26.2.2009   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 47/8

(1)

The decision was addressed to A. Raymond Sarl (hereafter ‘A. Raymond’), Berning & Söhne GmbH & Co. KG (hereafter ‘Berning’), Coats Holdings Ltd, Coats Deutschland GmbH (hereafter ‘Coats group’), Scovill Fasteners Inc., Scovill Fasteners Europe S.A. (hereafter ‘Scovill group’), William Prym GmbH & Co. KG, Prym Inovan GmbH & Co. KG, Éclair Prym Group S.A. (hereafter ‘Prym group’), YKK Corporation Japan, YKK Holding Europe B.V., YKK Stocko Fasteners GmbH (hereafter ‘YKK group’) and Fachverband Verbindungs- und Befestigungstechnik (hereafter ‘VBT’).

(2)

The products concerned by the four separate infringements were zip fasteners, other metal and plastic fasteners (hereinafter ‘other fasteners’) and attaching machines. Each of the four infringements covered the whole territory of the Community.

(3)

The findings in this Decision arise out of inspections carried out by the Commission in November 2001 pursuant to Article 14(3) of Regulation 17 at the premises of several producers of hard and soft haberdashery products. These inspections and other investigative measures by the Commission triggered applications from Prym group, Coats group and YKK group for immunity or reduction of fines under the Commission's leniency programme. A first Statement of Objections was notified to the parties in September 2004 and a supplementary Statement of Objections was notified in March 2006. An oral hearing was held in July 2006.

(4)

The Commission discovered evidence that the undertakings had taken part in one or several single and continuous infringements of Article 81(1) of the Treaty.

(5)

This cartel involved A. Raymond, Berning, the Scovill group, the Prym group, the YKK group and the association VBT and ran from 24 May 1991 until at least 15 March 2001. During this period the above undertakings agreed among other things on coordinated price increases in annual ‘price rounds’ and exchanged confidential information on prices and the implementation of price increases with respect to ‘other fasteners’ and their attaching machines. This collusion took place in the framework of the work circles organised by the trade association VBT.

(6)

This cartel involved the Prym group and the YKK group and ran from 13 August 1999 until at least 13 January 2003. During this period the two leading manufacturers of fastening products in Europe fixed prices on a product-by-product and country-by-country basis and allocated customers with respect to ‘other fasteners’ and their attaching machines.

(7)

This cartel involved the YKK group, the Coats group and the Prym group and ran from 28 April 1998 until at least 12 November 1999. During this period the three manufacturers of zip fasteners met on a number of occasions to exchange price information and to discuss price increases. The three undertakings also agreed on a methodology to set minimum prices for zip fasteners in Europe.

(8)

This cartel involved the Coats group and the Prym group and ran for more than 21 years, from 15 January 1977 until at least 15 July 1998. The products concerned by the cartel were zip fasteners and ‘other fasteners’. During the period of infringement the two undertakings shared the market for haberdashery, namely by preventing the Coats group from entering the market for ‘other fasteners’.

(9)

In fixing the amount of the fines, the Commission took into account the gravity and duration of the infringements, as well as the existence of aggravating and/or attenuating circumstances.

(10)

The association VBT was, however, considered separately given its specific role as an association of undertakings which performed different tasks and made different decisions from the parties to the agreements and considering that VBT's participation in the cartel arrangements was limited primarily to its role as secretariat for the Baseler and Wuppertaler work circles and facilitator of the price arrangement between the cartel members (which are addressees of this decision as well). The Commission, therefore, considered it appropriate to impose a symbolic fine on VBT of EUR 1 000 for its participation in the Baseler-Wuppertaler and Amsterdamer infringement (Cartel 1), in accordance with point 5(d) of the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty (2) (hereafter ‘the Guidelines on fines’).

(11)

Taking into account the nature of the infringements, their likely impact on the market and their geographical scope, the Commission concluded that all four infringements should be qualified as very serious.

(12)

Within the category of very serious infringements, the scale of likely fines makes it possible to apply differential treatment to undertakings in order to take account of differences in their effective economic capacity to cause significant damage to competition.

(13)

The undertakings were divided into two different categories according to their relative importance in the market. The YKK group and the Prym group were placed in a first category and the Scovill group, A. Raymond and Berning in a second category.

(14)

In view of their relative importance in the market, both the YKK group and the Prym group were placed in the same category.

(15)

In setting the starting amount for the two undertakings, the level of the starting amount imposed on the same undertakings in relation to Cartel 1 was taken into consideration. The bilateral infringement (Cartel 2) ran partly in parallel with the multilateral infringement (Cartel 1) on the same product markets and constituted an arrangement by which the two leading manufacturers reinforced their cooperation to achieve incremental effects on the relevant markets.

(16)

The undertakings were divided into three different categories according to their relative importance in the market. The YKK group was placed in a first category, the Coats group in a second category and the Prym group in a third category.

(17)

In view of the nature of this infringement it was not appropriate to apply any differential treatment to the two undertakings concerned.

(18)

In order to set the amount of the fine at a level which ensures a sufficiently deterrent effect, the Commission considered it appropriate to apply a multiplication factor to the fines imposed.

(19)

With its worldwide turnover the YKK group is a much larger player than the other addressees. Accordingly, the Commission considered it appropriate to multiply the fines for the YKK group.

(20)

Individual multiplying factors were also applied according to the duration of the infringement by each legal entity.

(21)

In line with point 28 of the Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (3) (hereafter ‘2002 Leniency Notice’), the applications for immunity and/or leniency concerning Cartels 1 and 2 were assessed under that notice, whereas the applications concerning Cartels 3 and 4 were assessed under the Commission notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases (4) (hereafter ‘1996 Leniency Notice’).

(22)

Unlike point 23 of the 2002 Leniency Notice, the 1996 Leniency Notice does not provide for any specific reward to a leniency applicant that discloses facts previously unknown to the Commission and affecting the gravity or duration of the cartel. It is therefore appropriate to consider any such cooperation under the attenuating factors.

(23)

As the Coats group and the YKK group provided the Commission with facts previously unknown to the Commission, which permitted the Commission to establish the entire duration of Cartel 3 (tripartite zip infringement), the two undertakings qualified for an attenuating factor justifying a reduction of the basic amount of the fine to be imposed on the two undertakings for this infringement.

(24)

With respect to Cartels 3 and 4 the addressees of the Decision cooperated with the Commission for the purpose of receiving the favourable treatment set out in the 1996 Leniency Notice.

(25)

In accordance with Section D of the 1996 Leniency Notice and in view of the Coats group's and the Prym group's level of cooperation, both undertakings were granted a 35 % reduction of the fine that would otherwise have been imposed for this infringement if they had not cooperated with the Commission. The YKK group was, however, not granted any reduction of the fine under the 1996 Leniency Notice.

(26)

In accordance with section C of the 1996 Leniency Notice and in view of the Prym group's extensive and substantial cooperation, the undertaking was granted a reduction of 75 % of the fine that would otherwise have been imposed for this infringement if it had not cooperated with the Commission.

(27)

With respect to Cartels 1 and 2 the addressees of the Decision cooperated with the Commission for the purpose of receiving the favourable treatment set out in the 2002 Leniency Notice.

(28)

The evidence submitted by the Prym group represented significant added value with respect to the evidence already in the Commission's possession, strengthening the Commission's ability to prove the facts of the anti-competitive practices. The Prym group was the first undertaking to meet point 21 of the 2002 Leniency Notice and was granted a 30 % reduction of the fine.

(29)

The evidence submitted by the YKK group represented significant added value with respect to the evidence already in the Commission's possession, strengthening the Commission's ability to prove the facts of the anti-competitive practices. The YKK group was the second undertaking to meet point 21 of the 2002 Leniency Notice and was granted a 20 % reduction of the fine.

(30)

The Prym group's submission enabled the Commission to find an infringement of Article 81 of the Treaty. Hence, the Prym group qualified for full immunity from the fine.

(31)

The evidence submitted by the YKK group represented significant added value with respect to the evidence already in the Commission's possession, strengthening the Commission's ability to prove the facts of the anti-competitive practices. The YKK group was the first undertaking to meet point 21 of the 2002 Leniency Notice and was granted a 40 % reduction of the fine.

(32)

The following undertakings infringed Article 81 of the Treaty by agreeing, for the periods indicated, on coordinated price increases and by exchanging confidential information on prices and the implementation of price increases:

(33)

The following undertakings infringed Article 81 of the Treaty by agreeing, for the periods indicated, to fix prices, notably minimum, average and target prices, to monitor price increases through the regular exchanges of price lists and frequent bilateral contacts, and to allocate customers by not undercutting each other's offers to clients:

(34)

The following undertakings infringed Article 81 of the Treaty, for the periods indicated, by exchanging price information, by discussing prices and price increases between themselves, and by agreeing on a methodology to fix minimum prices for standard products:

(35)

The following undertakings infringed Article 81 of the Treaty, for the periods indicated, by agreeing to share the haberdashery market by preventing Coats Group from entering the market for ‘other fasteners’:

(36)

For the infringements referred to above, the following fines were imposed:

Cartel 1: The Baseler-Wuppertaler and Amsterdamer cooperation

Cartel 2: The bilateral cooperation between the Prym group and the YKK group

Cartel 3: The tripartite cooperation between the YKK group, the Coats group and the Prym group

Cartel 4: The bilateral cooperation between the Coats group and the Prym group

(37)

The undertakings listed above shall immediately bring to an end their infringement, insofar as they have not already done so. They shall refrain from repeating any act or conduct as the infringement found in this case, and from any act or conduct having the same or similar object or effect.