived at work on May 24th, 2022, at 7:30 am but did not clock in until 8:00 am., which
is normal for him. He was wearing Khaki pants, a black, white, and green striped shirt, and a green
tie with the green lantern symbol. Sgt. Page had a good night’s sleep the night before.
There were three dispatchers working that day that Sgt. Page supervises. Two were dispatchers
taking 911 calls and answering the police radio and one was a supervisor, Mayra. Samantha Diaz,
one of the dispatchers working on May 24th, is now with the Uvalde Police Department as a police
cadet. Giana Santellanes is the third dispatcher that was working that day.
Sgt. Page recalled he was working on an internal investigation that he and Lt. Javier Martinez had
been assigned to investigate. They were at the office and recalled the time close to 11:30 am
because it is normally the time they go to lunch, when they heard several officers running through
the hall saying there was a 10-50 (car crash) and a man with a gun by the Robb School.
Sgt. Page went to his car and retrieved his vest then realized Lt. Javier Martinez had left without
him. They normally travel together because they do not have a handheld radio assigned to them.
They had given their radios to patrol because not all radios were functioning properly. Sgt. Page
went back to his Crown Victoria which is equipped with emergency lights but no siren. Sgt. Page
then traveled to the school where he had a child in the third grade. Sgt. Page’s wife has a cousin
who had a child who died that day at the school.
Sgt. Page arrived and passed the crash site but did not see it. The officers were pulling up to the
building and UCISD Officer Adrian Gonzales had parked on school property near the south
entrance of the building. SRO Gonzales was waiving down Sgt. Page, who parked behind SRO
Gonzales. Sgt. Page asked SRO Gonzales where the shooter was at, and they then heard constant
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gunfire. SRO Gonzales stated he must be in the building both then entered with their guns drawn
through the south door.
As they entered the shooting continued. The hallway was filled with smoke, but Sgt. Page was
not sure if it was gun smoke or sheet rock or both. The odor of gunfire was strong. Sgt. Page
believes he and SRO Gonzales entered before Lt. Martinez and Sgt. Canales entered from the
North Side of the hallway. Sgt. Page did not see Det. Landry with them but knew he was there
when he saw the hallway video.
Sgt. Page realized the shots had come from rooms 111 or 112 and he learned in the Alert training
to go to the gunfire. Sgt. Paige crossed in front of SRO Gonzales. Sgt. Paige made it to the point
near the doors and had a clear view of the door in room 112. He recalled telling the Ranger it was
111 and 112. Sgt. Page saw that the door was full of bullet holes and the door window was shot
out.
Lt. Martinez and Sgt. Canales were working their way towards Sgt. Page who motioned to the
men that he believed the shooter was in 111 or 112. Sgt. Page believed the shooter was in 112
because it was the only door that he could see. Sgt. Page did not want to put himself in a position
in front of door 111 but could see the bullet holes in the door of 112. Sgt. Page never saw door
111 from his position near the corner of the vestibule to both rooms. Sgt. Page planned for him
and SRO Gonzales to cross 111 to get to 112. The classroom at 112 was completely dark and even
though the window was shot out of the door he could not see in the room.
Sgt. Page stated that the teachers are taught to turn off lights. Sgt. Page last took active shooter
training in 2011 or 2012 with Texas DPS SWAT. Sgt. Page recalled that different school districts
may instruct teachers differently as to what to do in an active shooter scenario. Sgt. Page was
taught to take the threat out but in training the lights were on and the classroom doors were
open. Sgt. Page stated that DPS taught to go in quickly and cut the pie for the element of surprise
and not to “peekaboo.” Sgt. Page did recall a scenario of the shooter in a classroom, but the doors
were not locked and the lights were not off. Sgt. Page recalled learning not to “peekaboo”
because he was shot in the face by the wax bullets during training. They were trained to cut the
pie and stay out of the “fatal funnel” (doorway).
Lt. Martinez and Sgt. Canales could see room 111, but the plan was to enter 112 because of the
bullet holes. They did not know if the doors were locked but assumed that they were because
they are supposed to be locked. They never made it to the doors because as soon as Lt. Martinez
and Sgt. Canales began to move towards the door at 111 to “cut the pie”, the shooter fired at
them from room 111. Sgt. Page was not sure how far Lt. Martinez and Sgt. Canales made it
towards room 111 but they did not reach the door. Sgt. Page did not know how the shooter was
able to see them at that moment.
Sgt. Page recalled Sgt. Canales’s radio made a beeping noise as people were trying to speak on
the radio, but the radios were not working. Sgt. Page thought the radio going off may have given
his position to the shooter but was not sure. Both men appeared to be shot and retreated back
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towards the North. Sgt. Page recalled yelling at them if they had been hit, which he realized he
had just given up his own position. Sgt. Page did not have cover but was concealed and knew that
the .223 rounds were going through the wood and sheetrock. Sgt. Page did not have his heavy
rifle rated vest on.
Sgt. Page overheard on the radio that it was a man with a gun not a rifle. Sgt. Page knew it was a
rifle when he saw the casings in the hallway.
Sgt. Page did not encounter teachers or children when he went into the building. He had also
gone in through an unlocked door on the south side entrance. Sgt. Page went in front of SRO
Gonzales. Sgt. Page estimated that Lt. Martinez and Sgt. Canales were approximately eight feet
from him when they reached doors 111 and 112. Sgt. Page stated that both sides traveled directly
to the gunfire and the smoke filled the hallway. Sgt. Page did not hear any children.
Sgt. Page saw two rounds go through the sheet rock where he had been standing when the
gunfire started. He then backed up and took a position “caddy corner” in the closest vestibule
just southwest of rooms 111 and 112.
Sgt. Page stated it got so quiet that he could hear himself breathing. There were no children
crying or screaming. Sgt. Page recalled his training in Del Rio that had a scenario where children
were running and screaming up and down the hallway trying to get away from the shooter. Sgt.
Page has taken online training that teaches the teachers and children are supposed to be as quiet
as possible through Police One.
Sgt. Canales was hit in the ear and Lt. Martinez was hit in the head and in the forearm, but Sgt.
Page did not know the extent of their injuries at that moment. Of the four officers that
approached the doors two were hit, and Sgt. Page would have been hit through the sheet rock
had he stayed in the same spot. One of the rounds was about hip high and the other round was
near his foot, but Sgt. Page was not crouched down like Lt. Martinez and Sgt. Canales. If the
shooter saw Lt. Martinez and Sgt. Canales crouching, Sgt. Page believes the shooter shot through
the wall at the same height to try and hit anyone else in the head.
Sgt. Page placed himself in a position Southwest of rooms 111 and 112 to take out the shooter if
he came out the door without causing a crossfire with the officers on the Northside of the hall.
Sgt. Page believes he was in the door area of 104 and Chief Arredondo was in the area of 110.
Sgt. Page described his position as the closest doorway area on the opposite side as 111 and 112
but he could not see the doors from that angle.
Sgt. Page then asked Chief Arredondo if there was any other way into this classroom and Chief
Arredondo stated that there was no other way. Sgt. Page also informed Chief Arredondo that the
shooter had engaged Lt. Martinez and Sgt. Canales through the closed door and not by opening
the door to shoot at them. Sgt. Page believed the shooter was standing at the door or close to
the door because he had to have seen Lt. Martinez and Sgt. Canales through the door window as
they approached room 112 towards 111.
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Chief Arredondo did get into room 110 by pulling the door open. Sgt. Page asked him if there
were any kids in 110 and the chief told him that there were not. Sgt. Page stated that they ended
up removing people from that classroom later. Chief Arredondo said he did not see anyone but
when Sgt. Page checked the class later, the kids were hiding and did not come out until Sgt. Page
called out to the class in 110. The teacher and children just popped out of the darkness. Sgt. Page
believes that Chief Arredondo may have just glanced into the room and not seen them. (the map
we used of the layout of the building may not be accurate on the classroom numbers)
(Sgt. Page described the position he took after they were shot at was the vestibule to 104 and
103. Chief Arredondo was in vestibule 110 and 109.
Prior to finding the children but after Chief Arredondo went into 110, Sgt. Page then answered
a call from Texas Ranger Ryan Kindell who is his best friend and called his personal number. Sgt.
Page and Ranger Kindell became friends when he helped Sgt. Page with his first homicide and
has mentored Sgt. Page for a long time. Sgt. Page requested help with equipment, shields, and
rifles because he and Chief Arredondo only had pistols. Sgt. Page did not know what happened
with SRO. Gonzales, but when he saw the body cam from Sgt. Canales Sgt. Page appeared to be
alone on the Southside. Sgt. Page was so focused on the area of doors to 111 and 112 that he did
not see where SRO Gonzales went but Chief Arredondo was now with him.
Ranger Kindell stated that he had already engaged DPS resources and DPS Swat. Sgt. Page then
gave Ranger Kindell directions to the school and Ranger Kindell had both of his rifles. Sgt. Page
is not sure if Ranger Kindell is on the SWAT team, but Lt. Martinez was the SWAT Commander
and Sgt. Canales is now the SWAT Commander. Sgt. Page later learned that Officer Landry, also
SWAT, was there as well. The Uvalde SWAT team has not trained since COVID in 2020.
No one gave any direction from the Southside such as taking over command. Sgt. Page did not
know what was happening on the Northside. Chief Arredondo used hand signals to get rifles onto
his side.
Sgt. Page did not know for sure that there were children inside the classroom, but he realized
that the shooter was shooting at something in that room.
Sgt. Page described that the shooter was “camping,” like in a military video game. Sgt. Page
defined “camping” as taking a position in a room like 112, where he has a direct line of sight to
the door. The shooter just sits and waits for anyone to come in, to take them out. Sgt. Page is not
tactically trained and stated that the Alert training never simulated a person in a fixed position
waiting on you.
Sgt. Page stated that he had no sense of the time and the entire situation felt as if it occurred in
20 to 30 minutes.
Officer Greg Villa came into the Southside with a rifle and took Sgt. Page’s position. Sgt. Page
then went outside to meet with Ranger Kindell who had made it to the school. Sgt. Page was
asked by Sgt. Coronado if he had checked in the classrooms. Sgt. Page then checked room 102
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and saw children and a teacher pop up. He then ran out and they evacuated the kids through the
windows.
The officers went from classroom to classroom evacuating children and teachers through the
windows in the fourth-grade building. Sgt. Page knew there would be more casualties if they did
not evacuate the children.
“At that point, my only concern was getting them out. Which was the best idea because if we did
force our way and get into a gunfight, we're gonna have more casualties.”
Lt. Javier Martinez also assisted along with DPS, and Border Patrol. Lt. Martinez used Sgt.
Coronado’s baton to break the windows. Sgt. Page described knocking over bookshelves that the
children and teachers used to step on to reach the window better. Sgt. Page saw some children
coming out of the hallway door and assumed officers had cleared the other side of the building.
The teacher that was shot was also assisted out of her classroom.
Sgt. Page recalled while evacuating a classroom from the outside, shots rang out. Sgt. Page was
not inside the building. Soon after the shots Chief Arredondo came out and saw the evacuation
of the children and told Sgt. Page that they needed a master key and to get one from the office.
Sgt. Page then sees ISD Lt. Hernandez and tells him that Chief Arredondo needed a Master Key.
ISD Lt. Hernandez left to get it. Sgt. Page did not see Lt. Hernandez after that and believes it may
have been taken to the north side of the building.
Sgt. Page described the scene as an active problem that needed to be solved, they were not trying
to find out who was in charge but trying to solve the problem. Sgt. Page stated he felt that as
soon as all of the children were out, the entry was made a few minutes later but also stated that
his perception of time was different at the scene.
Sgt. Page knew the city policy and stated that he did not see any policy violations and followed
his training. Sgt. Page stated that they were all under the same consensus that a rifle shield was
needed to make entry. Sgt. Page had never been trained on the shield and did not know that they
had different ratings for pistols and rifles.
Sgt. Page did not know of any officers shot during the entry but knew that the shield they used,
took rounds. After the entry was made, Sgt. Page went into the hallway and saw a border patrol
agent fall down and state that he thought he had been hit. Sgt. Page checked him and found
blood on the back of the agent’s head. The agent was taken by other officers and when Sgt. Page
began to go to the classroom, he learned they had enough officers and medics. The shooter
appeared to be down on his side, but Sgt. Page never entered the room.
Sgt. Page stated that he did see that both doors and the windows were shot out. After looking at
the door to 111 Sgt. Page believes he would have been killed if he would have peeked around
the corner when they were initially shot at.
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Sgt. Page knew about the issues with radio communication in the schools because it had been an
issue since he was on patrol. In the past officers would tell dispatchers that they were going to
be in the school and to call the cell phone.
During the incident Sgt. Page recalled calling the dispatcher trying to get a cell phone for the
shooter because Constable Zamora had asked for it.
The EMTs gave the notice that the classroom was “all black;” Sgt. Page went back outside, and
his daughter came into his mind. He asked Lt. Martinez for permission to check on his own child.
Sgt. Page did not know where the shooter had been and did not know if there were other
casualties. Sgt. Page ran into District Attorney Investigator Shane Gilland, near his daughter’s
classroom. Investigator Gilland stated they had evacuated the children to the buses earlier. Sgt.
Page stated he lost his composure for a few minutes, becoming emotional.
Ranger Guajardo saw him and gave him an assignment to secure the crash site, but Sgt. Page
thinks the Ranger gave him the assignment to get him focused again. Ranger Guajardo and Sgt.
Page have known each other for a long time and were in an academy together.
Sgt. Page then met with Border Patrol agents who were at the crash site. The agents stated that
they had located another AR-15 and had cleared the weapon to secure it. Sgt. Page identified
them. The agents had also located another bag of ammunition but had cleared the weapon and
left it where they found it at the crash site. They had located a sweatshirt near the fence as well.
Agents had also identified the witness that saw the crash and got shot at.
Other agents came by and stated that an elderly man and a young man had come up to them
stating that they were related to the shooter and that the shooter had planned this. They stated
they did not know where the two had gone and they did not identify them.
Sgt. Page gave the information he had to DPS Swat, a few minutes after the agents left the scene.
DPS SWAT were told by Ranger Guajardo to relieve Sgt. Page.
Sgt. Page assisted in securing the crime scene. A call came out at the high school and many left
to go secure the high school leaving Lt. Javier Martinez and Sgt. Page at Robb. Sgt. Page noticed
that Lt. Martinez’ head was still bleeding and took him to the hospital.
A deputy sheriff, Felix Rubio lost his daughter in the classroom. Ruben Ruiz, a UCISD Officer, lost
his wife, Eva Mireles, in the shooting.
Sgt. Page stated that he felt the shooter was shooting at children in the classroom because he
was shooting at something.
Only the initial four officers tried approaching the room but after that Sgt. Page does not know
and never found out what happened when four more shots were fired while they were
evacuating children from other classes.
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Sgt. Page stated that they began asking for a key after the four rounds were fired. Sgt. Page never
encountered a door that was locked on the south side. Sgt. Page knew the south door was not
locked, the Northwest door was not locked, the classroom Chief Arredondo entered (110) was
not locked and the room that Sgt. Page entered (102) was not locked.
Sgt. Page did not know of anything that could have been done differently to end this sooner with
the circumstances that they faced in this case and without the equipment during the initial push.
After the initial push, Sgt. Page does not know because they had SWAT members there. The initial
call was a crash and a man with a gun. The active shooter is what it turned into.
Sgt. Page stated he believed that they followed the Uvalde Police policies because it says to go in
and neutralize but their SOP also states that if you are not able to kill the shooter contain him
and he was contained.
Sgt. Page knows of two other officers that had children in the same building but not in 111 or
112. One of the Officers, Delacruz, is no longer with the department but he was on the SWAT
team and was present.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Dispatcher Jeanna Santellanez by outside investigator Jesse Prado
Date of interview November 30th, 2022. Length of interview :39 minutes.
Attorney Randy Lopez of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP was present for Ms. Santellanez.
I played Ms. Santellanez’ interviews with the Texas Rangers that were conducted soon after the
events on May 24th, 2022, to assist her recollection. The initial Ranger interview was 10 minutes.
The Ranger division requested that no offense report be written in the Uvalde Police Department
report writing system and to notate in the report that the officer’s statements were submitted
to the Texas Rangers.
The following is a summary of Ms. Santellanez statement which was in response to my questions:
Jeanna Santellanez 10/9/1987 has been with the Uvalde Police Department for 5 years as a
Telecommunications operator. Ms. Santellanez handles all 911 calls, radio dispatch, and landline
calls. Her supervisor is Myra Landry.
On May 24th, 2022, during this incident, Ms. Santellanez was working with another dispatcher
on the console and her supervisor Ms. Landry. Three in total. Samantha Diaz was the other
dispatcher on the console. The console is the computer set up with the radios and 911 system. It
is a computer aided dispatch.
Samantha Diaz is currently in the police academy and not in the dispatch office any longer.
Ms. Santellanez also has landlines or non-emergency phones 830-xxx-xxxx. There is one landline
on each console, a total of four phones including the supervisor, but the main number separates
into four different extensions.
Ms. Santellanez has only gone over a few calls because it is triggering for her prior to this
interview.
Ms. Santellanez took the initial 911 call that came in as a car accident. Ms. Diaz also began
receiving calls at the same time. It came in as a pickup truck that had wrecked in the ditch. Then
as the people were going to help, they were shot at. Ms. Santellanez put it out as an accident and
then as shots fired as he was walking towards the school. Ms. Santellanez did not recall if the
weapon was described. She remembered the caller saying he is shooting. Numerous phone calls
started coming in.
Ms. Santellanez recalled using the words active shooter, but initially she stated it was a crash and
then he was shooting and walking towards the school. Ms. Santellanez immediately started
dispatching EMS and Fire for standbys.
Ms. Santellanez first learned that there were children in the classroom with the shooter when
Chloe called 911 from inside the classroom. Ms. Santellanez had received the call from the
teacher who had barricaded herself in the classroom prior to the call from the child. Ms.
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Santellanez was on the phone with the teacher for a while. The call from Chloe was the first time
anyone had gotten word that there were casualties.
The call came in as an abandoned call, but Ms. Santellanez called it back then started to hang up
because she did not want to alarm anyone. This is when Chloe answered the call.
Ms. Santellanez recalled Chloe stating that her teacher was dead, and that other classmates and
friends were hit. Ms. Santellanez had Chloe count how many were still with her and that is when
Chloe counted up to nine that were alive. Chloe told Ms. Santellanez that multiple people had
died. Chloe did not know where the shooter was. Chloe said she was in room 112.
Ms. Santellanez broadcasted over the PD radio, trying to make sure officers were aware and had
acknowledged the information, but at that time Border Patrol had already patched into the radio
channel without telling dispatch and someone had an open mic. Ms. Santellanez was not
broadcasting (also known as breaking). Ms. Santellanez then focused on the phone while Ms.
Landry was trying to broadcast it. Ms. Santellanez recalled at least one officer saying to go ahead
with traffic. Ms. Santellanez did not recall anyone acknowledging but they continued to repeat
the traffic.
Ms. Santellanez felt like she had been screaming on the radio that she had a caller from room
112 but did not remember an acknowledgement. Ms. Santellanez believed that dispatcher Diaz
had called either Lt. Pargas or Sgt. Coronado.
Ms. Santellanez does not remember what Ms. Diaz told them on the phone because she was
multitasking with Airlife and calling agencies for assistance. Ms. Santellanez only recalled one call
from Sgt. Coronado asking about a trooper but did not think she spoke to any other officers on
the phone.
Ms. Santellanez believes she put the information out regarding Chloe’s call about 5 times on the
radio without an acknowledgement. Her reason for repeating it was because she had not been
acknowledged.
Ms. Santellanez had previously been interviewed by the DOJ, who she told this information to.
Ms. Santellanez does not recall a point in time where she knew that officers knew about Chloe’s
call, but she was still dealing with the open line to the child and her other duties.
Ms. Santellanez heard when the entry was made on the open line to Chloe.
Ms. Santellanez continued her duties in calling for agencies and having EMS standby, as she is
trained to do, even though she had not been acknowledged on the radio regarding Chloe’s call.
Normally the radios work properly, and it is believed that the other agencies patching into the
radio caused the issues.
This was the longest period of time that Ms. Santellanez had an open mic issue. Usually, it is just
for a few seconds up to a minute. Ms. Santellanez recalled seeing a Border Patrol radio with the
open mic. She felt the open mic lasted 10 to 15 minutes but was unsure. The specific radio call
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sign did not pop up on her console, it just read Border Patrol. If the agent does not identify
himself, they will not know who it is because it was not a Uvalde Radio.
The Uvalde dispatchers are not allowed to keep their personal cell phones in the room while on
duty.
Ms. Santellanez’ opinion about the biggest issue she had was with Border Patrol patching into
the radio without notifying them. They all of a sudden had a massive influx of people on the radio.
She understood it was an emergency, but it was her biggest problem. She also recalled trying to
get the sheriff’s office on the same channel too. The only other frustrating issue was the calls
from the media trying to get information.
Ms. Santellanez is familiar with the city policies and did not witness anyone in violation of policy.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Dispatcher Myra Landry by outside investigator Jesse Prado
Date of interview November 30th, 2022. Length of interview 41 minutes.
Attorney Randy Lopez of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP was present for Ms. Landry.
I played Ms. Landry’s interviews with the Texas Rangers that were conducted soon after the
events on May 24th, 2022, to assist her recollection. The initial Ranger interview was
approximately 5 minutes.
The following is a summary of Ms. Landry’s statement which was in response to my questions:
Myra Landry, Supervisor over Uvalde Police Dispatchers, has worked there for about 13 years
and has been a supervisor for 6 or 7 years.
On May 24th, 2022, Ms. Landry came to work at about 8:00 am and was working with Jeanna
Santellanez and Samantha Diaz.
Ms. Landry thinks that the first call regarding the crash came in at about 11:30 am and she was
in the dispatcher room at the moment.
Ms. Landry recalls taking several calls on the non-emergency lines from other agencies calling in
for the traffic and two 911 calls.
One of the 911 calls was from the assistant principal who was off campus and asking if EMS was
on the way. The second call came in from a child or female who was whispering but Ms. Landry
could not make out what was being said. It is her belief that the call came in from within the
school.
Ms. Landry believes the caller who was whispering may have said room 111. Ms. Landry then
heard another voice asking who was on the phone, who they were talking to. The other person
sounded like an adult and then the phone disconnected.
Ms. Landry learned about the child in room 112 who called in to Ms. Santellanez. The child had
said that there was a room full of victims. Ms. Landry relayed that to the officers over the radio
but did not remember being acknowledged. Ms. Landry would like to think that it came out but
is not sure. Ms. Landry does not remember hearing herself on the recordings when she listened
to them later, but she knows that she said it.
Ms. Landry did have someone who died at Robb Elementary, but she did not know about it until
after entry was made. Lexi Rubio is the daughter of Felix Rubio, who was Ms. Landry’s ex.
Ms. Landry recalls speaking to Lt. Juan Martinez regarding where the students were going to be
transported to.
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Samantha Diaz spoke to Lt. Pargas and told him about the children in the classroom. Ms. Landry
did not relay any information to any officers over the phone about children in classrooms 111
or 112. It was by radio only.
Ms. Landry was mainly dealing with the landlines during the incident and coordinating all the
agencies.
Ms. Landry stated that there were many radios on the channel and her frustration was not
knowing whether they were getting out over the radio. When the radio had an open mic, they
were unsure if they were being heard. Ms. Landry was the dispatcher trying to clear the open
mic.
Ms. Landry also stated that she would have liked to know who to direct the traffic to or who
was the main point of contact because there was no command post. Ms. Landry stated that
someone told her later that Detective Ronald Rodriguez was in charge.
Ms. Landry does have experience dealing with a command post and knows that there is a point
of contact at a command post. Ms. Landry believes Detective Rodriguez’ call sign is 833 and
recalled calling out for him. Ms. Landry recalled Officer Michael Wally (unit 321) answering and
asking what the traffic was. She then said they had a caller on the phone that said there is a
class full of victims. Ms. Landry does not recall if Officer Wally acknowledged.
Ms. Landry is familiar with the policies regarding her unit and did not witness any policy
violations. Her shift normally ends at 5 pm but knew that day she stayed late.
Ms. Landry’s suggestion for critical incidents would be to identify the command staff on scene
or chain of command / point of contact.
Ms. Landry knew that Lt. Pargas was acting chief, but it did not sound like he was the one in
charge on the scene because she did not recall hearing him or anyone else saying that they
were in the command post and giving direction to where the command post was at. Ms. Landry
felt there was no command structure there.
Ms. Landry stated that in any critical incident she would ask who is in the command post in
charge. In this case she asked and was told it was Ronald Rodriguez.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Dispatcher Samantha Diaz by outside investigator Jesse Prado
Date of interview December 6th, 2022. Length of interview 38 minutes.
Attorney Randy Lopez of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP was present for Ms. Diaz.
I played Ms. Diaz’ interviews with the Texas Rangers that were conducted soon after the events
on May 24th, 2022, to assist her recollection. The initial Ranger interview was approximately 10
minutes.
The following is a summary of Ms. Diaz’ statement which was in response to my questions:
Samantha Diaz, 33 y.o.a. is a telecommunications operator employed by the Uvalde Police
Department since July of 2019. Ms. Diaz is currently in a police academy as a cadet in the
Southwest Texas Junior College Law Enforcement academy Located in Uvalde. Ms. Diaz is
scheduled to graduate on December 17th, 2022, and will become an Uvalde Police Officer.
Ms. Diaz came into work on May 24th, 2022, at 6am and was scheduled to work until 6pm along
with her partner Jeanna Santellanez. Ms. Diaz is not from Uvalde and did not have any relatives
in the school on this date.
Ms. Diaz stated that she took an initial call regarding the crash from one of the faculty members
saying that somebody had been in a crash and had a gun. Ms. Diaz immediately put it out to the
units, and everyone was enroute. The female caller stated that shots were being fired as the
officers were pulling up. Ms. Diaz recalled that Officer Jesus Mendoza and Sgt. Coronado were
pulling up to the school.
Ms. Diaz believes she had received a call from Ms. Marin, a faculty member at the school. Ms.
Marin yelled that he was coming, and the call was disconnected.
Ms. Diaz recalled that the caller stated he was shooting at the playground and the kids were
running. Ms. Diaz did not know the shooter had a rifle because the caller said gun.
Ms. Diaz recalled that there was a teacher, Ms. Martinez, who had barricaded herself in a class.
This is when Ms. Diaz first knew there were people in classes.
Ms. Diaz also received a call from someone whispering but she could not make it out. Ms. Diaz
stated that there were no headphones used in the dispatch office because they would just hold
a telephone and she was not able to hear the whispering with the other phones constantly
ringing. Ms. Diaz would mute the call so it would not make noise on the caller’s side, but she
could still hear the caller.
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Ms. Diaz believed they were breaking out on the radio but was unsure because the officers did
not always acknowledge. Ms. Diaz knew at least one officer acknowledged when they put out
the information that there were victims.
Ms. Diaz recalled telling Lt. Pargas on the Phone that there were kids in the class after he had
called in. Ms. Diaz told Lt. Pargas about Chloe, the child that called 911 and was in 112 with
others who were alive and some deceased. Border Patrol had already patched into the radio
because they had a hot mic for a while.
Ms. Diaz also spoke to Chief Arredondo when he called in. She understood he was in the room
or next to the room where the shooter was and that he did not have a radio. Ms. Diaz told Chief
Arredondo to stay on the line as long as possible, but he whispered something that was unclear,
and the call disconnected.
Ms. Diaz spoke to Constable Zamora on the phone, who told her the shooter was deceased,
after entry was made.
During the incident Ms. Diaz did not know who was in charge of the scene. She knew that Lt.
Pargas was acting chief.
Ms. Diaz stated in her opinion that the biggest problem they had in dispatch was the radio
communication to the officers in the school because there are no repeaters in the school. Ms.
Diaz knew that the officers were trying to transmit from within the hallway, but they could not
get out on the radio. This is an issue that is known. Air life, EMS and fire were not an issue on
the radio.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Sergeant Telescoro Daniel Coronado by outside investigator Jesse
Prado
Date of interview December 10th, 2022. Length of interview 1:40.
Attorney Randy Lopez of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP was present for Sgt. Coronado.
I played Sgt. Coronado’s interviews with the Texas Rangers that were conducted soon after the
events on May 24th, 2022, to assist his recollection. The initial Ranger interview was 1 hour and
7 minutes, and the follow-up interview was 1 hour and 30 minutes. The Ranger division requested
that no offense report be written in the Uvalde Police Department report writing system and to
notate in the report that the officer’s statements were submitted to the Texas Rangers.
The following is a summary of Sgt. Coronado’s statement which was in response to my questions:
Sgt. Telescoro Daniel Coronado 44 yoa. and has worked for the Uvalde Police Department since
2005. Sgt. Coronado has about 23 years of total law enforcement. Sgt. Coronado is a member of
the Uvalde Swat Team.
On May 24th, 2022, Sgt. Coronado began his duty at 6:00 am and was scheduled until 6:00 pm.
Sgt. Coronado does have family members that attend Robb Elementary, but they are not
immediate family members. Sgt. Coronado did not know that he had family members there
until after the incident.
Sgt. Coronado started the day as normal with a morning briefing, which consisted of the night
shift incidents and preparation for their shift. Sgt. Coronado recalled working near the high
school that morning. He knew that some of the seniors were going to be at the park that day.
Seniors had a parade the day before walking through their elementary schools, to motivate the
young students. Just after midmorning Sgt. Coronado went to the Police Station to check
reports.
Sgt. Coronado did not hear the initial call for an accident but heard when shots fired was
announced. His initial thought was a road rage incident and that it was right by the school. Sgt.
Coronado jumped up and said it was by the school. Sgt. Coronado ran through the police office
hall yelling shots fired by the school to get everyone’s attention. He then ran to his department-
issued Tahoe parked in the back and noticed lieutenants and others leaving the department as
well.
As Sgt. Coronado approached Grove and Geraldine, he saw officers Juan Saucedo and Jesus
Mendoza “aka Blue,” crouched down behind their units that were in the middle of the street
facing east on Geraldine. Sgt. Coronado stopped his unit facing South and as he exited, he
heard shots being fired. Sgt. Coronado thought they were being fired upon by the subject with
the gun. Sgt. Coronado did not see the truck which was in a small ravine or drainage ditch just
south of them.
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Sgt. Coronado asked the officers where the rounds were coming from because he thought they
were being shot at since they were out of their cars. the officers knew that the worst place to
be, was in the car if being shot at. Sgt. Coronado was going to join the fight seeing that the
officers were taking cover and believing they were taking rounds. Sgt. Coronado began to look
but did not hear the whistle of the rounds going past them or the vehicles taking hits. Sgt.
Coronado had briefly seen children when he got out of his unit and there were so many rounds
being fired that he also thought the officers were engaged in a firefight, but later learned the
officers had not fired one round. Sgt. Coronado also knew the shooter had a rifle because of the
distinctive sound of the gunshots.
While Sgt. Coronado attempted to assess the situation, he heard and saw the employees at the
funeral home yelling at them from a distance. Sgt. Coronado began to tell them to get inside
when he heard them say he was running to the school or at the school. The employees had
panic in their hand gestures as they pointed to the school.
Officer Saucedo then stated that he thought he saw the shooter and requested permission to
fire. A number of things went through his mind including how can he approve the shot if he
(Sgt. Coronado) did not see the threat. Sgt. Coronado was concerned that Officer Saucedo saw
a target that did not have a clear background, in case of a missed shot and children around. It
was okay if the officers were being shot at and unable to return fire, but he did not want to risk
the life of a child. Officer Saucedo had an AR-15, Officer Mendoza and Sgt. Coronado had their
department issued Glocks.
Sgt. Coronado would later learn that it was a coach, wearing black, that Officer Saucedo saw
and aimed at, not the shooter. Sgt. Coronado believed that the shooter had already gone into
the school when Officer Saucedo saw the coach. Sgt. Coronado was relieved that he had
followed his training and did not give the order to shoot, not knowing what Officer Saucedo
was looking at.
The employees yelled that the shooter was running, and Sgt. Coronado believed that he was
running through the school to come out on Old Carrizo Rd. Sgt. Coronado then got back in his
unit to cut off the shooter in the front of the school and drove to Old Carrizo jumping the curb
and stopping his unit in the front of the school. Sgt. Coronado was going to cut off the shooter
as the other officers flanked him. Sgt. Coronado learned later on the officers had followed him.
Sgt. Coronado saw Chief Arredondo park as he was walking into the school. He and Chief
Arredondo began walking through but did not hear gunshots. Sgt. Coronado turned his Body
Worn Camera (BWC) on at this point. The cameras do not automatically turn on when they exit
the cars. The camera started as they were running west bound through the breezeway. Sgt.
Coronado noticed he saw teachers sticking their heads out of classrooms and realized they
were not supposed to do that during a lockdown, but they were also trying to say something to
him.
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Sgt. Coronado then heard a massive amount of muffled gunshots that appeared to be coming
from the building straight ahead of him which was the 4th grade building. Sgt. Coronado could
see officers near the building and yelled at the officers to get into the building. Sgt. Coronado’s
intent was to locate the shooter and eliminate him. Sgt. Coronado also notified dispatch by
radio that they had shots fired on campus.
The officers that Sgt. Coronado yelled at made entry into the south side of the building before
he and Chief Arredondo went in. Sgt. Coronado only saw the officers that went in front of him,
and the building was eerily quiet. The officers did not have trouble getting into the building and
the doors were closed but not locked. Chief Arredondo opened the door, and it closed then Sgt.
Coronado opened it to enter. Sgt. Coronado had slowed down just prior to entering as he was
on the radio.
The officers did not know where the shooter was and began approaching checking doors. Sgt.
Coronado was covering the area behind them as well. As the officers approached the doors
(room 111 and 112) they began receiving gun fire. Sgt. Coronado knew that Chief Arredondo,
Staff Sgt. Canales, Sgt. Page and later learned ISD Officer Adrian Gonzales were in front of him.
The officers were approaching from both the north and the south side of the hall.
Sgt. Coronado did not see the officers checking doors but was not sure if they did it before he
walked in. The shots were a volley of rounds. He remembered Lt. Javier Martinez grabbing the
back of his head. Sgt. Coronado does not recall who asked Lt. Martinez if he was hit. Sgt.
Coronado hears that the shooter is right inside a door. Sgt. Coronado then needed to let people
arriving know but could not transmit or break on the radio because there was no signal. He
then went out of the building and got on the radio.
Sgt. Coronado could smell the gun smoke but did not see or hear kids. He did not see blood or
signs of anyone there. He saw bullet holes in the walls and casings on the ground.
Sgt. Coronado knew that communication was important and began to relay outside the
building. Officer Gonzales had also come out. During this time is when one of the school
officers stated it was an office and that is what Sgt. Coronado relayed but he believed it was a
classroom.
Sgt. Coronado did not know that there were children in the classroom. He did learn that it was
Ms. Mireles’ class and believes that ISD Officer Gonzales told him. Sgt. Coronado was close with
Eva Mireles and Officer Ruiz. He went to school with Officer Ruiz. There was no indication that
she was in there. Sgt. Coronado was suspicious that there were children in the rooms and then
told one of the officers that they needed to try and get into some of the other classes to see if
there were children in the other classes.
Sgt. Page then checked one of the classes on the south side of the building and came running
outside after he discovered children in a classroom. They then began to evacuate the children
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through the windows. Sgt. Coronado then realized that there were children in the classrooms.
Sgt. Coronado also noticed that none of the children coming out had been injured or shot.
Sgt. Coronado went to the active shooter training when he was a patrolman about 11 or 12
years before this incident. He recalled the training with DPS in Del Rio. Sgt. Coronado knew
from training that the class should be hiding out of sight and the doors were supposed to be
locked, but nothing was going right on this day. Sgt. Coronado recalled telling Chief Arredondo
how impressed he was with how the children were hiding so well, knowing the situation, and
staying quiet.
Sgt. Coronado recalled hearing an open mic as the children were being evacuated and an agent
with the open mic was asking a child if they were shot. He also recalled hearing that a person
had been shot in the face on a different street which added to the confusion for him. Sgt.
Coronado knew that they had to get inside the room to the shooter, but they needed to find
the keys to get inside and that was up to Chief Arredondo.
Sgt. Coronado believed that while Chief Arredondo was trying to get the keys to make entry,
Sgt. Coronado’s mindset was to evacuate all the students to avoid any injuries prior to a gun
battle that he believed was going to happen. But the belief was that the door was locked.
Sgt. Coronado knew all the doors should be locked and the doors that he had seen that were
tried were locked. Sgt. Coronado stated that his body cam showed attempts to open locked
doors with a knife, but the knife did not work. Sgt. Coronado also saw two doors unlocked, but
it was believed that the doors to 111 and 112 were locked.
Sgt. Coronado requested shields, a halogen tool, flashbangs, mirrors, and anything to breach an
outward facing locked door. Sgt. Coronado also knew that the only shields they had were rated
for pistols and not rifles. Sgt. Coronado also knew that rifle rounds would penetrate their vests.
Sgt. Coronado knew that the officers were going to go down the hallway and get in front of the
door that the suspect had just shot through to hit them. Sgt. Coronado believed that the keys
would be better than trying to force the door open with a sledgehammer and halogen tool.
Sgt. Coronado had never breached a door before and was not a breacher on the SWAT team.
Sgt. Coronado knew that a ram would not work on the door because it came out. He had known
that some SWAT teams use a shotgun to breach doors but that was not an option here. He
believed that prying the door or using the key was the only way to get in because he firmly
believed the door was locked.
Sgt. Coronado’s belief that the door was locked came from a combination of encountering
locked doors, officers asking for the keys, and the fact that doors are supposed to be locked. If
the officers approached the door they had to be prepared to get past a locked door.
Sgt. Coronado went through a forty-hour SWAT school through Charlie Mike about 6 to 8 years
ago with people from all over the region. He attended the class with Greg Villa. They never had
any live fire SWAT training.
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Sgt. Coronado also went through the intermediate SWAT school in Uvalde too. Sgt. Coronado
recalled training covering someone shooting in a room but not how to breach a school door.
Sgt. Coronado has breached houses with barricaded subjects before but never had to deal with
a door that swings out.
Sgt. Coronado only helped evacuate the children and teachers on the west side of the building,
not the east side. Many different agencies were present when they were evacuating.
After the children were evacuated Sgt. Coronado went into the hall and saw a hold-up but
UCISD Lt. Juan Hernandez was frantically going through keys trying to find the master. Sgt.
Coronado then tried to open a locked door with a knife. Sgt. Coronado had found an unlocked
door that did not have children.
Sgt. Coronado also recalled four gunshots while they were waiting and knew that BORTAC was
going to make the entry. Chief Arredondo said they were going to make an entry and soon
thereafter the entry was made.
Sgt. Coronado saw children coming out of one of the classes and then went into the classroom
after the entry and saw the suspect down at the closet to room 111.
(Sgt. Coronado described the scene in the class to me.)
Sgt. Coronado recalled a phone call and then someone told him that it was Ms. Mireles’ class,
and it was supposed to be in session. Sgt. Coronado only recalled a few phone calls; one of
them was from the school district and he did not have time to talk. The other call he received
was from his daughter but after the entry was made.
Sgt. Coronado knew that the ranking officer was Chief Arredondo, and believed he was also
part of the contact team, but Sgt. Coronado knew that he was in charge in that hallway. Chief
Arredondo never left the hallway and Sgt. Coronado did not go to the north side of the hallway.
Sgt. Coronado did not think that Chief Arredondo could be in charge of the whole operation
with so many agencies there, mainly DPS.
Sgt. Coronado did not know there were children in the classes until the entry was made.
Sgt. Coronado stated that he believed that before they initially entered the hallway all the
children and teachers were shot in 111 and 112.
Sgt. Coronado stated that he knew I did not listen to the news about Uvalde during this case
but some of the things they are being accused of is that they stood by while kids were dying
and begging for help, and they did nothing. Sgt. Coronado stated they never heard anything
including music that had supposedly been played. Sgt. Coronado did not witness any policy
violations and does not believe anyone violated policy.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Staff Sergeant Edwardo Canales by outside investigator Jesse Prado
Attorney Randy Lopez of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP was present for SSgt. Canales.
I played SSgt. Canales’s interviews with the Texas Rangers that were conducted soon after the
events on May 24th, 2022, to assist his recollection. The initial Ranger interview was 36 minutes,
and two follow-up interviews were 42 minutes total. The Ranger division requested that no
offense report be written in the Uvalde Police Department report writing system and to notate
in the report that the officer’s statements were submitted to the Texas Rangers.
The following is a summary of SSgt. Canales’s statement which was in response to my questions:
Eduardo Perez Canales is 39 years old. SSgt. Canales has over 16 years with the Uvalde Police
Department. SSgt. Canales is from Uvalde. SSgt. Canales has been through Charlie and Mike
Swat School and was appointed Swat Commander in 2019.
SSgt. Canales had a child in the fourth-grade present in the building on May 24th, 2022, the day
the shooting occurred. His child was in Ms. Martinez's classroom. This classroom was on the
same side of the hall as room 111 and 112 and was on the south end of the hall. Ms. Martinez
was not working that day and the room had a substitute teacher.
SSgt. Canales did not know what room his child was in during the time of the shooting; he just
knew his child was in the building. SSgt Canales learned that it was in Ms. Mireles class while he
was there. SSgt. Canales has never been in the fourth-grade building and has never been in his
child’s class.
SSgt. Canales was on duty that day at 8 am to 810 am SSgt. Canales was in a Uvalde patrol
uniform. SSgt. Canales has a take home truck that is provided by the U.S. Marshall service as
part of the task force. It is a lease vehicle. SSgt. Canales had his AR-15 in a lockbox in the truck
and was wearing his Glock .40 caliber on his hip. As Staff Sergeant he is in charge of the videos
and body cams for patrol. He schedules officers for security jobs and extra duty jobs or
overtime like parades. The detectives file the felonies and SSgt. Canales oversees the
misdemeanors.
SSgt. Canales volunteered for the Task Force job when the Marshals were looking for a
detective that could handle surveillance and help them locate people in the area. On the day of
the incident, his body camera was not fully charged and did not last that long.
SSgt. Canales was working in his office that morning and at about 1130am heard someone
running through the hall and said, “shots fired on Geraldine street”. He then grabbed his radio
and ran to his truck then left. He recalled Lt. Pargas in front of him. SSgt. Canales heard on the
radio that the guy was running towards the school. SSgt. Canales then called his wife and asked
which building their child was in. She said it was the last building in the back. SSgt. Canales was
in a train of police units until they arrived at Robb Elementary.
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SSgt. Canales saw Lt. Pargas, who told him shots were being fired in the direction of the school
building. SSgt. Canales then got his AR out with extra magazines. He had parked on Geraldine
with other police cars.
SSgt. Canales could hear the shooting. He went around the officers and could hear people
yelling that the guy was near the school. SSgt. Canales took his AR-15 then met Lt. Javier
Martinez who had a vest on while they moved to the building. SSgt. Canales saw a backpack on
the ground that looked like it was full. The backpack was in a grassy area near the building. He
then heard a couple more muffled shots.
SSgt. Canales and Lt. Martinez went into the building through the unlocked, northwest door
and saw the smoke that appeared to be sheetrock. SSgt. Canales did not see the .223 casings
but heard that Sgt. Page saw the casings. He did not recall if he opened it or Lt. Martinez. SSgt.
Canales did not know what room his child was in, but his child later told him that bullets had
gone through his classroom when they spoke, after it was over.
SSgt. Canales at the time was not thinking of his child but they lined up near the door to 111
and 112. There was no noise, just complete silence. SSgt. Canales was with Lt. Javier Martinez
approaching door 112 while Sgt. Page was closer to 111. UCISD Officer Gonzales was further
back on Sgt. Page’s side, with Chief Arredondo and Sgt. Coronado. SSgt. Canales said there were
more people behind him and Lt. Martinez. The sheet rock smoke led them to the door and the
door was damaged. The radio repeater was not working, and they could not transmit. SSgt.
Canales does not recall what the door to 112 looked like damage wise.
SSgt. Canales saw that Lt. Martinez had placed his body in the view of the door and told him to
be careful. At that moment, the shooter fired four shots from 111.
SSgt. Canales stated that Chief Rodriguez had appointed him Swat Commander but there has
not been much training since covid. They do not have the proper equipment and many of the
items they have have expired. None of the officers are certified in less lethal. They have a few
expired flash bangs, and no one is certified in them. There is no budget to properly train or
equip the SWAT unit. They had done a raffle that made 3000.00 for BDUs. They had their first
training meeting in 2019 then they set up training with a few agencies including BORTAC. Covid
then came and training slowed. Just recently when Covid started slowing down SSgt. Canales
sent emails to begin training again.
Although they did have a SWAT unit they were not trained and not certified in many of the
different weapons. They did have some training in basic entries. Their last training was in April
2021. SSgt. Canales does have about 120 hours of SWAT training with Charlie and Mike.
SSgt. Canales did not take an ALERRT training but did take an active shooter training. Officer
Ruben Ruiz and Officer Adrian Gonzales were the ones that instructed the active shooter class a
few months prior to the shooting. It was an eight-hour course that SSgt. Canales did attend.
SSgt. Canales recalled the training but most of the scenarios were in open areas.
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SSgt. Canales stated that they entered the structure immediately at Robb Elementary. They
were caught up at the room while being shot at.
The entry team did not consist of all BORTAC but included a Zavala County Deputy Joe Vasquez
and Uvalde County Deputy Joaquin Ybarra.
After entry was made SSgt. Canales did go into the rooms but did not see anyone alive.
SSgt. Canales did not encounter any unlocked doors and knew that at one point they were
looking for keys to make entry. SSgt. Canales recalled that the rounds fired by the shooter were
easily going through walls and while lined up knew that if the shooter opened fire they would
be shot through the walls. BORTAC did open a closet door but not a classroom door with a key.
SSgt. Canales recalled the BORTAC commander opening the door to 111 with a key then
accidentally letting the door go with the keys hanging on the door. The BORTAC Commander
caught the door before it shut and made entry. SSgt. Canales believes one of the officers was
shot and saw him limping.
SSgt. Canales had been at the school about 45 minutes before this incident began because his
fourth-grade child received an award in the cafeteria. SSgt. Canales was on an escort and
received permission from Lt. Pargas to go to the ceremony. SSgt. Canales knew the ceremony
and many of the students and teachers were in the cafeteria. The building was so quiet his first
thought was that they were still at the ceremony or that no one was in the building.
After the entry was made by BORTAC, SSgt. Canales saw the body of the shooter who was at
the doorway to the closet in room 111 and had no doubt he was “camping” or waiting on
officers to enter the doorway (fatal funnel) to shoot them from a tactical advantage. The
classroom was dark, and the hallway was lit which meant the shooter could see out and the
officers could not see in. SSgt. Canales never thought that children would be there hiding in the
dark and not yelling and screaming.
SSgt. Canales believes that if the doors were locked, they would have encountered the shooter
in the hallway or outside the building.
SSgt. Canales was told by his child that they had a substitute teacher that did not have keys to
lock the door to their classroom and that their door was unlocked throughout the entire time.
Substitute teachers do not lock doors. Sgt. Canales believes that even if the substitute teacher
could not lock her door, the exterior doors should have been locked. SSgt. Canales knows that
the children and teachers followed their training.
SSgt. Canales saw that Chief Arredondo was on the phone a lot during the incident and also saw
Constable Field on the phone. SSgt. Canales later learned that they were in communication with
each other.
SSgt. Canales was not sure who was in command but saw Chief Arredondo giving hand signals
to the officers on the other side of the hallway. When BORTAC arrived, they were planning for
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the entry and taking the lead. SSgt. Canales felt that it did take them a while to produce an
entry plan. BORTAC trains for this frequently.
SSgt. Canales did call his task force group with the Marshalls and asked for the rifle shields
which were brought in later and used in the entry. SSgt. Canales later learned that BORTAC did
not have rifle shields issued to them.
SSgt. Canales saw his body cam video of the incident and noted that UCISD Officer Ruben Ruiz
stated it was his wife’s classroom. SSgt. Canales stated he did not remember this at the time
but had just been shot at and hit by the shrapnel. Officer Ruiz is a close friend of SSgt. Canales.
SSgt. Canales saw Officer Ruiz standing over his wife, (being treated), SSgt. Canales then pulled
Officer Ruiz away and began talking to him. Officer Ruiz told SSgt. Canales said that it was his
wife’s classroom and that she had called him and told him that there was someone shooting
and that he told her to lock the door. Ms. Mireles said the door should be locked because she
locked it.
SSgt. Canales knows that Officer Ruiz told him that it was his wife’s classroom but only saw it on
his body cam afterwards and stated he did not recall it just after being shot.
SSgt. Canales never knew that there was anyone in the room. Upon review of videos, he
learned that Officer Dorflinger brought in gas and said there were kids but SSgt. Canales did not
hear that. SSgt. Canales did recall hearing in the hallway that Chief Arredondo was in the room
with the shooter, but it was confusing because SSgt. Canales had just seen him in the hallway.
SSgt. Canales felt there was a lot of confusion.
SSgt. Canales was not getting radio transmissions that he heard upon review of the videos.
Sgt. Canales believes they were within UPD policy after reviewing the videos. While they waited
for the drone and prepared for gas he thought of his child and called his wife. She stated that
their child had escaped through a window and was inside of a house nearby. It was the only
interaction SSgt. Canales talked with anyone about his own child who was in the same hallway.
SSgt. Canales knew that his child was within close proximity to the shooter, but also learned
that a Deputy in the hallway had a child in the class as well as it being Officer Ruiz’ wife, in the
class who he was friends with as well. SSgt. Canales stated that Officer Ruiz is one of his best
friends.
SSgt. Canales never thought about whether the door was locked or not. The Rangers asked him
why he did not check the door, but everything happened so fast. He stated that there had been
many scenarios, since then, that go through his head. During the incident he did not think of
how the shooter got in. SSgt. Canales says people hear this all the time but never think it will
happen to you. (active shooter)
SSgt. Canales knew they had to get into the room. They did not know if kids were in there. But
the main question was how they were going to do it with him shooting at the door. Trooper
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Maldonado told him that troopers were on the way. SSgt. Canales did not know if that was
going to make a difference because they still had to figure out a way to get in. SSgt. Canales
knew the gravity of the situation, but he could not figure out how they would do it. His thought
process was not working. He realized after that he may have been in some state of shock after
being shot at and hit. He also did not know how serious his wound was but was never out of the
fight.
Once a plan was formulated to breach the door to 111, SSgt. Canales placed himself in the
stack. Sgt. Canales was surprised to learn that it took 77 minutes, but it felt to him like 20
minutes at the most. He never kept up with the times.
SSgt. Canales believed that the shooter had his weapon aimed at the door and they could not
make entry to eliminate the threat without the shields. SSgt. Canales felt without the shields
they would not be able to live attempting to enter and would not be able to help. Not hearing
anyone crying or any noise coming from the room still left doubt that anyone was in there at
the time of the initial approach. They did not smell the blood or hear anyone.
SSgt. Canales would have rather written a report instead of giving an audio report only because
he is more detailed in his written report and is afraid, he will forget something later.
SSgt. Canales agreed that by being quiet with lights off, the class was following their training.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Lieutenant Javier Martinez by outside investigator Jesse Prado
Attorney Randy Lopez of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP was present for Lt. Martinez.
I played Lt. Martinez’ interviews with the Texas Rangers that were conducted soon after the
events on May 24th, 2022, to assist his recollection. The initial Ranger interview was 47 minutes,
and two follow-up interviews were 44 minutes. The Ranger division requested that no offense
report be written in the Uvalde Police Department report writing system and to notate in the
report that the officer’s statements were submitted to the Texas Rangers.
The following is a summary of Lt. Martinez’ statement which was in response to my questions:
Lieutenant Javier Martinez was born in 1969 and has been with the Uvalde Police Department
for approximately 28 years with a total of 29 years of Law Enforcement experience. He is the
Lieutenant of operations, handling training, internal affairs, animal control and Sgt. Page is under
his command. Lt. Martinez did not have any family members attending Robb Elementary.
Lt. Martinez reports to work in plain clothes ( not in uniform) and works 8am to 5pm.
Lt. Martinez rested well the night of May 23rd, 2022. Lt. Martinez recalled being in the office the
morning of May 24th, 2022, when he saw people moving and running in the hallway. Someone
stated it was an accident with shots fired. Lt. Martinez recalled grabbing his keys and going out
the door. Lt. Martinez did not have a handheld radio because he had to give it to patrol who had
too many radios not working.
Lt. Martinez had never been in the hallway before. He has an AR-15 issued to him but did not
take it with him. Lt. Martinez was carrying his department issued Glock .40 caliber pistol. Lt.
Martinez got in his city owned car, an Avenger, and drove to Grove at Geraldine.
Lt. Martinez did not see the car crash site and did not see any police cars but did see people
pointing to the school from the funeral home and yelling that he was in the school. Lt. Martinez
then retrieved his vest from the trunk of the car and while putting it on, heard SSgt. Canales near
him. Det. Lualemaga was nearby but Lt. Martinez does not remember seeing him.
Lt. Martinez then remembers running to the Northwest door of the 4 th Grade wing. He and SSgt.
Canales then heard gunshots and ran right into the, unlocked but closed, Northwest door. The
shots were muffled, and they thought they were coming from this wing. Lt. Martinez saw the
smoke in the area of room 111 and 112. The .223 bullet casings were on the ground in the
hallway.
Lt. Martinez recalled staying close to the wall approaching the rooms near the smoke then
stopped at the corner of the vestibule. Lt. Martinez did not know the room number at the time
but now knows he was closer to room 112. Lt. Martinez described the vestibule or space in the
area of the doors that open outward. Lt. Martinez had not crossed the door to 112 and began
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looking into the room through the small window on the door to room 111. Sgt. Page and Chief
Arredondo were on the other side of the vestibule and could most likely only see into the window
at room 112. The room was dark, and Lt. Martinez could not see in. Lt. Martinez thinks it could
have been over 10 seconds that he was there and after looking at a video he thinks it was longer,
closer to 20 seconds.
Lt. Martinez has been to active shooter training. Lt. Martinez believes the teachers are trained to
turn off lights and move the children to the side (away from the door). Lt. Martinez knew that
the school doors should be locked. He recalled learning this in ALERT training. Lt. Martinez, who
was approximately 4 to 6 feet away from the door handle to room 111, then began to take fire
from inside the room through the door and wall. Lt. Martinez then turned to take cover and was
struck in the head.
After the incident Lt. Martinez went to the doctor and learned that it was shrapnel, but the doctor
was not able to get the pieces out and it remains logged in his head today. Lt. Martinez was also
struck in the arm and did not know until he got home. This piece of shrapnel did eventually pop
out and Lt. Martinez has possession of the piece.
Lt. Martinez recalled being told to get checked but just found out that Lt. Pargas and Fire Marshal
Hernandez were the ones telling him to get checked because he did not recall this at the time. At
one time Lt. Martinez was the SWAT commander for about 2 and a half years. Lt. Martinez took
the basic and advanced SWAT training in town from Charlie Mike enterprises.
Lt. Martinez at his first approach planned on shooting the subject to take him out, but needed to
see him first and did not want to get in the line of fire while looking for the subject. Lt. Martinez
knew he was in one of the two rooms and was not going to go in exposing himself without
knowing where the subject was. Lt. Martinez did not know at the time that the rooms were
adjoining and did not hear any noise. He had only seen law enforcement at the school.
After the volley of shots, Lt. Martinez remembered going to the T-intersection and being told he
was injured. He then went back towards the classes. Lt. Martinez was told he went back towards
the door more than once after being shot but only recalls trying to look in once more but
expecting the shooter to come out of the door. No one approached him the time that he recalled
after being shot. He was hoping someone was with him but was not expecting anyone. He just
did not know. Lt. Martinez does not recall who was in the hallway at the time he made the second
approach. Lt. Martinez did not know how they would be able to approach the area of the door
without a rifle shield.
Lt. Martinez recalled bleeding from the back of the head and being told he was injured and
needed to go to EMS. Lt. Martinez recalled going out to get checked by EMS and passing his friend
Ranger Kendall in the area just outside the Northwest doors. Lt. Martinez recalled Ranger Kendall
yelling at him that AR was three away but Lt. Martinez just repeated AR not sure what was meant.
(note: Ranger Kendal may have said AR or .308? based on an interview with Sgt. Page on what
was needed in the hallway)
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After EMS went through a quick examination Lt. Martinez went back to the hallway through the
same northwest doors. He did not see Ranger Kendall when he returned. Lt. Martinez recalled
officers trying to get the teacher in the first door from the northwest door on the northside to
open the door. Lt. Martinez identified himself and this is when a female teacher came out and
ran. There were no children in the class.
Lt. Martinez recalled seeing Constable Field, Constable Zamora, JJ Suarez. Lt. Martinez thought
there were plenty of officers on the T-intersection side and then decided to go to the south side
of the hall through the exterior of the building. He then saw a DPS investigator Valenzuela, ex
Uvalde Police, looking at a backpack on the ground that belonged to the shooter. The DPS
investigator then located numerous magazines in the backpack.
Lt. Martinez then went towards the southside door and met with Sgt. Page who handed him an
AR-15. Lt. Martinez entered the building and recalled seeing Officer Greg Villa, Chief Arredondo,
Det. Landry, and Sgt. Coronado. Soon after he arrived to the southside, Lt. Martinez overheard
someone say they needed to get the kids out.
Lt. Martinez then saw the children and went outside. Sgt. Coronado was having trouble breaking
glass with his ASP. Lt. Martinez then took the ASP from Sgt. Coronado and began breaking and
raking the windows. Lt. Martinez does not recall everything he did while removing the children
but believes he only broke and raked windows.
Lt. Martinez did not recall when he knew there were children in the building. When he initially
approached the doors Lt. Martinez knew there was someone in there with a rifle and he did not
want to expose himself without a shield, to a rifle. Lt. Martinez also knew the shields that the
UPD had were not effective in this scenario. Lt. Martinez believed they were waiting on an
appropriately rated rifle shield.
Lt. Martinez does not recall anyone speaking of tactics to go into the room and did not know who
was bringing them. He recalled that BORTAC was enroute and DPS had people coming.
After the children were evacuated Lt. Martinez went back into the south side of the hall and
waited for BORTAC to arrive with the shield, while covering the room. Lt. Martinez believed he
overheard this from other officers talking but did not recall because everyone was whispering.
Lt. Martinez believed that the radios were being turned down also to keep quiet. He then learned
that BORTAC was there and to stack up for entry. There were 4 people in front of Lt. Martinez to
breach and enter. Lt. Martinez learned later that the person holding a shield on their side only
had a pistol-rated shield. The other stack was on the Northside of the hall, and they are the ones
that made entry first.
Lt. Martinez believed the door was locked, especially when they were looking for the guy with
the key. Lt. Martinez also believes that the volley of shots at the officers were not the last shots
fired but did not recall for sure. Lt. Martinez only recalled Officer Villa and Officer Landry in the
stack from UPD on the south side.
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Once entry was made Lt. Martinez team went into room 112 but the shooter was down. He does
not recall how they got into room 112.
(Lt. Martinez described the scene in the classroom at this point. He also described the shooter
down at the closet facing west.)
Lt. Martinez had recently heard the term camping and believes that is what the shooter was doing
from 12 to 14 feet away in the dark. Lt. Martinez frequently thinks about how he got spotted at
the door initially and believes that the shooter looking from the dark room to the lighted hall saw
them.
Lt. Martinez was told to leave the rooms for EMTs.
Lt. Martinez recalled the officers not able to break or contact dispatched from within the hall. Lt.
Martinez first heard of a key being requested when he got to the southside after receiving
treatment by EMS.
Lt. Martinez went over the entry into the door and reiterated that his belief was that there was
no other way of getting into that room without a rifle rated shield. His only thought was how they
were going to get into the room. He did remember hearing Officer Ruiz state that his wife was
shot.
Lt. Martinez believed that Chief Arredondo was in charge because he was the police chief over
the schools and was in the hallway with them. Lt. Martinez did not feel that he would have had
to get Chief Arredondo’s permission to make entry though and never asked anything of Chief
Arredondo. Chief Arredondo was not needed for the tactical decisions.
Lt. Martinez believes that policies were followed and did not witness anyone in violation of UPD
policy.
Lt. Martinez knew the active shooter policy and said that he stayed engaged the entire time and
did not know what was going on outside.
Lt. Martinez was frustrated about not being able to recall some answers to questions but
recognized it may have been the adrenalin rush and the stress of the incident.
Lt. Martinez remembered that Sgt. Page came to him while he was praying over a child, and asked
if he could go check on his daughter who was in the school as well.
Lt. Martinez recalled being consoled by other officers when he saw troopers and officers running,
then learned about the threat at the High School. A police chief “Homer” was calming Lt. Martinez
down in Lt. Martinez’ car when the call came out about the High school. Chief “Homer” tried to
get Lt. Martinez to stay but Lt. Martinez began driving to the school then learned it was a false
alarm. Lt. Martinez began focusing on his own daughter who attends High School.
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Lt. Martinez and Sgt. Page then went to the High School and checked his daughter out to take
her home. Sgt. Page had Lt. Martinez go to his doctor’s office, but his doctor could not care for
his wound and told him to go to the hospital.
Lt. Martinez's wife works in the emergency department, and he was taken in for treatment. Lt.
Martinez then went back to the police department but does not recall much about it after the
hospital visit.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Officer Jesus Mendoza by outside investigator Jesse Prado
Attorney Randy Lopez of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Attorney Analisa Longoria with
CLEAT and Attorney Carl Brehm staff attorney were present for Officer Mendoza.
I played Officer Mendoza’s interviews with the Texas Rangers that were conducted soon after
the events on May 24th, 2022, to assist his recollection. The initial Ranger interview was 41
minutes. The Ranger division requested that no offense report be written in the Uvalde Police
Department report writing system and to notate in the report that the officer’s statements were
submitted to the Texas Rangers.
The following is a summary of Officer Mendoza’s statement which was in response to my
questions:
Jesus Ramon Mendoza was born in 1994 and is a police officer assigned to patrol and has about
three years of experience. Officer Mendoza was working day shift on May 24 th and had begun his
tour of duty at 6am and was scheduled to get off duty at 6pm. Officer Mendoza worked the day
before. Officer Mendoza was wearing his department issued patrol uniform with his vest under
his shirt. He also was carrying his department issued Glock .40 cal. pistol. Officer Mendoza does
have an AR-15 issued to him but did not have it that day as he had left it at the police department.
Officer Mendoza does not have any relatives that were attending Robb Elementary. He learned
later that day that his wife had a nephew that attended but it was not known to Officer Mendoza.
Officer Mendoza said that they do not have take home vehicles and have to load the AR-15 into
the car at the beginning of their shift. They unload the AR-15 at the end of the shift. He does not
know why he did not take it from his locker into his unit that day. He did not recall if there were
calls that caused him to forget the rifle when he showed up to work. He recalled a call where a
fugitive was running through yards that morning. Officer Mendoza recalled that Officer Saucedo
took the fugitive to jail.
Officer Mendoza was coming from the jail and was near the police department when the call of
the crash came out. He did not stop at the P.D.
Officer Mendoza responded with code 3 (lights and siren). He arrived at Geraldine from Evans
and stopped his car on Geraldine. Officer Mendoza did not see the crash site.
Officer Mendoza heard shots being fired as he was arriving and believed the shots were directed
at him. Officer Mendoza had exited his vehicle as he was the first unit on scene. The shots
sounded close, and he recognized that it was a rifle not a pistol.
Officer Mendoza explained that the call came out for the 700 Block of Old Carrizo and stated he
was running towards the school and would exit the back of the school. Officer Saucedo arrived
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and parked his car in front of Officer Mendoza’s unit to cover for him. Sgt. Coronado showed up
soon after.
Sgt. Coronado then drove to Old Carrizo and Officer Mendoza then drove to Old Carrizo following
Sgt. Coronado. Officer Mendoza teamed up with Officer Justin Mendoza and recalled hearing
that they needed a perimeter for crowd control. They set up in front of the school. Officer Jesus
Mendoza then recalled hearing Sgt. Coronado broadcast that shots were fired in the building but
did not say which building. They waited and did not see a suspect come out of the campus and
moved into the school property through the exterior halls towards the West. Officer Mendoza
had not heard any other shots.
They proceeded as a team until they saw officers and DPS near the 4 th grade building. They
formed a stack on the Northeast side of the building. Officer Mendoza recalled the people in the
stack were Constable Zamora, Constable Field, an instructor Beto Diaz, and JJ Suarez. They then
entered the building. Officer Mendoza was the last person in the stack and held the exterior door
open for the team. He does not know how it was opened.
Officer Mendoza did attend the active shooter training sponsored by the UCISD Police several
months prior to this date. Lt. Mike Hernandez of the UCISD had invited Officer Mendoza to the
training. Officer Mendoza stated that the training was not like ALERRT training, but he had never
been sent to training by the PD before. Officer Mendoza attended the training on his own time
because of the invitation from the Lieutenant. They watched videos and ate. They debriefed
other school shootings in the training. They then had some scenarios in the auditorium but never
encountered locked doors. Officer Mendoza did learn what the teachers were supposed to do
and already knew because his wife is a teacher.
Officer Mendoza’s understanding from the school police was that every door should be locked,
and it was taught in training. The classes are to be quiet, move away from the door, they will not
open the door even to the police unless they put a badge under the door. The lights should be
off too.
Officer Mendoza was told to hold by the Northeast door because there were many officers in the
hallway. Someone from the hallway requested a rifle inside because they did not have enough.
Officer Mendoza then told Officer Justin Mendoza who went in. Officer Mendoza later acquired
another AR-15 from an officer Saucedo, outside, to give to Corporal Greg Villa. Everyone with
UPD is issued an AR-15.
Officer Mendoza did go into the building with the rifle for Corporal Villa.
Officer Mendoza also recalled someone on the radio saying the subject was contained.
Officer Mendoza and several other officers began to clear classrooms. They had not encountered
any children, which made him believe there may not be children in the building. Officer Mendoza
believes they cleared 4 to 6 rooms. A teacher was located in a classroom and a little boy was in
the restroom. They were located by other officers in his search group. The classrooms he helped
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clear were all on the east side of the T-intersection. Officer Mendoza does not recall any rooms
locked except for the one the teacher was in. The unlocked classes did not have anyone inside.
Once they were done clearing rooms, he heard several rounds fired. Someone in the hall said he
was not actively shooting right after the shots were fired. Officer Mendoza took it as a standby
notice. Officers had begun to stack, and Officer Mendoza placed himself in a third stack in the
hallway. Someone requested drones and this made him believe that another agency was taking
over. Officer Mendoza’s radio was not working in the building. One of the BORTAC agents told
Officer Mendoza not to allow anyone else into the area of the stack.
Officer Mendoza was then asked to begin clearing the streets of patrol cars because they were
blocking EMS.
Officer Mendoza felt that the other agencies were taking over the entry. Once entry was made
and the shooter was down, Officer Mendoza went back into the hallway for a short period.
Officer Mendoza described interactions with EMS which made him believe there were casualties.
(Officer Mendoza then explained to me what he witnessed while in the hallway.) Officer Mendoza
was sent to the EMS unit to retrieve the stretcher for Officer Ruiz 'wife, who was receiving
medical help.
Officer Mendoza then worked crowd control and even assisted in clearing some classes in the
front of the school.
Officer Mendoza heard the call to the high school and drove to that school. He and Officer Chapa
arrived at the school, then banged on the door until a custodian opened it. Both Officers began
to clear the school. It was determined that there was no threat at the high school.
From the high school they went to the Civic Center to help with security there.
Officer Mendoza recalled that there was confusion on information that Chief Arredondo was with
the shooter in the class. Officer Mendoza also saw problems with how they were supposed to
get into a locked classroom without training on breaching.
Officer Mendoza felt that he did not remember some of the facts while speaking to the Rangers
and was not in chronological order with them.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Detective Renato Lualemaga by outside investigator Jesse Prado
CLEAT.
I played Det. Lualemaga’s interviews with the Texas Rangers that were conducted soon after the
events on May 24th, 2022, to assist his recollection. The initial Ranger interview was 31 minutes.
to the Texas Rangers. There was a follow-up interview that was conducted by the Rangers that I
did not have access to allow Det. Lualemaga to listen to.
Attorney Randy Lopez gave a statement for Det. Rodriguez prior questioning that Det. Rodriguez
would participate in this interview contingent upon the ability to return once I am able to obtain
the second Ranger statement, to help refresh his memory.
The following is a summary of Det. Lualemaga’s statement which was in response to my
questions:
Renato Russell Lualemaga was born in 1991. Det. Lualemaga has been employed by the Uvalde
Police Department since December 2013 and was promoted to Detective in January of 2019. He
has a total of 9 years of experience.
Det. Lualemaga is responsible for general investigations assigned to him. The Uvalde Police
Department does not have specialized detectives for different types of cases. They have five
detectives within his division and one supervisor, who was Lt. Mariano Pargas at the time. Sgt.
Page has been acting supervisor since Lt. Pargas resigned. Det. Lualemaga is assigned a take-
home vehicle that is a Ford Fusion.
Det. Lualemaga has never been to SWAT schools but has been to active shooter training through
Charlie Mike Enterprises.
On May 24th, 2022, his normal work hours were 8:00 am to 5:00 pm. Det. Lualemaga does not
drink and did feel as if he showed up to work rested and alert.
Det. Lualemaga was at his desk when he heard that there were shots fired. He did not recall the
time but saw someone run by his office. Det. Lualemaga then ran out of the building to respond
to the call with Det. Louis Landry after putting on his vest. Det. Landry is a close friend, and they
normally partner up. They responded in an unmarked unit equipped with emergency lights.
Det. Lualemaga had his department issued Glock 22. Det. Lualemaga recalled preparing Det.
Landry’s rifle by putting a magazine in the weapon. They drove to Geraldine and Perez then
parked in the bus area. Det. Lualemaga does not recall the radio traffic while enroute to the
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scene. Det. Lualemaga believed he heard gunshots from the parking lot at the police department
before leaving.
Upon exiting the vehicle, he heard people yelling that the subject had gone into the school. Lt.
Javier Martinez had pulled up and was putting on his vest. The three officers waited together at
the back of Lt. Martinez 'unit. Lt. Martinez did not put his vest on properly, but they began to
move towards the school.
Upon approaching the building, they could hear muffled gunshots coming from inside the
building (4th grade wing). Det. Lualemaga only recalled the three of them approaching the
building but later learned that Officer Ventura Chapa was there as well. Det. Lualemaga also
learned that other officers were nearby like SSgt. Canales but did not recall them at the time.
The officers made entry into the building through the unlocked, but closed, northwest door that
opens outward. The shots had stopped as they entered the building.
Det. Lualemaga described the initial approach from the T-intersection and later realized that he
had not remained in line with Lt. Martinez and SSgt. Canales.
Det. Lualemaga stated “So like I said in my mind I thought I was right behind them, in my mind,
I I know or in my mind I felt like I was behind them, but I know that I wasn't and that's how it
was then that's how I still feel I in my mind I feel like I was right behind them, but I know that I
wasn't right behind them.”
Det. Lualemaga remained near the T-intersection area as the approach was made by Lt.
Martinez, SSgt. Canales and Det. Landry.
Det. Lualemaga expressed that the scene had been difficult to mentally process and did not
recall many details but remembered that the shots were fired at the officers who then came
back to the T-intersection. Lt. Martinez was bleeding from his head and SSgt. Canales was
bleeding from his ear.
Det. Lualemaga did not hear any shots and believed the shooter was in rooms 111 or 112. Det.
Lualemaga did not have a good recollection of the number of shots he heard. The shots
stopped when the officers came back to the T-intersection.
Det. Lualemaga did not see any children during this time until evacuation but knew people
were on campus because of the cars in the parking lot. Detective Lualemaga recalled active
shooter training that only had rooms with no doors to negotiate. Det. Lualemaga was never
trained in breaching a door. They trained in clearing rooms without doors. Det. Lualemaga has
cleared houses before, on duty, looking for people.
After the volley of shots other officers began coming into the northwest door. Det. Lualemaga
later assisted in clearing the classrooms on the Northeast side of the building. Several
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classrooms were open, but they did not contain children. Det. Lualemaga heard Officer Ruiz
state it was his wife’s classroom, and he did not know what to do. Det. Lualemaga did not know
if he meant that she was in the room or not. Officer Ruiz later said that she was not replying. No
one knew if classrooms had been cleared, which prompted the beginning of the search on the
northeast side of the building with at least two troopers. Det. Lualemaga then left the building
to begin checking other buildings on the campus, locating, and evacuating students and staff.
While they were clearing a cafeteria, with a stage, a woman (teacher) came out carrying an
item that she was going to use as a weapon to strike Det. Lualemaga. The officers yelled,
“police,” and she stopped once she realized they were police. The (teacher?) led them to an
area where she was keeping approximately three classes of children. The officers left them in
the cafeteria with instructions to lock the doors until they returned.
They continued clearing classrooms on the east side of the campus. Det. Lualemaga
encountered a locked door, and a school resource Officer Gonzales (female officer) opened it
with a key she possessed. It is unknown if it was a master key or not.
Det. Lualemaga had his police radio with him but had turned it down because there were so
many attempted transmissions he could not understand, and it was not working right.
Det. Lualemaga was also in the 4th grade building when the trooper found a little boy hiding in
the stall, previously.
Det. Lualemaga made it back to the 4th grade wing but saw officers prepping for entry.
Det. Lualemaga also recalled radio traffic that Chief Arredondo was in the room with the
shooter.
Det. Lualemaga was not present when the room was breached. Officer Justin Mendoza came
out distraught and Det. Lualemaga went to console him, until a Ranger requested him to secure
the northeast door.
Det. Lualemaga does not know how long he remained at the door until he was requested at the
funeral home. Corporal Morin switched places with him to note anyone going into the crime
scene.
Det. Lualemaga then reported to the command post and was ordered to secure an address at
552 Diaz Street by Lt. Pargas. Lt. Pargas told him to grab anyone’s vehicle and go. Det. Jose
Rodriguez went with him. Upon arrival they identified two females and a male who were in a
car. They were related to the grandmother of the shooter and the shooter.
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The officers forced entry into the house with Officer Fred Dela Cruz, (no longer with the
department) and some of his shift. Officer Dela Cruz stated that the house was clear of people
but there was a crime scene inside.
Just inside the door was a pool of blood and shell casings on the ground. The officers secured
the property and started a crime scene log. A Ranger arrived and stated the entire property was
going to be a crime scene and the officers taped it off.
I questioned Det. Lualemaga about his opinion of who was in command at the school. Det.
Lualemaga said that no one was giving orders in the hall that he knew of, but he was not in the
hall very long. He believed it would be the highest-ranking officer for the jurisdiction. (Chief
Arredondo). Lt. Pargas was UPD’s highest-ranking officer.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Detective Hoshi Cantu by outside investigator Jesse Prado
CLEAT were present representing Detective Cantu.
At the time of the event Detective Cantu’s last name was Cantu. Detective Cantu was not
interviewed by the Rangers.
The following is a summary of Det. Cantu’s statement which was in response to my questions:
Hoshi Cantu was born in 1992 and has been with the police department since January 2014. Det.
Cantu had recently been promoted to detective. Det. Cantu does have a nephew that was at
Robb Elementary School. She was not sure what grade and believed he was in a separate wing
during the incident.
On May 24th, she came in at 8 am. Det. Cantu was messaging her husband planning to go to lunch
when the call came out that morning. Det. Cantu heard the radio traffic in the station, which was
a little unusual, because they normally do not work inside a building.
The call initially came in as an accident at the intersection of Old Carrizo Rd and Geraldine. Det.
Cantu was not too concerned until shots fired was broadcasted and someone was running
towards the school.
Det. Cantu was on light duty because of a late-stage pregnancy. Det. Cantu went outside to get
into her car. Her restrictions were to not put herself in dangerous situations. One of the other
restrictions was not to carry a gun. Det. Cantu grabbed her department issued Glock .40 cal. after
this call after recognizing the severity of the call. She then called Corp. Dela Cruz by phone, who
is a SWAT team member along with Det. Cantu. Corp. Dela Cruz is her brother-in-law and also the
father of her nephew who attended Robb Elementary.
Det. Cantu attended basic SWAT school sponsored by Charlie Mike enterprises in 2017. Corporal
Dela Cruz was not aware of the incident and was at home. Det. Cantu got in her assigned Nissan
Sentra and began driving to the school. While enroute she heard a radio call needing shields. She
then went back to the police station to pick up a battering ram and ballistic shields. The custodian
loaded the car for her because she was not in physical condition to lift the equipment. Det. Cantu
then drove to Geraldine and stopped by the gate to the teacher’s parking lot. Officer Calliham
took the gear to the northwest entrance. Officer Calliham is no longer with the Uvalde Police
Department.
Det. Cantu, who was eight and a half months pregnant, debated about staying or leaving because
of her physical condition but decided to stay. She had seen officers having trouble with the
parents showing up and getting too close to the school. They were also blocking the streets. Det.
Cantu, who was wearing a black dress, then helped set up a perimeter to block the parents. Det.
Cantu was wearing a police vest over her dress.
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Det. Cantu heard someone asking if the shooter had been identified. She knew everyone at the
school was occupied and decided to go to the house at 552 Diaz Street. This is the address that
the return on the pickup truck came back to.
Det. Cantu and Officer Calliham arrived on Diaz and met with an older woman who seemed
distraught. Det. Cantu asked who the green truck belonged to. The woman answered by saying
she did not know why he shot her in Spanish. Det. Cantu asked for the name of the shooter and
the lady named the shooter, then pointed at an older man at the door to 552 Diaz stating he was
the suspect’s grandfather. The grandfather named the shooter and stated that he lived there
with them at 552 Diaz. Officer Calliham had been attending an interview with the Sheriff’s office
when this came out and was in plain clothes.
Det. Cantu did not know that the house was a crime scene because of the grandmother being
shot there. Det. Cantu thought the lady had been shot at the school. The grandfather stated he
was enroute to the San Antonio hospital to see his wife. Det. Cantu did not enter the house and
did not see any blood. She did not have her body worn camera on, during this encounter. A
neighbor gave a description of the shooter that Det. Cantu was able to provide dispatch with.
Det. Cantu stayed until the children were taken to the Civic Center. She also helped move cars
from Perez St. to clear a path for EMS and more buses. Most of the cars had someone near them
and they followed her direction. She then heard the crowd saying shots fired and people began
to duck down. She witnessed two children being escorted into the funeral home that had blood
on them, but it did not appear to be their blood.
Detective Cantu called her sister and found out that she picked up the child from the Civic Center.
Detective Cantu then learned that officers were being sent to different schools to secure them.
She drove around in her car and checked on one private school that had already dismissed
children.
Sgt. Ruiz called Det. Cantu and notified her that Officer Dela Cruz was transported to the hospital
with heat stroke symptoms from the high school. She drove to the high school to pick up his
property but found that he was still there in the ambulance. He was transported to the hospital
where Det. Cantu waited with her sister for him to be released. Det. Cantu went home after
checking in with Lt. Pargas.
I then questioned her over decisions to act even though she was on limited duty.
Det. Cantu stated that she was given rules regarding what she was and was not permitted to do.
No one else was at the police station when she went back to pick up and deliver the shields and
battering ram. She did not ask for permission because she recognized the gravity of the situation.
Det. Cantu felt that she did the right thing to help.
When she went to the house at 552 Diaz Street, she did not see anyone else available and made
the decision to go. Lt. Pargas did see her in the street helping with the parents on the perimeter.
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Lt. Pargas told her to go back to the office, but she did not. (Lt. Pargas stated through his attorney
that he does not recall giving her the order)
Det. Cantu made the decision to help because she knew the gravity of the call and did not want
to be behind the desk. Lt. Pargas was concerned for her well-being when he told her, but she
stated she just could not go because of the situations with the students.
On October 17th, 2023, I made a follow-up call to Det. Cantu and went over her statement and to
find out how she had retrieved a copy of the picture of the shooter, but it was a copy of his
identification through dispatch.
Det. Cantu admitted to the policy violation and stated that she did struggle with swelling at the
end of the day, but people were needed and not available.
Det. Cantu provided the ballistic shields to the officers on scene at Robb Elementary. Det. Cantu
moved vehicles from the roadway, worked crowd control and identified the shooter although
she was having difficulty physically moving around.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Detective Ronald Rodriguez by outside investigator Jesse Prado
CLEAT were present representing Detective Rodriguez.
I played Det. Rodriguez’ interview with the Texas Rangers that were conducted soon after the
There was a second follow-up interview by the Rangers that was not made available to me. Det
Rodriguez agreed to do the interview without listening to the 2 nd audio. I learned later that the
second audio was about 12 minutes long. The Ranger division requested that no offense report
be written in the Uvalde Police Department report writing system and to notate in the report
that the officer’s statements were submitted to the Texas Rangers.
Attorney Randy Lopez gave a statement for Det. Rodriguez prior questioning that Det. Rodriguez
would participate in this interview contingent upon the ability to return once I am able to obtain
the second Ranger statement, to help refresh his memory.
The following is a summary of Det. Rodriguez’ statement which was in response to my questions:
Det. Ronald Rodriguez has been with the Uvalde Police Department for 10 years and has a total
of 12 years of law enforcement experience. Det. Rodriguez works narcotics for the department
and also handles felony cases assigned to him. He is not on a task force and will frequently team
up with patrol to work different hot spots in the city. Det. Rodriguez has attended basic and
advanced SWAT training but was not on the SWAT team. Det. Rodriguez did not have any
immediate family attending the school, but his mother’s nephew is married to a teacher at Robb
Elementary.
Det. Rodriguez was off duty at the time of the incident because he was scheduled to work later
that evening into the night with Officer Wally. Det. Rodriguez had worked the night of May 23 rd
from 4pm to midnight and was home by 1230am. Det. Rodriguez was able to sleep that morning
and was rested. He drove to his mother's house when his mother notified him that there was a
shooting at the school going on.
Det. Rodriguez’ mother learned of the shooting from one of her nephews whose wife is a teacher
at Robb Elementary. Det. Rodriguez called Lt. Pargas approximately just after 11:30 am, which is
the time he arrived at his mother’s house. Lt. Pargas told him to come in “quick” and it sounded
like Lt. Pargas was possibly in the building because of the background noise.
Det. Rodriguez then drove home and put on Khaki pants and a blue shirt. He got into his city
issued Ford Fusion and drove about a mile to the school. Det. Rodriguez had his department
issued Glock .40 caliber pistol and his department issued AR-15. He parked in front of the funeral
home and did not see the crash site. He saw cars parked in the bus lanes.
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Det. Rodriguez was wearing his ballistic vest and carrying his AR-15 then went to the northwest
door where he spent most of his time. The door was being held open; attempts to prop it open
did not work because of the weight of the door. Constable Zamora was holding the door when
he initially arrived.
Det. Rodriguez did not enter the school building because there were many officers present. He
saw Lt. Martinez and SSgt. Canales, JJ Suarez, and Constable Field. At one-point UCISD Lt.
Hernandez came out and had Det. Rodriguez retrieve his keys from his police unit. The unit was
parked near the funeral home. Lt. Hernandez told him that the keys were in a backpack in the
back seat and were on a red lanyard. He retrieved the keys and handed them to a border patrol
agent and does not recall seeing Lt. Hernandez.
Det. Rodriguez received a call from S.A.P.D. Swat asking for details of the event. Det. Rodriguez
thinks someone gave them his number because he was on the school grounds near the door. Det.
Rodriguez had his hand-held radio but stated that during the incident he lost it and did not get it
back until midnight.
Det. Rodriguez told S.A.P.D. Swat that they had the subject barricaded in a room. S.A.P.D. stated
they were two hours away and would be enroute.
I asked Det. Rodriguez what made him distinguish a barricaded subject from an active shooter.
Det. Rodriguez recalled the broadcast on the radio that he was barricaded in a classroom.
Det. Rodriguez encountered Officer Ruiz from the time he arrived. Officer Ruiz came up to him
and said that it was Eva’s classroom, but he did not know what was going on or if they were in
there. A while after that Officer Ruiz got the call and said Eva was in there and was hurt. Officer
Ruiz was standing next to Det. Rodriguez when he got the call but walked a few steps away. Det.
Rodriguez did not hear the conversation, but Officer Ruiz came back and blurted out that Eva was
hurt.
This was the first time that Det. Rodriguez knew someone was in the room. He and Officer Ruiz
are good friends.
Officer Ruiz then nudged past Det. Rodriguez and stormed into the building. Det. Rodriguez did
not see him draw his weapon. Other officers stopped him from continuing in. Det. Rodriguez
pinned Officer Ruiz against the wall and noticed that Officer Ruiz had a dead stare and would not
snap out of it.
Det. Ruiz asked him for his gun. Det. Rodriguez recognized that Officer Ruiz was not mentally
ready to go, especially knowing him so well. Det. Rodriguez made the decision to disarm Officer
Ruiz, who was holding his pistol in his right hand. Officer Ruiz was not in a low ready position and
Det. Rodriguez saw his finger was very close to the trigger and not extended outside of the trigger
guard. Det. Rodriguez believed that Officer Ruiz’ finger had a slight bend towards the trigger of
the weapon. Det. Rodriguez believed that the officers around may be in danger because of Officer
Ruiz mental state and then pried the gun out of Officer Ruiz’ hand.
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No one told Det. Rodriguez to do this, but he felt it was a safety issue and disarmed UCISD Officer
Ruben Ruiz. Officer Ruiz maintained a blank look on his face throughout. Det. Rodriguez cleared
the weapon and placed it in his cargo pocket.
Det. Rodriguez was unsure what the waiting was for but then saw children getting evacuated.
Det. Rodriguez was sure everyone in the hall knew Eva Mireles was injured. Det. Rodriguez did
not know what was going on in the hall and remained in the area of the northwest door. Lt.
Pargas was on the phone and in the area as well as Ranger Kendall.
EMS pulled up while the kids were being evacuated and there was an injured teacher coming out
with assistance. Det. Rodriguez ran to the EMS unit to get a stretcher and saw that there were
two children in the van. One was bleeding saying they had been shot in the face. He took the
stretcher and helped load the teacher. Det. Rodriguez got both children from the EMS Van after
they were assessed and took them to the back door of the funeral home. They had not found any
wounds on the children other than some scratches on the one complaining of being shot in the
face. The other child stated his knee hurt. Det. Rodriguez cut his pants and saw a scab on his leg
that was irritated, most likely from kneeling and hiding. It was not a fresh wound. The funeral
home did not answer the front door. Det. Rodriguez took the children to the back door and
instructed the staff not to let anyone in.
A command post had not been set up yet. Det. Rodriguez did not see how the children were
evacuated but did hear windows breaking. The injured teacher was walking until he brought the
stretcher. EMS intercepted him and took over.
Just prior to the breach EMS began lining up and Sgt. Rodriguez understood that medics would
go in to assess first but that did not occur, and some casualties were brought out by police.
Det. Rodriguez assisted in carrying two children to the EMS van.
(Det. Rodriguez explained what he witnessed to me, in the building after he went back from
helping to take the two children.)
Det. Rodriguez saw the medics working on Ms. Mireles and then went to the entry gate. Officers
then began running to their cars after hearing a threat at the high school. While officers were
enroute Det. Rodriguez recalled he had possession of Officer Ruiz school radio and contacted the
high school. The high school acknowledged him and stated everything was okay, so the cars were
able to slow down.
Det. Rodriguez had encountered a distraught EMS Medic. Det. Rodriguez overheard the medic’s
partner say that if she could not keep it together, she was no help. The distraught medic told
Det. Rodriguez that she was concerned because she had a child in one of the classes believed to
be Mr. Reyes’ class. Det. Rodriguez only knew that it was Ms. Mireles’ class and told the medic.
This helped the medic continue working and Det. Rodriguez learned later that the medic’s child
survived.
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Once the building was sealed, he went to the command post and assisted there with printing out
documents. The Sheriff contacted the shooter’s mother, who he knew, attempting to locate the
shooter’s girlfriend.
Det. Rodriguez and Lt. Pargas then went to check on the detectives on Diaz street and took them
food and water.
I then stopped the recording and left the room to clear my weapon, a Glock 43x.
I handed the cleared weapon to Det. Rodriguez to demonstrate how he recalled Officer Ruiz’
finger on his weapon. This is not an accurate representation and not the same type of weapon,
however I wanted to know how Det. Rodriguez remembered his finger placement. Lt. Pargas
stated that he also saw Officer Ruiz with his finger in the trigger area. The following are
photographs that I took.
The first photograph is a demonstration of how Det. Rodriguez recalls the placement of Officer
Ruiz' finger at one point.
The second photograph is an example of the gap between his finger and the weapon. Det.
Rodriguez used his other finger to show the spacing.
The last is the way Det. Rodriguez stated the finger placement should have been.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Officer Lee Ann Cantu by outside investigator Jesse Prado
Date of interview January 9th, 2023. Length of interview 20 minutes.
CLEAT were present representing Officer Cantu.
Officer Cantu was not interviewed by the Rangers.
The following is a summary of Officer Cantu’s statement which was in response to my questions:
Lee Ann Cantu was born in 1982 and is assigned to patrol. She is also a hostage negotiator. Officer
Cantu has a son who was in the third grade at Robb Elementary at the time of the incident. Officer
Cantu’s 2nd cousin’s daughter died in the shooting at Robb Elementary.
Officer Cantu was not on duty and not scheduled to work patrol on May 24th, 2022. Officer Cantu
was working on an off duty, part time job in Gillette Texas. Her schedule that day was 6 am to 6
pm on the job site. Her duties in this job, which must be approved by the chief of police, were a
stationary assignment at an oil field subdivision where an office is located. Gillette is
approximately two and a half hours from Uvalde. Officer Cantu was wearing black BDUs and a
polo shirt that said POLICE on it. This job is for a security company and there are about three
Uvalde Officers that work the security job.
Her normal supervisors at the PD are Corporal Morin and Sgt. Banda. Officer Cantu recalled
receiving a call at about 1130 am that morning from Officer Michael Wally, who no longer works
for the UPD. Officer Wally was on her shift and told her to suit up because she was needed as a
hostage negotiator on a barricaded subject.
Officer Wally is also a hostage negotiator. She informed Officer Wally that she was two and a half
hours away and had informed several others that she would be working out of the area. They did
not have an official on call rotation and Officer Wally said he would call her if she was needed.
Officer Wally did not tell her that it had been an active shooter.
Officer Cantu was unable to attend the awards ceremony and her sister, who also takes care of
her kids, attended the ceremony. After the ceremony her son called her and pleaded to go home
but Officer Cantu did not want him home alone. Her son promised to stay in his room and play
video games and reminded her that the house was full of cameras. Officer Cantu reluctantly
agreed and had her sister take him home. Officer Cantu’s older daughter did not get home from
school until 430 pm.
Officer Cantu was able to tell from the time she called the office to release her child to the
lockdown was approximately 38 minutes. He was released to Officer Cantu’s sister.
Officer Cantu became worried and left the job site, because her daughter M.M. attended Morales
Middle School and learned they were locked down. Officer Cantu’s cousin picked up M.M. from
school because she could not make it back in time.
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Officer Cantu arrived in Uvalde at about 4: 45 pm then called Lt. Pargas to find out what they
needed. He assigned her to go to the grandmother’s house on Diaz Street and wait with
detectives for the Rangers to arrive. She stopped at the house and changed into a police uniform
then drove to Diaz.
Officer Cantu recalled Detectives Landry, Lualemaga, Ronald Rodriguez, and possibly Jose
Rodriguez there. All of the men appeared physically exhausted. She gave them drinks and they
told her not to allow the media to get close. She remained there for about two and a half hours
until the Rangers arrived and relieved her.
Officer Cantu arrived in her personal car and had been briefed that this was the location where
the grandmother was shot. She did not have to take any enforcement action, and everyone
complied with her. Officer Cantu did not interview anyone. Officer Cantu arrived home at about
930 pm.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Corporal Gregory Villa by outside investigator Jesse Prado
Date of interview January 9th, 2023. Length of interview 1:18.
CLEAT were present representing Corporal Villa.
I played Cpl. Villa’s interviews with the Texas Rangers that were conducted soon after the events
on May 24th, 2022, to assist his recollection. The initial Ranger interview was 1:19. There was a
second follow-up interview by the Rangers that was 20 minutes. The Ranger division requested
that no offense report be written in the Uvalde Police Department report writing system and to
notate in the report that the officer’s statements were submitted to the Texas Rangers.
The following is a summary of Corporal Villa’s statement which was in response to my questions:
Gregory Villa was born in 1986 and has been employed by the Uvalde Police Department for just
under 12 years. Cpl. Villa has been a SWAT team member since 2015. Cpl. Villa had a cousin by
marriage that died inside the classroom.
Cpl. Villa was assigned to patrol and on May 24th, 2022, he was working day shift from 6 am to 6
pm and had worked the day before. He arrived at work rested. Cpl. Villa was in patrol uniform
wearing BDU pants and a uniform shirt. Cpl. Villa does not have a take home vehicle and the
officers have to load and unload gear from their cars daily. Cpl. Villa is assigned an AR-15 that he
takes home with him daily.
On this day Cpl. Villa did not load his AR-15 from his personal vehicle to his patrol car. Supervisors
handle duties after the shift briefings and then sometimes go out on priority calls and on this day,
he did not have his AR-15 in his patrol car. Cpl. Villa said this was not normal for him. Sometimes
they will start their day and come back to load gear.
Cpl. Villa normally transfers a box or backpack with some gear like traffic vest, first aid, and his
AR-15 with extra ammo. Cpl. Villa does not recall much about that morning. They had been
dealing with assisting an alien smuggling operation that morning with Border Patrol and other
agencies waiting for a “load car.”
The call came out while they were waiting on the side of the road for the “load car” and Cpl. Villa
did not initially hear the call because he was facetiming with his son who had won an award at a
different school. His phone call was about one to two minutes, but he saw officer Hill motion to
leave. Cpl. Villa then followed Officer Hill. Cpl. Villa asked dispatch to repeat.
Cpl. Villa knew it was near the school but not at the school yet. Cpl. Villa took a route that put
him on Old Carrizo Road and ended up parking in front of the school near Geraldine. He had seen
other officers had arrived in the same area. Cpl. Villa approached the officers and was confused
because one of the officers said the guy ran towards the school, but he had not seen the accident
on Old Carrizo Rd.
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Cpl. Villa then thought he had to get into the school and began moving towards the middle of
campus. Officer Saucedo followed him. Cpl. Villa jumped an 8 ft. fence because he believed it was
locked. They went past the admin part of the school towards the west through the exterior halls
of the school moving towards the 4th grade building. Cpl. Villa did not know where he was
heading, only that he was moving to try and locate the subject. Cpl. Villa knew the layout of the
school and knew there were many hiding spots. Cpl. Villa did not know the type of gun the subject
had yet.
Cpl. Villa had not heard any shots. Cpl. Villa tactically made his way west with Officer Saucedo
and located a DPS Trooper Elizondo. He then heard Sgt. Coronado broadcast shots fired on the
radio but did not hear any shots. Officer Saucedo asked on the radio for the location. Cpl. Villa
then saw officers gathering in a stack near the fourth-grade building. He recognized Johnny Field,
Beko Diaz and Emanuel Zamora in the stack entering from the east.
Cpl. Villa was on the west side of the building when he saw UCISD Officer Adrian Gonzales who
told them to stay away from the windows. While they were near the building, he heard gunshots.
Trooper Hooks and Officer Saucedo were with him as Officer Gonzales asked if they could see
which window he was shooting out of. Cpl. Villa could not see into any rooms. Officer Gonzales
said something else before he walked back to the building, but Cpl. Villa did not understand.
After the shots were fired, they heard officers had been hit. Cpl. Villa told Trooper Hooks and
Officer Saucedo to stay in the spot watching the window from the east side of the building, while
he got in the stack with the Constables. The officers had entered through the unlocked east door.
Cpl. Villa caught up with them as someone was holding the door open for him. Cpl. Villa saw them
walking to the T-intersection without checking the doors. Officer Jesus Mendoza was behind Cpl.
Villa.
Cpl. Villa did not know why people were not moving if officers were hit. Cpl. Villa noticed that
there was very little communication in the hallway and Officers had a dazed look.
Cpl. Villa described the officers positioning in the hallway and saw that Sgt. Page was holding a
position near with a pistol. Cpl. Villa suggested relieving him with a rifle, but no one answered.
Cpl. Villa told officer Mendoza to get Officer Saucedo’s rifle and bring it to him. When Cpl. Villa
got the rifle, he along with two deputies, Lara and Brown, went to the southside to relieve Sgt.
Paige.
Cpl. Villa met with Sgt. Coronado who told him to relieve Sgt. Paige. No one prevented him from
going in but told him to be cautious of the fatal funnel. Cpl. Villa remained in that position
covering the door until BORTAC made entry. Cpl. Villa had his radio, but it was not working and
was making a tone, so he turned it off.
Cpl. Villa could hear commotion but did not lose focus on the door. He heard the children being
evacuated and realized children were in the building. Cpl. Villa could only see the vestibule and
not the doors from his position. Sgt. Canales is the most senior SWAT team member. Cpl. Villa
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heard four shots while covering the vestibule. He felt the concussions but did not see sheet rock
or hear the rounds coming out of the door.
Cpl. Villa never received a plan for entry and believed it was being prepared from the north end
of the hallway. He did not know of any communication from the south group to the north group
of officers. Cpl. Villa saw Chief Arredondo on the phone and then saw him put tables in the
hallway which confused him. He also saw Chief Arredondo attempt to communicate with the
shooter for a few minutes. Cpl. Villa repeated what Chief Arredondo stated in Spanish.
Cpl. Villa does have active shooter training through Charlie Mike Enterprises. They never trained
him in what the teachers were supposed to do in the classes. Cpl. Villa believed that the doors
were locked because Lt. Martinez and SSgt. Canales were shot trying to check doors.
Cpl. Villa recalls the entry with BORTAC unlocking the door and an attempt to prop it open. A
stack of officers got behind Cpl. Villa. Officer De La Cruz came in front with a pistol-rated shield
to cover Cpl. Villa.
Entry was made and numerous rounds were fired. Cpl. Villa entered room 112 and described the
scene to me.
They were then instructed to leave and allow medics only in the room.
Cpl. Villa went outside to the northeast side of the building. Cpl. Villa could not figure out who
was in charge or where the IC was at for any other assignments. He did not see a coordination of
command. Cpl. Villa believed that command staff was coordinating and planning outside the
building during the time he was on the vestibule.
Cpl. Villa did not have his body cam because it was charging at the police station. His body cam
has problems with the batteries.
Cpl. Villa stated that he was a member of the SWAT team, but they do not train and have not
trained since Covid. They have never had training in breaching.
Cpl. Villa did go to the pd to pick up his rifle then got called to the high school and coordinated
the security of the building there.
Cpl. Villa believes he leaves his rifle at the office 3 to 4 days out of a 10-day period.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Officer Randy Hill by outside investigator Jesse Prado
Date of interview January 9th, 2023. Length of interview :24 minutes.
CLEAT were present representing Officer Hill.
I played Officer Hill’s interviews with the Texas Rangers that were conducted soon after the
The following is a summary of Officer Hill’s statement which was in response to my questions:
Randy Hill was born in 1988 and has been with the Uvalde Police for about four and a half years
with a total of seven years of law enforcement. Ofc. Hill is assigned to patrol and is not a member
of SWAT.
Officer Hill has a daughter that was in the third grade at Robb Elementary on the day of this
incident but was checked out of school by Officer Hill’s wife after the awards ceremony.
Officer Hill worked on Monday and came into work on Tuesday like a normal day in UPD uniform
BDU pants and vest over his shirt. His AR-15 was in his unit that day and he carried his department
issued Glock .40 caliber.
Officer Hill was on Highway 55 at Cesar Chavez in a church parking lot working on an assignment
with Border Patrol who was waiting for two vehicles containing undocumented immigrants. The
dispatched call came out as an accident at the 700 block of Old Carrizo road by the dip. Officer
Hill did not recall who he was at the church with, but thought it was Officer Jesus Mendoza. While
enroute he heard that it was now a man with a gun walking towards the school.
Officer Hill pulled up to the intersection of Geraldine and Old Carrizo Road, got out of his unit
then retrieved his AR-15 from the passenger side of his car. He began walking towards the
opening of the gate near the front of the school. Officer Hill was with Corporal Villa, Officer
Saucedo, Sgt. Coronado, and Chief Arredondo. There may have been other officers.
Someone said shots were fired on the radio and Officer Hill could hear it but did not know where
it was coming from. Officer Hill was told to set up a perimeter and take the northside of the
building, once they believed it was the 4th grade wing. Officer Saucedo went to the southside of
the building. Officer Hill heard that an officer had been shot in the head and saw his entire shift
except for Officer Chapa, thinking Chapa was shot, but later learned he was okay. Officer Hill saw
multiple agencies entering the building and went in on the east side of the building. He assisted
in clearing classrooms on the east side of the T-intersection.
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Officer Hill saw a teacher and a student come out but was not sure where they were located.
Officer Hill took a position near the east door until Lt. Juan Martinez ordered him to assist with
crowd control near the funeral home. Officer Hill went back to his unit and moved it to Perez St
at Geraldine St. The buses began lining up on Perez St. where parents were pressing up close.
Officer Hill did not use any force and some of the crowd was loud but compliant. He then saw
children coming from the teacher’s parking lot and helped them with crowd control as well.
Officer Hill remained until everything was over. He then went to the PD.
Officer Hill did not know what happened to his body cam. He believes he may have turned it on
accidentally and then intentionally hit the button to turn it on but actually turned it off. It only
recorded a few seconds.
Officer Hill did not witness any violations of policy.
Officer Hill received orders from Cpl. Villa to set up the perimeter and then Lt. Juan Martinez to
work crowd control.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Officer Daniel Martinez by outside investigator Jesse Prado
CLEAT were present representing Officer Martinez.
Officer Martinez was not interviewed by the Rangers. Officer Martinez submitted a supplement
to case number 291345.
The following is a summary of Officer Martinez’s statement which was in response to my
questions:
Daniel Emilio Martinez was born in 1990 and has been with the Uvalde Police Department for
three years and three months. Officer Martinez did not have any relatives at the school.
Officer Martinez was not scheduled to work on May 24th, 2022, as it was a regularly scheduled
day off for him. Officer Martinez worked Operation Lone Star to assist Border Patrol with alien
smuggling on Monday for four hours.
Officer Martinez was at a doctor’s appointment at 10:30 am on Evans Street when he received
information about the incident at Robb Elementary School. He had been looking at Facebook and
saw the notice about a heavy police presence. A short time later a staff member at the doctor’s
office told him they were on lockdown because of a shooting incident in the area. Officer
Martinez informed the staff member that he was a police officer and they let him out of the
building. He then drove a few miles home and put his uniform on and then called Cpl. Morin who
did not answer. Officer Martinez drove to the P.D. to pick up a patrol car, then drove to the scene.
Officer Martinez does not believe entry had been made when he arrived. Officer Martinez had
his vest with heart plates and an AR-15 rifle. Officer Martinez saw the streets blocked by
emergency vehicles and drove to Evans at Geraldine Street where a Border Patrol Agent
requested assistance blocking the road. Officer Martinez held that post only allowing emergency
vehicles through.
Officer Martinez encountered the grandfather of the shooter at the intersection. Officer Martinez
told the grandfather that he did not know what was going on at the time and was assisting. Officer
Martinez was then approached by Joe Garcia who stated that he could not find his wife (Irma
Garcia). Officer Martinez informed Mr. Garcia to check the Civic Center. They exchanged numbers
and told Mr. Garcia that he would call him if he had any updates.
Officer Martinez recalled units showing up from Eagle Pass and possibly Galveston County.
Officer Martinez then went to Morales Junior High School because of threats at the high school
which is next to the high school. Officer Martinez’ wife picked up their son from the high school.
Officer Martinez was at the middle school until nearly 6 pm working traffic.
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Officer Martinez checked in on the radio but never received orders. He showed up and assisted
where he was needed. Officer Martinez felt that when he arrived at Morales Middle School
everything was more structured without the chaos.
When Officer Martinez initially showed up to assist the Border Patrol Agent, he received
instructions and the agent left without notifying Officer Martinez. Officer Martinez never knew
what had actually happened in this case until he saw the press conference with the Governor.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Corporal Ramon Morin Jr. by outside investigator Jesse Prado
CLEAT were present representing Corporal Morin.
I played Officer Morin’s interview with the Texas Rangers that were conducted soon after the
The following is a summary of Corporal Morin’s statement which was in response to my
questions:
Ramon Morin Jr. was born in 1984 and has been with the UPD for 10 years and a member of the
SWAT team for 8 years. Corporal Morin did not have any relatives or children at Robb Elementary.
Cpl. Morin was off duty on a regular day off on May 24 th, 2022. Cpl. Morin was at a dentist’s
appointment in the 900 block of Evans Street when he was informed by text message from his
coworkers about the Robb Elementary School shooting. He was already done and walking out
when he received the texts.
Cpl. Morin went home to get his gear and rifle which is about two miles from the dentist. He put
on his SWAT uniform. Cpl. Morin took his personal vehicle to the school and parked near Nicholas
at Geraldine. He then ran towards the school and had attempted to contact Cpl. Villa (312) but
he did not answer. Cpl. Morin had to go to the front of the school to get onto campus near the
cafeteria.
Cpl. Morin saw officers and deputies on the east side of the 4th grade building, who told him to
move because of crossfire and entry was about to be made. He moved to the east door of the
building and met with Det. Lualemaga then held that position at the east door.
While Cpl. Morin and Det. Lualemaga were at the door, they heard a female voice and began
checking rooms. A female was located in a room, and she came out of the east door. They
instructed her to go to Old Carrizo Rd. They searched the unlocked doors and did not locate
anyone else.
After BORTAC breached the classrooms, Cpl. Morin saw the EMTs working in the hallway. Cpl.
Morin maintained his position at the northeast door with Det. Lualemaga until Lt. Pargas sent
Lualemaga on an assignment.
Cpl. Morin was then instructed by a Texas Ranger not to allow anyone in or out of the door. Cpl.
Morin remained there for about 45 minutes to an hour and was relieved by a trooper. Corporal
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Morin was needed at Uvalde high school. He went to the Police Department and picked up a
marked unit before going to the high school.
His assignment at the high school was to post up and look for suspicious activity. Cpl. Morin does
not recall who gave him the order, but it was most likely Lt. Juan Martinez. He had no incidents
and was teamed up with a trooper.
They remained until the students were released.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Officer Max Dorflinger by outside investigator Jesse Prado
Date of interview January 10th, 2023. Length of interview 1:13.
CLEAT were present representing Officer Dorflinger.
I played Officer Dorflinger’s interviews with the Texas Rangers that were conducted soon after
the events on May 24th, 2022, to assist his recollection. The initial Ranger interview was 28
minutes. The Ranger division requested that no offense report be written in the Uvalde Police
Department report writing system and to notate in the report that the officer’s statements were
submitted to the Texas Rangers.
The following is a summary of Officer Dorflinger’s statement which was in response to my
questions:
Max Dorflinger was born in 1987 and has been with the Uvalde Police Department for about one
and a half years and has a total of sixteen years of law enforcement experience. Officer Dorflinger
started at the Uvalde County Sheriff’s Department.
Officer Dorflinger worked a normal night shift on Monday night from 6 pm until 6 am on the
morning of May 24th, 2022. He arrived home at about 6:30 am. He does not recall how he was
informed about the incident at Robb Elementary that morning and believes it may have been
social media chatter about a possible active shooter. He was at home in bed when he found out.
He then turned on his radio and listened to the traffic. Officer Dorflinger believed it was about
11:40 am
Officer Dorflinger then put his patrol uniform on with BDU pants and a load bearing vest. He then
left in his pickup truck that he purchased from a fireman that was equipped with emergency
lights and siren. Officer Dorflinger also took a .308 rifle with him and went to Robb Elementary.
He parked just east of Old Carrizo and Geraldine. He realized he had left his phone at home. He
saw many police vehicles.
Officer Dorflinger put himself at the school on the radio. He did not have his body cam. Officer
Dorflinger got out with his rifle case and could not figure out where to go. He heard the need for
crowd control assistance and went to leave the rifle in his car, but a border patrol car parked too
close to it. Officer Dorflinger then left his rifle in the Border Patrol car since it was open and went
to help with crowd control.
Officer Dorflinger saw a lot of parents attempting to get into school property and saw Mr.
Mueller, UCISD, standing at the school. Officer Dorflinger saw a parent he knew from dealing with
her at the S.O., being very vocal. Officer Dorflinger told parents to get off the property, but they
verbally contested him. At one-point parents were cursing at him and he turned up his radio. At
that moment it came out that Chief Arredondo was in the room with the subject. Parents then
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began asking him why he was not in the building to which he responded, “because I’m out here
dealing with Y’all.”
Other officers showed up soon thereafter and just as the District Attorney investigators arrived
children started to be evacuated. Most of the crowd then left for the funeral home. One of the
people that did not leave told Officer Dorflinger that he was going to go in and if he did not move,
they would go through him. Officer Dorflinger recognized that he knew who this person was.
D.E.A. showed up and assisted in the perimeter. Officer Dorflinger saw Deputy Eric Gonzalez and
asked him what equipment he had that he could take in. Deputy Gonzalez gave Officer Dorflinger
a crate of what he said were flash bangs. He later learned they were stinger grenades that
explode and throw out small rubber pellets. Deputy Gonzalez had other equipment also.
Officer Dorflinger then went into the building with the crate but saw they were not flashbangs.
Officer Dorflinger asked who was in charge and did not get an answer. He saw the BORTAC Agent
Guerrero and asked him if he needed flashbangs. Agent Guerrero asked if he had gas. Lt. Pargas
had gone into the hallway and said that there was a child on the phone and there were multiple
victims. Officer Dorflinger had heard this on the radio as well.
Officer Dorflinger stated that there were approximately fourteen officers around when it was
stated. Officer Dorflinger said he reiterated what Lt. Pargas said but louder.
Officer Dorflinger then went back to Deputy Gonzalez to obtain gas and took it back to the
building stating out loud what he had. Officer Dorflinger separated the smoke from the gas
because the smoke could be deadly in a building. The officers asked for gas masks which Officer
Dorflinger left to retrieve and bring back in.
Officer Dorflinger remained in the hallway and began to look at a map that Game Warden
Gassaway had, when four shots were fired. The officers then moved down the hall and the radio
chatter began. Officer Dorflinger yelled out to hold the radio traffic, but he had not realized the
radios were not working in the building.
Officer Dorflinger went outside and noticed only one ambulance then realized they could not get
in because of police cars. He then started moving cars for the ambulances. He went back into the
building several times collecting keys.
Officer Dorflinger found Officer De La Cruz 'vehicle running with the doors locked but could not
locate him and did not know he was on the south side of the building. He then broke the window
to gain entry to move the unit. They were able to make a path for EMS.
After the entry was made some children came out walking and were loaded onto the bus. Some
appeared to have minor injuries.
Officer Dorflinger described a chaotic scene with some parents trying to get to the kids. He does
not believe there was a command post yet. Officer Dorflinger described what he believed to be
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several hundred people. The Marshalls arrived and had to move people away. Some got physical
and there was a threat to tase a person.
During this time a Border Patrol agent in plain clothes with a large bird shotgun came up and
asked how he could help. Officer Dorflinger said he could not, because he was not in uniform and
had no police indication on his clothes.
Officer Dorflinger assisted by moving an ambulance that had a medic working on someone.
Officer Dorflinger described some of what he observed in the aftermath of the entry. The building
was shut down and he went back to crowd control.
Officer Dorflinger stated that people he knew at the scene were reaching out to him and during
this time an employee of the funeral home told him that they still had kids barricaded in the
funeral home. Officer Dorflinger evacuated children to the buses for transport to the Civic Center.
After the buses left, they located many more children in the funeral home and sent them to the
civic center.
CISD Officer Gonzalez showed Officer Dorflinger a social media message that said something
about finishing what we started as a threat. Officer Dorflinger put that out on the radio which
caused the High School to be secured by police.
Officer Dorflinger learned that while the Command Post was set up on the west side of the
building, they did not know there were still 90 kids in the same building in another room. There
were no officers with the children.
Officer Dorflinger stated that Agent Guerrero appeared to be in charge of the BORTAC team and
he heard Lt. Pargas coordinating Diaz street, but he did not know who was in charge of the entire
scene at the time it was active.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Officer Daniel Ruiz by outside investigator Jesse Prado
CLEAT were present representing Officer Ruiz.
Officer Ruiz was not interviewed by the Texas Rangers and wrote a supplement to incident
#291345.
The following is a summary of Officer Ruiz’s statement which was in response to my questions:
Daniel Ruiz was born in 1989 and has worked for the Uvalde Police Department for about one
year and has a total of two years of law enforcement experience. Officer Ruiz spent 11 years in
the Coast Guard enforcing maritime laws. Officer Ruiz has two sons that attended Robb
elementary at this time. One son was in the third grade and the other was in the fourth grade.
Officer Ruiz was off duty during the day on May 24th, 2022, because he had worked the night shift
on Monday from 6 pm to 6 am Officer Ruiz got home, which is two miles away, and was sleeping
when he noticed his phone continuously ringing. Sgt. Bobby Ruiz, 308, woke him up to tell him
about the active shooter at Robb Elementary and he needed to get there as soon as possible.
Officer Ruiz had two boys that were at the school that day but went home after the awards
ceremony. His fourth-grade son was a student in Ms. Mireles’ class. Both boys had gone home
with their mother that day. Officer Ruiz did not know that she had taken them to her house after
the ceremony. Officer Ruiz did not know that the incident was occurring in his son’s classroom
until about an hour into it.
Officer Ruiz received the call from his Sergeant at 11:50 am on his personal phone that morning.
Officer Ruiz put his patrol uniform on with BDU pants and went in. He did not have an AR-15 and
only had his department issued Glock 22. He then went to the police station and saw Officer Joe
Zamora and they both left for the school in the same unit. They parked at Grove and Sylvester
near the funeral home. There was not a command post when they arrived but saw the officers at
the northwest door to the building. Officer Ruiz knew that was his son’s building.
Officer Ruiz went through a mentally challenging time during the incident because he had left his
cell phone in his patrol car. The crowd was out of control and Officer Ruiz could not leave his post
to retrieve his phone, due to concerns for the safety of the crowd and officers.
There was a lot going on and someone said they needed a perimeter set up. At this point he saw
multiple agencies present. Officer Ruiz tried to find out what the situation was, but officers were
yelling for a perimeter because of the parents. He learned it was Ms. Mireles’ class after he
arrived on scene. Officer Ruiz then went to the funeral home and assisted with crowd control. He
remained at this post for about 30 minutes.
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Corporal De La Cruz asked him and officer Joe Zamora to go to 552 Diaz Street and they were
joined by Sgt. Ruiz.
Officer Ruiz retrieved his phone while enroute to 552 Diaz Street then learned that his children
were at their mother’s house, which eased his mind, and he was able to focus better.
Cpl. De La Cruz and Officer Zamora made entry while Officer Ruiz and Sgt. Ruiz stood by because
there were family members outside. Officer Ruiz did not have a body cam because it was in the
docking station.
Officer Ruiz spoke to the shooter’s aunt, who was loud and very upset. They were there for about
20 minutes because the call at the high school was broadcast. Officer Joe Zamora stayed with
detectives at the residence while Cpl. De La Cruz, Sgt. Ruiz, and Officer Ruiz left.
They cleared the high school and assisted with releasing the students. After the students were
released, he and Officer Calliham were instructed to go home.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Officer Jessica Zamora by outside investigator Jesse Prado
CLEAT were present representing Officer Zamora.
Officer Zamora was not interviewed by the Texas Rangers.
Officer Zamora found out after the incident that she had a nephew that attended Robb
Elementary School.
The following is a summary of Officer Zamora’s statement which was in response to my
questions:
Jessica Zamora was born in 1988 and has worked for the Uvalde Police Department for five years.
Officer Zamora has worked as a dispatcher, records clerk, Child Protective Service and DEA
administration. Officer Zamora is married to Constable Emmanuel Zamora and not related to UPD
Officer Joe Zamora
Officer Zamora is the PIO for the department and assists on patrol when needed. Officer Zamora
handles social media and community relations. Her normal hours are 8 am to 5 pm Monday
through Friday normally.
On May 24th, 2022, Officer Zamora arrived at work as normal but departed early due to an
emergency with her son at about 10:30 am. Officer Zamora was out in a patrol car when she
received a call from Flores Elementary School that her son had fallen and broken his wrist. Officer
Zamora went back to the P.D., changed out cars and clocked out. She then picked up her son and
took him to Uvalde Memorial Hospital. Officer Zamora was in uniform at the hospital and had
only taken off her outer carrier. Her radio was still on her duty belt.
Officer Zamora was in triage and had just checked him in when she heard the radio traffic picking
up. She then overheard the shots fired. The reception in the hospital is not good but she could
hear in the triage area. They exited the triage and were in the waiting room when she contacted
Lt. Juan Martinez, who told her that something was going on at Robb Elementary. Lt. Juan
Martinez told her to get there. She explained that she was in the hospital. He then told her to get
there as soon as she could.
Officer Zamora listened to the radio and made a generic post to inform the community to avoid
the area because of a large police presence (not the exact wording).
Officer Zamora contacted the communications director for UCISD but does not recall their
conversation. Officer Zamora did not recall calling Chief Rodriguez because he was out of state.
She contacted family members to come stay with her son, who was in the 5th grade. Her sister-
in-law responded and went to the hospital. Officer Zamora is married to Constable Emmanuel
Zamora, who was at the scene.
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Officer Zamora then informed the hospital of the situation to prepare them. Officer Zamora left
as soon as her sister-in-law showed up. Officer Zamora had to drive around the traffic and parked
on Perez Street. She met with Lt. Juan Martinez who had her start the reunification of the
students.
It was determined later that it would be at the Civic Center, and she began to push it out on social
media. Officer Zamora was on scene when she heard that the subject was in custody. Officer
Zamora got into a sheriff's patrol car’s loudspeaker and began informing the parents to go to the
Civic Center.
Lt. Martinez told Officer Zamora to find Lt. Pargas but cannot recall why. At that moment an EMS
paramedic grabbed her by the vest and shook her, telling her that they were bringing out bodies
and they needed to stop. Officer Zamora does not recall if she found Lt. Pargas because she felt
that everything became blurry after that. She does not think she notified the officers about the
paramedic’s observation, because she felt that she went into shock.
Officer Zamora then began to assist at the funeral home which was the command post. There
was a press conference at 6:30 pm that she assisted with. The Dilley Police Chief took her to the
Civic Center. She was feeling weak because she had not eaten all day and her son was still at the
hospital.
After the press conferences she returned to the funeral home and stayed until after 8 pm.
Officer Zamora never knew who was in charge because she arrived late, and it was never stated.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Officer Joe Zamora by outside investigator Jesse Prado
CLEAT were present representing Officer Zamora.
Officer Joe Zamora was not interviewed by the Texas Rangers and submitted a supplement to
incident #291345. Officer Zamora has a nephew who was in the third grade at Robb Elementary.
The following is a summary of Officer Zamora’s statement which was in response to my
questions:
Joe Martinez Zamora was born in 1985 and has been with the Uvalde Police Department for three
years.
Officer Zamora worked the night shift on Monday night from 6 pm to 6 am on May 24 th, 2022.
Officer Zamora recalled getting out of work and spending a little time with his daughter and wife
at home. He eventually fell asleep after taking his son to school. His daughter is not in school yet.
Officer Zamora has a nephew that went to Robb Elementary School but did not show up for
school on this day.
Officer Zamora was woken up by his wife who was alerted by many sirens in the area and cars
driving at a high rate of speed. Officer Zamora lives two blocks from Robb Elementary School. He
then received a call from his Sergeant, Bobby Ruiz telling him there was a shooting and to go in.
Officer Zamora called Officer Danny Ruiz and they met at the P.D. in their patrol uniforms.
They tried to get more information but were told that it was unknown if children were in the
room. Officer Zamora loaded his department issued rifle and was carrying his Glock 22. They
arrived at the funeral home but were never told where to go. He saw a crowd of upset parents
in the area. He could also see officers at the doorway of the school.
Officer Zamora walked to the northwest door of the school and asked what was needed. He was
told that he was not needed there by some UPD detectives.
He began working crowd control on Geraldine and moving vehicles to make space for EMS. Some
parents were more hostile than others, but Officer Zamora never had to get physical with anyone.
He was then ordered to go to Diaz Street after entry was made at Robb Elementary. They arrived
to clear the house. Sgt. Bobby Ruiz and Cpl. De La Cruz had him go to 552 Diaz Street. Officer
Zamora observed blood drops on the driveway at 552 Diaz and he told Cpl. De La Cruz who
decided to force the entry.
Officer Zamora described the crime scene in the house to me and after verifying there was no
one inside they secured the property. Det. Rodriguez and Lualemaga were there.
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Officer Zamora remained at the house until he was relieved. Officer Zamora met with the
shooter’s aunt at the residence.
Officer Zamora described the situation as total chaos. No one knew anything and no one was
talking to each other. The radio was beeping and sounding static. He could not transmit to get
officers to move their cars.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Sgt. Julian Arredondo by outside investigator Jesse Prado
CLEAT were present representing Sgt. Arredondo.
Sgt. Arredondo was not Interviewed by the Texas Rangers. Sgt. Arredondo learned after the
incident that he had some distant nieces and nephews attending Robb Elementary School.
The following is a summary of Sgt. Arredondo’s statement which was in response to my
questions:
Julian Rodriguez Arredondo was born in 1974 and has been employed by the Uvalde Police
Department for over fifteen years with thirteen years as a sworn officer. He is not related to Chief
Arredondo.
Sgt. Arredondo had worked the night shift the day before from 6 pm to 6 am on May 24 th, 2022.
and was asleep when he heard his phone buzzing just before noon. His wife had been calling and
told him that there may be an active shooter at the school. Sgt. Arredondo then called Lt. Juan
Martinez and asked if they were needed. Lt. Martinez said that they were not needed at this
time. Lt. Martinez asked if they had worked the night before. One of his officers, Joshua Perez,
called and told him that it was going on as well. Sgt. Arredondo got dressed in preparation.
Sgt. Arredondo called Lt. Juan Martinez a short while later asking again, and Lt. Martinez said
they were not needed, and that Lt. Pargas was in charge. Sgt. Arredondo then called Lt. Pargas
who said to come in. He then called Officer Perez and told him to come in.
Sgt. Arredondo had his department issued AR-15 and his Glock 22. He then drove his personal
vehicle to the 800 block of Old Carrizo Road. He then met Lt. Juan Martinez near the school. Sgt.
Arredondo then saw many parents and law enforcement. Lt. Martinez sent him to the funeral
home because they had children there and they were going to set up a triage there.
Sgt. Arredondo met with an employee at the funeral home and posted at the front to keep people
out. Officer Perez arrived and stayed with him. Lt. Martinez arrived and began to set up canopies.
Sgt. Arredondo then saw the crowd getting out of hand and Border Patrol having problems with
them. Sgt. Arredondo saw other officers helping the Border Patrol.
They were then sent to other schools because of a threat that was made. Sgt. Arredondo ended
up at Benson Street School until they were told to go back to the PD.
Sgt. Arredondo described a chaotic scene. The radios were not working right.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Lieutenant Juan Martinez by outside investigator Jesse Prado
Attorney Randy Lopez of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Attorney Chad Hyde with TMPA
were present representing Lt. Martinez.
Lt. Martinez was not interviewed by the Texas Rangers and wrote a supplement to incident #
291345. Lt. Martinez did not have any family attending Robb Elementary School.
The following is a summary of Lt. Martinez’ statement which was in response to my questions:
Juan A. Martinez was born in 1966 and has been employed by the Uvalde Police Department for
over 26 years.
Lt. Martinez started a weeklong vacation on Monday May 23 rd, 2022. On May 24th, Lt. Martinez
received a call from a hospital security supervisor, who asked him what was going on at Robb
Elementary. Lt. Martinez then received a call from his sergeant, Bobby Ruiz, who told him about
the shooting at Robb Elementary.
Lt. Martinez was wearing jeans and put on his police polo, vest, and gun then left for the scene.
Lt. Martinez believes he received the call at about 11:50 am Lt. Martinez left immediately in his
city issued Crown Victoria and parked in the 700 block of Old Carrizo Rd. Lt. Martinez attempted
to find out where the incident command post was by radio, but the radio was too busy with traffic
and did not work. He then assisted officers with the perimeter. Other agencies were already
present, setting up a perimeter.
When he arrived, it appeared that officers were set up and he learned the gunman was still inside
with firearms. Lt. Martinez was contacted by Lt. Pargas to go to the funeral home where they
were trying to set up the incident command post.
Lt. Martinez arrived at the funeral home and saw that nothing had been set up yet. UPD Officer
Michael Wally, a negotiator, was there attempting to get information on the shooter. Lt. Pargas
and Mayor McLaughlin were there but no other agencies were present yet.
The scene then became chaotic. They had people requesting streets to be blocked off, Officers
needing water, vehicles needing to be moved and agencies requesting to be stationed. The radio
communication had people talking but they were not identified because so many had gotten on
the channel.
Lt. Martinez said that Lt. Pargas was acting chief and was going back and forth between the school
and the command post.
Lt. Martinez said Lt. Pargas was trying to handle the situation. Everyone had trouble with the
radio. The problem was that nobody had direction as far as the other agencies involved. Lt. Pargas
was able to take care of their own agency but was not able to take care of the agencies coming
in. DPS took over the case after the shooter was down.
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DPS Captain Escalon came in and it was stated that they would take over the school scene and
the Diaz street scene.
After DPS took over the scene Lt. Martinez went into a support position and became a liaison for
UPD.
Lt. Martinez remained at the command post until about 10 pm. Lt. Martinez had to assist with
some missing students that were located. He then went to the police department to help support
his officers.
Lt. Martinez stated that he believed the scene should have been a unified command. The
command post should have had a representative from each agency there to coordinate the
efforts of their people. This way, whoever is planning is able to relate to everybody by location,
not just each agency trying to fend for themselves.
Lt. Martinez stated that he and Lt. Pargas attempted to set up the command post as with the
other agencies involved but it did not happen until after the entry was made. Lt. Martinez stated
that UPD followed their chain of command. When he attempted to notify the different agencies,
the officers would direct him to go speak to a different person.
I asked Lt. Martinez how he thought Lt. Pargas handled the command post situation. Lt. Martinez
believed Lt. Pargas did the best that he could regarding setting up the command post. Lt. Pargas
was at the funeral home walking back and forth when Lt. Martinez arrived.
Lt. Martinez believes that the biggest failure in the coordination of the command post was
communication between the agencies. Even coordinating with the principals of the school was
not timely because the school principals were locked down because the scene was still active.
The principals did not show up to the command post.
Lt. Martinez does not recall when he learned children were injured in the class or how he learned.
Lt. Martinez wrote a supplement to this incident stating that it was his belief that UCISD Chief
Arredondo was in command of the situation because of jurisdiction, rank, and training. Ranger
Kindell also told Lt. Martinez that Chief Arredondo was the incident commander.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Sergeant Bobby Ruiz Sr. by outside investigator Jesse Prado
Attorney Randy Lopez of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Attorney Chad Hyde with TMPA
were present representing Sergeant Ruiz.
Sgt. Ruiz was not interviewed by the Texas Rangers and wrote a supplement to incident #291345.
Sgt. Ruiz’ granddaughter was at Robb Elementary on May 24th, 2022.
The following is a summary of Sgt. Ruiz statement which was in response to my questions:
Bobby Ruiz Sr. was born in 1974 and has been employed by the Uvalde Police Department for 13
years.
Sgt. Ruiz was off duty at the time of the incident on May 24 th, 2022, and was asleep because his
shift worked the night before from 6 pm until 6 am that morning. Sgt. Ruiz was called by his wife
who was at work and told him. Sgt. Ruiz turned his police radio on and put his patrol uniform on.
Sgt. Ruiz did not recall the time but thought that he arrived at the police station at about 11:45
am. Sgt. Ruiz took his department issued AR-15 from home. Sgt. Ruiz knew that Chief Rodriguez
and Lt. Juan Martinez were on vacation and then attempted to contact Staff Sgt. Canales. He then
called Lt. Pargas who was very short but told him to come in.
Sgt. Ruiz called Cpl. De La Cruz (SWAT) and two officers, Joe Zamora, and Daniel Ruiz. Sgt. Ruiz
went to Robb Elementary School with Cpl. De La Cruz and dropped him off at the school while he
parked. There were many emergency vehicles on the roadway, and he parked on Geraldine. Cpl.
De La Cruz began gearing up and realized he forgot his AR-15 magazines, so Sgt. Ruiz gave him
his own magazines which left him without his rifle.
Lt. Juan Martinez came up during this time and gave instructions that people were needed on
the southside due to parents trying to push their way in. Sgt. Ruiz went to the southside school
parking lot and met with retired Deputy Bob Price who had shown up to assist and was in uniform
along with two parents. Sgt. Ruiz believes Deputy Price is a reserve. Sgt. Ruiz remained in the lot
when children began to be evacuated and picked up by buses.
Sgt. Ruiz saw his third-grade granddaughter come out as well as officer Wally’s wife. Sgt. Ruiz
stated that he would never forget the look on their faces. Sgt. Ruiz’ granddaughter came to him,
and he remembered checking her for any injuries. He sent her with her teacher and remained
until all were evacuated.
Lt. Martinez then asked for assistance at the Civic Center and Sgt. Ruiz went back to his unit. Sgt.
Ruiz does not believe he could transmit on his radio because of the traffic and was relying on Lt.
Martinez. Sgt. Ruiz would follow Lt. Martinez's direction even though he could not break/transmit
to tell him.
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Before Sgt. Ruiz left for the Civic Center, they were calling for officers at the funeral home for
crowd control. Sgt. Ruiz parked on Crisp Street and walked towards the funeral home,
encountering a grandmother who was frantic and trying to get into the school. Sgt. Ruiz explained
that he too had a grandchild there, which immediately calmed the lady down.
Sgt. Ruiz then handled crowd control and a male was caught trying to run around the police. Sgt.
Ruiz then said that Officer Joe Zamora handcuffed the parent. ( I later learned that a different
agency handcuffed the parent).
The parent was immediately released once he calmed down after a few minutes.
Once the entry was made, Cpl. De La Cruz came out of the school and said they had an assignment
to secure 552 Diaz St.
Officer Zamora, Cpl. De La Cruz, and Sgt. Ruiz arrived and met with a female at the house. They
cleared the house and located a crime scene inside. Sgt. Ruiz described the crime scene to me,
and they did not locate a victim in the house. Sgt. Ruiz overheard the conversation with the
female who claimed that she was the shooter’s cousin and tried speaking to him the night before
because he was suicidal.
The high school then received a threat just as the D.A. Mitchell was arriving with an assistant.
Sgt. Ruiz and Cpl. De La Cruz then left for high school.
The high school was on lockdown, and they stood by while the students were released. Cpl. De
La Cruz became dehydrated, and EMS was called for him at Uvalde High School.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Corporal Joshua Perez by outside investigator Jesse Prado
CLEAT were present representing Corporal Perez.
Corporal Perez was not interviewed by the Texas Rangers and wrote a supplement to incident
#291345. Officer Perez has a child that was in the third grade at Robb Elementary and his wife’s
grandparents live close to the school.
The following is a summary of Corporal Perez’ statement which was in response to my questions:
Joshua Perez was born in 1987 and has been employed by the Uvalde Police Department for four-
and one-half years. He previously worked corrections for the state and federal corrections.
Cpl. Perez was recently promoted to Corporal and was an officer on May 24 th, 2023. Cpl. Perez
was off duty because he had worked the night shift on Monday night from 6 pm until about 6
am.
Cpl. Perez was sleeping and heard on the radio what was going on at the school. Cpl. Perez’ wife’s
grandparents live across from the school and take care of his one-year-old child. Cpl. Perez also
had a third-grade child that attended Robb Elementary and would normally walk across the street
to his grandparents. Cpl. Perez immediately called his Sergeant Julian Arredondo, who told him
to get ready. Cpl. Perez put on his patrol uniform and the call came in to report to the PD to get
a unit. He loaded and prepared his AR-15 and then went alone to the funeral home.
Cpl. Perez parked on Perez St. and made his way to the funeral home where officers from
different agencies were struggling with a large crowd. They were told that some children were in
the funeral home and needed to stay there until instructed. Cpl. Perez did not know if the subject
was still active or not and he did not know about his own child yet either. Cpl. Perez did not use
force.
There was a threat at the high school that people went to, but he remained with his sergeant and
Lt. Pargas at the funeral home. UCISD Officer Adrian Gonzales handed him the list of about 90
students that were in the funeral home and were placed on buses.
Cpl. Perez never stepped onto school property.
Cpl. Perez then received an assignment to secure a school near Mueller and Park Street with Sgt.
Arredondo. They then began their night shift patrol duties from there.
Cpl. Perez said there was a lot of confusion about whether the suspect was down or in custody
when entry was made. Cpl. Perez never knew during the incident that there were injuries or
casualties.
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Cpl. Perez stated that he learned that his child was out in the playground when the incident
began, and the children had to run for safety from the shots being fired outside and seeing the
figure walking towards the children.
Cpl. Perez explained, in detail, the profound negative effect this had on his son and family and
continues to have. Cpl. Perez explained some of the steps they had to take to help his son in an
emotional interview. Cpl. Perez and his wife do not know who their child was with outside or
what coach was there with them to address what his child may have seen because their child has
not opened up completely to them.
Cpl. Perez recalled the crowd yelling at him and calling him a liar because while he attempted to
calm them down, they did not believe he did not know what was going on. During this time, he
did not know about his own child either but was able to remain focused on his job despite the
harassment from the crowd.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Detective Louis Landry by outside investigator Jesse Prado
Date of interview April 12th, 2023. Length of interview 53 minutes.
CLEAT were present representing Detective Landry.
I played Detective Landry’s interview with the Texas Rangers that were conducted soon after the
events on May 24th, 2022, to assist his recollection. The Ranger division requested that no offense
Detective Landry’s stepson’s sister died at Robb Elementary.
The following is a summary of Detective Landry’s statement which was in response to my
questions:
Louis Landry is 36 years old and has been employed by the Uvalde Police Department for about
12 years and has been a detective for 5 years.
Detective Landry’s hours on May 24th, 2022, were 8:00 am to 5:00 pm Detective Landry recalled
talking about where they were going for lunch when an accident was broadcast within the
hallways followed by shots fired at Geraldine and Grove. His first thought was road rage, and they
began running to get outside. Det. Lualemaga followed Det. Landry, who put his vest on, grabbed
his AR-15 and gave it to Det. Lualemaga to prepare while he drove. While enroute it was
broadcast that the subject was running on to school property.
Det. Landry drove to Geraldine because he saw police cars at the intersection. Det. Landry was
in plain clothes that day with his vest over his shirt. Lt. Javier Martinez parked in front of Det.
Landry and they staged behind the car. He then heard people yelling that the subject was in the
school. They then ran to the school and to the northwest door.
Det. Landry went into the school with an extra 15 round magazine for his Glock 22. He also had
25 rounds for his AR-15. Det. Landry went in with Lt. Javier Martinez, SSgt. Canales, and Det.
Lualemaga.
They moved to the T-intersection and heard shots as they entered. He could smell gunpowder
and saw smoke in the middle of the hallway. Lt. Martinez and SSgt. Canales were in front of Det.
Landry. Det. Landry made it to a double door area that can close off the hallway. Lt. Martinez and
SSgt. Canales made it to the vestibule and stopped when shots were fired. They backed up and
ran back towards Det. Landry.
Det. Landry saw officers coming in from the southside and was concerned for crossfire if the
subject came out shooting. Det. Landry told them that he was going to the south side and to tell
them about a crossfire. Det. Landry exited the building and ran into Deputy Ybarra. Deputy Ybarra
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was in full gear with a shield. Det. Landry told Deputy Ybarra that it was an AR, and the deputy
set the shield down saying it would be useless.
Det. Landry went to the southside and noticed a backpack on the ground which caught his eye.
He then went to the south door and met with officers telling them about the crossfire. Det. Landry
saw Chief Arredondo, who told him to check the classrooms for children. Det. Landry went into
a classroom and saw a teacher and students. They then tried to figure out how to get them out
of the classroom and decided the windows would be best. Det. Landry opened the window,
moved items, and began helping the children out to the officers waiting outside.
Det. Landry noticed the backpack outside again and told the officers to look. He later learned it
contained magazines. Other doors were locked, and officers began breaking windows from the
outside. Det. Landry did not remember if the other classes were locked but at least four rooms
had kids inside. Det. Landry did not know how much time had gone by. There was a point where
officers stacked up then stopped because they needed to get a key. Det. Landry knew that if the
shooter saw the stack of officers dealing with a locked door, he would shoot just like he did on
their initial approach.
Det. Landry stacked on the southside, but they did not make entry and he never entered class
111 or 112.
Det. Landry is a member of what he considers a part-time SWAT team. He has been through three
SWAT schools basic, advanced and a hostage rescue through Charlie Mike Enterprises.
Det. Landry stated that all the classes he has been to, even ALERRT training, the doors have
always been open into the classrooms.
Det. Landry knew the policy for the school is that all doors should be locked during the day. Their
general belief was that it was locked. Det. Landry did not have much conversation with Chief
Arredondo. Chief Arredondo opened the classroom door that Det. Landry entered but did not
enter.
Det. Landry thought the shooter got into the class with the unlocked door or shot his way in
somehow.
Det. Landry stated the following regarding this incident.
Louis Landry 32:04
“ So I've been to the level one alert that was now about six years ago. You're training to go
towards the gunfire, which we did. Every scenario that we've done that I've seen, doors are open.
You see the bad guy; you've taken him out? This wasn't you've probably heard it before. But this
wasn't a normal scenario. This is I've never heard anything like this. You either confront him in the
hallway, there's an open door, you see them, and you confront him. That's all their training
consists of actually just went to another one about three weeks ago.”
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Det. Landry questioned the instructors in a class recently where the scenarios had open doors
and all lights on. His question was what to do when you encounter a locked door, and the lights
are off. Det. Landry stated that they did not have a good answer.
Det. Landry believed that he heard ten rounds while there but thought they were directed at the
police. It was then treated like a barricaded subject since he was no longer shooting. Det. Landry
knew there were victims when they heard it on the radio. He believed there were children inside
111 and 112 when they evacuated the other classes.
Det. Landry stated that they were not part of the planning for entry on the southside. Det. Landry
spent most of his time waiting to see if the shooter would come out and what the officers on the
north side were planning.
Chief Arredondo appeared to be in charge and even tried to talk the subject out of the room.
Chief Arredondo gave the order to clear the classes but no one on the southside ever gave a plan
to enter. Det. Landry believed that plan was obviously made on the north side because they
entered.
Det. Landry described the scene after the entry was made and he exited the south doors to allow
space for the EMTs.
Det. Landry has never had a class on breaching doors.
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Interview of Uvalde Police Officer Ventura Chapa by outside investigator Jesse Prado
CLEAT were present representing Officer Chapa.
I played Officer Chapa’s interview with the Texas Rangers that were conducted soon after the
events on May 24th, 2022, to assist his recollection. The Ranger division requested that no offense
Officer Chapa’s sister was working as a certified second-grade teacher at Robb Elementary on
May 24th, 2022. Officer Chapa is also a distant cousin of UCISD Officer Ruben Ruiz.
The following is a summary of Officer Chapa’s statement which was in response to my questions:
Ventura Chapa is 32 years old and has been employed by the Uvalde Police Department for 2
years.
On May 24th, 2022, Officer Chapa was on day shift and reported at 6 am for a twelve-hour shift.
Officer Chapa remembered working school zones in the morning and taking calls. He was in full
patrol uniform and does not have an AR-15 issued to him. He did not have a taser issued to him
at that time either.
Officer Chapa had just taken a call and showed up to the squad room to complete the report. He
spoke briefly with Sgt. Coronado when the call came out of an accident in front of Robb School.
Officer Chapa then left with Officer Saucedo and Sgt. Coronado in different cars. Officer Jesus
Mendoza was ahead of them as he was coming from the jail. Officer Chapa grew up in the area
and knew the city well. The suspect was described wearing all black.
Officer Chapa parked near the funeral home and did not see the crash site. Officer Mendoza and
Saucedo arrived first and thought they were being shot at. Officer Saucedo thought he saw the
suspect dressed in black but later they found out it was the coach.
Sgt. Coronado had told Officer Chapa to take cover because he thought they were being shot at.
Sgt. Coronado then got into his unit and moved to the front of the school. Officer Chapa then
moved up to where Lt. Javier Martinez, Det. Lualemaga, and Det. Landry were at. All four put on
their body armor. A lady was screaming at them, and they proceeded to the northwest door of
the school. Officer Chapa saw Sgt. Page, Chief Arredondo, and Sgt. Coronado on the south side
and his group on the northside approached when the shots were fired. Officer Chapa saw the
smoke in the center of the hall that looked like sheetrock.
Officer Chapa recalled being told to move back and then Det. Landry told him to help check for
the kids. Officer Chapa checked the girl’s bathroom but not the boy’s bathroom. Other officers
from other agencies began arriving.
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Det. Lualemaga told Officer Chapa to tell the guys that this side was clear. Officer Chapa then saw
the Officers get shot. Officer Chapa was at the T-intersection and believed he was closer to the
officers than he was.
He then saw Lt. Martinez’ wound and told him he was grazed. Lt. Pargas showed up and was
trying to get Lt. Martinez to get out and get checked but Lt. Martinez was trying to figure out how
to breach the door. He recalled Lt. Martinez saying they needed to figure out a way to get in.
Officer Chapa had never been to active shooter training.
Officer Chapa noticed the radios were not working.
Officer Chapa’s sister is a second-grade teacher and was there but not in the building. During this
incident he forgot she was at the school.
Officer Chapa saw the academy instructors show up with troopers as well. Officer Chapa saw the
shields show up, but they were not rated for AR-15. He overheard that SWAT was 40 minutes
away. They then began evacuating kids from classes.
Officer Chapa remained in the hallway on the northeast side of the T-intersection.
Officer Ruiz told Officer Chapa that it was his wife’s classroom and that she was not answering
her phone. Several people heard including Fire Marshall Hernandez. Officer Ruiz walked out for
a short while then came back and said she had been shot. Officer Ruiz said this in front of others
including Johnny Field.
Officer Chapa felt that Lt. Juan Martinez was in charge because he was setting up the command
post.
Border Patrol agents showed up and began to prepare for the injured. There was a moment when
they thought the shooter was in the ceiling.
After the entry was made Officer Chapa described the scene in the hallway until they cleared
everyone out.
Officer Chapa responded to the high school where he assisted in their release.
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Interview of Uvalde Fire Marshal Juan M. Hernandez by outside investigator Jesse Prado
CLEAT were present representing Fire Marshal Hernandez.
I played Fire Marshal Hernandez’ interview with the Texas Rangers that were conducted soon
after the events on May 24th, 2022, to assist his recollection. The Ranger division requested that
no offense report be written in the Uvalde Police Department report writing system and to notate
in the report that the officer’s statements were submitted to the Texas Rangers.
Fire Marshal Hernandez’ grandson was a student in the third grade at Robb Elementary and was
on campus during the incident.
The following is a summary of Fire Marshal Hernandez’ statement which was in response to my
questions:
Juan M. Hernandez is 57 years of age and has been employed by the City of Uvalde as a fire
marshal since 2008. The Fire Marshal’s duties are to perform public safety inspections of
buildings and review plans for new construction, mainly for fire safety.
F.M. Hernandez carries a police radio with him and works out of the Planning and Development
Department. His normal hours are 8 am to 5 pm. On May 24th, 2022, F.M. Hernandez recalled
dealing with a call that had come in regarding an incident when he overheard the call of an
accident at Grove and Geraldine. F.M. Hernandez helps the police with some calls when he can.
He then overheard the shooter was on school grounds. F.M. Hernandez then drove his
emergency vehicle to the school and parked near the front of the school.
F.M. Hernandez grabbed his AR-15 and put his vest on then ran onto school property. He stopped
with a female trooper who told him to go. He had already heard officers were shot. F.M.
Hernandez then reached the northeast side of the building and stacked with a group of officers,
which included Officer Justin Mendoza, Officer Morin.
They made an entry and approached the T-intersection where he saw Lt. Martinez and SSgt.
Canales. F.M. Hernandez also saw Johnny Field and Becco Diaz. F.M. Hernandez said he inspected
Lt. Martinez's head and saw that he had been grazed by a bullet and needed medical attention.
Lt. Martinez refused to leave.
F.M. Hernandez took a position with his rifle aimed down the hall while other agencies began
showing up. He was under the assumption that all exterior doors should have been locked and
they had entered an unlocked door. F.M. Hernandez did not know how long he was there but
was there supporting the officers. F.M. Hernandez has never attended ALERRT training. He
recalled when some shields were brought in. F.M. Hernandez saw Chief Arredondo giving him
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hand signals for more officers on the southside. F.M. Hernandez has been to basic SWAT training
in 2013.
F.M. Hernandez switched out with a deputy and UCISD Officer Ruben Ruiz came in and said his
wife just texted that was shot. F.M. Hernandez asked if she had kids with her. Officer Ruiz said he
did not know. While the children were being evacuated, F.M. Hernandez noticed the backpack
on the ground. DPS Trooper Colton opened the bag and saw 30 round magazines.
F.M. Hernandez made his way to the southside and saw two Border Patrol agents helping an
injured teacher out. F.M. Hernandez began testing keys that Chief Arredondo had already tried
but had no luck.
F.M. Hernandez then heard the breach and entered the classrooms. F.M. Hernandez described
the scene and left when they closed the building.
He went to his truck and heard the call to the high school and helped with the release of the
students.
F.M. Hernandez would question Lt. Javier Martinez and felt he was the highest-ranking officer in
the north hallway. F.M. Hernandez learned later that his grandson was okay.
F.M. Hernandez said that he never heard kids in the hallway and noted that it was also lunchtime
and kids may have been at lunch.
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10. Recommendations:
My recommendations are based on the facts and circumstances that have been detailed in this
administrative investigative report related to the actions of the Uvalde Police Department’s
officer response to the mass murder on May 24th, 2022, at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde,
Texas. The recommendations are viewed from the perspective of whether the actions of the
officer’s conduct were within the guidelines of the Uvalde Police Department’s policies while
engaged in the response to the critical incident on May 24, 2022.
Review of the Uvalde contact team’s actions
Lieutenant Javier Martinez

Exonerated - There were no indications of wrongdoing in his actions. No evidence of serious
acts of misconduct in direct violation of Uvalde Police Department’s policies was found in his
behavior in response to the incident.
Lt. Martinez was the highest-ranking Uvalde Police Officer on the contact team. Lt. Martinez
accurately recognized that a rifle-rated shield was needed to get past the shooter's viewable
zone so that he could reach and then begin to negotiate the door to room 111. Lt. Martinez was
shot at while at least 8’ away and struck by fragments. He recognized that the bullets were
coming through the walls and door leaving him unable to blindly shoot into a blacked-out
classroom with no line of sight. I find that Lieutenant Javier Martinez acted in good faith.
Staff Sergeant Eduardo Canales

SSgt. Canales was the second person on the contact team and also received injuries to his ear.
SSgt. Canales showed unmeasurable strength and focus in the performance of his duties. SSgt.
Canales had no doubt his own 10-year-old child was within an unknown class in the close
proximity of the class the shooter had taken possession of. SSgt. Canales had to step out to call
for the necessary equipment which included a phone call to the U.S. Marshal Service for the
proper shield, which is the one that was used to breach the door. SSgt. Canales remained
focused and did not learn about the well-being of his child until just before the room was
breached. I find that Staff Sergeant Eduardo Canales acted in good faith.
Detective Louis Landry

Exonerated -There were no indications of wrongdoing in his actions. No evidence of serious
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Det. Landry entered third behind SSgt. Canales from the northwest door to the building. There
was a point in the second approach by Lt. Martinez where he most likely confused Det. Landry
by hand signaling to lower his weapon when Det. Landry was pointing it at the vestibule area.
Lt. Martinez got in front of Det. Landry but did not motion for Det. Landry to do anything other
than lower his weapon. Lt. Martinez proceeded alone towards the door to get a better view but
could not see in and went back to the T-intersection. I find that Detective Louis Landry acted in
good faith.
Officer Ventura Chapa

Officer Chapa was the least experienced officer of the initial team that went into the building.
Officer Chapa was given an assortment of orders while in the building which he followed. I find
that Officer Ventura Chapa acted in good faith.
Lieutenant Mariano Pargas

Please see the “Review of Uvalde Police Command” section below for review.
Detective Renato Lualemaga

behavior in response to the incident. I find that Detective Renato Lualemaga acted in good
faith.
Sergeant Donald Page

Sergeant Page entered the building without his rifle rated vest and went directly to the
shooter's location guiding Lt. Martinez and SSgt. Canales to the vestibule. Sgt. Page remained in
a position with Chief Arredondo, covering the vestibule to room 111 and 112 until he was
relieved with an officer carrying a rifle. Sgt. Page then contacted Texas Ranger Kindell who
arrived, giving his own AR-15 to Sgt. Page then coordinated assets and gave valuable direction.
Sgt. Page was the first to locate a classroom of children who were evacuated. I find that
Sergeant Donald Page acted in good faith.
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Sergeant Daniel Coronado
behavior in response to the incident. I find that Sergeant Coronado acted in good faith.
Review of Officer’s actions that entered the building during the incident.
The following group of Uvalde police officers had supportive roles and followed the direction and orders
of their chain of command and the incident commander, Pedro “Pete” Arredondo.
Officer Randy Hill

behavior in response to the incident. I find that Officer Randy Hill acted in good faith.
Corporal Ramon Morin

behavior in response to the incident. I find that Corporal Ramon Morin acted in good faith.
Officer Jesus Mendoza

behavior in response to the incident. I find that Officer Jesus Mendoza acted in good faith.
Corporal Gregory Villa

behavior in response to the incident. I find that Corporal Gregory Villa acted in good faith.
Detective Ronald Rodriguez

Detective Rodriguez recognized during this incident that his good friend UCISD Officer Ruben
Ruiz, was in an unimaginable crisis with his wife Eva Mireles. Detective Rodriguez saw Officer
Ruiz handling his weapon in a manner that was not consistent with training. Detective
Rodriguez decided to disarm Officer Ruiz, to avoid a possible accidental discharge. Lt. Pargas
witnessed the event and took Officer Ruiz out to UCISD Lt. Hernandez where they sat in a
Tahoe. I find that Det. Rodriguez and Lt. Pargas acted lawfully and in the best interest of UCISD
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Officer Ruben Ruiz and the officers in the hallway in mind. I find that Detective Ronald
Rodriguez’ actions were in good faith.
Officer Max Dorflinger

Officer Dorflinger witnessed Lt. Pargas announcing that children were in classroom 112 and
were injured. Officer Dorflinger repeated this to approximately fourteen officers at the area of
the T-intersection of the hallway. Officer Dorflinger acted in good faith.
City of Uvalde Fire Marshal Juan M. Hernandez

behavior in response to the incident. I find that Fire Marshal Juan M. Hernandez acted in good
faith.
Review of Perimeter team - Officers that did not enter the building but assisted on the call
including 552 Diaz Street.
Detective Hoshi Cantu

Exonerated - violation of a direct order limiting her duties.
2.1 Rules Of Conduct
V. General Duties
B. Obedience to Rules of Conduct, Laws & Orders
3. Insubordination. Employees shall promptly obey all lawful orders and directions given by
supervisors and radio dispatchers. The failure or deliberate refusal of employees to obey such
orders shall be deemed insubordination and is prohibited. Flouting the authority of a
supervisor by displaying obvious disrespect or by disputing their orders shall likewise be
deemed insubordination. (TBP: 1.08)
Detective Cantu was on limited duty on the day of this incident and had a clear understanding
of the rules and limitations of her duties. Detective Cantu did not have a supervisor available to
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ask for permission and had to quickly decide to violate her restrictions, which were in place,
because she was almost nine months pregnant. Detective Cantu was the closest officer to the
ballistic shields and to save time engaged herself in the incident for the emergency safety of the
other officers and innocent civilians.
She was unable to lift the shields but found a custodian to help her load the car. Detective
Cantu delivered the shields to officers who were waiting for her. She saw the problem with the
need for crowd control. Detective Cantu put on her vest over her dress and grabbed her
weapon to help with the crowd until she was relieved. There was a need to help identify the
shooter and Detective Cantu then went to the shooter’s residence identifying him by
interviewing his grandfather. Detective Cantu also obtained a physical description from a
neighbor.
Detective Cantu stated that she knew she was in violation of the direct order to remain
restricted in her duties but felt compelled to assist in this extreme emergency. Upon
completion of her day, Detective Cantu stated she was swollen and extremely fatigued.
Detective Cantu recalled Lt. Pargas ordered her back to the office because of his concern for her
health. Lt. Pargas did not recall this order. Detective Cantu was forthcoming and understood
the possible consequences of her actions.
Every person on my investigative team agreed that Detective Cantu only acted under extreme
circumstances and because of her actions she provided valuable assets to the officers and
valuable information in identifying the shooter.
Therefore, it is my recommendation based on the facts and circumstances described above to
exonerate Detective Hoshi Cantu for Insubordination or any policy violation that may be
associated with her restricted/limited duty.
Exclusive of the above-listed facts and circumstances there were no indications of wrongdoing
in her actions. No evidence of serious misconduct in direct violation of Uvalde Police
Department’s policies was found in her behavior in response to the incident. Officer Cantu’s
actions were in good faith.
Corporal. Joshua Perez

behavior in response to the incident. I find Corporal Joshua Perez acted in good faith.
Sergeant Bobby Ruiz Sr.

behavior in response to the incident. I find Sergeant Bobby Ruiz Sr. acted in good faith.
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Lieutenant Juan Martinez
behavior in response to the incident. I find that Lieutenant Juan Martinez acted in good faith.
Sergeant Julian Arredondo

behavior in response to the incident. I find Sergeant Julian Arredondo acted in good faith.
Officer Joe Zamora

behavior in response to the incident. I find Officer Joe Zamora acted in good faith.
Officer Jessica Zamora

Exonerated - There were no indications of wrongdoing in her actions. No evidence of serious
acts of misconduct in direct violation of Uvalde Police Department’s policies was found in her
behavior in response to the incident. I find that Officer Jessica Zamora acted in good faith.
Officer Daniel Ruiz

behavior in response to the incident. I find Officer Daniel Ruiz acted in good faith.
Officer Daniel Martinez

behavior in response to the incident. I find Officer Daniel Martinez acted in good faith.
Officer Lee Ann Cantu

behavior in response to the incident. I find Officer Lee Ann Cantu acted in good faith.
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Review of Communications / Dispatchers
Jeanna Santellanes
Samantha Diaz
Myra Landry
Review of Uvalde Police Command
Acting Chief Lt. Mariano Pargas

Exonerated - Lt. Pargas was the Uvalde Police Department’s acting chief of police on May 22,
2022. He immediately responded to the active shooter incident from the police department’s
headquarters. As the acting chief of police, Lt. Pargas was responsible for overseeing the City of
Uvalde’s response for the employees and equipment to assist the Uvalde Independent
Consolidated School District Police Department in accordance with the established
Memorandum of Understanding and understanding of mutual aid. In the acting chief capacity,
Lt. Pargas was the highest-ranking officer from Uvalde P.D. at the incident. At no time did Lt.
Pargas officially assume the position as incident commander for the event. By the time he
arrived at the school, UCISD Chief Pedro “Pete” Arredondo was on scene and in the hallways of
the 4th grade building where the shooter was located. It is reasonable that Lt. Pargas assumed
that UCISD Chief Arredondo was the incident commander. It is also a reasonable position that
UCISD Lt. Hernandez was second-in-command of the event as he was present at the scene on
the campus of Robb Elementary.
In the after-action investigation, it is clear that Lt. Pargas could have performed a stronger role
in the overall incident command structure as established by the National Institute
Management/ICS systems. He was instructed by Chief Rodriquez, by phone, to get a command
post established. Lt. Pargas delegated that task to Lt. Juan Martinez after he arrived on scene
from being called back to duty on his time off. Lt. Pargas along with Uvalde Mayor Don
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McLaughlin tried to establish a command post at the funeral home across from the street but
were not successful in getting the other participating agencies immediate cooperation in
establishing the command post. Part of the delay was the immediate need to establish an
outer perimeter to keep concerned parents and relatives out of the interior scene. The Uvalde
Consolidated Independent School District did not establish a command post during the
incident. Matters were also complicated with the extraction of students from various
classrooms and coordinating the logistics of getting them to a safe location while also
accounting for their whereabouts and any possible medical assistance.
Lt. Pargas, acting as the Chief’s designee talked to Chief Rodriguez by phone and gave him a
brief update of the situation as he knew it at the time. Lt. Pargas committed Uvalde Police
Department resources to the UCISD as part of the MOU Agreement and mutual aid policy. With
the severity of the situation, he recognized it was going to be a long duration event with full
scale assistance required to support UCISD and the other responding agencies. Lt. Pargas was
aware that the US Border Patrol was providing additional mutual aid to UCISD and bringing in
additional equipment to assist.
There were no indications of wrongdoing in his actions. No evidence of serious acts of
misconduct in direct violation of Uvalde Police Department’s policies was found in his behavior
as acting chief of police in response to the incident. Lieutenant Mariano Pargas acted in good
faith during this incident.
Chief Daniel Rodriguez

Exonerated - Chief Rodriguez was out of town on official leave. He was notified of the incident
by Officer Jessica Zamora who called him at 9:30 AM (MST), two hours difference from Central
Standard Time (local for Uvalde, TX). He called Uvalde City Manager Vince DiPiazza and
informed him of the active shooter at Robb Elementary School. He tried calling UCISD Chief
Arredondo but did not get an answer. He then called Acting Chief, Lt. Pargas and he received
an update and told Lt. Pargas to get a command post set up. Chief Rodriguez continued to try
and contact Chief Arredondo by phone with no success. Chief Rodriguez updated City Manager
DiPiazza on the situation during the incident.
During the incident Chief Rodriguez handled several phone calls from assisting agencies that
were responding to Uvalde. He advised them he was not in town and to get with Acting Chief,
Lt. Pargas at the scene.
There were no indications of wrongdoing in Chief Rodriguez’s actions. No evidence of serious
behavior as acting chief of police in response to the incident.
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Respectfully Submitted,
Jesse L. Prado Jr.

JPPI Investigations L.L.C.
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Appendix A
Tactical & Training Conclusions and Recommendations

Author: Paul Ford
Frequently used Abbreviations:

UPD – Uvalde PD
BWC – Body Worn Camera
SWAT – Special Weapons & Tactics
NTOA - National Tactical Officer’s Association
TTPOA – Texas Tactical Police Officer’s Association
ALERRT – Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training
This report offers recommendations derived from a review of Uvalde PD Policy, statements
from employees and officers, body-worn camera footage, and other supplementary documents
and materials, including maps, diagrams, and equipment lists provided during the investigation,
as well as news reports.
The recommendations herein are presented as perspectives on the tactical readiness of the
UPD on May 24, 2022. In addition to the materials available for review, these recommendations
are based on my training, knowledge, and experience as a police officer, tactical officer, trainer,
and developer and co-developer of numerous training programs. Many of the
recommendations may have been suggested, implemented, or are now required by state law.
Nonetheless, the recommendations are stated as they pertain to the Robb Elementary School
incident on that day.
The key findings and recommendations concern the following areas: Active Shooter Policy,
Training, SWAT, and equipment. There may be recommendations in these areas that overlap.
However, efforts have been made to segregate them as best as possible.
Active Shooter Policies
In light of the investigation's objective to assess the alignment of officers' actions with UPD
policy, I have included policy recommendations first and how that may influence the behavior
and decisions of individuals confronting these circumstances in the future.
Policy 8.6 Active Shooter Response
Recommendation 1: Ensuring consistency in Active Shooter definitions across policy

statements. One discrepancy has been noted comparing the definition outlined in Section III.A.
of Policy 8.6 Active Shooter Response and the one presented on Page 12, Section IV of the
Patrol SOP. Either definition is acceptable. However, the patrol SOP provides a concise
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emphasis on law enforcement’s primary objective responding to an active shooter, which is
mass murder in progress, rather than engaging in other criminal activities like hostage-taking.
Policy 8.6 Active Shooter Response

Active Shooter Response – an incident where one or more armed individuals have used,
or are reasonably likely to use, deadly force in an ongoing manner, and where persons
have been injured, killed, or are under imminent threat of death or serious body injury
by such persons.
Patrol SOP, Section IV, A. Active Shooter Incident, 4. Definition Active Shooter
One or more subjects who participate in a random or systematic shooting spree,
demonstrating their intent to continuously harm others. Their overriding objective will
appear to be that of mass murder, rather than other criminal conduct, such as robbery,
hostage taking, etcetera.
Recommendation 2: Consider amending UPD Policy 8.6 Active Shooter Response, Section II.
Purpose, restating the policy’s purpose with more emphasis on the priority of immediate and
decisive action in an active shooter situation.
Recommendation 3: Review the active shooter policies in both 8.6 Active Shooter Response,
and the Patrol SOP Section IV. Patrol Field Tactics and Operational Procedures, for their
completeness or appropriateness within the policy. The distinction between policy,
procedures, tactics, and necessary equipment can be subtle and sometimes difficult to
distinguish. Given that there are numerous statements by officers regarding the lack of proper
tools and equipment, Section V. Field Response, B. Contact Team, gives an equipment directive
without stating in general, what that equipment is supposed to be: Directive B. 2.iii states “Is
the officer equipped to respond to the threat.”
Training
Active shooter training is a crucial element of a strong tactical response. It is essential that such
training prepares individual officers with comprehensive knowledge of policies, methods,
tactics, and skills relevant to handling active shooter situations. Moreover, the training should
provide officers with the opportunity to practice these skills through situational drills and then
apply them with a degree of realism in field training scenarios.
Following the Robb Elementary School active shooter incident, SB 1852 set forth the minimum
active shooter training requirements for Texas law enforcement officers. It was signed by Texas
Governor Greg Abbott, becoming effective on September 1, 2023.
There is evidence that some officers at UPD received active shooter training prior to this
incident. Some of the training was only months prior to this incident. However, there is no
evidence that the training was consistent or comprehensive, and it was not attended by
officer’s department wide. The following recommendations are suggested to sustain response
capabilities while continuously seeking improvement.
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Recommendation 3: Establish a UPD tactical training effort comprising two officers tasked with
leading a “UPD Active Shooter Readiness” training curriculum. This would exceed the minimum
requirements set forth by SB 1852 and emphasize the continuing education and readiness of
every officer over time. While not necessitating a full-time commitment, it would be
advantageous if these officers are already actively engaged in training roles within the
department.
Recommendation 4: To evaluate the UPD’s efficiency and readiness implement a Field Training
Exercise (FTX) to conduct a scenario-based event simulating a real-world incident, but in a
controlled environment.
Recommendation 5: Collaborate with both the Uvalde public and private sectors, to include the
Uvalde CISD and other nearby agencies to encourage active shooter response training for
employees, students, customers, and mutual cooperation between agencies.
Recommendation 6: Continuously seek outside input on active shooter response preparedness

and capabilities. Participate in tactical associations, tactical incident debriefings, and
conferences to foster creative tactical thought, share information, participating with variety of
other agencies in training. Examples include but are not limited to the following:
● Annual ALERRT Conference
● Texas Tactical Police Officer’s Association
● National Association of School Resource Officers (NASRO) School Safety Conference
● National Tactical Officers Association
SWAT
Since their inception, SWAT teams have been dedicated to the paramount goal of preserving
lives—both of citizens and police officers. This fundamental objective underscores the
invaluable role these teams play in responding to special threat situations, consistently
demonstrating their capacity to mitigate the risk of fatalities and serious bodily harm to officers
and innocent individuals.
The citizens of the City of Uvalde rightfully deserve the protective and rescue capabilities
afforded by a well-structured SWAT team, composed of carefully selected and extensively
trained officers capable of deploying a range of options in addressing special threat situations.
The UPD SWAT team that existed on the day of the Mass Murder at Robb Elementary School,
unfortunately, fell short of embodying the qualities of a contemporary law enforcement SWAT
team. It lacked the essential elements of organizational structure, command and control,
equipment readiness and resources, and comprehensive training. To maintain this crucial
capability, the UPD must earnestly address these shortcomings and recognize that these
recommendations are directed towards enhancing the UPD SWAT concept at the organizational
level rather than focusing on individual officers.
178 | Page
Recommendation 8: Abandon or put on hold the current SWAT concept in place at UPD. If this
decentralized model is the direction the agency wants to proceed, then it should be researched,
organized, have assets allocated, and be funded commensurate to what is required to meet
contemporary standards.
Recommendation 7: Consider other SWAT team models, such as participating in a regional

SWAT team or having a mutual assistance agreement with neighboring agencies.
Regional SWAT Task Force – The UPD participation in a collaborative initiative within a
regional SWAT team, comprised of carefully selected officers from UPD and partner
agencies. This cooperative alliance guarantees that the SWAT team maintains a full
complement of officers, pooled resources, and sufficient funding to effectively execute
its operational duties. If this is the goal of the UPD and such a framework does not exist
in the Uvalde region, proactive engagement with other agencies to champion the
concept and generate interest is the next step.
Mutual Assistance Agreement – Formal contractual arrangements established with a
neighboring police agency, usually a larger city with advanced SWAT capability, serving
as a strategic partner to augment the UPD's tactical operations during critical incidents,
such as barricaded subjects and hostage situations.
Equipment
A prevalent theme emerging from this incident is the claim of the lack of or inadequacy of
certain equipment by first responding officers, thus hindering their ability to swiftly intervene
and neutralize the suspect. Specifically, statements by officers concerned the absence of rifle
rated ballistic shields, and breaching tools.
On August 17, 2022, Texas Governor Greg Abbott announced a $50,000,000 Bullet Resistant
Shield Grant Program addressing fiscal year 2023. This grant funding addresses the perceived
need for updating and upgrading ballistic shield capabilities.
Although in this investigation, it has never been established with certainty whether the door to
the classroom was locked or unlocked, the second prevalent theme concerns the lack of
breaching tools to gain entry. The following recommendations concern primarily breaching
equipment. However, they are not for SWAT equipment, rather tools that are quickly accessible
from the trunk of a car and can be on scene with the first responders.
Recommendation 8: Select experienced officers and supervisors who are physically capable, as
well as committed to additional training and practice with breaching tools.
Most hand carried ballistic shields, regardless of ballistic rating, are heavy. Rifle rated NIJ Level
III, and manufacturer designated Level IV shields are notably heavy, like twice as much as NIJ
179 | Page
Rated Level IIIA shields of comparable size and are challenging and difficult to maneuver.
Hence, the need for physical fitness.
How to breach a door is never straightforward. It is a special skill acquired through repetitive
training, tactics, and the use of these tools. Breaching is always a challenge, even for skilled
operators. Breaching always occurs in a fatal funnel and is fraught with risk. Hence, there is the
need for additional training.
Recommendation 9: Designate UPD trainers to sustain UPD breaching equipment capabilities

and seek outside law enforcement “Train the Trainer” programs through the State and national
tactical associations. Also seek “Train the Trainer” programs through special equipment
providers.
● Tactical Breaching Instructor Certification Programs
Recommendation 10: Equip select the UPD front line officers with breaching equipment that
offers first responders with options. These may seem like basic options, but they are effective
and once these tools are mastered an agency can increase their portfolio of equipment options.
Hydraulic Jamb Spreader/Door Wedge – Highly portable device that allows an operator
to push door jambs apart or use as a tactical wedge to separate the door from the jamb
of both metal or wooden doors on the lock side.
Heavy Bolt Cutters – Active shooters have in the past used chains or cables to prevent
or slow ingress and ingress at soft target areas they have selected for mass murder.
A Claw Tool + Sledge Hammer – Identified as a JTC Tactical Claw, Halligan Tool, or as
was suggested in the ALERRT Assessment & Recommendations the Stanley Fat Max.
These are specific tools to be used in addition with a sledge hammer, which is
sometimes required to set the narrow pointed teeth of the claw into the gap of the
door.
Closing Remarks
In conclusion, the recommendations outlined in this report, are intended to be practical and
geared towards improvement, aiming to increase the likelihood of a better outcome should a
similar incident occur again in UPD’s jurisdiction. The nature of tactical operations and the
culture of tactical units encourage open debriefing and self-criticism. Therefore, the suggestions
for remediation should be viewed in a positive light, aimed at correcting deficiencies, resolving
noted issues, and contributing positively to a more effective and responsive tactical framework
for the UPD.
180 | Page
References
City of Uvalde. (2019, August 5). Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Uvalde
Police Department and the Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department.
City of Uvalde.
Course Curriculum Materials and Updates. (2024, February 16). Texas Commission on Law
Enforcement. Retrieved February 18, 2024, from https://www.tcole.texas.gov/course-
curriculum-materials-and-updates
International Association of Chiefs of Police. (2018, April). Model Policy - Active Shooter.
International Association of Chiefs of Police. Retrieved February 18, 2024, from
https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/ActiveShooterPolicy2018.pdf
State of Texas. (2019, April 25). 86(R) HB 2195 - Enrolled version. Texas Legislature Online.
Retrieved February 18, 2024, from
https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/86R/billtext/pdf/HB02195F.pdf#navpanes=0
State of Texas. (2024, February 9). EDUCATION CODE CHAPTER 37. DISCIPLINE; LAW AND
ORDER. Texas Statutes. Retrieved February 18, 2024, from
https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/ED/htm/ED.37.htm
State of Texas. (2024, February 9). OCCUPATIONS CODE CHAPTER 1701. LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICERS. Texas Statutes. Retrieved February 18, 2024, from
https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/OC/htm/OC.1701.htm#1701.601
State of Texas. (2024, February 15). EDUCATION CODE CHAPTER 37. DISCIPLINE; LAW AND
ORDER. Texas Statutes. Retrieved February 18, 2024, from
https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/ED/htm/ED.37.htm
Straub, F., Cambria, J., Gorban, B., Meade, B., Waltemeyer, D., & Zeunik, J. (2017). Rescue,
Response, and Resilience: A Critical Incident Review of the Orlando Public Safety Response to the
181 | Page
Attack on the Pulse Ni. Community Oriented Policing Services - Agency Portal. Retrieved
February 18, 2024, from https://portal.cops.usdoj.gov/resourcecenter/ric/Publications/cops-
w0857-pub.pdf
Texas Commission On Law Enforcement. (2020, January). Active Shooter Response for School-
Based Law Enforcement. State of Texas.
Texas Police Chiefs Association. (2024, February 3). TPCAF Accreditation Program. Texas Police
Chiefs Association. Retrieved February 18, 2024, from
https://www.texaspolicechiefs.org/accreditation-program
Uvalde Police Department. (2013, December 18). Patrol Division Standard Operational
Procedures. Uvalde Police Department.
Uvalde Police Department. (2013, December 18). Policy 8.1 Unusual Occurrences and Special
Events. Uvalde Police Department.
Uvalde Police Department. (2013, December 18). Policy 8.3 Special Weapons and Tactics Team.
Uvalde Police Department.
Uvalde Police Department. (2015, September 01). Policy 8.6 Active Shooter Response. Uvalde
Police Department.
182 | Page

JPPI Investigation Report - 3.7.2024

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JPPI INVESTIGATIONS LLC

2421 STATE HWY 71 W

City Attorney Paul J. Tarski of Tarski Law

JPPI Case # 2022_07_15 Uvalde

Prado's exceptional dedication and effectiveness garnered him numerous commendations

Others that contributed to this investigation report were:

Nevaeh Alyssa Bravo, 10

Jacklyn “Jackie” Cazares, 9

Makenna Lee Elrod, 10

Jose Flores Jr., 10

Eliahna “Ellie” Amyah Garcia, 9

Uziyah Sergio Garcia, 10

Xavier James Lopez, 10

Jayce Carmelo Luevanos, 10

Tess Marie Mata, 10

Alithia Haven Ramirez, 10

Annabell Guadalupe Rodriguez, 10

Maite Yuleana Rodriguez, 10

Alexandria “Lexi” Aniyah Rubio, 10

Layla Marie Salazar, 11

Jalilah Nicole Silguero, 10

Eliahna Cruz Torres, 10

Rojelio Fernandez Torres, 10

Irma Linda Garcia, 48

● Interviews of witnesses and officers

Uvalde Police Department

Texas Department of Public Safety Uvalde police officer statements

On July 28th, I signed a Non-disclosure Agreement through DNRB&Z PC attorney Clarissa

Uvalde County District Attorney Christina Mitchell

I received the following from the Uvalde District Attorney in a packet.

United States Border Patrol – Documents and evidence

The Department of Justice Report was released in January 2024.

Uvalde Police Officer and Dispatcher interviews conducted by Investigator Jesse

2) Memorandum of Understanding between Uvalde Police and Uvalde Consolidated

3) Review of the Uvalde contact team’s actions

4) Analysis of Active Shooter Response for School-Based Law Enforcement

7) Review of Communications / Dispatchers

8) Review of Uvalde Police Command

9) Uvalde Police Officer interview summaries

Comparison IACP Model Policy:

Contact Officer / Team:

Rescue Task Force / Rescue Team:

Comparison Texas Police Chiefs Association Model Policy:

The sections are identical.

Active Shooter Response:

Concepts and Principles:

Additional Uvalde Police Department Policies:

Uvalde Police Department’s Standard Operational Procedures:

Texas Education Code, Subchapter C. Law And Order

Texas Occupations Code

Section 1701.601. Definition

Example of view of lighted hallway from inside a classroom

Evacuations and time leading to breaching the classroom.

Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department

The learning objective further states,

The objective continues with,

Scenario-Based Training Section:

Texas Basic Peace Officer Course:

● Det. Hoshi Cantu

Timeline of incoming and outgoing calls on May 24, 2022

Review of the Uvalde contact team’s actions

Lieutenant Javier Martinez