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{{Use mdy dates|date = November 2019}}
{{Katrina}}
On Monday, August 29, 2005, there were over 50 failures of the [[levee]]s and [[flood wall]]s protecting [[New Orleans, Louisiana]], and its suburbs following passage of [[Hurricane Katrina]] and landfall in Mississippi. The levee and flood wall failures caused flooding in 80% of New Orleans and all of St. Bernard Parish. Tens of billions of gallons of water spilled into vast areas of New Orleans, flooding over 100,000 homes and businesses. Responsibility for the design and construction of the levee system belongs to the [[United States Army Corps of Engineers]]; the responsibility of maintenance belongs to the local levee boards. The Corps hands components of the system over to the local levee boards upon completion. When Katrina struck on August 29, 2005, the project was between 60–90% complete. <ref name="gao.gov">{{Cite web|url=https://levees.org/2/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/2005-GAO-report-Testimony-Before-the-Subcommittee-on-Energy-and-Water-Development-Committee-on-Appropriations-House-of-Representatives.pdf | title= Army Corps of Engineers; Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project |date=2005-09-28|access-date=2021-09-20}}</ref> Four major investigations were conducted by civil engineers and other experts in an attempt to identify the underlying reasons for the failure of the federal flood protection system. All concur that the primary cause of the flooding was inadequate design and construction by the Army Corps of Engineers. <ref>Robertson, Campbell. {{Cite web|url= https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/24/us/decade-after-katrina-pointing-finger-more-firmly-at-army-corps.html |title= Decade After Katrina, Pointing Finger More Firmly at Army Corps |date=2015-05-23|website=New York Times|access-date=2016-10-20}}</ref>
There were six major breaches in Orleans Parish:
#Three major breaches occurred on the [[Industrial Canal]]: one on the northeast side near the junction with Gulf Intracoastal Waterway and two on the southeast side along the [[Lower Ninth Ward]], between Florida Avenue and Claiborne Avenue.
#On the west side of New Orleans, the [[17th Street Canal]] levee breached {{convert|4|ft|m}} below design specs on the New Orleans side near the Old Hammond Highway Bridge
#The [[London Avenue Canal]] in the Gentilly neighborhood breached on both sides – on the west side near Robert E. Lee Boulevard and on the east near the Mirabeau Avenue Bridge
Storm surge caused breaches in 20 places on the [[Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet Canal]] ("MR-GO") in [[Saint Bernard Parish, Louisiana|Saint Bernard Parish]], flooding the entire parish and the East Bank of [[Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana|Plaquemines Parish]].
==Background==
[[File:New Orleans Elevations.jpg|thumb|300px|left|Vertical cross-section of New Orleans, showing maximum levee height of 23 feet (7 m) at the Mississippi River on the left and 17.5 feet (5 m) at Lake Pontchartrain on the right]]
{{See also|Drainage in New Orleans|Hurricane preparedness for New Orleans}}
The original residents of [[French Quarter|New Orleans]] settled on the high ground along the Mississippi River. Later developments eventually extended to nearby Lake Pontchartrain, built upon fill to bring them above the average lake level. Navigable commercial waterways extended from the lake to downtown. After 1940, the state decided to close those waterways following the completion of a new Industrial Canal for waterborne commerce. Closure of the waterways resulted in a drastic lowering of the water table by the city's drainage system, causing some areas to settle by up to <span style="white-space:nowrap">8 feet (2 m)</span> due to the compacting and desiccation of the underlying organic soils.
After the [[Great Mississippi Flood of 1927]], [[United States Congress]] passed the [[Flood Control Act of 1928]] which authorized the Corps of Engineers to design and construct flood control structures, along with levees, on the Mississippi River to protect populated areas from floods. It also affirmed the principle of local participation in federally funded projects but acknowledged that the $292 million already spent by local interests was sufficient to cover local participatory costs.<ref>[http://www.mvd.usace.army.mil/mrc/history/AppendixE.htm Flood Control Act of 1928 on Mississippi Valley Division of USACE website] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090109031739/http://www.mvd.usace.army.mil/mrc/history/AppendixE.htm |date=2009-01-09 }}</ref> It is instructive to note that, in addition, sovereign immunity was given to the Corps of Engineers under Section 3 of the Flood Control Act of 1928, which states “no liability of any kind would attach or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place, provided that if on any stretch of the banks of the Mississippi River it was impracticable to construct levees.” 33 U.S.C. § 702c. Section 702c is sometimes referred as “Section 3 of the act,” based on where it appears in the Public law.
Heavy flooding caused by [[Hurricane Betsy]] in 1965 brought concerns regarding flooding from hurricanes to the forefront. In response, the Congress passed the [[Flood Control Act of 1965]] which mandated that henceforth, the [[United States Army Corps of Engineers|Corps of Engineers]] is the agency responsible for design and construction of flood protection projects, to include those in Greater New Orleans. The local interests' role was maintenance once the projects were complete.<ref name=GAOReport>{{Cite web |url=http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d051050t.pdf |title=GAO Report on Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project, September 2005 |access-date=November 25, 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110523230347/http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d051050t.pdf |archive-date=May 23, 2011 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
Also that year, Congress authorized the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project (LPVHPP) which reiterated the principle of local participation in federally funded projects. The project was initially estimated to take 13 years, but when Katrina struck in 2005, almost 40 years later, the project was only 60–90% complete with a revised projected completion date of 2015.<ref name="gao.gov"/>
On August 29, 2005, flood walls and levees catastrophically failed throughout the metro area. Some collapsed well below design thresholds (17th Street and London Canals). Others collapsed after a brief period of overtopping (Industrial Canal) caused scouring or erosion of the earthen levee walls. In April 2007, the American Society of Civil Engineers called the flooding of New Orleans "the worst engineering catastrophe in US History."<ref>[http://eng.auburn.edu/admin/marketing/seminars/2007/l-roth.html The New Orleans Levees: The Worst Engineering Catastrophe in US History - What Went Wrong and Why<!-- Bot generated title -->] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071015234208/http://eng.auburn.edu/admin/marketing/seminars/2007/l-roth.html |date=2007-10-15 }}</ref>
==Levee and floodwall breaches==
[[File:New-Orleans-deaths.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Sketch of New Orleans (shaded gray), indicating the locations of the principal breaches in the levees/floodwalls (dark blue arrows). Red dots show locations of deaths.]]
[[File:NOAA Katrina NOLA 17th Street breach Aug 31 2005.jpg|thumb|right|250px|Breach in [[17th Street Canal]] [[levee]] in [[New Orleans, Louisiana]], on August 31, 2005, showing the inundated [[Lakeview, New Orleans|Lakeview]] neighborhood on the right and the largely dry [[Metairie]] side on the left. (NOAA)]]
[[File:HousesPrattBehindLondonAvBreech.jpg|thumb|250px|right|Severely damaged homes in piles of sand near the upper [[London Avenue Canal]] breach]]
Many of the levee and floodwall failures were reported on Monday, August 29, 2005, at various times throughout the day. There were 28 reported failures in the first 24 hours <ref name="breaches">Staff Writer. "[https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5200940 Timeline: Who Knew When the Levees Broke]." ''[[National Public Radio]].'' February 10, 2006.</ref> and over 50 were reported in the ensuing days. A breach in the [[Industrial Canal]], near the [[St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana|St. Bernard]]/[[Orleans Parish, Louisiana|Orleans]] parish line, occurred at approximately 9:00 a.m. [[Central Time Zone (North America)|CDT]], the day Katrina arrived. Another breach in the Industrial Canal was reported a few minutes later at Tennessee Street, as well as multiple failures in the levee system, and a pump failure in the [[Lower Ninth Ward]], near Florida Avenue.
Local fire officials reported a breach at the [[17th Street Canal]] [[levee]] shortly after 9:00 a.m. [[Central Time Zone (North America)|CDT]].<ref>[http://www.wwltv.com/local/stories/wwl062006khvideo.a430c449.html News for New Orleans, Louisiana | Local News | News for New Orleans, Louisiana | wwltv.com<!-- Bot generated title -->] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071222194749/http://www.wwltv.com/local/stories/wwl062006khvideo.a430c449.html |date=2007-12-22 }}</ref> An estimated 66% to 75% of the city was now under water.<ref name="breaches"/> The Duncan and Bonnabel Pumping Stations were also reported to have suffered roof damage, and were non-functional.<ref name="breaches"/> Breaches at St. Bernard Parish and the Lower Ninth Ward were reported at 5:00 p.m. [[Central Time Zone (North America)|CDT]], as well as a breach at the Hayne Blvd. [[Pumping Station]], and another breach along the 17th Street Canal levee. By 8:30 p.m. [[Central Time Zone (North America)|CDT]], all pumping stations in [[Jefferson Parish, Louisiana|Jefferson]] and [[Orleans Parish|Orleans]] parishes were reported as non-functional.
At 10:00 pm [[Central Time Zone (North America)|CDT]], a breach of the levee on the west bank of the Industrial Canal was reported, bringing {{convert|10|ft|m}} of standing water to the area. At about midnight, a breach in the [[London Avenue Canal]] levee was reported.
The [[Orleans Canal]] about midway between the 17th Street Canal and the London Avenue Canal, engineered to the same standards, and presumably put under similar stress during the hurricane, survived intact because an incomplete section of floodwall along this canal which allowed water to overtop at that point, thus creating a spill way.
==Investigations==
===Levee investigations===
In the ten years following Katrina, over a dozen investigations were conducted. There was no federally ordered independent commission like those ordered after the September 11 terrorist attacks and after the BP Oil Spill in the Gulf. The only federally ordered study was convened and managed by the Army Corps of Engineers, the federal agency responsible for the flood protection's performance. A major independent study was conducted by the University of California at Berkeley.<ref>[http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/%7Enew_orleans/ ILIT DOWNLOAD CENTER (sponsored in part by the National Science Foundation)] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060618182444/http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/~new_orleans/ |date=2006-06-18 }}</ref> A second major study was sponsored by the Louisiana Department of Transportation led by [[Ivor van Heerden]] at Louisiana State University.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.dotd.louisiana.gov/administration/teamlouisiana/TeamLaLetter.pdf |title=LSU Katrina Investigation |access-date=October 9, 2007 |archive-date=July 18, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110718210500/http://www.dotd.louisiana.gov/administration/teamlouisiana/TeamLaLetter.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref> Studies were also done by FEMA, the insurance industry, the National Research Council, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the Katrina Consolidated Lawsuit. All studies basically agreed on the engineering mechanisms of failure.
The primary mechanisms of failure at the 17th Street Canal, London Avenue Canal and Industrial Canal (east side north) were improper design of the canal floodwalls.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.dotd.louisiana.gov/administration/teamlouisiana/ |title=Archived copy |access-date=October 9, 2007 |archive-date=August 15, 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070815202550/http://www.dotd.louisiana.gov/administration/TeamLouisiana/ |url-status=dead }}</ref> The failure mechanism for the Industrial Canal (east side south and west side) was overtopping of levees and floodwalls by the storm surge. The primary mechanism of failure for levees protecting eastern New Orleans was the existence of sand in 10% of places instead of thick Louisiana clay. The primary mechanism of failure for the levees protecting St. Bernard Parish was overtopping due to negligent maintenance<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.nola.com/hurricane/index.ssf/2009/11/post_16.html|title=Corps' operation of MR-GO doomed homes in St. Bernard, Lower 9th Ward, judge rules}}</ref> of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, a navigation channel, built and maintained by the Corps of Engineers.
A June 2007 report by the [[American Society of Civil Engineers]] in peer review panel concluded that the flooding in the Lakeview neighborhood (from the 17th Street Canal) and the Gentilly neighborhood (from the London Avenue Canal) was due to two engineering oversights.
The engineers responsible for the design of the canal levees and the I-walls embedded in them overestimated the soil strength, meaning that the soil strength used in the design calculations was greater than what actually existed under and near the levee during Hurricane Katrina. They made unconservative (i.e., erring toward unsafe) interpretations of the data: the soil below the levee was actually weaker than that used in the I-wall design (ASCE: External Review Panel, pg 48). Another critical engineering oversight that led to the failure of the 17th Street Canal involves not taking into account the possibility of a water-filled gap which turned out to be a very important aspect of the failures of the I-walls around New Orleans. “Analysis indicate that, with the presence of a water-filled gap, the factor of safety is about 30 percent lower. Because a factor of safety of 1.3 was used for design, a reduction of 30 percent would reduce the factor of safety to approximately one: a condition of incipient failure.” (ASCE: External Review Panel, pg 51)<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20110807184732/http://levees.org/2/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/American-Society-of-Civil-Engineers-What-Went-Wrong-ERPreport-1.pdf ''The New Orleans Hurricane Protection System : What Went Wrong and Why''] (2007). [[ASCE]] Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel report. hosted at ''web.archive.org''. Retrieved 29 August 2015.</ref> This meant that the design included a safety factor of 30% ("1.3"), and could cope in theory with stresses 30% more than expected, but the error due to the water gap was about 30%, which immediately used up the entire safety margin, leaving no leeway in the design if any other excess stress occurred.
Soil borings in the area of the [[17th Street Canal]] breach showed a layer of [[peat]] starting at about {{convert|30|ft|m}} below the surface, and ranging from about {{convert|5|ft|m}} to {{convert|20|ft|m}} thick. Engineers misjudged the strength of the peat which is from the remains of the swamp on which some areas of New Orleans (near [[Lake Ponchartrain]]) in the 20th century were built.<ref name="weaksoil">McQuaid, John; Marshall, Bob.
"[http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/base/news-4/1129960640235820.xml Officials knew about weak soil under levee] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051027003250/http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?%2Fbase%2Fnews-4%2F1129960640235820.xml |date=2005-10-27 }}." ''[[Times Picayune]].'' October 22, 2005.</ref> The [[shear strength (soil)|shear strength]] of this peat was found to be very low and it had a high water content. According to [[Robert Bea]], a geotechnical engineer from the [[University of California, Berkeley]], the weak soil made the floodwall very vulnerable to the stresses of a large flood. "At 17th Street, the soil moved laterally, pushing entire wall sections with it. ... As Katrina's storm surge filled the canal, water pressure rose in the soil underneath the wall and in the peat layer. Water moved through the soil underneath the base of the wall. When the rising pressure and moving water overcame the soil's strength, it suddenly shifted, taking surrounding material – and the wall – with it."<ref name="swamppeat">McQuaid, John. "[http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/base/news-4/1129359337274730.xml Swamp peat was poor anchor, engineer says] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051021151308/http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?%2Fbase%2Fnews-4%2F1129359337274730.xml |date=2005-10-21 }}." ''[[Times Picayune]].'' October 15, 2005.</ref>
The Federal study was initiated in October 2005, by Lt. Gen. Carl Strock, [[Chief of Engineers]] and the Commander of the Corps of Engineers; he established the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force (IPET) to "provide credible and objective scientific and engineering answers to fundamental questions about the performance of the hurricane protection and flood damage reduction system in the New Orleans metropolitan area.<ref name=IPET>{{Cite web |url=https://ipet.wes.army.mil/NOHPP/_Post-Katrina/(IPET)%20Interagency%20Performance%20Evaluation%20TaskForce/Reports/IPET%20Final%20Report/Volume%20I/IPET%20Vol%20I%20Final%20Draft_Jun08.pdf |title=IPET Final Draft Report |access-date=2008-11-25 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110722185115/https://ipet.wes.army.mil/NOHPP/_Post-Katrina/(IPET)%20Interagency%20Performance%20Evaluation%20TaskForce/Reports/IPET%20Final%20Report/Volume%20I/IPET%20Vol%20I%20Final%20Draft_Jun08.pdf |archive-date=2011-07-22 |url-status=dead }}</ref> IPET consisted of independent and recognized experts from the Universities of [[University of Maryland, College Park|Maryland]], [[University of Florida|Florida]], [[University of Notre Dame|Notre Dame]], and [[Virginia Polytechnic Institute]], the [[National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration]], the [[South Florida Water Management District]], Harris County Flood Control District (Houston, TX), the [[United States Department of Agriculture]], and the [[United States Bureau of Reclamation]] as well as those from USACE.<ref name=IPET />
IPET's final findings indicated that, {{quote|With the exception of four foundation design failures, all of the major breaches were caused by overtopping and subsequent erosion. Reduced protective elevations increased the amount of overtopping, erosion, and subsequent flooding, particularly in Orleans East. The structures that ultimately breached performed as designed, providing protection until overtopping occurred and then becoming vulnerable to catastrophic breaching. The levee-floodwall designs for the 17th Street and London Avenue Outfall Canals and the northeast breach of the IHNC were inadequate due to steel sheet-pilings driven to depths that were too shallow. In four cases the structures failed catastrophically prior to water reaching design elevations. A significant number of structures that were subjected to water levels beyond their design limits performed well. Typically, in the case of floodwalls, they represented more conservative design assumptions and, for levees, use of higher quality, less erodible materials.<ref name=IPET /><ref>http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/katrina/ipet/ipet.html</ref>}}
===Criticism of the IPET Federal Investigation===
The IPET's findings are challenged by Levees.org<ref>http://levees.org/</ref> (a grass roots organization) as lacking credibility since the USACE convened and managed the study and also chose and directly compensated its peer review team. The groups points out that eighty percent of the participants in IPET either worked for the Corps of Engineers or its sister agency [[Army Research and Development.]] The top three leaders all were Corps employees or past employees.
The credibility of the IPET was also challenged in a 42-page letter to the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) submitted by Dr. Ray M. Seed, co-chair of the ILIT study. Dr. Seed described an early intentional plan by the Corps of Engineers to hide their mistakes in the New Orleans flooding after Katrina and to intimidate anyone who tried to intervene. All of this was done with the help and the complicity of some at the ASCE, according to Dr. Seed.<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20120323155056/http://www.lasce.org/documents/RaySeedsLetter.pdf Dr. Ray Seed's letter to ASCE.] hosted at ''web.archive.org''. Retrieved 29 August 2015.</ref>
===Flood wall design===
[[File:New Orleans msi 9mar2004 31aug2005-Merge.gif|right|thumb|Satellite photos of New Orleans taken in March 2004, then on August 31, 2005, after the levee failures.]]
Investigators focused on the [[17th Street Canal|17th Street]] and London Avenue canals, where evidence showed they were breached even though water did not flow over their tops, indicating a design or construction flaw. Eyewitness accounts and other evidence show that levees and flood walls in other parts of the city, such as along the Industrial Canal, were topped by floodwaters first, then breached or eroded.
A preliminary report released on November 2, 2005, carried out by independent investigators from the [[University of California, Berkeley]] and the [[American Society of Civil Engineers]] (ASCE) stated that many New Orleans levee and flood wall failures occurred at weak-link junctions where different levee or wall sections joined together.<ref>Yang, Sarah. "[http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2005/11/02_levee.shtml Investigators release preliminary findings of levee failures at Senate hearing]." ''[[University of California, Berkeley]].'' November 2, 2005.</ref><ref>Seed, R.B.; et al. "[http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2005/11/leveereport_prelim.pdf Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005]." ''[[University of California, Berkeley]].'' November 2, 2005.</ref> This was not supported by later final studies.
A forensic engineering team from the [[Louisiana State University]], using sonar, showed that at one point near the 17th Street Canal breach, the piling extends just {{convert|10|ft|m}} below sea level, {{convert|7|ft|m}} shallower than the Corps of Engineers had maintained. "The Corps keeps saying the piles were 17 feet, but their own drawings show them to be 10 feet, Ivor van Heerden said. "This is the first time anyone has been able to get a firm fix on what's really down there. And, so far, it's just 10 feet. Not nearly deep enough."<ref>Marshall, Bob. "[http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/base/news-4/1131604614166260.xml Short Sheeted] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070312084540/http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?%2Fbase%2Fnews-4%2F1131604614166260.xml |date=2007-03-12 }}." ''[[Times Picayune]].'' November 10, 2005.</ref> The two sets of November tests conducted by the Corps of Engineers and LSU researchers used non-invasive seismic methods. Both studies understated the length of the [[Deep foundation|piles]] by about seven feet. By December, seven of the actual piles had been pulled from the ground and measured. The [[Engineering News Record]] reported on December 16 that they ranged from 23' 3 1/8" to 23' 7 7/16" long, well within the original design specifications, contradicting the early report of short pilings.
They also found that homeowners along the 17th Street Canal, near the site of the breach, had been reporting their front yards flooding from persistent seepage from the canal for a year prior to Hurricane Katrina to the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans. However, no data exists confirming that the water was coming from the canal.
Other studies showed the levee floodwalls on the 17th Street Canal were "destined to fail" from bad Corps of Engineers design, saying in part, "that miscalculation was so obvious and fundamental," investigators said, they, "could not fathom how the design team of engineers from the Corps, local firm Eustis Engineering, and the national firm Modjeski and Masters could have missed what is being termed the costliest engineering mistake in American history."<ref name="doomed">Marshall, Bob. "[http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/base/news-4/1133336859287360.xml 17th Street Canal levee was doomed] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060907073947/http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?%2Fbase%2Fnews-4%2F1133336859287360.xml |date=2006-09-07 }}." ''[[Times Picayune]].'' November 30, 2005.</ref>
Dr. Robert Bea, chair of an independent levee investigation team, has said that the New Orleans-based design firm Modjeski and Masters could have followed correct procedures in calculating safety factors for the flood walls. He added, however, that design procedures of the Corps may not account for changes in soil strength caused by the changes in water flow and pressure during a hurricane flood.<ref>[http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/%7Enew_orleans/ "Investigation of the Performance of the New Orleans Flood Protection Systems in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060618182444/http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/~new_orleans/ |date=June 18, 2006 }}. Independent Levee Investigation Team Final Report. July 31, 2006</ref> Dr. Bea has also questioned the size of the design safety margins. He said the corps applied a 30% margin over the maximum design load. A doubling of strength would be a more typical margin for highway bridges, dams, off-shore oil platforms and other public structures. There were also indications that substandard concrete may have been used at the 17th Street Canal.
In August 2007, the Corps released an analysis revealing that their floodwalls were so poorly designed that the maximum safe load is only {{convert|7|ft|m}} of water, which is half the original {{convert|14|ft|m|sing=on}} design.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://blog.nola.com/times-picayune/2007/08/corps_analysis_shows_17th_st_c.html |title=Corps analysis shows canal's weaknesses - Breaking News Updates New Orleans - Times-Picayune - NOLA.com<!-- Bot generated title --> |access-date=October 9, 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130728150431/http://blog.nola.com/times-picayune/2007/08/corps_analysis_shows_17th_st_c.html |archive-date=July 28, 2013 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
A report released in August 2015 in the official journal of the [[World Water Council]] concluded the following:
{{quote|"...What is evident from the project record is that the Army Corps of Engineers recommended raising the canal floodwalls for the 17th Street Canal, but recommended gated structures at the mouths of the Orleans and London Avenue Canals because the latter plan was less expensive. The OLB convinced Congress to pass legislation that required the Corps to raise the floodwalls for all three canals. Furthermore, the Corps, in a separate attempt to limit project costs, initiated a sheet pile load test (E-99 Study), but misinterpreted the results and wrongly concluded that sheet piles needed to be driven to depths of only 17 feet (1 foot ¼ 0.3048 meters) instead of between 31 and 46 feet. That decision saved approximately US$100 million, but significantly reduced overall engineering reliability..."<ref>{{cite news | page=707 | author=J. David Rogers, G. Paul Kemp | title=Interaction between the US Army Corps of Engineers and the Orleans Levee Board preceding the drainage canal wall failures and catastrophic flooding of New Orleans in 2005 | publisher=Water Policy|year=2015 | access-date=2015-10-31|url= http://levees.org/2/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/WPOL-V17-NO4-21051.pdf
}}</ref>
}}
===Overtopping of levees in the Eastern New Orleans===
According to Professor Raymond Seed of the [[University of California, Berkeley]], a surge of water estimated at 24 feet (7 m), about 10 feet (3 m) higher than the height of the levees along the city's eastern flank, swept into New Orleans from the [[Gulf of Mexico]], causing most of the flooding in the city. He said that storm surge from [[Lake Borgne]] travelling up the [[Intracoastal Waterway]] caused the breaches on the Industrial Canal.<ref>Seed, Raymond B. "[http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2005/11/02_levee_testimony.shtml Hurricane Katrina: Performance of the Flood Control System]." (Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, [[U.S. Senate]]) ''[[University of California, Berkeley]].'' November 2, 2005.</ref>
Aerial evaluation revealed damage to approximately 90% of some levee systems in the east which should have protected [[St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana|St. Bernard Parish]].
[[File:17rhStCanalFloodwallKatrinaGraffitti.jpg|thumb|250px|right|Portion of the flood wall atop [[17th Street Canal]] levee, with Katrina-related graffiti. Notice cracks in the flood wall joints. Operation and maintenance are the responsibility of local levee boards as mandated by the [[Flood Control Act of 1965]]]]
===National Academy of Sciences Investigation===
{{Update section|date=April 2016}}
On October 19, 2005, [[United States Secretary of Defense|Defense Secretary]] [[Donald Rumsfeld]] announced that an independent panel of experts, under the direction of the [[United States National Academy of Sciences|National Academy of Sciences]], would convene to evaluate the performance of the New Orleans levee system, and issue a final report in eight months. The panel would study the results provided by the two existing teams of experts that had already examined the levee failures.<ref>Schleifstein, Mark. "[http://www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_Times-Picayune/archives/2005_10_19.html#088443 Corps levee probe role reduced] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080326231525/http://www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?%2Fmtlogs%2Fnola_Times-Picayune%2Farchives%2F2005_10_19.html#088443 |date=2008-03-26 }}." ''[[Times Picayune]].'' October 19, 2005.</ref> The academy concluded that “the engineering of the levee system was not adequate. The procedures for designing and constructing hurricane protection systems will have to be improved, and the designing organizations must upgrade their engineering capabilities. The levees must be seen not as a system to protect real estate but as a set of dams to protect people. There must be independent peer reviews of future designs and construction.”<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.nae.edu/Publications/Bridge/EngineeringfortheThreatofNaturalDisasters/LessonsfromHurricaneKatrina.aspx|title=Lessons from Hurricane Katrina}}</ref>
===Senate Committee hearings===
Preliminary investigations and evidence were presented before the [[U.S. Senate]] Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on November 2, 2005, and generally confirmed the findings of the preliminary investigations.<ref name="senate">"[http://hsgac.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Detail&HearingID=290 Hurricane Katrina: Why Did the Levees Fail?]." ''[[U.S. Senate]]'' (Hearing Report for the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs). November 2, 2005.</ref>
On November 9, 2005, The [[Government Accountability Office]] testified before the [[Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works]]. The report cited the [[Flood Control Act of 1965]], which authorized the [[U.S. Army Corps of Engineers]] to design and construct a flood protection system to protect south [[Louisiana]] from the strongest storms characteristic of the region.
===Corps of Engineers admits problems with design===
On April 5, 2006, months after independent investigators had demonstrated that the levee failures were not due to natural forces beyond intended design strength, Lt. Gen. Carl Strock testified before the [[United States Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development|U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Energy and Water]] that, "We have now concluded we had problems with the design of the structure." He also testified that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers did not know of this mechanism of failure prior to August 29, 2005. The claim of ignorance is refuted by the [[National Science Foundation]] investigators hired by the [[United States Army Corps of Engineers|Army Corps of Engineers]], who point to a 1986 study (E-99 study) by the corps itself that such separations were possible in the I-wall design.<ref>{{cite web | last=Walsh | first=Bill | title=Corps chief admits to 'design failure' | work=[[Times Picayune]] | date=April 6, 2006}}</ref> This issue is addressed again in a study released in August 2015 by J. David Rogers et al., who concluded that a misinterpretation of the 1986 study occurred apparently because the Corps had draped a tarpaulin over the gap that formed between the bases of the deflecting sheet piles and the soil in which they were embedded, so they did not see the gap. The tarpaulin was there for safety and to stop water that would seep through the interlocks. Failure to include the gap in interpretation of the test results introduced unconservatism in the final designs based on these tests. It allowed the use of shorter sheet piles, and reduced overall flood protection reliability.<ref>{{cite news | page=707 | author=J. David Rogers, G. Paul Kemp | title=Interaction between the US Army Corps of Engineers and the Orleans Levee Board preceding the drainage canal wall failures and catastrophic flooding of New Orleans in 2005 | publisher=Water Policy|year=2015 | access-date=2015-10-31|url= http://levees.org/2/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/WPOL-V17-NO4-21051.pdf
}}</ref>
Nearly two months later, on June 1, 2006, the USACE finalized their report. The final draft of the IPET report states the destructive forces of Katrina were "aided by incomplete protection, lower than authorized structures, and levee sections with erodible materials.
== The New Levees ==
Following the damages of Hurricane Katrina and the levee failures, changes had to be made in order to prepare for any future disasters. This caused the city to take steps to obtain new system of levees that would protect the city from future damage; a system that would cost 14.5 billion dollars.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Layne|first=Nathan|date=2021-08-30|title=New Orleans' levees got a $14.5 billion upgrade. Will they hold?|language=en|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/us/new-orleans-levees-got-145-billion-upgrade-will-they-hold-2021-08-30/|access-date=2021-12-03}}</ref> With the recent hit of Hurricane Ida, the new levees were to put the test.
The strength of Hurricane Ida forced a considerable amount of water towards New Orleans, similar to what happened during Hurricane Katrina. However, thanks to the new levee systems, damages that occurred during Hurricane Ida were minimized. Concerns were expressed about future uses of the system. Despite the overall success during Hurricane Ida, the effectiveness of the levee system during future storms might not be up to par.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Bittle|first=Jake|date=2021-09-02|title=New Orleans’s Levees Held Up This Time — But That’s Not Enough|url=https://www.curbed.com/2021/09/levees-louisiana-hurricane-ida-managed-retreat.html|access-date=2021-12-03|website=Curbed|language=en-us}}</ref> Realizing that there needed to be more updates and changes, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers requested $3.2 billion from Congress in the Fall of 2021, in addition to the already $14.5 billion system. This was to ensure that they could continue to provide their 100-year level of hurricane protection through 2073. State and local officials say that the 100-year protection is not good enough in the era of global warming, however, the changes that have already been made are improving flood protection and the levee system will continue to be upgraded as necessary when they fail to meet standards.<ref>{{Cite web|last=writer|first=MARK SCHLEIFSTEIN {{!}} Staff|title=15 years after Katrina, New Orleans levees are in the best shape ever. Experts say it's not enough.|url=https://www.nola.com/news/environment/article_80c27be8-e3e7-11ea-bbf9-1731ebdd9171.html|access-date=2021-12-03|website=NOLA.com|language=en}}</ref>
==Conspiracy theories==
[[Nation of Islam]] leader [[Louis Farrakhan]] among other public figures claimed the levees were dynamited to divert waters away from wealthy white areas. The conspiracy theory reached a [[United States House of Representatives]] committee investigating Katrina when a New Orleans community activist made the claim. According to the ''[[New Orleans Times Picayune]]'' this is an "[[urban myth]]". Reasons for belief in these theories have been ascribed to the decision by city officials during the [[Great Mississippi Flood of 1927]] to set off 30 tons of dynamite on the levee at [[Caernarvon, Louisiana]] which eased pressure on levees at New Orleans but flooded [[St. Bernard Parish]], the [[Ninth Ward]] taking the brunt of the city's flooding during [[Hurricane Betsy]], the general disenfranchisement of blacks and lower-class people, and the similarity of the sound of the levees collapsing to that of a bombing.<ref>[http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/index.ssf?/base/news-4/1134370689216400.xml&coll=1 Rumor of levee dynamite persists New Orleans Times Picayune December 12, 2005] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091126063459/http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/index.ssf?%2Fbase%2Fnews-4%2F1134370689216400.xml |date=November 26, 2009 }}</ref><ref name="SHG">Manning Marable, [[Kristen Clarke]], ''Seeking Higher Ground: The Hurricane Katrina Crisis, Race, and Public Policy'' (2008), p. 192. {{ISBN|1-4039-7779-8}}.</ref><ref name="UGNO">Eve Zibart, Tom Fitzmorris, Will Coviello, ''The Unofficial Guide to New Orleans'' (2009), p. 23.</ref>
==See also==
*[[Flood Control Act of 1965]]
*[[17th Street Canal]]
*[[Civil engineering and infrastructure repair in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina]]
*[[Drainage in New Orleans]]
*[[Industrial Canal]]
*[[ING 4727]]
*[[Old River Control Structure]]
*[[Seabrook Floodgate]]
*[[London Avenue Canal]]
*[[U.S. Army Corps of Engineers civil works controversies (New Orleans)]]
==References==
<!-- This article uses [[Wikipedia:Footnotes]]. Please use this format when making edits to references in the article. Any external links directly added to this section will be summarily and swiftly deleted. -->
{{reflist|2}}
==Further reading==
{{refbegin}}
*{{cite book |last=van Heerden |first=Ivor |author2=Bryan, Mike |title=What Went Wrong and Why During Hurricane Katrina |year=2006 |publisher=Viking |isbn=0-670-03781-8 |url-access=registration |url=https://archive.org/details/stormwhatwentwro00vanh }}
{{refend}}
Bush, Ann McReynolds, "Katrina: 10 Years On" (year 2015 publisher+Amazon
==External links==
*[http://www.levees.org Levees.Org (non-profit flood protection group in New Orleans)]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20090130100021/https://ipet.wes.army.mil/ Interagency Performance Evaluation Taskforce (IPET) Draft Final Report] (1 June 2006) provided by [[USACE]] <br><small>Note: Site may be slow to load and considered non-secure by [[Internet Explorer|IE7]]</small>
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20070930191702/http://www.nola.com/weblogs/nola/index.ssf?%2Fmtlogs%2Fnola_nolaview%2Farchives%2F2006_06_01.html IPET Draft Final Report] (1 June 2006) provided by [[The Times-Picayune]]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20060618182444/http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/~new_orleans/ Independent Levee Investigation Team (ILIT) Final Report] (31 July 2006)
<!-- [http://www.nola.com/katrina/graphics/flashflood.swf/ Animation of the flooding of New Orleans] – Note: Link is expired! -->*
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20110807184732/http://levees.org/2/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/American-Society-of-Civil-Engineers-What-Went-Wrong-ERPreport-1.pdf ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel Report] (2007). at ''web.archive.org''
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20071101043228/http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/inside/products/pub/hpdc/hpdc.cfm Decision-Making Chronology for Hurricane Protection Project]
{{Katrinaseries}}
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[[Category:George W. Bush administration controversies]]
[[Category:Dikes in the United States]]' |
New page wikitext, after the edit (new_wikitext) | '{{Use American English|date = November 2019}}
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{{Katrina}}
On Monday, August 29, 2005, there were over 50 failures of the [[levee]]s and [[flood wall]]s protecting [[New Orleans, Louisiana]], and its suburbs following passage of [[Hurricane Katrina]] and landfall in Mississippi. The levee and flood wall failures caused flooding in 80% of New Orleans and all of St. Bernard Parish. Tens of billions of gallons of water spilled into vast areas of New Orleans, flooding over 100,000 homes and businesses. Responsibility for the design and construction of the levee system belongs to the [[United States Army Corps of Engineers]]; the responsibility of maintenance belongs to the local levee boards. The Corps hands components of the system over to the local levee boards upon completion. When Katrina struck on August 29, 2005, the project was between 60–90% complete. <ref name="gao.gov">{{Cite web|url=https://levees.org/2/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/2005-GAO-report-Testimony-Before-the-Subcommittee-on-Energy-and-Water-Development-Committee-on-Appropriations-House-of-Representatives.pdf | title= Army Corps of Engineers; Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project |date=2005-09-28|access-date=2021-09-20}}</ref> Four major investigations were conducted by civil engineers and other experts in an attempt to identify the underlying reasons for the failure of the federal flood protection system. All concur that the primary cause of the flooding was inadequate design and construction by the Army Corps of Engineers. <ref>Robertson, Campbell. {{Cite web|url= https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/24/us/decade-after-katrina-pointing-finger-more-firmly-at-army-corps.html |title= Decade After Katrina, Pointing Finger More Firmly at Army Corps |date=2015-05-23|website=New York Times|access-date=2016-10-20}}</ref>
There were six major breaches in Orleans Parish:
#Three major breaches occurred on the [[Industrial Canal]]: one on the northeast side near the junction with Gulf Intracoastal Waterway and two on the southeast side along the [[Lower Ninth Ward]], between Florida Avenue and Claiborne Avenue.
#On the west side of New Orleans, the [[17th Street Canal]] levee breached {{convert|4|ft|m}} below design specs on the New Orleans side near the Old Hammond Highway Bridge
#The [[London Avenue Canal]] in the Gentilly neighborhood breached on both sides – on the west side near Robert E. Lee Boulevard and on the east near the Mirabeau Avenue Bridge
Storm surge caused breaches in 20 places on the [[Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet Canal]] ("MR-GO") in [[Saint Bernard Parish, Louisiana|Saint Bernard Parish]], flooding the entire parish and the East Bank of [[Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana|Plaquemines Parish]].
==Background==
[[File:New Orleans Elevations.jpg|thumb|300px|left|Vertical cross-section of New Orleans, showing maximum levee height of 23 feet (7 m) at the Mississippi River on the left and 17.5 feet (5 m) at Lake Pontchartrain on the right]]
{{See also|Drainage in New Orleans|Hurricane preparedness for New Orleans}}
The original residents of [[French Quarter|New Orleans]] settled on the high ground along the Mississippi River. Later developments eventually extended to nearby Lake Pontchartrain, built upon fill to bring them above the average lake level. Navigable commercial waterways extended from the lake to downtown. After 1940, the state decided to close those waterways following the completion of a new Industrial Canal for waterborne commerce. Closure of the waterways resulted in a drastic lowering of the water table by the city's drainage system, causing some areas to settle by up to <span style="white-space:nowrap">8 feet (2 m)</span> due to the compacting and desiccation of the underlying organic soils.
After the [[Great Mississippi Flood of 1927]], [[United States Congress]] passed the [[Flood Control Act of 1928]] which authorized the Corps of Engineers to design and construct flood control structures, along with levees, on the Mississippi River to protect populated areas from floods. It also affirmed the principle of local participation in federally funded projects but acknowledged that the $292 million already spent by local interests was sufficient to cover local participatory costs.<ref>[http://www.mvd.usace.army.mil/mrc/history/AppendixE.htm Flood Control Act of 1928 on Mississippi Valley Division of USACE website] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090109031739/http://www.mvd.usace.army.mil/mrc/history/AppendixE.htm |date=2009-01-09 }}</ref> It is instructive to note that, in addition, sovereign immunity was given to the Corps of Engineers under Section 3 of the Flood Control Act of 1928, which states “no liability of any kind would attach or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place, provided that if on any stretch of the banks of the Mississippi River it was impracticable to construct levees.” 33 U.S.C. § 702c. Section 702c is sometimes referred as “Section 3 of the act,” based on where it appears in the Public law.
Heavy flooding caused by [[Hurricane Betsy]] in 1965 brought concerns regarding flooding from hurricanes to the forefront. In response, the Congress passed the [[Flood Control Act of 1965]] which mandated that henceforth, the [[United States Army Corps of Engineers|Corps of Engineers]] is the agency responsible for design and construction of flood protection projects, to include those in Greater New Orleans. The local interests' role was maintenance once the projects were complete.<ref name=GAOReport>{{Cite web |url=http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d051050t.pdf |title=GAO Report on Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project, September 2005 |access-date=November 25, 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110523230347/http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d051050t.pdf |archive-date=May 23, 2011 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
Also that year, Congress authorized the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project (LPVHPP) which reiterated the principle of local participation in federally funded projects. The project was initially estimated to take 13 years, but when Katrina struck in 2005, almost 40 years later, the project was only 60–90% complete with a revised projected completion date of 2015.<ref name="gao.gov"/>
On August 29, 2005, flood walls and levees catastrophically failed throughout the metro area. Some collapsed well below design thresholds (17th Street and London Canals). Others collapsed after a brief period of overtopping (Industrial Canal) caused scouring or erosion of the earthen levee walls. In April 2007, the American Society of Civil Engineers called the flooding of New Orleans "the worst engineering catastrophe in US History."<ref>[http://eng.auburn.edu/admin/marketing/seminars/2007/l-roth.html The New Orleans Levees: The Worst Engineering Catastrophe in US History - What Went Wrong and Why<!-- Bot generated title -->] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071015234208/http://eng.auburn.edu/admin/marketing/seminars/2007/l-roth.html |date=2007-10-15 }}</ref>
poop
==Investigations==
===Levee investigations===
In the ten years following Katrina, over a dozen investigations were conducted. There was no federally ordered independent commission like those ordered after the September 11 terrorist attacks and after the BP Oil Spill in the Gulf. The only federally ordered study was convened and managed by the Army Corps of Engineers, the federal agency responsible for the flood protection's performance. A major independent study was conducted by the University of California at Berkeley.<ref>[http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/%7Enew_orleans/ ILIT DOWNLOAD CENTER (sponsored in part by the National Science Foundation)] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060618182444/http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/~new_orleans/ |date=2006-06-18 }}</ref> A second major study was sponsored by the Louisiana Department of Transportation led by [[Ivor van Heerden]] at Louisiana State University.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.dotd.louisiana.gov/administration/teamlouisiana/TeamLaLetter.pdf |title=LSU Katrina Investigation |access-date=October 9, 2007 |archive-date=July 18, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110718210500/http://www.dotd.louisiana.gov/administration/teamlouisiana/TeamLaLetter.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref> Studies were also done by FEMA, the insurance industry, the National Research Council, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the Katrina Consolidated Lawsuit. All studies basically agreed on the engineering mechanisms of failure.
The primary mechanisms of failure at the 17th Street Canal, London Avenue Canal and Industrial Canal (east side north) were improper design of the canal floodwalls.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.dotd.louisiana.gov/administration/teamlouisiana/ |title=Archived copy |access-date=October 9, 2007 |archive-date=August 15, 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070815202550/http://www.dotd.louisiana.gov/administration/TeamLouisiana/ |url-status=dead }}</ref> The failure mechanism for the Industrial Canal (east side south and west side) was overtopping of levees and floodwalls by the storm surge. The primary mechanism of failure for levees protecting eastern New Orleans was the existence of sand in 10% of places instead of thick Louisiana clay. The primary mechanism of failure for the levees protecting St. Bernard Parish was overtopping due to negligent maintenance<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.nola.com/hurricane/index.ssf/2009/11/post_16.html|title=Corps' operation of MR-GO doomed homes in St. Bernard, Lower 9th Ward, judge rules}}</ref> of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, a navigation channel, built and maintained by the Corps of Engineers.
A June 2007 report by the [[American Society of Civil Engineers]] in peer review panel concluded that the flooding in the Lakeview neighborhood (from the 17th Street Canal) and the Gentilly neighborhood (from the London Avenue Canal) was due to two engineering oversights.
The engineers responsible for the design of the canal levees and the I-walls embedded in them overestimated the soil strength, meaning that the soil strength used in the design calculations was greater than what actually existed under and near the levee during Hurricane Katrina. They made unconservative (i.e., erring toward unsafe) interpretations of the data: the soil below the levee was actually weaker than that used in the I-wall design (ASCE: External Review Panel, pg 48). Another critical engineering oversight that led to the failure of the 17th Street Canal involves not taking into account the possibility of a water-filled gap which turned out to be a very important aspect of the failures of the I-walls around New Orleans. “Analysis indicate that, with the presence of a water-filled gap, the factor of safety is about 30 percent lower. Because a factor of safety of 1.3 was used for design, a reduction of 30 percent would reduce the factor of safety to approximately one: a condition of incipient failure.” (ASCE: External Review Panel, pg 51)<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20110807184732/http://levees.org/2/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/American-Society-of-Civil-Engineers-What-Went-Wrong-ERPreport-1.pdf ''The New Orleans Hurricane Protection System : What Went Wrong and Why''] (2007). [[ASCE]] Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel report. hosted at ''web.archive.org''. Retrieved 29 August 2015.</ref> This meant that the design included a safety factor of 30% ("1.3"), and could cope in theory with stresses 30% more than expected, but the error due to the water gap was about 30%, which immediately used up the entire safety margin, leaving no leeway in the design if any other excess stress occurred.
Soil borings in the area of the [[17th Street Canal]] breach showed a layer of [[peat]] starting at about {{convert|30|ft|m}} below the surface, and ranging from about {{convert|5|ft|m}} to {{convert|20|ft|m}} thick. Engineers misjudged the strength of the peat which is from the remains of the swamp on which some areas of New Orleans (near [[Lake Ponchartrain]]) in the 20th century were built.<ref name="weaksoil">McQuaid, John; Marshall, Bob.
"[http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/base/news-4/1129960640235820.xml Officials knew about weak soil under levee] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051027003250/http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?%2Fbase%2Fnews-4%2F1129960640235820.xml |date=2005-10-27 }}." ''[[Times Picayune]].'' October 22, 2005.</ref> The [[shear strength (soil)|shear strength]] of this peat was found to be very low and it had a high water content. According to [[Robert Bea]], a geotechnical engineer from the [[University of California, Berkeley]], the weak soil made the floodwall very vulnerable to the stresses of a large flood. "At 17th Street, the soil moved laterally, pushing entire wall sections with it. ... As Katrina's storm surge filled the canal, water pressure rose in the soil underneath the wall and in the peat layer. Water moved through the soil underneath the base of the wall. When the rising pressure and moving water overcame the soil's strength, it suddenly shifted, taking surrounding material – and the wall – with it."<ref name="swamppeat">McQuaid, John. "[http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/base/news-4/1129359337274730.xml Swamp peat was poor anchor, engineer says] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051021151308/http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?%2Fbase%2Fnews-4%2F1129359337274730.xml |date=2005-10-21 }}." ''[[Times Picayune]].'' October 15, 2005.</ref>
The Federal study was initiated in October 2005, by Lt. Gen. Carl Strock, [[Chief of Engineers]] and the Commander of the Corps of Engineers; he established the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force (IPET) to "provide credible and objective scientific and engineering answers to fundamental questions about the performance of the hurricane protection and flood damage reduction system in the New Orleans metropolitan area.<ref name=IPET>{{Cite web |url=https://ipet.wes.army.mil/NOHPP/_Post-Katrina/(IPET)%20Interagency%20Performance%20Evaluation%20TaskForce/Reports/IPET%20Final%20Report/Volume%20I/IPET%20Vol%20I%20Final%20Draft_Jun08.pdf |title=IPET Final Draft Report |access-date=2008-11-25 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110722185115/https://ipet.wes.army.mil/NOHPP/_Post-Katrina/(IPET)%20Interagency%20Performance%20Evaluation%20TaskForce/Reports/IPET%20Final%20Report/Volume%20I/IPET%20Vol%20I%20Final%20Draft_Jun08.pdf |archive-date=2011-07-22 |url-status=dead }}</ref> IPET consisted of independent and recognized experts from the Universities of [[University of Maryland, College Park|Maryland]], [[University of Florida|Florida]], [[University of Notre Dame|Notre Dame]], and [[Virginia Polytechnic Institute]], the [[National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration]], the [[South Florida Water Management District]], Harris County Flood Control District (Houston, TX), the [[United States Department of Agriculture]], and the [[United States Bureau of Reclamation]] as well as those from USACE.<ref name=IPET />
IPET's final findings indicated that, {{quote|With the exception of four foundation design failures, all of the major breaches were caused by overtopping and subsequent erosion. Reduced protective elevations increased the amount of overtopping, erosion, and subsequent flooding, particularly in Orleans East. The structures that ultimately breached performed as designed, providing protection until overtopping occurred and then becoming vulnerable to catastrophic breaching. The levee-floodwall designs for the 17th Street and London Avenue Outfall Canals and the northeast breach of the IHNC were inadequate due to steel sheet-pilings driven to depths that were too shallow. In four cases the structures failed catastrophically prior to water reaching design elevations. A significant number of structures that were subjected to water levels beyond their design limits performed well. Typically, in the case of floodwalls, they represented more conservative design assumptions and, for levees, use of higher quality, less erodible materials.<ref name=IPET /><ref>http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/katrina/ipet/ipet.html</ref>}}
===Criticism of the IPET Federal Investigation===
The IPET's findings are challenged by Levees.org<ref>http://levees.org/</ref> (a grass roots organization) as lacking credibility since the USACE convened and managed the study and also chose and directly compensated its peer review team. The groups points out that eighty percent of the participants in IPET either worked for the Corps of Engineers or its sister agency [[Army Research and Development.]] The top three leaders all were Corps employees or past employees.
The credibility of the IPET was also challenged in a 42-page letter to the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) submitted by Dr. Ray M. Seed, co-chair of the ILIT study. Dr. Seed described an early intentional plan by the Corps of Engineers to hide their mistakes in the New Orleans flooding after Katrina and to intimidate anyone who tried to intervene. All of this was done with the help and the complicity of some at the ASCE, according to Dr. Seed.<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20120323155056/http://www.lasce.org/documents/RaySeedsLetter.pdf Dr. Ray Seed's letter to ASCE.] hosted at ''web.archive.org''. Retrieved 29 August 2015.</ref>
===Flood wall design===
[[File:New Orleans msi 9mar2004 31aug2005-Merge.gif|right|thumb|Satellite photos of New Orleans taken in March 2004, then on August 31, 2005, after the levee failures.]]
Investigators focused on the [[17th Street Canal|17th Street]] and London Avenue canals, where evidence showed they were breached even though water did not flow over their tops, indicating a design or construction flaw. Eyewitness accounts and other evidence show that levees and flood walls in other parts of the city, such as along the Industrial Canal, were topped by floodwaters first, then breached or eroded.
A preliminary report released on November 2, 2005, carried out by independent investigators from the [[University of California, Berkeley]] and the [[American Society of Civil Engineers]] (ASCE) stated that many New Orleans levee and flood wall failures occurred at weak-link junctions where different levee or wall sections joined together.<ref>Yang, Sarah. "[http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2005/11/02_levee.shtml Investigators release preliminary findings of levee failures at Senate hearing]." ''[[University of California, Berkeley]].'' November 2, 2005.</ref><ref>Seed, R.B.; et al. "[http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2005/11/leveereport_prelim.pdf Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005]." ''[[University of California, Berkeley]].'' November 2, 2005.</ref> This was not supported by later final studies.
A forensic engineering team from the [[Louisiana State University]], using sonar, showed that at one point near the 17th Street Canal breach, the piling extends just {{convert|10|ft|m}} below sea level, {{convert|7|ft|m}} shallower than the Corps of Engineers had maintained. "The Corps keeps saying the piles were 17 feet, but their own drawings show them to be 10 feet, Ivor van Heerden said. "This is the first time anyone has been able to get a firm fix on what's really down there. And, so far, it's just 10 feet. Not nearly deep enough."<ref>Marshall, Bob. "[http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/base/news-4/1131604614166260.xml Short Sheeted] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070312084540/http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?%2Fbase%2Fnews-4%2F1131604614166260.xml |date=2007-03-12 }}." ''[[Times Picayune]].'' November 10, 2005.</ref> The two sets of November tests conducted by the Corps of Engineers and LSU researchers used non-invasive seismic methods. Both studies understated the length of the [[Deep foundation|piles]] by about seven feet. By December, seven of the actual piles had been pulled from the ground and measured. The [[Engineering News Record]] reported on December 16 that they ranged from 23' 3 1/8" to 23' 7 7/16" long, well within the original design specifications, contradicting the early report of short pilings.
They also found that homeowners along the 17th Street Canal, near the site of the breach, had been reporting their front yards flooding from persistent seepage from the canal for a year prior to Hurricane Katrina to the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans. However, no data exists confirming that the water was coming from the canal.
Other studies showed the levee floodwalls on the 17th Street Canal were "destined to fail" from bad Corps of Engineers design, saying in part, "that miscalculation was so obvious and fundamental," investigators said, they, "could not fathom how the design team of engineers from the Corps, local firm Eustis Engineering, and the national firm Modjeski and Masters could have missed what is being termed the costliest engineering mistake in American history."<ref name="doomed">Marshall, Bob. "[http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/base/news-4/1133336859287360.xml 17th Street Canal levee was doomed] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060907073947/http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?%2Fbase%2Fnews-4%2F1133336859287360.xml |date=2006-09-07 }}." ''[[Times Picayune]].'' November 30, 2005.</ref>
Dr. Robert Bea, chair of an independent levee investigation team, has said that the New Orleans-based design firm Modjeski and Masters could have followed correct procedures in calculating safety factors for the flood walls. He added, however, that design procedures of the Corps may not account for changes in soil strength caused by the changes in water flow and pressure during a hurricane flood.<ref>[http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/%7Enew_orleans/ "Investigation of the Performance of the New Orleans Flood Protection Systems in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060618182444/http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/~new_orleans/ |date=June 18, 2006 }}. Independent Levee Investigation Team Final Report. July 31, 2006</ref> Dr. Bea has also questioned the size of the design safety margins. He said the corps applied a 30% margin over the maximum design load. A doubling of strength would be a more typical margin for highway bridges, dams, off-shore oil platforms and other public structures. There were also indications that substandard concrete may have been used at the 17th Street Canal.
In August 2007, the Corps released an analysis revealing that their floodwalls were so poorly designed that the maximum safe load is only {{convert|7|ft|m}} of water, which is half the original {{convert|14|ft|m|sing=on}} design.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://blog.nola.com/times-picayune/2007/08/corps_analysis_shows_17th_st_c.html |title=Corps analysis shows canal's weaknesses - Breaking News Updates New Orleans - Times-Picayune - NOLA.com<!-- Bot generated title --> |access-date=October 9, 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130728150431/http://blog.nola.com/times-picayune/2007/08/corps_analysis_shows_17th_st_c.html |archive-date=July 28, 2013 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
A report released in August 2015 in the official journal of the [[World Water Council]] concluded the following:
{{quote|"...What is evident from the project record is that the Army Corps of Engineers recommended raising the canal floodwalls for the 17th Street Canal, but recommended gated structures at the mouths of the Orleans and London Avenue Canals because the latter plan was less expensive. The OLB convinced Congress to pass legislation that required the Corps to raise the floodwalls for all three canals. Furthermore, the Corps, in a separate attempt to limit project costs, initiated a sheet pile load test (E-99 Study), but misinterpreted the results and wrongly concluded that sheet piles needed to be driven to depths of only 17 feet (1 foot ¼ 0.3048 meters) instead of between 31 and 46 feet. That decision saved approximately US$100 million, but significantly reduced overall engineering reliability..."<ref>{{cite news | page=707 | author=J. David Rogers, G. Paul Kemp | title=Interaction between the US Army Corps of Engineers and the Orleans Levee Board preceding the drainage canal wall failures and catastrophic flooding of New Orleans in 2005 | publisher=Water Policy|year=2015 | access-date=2015-10-31|url= http://levees.org/2/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/WPOL-V17-NO4-21051.pdf
}}</ref>
}}
===Overtopping of levees in the Eastern New Orleans===
According to Professor Raymond Seed of the [[University of California, Berkeley]], a surge of water estimated at 24 feet (7 m), about 10 feet (3 m) higher than the height of the levees along the city's eastern flank, swept into New Orleans from the [[Gulf of Mexico]], causing most of the flooding in the city. He said that storm surge from [[Lake Borgne]] travelling up the [[Intracoastal Waterway]] caused the breaches on the Industrial Canal.<ref>Seed, Raymond B. "[http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2005/11/02_levee_testimony.shtml Hurricane Katrina: Performance of the Flood Control System]." (Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, [[U.S. Senate]]) ''[[University of California, Berkeley]].'' November 2, 2005.</ref>
Aerial evaluation revealed damage to approximately 90% of some levee systems in the east which should have protected [[St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana|St. Bernard Parish]].
[[File:17rhStCanalFloodwallKatrinaGraffitti.jpg|thumb|250px|right|Portion of the flood wall atop [[17th Street Canal]] levee, with Katrina-related graffiti. Notice cracks in the flood wall joints. Operation and maintenance are the responsibility of local levee boards as mandated by the [[Flood Control Act of 1965]]]]
===National Academy of Sciences Investigation===
{{Update section|date=April 2016}}
On October 19, 2005, [[United States Secretary of Defense|Defense Secretary]] [[Donald Rumsfeld]] announced that an independent panel of experts, under the direction of the [[United States National Academy of Sciences|National Academy of Sciences]], would convene to evaluate the performance of the New Orleans levee system, and issue a final report in eight months. The panel would study the results provided by the two existing teams of experts that had already examined the levee failures.<ref>Schleifstein, Mark. "[http://www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_Times-Picayune/archives/2005_10_19.html#088443 Corps levee probe role reduced] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080326231525/http://www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?%2Fmtlogs%2Fnola_Times-Picayune%2Farchives%2F2005_10_19.html#088443 |date=2008-03-26 }}." ''[[Times Picayune]].'' October 19, 2005.</ref> The academy concluded that “the engineering of the levee system was not adequate. The procedures for designing and constructing hurricane protection systems will have to be improved, and the designing organizations must upgrade their engineering capabilities. The levees must be seen not as a system to protect real estate but as a set of dams to protect people. There must be independent peer reviews of future designs and construction.”<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.nae.edu/Publications/Bridge/EngineeringfortheThreatofNaturalDisasters/LessonsfromHurricaneKatrina.aspx|title=Lessons from Hurricane Katrina}}</ref>
===Senate Committee hearings===
Preliminary investigations and evidence were presented before the [[U.S. Senate]] Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on November 2, 2005, and generally confirmed the findings of the preliminary investigations.<ref name="senate">"[http://hsgac.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Detail&HearingID=290 Hurricane Katrina: Why Did the Levees Fail?]." ''[[U.S. Senate]]'' (Hearing Report for the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs). November 2, 2005.</ref>
On November 9, 2005, The [[Government Accountability Office]] testified before the [[Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works]]. The report cited the [[Flood Control Act of 1965]], which authorized the [[U.S. Army Corps of Engineers]] to design and construct a flood protection system to protect south [[Louisiana]] from the strongest storms characteristic of the region.
===Corps of Engineers admits problems with design===
On April 5, 2006, months after independent investigators had demonstrated that the levee failures were not due to natural forces beyond intended design strength, Lt. Gen. Carl Strock testified before the [[United States Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development|U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Energy and Water]] that, "We have now concluded we had problems with the design of the structure." He also testified that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers did not know of this mechanism of failure prior to August 29, 2005. The claim of ignorance is refuted by the [[National Science Foundation]] investigators hired by the [[United States Army Corps of Engineers|Army Corps of Engineers]], who point to a 1986 study (E-99 study) by the corps itself that such separations were possible in the I-wall design.<ref>{{cite web | last=Walsh | first=Bill | title=Corps chief admits to 'design failure' | work=[[Times Picayune]] | date=April 6, 2006}}</ref> This issue is addressed again in a study released in August 2015 by J. David Rogers et al., who concluded that a misinterpretation of the 1986 study occurred apparently because the Corps had draped a tarpaulin over the gap that formed between the bases of the deflecting sheet piles and the soil in which they were embedded, so they did not see the gap. The tarpaulin was there for safety and to stop water that would seep through the interlocks. Failure to include the gap in interpretation of the test results introduced unconservatism in the final designs based on these tests. It allowed the use of shorter sheet piles, and reduced overall flood protection reliability.<ref>{{cite news | page=707 | author=J. David Rogers, G. Paul Kemp | title=Interaction between the US Army Corps of Engineers and the Orleans Levee Board preceding the drainage canal wall failures and catastrophic flooding of New Orleans in 2005 | publisher=Water Policy|year=2015 | access-date=2015-10-31|url= http://levees.org/2/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/WPOL-V17-NO4-21051.pdf
}}</ref>
Nearly two months later, on June 1, 2006, the USACE finalized their report. The final draft of the IPET report states the destructive forces of Katrina were "aided by incomplete protection, lower than authorized structures, and levee sections with erodible materials.
== The New Levees ==
Following the damages of Hurricane Katrina and the levee failures, changes had to be made in order to prepare for any future disasters. This caused the city to take steps to obtain new system of levees that would protect the city from future damage; a system that would cost 14.5 billion dollars.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Layne|first=Nathan|date=2021-08-30|title=New Orleans' levees got a $14.5 billion upgrade. Will they hold?|language=en|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/us/new-orleans-levees-got-145-billion-upgrade-will-they-hold-2021-08-30/|access-date=2021-12-03}}</ref> With the recent hit of Hurricane Ida, the new levees were to put the test.
The strength of Hurricane Ida forced a considerable amount of water towards New Orleans, similar to what happened during Hurricane Katrina. However, thanks to the new levee systems, damages that occurred during Hurricane Ida were minimized. Concerns were expressed about future uses of the system. Despite the overall success during Hurricane Ida, the effectiveness of the levee system during future storms might not be up to par.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Bittle|first=Jake|date=2021-09-02|title=New Orleans’s Levees Held Up This Time — But That’s Not Enough|url=https://www.curbed.com/2021/09/levees-louisiana-hurricane-ida-managed-retreat.html|access-date=2021-12-03|website=Curbed|language=en-us}}</ref> Realizing that there needed to be more updates and changes, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers requested $3.2 billion from Congress in the Fall of 2021, in addition to the already $14.5 billion system. This was to ensure that they could continue to provide their 100-year level of hurricane protection through 2073. State and local officials say that the 100-year protection is not good enough in the era of global warming, however, the changes that have already been made are improving flood protection and the levee system will continue to be upgraded as necessary when they fail to meet standards.<ref>{{Cite web|last=writer|first=MARK SCHLEIFSTEIN {{!}} Staff|title=15 years after Katrina, New Orleans levees are in the best shape ever. Experts say it's not enough.|url=https://www.nola.com/news/environment/article_80c27be8-e3e7-11ea-bbf9-1731ebdd9171.html|access-date=2021-12-03|website=NOLA.com|language=en}}</ref>
==Conspiracy theories==
[[Nation of Islam]] leader [[Louis Farrakhan]] among other public figures claimed the levees were dynamited to divert waters away from wealthy white areas. The conspiracy theory reached a [[United States House of Representatives]] committee investigating Katrina when a New Orleans community activist made the claim. According to the ''[[New Orleans Times Picayune]]'' this is an "[[urban myth]]". Reasons for belief in these theories have been ascribed to the decision by city officials during the [[Great Mississippi Flood of 1927]] to set off 30 tons of dynamite on the levee at [[Caernarvon, Louisiana]] which eased pressure on levees at New Orleans but flooded [[St. Bernard Parish]], the [[Ninth Ward]] taking the brunt of the city's flooding during [[Hurricane Betsy]], the general disenfranchisement of blacks and lower-class people, and the similarity of the sound of the levees collapsing to that of a bombing.<ref>[http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/index.ssf?/base/news-4/1134370689216400.xml&coll=1 Rumor of levee dynamite persists New Orleans Times Picayune December 12, 2005] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091126063459/http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/index.ssf?%2Fbase%2Fnews-4%2F1134370689216400.xml |date=November 26, 2009 }}</ref><ref name="SHG">Manning Marable, [[Kristen Clarke]], ''Seeking Higher Ground: The Hurricane Katrina Crisis, Race, and Public Policy'' (2008), p. 192. {{ISBN|1-4039-7779-8}}.</ref><ref name="UGNO">Eve Zibart, Tom Fitzmorris, Will Coviello, ''The Unofficial Guide to New Orleans'' (2009), p. 23.</ref>
==See also==
*[[Flood Control Act of 1965]]
*[[17th Street Canal]]
*[[Civil engineering and infrastructure repair in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina]]
*[[Drainage in New Orleans]]
*[[Industrial Canal]]
*[[ING 4727]]
*[[Old River Control Structure]]
*[[Seabrook Floodgate]]
*[[London Avenue Canal]]
*[[U.S. Army Corps of Engineers civil works controversies (New Orleans)]]
==References==
<!-- This article uses [[Wikipedia:Footnotes]]. Please use this format when making edits to references in the article. Any external links directly added to this section will be summarily and swiftly deleted. -->
{{reflist|2}}
==Further reading==
{{refbegin}}
*{{cite book |last=van Heerden |first=Ivor |author2=Bryan, Mike |title=What Went Wrong and Why During Hurricane Katrina |year=2006 |publisher=Viking |isbn=0-670-03781-8 |url-access=registration |url=https://archive.org/details/stormwhatwentwro00vanh }}
{{refend}}
Bush, Ann McReynolds, "Katrina: 10 Years On" (year 2015 publisher+Amazon
==External links==
*[http://www.levees.org Levees.Org (non-profit flood protection group in New Orleans)]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20090130100021/https://ipet.wes.army.mil/ Interagency Performance Evaluation Taskforce (IPET) Draft Final Report] (1 June 2006) provided by [[USACE]] <br><small>Note: Site may be slow to load and considered non-secure by [[Internet Explorer|IE7]]</small>
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20070930191702/http://www.nola.com/weblogs/nola/index.ssf?%2Fmtlogs%2Fnola_nolaview%2Farchives%2F2006_06_01.html IPET Draft Final Report] (1 June 2006) provided by [[The Times-Picayune]]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20060618182444/http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/~new_orleans/ Independent Levee Investigation Team (ILIT) Final Report] (31 July 2006)
<!-- [http://www.nola.com/katrina/graphics/flashflood.swf/ Animation of the flooding of New Orleans] – Note: Link is expired! -->*
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20110807184732/http://levees.org/2/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/American-Society-of-Civil-Engineers-What-Went-Wrong-ERPreport-1.pdf ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel Report] (2007). at ''web.archive.org''
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20071101043228/http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/inside/products/pub/hpdc/hpdc.cfm Decision-Making Chronology for Hurricane Protection Project]
{{Katrinaseries}}
{{DEFAULTSORT:Levee Failures In Greater New Orleans 2005}}
[[Category:George W. Bush administration controversies]]
[[Category:Dikes in the United States]]' |
Unified diff of changes made by edit (edit_diff) | '@@ -25,16 +25,5 @@
On August 29, 2005, flood walls and levees catastrophically failed throughout the metro area. Some collapsed well below design thresholds (17th Street and London Canals). Others collapsed after a brief period of overtopping (Industrial Canal) caused scouring or erosion of the earthen levee walls. In April 2007, the American Society of Civil Engineers called the flooding of New Orleans "the worst engineering catastrophe in US History."<ref>[http://eng.auburn.edu/admin/marketing/seminars/2007/l-roth.html The New Orleans Levees: The Worst Engineering Catastrophe in US History - What Went Wrong and Why<!-- Bot generated title -->] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071015234208/http://eng.auburn.edu/admin/marketing/seminars/2007/l-roth.html |date=2007-10-15 }}</ref>
-==Levee and floodwall breaches==
-[[File:New-Orleans-deaths.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Sketch of New Orleans (shaded gray), indicating the locations of the principal breaches in the levees/floodwalls (dark blue arrows). Red dots show locations of deaths.]]
-[[File:NOAA Katrina NOLA 17th Street breach Aug 31 2005.jpg|thumb|right|250px|Breach in [[17th Street Canal]] [[levee]] in [[New Orleans, Louisiana]], on August 31, 2005, showing the inundated [[Lakeview, New Orleans|Lakeview]] neighborhood on the right and the largely dry [[Metairie]] side on the left. (NOAA)]]
-[[File:HousesPrattBehindLondonAvBreech.jpg|thumb|250px|right|Severely damaged homes in piles of sand near the upper [[London Avenue Canal]] breach]]
-
-Many of the levee and floodwall failures were reported on Monday, August 29, 2005, at various times throughout the day. There were 28 reported failures in the first 24 hours <ref name="breaches">Staff Writer. "[https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5200940 Timeline: Who Knew When the Levees Broke]." ''[[National Public Radio]].'' February 10, 2006.</ref> and over 50 were reported in the ensuing days. A breach in the [[Industrial Canal]], near the [[St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana|St. Bernard]]/[[Orleans Parish, Louisiana|Orleans]] parish line, occurred at approximately 9:00 a.m. [[Central Time Zone (North America)|CDT]], the day Katrina arrived. Another breach in the Industrial Canal was reported a few minutes later at Tennessee Street, as well as multiple failures in the levee system, and a pump failure in the [[Lower Ninth Ward]], near Florida Avenue.
-
-Local fire officials reported a breach at the [[17th Street Canal]] [[levee]] shortly after 9:00 a.m. [[Central Time Zone (North America)|CDT]].<ref>[http://www.wwltv.com/local/stories/wwl062006khvideo.a430c449.html News for New Orleans, Louisiana | Local News | News for New Orleans, Louisiana | wwltv.com<!-- Bot generated title -->] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071222194749/http://www.wwltv.com/local/stories/wwl062006khvideo.a430c449.html |date=2007-12-22 }}</ref> An estimated 66% to 75% of the city was now under water.<ref name="breaches"/> The Duncan and Bonnabel Pumping Stations were also reported to have suffered roof damage, and were non-functional.<ref name="breaches"/> Breaches at St. Bernard Parish and the Lower Ninth Ward were reported at 5:00 p.m. [[Central Time Zone (North America)|CDT]], as well as a breach at the Hayne Blvd. [[Pumping Station]], and another breach along the 17th Street Canal levee. By 8:30 p.m. [[Central Time Zone (North America)|CDT]], all pumping stations in [[Jefferson Parish, Louisiana|Jefferson]] and [[Orleans Parish|Orleans]] parishes were reported as non-functional.
-
-At 10:00 pm [[Central Time Zone (North America)|CDT]], a breach of the levee on the west bank of the Industrial Canal was reported, bringing {{convert|10|ft|m}} of standing water to the area. At about midnight, a breach in the [[London Avenue Canal]] levee was reported.
-
-The [[Orleans Canal]] about midway between the 17th Street Canal and the London Avenue Canal, engineered to the same standards, and presumably put under similar stress during the hurricane, survived intact because an incomplete section of floodwall along this canal which allowed water to overtop at that point, thus creating a spill way.
+poop
==Investigations==
' |
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0 => '==Levee and floodwall breaches==',
1 => '[[File:New-Orleans-deaths.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Sketch of New Orleans (shaded gray), indicating the locations of the principal breaches in the levees/floodwalls (dark blue arrows). Red dots show locations of deaths.]]',
2 => '[[File:NOAA Katrina NOLA 17th Street breach Aug 31 2005.jpg|thumb|right|250px|Breach in [[17th Street Canal]] [[levee]] in [[New Orleans, Louisiana]], on August 31, 2005, showing the inundated [[Lakeview, New Orleans|Lakeview]] neighborhood on the right and the largely dry [[Metairie]] side on the left. (NOAA)]]',
3 => '[[File:HousesPrattBehindLondonAvBreech.jpg|thumb|250px|right|Severely damaged homes in piles of sand near the upper [[London Avenue Canal]] breach]]',
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5 => 'Many of the levee and floodwall failures were reported on Monday, August 29, 2005, at various times throughout the day. There were 28 reported failures in the first 24 hours <ref name="breaches">Staff Writer. "[https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5200940 Timeline: Who Knew When the Levees Broke]." ''[[National Public Radio]].'' February 10, 2006.</ref> and over 50 were reported in the ensuing days. A breach in the [[Industrial Canal]], near the [[St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana|St. Bernard]]/[[Orleans Parish, Louisiana|Orleans]] parish line, occurred at approximately 9:00 a.m. [[Central Time Zone (North America)|CDT]], the day Katrina arrived. Another breach in the Industrial Canal was reported a few minutes later at Tennessee Street, as well as multiple failures in the levee system, and a pump failure in the [[Lower Ninth Ward]], near Florida Avenue.',
6 => '',
7 => 'Local fire officials reported a breach at the [[17th Street Canal]] [[levee]] shortly after 9:00 a.m. [[Central Time Zone (North America)|CDT]].<ref>[http://www.wwltv.com/local/stories/wwl062006khvideo.a430c449.html News for New Orleans, Louisiana | Local News | News for New Orleans, Louisiana | wwltv.com<!-- Bot generated title -->] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071222194749/http://www.wwltv.com/local/stories/wwl062006khvideo.a430c449.html |date=2007-12-22 }}</ref> An estimated 66% to 75% of the city was now under water.<ref name="breaches"/> The Duncan and Bonnabel Pumping Stations were also reported to have suffered roof damage, and were non-functional.<ref name="breaches"/> Breaches at St. Bernard Parish and the Lower Ninth Ward were reported at 5:00 p.m. [[Central Time Zone (North America)|CDT]], as well as a breach at the Hayne Blvd. [[Pumping Station]], and another breach along the 17th Street Canal levee. By 8:30 p.m. [[Central Time Zone (North America)|CDT]], all pumping stations in [[Jefferson Parish, Louisiana|Jefferson]] and [[Orleans Parish|Orleans]] parishes were reported as non-functional.',
8 => '',
9 => 'At 10:00 pm [[Central Time Zone (North America)|CDT]], a breach of the levee on the west bank of the Industrial Canal was reported, bringing {{convert|10|ft|m}} of standing water to the area. At about midnight, a breach in the [[London Avenue Canal]] levee was reported.',
10 => '',
11 => 'The [[Orleans Canal]] about midway between the 17th Street Canal and the London Avenue Canal, engineered to the same standards, and presumably put under similar stress during the hurricane, survived intact because an incomplete section of floodwall along this canal which allowed water to overtop at that point, thus creating a spill way.'
] |
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35 => 'https://www.nae.edu/Publications/Bridge/EngineeringfortheThreatofNaturalDisasters/LessonsfromHurricaneKatrina.aspx',
36 => 'http://hsgac.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Detail&HearingID=290',
37 => 'https://www.reuters.com/world/us/new-orleans-levees-got-145-billion-upgrade-will-they-hold-2021-08-30/',
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42 => 'http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/katrina/ipet/ipet.html',
43 => 'http://levees.org/',
44 => 'https://archive.org/details/stormwhatwentwro00vanh',
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21 => 'http://www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_Times-Picayune/archives/2005_10_19.html#088443',
22 => 'http://www.wwltv.com/local/stories/wwl062006khvideo.a430c449.html',
23 => 'https://archive.org/details/stormwhatwentwro00vanh',
24 => 'https://ipet.wes.army.mil/NOHPP/_Post-Katrina/(IPET)%20Interagency%20Performance%20Evaluation%20TaskForce/Reports/IPET%20Final%20Report/Volume%20I/IPET%20Vol%20I%20Final%20Draft_Jun08.pdf',
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Parsed HTML source of the new revision (new_html) | '<div class="mw-parser-output"><p class="mw-empty-elt">
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<style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1045330069">.mw-parser-output .sidebar{width:22em;float:right;clear:right;margin:0.5em 0 1em 1em;background:#f8f9fa;border:1px solid #aaa;padding:0.2em;text-align:center;line-height:1.4em;font-size:88%;border-collapse:collapse;display:table}body.skin-minerva .mw-parser-output .sidebar{display:table!important;float:right!important;margin:0.5em 0 1em 1em!important}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-subgroup{width:100%;margin:0;border-spacing:0}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-left{float:left;clear:left;margin:0.5em 1em 1em 0}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-none{float:none;clear:both;margin:0.5em 1em 1em 0}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-outer-title{padding:0 0.4em 0.2em;font-size:125%;line-height:1.2em;font-weight:bold}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-top-image{padding:0.4em}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-top-caption,.mw-parser-output .sidebar-pretitle-with-top-image,.mw-parser-output .sidebar-caption{padding:0.2em 0.4em 0;line-height:1.2em}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-pretitle{padding:0.4em 0.4em 0;line-height:1.2em}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-title,.mw-parser-output .sidebar-title-with-pretitle{padding:0.2em 0.8em;font-size:145%;line-height:1.2em}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-title-with-pretitle{padding:0.1em 0.4em}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-image{padding:0.2em 0.4em 0.4em}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-heading{padding:0.1em 0.4em}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-content{padding:0 0.5em 0.4em}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-content-with-subgroup{padding:0.1em 0.4em 0.2em}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-above,.mw-parser-output .sidebar-below{padding:0.3em 0.8em;font-weight:bold}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-collapse .sidebar-above,.mw-parser-output .sidebar-collapse .sidebar-below{border-top:1px solid #aaa;border-bottom:1px solid #aaa}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-navbar{text-align:right;font-size:115%;padding:0 0.4em 0.4em}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-list-title{padding:0 0.4em;text-align:left;font-weight:bold;line-height:1.6em;font-size:105%}.mw-parser-output .sidebar-list-title-c{padding:0 0.4em;text-align:center;margin:0 3.3em}@media(max-width:720px){body.mediawiki .mw-parser-output .sidebar{width:100%!important;clear:both;float:none!important;margin-left:0!important;margin-right:0!important}}</style><table class="sidebar nomobile nowraplinks" style="width: 22em"><tbody><tr><th class="sidebar-title"><a href="/wiki/Hurricane_Katrina" title="Hurricane Katrina">Hurricane Katrina</a></th></tr><tr><td class="sidebar-image"><a href="/wiki/File:Katrina-noaaGOES12.jpg" class="image"><img alt="Katrina-noaaGOES12.jpg" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/6f/Katrina-noaaGOES12.jpg/220px-Katrina-noaaGOES12.jpg" decoding="async" width="220" height="137" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/6f/Katrina-noaaGOES12.jpg/330px-Katrina-noaaGOES12.jpg 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/6f/Katrina-noaaGOES12.jpg/440px-Katrina-noaaGOES12.jpg 2x" data-file-width="1919" data-file-height="1198" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="sidebar-above" style="font-style: italic">
<a href="/wiki/2005_Atlantic_hurricane_season" title="2005 Atlantic hurricane season">2005 Atlantic hurricane season</a></td></tr><tr><th class="sidebar-heading">
General</th></tr><tr><td class="sidebar-content" style="text-align: left">
<ul><li><a href="/wiki/Timeline_of_Hurricane_Katrina" title="Timeline of Hurricane Katrina">Timeline</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Meteorological_history_of_Hurricane_Katrina" title="Meteorological history of Hurricane Katrina">Meteorological history</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Hurricane_Katrina_tornado_outbreak" title="Hurricane Katrina tornado outbreak">Tornado outbreak</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Preparations_for_Hurricane_Katrina" title="Preparations for Hurricane Katrina">Preparations</a>
<ul><li><a href="/wiki/Hurricane_preparedness_for_New_Orleans" class="mw-redirect" title="Hurricane preparedness for New Orleans">New Orleans preparedness</a></li></ul></li></ul></td>
</tr><tr><th class="sidebar-heading">
Impact</th></tr><tr><td class="sidebar-content" style="text-align: left">
<ul><li><a href="/wiki/Economic_effects_of_Hurricane_Katrina" title="Economic effects of Hurricane Katrina">Economic effects</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Political_effects_of_Hurricane_Katrina" title="Political effects of Hurricane Katrina">Political effects</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Criticism_of_the_government_response_to_Hurricane_Katrina" title="Criticism of the government response to Hurricane Katrina">Criticism of government response</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Social_effects_of_Hurricane_Katrina" title="Social effects of Hurricane Katrina">Social effects</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Hurricane_Katrina_effects_by_region" title="Hurricane Katrina effects by region">Effects by region</a>
<ul><li><a href="/wiki/Effects_of_Hurricane_Katrina_in_Florida" title="Effects of Hurricane Katrina in Florida">Effects on Florida</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Effects_of_Hurricane_Katrina_in_Mississippi" title="Effects of Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi">Effects on Mississippi</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Effects_of_Hurricane_Katrina_in_New_Orleans" title="Effects of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans">Effects on New Orleans</a>
<ul><li><a class="mw-selflink selflink">Levee failures</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Memorial_Medical_Center_and_Hurricane_Katrina" title="Memorial Medical Center and Hurricane Katrina">Memorial Medical Center</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Effect_of_Hurricane_Katrina_on_the_New_Orleans_Hornets" title="Effect of Hurricane Katrina on the New Orleans Hornets">New Orleans Hornets</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Effect_of_Hurricane_Katrina_on_the_New_Orleans_Saints" title="Effect of Hurricane Katrina on the New Orleans Saints">New Orleans Saints</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Effect_of_Hurricane_Katrina_on_the_Louisiana_Superdome" title="Effect of Hurricane Katrina on the Louisiana Superdome">Superdome</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Effect_of_Hurricane_Katrina_on_Tulane_University" title="Effect of Hurricane Katrina on Tulane University">Tulane University</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Civil_engineering_and_infrastructure_repair_in_New_Orleans_after_Hurricane_Katrina" title="Civil engineering and infrastructure repair in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina">Infrastructure repairs</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Reconstruction_of_New_Orleans" title="Reconstruction of New Orleans">Reconstruction</a></li></ul></li></ul></li></ul></td>
</tr><tr><th class="sidebar-heading">
Relief</th></tr><tr><td class="sidebar-content" style="text-align: left">
<ul><li><a href="/wiki/Hurricane_Katrina_disaster_relief" title="Hurricane Katrina disaster relief">Disaster relief</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/International_response_to_Hurricane_Katrina" title="International response to Hurricane Katrina">International response</a></li></ul></td>
</tr><tr><th class="sidebar-heading">
Analysis</th></tr><tr><td class="sidebar-content" style="text-align: left">
<ul><li><a href="/wiki/Tropical_cyclones_and_climate_change#2005" title="Tropical cyclones and climate change">Global warming</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Media_coverage_of_Hurricane_Katrina" title="Media coverage of Hurricane Katrina">Media coverage</a></li></ul></td>
</tr><tr><th class="sidebar-heading">
External links</th></tr><tr><td class="sidebar-content" style="text-align: left">
<ul><li><img alt="Commons page" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/4/4a/Commons-logo.svg/12px-Commons-logo.svg.png" decoding="async" title="Commons page" width="12" height="16" class="noviewer" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/4/4a/Commons-logo.svg/18px-Commons-logo.svg.png 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/4/4a/Commons-logo.svg/24px-Commons-logo.svg.png 2x" data-file-width="1024" data-file-height="1376" /> Media related to <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/category:Hurricane_Katrina" class="extiw" title="c:category:Hurricane Katrina">Hurricane Katrina</a> at Wikimedia Commons</li>
<li><a href="/wiki/File:Wikinews-logo.svg" class="image"><img alt="Wikinews-logo.svg" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/24/Wikinews-logo.svg/16px-Wikinews-logo.svg.png" decoding="async" width="16" height="9" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/24/Wikinews-logo.svg/24px-Wikinews-logo.svg.png 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/24/Wikinews-logo.svg/32px-Wikinews-logo.svg.png 2x" data-file-width="759" data-file-height="415" /></a> <a href="https://en.wikinews.org/wiki/Category:New_Orleans_Disaster" class="extiw" title="wikinews:Category:New Orleans Disaster">Katrina stories</a> at <a href="/wiki/Wikinews" title="Wikinews">Wikinews</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/File:Wikisource-logo.svg" class="image"><img alt="" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/4c/Wikisource-logo.svg/15px-Wikisource-logo.svg.png" decoding="async" width="15" height="16" class="noviewer" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/4c/Wikisource-logo.svg/23px-Wikisource-logo.svg.png 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/4c/Wikisource-logo.svg/30px-Wikisource-logo.svg.png 2x" data-file-width="410" data-file-height="430" /></a> Works related to <a href="https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Category:Hurricane_Katrina" class="extiw" title="wikisource:Category:Hurricane Katrina">Katrina sources</a> at Wikisource</li></ul></td>
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<p>On Monday, August 29, 2005, there were over 50 failures of the <a href="/wiki/Levee" title="Levee">levees</a> and <a href="/wiki/Flood_wall" title="Flood wall">flood walls</a> protecting <a href="/wiki/New_Orleans,_Louisiana" class="mw-redirect" title="New Orleans, Louisiana">New Orleans, Louisiana</a>, and its suburbs following passage of <a href="/wiki/Hurricane_Katrina" title="Hurricane Katrina">Hurricane Katrina</a> and landfall in Mississippi. The levee and flood wall failures caused flooding in 80% of New Orleans and all of St. Bernard Parish. Tens of billions of gallons of water spilled into vast areas of New Orleans, flooding over 100,000 homes and businesses. Responsibility for the design and construction of the levee system belongs to the <a href="/wiki/United_States_Army_Corps_of_Engineers" title="United States Army Corps of Engineers">United States Army Corps of Engineers</a>; the responsibility of maintenance belongs to the local levee boards. The Corps hands components of the system over to the local levee boards upon completion. When Katrina struck on August 29, 2005, the project was between 60–90% complete. <sup id="cite_ref-gao.gov_1-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-gao.gov-1">[1]</a></sup> Four major investigations were conducted by civil engineers and other experts in an attempt to identify the underlying reasons for the failure of the federal flood protection system. All concur that the primary cause of the flooding was inadequate design and construction by the Army Corps of Engineers. <sup id="cite_ref-2" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-2">[2]</a></sup>
</p><p>There were six major breaches in Orleans Parish:
</p>
<ol><li>Three major breaches occurred on the <a href="/wiki/Industrial_Canal" title="Industrial Canal">Industrial Canal</a>: one on the northeast side near the junction with Gulf Intracoastal Waterway and two on the southeast side along the <a href="/wiki/Lower_Ninth_Ward" title="Lower Ninth Ward">Lower Ninth Ward</a>, between Florida Avenue and Claiborne Avenue.</li>
<li>On the west side of New Orleans, the <a href="/wiki/17th_Street_Canal" title="17th Street Canal">17th Street Canal</a> levee breached 4 feet (1.2 m) below design specs on the New Orleans side near the Old Hammond Highway Bridge</li>
<li>The <a href="/wiki/London_Avenue_Canal" title="London Avenue Canal">London Avenue Canal</a> in the Gentilly neighborhood breached on both sides – on the west side near Robert E. Lee Boulevard and on the east near the Mirabeau Avenue Bridge</li></ol>
<p>Storm surge caused breaches in 20 places on the <a href="/wiki/Mississippi_River-Gulf_Outlet_Canal" class="mw-redirect" title="Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet Canal">Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet Canal</a> ("MR-GO") in <a href="/wiki/Saint_Bernard_Parish,_Louisiana" class="mw-redirect" title="Saint Bernard Parish, Louisiana">Saint Bernard Parish</a>, flooding the entire parish and the East Bank of <a href="/wiki/Plaquemines_Parish,_Louisiana" title="Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana">Plaquemines Parish</a>.
</p>
<div id="toc" class="toc" role="navigation" aria-labelledby="mw-toc-heading"><input type="checkbox" role="button" id="toctogglecheckbox" class="toctogglecheckbox" style="display:none" /><div class="toctitle" lang="en" dir="ltr"><h2 id="mw-toc-heading">Contents</h2><span class="toctogglespan"><label class="toctogglelabel" for="toctogglecheckbox"></label></span></div>
<ul>
<li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-1"><a href="#Background"><span class="tocnumber">1</span> <span class="toctext">Background</span></a></li>
<li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-2"><a href="#Investigations"><span class="tocnumber">2</span> <span class="toctext">Investigations</span></a>
<ul>
<li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-3"><a href="#Levee_investigations"><span class="tocnumber">2.1</span> <span class="toctext">Levee investigations</span></a></li>
<li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-4"><a href="#Criticism_of_the_IPET_Federal_Investigation"><span class="tocnumber">2.2</span> <span class="toctext">Criticism of the IPET Federal Investigation</span></a></li>
<li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-5"><a href="#Flood_wall_design"><span class="tocnumber">2.3</span> <span class="toctext">Flood wall design</span></a></li>
<li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-6"><a href="#Overtopping_of_levees_in_the_Eastern_New_Orleans"><span class="tocnumber">2.4</span> <span class="toctext">Overtopping of levees in the Eastern New Orleans</span></a></li>
<li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-7"><a href="#National_Academy_of_Sciences_Investigation"><span class="tocnumber">2.5</span> <span class="toctext">National Academy of Sciences Investigation</span></a></li>
<li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-8"><a href="#Senate_Committee_hearings"><span class="tocnumber">2.6</span> <span class="toctext">Senate Committee hearings</span></a></li>
<li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-9"><a href="#Corps_of_Engineers_admits_problems_with_design"><span class="tocnumber">2.7</span> <span class="toctext">Corps of Engineers admits problems with design</span></a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-10"><a href="#The_New_Levees"><span class="tocnumber">3</span> <span class="toctext">The New Levees</span></a></li>
<li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-11"><a href="#Conspiracy_theories"><span class="tocnumber">4</span> <span class="toctext">Conspiracy theories</span></a></li>
<li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-12"><a href="#See_also"><span class="tocnumber">5</span> <span class="toctext">See also</span></a></li>
<li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-13"><a href="#References"><span class="tocnumber">6</span> <span class="toctext">References</span></a></li>
<li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-14"><a href="#Further_reading"><span class="tocnumber">7</span> <span class="toctext">Further reading</span></a></li>
<li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-15"><a href="#External_links"><span class="tocnumber">8</span> <span class="toctext">External links</span></a></li>
</ul>
</div>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="Background">Background</span><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=2005_levee_failures_in_Greater_New_Orleans&action=edit&section=1" title="Edit section: Background">edit</a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></h2>
<div class="thumb tleft"><div class="thumbinner" style="width:302px;"><a href="/wiki/File:New_Orleans_Elevations.jpg" class="image"><img alt="" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b2/New_Orleans_Elevations.jpg/300px-New_Orleans_Elevations.jpg" decoding="async" width="300" height="204" class="thumbimage" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b2/New_Orleans_Elevations.jpg/450px-New_Orleans_Elevations.jpg 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b2/New_Orleans_Elevations.jpg/600px-New_Orleans_Elevations.jpg 2x" data-file-width="3000" data-file-height="2042" /></a> <div class="thumbcaption"><div class="magnify"><a href="/wiki/File:New_Orleans_Elevations.jpg" class="internal" title="Enlarge"></a></div>Vertical cross-section of New Orleans, showing maximum levee height of 23 feet (7 m) at the Mississippi River on the left and 17.5 feet (5 m) at Lake Pontchartrain on the right</div></div></div>
<style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1033289096">.mw-parser-output .hatnote{font-style:italic}.mw-parser-output div.hatnote{padding-left:1.6em;margin-bottom:0.5em}.mw-parser-output .hatnote i{font-style:normal}.mw-parser-output .hatnote+link+.hatnote{margin-top:-0.5em}</style><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">See also: <a href="/wiki/Drainage_in_New_Orleans" title="Drainage in New Orleans">Drainage in New Orleans</a> and <a href="/wiki/Hurricane_preparedness_for_New_Orleans" class="mw-redirect" title="Hurricane preparedness for New Orleans">Hurricane preparedness for New Orleans</a></div>
<p>The original residents of <a href="/wiki/French_Quarter" title="French Quarter">New Orleans</a> settled on the high ground along the Mississippi River. Later developments eventually extended to nearby Lake Pontchartrain, built upon fill to bring them above the average lake level. Navigable commercial waterways extended from the lake to downtown. After 1940, the state decided to close those waterways following the completion of a new Industrial Canal for waterborne commerce. Closure of the waterways resulted in a drastic lowering of the water table by the city's drainage system, causing some areas to settle by up to <span style="white-space:nowrap">8 feet (2 m)</span> due to the compacting and desiccation of the underlying organic soils.
</p><p>After the <a href="/wiki/Great_Mississippi_Flood_of_1927" title="Great Mississippi Flood of 1927">Great Mississippi Flood of 1927</a>, <a href="/wiki/United_States_Congress" title="United States Congress">United States Congress</a> passed the <a href="/wiki/Flood_Control_Act_of_1928" title="Flood Control Act of 1928">Flood Control Act of 1928</a> which authorized the Corps of Engineers to design and construct flood control structures, along with levees, on the Mississippi River to protect populated areas from floods. It also affirmed the principle of local participation in federally funded projects but acknowledged that the $292 million already spent by local interests was sufficient to cover local participatory costs.<sup id="cite_ref-3" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-3">[3]</a></sup> It is instructive to note that, in addition, sovereign immunity was given to the Corps of Engineers under Section 3 of the Flood Control Act of 1928, which states “no liability of any kind would attach or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place, provided that if on any stretch of the banks of the Mississippi River it was impracticable to construct levees.” 33 U.S.C. § 702c. Section 702c is sometimes referred as “Section 3 of the act,” based on where it appears in the Public law.
</p><p>Heavy flooding caused by <a href="/wiki/Hurricane_Betsy" title="Hurricane Betsy">Hurricane Betsy</a> in 1965 brought concerns regarding flooding from hurricanes to the forefront. In response, the Congress passed the <a href="/wiki/Flood_Control_Act_of_1965" title="Flood Control Act of 1965">Flood Control Act of 1965</a> which mandated that henceforth, the <a href="/wiki/United_States_Army_Corps_of_Engineers" title="United States Army Corps of Engineers">Corps of Engineers</a> is the agency responsible for design and construction of flood protection projects, to include those in Greater New Orleans. The local interests' role was maintenance once the projects were complete.<sup id="cite_ref-GAOReport_4-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-GAOReport-4">[4]</a></sup>
</p><p>Also that year, Congress authorized the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project (LPVHPP) which reiterated the principle of local participation in federally funded projects. The project was initially estimated to take 13 years, but when Katrina struck in 2005, almost 40 years later, the project was only 60–90% complete with a revised projected completion date of 2015.<sup id="cite_ref-gao.gov_1-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-gao.gov-1">[1]</a></sup>
</p><p>On August 29, 2005, flood walls and levees catastrophically failed throughout the metro area. Some collapsed well below design thresholds (17th Street and London Canals). Others collapsed after a brief period of overtopping (Industrial Canal) caused scouring or erosion of the earthen levee walls. In April 2007, the American Society of Civil Engineers called the flooding of New Orleans "the worst engineering catastrophe in US History."<sup id="cite_ref-5" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-5">[5]</a></sup>
</p><p>poop
</p>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="Investigations">Investigations</span><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=2005_levee_failures_in_Greater_New_Orleans&action=edit&section=2" title="Edit section: Investigations">edit</a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></h2>
<h3><span class="mw-headline" id="Levee_investigations">Levee investigations</span><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=2005_levee_failures_in_Greater_New_Orleans&action=edit&section=3" title="Edit section: Levee investigations">edit</a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></h3>
<p>In the ten years following Katrina, over a dozen investigations were conducted. There was no federally ordered independent commission like those ordered after the September 11 terrorist attacks and after the BP Oil Spill in the Gulf. The only federally ordered study was convened and managed by the Army Corps of Engineers, the federal agency responsible for the flood protection's performance. A major independent study was conducted by the University of California at Berkeley.<sup id="cite_ref-6" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-6">[6]</a></sup> A second major study was sponsored by the Louisiana Department of Transportation led by <a href="/wiki/Ivor_van_Heerden" title="Ivor van Heerden">Ivor van Heerden</a> at Louisiana State University.<sup id="cite_ref-7" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-7">[7]</a></sup> Studies were also done by FEMA, the insurance industry, the National Research Council, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the Katrina Consolidated Lawsuit. All studies basically agreed on the engineering mechanisms of failure.
</p><p>The primary mechanisms of failure at the 17th Street Canal, London Avenue Canal and Industrial Canal (east side north) were improper design of the canal floodwalls.<sup id="cite_ref-8" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-8">[8]</a></sup> The failure mechanism for the Industrial Canal (east side south and west side) was overtopping of levees and floodwalls by the storm surge. The primary mechanism of failure for levees protecting eastern New Orleans was the existence of sand in 10% of places instead of thick Louisiana clay. The primary mechanism of failure for the levees protecting St. Bernard Parish was overtopping due to negligent maintenance<sup id="cite_ref-9" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-9">[9]</a></sup> of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, a navigation channel, built and maintained by the Corps of Engineers.
</p><p>A June 2007 report by the <a href="/wiki/American_Society_of_Civil_Engineers" title="American Society of Civil Engineers">American Society of Civil Engineers</a> in peer review panel concluded that the flooding in the Lakeview neighborhood (from the 17th Street Canal) and the Gentilly neighborhood (from the London Avenue Canal) was due to two engineering oversights.
</p><p>The engineers responsible for the design of the canal levees and the I-walls embedded in them overestimated the soil strength, meaning that the soil strength used in the design calculations was greater than what actually existed under and near the levee during Hurricane Katrina. They made unconservative (i.e., erring toward unsafe) interpretations of the data: the soil below the levee was actually weaker than that used in the I-wall design (ASCE: External Review Panel, pg 48). Another critical engineering oversight that led to the failure of the 17th Street Canal involves not taking into account the possibility of a water-filled gap which turned out to be a very important aspect of the failures of the I-walls around New Orleans. “Analysis indicate that, with the presence of a water-filled gap, the factor of safety is about 30 percent lower. Because a factor of safety of 1.3 was used for design, a reduction of 30 percent would reduce the factor of safety to approximately one: a condition of incipient failure.” (ASCE: External Review Panel, pg 51)<sup id="cite_ref-10" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-10">[10]</a></sup> This meant that the design included a safety factor of 30% ("1.3"), and could cope in theory with stresses 30% more than expected, but the error due to the water gap was about 30%, which immediately used up the entire safety margin, leaving no leeway in the design if any other excess stress occurred.
</p><p>Soil borings in the area of the <a href="/wiki/17th_Street_Canal" title="17th Street Canal">17th Street Canal</a> breach showed a layer of <a href="/wiki/Peat" title="Peat">peat</a> starting at about 30 feet (9.1 m) below the surface, and ranging from about 5 feet (1.5 m) to 20 feet (6.1 m) thick. Engineers misjudged the strength of the peat which is from the remains of the swamp on which some areas of New Orleans (near <a href="/wiki/Lake_Ponchartrain" class="mw-redirect" title="Lake Ponchartrain">Lake Ponchartrain</a>) in the 20th century were built.<sup id="cite_ref-weaksoil_11-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-weaksoil-11">[11]</a></sup> The <a href="/wiki/Shear_strength_(soil)" title="Shear strength (soil)">shear strength</a> of this peat was found to be very low and it had a high water content. According to <a href="/w/index.php?title=Robert_Bea&action=edit&redlink=1" class="new" title="Robert Bea (page does not exist)">Robert Bea</a>, a geotechnical engineer from the <a href="/wiki/University_of_California,_Berkeley" title="University of California, Berkeley">University of California, Berkeley</a>, the weak soil made the floodwall very vulnerable to the stresses of a large flood. "At 17th Street, the soil moved laterally, pushing entire wall sections with it. ... As Katrina's storm surge filled the canal, water pressure rose in the soil underneath the wall and in the peat layer. Water moved through the soil underneath the base of the wall. When the rising pressure and moving water overcame the soil's strength, it suddenly shifted, taking surrounding material – and the wall – with it."<sup id="cite_ref-swamppeat_12-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-swamppeat-12">[12]</a></sup>
</p><p>The Federal study was initiated in October 2005, by Lt. Gen. Carl Strock, <a href="/wiki/Chief_of_Engineers" class="mw-redirect" title="Chief of Engineers">Chief of Engineers</a> and the Commander of the Corps of Engineers; he established the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force (IPET) to "provide credible and objective scientific and engineering answers to fundamental questions about the performance of the hurricane protection and flood damage reduction system in the New Orleans metropolitan area.<sup id="cite_ref-IPET_13-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-IPET-13">[13]</a></sup> IPET consisted of independent and recognized experts from the Universities of <a href="/wiki/University_of_Maryland,_College_Park" title="University of Maryland, College Park">Maryland</a>, <a href="/wiki/University_of_Florida" title="University of Florida">Florida</a>, <a href="/wiki/University_of_Notre_Dame" title="University of Notre Dame">Notre Dame</a>, and <a href="/wiki/Virginia_Polytechnic_Institute" class="mw-redirect" title="Virginia Polytechnic Institute">Virginia Polytechnic Institute</a>, the <a href="/wiki/National_Oceanic_and_Atmospheric_Administration" title="National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration">National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration</a>, the <a href="/wiki/South_Florida_Water_Management_District" title="South Florida Water Management District">South Florida Water Management District</a>, Harris County Flood Control District (Houston, TX), the <a href="/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Agriculture" title="United States Department of Agriculture">United States Department of Agriculture</a>, and the <a href="/wiki/United_States_Bureau_of_Reclamation" title="United States Bureau of Reclamation">United States Bureau of Reclamation</a> as well as those from USACE.<sup id="cite_ref-IPET_13-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-IPET-13">[13]</a></sup>
</p><p>
IPET's final findings indicated that, <style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r996844942">.mw-parser-output .templatequote{overflow:hidden;margin:1em 0;padding:0 40px}.mw-parser-output .templatequote .templatequotecite{line-height:1.5em;text-align:left;padding-left:1.6em;margin-top:0}</style></p><blockquote class="templatequote"><p>With the exception of four foundation design failures, all of the major breaches were caused by overtopping and subsequent erosion. Reduced protective elevations increased the amount of overtopping, erosion, and subsequent flooding, particularly in Orleans East. The structures that ultimately breached performed as designed, providing protection until overtopping occurred and then becoming vulnerable to catastrophic breaching. The levee-floodwall designs for the 17th Street and London Avenue Outfall Canals and the northeast breach of the IHNC were inadequate due to steel sheet-pilings driven to depths that were too shallow. In four cases the structures failed catastrophically prior to water reaching design elevations. A significant number of structures that were subjected to water levels beyond their design limits performed well. Typically, in the case of floodwalls, they represented more conservative design assumptions and, for levees, use of higher quality, less erodible materials.<sup id="cite_ref-IPET_13-2" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-IPET-13">[13]</a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-14" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-14">[14]</a></sup></p></blockquote>
<h3><span class="mw-headline" id="Criticism_of_the_IPET_Federal_Investigation">Criticism of the IPET Federal Investigation</span><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=2005_levee_failures_in_Greater_New_Orleans&action=edit&section=4" title="Edit section: Criticism of the IPET Federal Investigation">edit</a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></h3>
<p>The IPET's findings are challenged by Levees.org<sup id="cite_ref-15" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-15">[15]</a></sup> (a grass roots organization) as lacking credibility since the USACE convened and managed the study and also chose and directly compensated its peer review team. The groups points out that eighty percent of the participants in IPET either worked for the Corps of Engineers or its sister agency <a href="/w/index.php?title=Army_Research_and_Development.&action=edit&redlink=1" class="new" title="Army Research and Development. (page does not exist)">Army Research and Development.</a> The top three leaders all were Corps employees or past employees.
</p><p>The credibility of the IPET was also challenged in a 42-page letter to the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) submitted by Dr. Ray M. Seed, co-chair of the ILIT study. Dr. Seed described an early intentional plan by the Corps of Engineers to hide their mistakes in the New Orleans flooding after Katrina and to intimidate anyone who tried to intervene. All of this was done with the help and the complicity of some at the ASCE, according to Dr. Seed.<sup id="cite_ref-16" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-16">[16]</a></sup>
</p>
<h3><span class="mw-headline" id="Flood_wall_design">Flood wall design</span><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=2005_levee_failures_in_Greater_New_Orleans&action=edit&section=5" title="Edit section: Flood wall design">edit</a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></h3>
<div class="thumb tright"><div class="thumbinner" style="width:222px;"><a href="/wiki/File:New_Orleans_msi_9mar2004_31aug2005-Merge.gif" class="image"><img alt="" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0b/New_Orleans_msi_9mar2004_31aug2005-Merge.gif/220px-New_Orleans_msi_9mar2004_31aug2005-Merge.gif" decoding="async" width="220" height="275" class="thumbimage" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0b/New_Orleans_msi_9mar2004_31aug2005-Merge.gif/330px-New_Orleans_msi_9mar2004_31aug2005-Merge.gif 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0b/New_Orleans_msi_9mar2004_31aug2005-Merge.gif/440px-New_Orleans_msi_9mar2004_31aug2005-Merge.gif 2x" data-file-width="1024" data-file-height="1280" /></a> <div class="thumbcaption"><div class="magnify"><a href="/wiki/File:New_Orleans_msi_9mar2004_31aug2005-Merge.gif" class="internal" title="Enlarge"></a></div>Satellite photos of New Orleans taken in March 2004, then on August 31, 2005, after the levee failures.</div></div></div>
<p>Investigators focused on the <a href="/wiki/17th_Street_Canal" title="17th Street Canal">17th Street</a> and London Avenue canals, where evidence showed they were breached even though water did not flow over their tops, indicating a design or construction flaw. Eyewitness accounts and other evidence show that levees and flood walls in other parts of the city, such as along the Industrial Canal, were topped by floodwaters first, then breached or eroded.
</p><p>A preliminary report released on November 2, 2005, carried out by independent investigators from the <a href="/wiki/University_of_California,_Berkeley" title="University of California, Berkeley">University of California, Berkeley</a> and the <a href="/wiki/American_Society_of_Civil_Engineers" title="American Society of Civil Engineers">American Society of Civil Engineers</a> (ASCE) stated that many New Orleans levee and flood wall failures occurred at weak-link junctions where different levee or wall sections joined together.<sup id="cite_ref-17" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-17">[17]</a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-18" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-18">[18]</a></sup> This was not supported by later final studies.
</p><p>A forensic engineering team from the <a href="/wiki/Louisiana_State_University" title="Louisiana State University">Louisiana State University</a>, using sonar, showed that at one point near the 17th Street Canal breach, the piling extends just 10 feet (3.0 m) below sea level, 7 feet (2.1 m) shallower than the Corps of Engineers had maintained. "The Corps keeps saying the piles were 17 feet, but their own drawings show them to be 10 feet, Ivor van Heerden said. "This is the first time anyone has been able to get a firm fix on what's really down there. And, so far, it's just 10 feet. Not nearly deep enough."<sup id="cite_ref-19" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-19">[19]</a></sup> The two sets of November tests conducted by the Corps of Engineers and LSU researchers used non-invasive seismic methods. Both studies understated the length of the <a href="/wiki/Deep_foundation" title="Deep foundation">piles</a> by about seven feet. By December, seven of the actual piles had been pulled from the ground and measured. The <a href="/wiki/Engineering_News_Record" class="mw-redirect" title="Engineering News Record">Engineering News Record</a> reported on December 16 that they ranged from 23' 3 1/8" to 23' 7 7/16" long, well within the original design specifications, contradicting the early report of short pilings.
</p><p>They also found that homeowners along the 17th Street Canal, near the site of the breach, had been reporting their front yards flooding from persistent seepage from the canal for a year prior to Hurricane Katrina to the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans. However, no data exists confirming that the water was coming from the canal.
</p><p>Other studies showed the levee floodwalls on the 17th Street Canal were "destined to fail" from bad Corps of Engineers design, saying in part, "that miscalculation was so obvious and fundamental," investigators said, they, "could not fathom how the design team of engineers from the Corps, local firm Eustis Engineering, and the national firm Modjeski and Masters could have missed what is being termed the costliest engineering mistake in American history."<sup id="cite_ref-doomed_20-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-doomed-20">[20]</a></sup>
</p><p>Dr. Robert Bea, chair of an independent levee investigation team, has said that the New Orleans-based design firm Modjeski and Masters could have followed correct procedures in calculating safety factors for the flood walls. He added, however, that design procedures of the Corps may not account for changes in soil strength caused by the changes in water flow and pressure during a hurricane flood.<sup id="cite_ref-21" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-21">[21]</a></sup> Dr. Bea has also questioned the size of the design safety margins. He said the corps applied a 30% margin over the maximum design load. A doubling of strength would be a more typical margin for highway bridges, dams, off-shore oil platforms and other public structures. There were also indications that substandard concrete may have been used at the 17th Street Canal.
</p><p>In August 2007, the Corps released an analysis revealing that their floodwalls were so poorly designed that the maximum safe load is only 7 feet (2.1 m) of water, which is half the original 14-foot (4.3 m) design.<sup id="cite_ref-22" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-22">[22]</a></sup>
</p><p>A report released in August 2015 in the official journal of the <a href="/wiki/World_Water_Council" title="World Water Council">World Water Council</a> concluded the following:
</p>
<link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r996844942"/><blockquote class="templatequote"><p>"...What is evident from the project record is that the Army Corps of Engineers recommended raising the canal floodwalls for the 17th Street Canal, but recommended gated structures at the mouths of the Orleans and London Avenue Canals because the latter plan was less expensive. The OLB convinced Congress to pass legislation that required the Corps to raise the floodwalls for all three canals. Furthermore, the Corps, in a separate attempt to limit project costs, initiated a sheet pile load test (E-99 Study), but misinterpreted the results and wrongly concluded that sheet piles needed to be driven to depths of only 17 feet (1 foot ¼ 0.3048 meters) instead of between 31 and 46 feet. That decision saved approximately US$100 million, but significantly reduced overall engineering reliability..."<sup id="cite_ref-23" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-23">[23]</a></sup>
</p></blockquote>
<h3><span class="mw-headline" id="Overtopping_of_levees_in_the_Eastern_New_Orleans">Overtopping of levees in the Eastern New Orleans</span><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=2005_levee_failures_in_Greater_New_Orleans&action=edit&section=6" title="Edit section: Overtopping of levees in the Eastern New Orleans">edit</a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></h3>
<p>According to Professor Raymond Seed of the <a href="/wiki/University_of_California,_Berkeley" title="University of California, Berkeley">University of California, Berkeley</a>, a surge of water estimated at 24 feet (7 m), about 10 feet (3 m) higher than the height of the levees along the city's eastern flank, swept into New Orleans from the <a href="/wiki/Gulf_of_Mexico" title="Gulf of Mexico">Gulf of Mexico</a>, causing most of the flooding in the city. He said that storm surge from <a href="/wiki/Lake_Borgne" title="Lake Borgne">Lake Borgne</a> travelling up the <a href="/wiki/Intracoastal_Waterway" title="Intracoastal Waterway">Intracoastal Waterway</a> caused the breaches on the Industrial Canal.<sup id="cite_ref-24" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-24">[24]</a></sup>
</p><p>Aerial evaluation revealed damage to approximately 90% of some levee systems in the east which should have protected <a href="/wiki/St._Bernard_Parish,_Louisiana" title="St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana">St. Bernard Parish</a>.
</p>
<div class="thumb tright"><div class="thumbinner" style="width:252px;"><a href="/wiki/File:17rhStCanalFloodwallKatrinaGraffitti.jpg" class="image"><img alt="" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/e0/17rhStCanalFloodwallKatrinaGraffitti.jpg/250px-17rhStCanalFloodwallKatrinaGraffitti.jpg" decoding="async" width="250" height="188" class="thumbimage" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/e0/17rhStCanalFloodwallKatrinaGraffitti.jpg/375px-17rhStCanalFloodwallKatrinaGraffitti.jpg 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/e0/17rhStCanalFloodwallKatrinaGraffitti.jpg/500px-17rhStCanalFloodwallKatrinaGraffitti.jpg 2x" data-file-width="1000" data-file-height="750" /></a> <div class="thumbcaption"><div class="magnify"><a href="/wiki/File:17rhStCanalFloodwallKatrinaGraffitti.jpg" class="internal" title="Enlarge"></a></div>Portion of the flood wall atop <a href="/wiki/17th_Street_Canal" title="17th Street Canal">17th Street Canal</a> levee, with Katrina-related graffiti. Notice cracks in the flood wall joints. Operation and maintenance are the responsibility of local levee boards as mandated by the <a href="/wiki/Flood_Control_Act_of_1965" title="Flood Control Act of 1965">Flood Control Act of 1965</a></div></div></div>
<h3><span class="mw-headline" id="National_Academy_of_Sciences_Investigation">National Academy of Sciences Investigation</span><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=2005_levee_failures_in_Greater_New_Orleans&action=edit&section=7" title="Edit section: National Academy of Sciences Investigation">edit</a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></h3>
<table class="box-Update plainlinks metadata ambox ambox-content ambox-Update" role="presentation"><tbody><tr><td class="mbox-image"><div style="width:52px"><img alt="Ambox current red Americas.svg" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/53/Ambox_current_red_Americas.svg/42px-Ambox_current_red_Americas.svg.png" decoding="async" width="42" height="34" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/53/Ambox_current_red_Americas.svg/63px-Ambox_current_red_Americas.svg.png 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/53/Ambox_current_red_Americas.svg/84px-Ambox_current_red_Americas.svg.png 2x" data-file-width="360" data-file-height="290" /></div></td><td class="mbox-text"><div class="mbox-text-span">This section needs to be <b>updated</b>.<span class="hide-when-compact"> Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information.</span> <span class="date-container"><i>(<span class="date">April 2016</span>)</i></span></div></td></tr></tbody></table>
<p>On October 19, 2005, <a href="/wiki/United_States_Secretary_of_Defense" title="United States Secretary of Defense">Defense Secretary</a> <a href="/wiki/Donald_Rumsfeld" title="Donald Rumsfeld">Donald Rumsfeld</a> announced that an independent panel of experts, under the direction of the <a href="/wiki/United_States_National_Academy_of_Sciences" class="mw-redirect" title="United States National Academy of Sciences">National Academy of Sciences</a>, would convene to evaluate the performance of the New Orleans levee system, and issue a final report in eight months. The panel would study the results provided by the two existing teams of experts that had already examined the levee failures.<sup id="cite_ref-25" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-25">[25]</a></sup> The academy concluded that “the engineering of the levee system was not adequate. The procedures for designing and constructing hurricane protection systems will have to be improved, and the designing organizations must upgrade their engineering capabilities. The levees must be seen not as a system to protect real estate but as a set of dams to protect people. There must be independent peer reviews of future designs and construction.”<sup id="cite_ref-26" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-26">[26]</a></sup>
</p>
<h3><span class="mw-headline" id="Senate_Committee_hearings">Senate Committee hearings</span><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=2005_levee_failures_in_Greater_New_Orleans&action=edit&section=8" title="Edit section: Senate Committee hearings">edit</a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></h3>
<p>Preliminary investigations and evidence were presented before the <a href="/wiki/U.S._Senate" class="mw-redirect" title="U.S. Senate">U.S. Senate</a> Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on November 2, 2005, and generally confirmed the findings of the preliminary investigations.<sup id="cite_ref-senate_27-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-senate-27">[27]</a></sup>
</p><p>On November 9, 2005, The <a href="/wiki/Government_Accountability_Office" title="Government Accountability Office">Government Accountability Office</a> testified before the <a href="/wiki/Senate_Committee_on_Environment_and_Public_Works" class="mw-redirect" title="Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works">Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works</a>. The report cited the <a href="/wiki/Flood_Control_Act_of_1965" title="Flood Control Act of 1965">Flood Control Act of 1965</a>, which authorized the <a href="/wiki/U.S._Army_Corps_of_Engineers" class="mw-redirect" title="U.S. Army Corps of Engineers">U.S. Army Corps of Engineers</a> to design and construct a flood protection system to protect south <a href="/wiki/Louisiana" title="Louisiana">Louisiana</a> from the strongest storms characteristic of the region.
</p>
<h3><span class="mw-headline" id="Corps_of_Engineers_admits_problems_with_design">Corps of Engineers admits problems with design</span><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=2005_levee_failures_in_Greater_New_Orleans&action=edit&section=9" title="Edit section: Corps of Engineers admits problems with design">edit</a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></h3>
<p>On April 5, 2006, months after independent investigators had demonstrated that the levee failures were not due to natural forces beyond intended design strength, Lt. Gen. Carl Strock testified before the <a href="/wiki/United_States_Senate_Appropriations_Subcommittee_on_Energy_and_Water_Development" title="United States Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development">U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Energy and Water</a> that, "We have now concluded we had problems with the design of the structure." He also testified that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers did not know of this mechanism of failure prior to August 29, 2005. The claim of ignorance is refuted by the <a href="/wiki/National_Science_Foundation" title="National Science Foundation">National Science Foundation</a> investigators hired by the <a href="/wiki/United_States_Army_Corps_of_Engineers" title="United States Army Corps of Engineers">Army Corps of Engineers</a>, who point to a 1986 study (E-99 study) by the corps itself that such separations were possible in the I-wall design.<sup id="cite_ref-28" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-28">[28]</a></sup> This issue is addressed again in a study released in August 2015 by J. David Rogers et al., who concluded that a misinterpretation of the 1986 study occurred apparently because the Corps had draped a tarpaulin over the gap that formed between the bases of the deflecting sheet piles and the soil in which they were embedded, so they did not see the gap. The tarpaulin was there for safety and to stop water that would seep through the interlocks. Failure to include the gap in interpretation of the test results introduced unconservatism in the final designs based on these tests. It allowed the use of shorter sheet piles, and reduced overall flood protection reliability.<sup id="cite_ref-29" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-29">[29]</a></sup>
</p><p>Nearly two months later, on June 1, 2006, the USACE finalized their report. The final draft of the IPET report states the destructive forces of Katrina were "aided by incomplete protection, lower than authorized structures, and levee sections with erodible materials.
</p><p><br />
</p>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="The_New_Levees">The New Levees</span><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=2005_levee_failures_in_Greater_New_Orleans&action=edit&section=10" title="Edit section: The New Levees">edit</a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></h2>
<p>Following the damages of Hurricane Katrina and the levee failures, changes had to be made in order to prepare for any future disasters. This caused the city to take steps to obtain new system of levees that would protect the city from future damage; a system that would cost 14.5 billion dollars.<sup id="cite_ref-30" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-30">[30]</a></sup>  With the recent hit of Hurricane Ida, the new levees were to put the test.
</p><p>The strength of Hurricane Ida forced a considerable amount of water towards New Orleans, similar to what happened during Hurricane Katrina. However, thanks to the new levee systems, damages that occurred during Hurricane Ida were minimized. Concerns were expressed about future uses of the system. Despite the overall success during Hurricane Ida, the effectiveness of the levee system during future storms might not be up to par.<sup id="cite_ref-31" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-31">[31]</a></sup>  Realizing that there needed to be more updates and changes, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers requested $3.2 billion from Congress in the Fall of 2021, in addition to the already $14.5 billion system. This was to ensure that they could continue to provide their 100-year level of hurricane protection through 2073. State and local officials say that the 100-year protection is not good enough in the era of global warming, however, the changes that have already been made are improving flood protection and the levee system will continue to be upgraded as necessary when they fail to meet standards.<sup id="cite_ref-32" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-32">[32]</a></sup>
</p>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="Conspiracy_theories">Conspiracy theories</span><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=2005_levee_failures_in_Greater_New_Orleans&action=edit&section=11" title="Edit section: Conspiracy theories">edit</a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></h2>
<p><a href="/wiki/Nation_of_Islam" title="Nation of Islam">Nation of Islam</a> leader <a href="/wiki/Louis_Farrakhan" title="Louis Farrakhan">Louis Farrakhan</a> among other public figures claimed the levees were dynamited to divert waters away from wealthy white areas. The conspiracy theory reached a <a href="/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives" title="United States House of Representatives">United States House of Representatives</a> committee investigating Katrina when a New Orleans community activist made the claim. According to the <i><a href="/wiki/New_Orleans_Times_Picayune" class="mw-redirect" title="New Orleans Times Picayune">New Orleans Times Picayune</a></i> this is an "<a href="/wiki/Urban_myth" class="mw-redirect" title="Urban myth">urban myth</a>". Reasons for belief in these theories have been ascribed to the decision by city officials during the <a href="/wiki/Great_Mississippi_Flood_of_1927" title="Great Mississippi Flood of 1927">Great Mississippi Flood of 1927</a> to set off 30 tons of dynamite on the levee at <a href="/wiki/Caernarvon,_Louisiana" title="Caernarvon, Louisiana">Caernarvon, Louisiana</a> which eased pressure on levees at New Orleans but flooded <a href="/wiki/St._Bernard_Parish" class="mw-redirect" title="St. Bernard Parish">St. Bernard Parish</a>, the <a href="/wiki/Ninth_Ward" class="mw-redirect" title="Ninth Ward">Ninth Ward</a> taking the brunt of the city's flooding during <a href="/wiki/Hurricane_Betsy" title="Hurricane Betsy">Hurricane Betsy</a>, the general disenfranchisement of blacks and lower-class people, and the similarity of the sound of the levees collapsing to that of a bombing.<sup id="cite_ref-33" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-33">[33]</a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-SHG_34-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-SHG-34">[34]</a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-UGNO_35-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-UGNO-35">[35]</a></sup>
</p>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="See_also">See also</span><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=2005_levee_failures_in_Greater_New_Orleans&action=edit&section=12" title="Edit section: See also">edit</a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></h2>
<ul><li><a href="/wiki/Flood_Control_Act_of_1965" title="Flood Control Act of 1965">Flood Control Act of 1965</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/17th_Street_Canal" title="17th Street Canal">17th Street Canal</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Civil_engineering_and_infrastructure_repair_in_New_Orleans_after_Hurricane_Katrina" title="Civil engineering and infrastructure repair in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina">Civil engineering and infrastructure repair in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Drainage_in_New_Orleans" title="Drainage in New Orleans">Drainage in New Orleans</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Industrial_Canal" title="Industrial Canal">Industrial Canal</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/ING_4727" title="ING 4727">ING 4727</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Old_River_Control_Structure" title="Old River Control Structure">Old River Control Structure</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Seabrook_Floodgate" title="Seabrook Floodgate">Seabrook Floodgate</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/London_Avenue_Canal" title="London Avenue Canal">London Avenue Canal</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/U.S._Army_Corps_of_Engineers_civil_works_controversies_(New_Orleans)" title="U.S. Army Corps of Engineers civil works controversies (New Orleans)">U.S. Army Corps of Engineers civil works controversies (New Orleans)</a></li></ul>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="References">References</span><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=2005_levee_failures_in_Greater_New_Orleans&action=edit&section=13" title="Edit section: References">edit</a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></h2>
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<ol class="references">
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<li id="cite_note-2"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-2">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">Robertson, Campbell. <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r999302996"/><cite class="citation web cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/24/us/decade-after-katrina-pointing-finger-more-firmly-at-army-corps.html">"Decade After Katrina, Pointing Finger More Firmly at Army Corps"</a>. <i>New York Times</i>. May 23, 2015<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">October 20,</span> 2016</span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=unknown&rft.jtitle=New+York+Times&rft.atitle=Decade+After+Katrina%2C+Pointing+Finger+More+Firmly+at+Army+Corps&rft.date=2015-05-23&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2015%2F05%2F24%2Fus%2Fdecade-after-katrina-pointing-finger-more-firmly-at-army-corps.html&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3A2005+levee+failures+in+Greater+New+Orleans" class="Z3988"></span></span>
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<li id="cite_note-3"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-3">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.mvd.usace.army.mil/mrc/history/AppendixE.htm">Flood Control Act of 1928 on Mississippi Valley Division of USACE website</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20090109031739/http://www.mvd.usace.army.mil/mrc/history/AppendixE.htm">Archived</a> 2009-01-09 at the <a href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a></span>
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<li id="cite_note-GAOReport-4"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-GAOReport_4-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r999302996"/><cite class="citation web cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110523230347/http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d051050t.pdf">"GAO Report on Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project, September 2005"</a> <span class="cs1-format">(PDF)</span>. Archived from <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d051050t.pdf">the original</a> <span class="cs1-format">(PDF)</span> on May 23, 2011<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">November 25,</span> 2008</span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=unknown&rft.btitle=GAO+Report+on+Lake+Pontchartrain+and+Vicinity+Hurricane+Protection+Project%2C+September+2005&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gao.gov%2Fnew.items%2Fd051050t.pdf&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3A2005+levee+failures+in+Greater+New+Orleans" class="Z3988"></span></span>
</li>
<li id="cite_note-5"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-5">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://eng.auburn.edu/admin/marketing/seminars/2007/l-roth.html">The New Orleans Levees: The Worst Engineering Catastrophe in US History - What Went Wrong and Why</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20071015234208/http://eng.auburn.edu/admin/marketing/seminars/2007/l-roth.html">Archived</a> 2007-10-15 at the <a href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a></span>
</li>
<li id="cite_note-6"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-6">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/%7Enew_orleans/">ILIT DOWNLOAD CENTER (sponsored in part by the National Science Foundation)</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20060618182444/http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/~new_orleans/">Archived</a> 2006-06-18 at the <a href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a></span>
</li>
<li id="cite_note-7"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-7">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r999302996"/><cite class="citation web cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110718210500/http://www.dotd.louisiana.gov/administration/teamlouisiana/TeamLaLetter.pdf">"LSU Katrina Investigation"</a> <span class="cs1-format">(PDF)</span>. Archived from <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.dotd.louisiana.gov/administration/teamlouisiana/TeamLaLetter.pdf">the original</a> <span class="cs1-format">(PDF)</span> on July 18, 2011<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">October 9,</span> 2007</span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=unknown&rft.btitle=LSU+Katrina+Investigation&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dotd.louisiana.gov%2Fadministration%2Fteamlouisiana%2FTeamLaLetter.pdf&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3A2005+levee+failures+in+Greater+New+Orleans" class="Z3988"></span></span>
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<li id="cite_note-8"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-8">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r999302996"/><cite class="citation web cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20070815202550/http://www.dotd.louisiana.gov/administration/TeamLouisiana/">"Archived copy"</a>. Archived from <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.dotd.louisiana.gov/administration/teamlouisiana/">the original</a> on August 15, 2007<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">October 9,</span> 2007</span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=unknown&rft.btitle=Archived+copy&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dotd.louisiana.gov%2Fadministration%2Fteamlouisiana%2F&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3A2005+levee+failures+in+Greater+New+Orleans" class="Z3988"></span><span class="cs1-maint citation-comment">CS1 maint: archived copy as title (<a href="/wiki/Category:CS1_maint:_archived_copy_as_title" title="Category:CS1 maint: archived copy as title">link</a>)</span></span>
</li>
<li id="cite_note-9"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-9">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r999302996"/><cite class="citation web cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.nola.com/hurricane/index.ssf/2009/11/post_16.html">"Corps' operation of MR-GO doomed homes in St. Bernard, Lower 9th Ward, judge rules"</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=unknown&rft.btitle=Corps%27+operation+of+MR-GO+doomed+homes+in+St.+Bernard%2C+Lower+9th+Ward%2C+judge+rules&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nola.com%2Fhurricane%2Findex.ssf%2F2009%2F11%2Fpost_16.html&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3A2005+levee+failures+in+Greater+New+Orleans" class="Z3988"></span></span>
</li>
<li id="cite_note-10"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-10">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110807184732/http://levees.org/2/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/American-Society-of-Civil-Engineers-What-Went-Wrong-ERPreport-1.pdf"><i>The New Orleans Hurricane Protection System : What Went Wrong and Why</i></a> (2007). <a href="/wiki/ASCE" class="mw-redirect" title="ASCE">ASCE</a> Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel report. hosted at <i>web.archive.org</i>. Retrieved 29 August 2015.</span>
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<li id="cite_note-weaksoil-11"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-weaksoil_11-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">McQuaid, John; Marshall, Bob.
"<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/base/news-4/1129960640235820.xml">Officials knew about weak soil under levee</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20051027003250/http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?%2Fbase%2Fnews-4%2F1129960640235820.xml">Archived</a> 2005-10-27 at the <a href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a>." <i><a href="/wiki/Times_Picayune" class="mw-redirect" title="Times Picayune">Times Picayune</a>.</i> October 22, 2005.</span>
</li>
<li id="cite_note-swamppeat-12"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-swamppeat_12-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">McQuaid, John. "<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/base/news-4/1129359337274730.xml">Swamp peat was poor anchor, engineer says</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20051021151308/http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?%2Fbase%2Fnews-4%2F1129359337274730.xml">Archived</a> 2005-10-21 at the <a href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a>." <i><a href="/wiki/Times_Picayune" class="mw-redirect" title="Times Picayune">Times Picayune</a>.</i> October 15, 2005.</span>
</li>
<li id="cite_note-IPET-13"><span class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <a href="#cite_ref-IPET_13-0"><sup><i><b>a</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-IPET_13-1"><sup><i><b>b</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-IPET_13-2"><sup><i><b>c</b></i></sup></a></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r999302996"/><cite class="citation web cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110722185115/https://ipet.wes.army.mil/NOHPP/_Post-Katrina/(IPET)%20Interagency%20Performance%20Evaluation%20TaskForce/Reports/IPET%20Final%20Report/Volume%20I/IPET%20Vol%20I%20Final%20Draft_Jun08.pdf">"IPET Final Draft Report"</a> <span class="cs1-format">(PDF)</span>. Archived from <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://ipet.wes.army.mil/NOHPP/_Post-Katrina/(IPET)%20Interagency%20Performance%20Evaluation%20TaskForce/Reports/IPET%20Final%20Report/Volume%20I/IPET%20Vol%20I%20Final%20Draft_Jun08.pdf">the original</a> <span class="cs1-format">(PDF)</span> on July 22, 2011<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">November 25,</span> 2008</span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=unknown&rft.btitle=IPET+Final+Draft+Report&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fipet.wes.army.mil%2FNOHPP%2F_Post-Katrina%2F%28IPET%29%2520Interagency%2520Performance%2520Evaluation%2520TaskForce%2FReports%2FIPET%2520Final%2520Report%2FVolume%2520I%2FIPET%2520Vol%2520I%2520Final%2520Draft_Jun08.pdf&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3A2005+levee+failures+in+Greater+New+Orleans" class="Z3988"></span></span>
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<li id="cite_note-14"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-14">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a rel="nofollow" class="external free" href="http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/katrina/ipet/ipet.html">http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/katrina/ipet/ipet.html</a></span>
</li>
<li id="cite_note-15"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-15">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a rel="nofollow" class="external free" href="http://levees.org/">http://levees.org/</a></span>
</li>
<li id="cite_note-16"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-16">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20120323155056/http://www.lasce.org/documents/RaySeedsLetter.pdf">Dr. Ray Seed's letter to ASCE.</a> hosted at <i>web.archive.org</i>. Retrieved 29 August 2015.</span>
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<li id="cite_note-17"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-17">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">Yang, Sarah. "<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2005/11/02_levee.shtml">Investigators release preliminary findings of levee failures at Senate hearing</a>." <i><a href="/wiki/University_of_California,_Berkeley" title="University of California, Berkeley">University of California, Berkeley</a>.</i> November 2, 2005.</span>
</li>
<li id="cite_note-18"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-18">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">Seed, R.B.; et al. "<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2005/11/leveereport_prelim.pdf">Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005</a>." <i><a href="/wiki/University_of_California,_Berkeley" title="University of California, Berkeley">University of California, Berkeley</a>.</i> November 2, 2005.</span>
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<li id="cite_note-19"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-19">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">Marshall, Bob. "<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/base/news-4/1131604614166260.xml">Short Sheeted</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20070312084540/http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?%2Fbase%2Fnews-4%2F1131604614166260.xml">Archived</a> 2007-03-12 at the <a href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a>." <i><a href="/wiki/Times_Picayune" class="mw-redirect" title="Times Picayune">Times Picayune</a>.</i> November 10, 2005.</span>
</li>
<li id="cite_note-doomed-20"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-doomed_20-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">Marshall, Bob. "<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/base/news-4/1133336859287360.xml">17th Street Canal levee was doomed</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20060907073947/http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?%2Fbase%2Fnews-4%2F1133336859287360.xml">Archived</a> 2006-09-07 at the <a href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a>." <i><a href="/wiki/Times_Picayune" class="mw-redirect" title="Times Picayune">Times Picayune</a>.</i> November 30, 2005.</span>
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<li id="cite_note-21"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-21">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/%7Enew_orleans/">"Investigation of the Performance of the New Orleans Flood Protection Systems in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005"</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20060618182444/http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/~new_orleans/">Archived</a> June 18, 2006, at the <a href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a>. Independent Levee Investigation Team Final Report. July 31, 2006</span>
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<li id="cite_note-22"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-22">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r999302996"/><cite class="citation web cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130728150431/http://blog.nola.com/times-picayune/2007/08/corps_analysis_shows_17th_st_c.html">"Corps analysis shows canal's weaknesses - Breaking News Updates New Orleans - Times-Picayune - NOLA.com"</a>. Archived from <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://blog.nola.com/times-picayune/2007/08/corps_analysis_shows_17th_st_c.html">the original</a> on July 28, 2013<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">October 9,</span> 2007</span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=unknown&rft.btitle=Corps+analysis+shows+canal%27s+weaknesses+-+Breaking+News+Updates+New+Orleans+-+Times-Picayune+-+NOLA.com&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Fblog.nola.com%2Ftimes-picayune%2F2007%2F08%2Fcorps_analysis_shows_17th_st_c.html&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3A2005+levee+failures+in+Greater+New+Orleans" class="Z3988"></span></span>
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<li id="cite_note-23"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-23">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r999302996"/><cite id="CITEREFJ._David_Rogers,_G._Paul_Kemp2015" class="citation news cs1">J. David Rogers, G. Paul Kemp (2015). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://levees.org/2/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/WPOL-V17-NO4-21051.pdf">"Interaction between the US Army Corps of Engineers and the Orleans Levee Board preceding the drainage canal wall failures and catastrophic flooding of New Orleans in 2005"</a> <span class="cs1-format">(PDF)</span>. Water Policy. p. 707<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">October 31,</span> 2015</span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Interaction+between+the+US+Army+Corps+of+Engineers+and+the+Orleans+Levee+Board+preceding+the+drainage+canal+wall+failures+and+catastrophic+flooding+of+New+Orleans+in+2005&rft.pages=707&rft.date=2015&rft.au=J.+David+Rogers%2C+G.+Paul+Kemp&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Flevees.org%2F2%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2015%2F11%2FWPOL-V17-NO4-21051.pdf&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3A2005+levee+failures+in+Greater+New+Orleans" class="Z3988"></span></span>
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<li id="cite_note-24"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-24">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">Seed, Raymond B. "<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2005/11/02_levee_testimony.shtml">Hurricane Katrina: Performance of the Flood Control System</a>." (Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, <a href="/wiki/U.S._Senate" class="mw-redirect" title="U.S. Senate">U.S. Senate</a>) <i><a href="/wiki/University_of_California,_Berkeley" title="University of California, Berkeley">University of California, Berkeley</a>.</i> November 2, 2005.</span>
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<li id="cite_note-25"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-25">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">Schleifstein, Mark. "<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_Times-Picayune/archives/2005_10_19.html#088443">Corps levee probe role reduced</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20080326231525/http://www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?%2Fmtlogs%2Fnola_Times-Picayune%2Farchives%2F2005_10_19.html#088443">Archived</a> 2008-03-26 at the <a href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a>." <i><a href="/wiki/Times_Picayune" class="mw-redirect" title="Times Picayune">Times Picayune</a>.</i> October 19, 2005.</span>
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<li id="cite_note-26"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-26">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r999302996"/><cite class="citation web cs1"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.nae.edu/Publications/Bridge/EngineeringfortheThreatofNaturalDisasters/LessonsfromHurricaneKatrina.aspx">"Lessons from Hurricane Katrina"</a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=unknown&rft.btitle=Lessons+from+Hurricane+Katrina&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nae.edu%2FPublications%2FBridge%2FEngineeringfortheThreatofNaturalDisasters%2FLessonsfromHurricaneKatrina.aspx&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3A2005+levee+failures+in+Greater+New+Orleans" class="Z3988"></span></span>
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<li id="cite_note-senate-27"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-senate_27-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">"<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://hsgac.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Detail&HearingID=290">Hurricane Katrina: Why Did the Levees Fail?</a>." <i><a href="/wiki/U.S._Senate" class="mw-redirect" title="U.S. Senate">U.S. Senate</a></i> (Hearing Report for the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs). November 2, 2005.</span>
</li>
<li id="cite_note-28"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-28">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r999302996"/><cite id="CITEREFWalsh2006" class="citation web cs1">Walsh, Bill (April 6, 2006). "Corps chief admits to 'design failure<span class="cs1-kern-right">'</span>". <i><a href="/wiki/Times_Picayune" class="mw-redirect" title="Times Picayune">Times Picayune</a></i>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=unknown&rft.jtitle=Times+Picayune&rft.atitle=Corps+chief+admits+to+%27design+failure%27&rft.date=2006-04-06&rft.aulast=Walsh&rft.aufirst=Bill&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3A2005+levee+failures+in+Greater+New+Orleans" class="Z3988"></span> <span class="cs1-visible-error error citation-comment">Missing or empty <code class="cs1-code">|url=</code> (<a href="/wiki/Help:CS1_errors#cite_web_url" title="Help:CS1 errors">help</a>)</span></span>
</li>
<li id="cite_note-29"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-29">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r999302996"/><cite id="CITEREFJ._David_Rogers,_G._Paul_Kemp2015" class="citation news cs1">J. David Rogers, G. Paul Kemp (2015). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://levees.org/2/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/WPOL-V17-NO4-21051.pdf">"Interaction between the US Army Corps of Engineers and the Orleans Levee Board preceding the drainage canal wall failures and catastrophic flooding of New Orleans in 2005"</a> <span class="cs1-format">(PDF)</span>. Water Policy. p. 707<span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">October 31,</span> 2015</span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Interaction+between+the+US+Army+Corps+of+Engineers+and+the+Orleans+Levee+Board+preceding+the+drainage+canal+wall+failures+and+catastrophic+flooding+of+New+Orleans+in+2005&rft.pages=707&rft.date=2015&rft.au=J.+David+Rogers%2C+G.+Paul+Kemp&rft_id=http%3A%2F%2Flevees.org%2F2%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2015%2F11%2FWPOL-V17-NO4-21051.pdf&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3A2005+levee+failures+in+Greater+New+Orleans" class="Z3988"></span></span>
</li>
<li id="cite_note-30"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-30">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r999302996"/><cite id="CITEREFLayne2021" class="citation news cs1">Layne, Nathan (August 30, 2021). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/new-orleans-levees-got-145-billion-upgrade-will-they-hold-2021-08-30/">"New Orleans' levees got a $14.5 billion upgrade. Will they hold?"</a>. <i>Reuters</i><span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">December 3,</span> 2021</span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtitle=Reuters&rft.atitle=New+Orleans%27+levees+got+a+%2414.5+billion+upgrade.+Will+they+hold%3F&rft.date=2021-08-30&rft.aulast=Layne&rft.aufirst=Nathan&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.reuters.com%2Fworld%2Fus%2Fnew-orleans-levees-got-145-billion-upgrade-will-they-hold-2021-08-30%2F&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3A2005+levee+failures+in+Greater+New+Orleans" class="Z3988"></span></span>
</li>
<li id="cite_note-31"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-31">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r999302996"/><cite id="CITEREFBittle2021" class="citation web cs1">Bittle, Jake (September 2, 2021). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.curbed.com/2021/09/levees-louisiana-hurricane-ida-managed-retreat.html">"New Orleans's Levees Held Up This Time — But That's Not Enough"</a>. <i>Curbed</i><span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">December 3,</span> 2021</span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=unknown&rft.jtitle=Curbed&rft.atitle=New+Orleans%E2%80%99s+Levees+Held+Up+This+Time+%E2%80%94+But+That%E2%80%99s+Not+Enough&rft.date=2021-09-02&rft.aulast=Bittle&rft.aufirst=Jake&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.curbed.com%2F2021%2F09%2Flevees-louisiana-hurricane-ida-managed-retreat.html&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3A2005+levee+failures+in+Greater+New+Orleans" class="Z3988"></span></span>
</li>
<li id="cite_note-32"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-32">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r999302996"/><cite id="CITEREFwriter" class="citation web cs1">writer, MARK SCHLEIFSTEIN | Staff. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.nola.com/news/environment/article_80c27be8-e3e7-11ea-bbf9-1731ebdd9171.html">"15 years after Katrina, New Orleans levees are in the best shape ever. Experts say it's not enough"</a>. <i>NOLA.com</i><span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">December 3,</span> 2021</span>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=unknown&rft.jtitle=NOLA.com&rft.atitle=15+years+after+Katrina%2C+New+Orleans+levees+are+in+the+best+shape+ever.+Experts+say+it%27s+not+enough.&rft.aulast=writer&rft.aufirst=MARK+SCHLEIFSTEIN+%7C+Staff&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nola.com%2Fnews%2Fenvironment%2Farticle_80c27be8-e3e7-11ea-bbf9-1731ebdd9171.html&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3A2005+levee+failures+in+Greater+New+Orleans" class="Z3988"></span></span>
</li>
<li id="cite_note-33"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-33">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/index.ssf?/base/news-4/1134370689216400.xml&coll=1">Rumor of levee dynamite persists New Orleans Times Picayune December 12, 2005</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20091126063459/http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/index.ssf?%2Fbase%2Fnews-4%2F1134370689216400.xml">Archived</a> November 26, 2009, at the <a href="/wiki/Wayback_Machine" title="Wayback Machine">Wayback Machine</a></span>
</li>
<li id="cite_note-SHG-34"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-SHG_34-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">Manning Marable, <a href="/wiki/Kristen_Clarke" title="Kristen Clarke">Kristen Clarke</a>, <i>Seeking Higher Ground: The Hurricane Katrina Crisis, Race, and Public Policy</i> (2008), p. 192. <link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r999302996"/><a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/1-4039-7779-8" title="Special:BookSources/1-4039-7779-8">1-4039-7779-8</a>.</span>
</li>
<li id="cite_note-UGNO-35"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-UGNO_35-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">Eve Zibart, Tom Fitzmorris, Will Coviello, <i>The Unofficial Guide to New Orleans</i> (2009), p. 23.</span>
</li>
</ol></div>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="Further_reading">Further reading</span><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=2005_levee_failures_in_Greater_New_Orleans&action=edit&section=14" title="Edit section: Further reading">edit</a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></h2>
<style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1054258005">.mw-parser-output .refbegin{font-size:90%;margin-bottom:0.5em}.mw-parser-output .refbegin-hanging-indents>ul{margin-left:0}.mw-parser-output .refbegin-hanging-indents>ul>li{margin-left:0;padding-left:3.2em;text-indent:-3.2em}.mw-parser-output .refbegin-hanging-indents ul,.mw-parser-output .refbegin-hanging-indents ul li{list-style:none}@media(max-width:720px){.mw-parser-output .refbegin-hanging-indents>ul>li{padding-left:1.6em;text-indent:-1.6em}}.mw-parser-output .refbegin-columns{margin-top:0.3em}.mw-parser-output .refbegin-columns ul{margin-top:0}.mw-parser-output .refbegin-columns li{page-break-inside:avoid;break-inside:avoid-column}</style><div class="refbegin" style="">
<ul><li><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r999302996"/><cite id="CITEREFvan_HeerdenBryan,_Mike2006" class="citation book cs1">van Heerden, Ivor; Bryan, Mike (2006). <span class="cs1-lock-registration" title="Free registration required"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/stormwhatwentwro00vanh"><i>What Went Wrong and Why During Hurricane Katrina</i></a></span>. Viking. <a href="/wiki/ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <a href="/wiki/Special:BookSources/0-670-03781-8" title="Special:BookSources/0-670-03781-8"><bdi>0-670-03781-8</bdi></a>.</cite><span title="ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Abook&rft.genre=book&rft.btitle=What+Went+Wrong+and+Why+During+Hurricane+Katrina&rft.pub=Viking&rft.date=2006&rft.isbn=0-670-03781-8&rft.aulast=van+Heerden&rft.aufirst=Ivor&rft.au=Bryan%2C+Mike&rft_id=https%3A%2F%2Farchive.org%2Fdetails%2Fstormwhatwentwro00vanh&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fen.wikipedia.org%3A2005+levee+failures+in+Greater+New+Orleans" class="Z3988"></span></li></ul>
</div>
<p>Bush, Ann McReynolds, "Katrina: 10 Years On" (year 2015 publisher+Amazon
</p>
<h2><span class="mw-headline" id="External_links">External links</span><span class="mw-editsection"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">[</span><a href="/w/index.php?title=2005_levee_failures_in_Greater_New_Orleans&action=edit&section=15" title="Edit section: External links">edit</a><span class="mw-editsection-bracket">]</span></span></h2>
<ul><li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.levees.org">Levees.Org (non-profit flood protection group in New Orleans)</a></li>
<li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20090130100021/https://ipet.wes.army.mil/">Interagency Performance Evaluation Taskforce (IPET) Draft Final Report</a> (1 June 2006) provided by <a href="/wiki/USACE" class="mw-redirect" title="USACE">USACE</a> <br /><small>Note: Site may be slow to load and considered non-secure by <a href="/wiki/Internet_Explorer" title="Internet Explorer">IE7</a></small></li>
<li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20070930191702/http://www.nola.com/weblogs/nola/index.ssf?%2Fmtlogs%2Fnola_nolaview%2Farchives%2F2006_06_01.html">IPET Draft Final Report</a> (1 June 2006) provided by <a href="/wiki/The_Times-Picayune" class="mw-redirect" title="The Times-Picayune">The Times-Picayune</a></li>
<li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20060618182444/http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/~new_orleans/">Independent Levee Investigation Team (ILIT) Final Report</a> (31 July 2006)</li>
<li class="mw-empty-elt"></li>
<li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20110807184732/http://levees.org/2/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/American-Society-of-Civil-Engineers-What-Went-Wrong-ERPreport-1.pdf">ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel Report</a> (2007). at <i>web.archive.org</i></li>
<li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20071101043228/http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/inside/products/pub/hpdc/hpdc.cfm">Decision-Making Chronology for Hurricane Protection Project</a></li></ul>
<div class="navbox-styles nomobile"><style data-mw-deduplicate="TemplateStyles:r1057682214">.mw-parser-output .navbox{box-sizing:border-box;border:1px solid #a2a9b1;width:100%;clear:both;font-size:88%;text-align:center;padding:1px;margin:1em auto 0}.mw-parser-output .navbox .navbox{margin-top:0}.mw-parser-output .navbox+.navbox,.mw-parser-output .navbox+.navbox-styles+.navbox{margin-top:-1px}.mw-parser-output .navbox-inner,.mw-parser-output .navbox-subgroup{width:100%}.mw-parser-output .navbox-group,.mw-parser-output .navbox-title,.mw-parser-output .navbox-abovebelow{padding:0.25em 1em;line-height:1.5em;text-align:center}.mw-parser-output .navbox-group{white-space:nowrap;text-align:right}.mw-parser-output .navbox,.mw-parser-output .navbox-subgroup{background-color:#fdfdfd}.mw-parser-output .navbox-list{line-height:1.5em;border-color:#fdfdfd}.mw-parser-output .navbox-list-with-group{text-align:left;border-left-width:2px;border-left-style:solid}.mw-parser-output tr+tr>.navbox-abovebelow,.mw-parser-output tr+tr>.navbox-group,.mw-parser-output tr+tr>.navbox-image,.mw-parser-output tr+tr>.navbox-list{border-top:2px solid #fdfdfd}.mw-parser-output .navbox th,.mw-parser-output .navbox-title{}.mw-parser-output .navbox-abovebelow,.mw-parser-output th.navbox-group,.mw-parser-output .navbox-subgroup .navbox-title{background-color:#ddf}.mw-parser-output .navbox-subgroup .navbox-group,.mw-parser-output .navbox-subgroup .navbox-abovebelow{background-color:#e6e6ff}.mw-parser-output .navbox-even{background-color:#f7f7f7}.mw-parser-output .navbox-odd{background-color:transparent}.mw-parser-output .navbox .hlist td dl,.mw-parser-output .navbox .hlist td ol,.mw-parser-output .navbox .hlist td ul,.mw-parser-output .navbox td.hlist dl,.mw-parser-output .navbox td.hlist ol,.mw-parser-output .navbox td.hlist ul{padding:0.125em 0}.mw-parser-output .navbox .navbar{display:block;font-size:100%}.mw-parser-output .navbox-title .navbar{float:left;text-align:left;margin-right:0.5em}</style></div><div role="navigation" class="navbox" aria-labelledby="Hurricane_Katrina" style="padding:3px"><table class="nowraplinks mw-collapsible autocollapse navbox-inner" style="border-spacing:0;background:transparent;color:inherit"><tbody><tr><th scope="col" class="navbox-title" colspan="3"><link rel="mw-deduplicated-inline-style" href="mw-data:TemplateStyles:r1054937957"/><div class="navbar plainlinks hlist navbar-mini"><ul><li class="nv-view"><a href="/wiki/Template:Hurricane_Katrina_series" title="Template:Hurricane Katrina series"><abbr title="View this template" style=";;background:none transparent;border:none;box-shadow:none;padding:0;">v</abbr></a></li><li class="nv-talk"><a href="/wiki/Template_talk:Hurricane_Katrina_series" title="Template talk:Hurricane Katrina series"><abbr title="Discuss this template" style=";;background:none transparent;border:none;box-shadow:none;padding:0;">t</abbr></a></li><li class="nv-edit"><a class="external text" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Template:Hurricane_Katrina_series&action=edit"><abbr title="Edit this template" style=";;background:none transparent;border:none;box-shadow:none;padding:0;">e</abbr></a></li></ul></div><div id="Hurricane_Katrina" style="font-size:114%;margin:0 4em"><a href="/wiki/Hurricane_Katrina" title="Hurricane Katrina">Hurricane Katrina</a></div></th></tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="navbox-list navbox-odd hlist" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">
<ul><li><a href="/wiki/Timeline_of_Hurricane_Katrina" title="Timeline of Hurricane Katrina">Timeline</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Meteorological_history_of_Hurricane_Katrina" title="Meteorological history of Hurricane Katrina">Meteorological history</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Hurricane_Katrina_tornado_outbreak" title="Hurricane Katrina tornado outbreak">Tornado outbreak</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Preparations_for_Hurricane_Katrina" title="Preparations for Hurricane Katrina">Preparations</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Hurricane_preparedness_in_New_Orleans" title="Hurricane preparedness in New Orleans">New Orleans preparations</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Economic_effects_of_Hurricane_Katrina" title="Economic effects of Hurricane Katrina">Economic effects</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Political_effects_of_Hurricane_Katrina" title="Political effects of Hurricane Katrina">Political effects</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Criticism_of_the_government_response_to_Hurricane_Katrina" title="Criticism of the government response to Hurricane Katrina">Criticism of government response</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Social_effects_of_Hurricane_Katrina" title="Social effects of Hurricane Katrina">Social effects</a></li></ul>
</div></td><td class="noviewer navbox-image" rowspan="3" style="width:1px;padding:0 0 0 2px"><div><a href="/wiki/File:Katrina-noaaGOES12.jpg" class="image"><img alt="Katrina-noaaGOES12.jpg" src="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/6f/Katrina-noaaGOES12.jpg/70px-Katrina-noaaGOES12.jpg" decoding="async" width="70" height="44" srcset="//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/6f/Katrina-noaaGOES12.jpg/105px-Katrina-noaaGOES12.jpg 1.5x, //upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/6f/Katrina-noaaGOES12.jpg/140px-Katrina-noaaGOES12.jpg 2x" data-file-width="1919" data-file-height="1198" /></a></div></td></tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="navbox-list navbox-even hlist" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">
<ul><li><a href="/wiki/Hurricane_Katrina_effects_by_region" title="Hurricane Katrina effects by region">Effects by region</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Effects_of_Hurricane_Katrina_in_Mississippi" title="Effects of Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi">Mississippi</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Effects_of_Hurricane_Katrina_in_New_Orleans" title="Effects of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans">New Orleans</a>
<ul><li><a href="/wiki/Effect_of_Hurricane_Katrina_on_the_Louisiana_Superdome" title="Effect of Hurricane Katrina on the Louisiana Superdome">Louisiana Superdome</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Effect_of_Hurricane_Katrina_on_the_New_Orleans_Hornets" title="Effect of Hurricane Katrina on the New Orleans Hornets">New Orleans Hornets</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Effect_of_Hurricane_Katrina_on_the_New_Orleans_Saints" title="Effect of Hurricane Katrina on the New Orleans Saints">New Orleans Saints</a></li></ul></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Effects_of_Hurricane_Katrina_in_Florida" title="Effects of Hurricane Katrina in Florida">Florida</a></li>
<li><a class="mw-selflink selflink">Levee failures</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Civil_engineering_and_infrastructure_repair_in_New_Orleans_after_Hurricane_Katrina" title="Civil engineering and infrastructure repair in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina">Infrastructural repair</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Reconstruction_of_New_Orleans" title="Reconstruction of New Orleans">Reconstruction</a></li></ul>
</div></td></tr><tr><td colspan="2" class="navbox-list navbox-odd hlist" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">
<ul><li><a href="/wiki/Hurricane_Katrina_disaster_relief" title="Hurricane Katrina disaster relief">Disaster relief</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/International_response_to_Hurricane_Katrina" title="International response to Hurricane Katrina">International response</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/Media_coverage_of_Hurricane_Katrina" title="Media coverage of Hurricane Katrina">Media coverage</a></li>
<li><a href="/wiki/New_Orleans_diaspora" class="mw-redirect" title="New Orleans diaspora">Diaspora</a></li></ul>
</div></td></tr></tbody></table></div></div>' |
Whether or not the change was made through a Tor exit node (tor_exit_node) | false |
Unix timestamp of change (timestamp) | 1638807253 |
