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breakingballsfinal
breakingballsfinal
Abstract
Whenever a pitcher throws a breaking ball with a runner on third base,
he risks allowing the ball go past the catcher and allowing the runner
to score. In this article, I analyze the optimal behavior of the players
in such a scenario. With decent control and competent catchers, the
pitcher throws breaking balls at the same rate he would if the bases were
empty. Knowing that a wild breaking ball will occasionally score from
third without a swing, the batter anticipates more fastballs. Yet, because
the batter throws pitches at the same rate, the batter’s ability to guess
the correct pitch is the same in both instances.
1 Introduction
With a runner on third base, the pitcher faces a dilemma. Throwing breaking
balls is risky because the ball may go past the catcher, thereby allowing the
runner to score without a hit. But if the pitcher avoids throwing breaking balls
altogether, the batter can anticipate fastballs exclusively, increasing his ability
to record a hit, which scores the runner anyway.
Using a game theoretical framework, this paper shows how each player op-
timally solves the dilemma. Our intuition (and the broadcasters we listen to)
might tell us that, to decrease the likelihood of the runner scoring on a wild
pitch or passed ball, the pitcher increases his fastball frequency. Consequently,
the batter anticipates more fastballs and is therefore more likely to record a hit,
as the pitcher has adopted a more predictable strategy.
In actuality, after solving the each player’s optimal strategy, it turns out
only one part of this intuition is correct. When the players strategize correctly,
the batter anticipates more fastballs. However, the pitcher continues throwing
breaking balls at the same frequency as before, which makes the batter equally
successful at guessing the correct pitch with a man on third base as with third
base empty.
2 The Model
To establish a baseline for comparison, I begin this section by formally defining
a pitching situation with the bases empty. I then introduce the added tradeoff
of a man on third and find the solution of the more complex game. Afterward,
I compare the results of the two models to prove my claims.
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Breaking Balls with a Runner on Third William Spaniel
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Breaking Balls with a Runner on Third William Spaniel
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Breaking Balls with a Runner on Third William Spaniel
for changeups, 0.60% for curveballs, 0.73% for sliders, and 1.37% for knuckleballs. See “A
Pitchf/x Look at Passed Balls and Wild Pitches” by Dave Allen.
5 A knife-edge condition is when an input (here, X) must be equal to an exact value for the
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Breaking Balls with a Runner on Third William Spaniel
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Breaking Balls with a Runner on Third William Spaniel
1+X
σBF =
2
To verify that this is a valid, non-deterministic probability distribution (that
is, σBF is between 0 and 1), note that both the numerator and denominator are
positive, and that 2 > 1 + X since X ∈ (0, 1). These two properties preserve
the fact that σBF is a strictly positive number less than 1.
Therefore, in equilibrium, when X ∈ (0, 1) the pitcher throws fastballs and
sliders both with probability 12 , while the batter guesses fastball with probability
1+X
2 and guesses slider with probability 1−X 2 .
3 Comparative Statics
Comparative statics analyze changes in equilibrium behavior as a function of
changes to the game’s parameters. In the strategic situation presented here,
there are two such parameters: whether the bases are empty or there is a man
on third, and the likelihood that a ball goes past the catcher (represented by
X).
Two things are immediately apparent. First, the pitcher only changes his
behavior in the case with a runner on third and X > 1, where he throws fastballs
exclusively. Substantively, when X > 1, the pitcher is so wild, the catcher is
so ineffective at blocking balls in the dirt, and the runner at third is so fast
that the pitcher would rather be predictable with his fastball than risk having
a slider go past the catcher.
Although mathematically possible, the situation seems unlikely at the major
league level; it requires a level of pitching inconsistency and catcher incompe-
tency unbecoming of a professional baseball player. Perhaps the only major
league application is when an emergency catcher is behind the plate or a po-
sition player is on the mound. At that point, the pitcher may simply want to
throw fastballs exclusively.
The second obvious difference is that the batter looks for a fastball more
frequently with a runner on third and X ∈ (0, 1) than with the bases empty.
To see this, recall that the probability he guesses fastball with the bases empty
equals 12 , while the probability he guesses fastball with a man on third and
X ∈ (0, 1) equals 1+X2 . Note that
1+X
2 > 12 because X > 0. So, as X increases,
the probability the batter guesses fastball increases.6
To the observer, the batter displays a type of risk aversion here. He knows if
the pitcher throws a slider, the runner will score with some probability no matter
what he guessed. So guessing fastball more frequently increases his minimum
payoff. However, he cannot guess fastball too often (that is, more frequently
that 1+X2 ), otherwise the pitcher’s best response is to always throw a slider,
despite the risk of scoring the runner from third.
6 That is, the derivative of 1+X
2
with respect to X equals 21 . Since X ∈ (0, 1) in this case,
the derivative is always positive on the relevant interval for X and thus the probability 1+X 2
is increasing as a function of X.
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Breaking Balls with a Runner on Third William Spaniel
he is more likely to because he can always anticipate the pitch that is thrown to him.
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Breaking Balls with a Runner on Third William Spaniel
ity that each outcome occurs in equilibrium. Recall the probability the pitcher
throws a fastball equals 12 and the probability he throws a slider also equals
1 1+X
2 . Meanwhile, the batter guesses fastball with probability 2 and guesses
1−X
slider with probability 2 . Thus, the probability the pitcher throws a fast-
ball and the batter guesses fastball equals ( 12 )( 1+X
2 ), the probability the pitcher
throws slider and the batter guesses fastball equals ( 21 )( 1+X 2 ), the probabil-
ity the pitcher throws fastball and the batter guesses slider equals ( 12 )( 1−X 2 ),
and the probability the pitcher throws a slider and the batter guesses a slider
equals ( 12 )( 1−X
2 ). Multiplying these probabilities by the pitcher’s payoffs in the
outcomes they represent yields the pitcher’s overall expected utility:
1 1+X 1 1+X
EUP = (−1) + (−X)
2 2 2 2
1 1−X 1 1−X
+ (0) + (−1 − X)
2 2 2 2
−1 − X
EUP =
2
It is easy to see that as X increases, the pitcher’s expected utility decreases.8
Thus, since the pitcher’s ability to control his slider and the catcher’s ability to
block the slider decrease X, these skill sets increase the pitcher’s overall payoff.9
However, pitcher and catcher incompetence can only reduce the pitcher’s payoff
by so much; if X > 1, the pitcher always throws a fastball and the batter always
guesses fastball, leading the pitcher to earn -1 with certainty.
4 Conclusion
This article investigated the strategic dynamics of pitching with a runner on
third base. I found that, when players strategize optimally, a runner on third
only changes the pitcher’s behavior in extreme circumstances. When the pitcher
has some control over his breaking balls and the catcher can competently block
balls in the dirt, pitchers optimally throw as they would with the bases empty.
On the other hand, the batter focuses on fastballs, knowing that there is some
chance the runner will score without a hit on a breaking ball.
Since the model provides derives specific expectations, future research could
investigate whether players play according to the optimal parameters. How-
ever, this may prove complicated. Note that the model investigated a simplified
world where the pitcher and batter are unconcerned about the type of out
recorded. Yet, with one out, a deep flyball out is much worse for the pitcher
than a groundball, which increases the complexity of drawing direct compar-
isons between when the bases are empty and when there is a runner on third.
8 That is, the derivative of pitcher’s payoff with respect to X equals −1 , so the payoff
2
function is decreasing in X.
9 This result should be unsurprising. See “Blocking Pitches: Assessing a Catcher’s Ability
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Breaking Balls with a Runner on Third William Spaniel
Fortunately, this concern disappears with two outs, since the third out is strate-
gically the same no matter how it is recorded.10 Given the incorrect intuition
presented at the beginning of the article, it may very well be that players engage
in suboptimal behavior.
5 Appendix
This appendix solves the game with a runner on third when X = 1. To begin,
note that throwing a fastball weakly dominates throwing a slider for the pitcher.
Both players selecting fastball is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. However,
infinitely many partially mixed strategy Nash equilibria also exist in which the
batter plays fastball as a pure strategy and the pitcher mixes.
The batter’s expected utility for guessing fastball as a function of the pitcher’s
mixed strategy σP F equals:
1 ≥ (1 − σP F )(2)
1
σP F ≥
2
Since the pitcher is indifferent to throwing a fastball and throwing a slider
when the batter is guessing fastball, any σP F ∈ [ 21 , 1) constitutes a partially
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
6 Works Cited
“A Pitchf/x Look at Passed Palls and Wild Pitches,” Dave Allen, accessed
February 24, 2012, http://baseballanalysts.com/archives/2009/11/
a_pitchfx_look.php.
10 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this issue and a way to work
around it.