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170th Rifle Division (Soviet Union)

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170th Rifle Division (September 15, 1939 – October 4, 1941)
170th Rifle Division (January 31, 1942 – July 1945)
Active1939–1945
Country Soviet Union
Branch Red Army
TypeInfantry
SizeDivision
EngagementsBattle of Smolensk (1941)
Operation Typhoon
Battle of Demyansk Pocket
Battle of Kursk
Operation Kutuzov
Gomel-Rechitsa offensive
Parichi-Bobruisk offensive
Operation Bagration
Bobruysk offensive
Lublin-Brest offensive
Vistula-Oder offensive
East Prussian offensive
DecorationsOrder of the Red Banner Order of the Red Banner (2nd Formation)
Order of Suvorov 2nd Class Order of Suvorov (2nd Formation)
Battle honoursRechytsa (2nd Formation)
Commanders
Notable
commanders
Maj. Gen. Tikhon Konstantinovich Silkin
Col. Nikolai Matveevich Laskin
Col. Ivan Vladimirovich Panchuk
Col. Stepan Ignatevich Ushakov
Col. Abram Mikhailovich Cheryak
Col. Semyon Grigorovich Tsiplenkov

The 170th Rifle Division was originally formed as an infantry division of the Red Army in the Ural Military District in September 1939, based on the shtat (table of organization and equipment) of that same month. It was still in this District at the time of the German invasion as part of 22nd Army and began moving west by rail, joining Western Front when it arrived at the fighting front well to the north of Polotsk. During early July 1941 it was encircled along with its 51st Rifle Corps near the town of Nevel and struggled to break out at the cost of considerable losses in personnel and equipment. After the first battles around Velikiye Luki it was partly rebuilt with the escaped elements the other divisions of its former Corps, but it was again encircled in late August and reduced to remnants. By the beginning of October this cadre had been moved to 24th Army in Reserve Front for another rebuilding but during Operation Typhoon it was so severely depleted that it had to be disbanded a few days later.

A new 170th was formed between December 1941 and January 1942. In April it joined 34th Army in Northwestern Front, which was engaged in the dismal fighting around Demyansk. In July it was reassigned to 11th Army in the same Front and took part in three futile and costly offensives in August, September and November to sever the corridor that joined German 16th Army to its forces inside the pocket. After these forces evacuated Demyansk in February 1943 the 170th was assigned to 53rd Army and moved south to join Central Front inside the Kursk salient. In June it was moved to 48th Army of that Front and it would remain in this Army, with one brief exception, for the duration of the war, mostly as part of 42nd Rifle Corps. The division saw little combat during the German Kursk offensive, but went over to the offensive itself on July 15 when Central Front joined the operation against the German-held Oryol salient. This objective was reached around August 18, and within days the 170th began an advance through northeastern Ukraine toward eastern Belarus. In November, as part of the renamed Belorussian Front it won a battle honor for its part in the liberation of Rechytsa. Through the winter it participated in several battles through the frozen swamps and along the many river lines of this region, after February 1944 as part of the renamed 1st Belorussian Front.

1st Formation[edit]

The division was first organized at Sterlitamak in the Ural Military District in September 1939, based on a cadre from the 98th Rifle Division, as part of the major pre-World War II mobilization of the Red Army. The division was mostly composed of Bashkir soldiers and was commanded by Kombrig Tikhon Konstantinovich Silkin; this officer would have his rank modernized to major general on June 4, 1940. Divisional headquarters and most units were based at Sterlitamak. The 422nd Rifle and 512th Howitzer Regiments were at Belebey, and the 717th Rifle Regiment was at Davlekanovo. The 294th Light Artillery Regiment was based at Miass.[1]

On June 22, 1941, its order of battle was as follows:

  • 391st Rifle Regiment
  • 422nd Rifle Regiment
  • 717th Rifle Regiment
  • 294th Light Artillery Regiment
  • 512th Howitzer Regiment
  • 210th Antitank Battalion[2]
  • 286th Antiaircraft Battalion
  • 134th Reconnaissance Battalion
  • 182nd Sapper Battalion
  • 210th Signal Battalion
  • 154th Medical/Sanitation Battalion
  • 140th Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Platoon
  • 49th Motor Transport Battalion
  • 132nd Field Bakery
  • 481st Field Postal Station
  • 366th Field Office of the State Bank

Battle of Smolensk[edit]

As the German invasion began on June 22, 1941, the 170th was moving west from the Urals as part of 22nd Army's 62nd Rifle Corps,[3] and was scheduled to arrive, with its Corps, at Sebezh by July 2.[4][5] This Army was under the command of Lt. Gen. F. A. Yershakov. By the beginning of July the division had been reassigned to 51st Rifle Corps, still in 22nd Army, joining the 98th and 112th Rifle Divisions. By July 10 the Army had been assigned to Western Front,[6] where it took up positions on the Front's far right (north) flank.

Late on July 11 it was reported that the Front's forces:

fought with attacking enemy units in the Sebezh, Osveia, Borkovichi, Gorodok, Vitebsk, Barsuki Station, and Borkolobovo region, while directing its main efforts at liquidating the enemy's advancing Vitebsk grouping.

The 170th, on the north flank of 22nd Army and therefore the extreme right flank of the Front, was said to have attacked with its right wing at 1000 hours, while continuing to fight along its previous positions with its left wing. The Army was facing the German VIII Army Corps and XXXIX Motorized Corps. At 0300 hours on July 12, Lt. Gen. G. K. Malandin, the Front's chief of staff, sent instructions to Yershakov and to 19th Army to his south to prepare for a counterstroke on Vitebsk, to start at 0800. These plans were completely preempted when the LVII Motorized Corps, with the cooperation of 9th Army's L and XXIII Army Corps, drove 22nd Army out of its defenses along the Western Dvina River northwest of Polotsk, cut it into two parts, and threatened both with encirclement. The German armored units bypassed Polotsk and pushed north toward Nevel. Western Front's commander, Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, ordered Yershakov to withdraw to new defenses.[7]

First Battle of Velikiye Luki[edit]

Timoshenko issued new orders on July 14 urging that the German penetrations be cut off and eliminated. Yershakov was to withdraw his 98th and 112th Divisions to "smooth out the front". Over the next two days he became more realistic, and directed his deputy, Lt. Gen. A. I. Yeryomenko, to establish a new defense line from Nevel south to just north of Smolensk.[8] On July 15, General Silkin was removed from his command and placed at the disposal of 22nd Army, and on July 21, after the recapture of Velikiye Luki, he was made commander of its garrison. His subsequent fate is obscure. According to surviving PoWs, Yershakov stated, prior to his own death in captivity, that Silkin had died in battle when the city was again captured on August 29. German reports say that a Soviet command headquarters blew itself up in a dugout during this fighting. He has been considered missing in action since October 1941.

Col. Nikolai Matveevich Laksin took command of the 170th; he had been serving as chief of 22nd Army's combat training section. After taking Nevel on July 15, following a battle with the 170th and the 48th Tank Division, the LVII Motorized was ordered to capture Velikiye Luki. This was accomplished at nightfall on July 18 with an isolated thrust by 19th Panzer and 14th Motorized Divisions.[9] The loss of Nevel had already pocketed 51st Corps, the 179th Rifle Division of 62nd Corps, plus three divisions of Northwestern Front's 27th Army. The commander of Army Group North believed, from the papers found on a captured courier, that a total of 13 divisions were trapped, but the OKH was less optimistic. The elimination of this pocket would effectively dispose of any threat to the Army Group's right flank as it advanced on Leningrad.[10]

After the loss of Nevel the 170th, 179th and 48th Tanks withdrew toward Velikiye Luki in some disorder but aided by the comparatively good road between these two places. 14th Motorized was especially overextended and vulnerable to counterattack, and the escaping troops pressed against the light screen it had erected south of Nevel and 12th Infantry Division's blocking positions north of that place. On July 19 the STAVKA ordered 29th Army to begin preparing an attack from the Toropets area toward Velikiye Luki with three divisions. Overnight on July 19/20 this force overran a sector lightly held by 14th Motorized and broke into the clear. 19th Panzer sent a battlegroup to intercept but this ran into unexpectedly stiff resistance. It then abandoned the city itself.[11]

Meanwhile, on July 21 Yershakov was ordered to tie down German forces with local attacks beginning the next day. On July 24, Timoshenko reported the liberation of the city, with the attackers taking up defensive positions along the Lovat River to the north and south. In the process of withdrawing from encirclement, 51st Corps had lost its headquarters as well as the bulk of the 98th and 112th Divisions. The 170th was reported as fighting along a line from Stankovo to Lake Udrai with one group at 0600 hours on July 21 while a second group remained in encirclement and was attempting to escape. At 2000 on July 23 Yershakov effectively admitted that only remnants of the Corps had been able to break out; the division had been attacking to the southwest from the Kozhemiachkino area in and effort to assist its corps-mates to escape.[12]

On July 26 the 170th moved to the Dokuhino area, where it absorbed the remnants of the 98th and 112th Divisions. The following day Yershakov reorganized his Army to defend along the Lovat through Velikiye Luki to Lake Dvine, which was 45km to the southeast. He was directed to hold the city "at all cost". German 9th Army now took up the front south of the city from LVII Motorized but made no immediate effort to retake it. Late on August 3, Western Front reported that the 170th, now back under 62nd Rifle Corps, had repelled an attack by a regiment of German infantry. A further report on August 7 stated that the positions of 22nd Army remained unchanged, with limited artillery exchanges and reconnaissance by both sides.[13]

Second Battle of Velikiye Luki[edit]

Stalin approved a plan on August 15 by Timoshenko to renew the counteroffensive by Western Front, although the task allotted to 22nd Army was largely to continue to hold its positions. This began on August 17. Two days later Hitler and the OKH ordered Army Group Center to shift the bulk of 3rd Panzer Group to reinforce Army Group North's faltering drive toward Leningrad and also eliminate the perceived threat to Army Group Center's left flank. This set up a cat-and-mouse game between the two sides, with the German immediate objective of crushing 22nd Army and defeating 29th Army into the bargain.[14]

Western Front first reported at 2000 hours on August 19 about the possibility of a German counterstroke on Velikiye Luki, but also stated that 22nd Army was fortifying its positions. A further report 48 hours later stated:

22nd Army - while defending on its right wing, attacked in its center and left wing at 1300 hours on 21 August to destroy the opposing enemy.

The 170th, which was now under command of 29th Rifle Corps, was said to have advanced toward Mulina and Pronino. This showed Timoshenko's complete ignorance about the true situation, as by now the Army was fighting for its existence. This ignorance continued the next day, although significantly there was no mention of the 170th. Finally, on August 23 the news of Yershakov's actual position broke through the fog, forcing Timoshenko to alter his plans significantly. Noon reports described a German attack affecting most of the Army and at 1430 the neighboring 29th Army stated that "at least an enemy panzer division has penetrated toward Velikiye Luki from the west" and armored reconnaissance troops were in 22nd Army's rear. At this time the 170th was in the vicinity of Balychi, some 35km southeast of the city, facing the 206th Infantry Division as LVII Motorized Corps began to break through farther east.[15]

In his evening report to STAVKA Timoshenko reported that the left (east) flank of 22nd Army, on the sector of 186th Rifle Division, had been penetrated and the Army was "organizing a counterstroke", while the 170th's defenses were defeated and German armor pushed 20km to the north, cutting the Toropets–Velikiye Luki highway. Yershakov was scrambling to respond while being forced to move his headquarters. The next day, the summary identified the 19th and 20th Panzer Divisions as well as a panzer brigade and 206th Infantry, and that a captured order indicated that their objective was to encircle 22nd Army. The situation on 62nd Corps left flank (essentially the 186th) was said to be "unclear"; Yershakov had sent most of the 98th Rifle Division to support the 186th, but both had been effectively smashed by the attack and the 174th Division was forced to flee to the northeast. He was forced to try to defend the city as best he could, while also organizing a credible breakout to the east or northeast. 29th Army was ordered to detach forces to cover Toropets and Staraya Toropa, where the German forces appeared to be heading. In fact, the two panzer divisions were exploiting to take Velikiye Luki from the east while XXIII Army Corps invested it from the south and west. What remained of 22nd Army, some 40,000 personnel, were now confined to a pocket 12-15km from north to south and 16-20km east to west.[16]

Yershakov issued his first breakout order at 1015 hours on August 24, calling for his forces to push eastward along and south of the Toropets–Velikiye Luki highway. The 170th, along with 48th Tanks and 214th Rifle Division, which were close to the breakout sector, were to defend until the evening, "destroy enemy forces in the Ushitsy State Farm region", and then, starting at 2200 hours, begin the breakout, with 126th Rifle Division and 48th Tanks in the first echelon, the 179th and 214th in second, followed by what remained of 62nd Corps and the 170th as rearguard. The artillery and trucks of the 214th were stretched out on the road along its axis of attack and on the morning of the 25th came under heavy air, artillery and mortar attacks, causing considerable losses. The escaping force numbered from 15-20,000 men while another 25,000 of 22nd Army remained behind in small pockets south of Velikiye Luki and either fought to the death or surrendered over the following days.[17]

The now-deputy chief of staff of Western Front, General Malandin, was sent to Yershakov's headquarters on August 26 to survey the situation as the survivors left the pocket. He reported back near midnight, in part, that the 170th, along with the 126th and 98th Divisions, "appeared in separate disorganized groups". Thus, although they had withdrawn, they were no longer combat-capable.[18] On August 28 Malandin further stated that the division had just 300 men with "...no equipment, headquarters or staff". Despite this, the small handful was concentrated some 30km southwest of Toropets with instructions to operate toward Nazimovo. On September 8 General Yershakov, who had also escaped, wrote an after-action report in which, among other matters, praised the 170th for "stubbornly continu[ing] to hold onto its positions" on August 24.[19] Colonel Laskin would lead a group of 150 armed men to friendly territory on September 18. He remained in command for the remaining weeks of the 1st formation's existence, and in November was given command of the newly-forming 86th Rifle Brigade. In April 1943 he was moved to command of the 63rd Rifle Division, where he remained until the last weeks of the war, when he was sent to the Military Academy of the General Staff. He had been promoted to the rank of major general in February 1944. For the remainder of his career he specialized in combat and physical training. Laskin retired in May 1959 and died on February 21, 1962, at the age of 58.

The 170th was transferred to 24th Army in Reserve Front for rebuilding in September,[20] but was far from complete when Army Group Center launched Operation Typhoon. It was surrounded with its army north of Spas-Demensk by October 1, and was disbanded on October 4,[21] due to a shortage of equipment. The remaining personnel were moved to 22nd Army headquarters to be reallocated.[22]

2nd Formation[edit]

A new 170th Rifle Division was formed at Molotov, once again in the Ural Military District, based on the 439th Rifle Division which was already forming up when re-designated.[23] The order of battle remained mostly the same as the 1st formation:

  • 391st Rifle Regiment
  • 422nd Rifle Regiment
  • 717th Rifle Regiment
  • 294th Artillery Regiment[24]
  • 210th Antitank Battalion
  • 134th Reconnaissance Company (later 124th)
  • 182nd Sapper Battalion
  • 355th Signal Battalion (later 210th Signal Battalion, 353rd Signal Company)
  • 154th Medical/Sanitation Battalion
  • 536th Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Platoon
  • 49th Motor Transport Company
  • 452nd Field Bakery
  • 917th Divisional Veterinary Hospital
  • 294th Field Postal Station (later 1673rd)
  • 1094th Field Office of the State Bank

Col. Ivan Vladimirovich Panchuk was appointed to command on January 31, 1942. This officer had led the survivors of his 290th Rifle Regiment (186th Rifle Division) out of the August encirclement of 22nd Army. In February, the division was moved to the west, into the 58th Army of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command, and in April it deployed to the front lines in the 34th Army of Northwestern Front.[25]

Battle of Demyansk[edit]

Demyansk Pocket, February 1943. Note position of the 170th northeast of Staraya Russa in 27th Army's sector.

Forces of this Front had isolated the II Army Corps of 16th Army in a pocket centered on Demyansk on February 25, but on April 21 a narrow corridor had been pushed through the village of Ramushevo from inside and out. Because the corridor was still under Soviet artillery fire it was not sufficient as a line of communications, and II Corps continued to rely on air supply for most of its needs through the remainder of the battle. Northwestern Front was under command of Lt. Gen. P. A. Kurochkin and at this time consisted of four Armies (1st Shock, 11th, 53rd and 34th). Maj. Gen. N. E. Berzarin was in command of the latter.[26]

A first effort to cut the corridor was made in May by 1st Shock and 11th Armies, but this did not directly involve the 34th, which was positioned around the northeastern sector of the pocket. In June the 27th Army was added to the Front's forces, but a further effort to sever the corridor in July was unsuccessful. The STAVKA was now questioning the leadership of Kurochkin and Marshal Timoshenko was called on to supervise the next effort.[27] During that month the 170th was reassigned to 11th Army.[28] On July 24, Colonel Panchuk was removed from his command and replaced by Lt. Col. Stepan Ignatevich Ushakov, who would be promoted to the rank of colonel on September 4. Panchuk took over the 129th Rifle Division in October and led it until November 1944, being promoted to major general in September 1943.

The 170th was one of six rifle divisions that made up the Army's shock group that attacked the corridor from the north, along with over 100 tanks, with the objective of linking up with 1st Shock to the south. The armies around the perimeter of the pocket, such as the 34th, were directed to make local attacks to tie down German reserves, but this cut into the logistic support for the main effort while producing no practical results. The offensive began on August 10, but there were only enough shells for a 10-minute artillery preparation, which was utterly inadequate against the strong German defenses. The shock groups of both Armies were shot to pieces after becoming enmeshed in obstacle belts, and in a week of fighting gained no more than a few hundred metres. By August 21 Kurochkin was obligated to call the offensive to a halt due to heavy casualties and low supplies of ammunition. A further assault in September fared much the same.[29] Timoshenko reported on October 18 to the STAVKA on his plan for a new offensive in November:

The 11th Army's primary mission is to destroy the enemy in the sector between the Pola and Polomet Rivers by an attack from the Strelitsy, Gorby, Viazovka and Dedno (inclusive) line with the forces on the army's left wing and, after reaching the Rosino, Maslino, Kostkovo and Solovevo front on the northern and western banks of these rivers, complete the encirclement of the enemy's Demyansk grouping in close coordination with forces on the 1st Shock Army's right wing, which will be attacking from the south.

The 170th is specified in this plan as one of the three rifle divisions to be employed by 11th Army, along with three rifle brigades and a tank brigade. A prolonged thaw developed in November which delayed the regrouping and the actual offensive, which finally began early on November 28 and faltered almost immediately after it began.[30]

Colonel Ushakov left his command on December 29, being replaced by Col. Fyodor Vasilevich Karlov, but this officer was in turn replaced on January 25, 1943, by Col. Sergei Ivanovich Aksyonov. In the same month, the 170th was reassigned to the 27th Army.[31] While it was apparent that 16th Army's defenses in the salient were still formidable, the encirclement of German 6th Army at Stalingrad changed everything. Despite the Ramushevo corridor the fact was that II Corps continued to rely heavily on air supply, and every transport aircraft was now needed in the south. Finally, when it was too late to affect the outcome at Stalingrad, on January 31 Hitler authorized the evacuation of the Demyansk and Rzhev salients.[32] In the wake of Operation Iskra, which broke the German land blockade of Leningrad in January, Marshal G. K. Zhukov conceived a plan to encircle and destroy Army Group North: Operation Polar Star. The first phase of the overall operation would be yet another attempt to cut off and eliminate the Demyansk salient. Zhukov finalized his plan during the week preceding the planned attack date of February 15,[33] and the 11th and 27th Armies together had nine rifle divisions, including the 253rd, plus 150 tanks, massed between Penno and Ramushevo against the 5th Jäger Division, but the difficulties of logistics meant the 27th needed another week to redeploy. The piecemeal Soviet attacks were repulsed with heavy losses and Polar Star collapsed. Operation Ziethen began on February 17 before the delayed Soviet attack could get fully underway; Demyansk was abandoned on February 21 and by February 26 most of the corridor was evacuated as well.[34]

On March 9, Colonel Aksyonov left the division; he would later command the 171st Rifle Division. He was replaced by Col. Abram Mikhailovich Cheryak. In accordance with STAVKA Order No. 46079 issued at 0300 hours on March 20 the 170th is listed as one of seven rifle divisions and six rifle brigades to be removed from Northwestern Front along with 53rd Army and begin moving toward Livny.[35] All of these formations were now in the Reserve of the Supreme High Command for much-needed rebuilding.[36] By the beginning of June, the 170th was assigned to the Central Front in the Kursk salient. The division was assigned to Lt. Gen. P. L. Romanenko's 48th Army,[37] and remained there for the duration, with the exception of a few months in early 1944.

Battle of Kursk[edit]

When the German Zitadelle offensive began on July 5 the 48th Army was on the right flank of Central Front with seven rifle divisions defending a 38km-wide front from Droskovo to Stepanishchevo to Verkhnyaya Gnilusha to the 2nd Five-Year Plan Sovkhoz. Three divisions were in the first echelon with four, including the 170th, occupying the second defensive zone. It had the 2nd Antitank Brigade and three tank regiments in support, plus the 1168th Cannon Artillery Regiment and three self-propelled artillery regiments. While the possibility of the main German attack from the north striking 48th Army was anticipated it was considered more likely to come against 13th Army to its left. In the event the assault by German 9th Army followed the more likely path and 48th Army played little role in the defensive battle. By July 15 the German forces had been fought to a standstill and the 48th, 13th, 70th, and 2nd Tank Armies were prepared to go over to the counteroffensive against the German grouping in the Oryol salient.[38]

Operation Kutuzov[edit]

Map of Operation Kutuzov. Note position of 48th Army.

48th Army was ordered to attack with its left flank 42nd Rifle Corps along the sector Sondrovka–outside Krasnaya Slobodka in the direction of Yasnaya Polyana and Shamshin and by the end of July 17 to reach a line from Nagornyi to Shamshin, after which it was to develop the offensive toward Zmievka. At 0600 hours on July 15, following a 15-minute artillery fire onslaught, Central Front went over to the attack. Despite stubborn resistance, by 0800 Soviet forces had penetrated up to 2–3km on some sectors; 42nd Corps made considerable progress toward Kunach. The advance continued over the next week despite the defenders making good use of terrain and pre-existing defenses and after forcing the Neruch River on July 22 the right flank forces of 48th Army liberated the town of Bogodukhov on July 24 while its center and left flank reached a line from Glazunovka to Gremyachevo. Following this the Army sped up its advance to the northwest from the line of the Zmievka–Ponyri railroad.[39]

During this advance, on July 27-29 Starshina Georgii Maksimovich Kudashov, a platoon commander of the 3rd Machine Gun Company of 391st Rifle Regiment, distinguished himself in the fighting for the village of Filosovo. Breaking in with a group of soldiers he soon found his group was surrounded. Kudashov organized a perimeter defense and, for two days, repelled all attacks despite being wounded twice, including the loss of his left eye. As relief was arriving from his battalion he personally destroyed a German firing point from the rear. On January 15, 1944, he was made a Hero of the Soviet Union. His injury made it impossible to return to the front, so he was employed on the railway system, where he had worked before the war. He entered the reserve in 1945 with the rank of lieutenant and moved back to Shepetivka, where he had lived pre-war. He died there in 2007 at the age of 88.[40]

By this time Oryol was in danger of being encircled by the forces of Central and Bryansk Fronts and 9th Army was making preparations to evacuate it even as resistance at the front remained stubborn. Romanenko now ordered his Army in the general direction of Nesterovo and in an energetic advance it covered more than 60km by August 1, reaching a line from Ploskoe to Gutorovo and capturing both villages. On August 3, German sappers began demolition work within the city. The following morning elements of 63rd Army broke into Oryol and street fighting began; this continued until dawn on August 5. 9th Army now began falling back to the west to take up positions at the base of the diminishing salient. The right wing forces of 48th Army took Kromy on August 6 and five days later reached a line from Mytskoe to outside Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky. By August 18 the Soviet forces reached the Hagen position and the Oryol salient had been cleared.[41]

Into Ukraine and Belarus[edit]

Central Front struck German 2nd Army's center at Sevsk and east flank at Klintsy on August 26. The Front's forces quickly broke the German line with 60th Army in the lead. On September 2 the XIII Army Corps was ordered to fall back to the west and maintain contact with Army Group South, but instead was pushed south across the Seym River into the 4th Panzer Army sector, thereby opening a 30km wide gap between Army Groups South and Center. The following day, 2nd Army withdrew to the Desna River as the Front commander, Army Gen. K. K. Rokossovskii, paused to regroup. On September 9 the Front's forces forced this river south of Novhorod-Siverskyi and at Otsekin.[42]

Central Front liberated Nizhyn on the Oster River on September 15, which finally triggered the OKH to order a full withdrawal to the Dniepr. Over the next five days the Front staged a two-pronged thrust northward on either side of Chernihiv which collapsed the flank of 2nd Army, allowing it to advance north toward Gomel.[43]

Gomel-Rechytsa Offensive[edit]

48th Army closed up to the German defenses at Gomel from the east and south on September 29-30. Romanenko arrayed his five divisions under direct Army command in an arc extending from Dobrush along the Iput River for some 25km to where it entered the Sozh River. The Army largely faced the XXXV Army Corps. During the first two weeks of October, Rokossovskii launched his first attempt to seize Gomel and advance on Rechytsa, but this was unsuccessful. For the second attempt he called for the formation of three shock groups on Central Front's right wing (48th, 65th and 61st Armies). These were to attack on October 15 in the direction of Babruysk and Minsk. The first of these included seven divisions from 48th Army and four from 65th Army. Three divisions (102nd, 194th, and 307th), were moved into a bridgehead over the Sozh south of Gomel while the 170th, 137th and 175th took over their former sectors. In the event, this effort made little more progress than the first attempt.[44]

On October 20, Central Front was redesignated as Belorussian Front, and at about the same time the 170th was subordinated to 42nd Corps.[45] Two days later Colonel Cheryak left the division and was replaced by Col. Semyon Grigorovich Tsiplenkov. This officer had been serving as deputy commander of the 399th Rifle Division when he was wounded during Operation Kutuzov and was hospitalized in Moscow until September, when he returned to the 399th.

Rokossovskii planned for a renewed offensive to begin on November 10. Over the first ten days of the month the Front carried out another regrouping to continue the offensive and encircle and destroy the German Rechytsa-Gomel grouping. He ordered the 175th, 102nd and 73rd Rifle Divisions into the bridgehead between the Dniepr and Sozh while the 42nd Corps was moved to a bridgehead over the Dniepr south of Loyew where it was backed up by two other divisions in the Corps' second echelon. In three days of fighting the forces of 48th and 65th Armies managed to tear a gap 15km wide and from 8–12km deep in the German defenses, and were halfway to Rechytsa. Over the next four days XXXV Corps was driven back into the city, and on November 18 the German forces evacuated it, crossing to the east bank of the Dniepr.[46] The division was one of several Red Army units granted honorifics for this victory:

RECHITSA – ...170th Rifle Division (Col. Tsiplenkov, Semyon Grigorovich)... The troops that participated in the liberation of Rechitsa, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of 18 November 1943 and a commendation in Moscow, are given a salute of 12 artillery salvoes by 124 guns.[47]

Army Group Center's southern defenses were in a state of crisis by this point, and 9th Army had been forced out of Gomel. Along with a small group from 1st Guards Tank Corps the 48th joined the advance of 11th and 63rd Armies, which were pursuing the XXXV Corps as it withdrew from Gomel. By November 30 the combined armies had pushed the Corps westward and northwestward to the Klenovichi–Potapovka line, 25km southeast of Zhlobin.[48]

Parichi-Bobruisk Offensive[edit]

For Rokossovskii's next attempt to reach Parichi and Babruysk General Romanenko formed a shock group with his 42nd and 29th Rifle Corps with armor support and it was to launch its attack in the 15km-wide sector from Shatsilki on the Berezina southwest to Zherd Station on the Shatsilki–Kalinkavichy rail line, facing elements of XXXXI Panzer. This was to begin on January 16, 1944, and was to reach a line from Oktyabirskii to Parichi by the end of the month, after which 48th and 65th Armies were to exploit to Babruysk. 42nd Corps' immediate objectives were the villages of Zareche and Sosnovka roughly 15km behind the front, so it attacked in a two-echelon formation to sustain its drive across the Zherdianka River and beyond. This required a regrouping in which the 194th Rifle Division provided cover for the 175th Division to move into first echelon and the 399th Division to move into second. The 170th was to be introduced once a penetration had been achieved.[49]

From the beginning the 194th and 175th struggled to penetrate the German forward defenses. On January 19 the 73rd and 170th were committed to reinforce the assault. Tsiplenkov's troops passed through the 399th early the next day and attacked a strongpoint at Medved, 4km southwest of Pechishche. The weight of four rifle divisions gave the defenders of this latter place no choice but to withdraw, which took place late in the day, followed by a close pursuit. The advance of 42nd Corps was finally halted by the German 36th Infantry Division at Sosnovka and the large swath of swampy terrain that extended nearly 10km to its west. However, the 36th had given up considerable ground.[50] Before the operation entered its second phase the 170th was removed from 42nd Corps and came under Romanenko's direct command.[51]

This phase began on February 2. Rokossivskii intended Romanenko's Army, which had been heavily reinforced and would be supported on the left by 65th Army's 95th Rifle Corps, to smash the defenses of 9th Army in the Dubrova area and advance northwest in the direction of Parichi and Babruysk. The Army's shock group would consist of the 25th and 53rd Rifle Corps and these would assault the positions of 36th and 134th Infantry Divisions. Once the penetration was achieved the 1st Guards Tanks would be introduced to lead the exploitation and, if necessary, the 170th and the 42nd Corps. Dubrova was cleared by 96th Rifle Division on the first day and the advance covered some 4km by February 5, but came under repeated counterattacks by infantry and tanks and Romanenko was ordered to go over to the defense the next day. By the time it was renewed on February 14 the 170th had returned to 42nd Corps. Again the attackers made initial gains of about 2km before being halted by reinforcements. Romanenko's next effort took place east and west of Iazvin beginning on February 22. He concentrated 42nd and 29th Corps backed by elements of 1st Guards Tanks. This amounted to eight understrength divisions supported by roughly 70 tanks, which penetrated the defense and pushed forward some 4km to the northwest; in three more days of heavy fighting another 5km were gained. The battle died out by February 25 due to mutual exhaustion.[52] Belorussian Front was renamed 1st Belorussian during this month.

In the last week of March Rokossovskii set out to eliminate the remaining German bridgeheads on the east bank of the Dniepr. One of these was held by elements of 9th Army between Bykhaw and Chavusy and was to be attacked by the Front's 10th and 50th Armies, backed by 1st Guards Tanks, starting on March 25. In preparation for this ambitious offensive 42nd Corps was transferred to the 50th. This Army was to penetrate the defenses of German 4th Army's XII Army Corps on a 10km-wide front east of Bykhaw. The shock group would consist of the 121st Rifle Corps and part of 46th Rifle Corps with the objective of reaching the southern approaches of Mogilev by the end of April 1. 42nd Corps was to reinforce this exploitation once it completed its redeployment around March 30. In the event, in five days of heavy fighting the shock group managed to gain only 3km at the most, and 42nd Corps could do little to help.[53]

In mid-April 1st Belorussian Front went over to the defense to prepare for the summer offensive.[54] At about the same time the 170th and its Corps was transferred to 3rd Army, still in the same Front, but returned to 48th Army prior to the start of Operation Bagration.[55]

Operation Bagration[edit]

Babruysk operation. Note thrust of 48th Army's shock group north of Rahachow.

At the start of the offensive 42nd Corps was concentrated north of Rahachow to form the Army's shock group with 29th Corps, heavily backed by artillery and armor. The 7km-wide attack sector ran from Kostyashevo to Kolosy. 42nd Corps specifically was to attack on a 1,000m front just north of the former and develop its attack in the direction of Koshary, and was tasked with capturing bridgeheads on the west bank of the Dobysna River, using forward detachments, by the end of the second day. The shock group would then advance in the direction of Repki, Turki, and Babruysk, complete breaking the German defense, and then reach the rear of the three divisions in and around Zhlobin, cut them off from the crossings of the Berezina, and destroy them in cooperation with 65th Army. At the same time, the Army would seize crossings south of Babruysk and take the city with an attack from the south. Following this the offensive would be developed in the direction of Asipovichy and Pukhavichy. Romanenko deployed his Army in a single echelon.[56]

Units of the 3rd Army to break through the positions of the German 134th and 296th Infantry Divisions. By late on June 24 this had been achieved, with the Germans overwhelmed and the 9th Tank Corps exploiting to the rear. With the defenses of Army Group Center shattered, the division trekked westward towards Poland.

48th Army was transferred to 2nd Belorussian Front in the late autumn of 1944. During the Vistula-Oder Offensive the 170th pushed on through northern Poland before the army was once again transferred to 3rd Belorussian Front. The division fought in the East Prussian Offensive, and ended the war near Elbing.[57]

At the end of the war the men and women of the division carried the full title 170th Rifle, Rechytsa, Order of the Red Banner, Order of Suvorov Division. (Russian: 170-я стрелковая Речицкая Краснознамённая ордена Суворова дивизия.) The division was disbanded near Mühlhausen in July 1945.

References[edit]

Citations[edit]

  1. ^ Biryuzov, Yuri. "170 СТРЕЛКОВАЯ ДИВИЗИЯ (1-го формирования)" [170th Rifle Division (1st formation)]. www.bashpoisk.ufanet.ru (in Russian). Republic of Bashkortostan Search Teams. Retrieved 2016-02-15.
  2. ^ Charles C. Sharp, "Red Legions", Soviet Rifle Divisions Formed Before June 1941, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, Vol. VIII, Nafziger, 1996, p. 84
  3. ^ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, p. 10
  4. ^ David M. Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 1998, p. 108
  5. ^ David Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2009, map on p. 238
  6. ^ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, pp. 18, 23
  7. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 1, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2010, Kindle ed., ch. 3
  8. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 1, Kindle ed., ch. 3
  9. ^ Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East, pp. 260-61, and map on p. 265
  10. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 1, Kindle ed., ch. 3
  11. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 1, Kindle ed., ch. 6
  12. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 1, Kindle ed., chs. 4, 5, 6
  13. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 1, Kindle ed., chs. 6, 7
  14. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 1, Kindle ed., ch. 9
  15. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 1, Kindle ed., ch. 10
  16. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 1, Kindle ed., chs. 10, 11
  17. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 1, Kindle ed., ch. 11
  18. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 2, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2012, pp. 40-41
  19. ^ Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 2, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2012, pp. 40-41, 44, 49, 153
  20. ^ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, p. 51
  21. ^ Sharp, "Red Legions", p. 84
  22. ^ Lev Lopukhovsky, The Viaz'ma Catastrophe, ed. & trans. S. Britton, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2013, Kindle ed., pt. 2. This source states at one point that the date of disbandment was September 30.
  23. ^ Walter S. Dunn Jr, Stalin's Keys to Victory, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2006, p. 99
  24. ^ Sharp, "Red Swarm", Soviet Rifle Divisions Formed From 1942 to 1945, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, Vol. X, Nafziger, 1996, p. 68
  25. ^ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1942, pp. 54, 73, 81
  26. ^ Robert Forczyk, Demyansk 1942-43: The Frozen Fortress, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, UK, 2012, Kindle ed.
  27. ^ Forczyk, Demyansk 1942-43: The Frozen Fortress, Kindle ed.
  28. ^ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1942, p. 142
  29. ^ Forczyk, Demyansk 1942-43: The Frozen Fortress, Kindle ed.
  30. ^ Glantz, After Stalingrad, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2009, pp. 95-96, 101, 103
  31. ^ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1943, p. 34
  32. ^ Forczyk, Demyansk 1942-43: The frozen fortress, Kindle ed.
  33. ^ Glantz, After Stalingrad, p. 417
  34. ^ Forczyk, Demyansk 1942-43: The frozen fortress, Kindle ed.
  35. ^ Glantz, After Stalingrad, p. 433
  36. ^ Sharp, "Red Swarm", p. 68
  37. ^ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1943, p. 162
  38. ^ Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, ed. & trans. R. W. Harrison, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2016, Kindle ed., book 1, part 1, ch. 1; part 2, ch. 2
  39. ^ Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, Kindle ed., book 1, part 2, ch. 2; book 2, part 1, ch. 4
  40. ^ https://warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=17383. In Russian, English translation available. Retrieved July 4, 2024.
  41. ^ Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, Kindle ed., book 2, part 1, chs. 4, 5
  42. ^ Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, Center of Military History United States Army, Washington, DC, 1968, pp. 155, 159-60, 164-65
  43. ^ Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, pp. 168-70
  44. ^ Glantz, Battle for Belorussia, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2016, pp. 97-98, 103-04, 106, 110
  45. ^ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1943, p. 276
  46. ^ Glantz, Battle for Belorussia, pp. 172-73, 178-79, 181-82, 186
  47. ^ http://www.soldat.ru/spravka/freedom/1-ssr-5.html. In Russian. Retrieved July 3, 2021.
  48. ^ Glantz, Battle for Belorussia, pp. 191, 193, 200
  49. ^ Glantz, Battle for Belorussia, pp. 480-86
  50. ^ Glantz, Battle for Belorussia, pp. 486-91
  51. ^ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1944, pp. 41-42
  52. ^ Glantz, Battle for Belorussia, pp. 494, 497-99, 502-04
  53. ^ Glantz, Battle for Belorussia, pp. 526-29, 533-34
  54. ^ Glantz, Battle for Belorussia, p. 539
  55. ^ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1944, pp. 132, 193
  56. ^ Soviet General Staff, Operation Bagration, ed. & trans. R. W. Harrison, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2016; Kindle ed., Vol. 1, ch. 3
  57. ^ Sharp, "Red Swarm", p. 68

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