23 Jorge v. Marcelo
23 Jorge v. Marcelo
DECISION
PERALTA, J : p
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari (with Urgent Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction) assailing
the March 2, 2017 1 and June 23, 2017 2 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 149666, which affirmed the August 26, 20163 and
November 21, 2016 4 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) denying the Petition for Extraordinary Remedies (with
Urgent Prayer for TRO and/or WPI) filed by petitioner Rufina S. Jorge (Rufina)
under Rule XII of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended (NLRC
Rules).
The present controversy arose from the cases for illegal dismissal, non-
payment of service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay, and claims for
payment of separation pay, damages and attorney's fees filed against R.
Jorgensons Swine Multiplier Corporation and Romeo J. Jorge by private
respondents Alberto C. Marcelo, Joel San Pascual, Romeo Salen, Celso
Santos, Higino Dalangin, Jr., Eduardo A. Garcia, Julius Fronda, Rogelio
Vergara, Larry P. Torres, Rodel L. Zamora, Alexander F. Suerte, Edisio G.
Casebo, Fernando Enorme, Noel Almazan, Regino Cruz, Ronald Allam, Lolito
Dizon, Ceceron S. Pena, Jr., Renato M. Zonio, Roberto F. Ayuson, Cristosi S.
Albor, and Roger Tiburcio. On August 31, 2010, Executive Labor Arbiter
Generoso V. Santos (Labor Arbiter Santos) rendered a Decision 5 in favor of
private respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered, dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal. However,
respondents are jointly and severally ordered to pay the
complainants as follows:
1. Their separation pay computed at one month salary or at
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
least one-half month salary for every year of service
whichever is higher, a fraction of six months to be
considered as one year;
2. Nominal damages of Php50,000.00 for each and every
complainant[;] [and]
3. Attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total
monetary award.
The attached computation of the foregoing monetary award is
hereby adapted as Annex "A" and made an integral part of this
Decision.
SO ORDERED. 6
On August 26, 2016, the NLRC denied the petition for lack of merit. It
was ruled that the Third Party Claim was procedurally flawed, thus,
warranting its outright dismissal. In violation of Section 14 (c), Rule XI of the
NLRC Rules, Rufina "merely kept silent and did not address the defect of
non-submission of the requisite cash/surety bond until the issuance of the
assailed Order dated June 16, 2016." Rufina moved for reconsideration, 14
but it was denied on November 21, 2016.
The Court agrees with Rufina's contention that the phrase "married to
Romeo J. Jorge" written after her name in TCT No. N-45328 is merely
descriptive of her civil status as the registered owner. 35 It does not
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
necessarily prove or indicate that the land is a conjugal property of Rufina
and Romeo or that they co-own it. 36 It is not a proof that the property was
acquired during the marriage. 37 The only import of the title is that Rufina is
the owner of the property, the same having been registered in her name
alone, and that she is married to Romeo. 38 Before the presumption of
conjugal nature of property can apply, it must first be established that the
property was in fact acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition
during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of conjugal partnership. 39 The party who asserts this
presumption must first prove said time element. 40 The presumption does
not operate when there is no showing as to when the property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired. 41 If there is no showing as to when the property in
question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the wife alone
is determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to
said spouse. 42 Notably, acquisition of title and registration thereof are two
different acts. 43 It is well settled that registration under the Torrens title
system does not confer or vest title but merely confirms one already
existing. 44
In the interest of justice and fair play, We remand this case to the NLRC
to rule on the unresolved factual issue. Private respondents are given one
last opportunity to show when the property alleged to be conjugal was
acquired. Proof that the subject property was acquired during the marriage
of Rufina and Romeo must be presented. There must be evidence from
which the actual date of acquisition of the realty can be ascertained. It is not
necessary to prove that the subject property was acquired with funds of the
partnership. 45
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The March 2, 2017 and June
23, 2017 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 149666,
which affirmed the August 26, 2016 and November 21, 2016 Resolutions of
the National Labor Relations Commission denying the Petition for
Extraordinary Remedies (with Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction) filed by petitioner Rufina S. Jorge under
Rule XII of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended, are REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the NLRC to determine with
reasonable dispatch the ownership of the real property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-45328.
SO ORDERED.
Leonen, A.B. Reyes, Jr., Hernando and Carandang, * JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* Designated Additional Member per Special Order No. 2624 dated November 28,
2018.
1. Penned by Associate Justice Marlene B. Gonzales-Sison, with Associate Justices
Ramon A. Cruz and Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, concurring; rollo, pp. 10-11; CA
rollo, pp. 98-99.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
2. Rollo , pp. 21-24; CA rollo, pp. 139-142.
3. Id. at 104-111; Id. at 24-31.
4. Id. at 120-124; Id. at 40-44.
5. Id. at 56-67; Id. at 45-56.
6. Id. at 67; Id. at 56.
20. SEC. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. — The phrase "competent evidence
of identity" refers to the identification of an individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency
bearing the photograph and signature of the individual, such as but not
limited to, passport, driver's license, Professional Regulations Commission ID,
National Bureau of Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal ID,
voter's ID, Barangay certification, Government Service and Insurance System
(GSIS) e-card, Social Security System (SSS) card, PhilHealth card, senior
citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID,
seaman's book, alien certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of
registration, government office ID, certification from the National Council for
the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP), Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) certification; or
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who is personally known to the notary public and
who personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of
whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each
personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public documentary
identification.
21. SEC. 2. Affirmation or Oath. — The term "Affirmation" or "Oath" refers to an act
in which an individual on a single occasion:
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
(a) appears in person before the notary public;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the
instrument or document.
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
24. 622 Phil. 886, 899-900 (2009), as cited in Victoriano v. Dominguez , G.R. No.
214794, July 23, 2018.
25. See Heir of Unite v. Guzman, A.C. No. 12062, July 2, 2018 (2nd Division
Resolution).
28. See Reyes v. Glaucoma Research Foundation, Inc., et al., supra, at 787.
29. Reyes v. Glaucoma Research Foundation, Inc., et al., supra note 27, at 787.
31. See Kilosbayan Foundation, et al. v. Judge Janolo, Jr., et al., 640 Phil. 33, 46
(2010), as cited in William Go Que Construction v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
785 Phil. 117, 129 (2016).
Section 6. Bond. — In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional
Director involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of a bond, which shall either be in the form
of cash deposit or surety bond equivalent in the amount to the monetary
award, exclusive of damages and attorney's fees.
In case of surety bond, the same shall be issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission and shall be accompanied by
original or certified true copies of the following:
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
(a) a joint declaration under oath by the employer, his/her counsel, and the
bonding company, attesting that the bond posted is genuine, and shall be in
effect until final disposition of the case;
A cash or surety bond shall be valid and effective from the date of deposit or
posting, until the case is finally decided, resolved or terminated, or the award
satisfied. This condition shall be deemed incorporated in the terms and
conditions of the surety bond, and shall be binding on the appellants and the
bonding company.
The appellant shall furnish the appellee with a certified true copy of the said
surety bond with all the above-mentioned supporting documents. The
appellee shall verify the regularity and genuineness thereof and immediately
report any irregularity to the Commission.
The mere filing of a motion to reduce bond without complying with the
requisites in the preceding paragraphs shall not stop the running of the
period to perfect an appeal.
34. Sumiran v. Spouses Damaso , 613 Phil. 72, 78-79 (2009) and NAPOCOR v.
Spouses Laohoo, et al., 611 Phil. 194, 212 (2009).
35. See Uy v. Spouses Lacsamana, 767 Phil. 501, 517 (2015); Ventura, Jr. v.
Spouses Abuda, 720 Phil. 575, 583 (2013); Salas, Jr. v. Aguila, 718 Phil. 274,
283 (2013); Dela Peña, et al. v. Avila, et al., 681 Phil. 553, 564 (2012);
Agtarap v. Agtarap, et al., 666 Phil. 452, 472 (2011); Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot
v. Court of Appeals, 547 Phil. 113, 122 (2007); Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company v. Tan , 538 Phil. 873, 882 (2006); Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, 449
Phil. 419, 431 (2003); Francisco v. CA, 359 Phil. 519, 529 (1998); and
Magallon v. Hon. Montejo, 230 Phil. 366, 377 (1986).
36. Ventura, Jr. v. Spouses Abuda, supra; Agtarap v. Agtarap, et al., supra;
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tan, supra, at 881; Ruiz v. Court of
Appeals, supra; and Magallon v. Hon. Montejo, supra.
37. Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot v. Court of Appeals, 547 Phil. 113, 122 (2007);
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tan, supra note 35; and Ruiz v.
Court of Appeals, supra note 35.
38. Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, supra note 35, at 432.
39. See Dela Peña, et al. v. Avila, et al., supra note 35, at 563; Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company v. Tan, supra note 35; Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, supra
note 35; and Francisco v. Court of Appeals, supra note 35.
40. Dela Peña, et al. v. Avila, et al., supra note 35, at 563, citing Francisco v. Court
of Appeals, supra note 35, at 526.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 565, citing Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, supra note 35, at 431-432.
43. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tan, supra note 35; Ruiz v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 35; and Francisco v. Court of Appeals, supra note 35.
44. Ventura, Jr. v. Spouses Abuda, supra note 35, at 583-584 and Francisco v.
Court of Appeals, supra, note 35.
45. Dela Peña, et al. v. Avila, et al., supra note 35, at 563.