UNODA Occasional Papers: No. 34, November 2019

EMINARS STATEMENTS SYMPOSIA WORKSHOPS MEETINGS PRESENTATIONS PAPERS SEMINAR
UNODA Occasional Papers

SHOPS MEETINGS PRESENTATIONS PAPERS SEMINARS STATEMENTS SYMPOSIA WORKSHOPS M
No. 34, November 2019
S SEMINARS STATEMENTS SYMPOSIA WORKSHOPS MEETINGS PRESENTATIONS PAPERS SEMIN
The Anti-Personnel
SHOPS MEETINGS PRESENTATIONS PAPERS SEMINARS STATEMENTS SYMPOSIAMine
WORKSHOPS M
Ban Convention
Twenty Years of Saving Lives and
SHOPS MEETINGS PRESENTATIONS PAPERS SEMINARS STATEMENTS SYMPOSIA WORKSHOPS
Preventing Indiscriminate Harm M
ISBN 978-92-1-139176-3

19 18715

The Anti-Personnel Mine

Ban Convention

Preventing Indiscriminate Harm
The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) publishes
the UNODA Occasional Papers series to feature, in edited form, papers or
statements made at meetings, symposiums, seminars, workshops or lectures
that deal with topical issues in the field of arms limitation, disarmament and
international security. The Occasional Papers series also publishes original
work. They are intended primarily for those concerned with these matters in
Government, civil society and in the academic community.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and
do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations or its Member States.
Material in UNODA Occasional Papers may be reprinted without permission,
provided the credit line reads “Reprinted from UNODA Occasional Papers”
and specifies the number of the Occasional Paper concerned. Notification to
the following e-mail address would be highly appreciated: [email protected].
Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters

combined with figures. These documents are available in the official languages
of the United Nations at http://ods.un.org. Specific disarmament-related
documents can also be accessed through the disarmament reference collection
at www.un.org/disarmament/publications/library.
This publication is available from

www.un.org/disarmament
UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION
Sales No. E.20.IX.2
ISBN 978-92-1-139176-3
eISBN 978-92-1-004672-5
Copyright © United Nations, 2019
All rights reserved
Printed at the United Nations, New York
Inhalt
Foreword
Jody Williams. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
The history of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention

John English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Universalizing the Convention: Practical means

Amelie Chayer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Landmine stockpiles and their destruction

Mary Wareham. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Clearance under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention

Lucy Pinches and Stuart Casey-Maslen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
International cooperation and assistance: A Norwegian

perspective
Ingrid Schøyen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Victim assistance: There is a face and name behind each

casualty
Firoz Alizada and Ken Rutherford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Mine risk education: From infancy to maturity?

Hugues Laurenge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention:

The importance of transparency and exchange of
information and opportunities under the Convention
Juan Carlos Ruan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Afterword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
iii
ICBL’s Mary Wareham, Jody Williams, Steve Goose and Norwegian diplomat Steffen Kongstad
at the Mine Ban Convention negotiations in Oslo, Norway, in September 1997. © John Rodsted
ICBL’s Steve Goose, Mette Sofie Eliseussen, Jody Williams, Mary Wareham and Mereso Agina
provided a t-shirt signed by campaigners, deminers and landmine survivors to the chair of
the negotiations, Ambassador Jackie Selebi of South Africa, immediately after the Mine Ban
Convention was adopted in Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997. © John Rodsted
Foreword
Jody Williams
Nobel Peace Laureate
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,

Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their
Destruction is arguably the most successful disarmament treaty
ever. This Occasional Paper shows how and why.
Thinking about these first twenty years of the life of the
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention is not possible for me
without reflecting a bit on how the treaty itself came about.
Efforts to ban anti-personnel landmines were first seen after
the Viet Nam War during the negotiations of the Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) of 1980.
Although Protocol II of that Convention dealt with
landmines, it did not ban them, it merely restricted their use
“where feasible”. Essentially, it prioritized the needs of the
militaries that used landmines over protecting civilian lives and
limbs.
Around the beginning of 1991, with the collapse of the
Soviet Union, several non-governmental organizations began
variously discussing the necessity of dealing with anti-personnel
landmines. In October 1992, six of those organizations came
together to form the International Campaign to Ban Landmines
(ICBL): Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico
International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human
Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation.
From the beginning, ICBL defined itself as a flexible
coalition of organizations that shared common objectives. The
campaign called for an international ban on the use, production,
stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, and
v
for increased international resources for humanitarian mine
clearance and mine victim assistance programmes.
The members of ICBL were responding to a humanitarian
crisis resulting from the use of landmines, especially in the
regions of the world where the two super-Powers had fought
proxy wars during the cold war. Once these wars ended, the
landmines, or “indiscriminate weapons of mass destruction in
slow motion” as we came to call them, remained where they
had been sown. It was primarily civilians who were maimed or
killed. Not surprisingly, landmine survivors became some of
ICBL’s most powerful advocates for a treaty banning landmines.
While ICBL was the engine that drove the landmine issue
forward, it was the building of the ban movement overall that
ultimately resulted in the successful negotiation of the treaty.
The second critical element of the movement was when
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) found
a renewed public voice on landmines. ICRC had been deeply
involved in the development of the CCW in the 1970s and for
years its medical personnel had been sending reports from the
field about the horrors of landmines. With all of the interest
being generated by ICBL and increased media coverage of what
was being called a “landmine crisis”, the ICRC internal debate
about landmines was heating up and, in 1994, its then-president,
Cornelio Sommaruga, stated that, “from a humanitarian point
of view, we believe that a worldwide ban on anti-personnel
landmines is the only truly effective solution”. With that, ICRC
added its formidable might to the movement.
The final and fundamental element was building a self-
identifying core group of Governments that were as pro-ban as
ICBL and ICRC, all while groups of governmental experts were
meeting to review and perhaps amend Protocol II of the CCW
in discussions that, over two and a half years, did not yield
meaningful action against landmines.
The core group evolved out of the countries that had
taken unilateral steps related to ban anti-personnel landmines.
vi
In March 1995, Belgium, for example, became the first country
in the world to completely ban anti-personnel landmines at the
domestic level and other countries followed suit. By September
1995, 14 countries had declared themselves pro-ban and the
number continued to grow and regions of the world, beginning
with Central America, began to declare themselves as “mine-
free zones”.
All these actions were the building blocks of what would
become the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the
actions continued even as the expert sessions of the CCW finally
ended with no meaningful change to its Landmine Protocol. In
the view of many, the CCW review process had not only not
succeeded in banning landmines, but it actually weakened the
Convention overall.
While this review failed to gain traction, other parts of the
United Nations were active on the ban issue. Steps included the
United Nations Children’s Fund’s Director Jim Grant calling for
a landmine ban in April 1994 as did United Nations Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Gali one month later. In December
1996, a total of 155 countries supported a United Nations
General Assembly resolution curiously proposed by the United
States supporting the negotiation of a treaty banning landmines
as soon as possible. Of course, the United States ultimately
withdrew from the treaty negotiations in 1997 in Oslo and has
never joined the treaty.
As the CCW process faltered in May 1996, a new and
surprising ban champion emerged. Departing from the United
States position on landmines, Canada called immediately for
a conference of self-declared pro-ban States later in the year.
ICBL and ICRC were also invited as full participants. The goal
of the conference, which took place in Ottawa in October, was
to chart a concrete path to a ban treaty.
As that conference concluded, Canada came up with
another surprise when its then-Foreign Minister Lloyd
Axworthy, at the closing session challenged the countries
vii
present to stop just talking about being pro-ban but to act the
part and negotiate a treaty banning landmines within a year’s
time and return to Ottawa to sign it. He stated that Canada
would be willing to sign a treaty even if there was only one
other country signing it.
The emotions in that room were chaotic. Those of us who
truly wanted a mine ban treaty were exuberant. Those who
did not, however, were deeply disturbed. Even some pro-ban
countries felt shut-out by Axworthy’s surprise challenge that
sparked the stand-alone process with negotiating sessions held
in Vienna, Bonn, Brussels and the final, successful session in
Norway in September which ended with a complete, simple and
elegant treaty banning the use, production, trade and stockpiling
of anti-personnel landmines.
The 80-plus countries that had negotiated the treaty in
Oslo and more came to Ottawa on 3 and 4 December to sign
the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, also known as the
Ottawa Convention. In two days of public events, celebration
and signing, 122 nations added their names to the Convention.
“Big Powers” did not join—the United States, the Russian
Federation, China, India, Pakistan and others—but the majority
of mine-affected countries in the world did. It was a triumph.
Less than one week later, ICBL and I jointly received the
1997 Nobel Peace Prize. In its announcement of the Peace Prize
in October that year, the Nobel Committee not only recognized
the banning and demining of landmines, but also underscored
the importance of ICBL and the ban movement: “As a model
for similar processes in the future, it could prove of decisive
importance to the international effort for disarmament and
peace.”
These words have become prescient and our success was
not a fluke. It was not the result of some special, innate capacity
that we alone had access to. Since the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention, campaigns making up the emergent “humanitarian
disarmament” community have achieved three major new
viii
treaties: the Convention on Cluster Munitions of 2008, the
Arms Trade Treaty of 2013 and the Treaty on the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons of 2017. The International Campaign to
Abolish Nuclear Weapons was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize
in 2017 for that work.
The model has also shaped the ongoing work of the
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots—an effort to pre-emptively
ban autonomous weapons systems that on their own could
select and attack human beings—since even before its launch
in April 2013. Machines have historically been created to be of
service to people. Machines are not moral beings. Humans—as
supposedly moral beings—should not delegate target-and-kill
decisions to machines.
This movement against indiscriminate weapons, growing
from the unprecedented success of ICBL and the mine ban
movement, has also shown that it can have a normative
impact beyond the supportive States. The landmine ban treaty
has demonstrably changed the behaviour of major military
powers that are not party to the treaty. They have adopted
export moratoriums, destroyed stockpiles, avoided using anti-
personnel mines in conflict and committed significant resources
to mine action. Many non-State armed groups have also signed
commitments to abide by its norms. The movement also clearly
demonstrated that civil society has a serious role to play in
security issues, including how security and disarmament are
defined.
But all of us knew that the beautiful words on paper
that made up the obligations of the Anti-Personnel Mine
Ban Convention would remain just that without ongoing
pressure on States to ratify it, universalize it and see to its full
implementation and compliance with its terms. ICBL became
the first civil society group to de facto monitor a treaty through
its annual “Landmine Monitor Report”, the first of which was
issued in 1999. The Monitor became known as the “bible”
ix
of reporting on progress—or lack thereof—in achieving the
obligations and goals of the Convention.
In the 20 years since the Convention took effect on
1 March 1999, 30 countries have acceded to it, resulting in
the current total of 164 States parties. According to Landmine
Monitor, a total of 92 States parties have destroyed a collective
total of more than 55 million stockpiled anti-personnel mines.
Nearly all of the 33 States not party to the Convention still
stockpile mines, albeit in reduced quantities. Yet, very few
non-signatories dare to use these widely stigmatized weapons.
Only two outlier States have used anti-personnel mines in
recent years, although non-State armed groups have used
improvised mines, also known as improvised explosive devices.
Such devices that are victim-activated are prohibited by the
Convention.
Not only was the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
negotiated in a diplomatic whirlwind, but it also became
the disarmament treaty that most rapidly entered into force
in history. The chapters of this paper will describe the
achievements and shortfalls of the first twenty years of the
Convention.
x
Acknowledgements
Authors
Jody Williams
Jody Williams is the Chair of Nobel Women’s Initiative, an organization
that uses the prestige of the Nobel Peace Prize and the influence and
access of six women Nobel Laureates to support and amplify the efforts
of women around the world working for sustainable peace with justice
and equality. She is also an Ambassador for the International Campaign
to Ban Landmines. She received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997 for her
work to ban landmines as the founding coordinator of the ICBL.
John English
A Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of Waterloo, John
English has been a Liberal Member of Parliament, a Special Ambassador
for Landmines and a Special Envoy for the election of Canada to the
United Nations Security Council, and a Board member of the Canadian
Landmine Foundation. He is currently the Director of the Bill Graham
Centre for Contemporary International History at Trinity College.
amEliE ChayEr
Amelie Chayer is a former Policy Manager and Acting Director at the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines, a global coalition of non-
governmental organizations working to end the suffering caused by
anti-personnel mines and also a laureate of the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize.
mary WarEham
Mary Wareham is advocacy director of the arms division of Human
Rights Watch and global coordinator of the Campaign to Stop Killer
Robots, a coalition of non-governmental organizations working to
retain meaningful human control over the use of force by banning lethal
autonomous weapons systems. After helping the Internation Campaign
to Ban Landmines to create the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention,
she served as global coordinator of the Campaign’s Landmine Monitor
research initiative while serving as senior arms advocate for Human
Rights Watch from 1998 to 2006. She was centrally involved in the
negotiation of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions and has edited
xi
Landmine Monitor’s sister publication Cluster Munition Monitor since
its inception.
Lucy Pinches
Lucy Pinches is Project Manager of Mine Action Review, published by
Norwegian People’s Aid, and also serves as a Senior Researcher on the
project. Prior to joining Norwegian People’s Aid in 2015, she worked
for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines-Cluster Munition
Coalition. She previously worked in India and Nepal on international
development issues and before that was a manager in the private sector.
Stuart Casey-Maslen
Stuart Casey-Maslen is Honorary Professor at the University of Pretoria,
specializing in the use of force under international law. He represented
the International Committee of the Red Cross at the 1997 diplomatic
conference that adopted the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and
has written a legal commentary on the provisions, published by Oxford
University Press in 2003. He edits the Mine Action Review, published
by Norwegian People’s Aid. His co-authored work on international
disarmament law was published by Routledge in June 2019.
Ingrid Schøyen
Ingrid Schøyen is a senior adviser in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry.
Her portfolio covers humanitarian disarmament, protection issues
and global mine action, including policy implementation of the
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster
Munitions. She is responsible for Norway´s financial support for global
mine action and donor relations with affected countries and humanitarian
demining organizations.
Firoz Alizada
Firoz Alizada has worked in the field of victim assistance, disability
rights and humanitarian disarmament for over 15 years with non-
governmental organizations, the International Committee of the Red
Cross, the United Nations and the International Campaign to Ban
Landamines. He is currently working for the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention’s Implementation Support Unit in Geneva, supporting
affected States in implementing the victim assistance provisions of the
Convention.
xii
Ken Rutherford
Ken Rutherford is currently a Political Science Professor at James
Madison University, where he also serves as Director of the Center of
International Stabilization and Recovery. He co-founded the Landmine
Survivors Network, which pioneered techniques in war victim assistance
while also advocating for global prohibitions on anti-personnel mines
and conventional weapons.
Hugues Laurenge
Hugues Laurenge started in 1999 as a mine risk education volunteer in
eight affected countries and a global mine risk education coordinator
for Handicap International until 2002. He then joined various United
Nations offices to support the establishment of new national mine action
programmes in Burundi, Chad, Nepal and the Niger and to reinforce
existing programmes in the Russian Federation and Tajikistan. Between
2012 and 2015, he worked for the United Natons Children’s Fund as a
mine action resource person for country offices and global programmes.
Since 2015, he has been based in the headquarters of the United Natons
Children’s Fund in New York as a Child Protection and Mine Action/
Explosive Weapons Specialist, particularly to reinforce advocacy, injury
surveillance, explosive ordnance risk education, integrated mine action
and standards. He is currently the moderator of the International Mine
Risk Education Working Group formed in 2000, and he co-chairs the
global Explosive Ordnance Risk Education Advisory Group established
in May 2019.
Juan Carlos Ruan

Since June 2016, Juan Carlos Ruan has served as Director of the
Implementation Support Unit of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention, having previously served as Acting Director from October
2015. He provides strategic advice, briefings, communications and other
services to the States parties in accordance with the Unit’s mandate,
including liaising and developing contacts with international and non-
governmental organizations. In addition, he is responsible for leading
the Unit’s staff in the substantive development of formal and informal
meetings of the Convention. Prior to assuming his position as Director,
he served as Mine Action Implementation Specialist within the Unit.
Before joining the Unit, he worked for the Office of Humanitarian Mine
Action of the Organization of American States, the Inter-American
Defense Board, humanitarian organizations involved in disasters and the
Mine Action Information Center of James Madison University.
xiii
Photographers
gWEnn dubourthoumiEu
Gwenn Dubourthoumieu is a freelance photographer who has
received numerous awards for his work. He covered news as a photo
correspondent for Agence France-Presse (AFP), and his work on the
social impact of copper exploitation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo is part of the permanent collection of the United States Library of
Congress.
albErt gonzálEz Farran

Albert González Farran is an independent photojournalist and
videographer with 18 years of experience. From 2015 to 2017, he
worked for Agence France-Presse (AFP), as well as other media outlets,
and humanitarian organizations in South Sudan. He has also been the
photographer of the United Nations peacekeeping missions in Liberia,
Afghanistan and Darfur.
marCo grob
Marco Grob is an Emmy-winning photographer and director who has
worked with numerous celebrities and heads of State. In 2011, he was
commissioned by TIME to create a series of portraits centred around
the events of 11 September 2001: titled “BEYOND 9/11: Portraits
of Resilience”. This award-winning body of work is now part of the
permanent collections of the Smithsonian Institution and the National
9/11 Memorial and Museum. Since 2010, he has been working for the
United Nations Mine Action Service to report and educate on the global
tragedy caused by landmines.
martinE PErEt
Martine Peret is a photographer with multiple awards and over a decade
of experience working for United Nations missions in conflict zones
such as Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan,
Timor-Leste and West Africa.
luKE PoWEll
Luke Powell is a photographer known for his images from Afghanistan,
which have been widely exhibited in cities such as Frankfurt, Moscow
and Toronto. He photographed the country extensively throughout the
xiv
1970s as a tourist, and from 2000 to 2003, he photographed Afghanistan
for the United Nations Mine Action Service and other United Nations
agencies.
John Rodsted
John Rodsted is an official photographer of the International Campaign
to Ban Landmines with over 40 years of experience in the photographic
industry. He has documented the legacies of war in countries around the
world, including as team leader, co-researcher and photographer for the
2012 research project, “In Search of SafeGround”, focusing on north-
east Cambodia. Photographs from this project were exhibited at the third
Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in
Oslo in 2012. His work has been widely exhibited globally in some of
the world’s most prestigious venues, including the Sydney Opera House,
the Royal Geographical Society and the United Nations,
Evan Schneider
Evan Schneider is a Staff Photographer at the United Nations, providing
photographic coverage of the work of the United Nations both at
headquarters and in the field locations around the world. He has received
multiple awards and his images have been widely exhibited.
xv
In his first State visit to Canada to address the opening ceremony for the signing of the
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Secretary-General Kofi Annan (third from left)
receives from Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien the instruments of ratification to
the Convention. To the left of the Secretary-General is Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd
Axworthy. UN Photo/Evan Schneider
The history of the Anti-Personnel Mine
Ban Convention1
John English2
Canadian Landmine Foundation
The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention—also known as the

Ottawa Treaty or, as it is properly known, the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction—was signed by
122 Governments in Ottawa on 3 and 4 December 1997. On 18
September 1997, a diplomatic conference at Oslo had concluded
the Convention and Article 15 provided for the opening for
signature in Ottawa.3 On 1 March 1999, Burkina Faso became
the fortieth State to ratify the Convention, thus triggering the
entry into force after a six-month delay prescribed in the
Convention’s terms. After the treaty’s entry into force, States
no longer signed the Convention but became bound by their
accession; there are currently 164 States parties to the treaty, 1
signatory State that has not ratified and 32 non-signatory States.4
International Campaign to Ban Landmines: A multi-

actor partnership
The momentum for the Convention arose in the aftermath
of the cold war. It increased during the early 1990s as non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) united around the notion of
a ban on anti-personnel mines and sped to its conclusion when
1
UNODA Occasional Papers, No. 34
major Governments embraced the movement. The Norwegian

Nobel Committee awarded the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize to the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and to Jody
Williams, an American activist who had been recruited by the
Washington-based Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation
(VVAF) to organize a campaign to ban landmines. The prize
recognized the significant contribution of Americans to the
campaign, but many contemporary observers pointed out that
the Americans had not convinced their own government to sign
the Convention. The refusal not only of the dominant super-
Power at the time but also the Russian Federation, China and
India to sign the Convention deeply troubles the Convention’s
proponents. Nevertheless, they correctly argue that the
Convention has fulfilled its fundamental purpose: it has greatly
reduced the number of victims of landmines. It has also acquired
symbolic significance as an innovative partnership between
NGOs and Governments and, to some extent, as a model of how
significant change can occur in stagnant international waters.5
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
first drew attention to the growing use of landmines in the
1970s because of “the magnitude of human suffering” caused
by their proliferation in civilian areas in developing countries.6
The development of “scatterable” mines had drastically changed
the use of anti-personnel mines, which had previously been
restricted to protection of perimeters. ICRC, with its close ties to
military officers and legitimacy as a neutral intermediary based
upon international conventions, was uniquely situated to act as
convener and an animator. It filled these roles through the last
decade of the cold war, bringing together soldiers, diplomats and
concerned NGOs to learn from medical practitioners who had
treated the shattered limbs of landmine survivors in countries
including Cambodia, Afghanistan, Mozambique and Angola—
while also handling the bodies of many deceased victims.
The human costs, borne mainly by innocent civilians, were
reported in detail and the military utility of such indiscriminate
killing was questioned.7 These discussions penetrated the
2
political world in the late 1980s, most notably in the United

States, where Vermont Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy
developed a strong interest in the subject after he encountered
a young disabled boy in a Central American hospital. The boy
told a shaken Leahy that he did not know who had placed the
landmine or who had made it, but it meant he would be on
crutches all his life. Leahy returned to Washington determined
to effect change and, in 1988, he used the exceptional powers of
an American senator to establish a War Victims Fund from the
American development assistance budget. The fund provided
$5 million annually for landmine victims and also supported
organizations contemplating a broader campaign to reduce the
human costs of landmine proliferation.8
Spurred on by Leahy’s support and by the innovative
atmosphere after the cold war’s end, Human Rights Watch
and Physicians for Human Rights published Landmines in
Cambodia: The Coward’s War. The impact of this report was
magnified by the celebrated 1984 Roland Joffé film, The Killing
Fields, which itself did not focus on the landmine question in
Cambodia but did draw Western attention to the Cambodian
tragedy and did offer its title as an effective metaphor for a
campaign against landmine proliferation. Shortly after the
publication of Landmines in Cambodia, Bobby Muller, the
founder and president of VVAF, and Thomas Gebauer, the
head of Medico International (a German NGO), who shared
with VVAF recent experiences with Cambodian mine victims,
discussed the possibility of together leading a campaign to
ban anti-personnel landmines. Muller hired Jody Williams,
a Vermonter, who quickly contacted Leahy, her senator. On
4 December 1991, Williams and Leahy’s aide Tim Rieser
agreed that the senator would offer congressional support for the
NGO’s efforts.9
The fruits of the collaboration quickly became evident
when Leahy pressed the issue forward in Congress, sponsoring
an amendment requiring a moratorium on the export of
landmines. The amendment, which was signed into law by
3
President George H.W. Bush on 23 October 1992, echoed the

tone of the NGO meetings and called upon the United States
to “seek verifiable international agreements prohibiting the sale,
transfer, or export, and further limiting the use, production,
possession, and deployment of anti-personnel landmines”. This
statement of purpose quickly became the goal of ICBL, which
was also created in October 1992 in New York by six NGOs:
Handicap International (France), Human Rights Watch (United
States), Medico International (Germany), Mines Advisory
Group (United Kingdom), Physicians for Human Rights
(United States) and VVAF (United States). Williams became the
coordinator, and the campaign drew its first breath as Democrat
Bill Clinton became President of the United States and Congress
showed unanimity in supporting Leahy’s landmine moratorium
in the last days of George H.W. Bush’s presidency.10
While Leahy’s role remained central in the landmine ban
campaign, the United States Government under Clinton was
to become continuously more reluctant to give leadership.
Nevertheless, ICBL moved beyond its American roots and
became remarkably effective in organizing the campaign. It
took shrewd advantage of intellectual trends emphasizing the
role of non-State actors in the early 1990s, not only in the West
but also in the developing world. Aware of waning American
government support, ICBL appeared to take pains to distance
itself from the United States Government as the campaign
progressed. It increasingly associated itself with what the New
York Times foreign affairs correspondent Flora Lewis hailed
in 1989 as the “rise of civil society”, through which people
were “groping for a way of organizing their societies to give
more satisfaction both to the community and the individual”. It
was for the landmine activists an invigorating concept as they
came to define themselves as a “third force” beyond States and
traditional international structures and a movement that attended
to the security of individuals.11
In a retrospective analysis of its accomplishment, the ICBL
credits its achievement to its intense focus on the landmine
4
issue, its successful (although loose) linking of diverse NGOs

throughout the world and, not least, its effective use of new
communication technologies, notably email. The web and
email allowed integration of efforts in developing countries
with crucial joint planning and strategies with campaigners
in developed countries.12 And it worked. The memory of the
motley groups with various dress, languages and faces coming
to Ottawa in December 1997 endures as the dominant image of
the landmine campaign.
Despite the important role of NGOs, the official
photographs of Ottawa reveal mainly older men in dark suits
representing their Governments. In the absence of NGOs, the
landmine ban would have lacked substance and force. Civil
society and the emergence of the Internet were not enough.
International Committee of the Red Cross

The ICRC was critical to the success of the movement
because it possessed direct access not only to foreign offices
but also to national defence ministries that held the existing
landmine stocks—from which resistance to the loss of a
weapon, and suspicion of NGOs advocating such a programme,
could be expected. The highly capable ICRC President Cornelio
Sommaruga took up the landmine issue as a personal cause
and devoted significant ICRC resources to its advocacy. With
its links to militaries and mine eradication and mine victim
assistance in developing countries, ICRC brought together
members of the growing ICBL coalition with military offices
and aid workers who had direct experience of the hideous
impact of landmines on civilian populations. A typical ICRC
initiative was a symposium it held in April 1993 in Montreux,
Switzerland, to which it invited the President of Human Rights
Watch and representatives of Medico International, Handicap
International, Physicians for Human Rights, the Mines Advisory
Group and VVAF (Jody Williams). There they encountered
Russian and French diplomats; Kuwaiti, British, Egyptian,
American and Russian military officials; and deminers—
5
including an influential group of British deminers (mainly

former soldiers) who came to oppose the landmine campaign.
Among the 55 participants were, tellingly, journalists from
BBC, The Observer, The Economist and The New Yorker, and
the Paris-based foreign affairs correspondent of the New York
Times.13
Since its mid-nineteenth-century foundation, ICRC had
played a central role in the development of humanitarian law
and, at certain times, in the prohibition of weapons.
The greatest successes had occurred before the Second
World War with the ban on exploding bullets and poison gas;
the cold war stalled most progress and had taken weapons
restrictions out of the humanitarian law forums and into direct
negotiations between the two super-Powers. The relevant United
Nations institutions were often sidelined or ignored, limited by
their dependence on consensus. Nevertheless, the Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) was concluded in
1980, partly in response to ICRC concerns about the impact
of landmines upon civilians. Protocol II of the CCW imposed
restrictions upon landmine use, particularly remotely delivered
mines, which had such horrendous civilian impact in South-East
Asia. In the aftermath of the American congressional landmine
initiative, the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament faced
pressure to expand the scope of Protocol II, and ICBL, ICRC
and other States developed a strong interest in advancing their
cause in Geneva.
The campaigners quickly became aware that two particular
objections had to be met for their cause to move forward. First,
they had to establish that the military utility of landmines
was limited. Second, they needed to reinvigorate the tradition
of international humanitarian law and construct powerful
arguments that the concept of “proportionality”, embraced
within the Geneva Conventions of 1949, whereby weapons that
were “of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering”, included anti-personnel landmines. The former goal
6
was facilitated by the experience of Operation Desert Storm (the

First Gulf War), when prominent American soldiers questioned
the military utility of mines. For example, General Alfred Gray,
the retired commander of the United States Marine Corps,
reflected on his own military experience including Desert Storm
and declared mines largely irrelevant in pursuing military
objectives. He bluntly declared, “We kill more Americans
with our own mines than we do anyone else.”14 Desert Storm
commander-in-chief Norman Schwartzkopf reportedly shared
his views and expressed them in many private conversations.
VVAF, in cooperation with Lieutenant-General Robert Gard, the
former President of the National Defense University, used their
close ties with the military to encourage further open expression
of such doubts. Simultaneously, think tanks and academic
institutions such as the highly reputable Centre for Defence
Studies at the University of London published new studies that
set out the case against the military utility of landmines.15
ICRC continued to hold seminars and meetings where
military officers mingled with landmine activists and diplomats,
and research papers accumulated making the arguments for
proportionality. At ICRC gatherings, nearly all participants
granted that landmines might have a very specific military
use, but those cases were few and were far outweighed by the
difficulty of removal, the danger to innocent civilians and,
increasingly, the economic costs of landmines to poor nations
such as Cambodia and Angola. NGOs associated with the
campaign used highly evocative images of victims and stories
of individual human suffering to focus public attention on the
issue.
For the Conference on Disarmament debates, more
important than emotional pleas were the legal arguments based
upon humanitarian law. Here, too, ICRC played a central part.
In particular, its legal adviser, Peter Herby, carefully formulated
arguments that placed landmines, like exploding bullets and
poison gas, within the tradition of international humanitarian law.
7
Human security network

Although President Clinton had initially indicated his
support for a ban on anti-personnel landmines, his confrontations
with the military establishment over such issues as gays in the
military caused him to become increasingly reluctant. ICBL
was already eager to escape from its own American origins and
American political leadership, and it quickly found accomplices
in its quest. While attributing the landmine campaign’s success
primarily to the work of ICBL, Jody Williams and Human
Rights Watch advocate Stephen Goose acknowledge that
Governments were essential to its success:
Historically, NGOs and governments have often seen
each other as adversaries not colleagues—and in many
cases rightly so. And at first many in the NGO mine
ban community worried that governments were going
to “hijack” the issue in order to undermine a ban. But a
relationship of trust among the relatively small “core
group” of governments (most notably Canada, Norway,
Austria, and South Africa) and ICBL leadership quickly
developed. … Eventually this relationship became known
as “citizen diplomacy” and the coalition of small and
middle rank states who formed the core of the landmine
initiative within international organizations established the
“human security network.”16
The ties between the Canadians and the Scandinavians
were historically strong: in the 1950s, the close relationship
between Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson and
United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld led
to the coinage of “Scandicanadians”, referring to a group of
smaller, mainly northern countries committed to United Nations
peacekeeping and to resolution of conflicts where the super-
Powers were on the sidelines or too compromised to interfere.
The end of the cold war reinvigorated these relationships and
the landmine cause captured the imagination of the relevant
foreign ministries in the mid-1990s.
8
This coalition formed around the review of the CCW

in Vienna in September and October 1995. ICBL members
carrying petitions with 1.7 million signatures and church
groups crammed the hotel lobbies, rang bells for landmine
victims and badgered delegates in the bars and Gaststaette of
the old imperial capital. But the results were disappointing as
Governments, including the United States, failed to go beyond
the limited restrictions placed on landmines in Protocol II of the
CCW.
After the meetings, the discouraged ICBL leadership
met with some government officials who shared their
disappointment. Together they determined to press ahead with
informal gatherings, as soon as early winter in Geneva, and,
furthermore, to organize a broader conference involving States
and NGOs to press for a fuller ban. Their actions attracted
attention.
Veteran politician Lloyd Axworthy, who became Canada’s
foreign minister on 25 January 1996, was uniquely placed
and trained to give leadership to the landmine movement. At
Princeton, where he obtained a doctorate in political science,
he had studied with Richard Falk, a strong critic of the Viet
Nam War and proponent of a strengthened international law
regime. Within liberal cabinets, he was correctly perceived as a
strong voice on the left, a critic of nuclear weapons and a strong
supporter of international development and multilateralism.
He had close ties with the Canadian NGOs that had become
prominent in ICBL. His support for a landmine ban was
unequivocal, although ICBL leadership was initially wary of a
Canadian initiative to hold a conference to discuss how the ban
movement might advance. Canada was a member of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, whose leading members were
clearly opposed to the ban, and the close ally of the increasingly
reluctant United States.
In spring 1996, ICBL’s suspicions waned and Canadians
began to seek out diplomatic support for further action. On the
9
last day of the CCW meetings on 3 May 1996, the Canadians

appeared alongside representatives of the United Nations
Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations
Children’s Fund to encourage those who were dissatisfied with
the limitations of the Conference on Disarmament to come to
Ottawa in October.17 With that announcement, in Axworthy’s
words, “the bailiwick of the land-mine movement” shifted
away from Geneva; “the battle over strategy was rejoined, with
Canada at centre court”. Most Governments, Axworthy admits,
favoured remaining in Geneva and working through traditional
institutions, but others dissented. These included Belgium
and Norway, which had recently and unilaterally announced a
complete ban on use, production and export of landmines and,
along with Austria and Germany, subsequently hosted important
stages of the Ottawa Process during the first 10 months of
1997. Moreover, developing countries had begun to raise their
voices in the debate and to provide ever more vivid images
and personal testimony of the human devastation caused by
landmines. These images and words had a significant impact. In
Britain, for example, the Cambodia Trust, organized by Catholic
NGO leader Stan Windass, collected tens of thousands of small
donations to support victim rehabilitation in a land with tens of
thousands of victims and millions of unexploded mines.18
Ottawa calling
The structure of the October 1996 Ottawa conference
reflected, on the one hand, the importance of global networks
and, on the other, the willingness of some NGOs and
Governments to work together for common international
purpose. Such cooperation was hardly new: the anti-slavery
movement of the nineteenth century and the peace movement
of the early twentieth century had built on such collaboration.
Nevertheless, the hybrid of the 1990s was different in its global
character, secular emphasis, technological spirit and fluidity
of structures. By 1996, funding for the NGO campaign came
directly from some Governments, including the United States
10
Government through the Leahy direction of State Department

funds. In Canada, NGO activists accompanied Canadian
diplomats to official meetings and some were hired to work
for the cause in its foreign affairs department. The “new
diplomacy” is an ancient cliché, but the landmine campaign’s
approach did signal the impact of new media and of social and
political networks of broad geographical range and technical
sophistication. Critics have attacked the non-representativeness
of NGOs and their disregard for the character of relationships
between States and the international system more generally,
but few dispute that the landmine campaign startled diplomats
of the time, captured public attention, created new coalitions
and roiled international meetings, particularly when NGOs
penetrated gatherings where they had never been seen or heard
before.
Tensions pervaded the meeting at Ottawa from 3 to
5 October 1996, where, in Axworthy’s own words, “the mixture
of NGOs and governments proved combustible”. There were
50 participant States, the majority of them favouring a ban,
24 observer States who were nearly all opposed and far more
NGO representatives in the former Ottawa train station that
had been transformed into a cavernous conference hall. Several
of Canada’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, most
notably France and the United States, expressed open dismay
when Williams, in close collaboration with some Canadian
officials, vituperatively attacked the French delegate for a
statement that stressed traditional approaches and reflected
French reluctance to ban landmines. Throughout the conference,
Canadian officials worked closely with ICBL leadership but
avoided their French, American, and Russian colleagues, who
were increasingly horrified by the style and substance of the
conference. Axworthy accepted his diplomats’ defiance of
their profession’s traditions and on the final day announced
that, despite the strong opposition to abandoning the Geneva
roadmap, Canada would hold a conference in 1997 whose
purpose would be to sign a treaty to ban anti-personnel
11
landmines. The media, Axworthy later wrote, “couldn’t decide

if this was a bold stroke or if I had just lost it”.19
Axworthy had gained resolve before his statement not
only from other pro-ban countries from Western Europe but
also from several in Africa and Asia. Moreover, he had strong
public support from Sommaruga of ICRC and privately from
United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. With
his words, the so-called Ottawa Process—a series of meetings
convened firstly to develop and negotiate a convention to
ban landmines and secondly to build the political will to sign
it—began, leading to a dramatic conference in Ottawa in early
December 1997. The principle for participation would be self-
selection: those States that wanted to attend could come; those
opposed could be absent or attend as observers. In the meantime,
ICBL would have the principal responsibility of rallying
landmine foes around the world to press their Governments to
come to Ottawa while the pro-ban States would work closely to
develop treaty language and to push forward the ban in official
forums.
The bold stroke brought forth strong critics. Some
ridiculed the Western-dominated leadership of the movement.
Victims’ voices did not have the American accents that
dominated the NGO leadership, and Norwegians, Canadians,
and Belgians were not, in recent times, victims of landmines
and none of the hidden killers lay in their fields. Others worried
about the cavalier disregard of the Conference on Disarmament
and the blunt attack upon traditional institutions and diplomatic
decorum.
But fate fell upon the path of the Ottawa Process. In
January 1997, Kofi Annan, an African and a veteran United
Nations diplomat, became its Secretary-General, and he gave
immediate and enthusiastic support for a landmine ban. With
the invaluable moral support of South Africa, the ICBL held its
fourth annual conference on landmines in Mozambique from
25 to 28 February 1997. It proved to be invaluable in creating
12
a powerful “story” as victims told tales of lives lost, limbs

shattered and Governments helpless in facing the challenge of
clearing mines. Most African States participated and endorsed
a landmine ban as South Africa had unilaterally done a week
before the conference. It was a powerful endorsement for the
campaign and a certain indicator that most of the African States
would trek northwards in December to back a landmine ban.
Other conferences followed, notably in March 1997 in
Japan, whose Government was opposed and where it was
believed NGOs played an insignificant role in the political
system. The Government hosted a conference, but NGOs were
permitted to attend only the opening session. In response, ICBL
and some Japanese NGOs sponsored a counter-conference
that led to the creation of an indigenous anti-landmine group
that effectively lobbied the Japanese Government to attend the
forthcoming Ottawa conference. ICRC continued to play its
critical part, sponsoring conferences that brought in military
officials as well as many others with field experience. Canada
and other Governments often sent delegates and provided
indirect support through their embassies. In Australia, where
opposition within the defence and foreign ministries was strong,
the Canadian embassy impishly encouraged local landmine
campaigners to lobby the Government. Controversially, the
Canadian ambassador brought a Canadian NGO representative
with him when he met with the Australian foreign minister.
After the official meeting, the Canadian NGO representative
promptly told Australian NGOs that their foreign office
was strongly opposed to the landmine ban. In response,
they quickly organized a conference chaired by the eminent
academic Ramesh Thakur to which the Canadian Government
sent representatives to argue for the landmine ban. Australian
politicians, journalists, church groups and NGOs tilted the
balance strongly in favour of a ban and the Government slowly
began to shift its position as fall began.
Australian leaders were not alone in sensing political
danger or, conversely, opportunity in joining the landmine
13
campaign. Backbenchers signed on in the meetings of the

international parliamentary associations, where politicians from
ban-supporting countries put forward resolutions approved by
many representatives from States opposed to a ban. As they
returned to their homes for the summer, politicians heard from
constituents, many of whom had watched the “public service”
television advertisements produced by ICRC and ICBL and
financed by private donations and pro-ban Governments.
Rock stars, spurred on by the success of Live Aid, raised their
voices in support, but no celebrity attracted more attention
than Princess Diana of Wales who, wearing a ballistic helmet
and a flak jacket, walked through an Angolan minefield in
January 1997. The image persisted in the public mind and
then was magnified in the public imagination when she died
in an automobile crash on 31 August 1997. The British had
previously opposed the landmine ban. After Diana’s death, they
moved dramatically towards support as Diana’s minefield image
became ubiquitous and the new Labour government under Tony
Blair clung closely to her popular memory.20
The year 1997 witnessed expert meetings in Vienna in
February (with Austria taking the lead role in drafting a text
for the proposed ban) and in Bonn in April, during which the
issue of verification was discussed. These were followed by the
International Conference for a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel
Mines, held in Brussels, Belgium, in late June, during which
a record number of States (154) were in attendance. Lastly, at
the diplomatic conference in Oslo in September, the text of the
Convention was adopted.21 As Ottawa approached, however,
there still remained some uncertainty about how many States
would commit to the Convention.
Despite the dominance of Americans among ban leaders,
the United States was increasingly wary. President Clinton’s
relationship with Jody Williams was particularly bad despite
her numerous ties to major Democrats. Clinton found military
leaders increasingly intractable as they pointed to the Korean
Peninsula as the stumbling block to an American signature.
14
Princess Diana meets a victim of landmines in Angola in July 1997. © Alamy Stock
When the British agreed to support the Convention, there

were some caveats related to the its entry into force that were
accepted by ICBL, but a similar attempt to find a compromise
with the American Government failed. Meanwhile, the process
leading to Ottawa developed in Western Europe in meetings of
diplomats concerned with treaty wording and verification. The
final negotiating session took place in Oslo in September. Two
members of the Security Council, Britain and France (under a
newly elected Socialist government) were now on board, but
the Americans remained outside. Axworthy met often with
Madeleine Albright, the new American Secretary of State, who
told him she personally supported the ban but had to find a way
to accommodate American military interests. Clinton continued
to hesitate.
The pro-ban States tried to find a way to deal with the
Korean Peninsula question, but the NGO leaders became
increasingly suspicious of these manoeuvres. No exceptions or
exemptions for Americans, they declared, even though some
special provisions had been allowed for others; for example,
the Convention did not include those national arsenals of
anti-vehicle landmines that had built-in anti-personnel devices
to prevent them from being handled, disarmed or moved, or
remotely triggered anti-personnel mines such as claymores. In
addition, it permitted the retention of some limited stocks of
anti-personnel mines by States for demining training purposes
and it left open the right of States to request renewable 10-year
extensions to their deadlines for the elimination of stockpiles.
When Axworthy arrived in Oslo, rumors swirled about his
attempts to weaken the treaty to win American acceptance. Some
campaigners loudly booed him as he entered the conference hall
to give his speech. Axworthy and others were strongly seeking
some way the Americans could join. Just before Oslo, Albright
and other senior American officials told Axworthy that Clinton
was ready to sign. But his bar remained too high. The demand
that the United States be permitted to use anti-personnel mines
not simply attached to the permitted anti-tank mines but,
16
separately, on a perimeter around them was a bridge too far to

cross not only for ICBL, but also for the Canadians.22
A Canadian winter welcomed over 2,400 delegates
and 500 journalists to Ottawa on 3 December 1997 where
representatives of 122 nations signed the Ottawa Convention.
At the final ceremony, Williams, now a Nobel Prize laureate,
joined Axworthy, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien,
whose support had been crucial, Sommaruga of ICRC, whose
commitment to the cause had been essential, and United Nations
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who boldly cast aside objections
that the Ottawa Process had pushed aside the Conference on
Disarmament and the United Nations system, to endorse the
landmine ban. In the exuberance of the moment, the landmine
ban seemed like the harbinger of a major transformation—one
where NGOs could work with like-minded States to advance a
“human security agenda” whose focus was on the individual.
The final speeches celebrated the extraordinary cooperation
between nations and NGOs to save lives and to make the world
a safer place for all its people.
17
Cambodian mine ban activists at the treaty negotiations in Oslo, Norway,
in September 1997. © John Rodsted
Women campaigners and delegates to the Mine Ban Convention negotiations in

Oslo, Norway, in September 1997. © John Rodsted
Sri Lankan deminers, 2018. © AP Mine Ban Convention ISU
Universalizing the Convention:
Practical means
Amelie Chayer23
International Campaign to Ban Landmines
The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention benefited from

international momentum and attention from the moment of its
negotiation over 20 years ago. Some 122 States signed it when
it opened for signature in December 1997 and, as at October
2019, it had 164 States parties. States themselves, international
organizations, United Nations entities, civil society and other
partners have contributed to attracting widespread adherence to
the Convention through numerous means. We review here a few
of these means that have worked well in recent years. None of
them work in isolation or constitute a magic bullet; it is always
the simultaneous deployment of several of these means, and
sometimes over a very long period of time, that yields results.
Appeals by United Nations officials

After United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan
played a key role in the adoption of the Convention, calling
it “a highlight of [his] career”24, Secretaries-General Ban
Ki-Moon and António Guterres continued to encourage
universal adherence to the ban on anti-personnel mines,25 a call
echoed for instance by United Nations High Representative
for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu.26 Such high-level
21
endorsement helps to keep the Convention on the agenda of

States. The Convention is also part of the United Nations
Secretary-General’s list of multilateral treaties that are close to
achieving universal participation27 and regularly benefits from
a special highlight at the annual United Nations treaty event
alongside a small number of other international instruments.28
High-level representation
A number of famous figures have over time expressed
their support for the landmine issue, such as singers Paul
McCartney29 and Juanes,30 actors Daniel Craig31 and Angelina
Jolie,32 football player Neymar Jr,33 Prince Harry of the United
Kingdom,34 and Archbishop Desmond Tutu,35 among others.
More formally, the Convention currently has two high-level
Special Envoys, Prince Mired Raad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan
and Princess Astrid of Belgium. In addition to participating in
Meetings of States Parties and other international events related
to the Convention, they carry out meetings with representatives
of States not party in order to encourage adhesion.36 Far from
being merely symbolic, these missions arranged with assistance
from the Implementation Support Unit of the Convention
provide an opportunity to reach out at the highest level of
decision-making in target countries.
It would also be impossible to overlook the enduring
legacy of the 1997 visits of Princess Diana of Wales to
landmine-affected communities in Angola and in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which “helped bring home to many, the terribly
high human costs of landmines” and confirmed her status as
“one of the most visible anti-landmines advocates”.37 More than
20 years on, her contribution to the anti-landmine movement
can still be felt.
Démarches in capitals
Diplomatic démarches in the capitals of States not party
are an essential component of universalization efforts, where
22
States parties can encourage adhesion by explaining how

they themselves did it and what benefits they gained, and by
providing answers to any questions related to Convention
implementation. In a recent example, at least five States or
regional bodies held high-level meetings or undertook other
démarches during the final months leading to a State’s important
decision to join the Convention.
Regular appeals by presidents of Convention meetings

By regularly making official public calls for further
adherence to the Convention, the successive presidents of
the Convention meetings ensure that the issue remains on the
international agenda. Recent examples include appeals for
“those States that have not yet joined to meet us on the right
side of history”,38 and for “achieving universal acceptance of the
treaty if we are to meet the Convention’s ambition of a mine-
free world”.39 One recent president was particularly active and
vocal on the universalization of both the Convention and the
norm against the use of anti-personnel mines, calling publicly
and bilaterally for an immediate stop to landmine use by a non-
State armed group in Yemen40 and for Myanmar to clarify its
situation further to reports of landmine use.41
Action plans adopted by States parties

At Review Conferences, States parties adopt five-year
action plans where they pledge to continue taking concrete
measures to promote adhesion to the Convention. The very first
action point of the original 2005–2009 Nairobi Action Plan
reads, “[All States parties will] call on those States that have not
yet done so, to accede to the Convention as soon as possible.”42
This was echoed in the 2010–2014 Cartagena Action Plan and
2015–2019 Maputo Action Plan, which respectively committed
all States parties to “seize every opportunity to promote
ratification [and] accession” and to “promote formal adherence
to the Convention [and] universal observance of [its] norms”.43
23
Political declarations adopted at Review Conferences also refer

to the desirability of full universalization. In between Review
Conferences, each Meeting of States Parties includes an agenda
item where States parties can report on how they promote the
Convention while States not party provide updates on any
steps they have taken towards joining. All statements are duly
recorded and made available publicly online.44
Support from the European Union since 2008

Concerted support from a regional organization can offer
tremendous opportunities, especially if a highly specialized
entity is tasked with project implementation. As of June 2013,
all member States of the European Union were on board the
Convention and the organization was able to announce that
it was “united to end the suffering and casualties caused by
anti-personnel mines” and that it would continue to “provide
leadership and resources” for the Convention.45 Already in
2008, the Council of the European Union adopted a Joint Action
in support of the universalization and implementation of the
Convention, and this was followed by other Council Decisions
in 2012 and 2017.46 Each decision tasked the Implementation
Support Unit to arrange national or regional dialogues, visits or
technical missions to advance clearance of landmines, assistance
to victims, destruction of anti-personnel mine stockpiles and
adherence to the Convention, in partnership with relevant
organizations. The overall budget was about €4.4 million, a
small percentage of the European Union’s global support to
mine action.
While these decisions focused mostly on implementation
in States parties, each also included a strong universalization
component. This allowed for high-level universalization visits
to be carried out by the Convention’s Special Envoys47 to
China, Mongolia, Myanmar, Oman and Sri Lanka48, and for
the organization of seminars for government representatives
in Switzerland and the United States.49 There is no doubt that
these visits and events, combined with other efforts, played
24
a significant role in convincing Oman (2014), Palestine

(2017), and Sri Lanka (2017) to accede to the Convention and
encouraged interim steps by at least Singapore and the United
States.50
Annual United Nations General

Assembly resolution on the Convention
From 1997, all United Nations Member States have had the
opportunity to express their support for the aim of addressing
the global anti-personnel mine problem through their vote on
the annual General Assembly resolution on the Convention. In
the resolution, tabled annually by the President of that year’s
Convention meeting and by partner States, the Assembly calls
for the full universalization of the instrument, using language
that has evolved from “The General Assembly … invites all
States to sign” in 1997 to “The General Assembly … invites all
States … to accede to it without delay” in 2018.51
The resolution emphasizes “the desirability of attracting
the adherence of all States to the Convention” and the need to
“work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization
and norms”.52 The year 2018 saw a record number of votes
in favour of the resolution, with 169 States voting in favour,
none voting against, and only 16 abstaining. Each year in
the past decade, about half of the States not party to the
Convention voted in favour of the resolution, thus affirming
their “determination to put an end to the suffering and casualties
caused by anti-personnel mines”.53 The International Campaign
to Ban Landmines views such votes as a positive interim step on
the path towards eventually joining the Convention. More than a
dozen States have adhered after voting in favour of consecutive
resolutions.54
Universalization contact group

In the early years of the Convention, an informal forum
emerged where diplomats and other supporters could share
25
information and coordinate action. The Universalization Contact

Group, first chaired for many years by Canada and then by other
volunteer States, grew to comprise forty or more individuals
attending its meetings to strategize on universalization efforts
in a non-official manner, raise the profile of universalization,and
share information on available tools.55 Such a spirit of
partnership and of informal collaboration is characteristic of the
Convention and, while the activities of the contact group have
been less prominent in recent years, leading States continue to
share information on universalization in the context of regular
Coordinating Committee meetings chaired by presidents of
Convention meetings.56
Work of the International Committee of the Red Cross

In order to facilitate the work of government authorities,
the Advisory Services of the International Committee of the
Red Cross have produced model instruments of ratification
and adhesion, fact sheets and an information kit on the
development of national implementation legislation.57 The
importance of such practical tools cannot be overstated, as
sometimes it is the administrative practicalities that get in the
way of adhesion. These documents are quick reference guides
that can help any universalization advocate provide useful
answers on legal steps towards adhesion. As an early proponent
of the ban on landmines, the International Committee of the
Red Cross “continues to promote adherence to the Convention
in bilateral dialogue with these States not party to the
Convention, in multilateral fora and in the numerous training
sessions on [international humanitarian law] it organizes each
year”.58 Support and active engagement from the guardian
of international humanitarian law have been crucial to the
universalization of the Convention.
26
Advocacy by the International Campaign

to Ban Landmines
Non-governmental organizations that are members of the
global coalition International Campaign to Ban Landmines
(ICBL) carry out tireless advocacy at the national level,
wherever feasible, encouraging the authorities to renounce anti-
personnel mines and to join the Convention. This can include,
for instance, bilateral meetings and correspondence with
government officials and decision-makers and, additionally,
the dissemination of accurate data on the problem posed
by anti-personnel mines through publications, media work
and public events. ICBL ensures that survivors of landmine
explosions, family members of people killed by landmines,
and other representatives of affected communities participate
meaningfully in advocacy efforts, including through direct
bilateral meetings with government officials.
At the international level, representatives of ICBL,
including 1997 Nobel Peace Prize Co-Laureate Jody Williams,
hold bilateral meetings with government officials and deliver
statements in United Nations forums, ensuring that the landmine
issue remains on the public affairs agenda. For many years,
retired Indian Ambassador Satnam Singh contributed to ICBL’s
promotion of the Convention as Diplomatic Advisor, traveling
to States not party to meet with decision makers. ICBL is also
known for its research initiative, Landmine Monitor, the world’s
most comprehensive repository of accurate data on the status of
the global anti-personnel mine problem and on the international
community’s response to it. By asking questions on adhesion
status to States not party, the Monitor’s researchers contribute to
scrutiny of State policy regarding anti-personnel mines.
Joint adhesion
There are not many examples of States joining the
Convention simultaneously as a confidence-building measure,
but a notable one is from Greece and Turkey. In April 2001,
27
during a visit to Ankara by the Greek foreign minister, both

countries announced that they were going to join the Convention
at the same time.59 The initiative was widely welcomed
internationally. The Turkish foreign minister wrote: “[T]his is
an important confidence-building measure which will contribute
to security and stability in the region.”60 A few days later, at the
Conference on Disarmament, the two countries delivered a joint
statement calling on all States to also join the Convention.61
ICBL continues to encourage other neighbour countries to
include the issue of anti-personnel mines in their bilateral
dialogue and to consider joining the Convention simultaneously.
Interim steps
Short of joining the Convention, States can still take
interim steps such as destroying stockpiles, enacting a
moratorium on exports of anti-personnel mines, undertaking
minefield clearance or disclosing information on how many
mines they possess. While such measures are not as significant
as adhering to the Convention, they may show a State’s support
for the eventual global elimination of anti-personnel mines and
help to grow the stigma against the weapon. Recent examples
of noteworthy interim steps include a de facto halt on the
production of anti-personnel mines in Singapore62—one of the
last producing countries—and an announcement by the United
States that it was renouncing the use of anti-personnel mines
worldwide except in the Korean Peninsula.63 Submitting full or
partial voluntary transparency reports64 to the United Nations
Secretary-General, through the United Nations Office for
Disarmament Affairs, has been a popular interim step; States not
party Azerbaijan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mongolia,
and Morocco have submitted transparency reports in recent
years, while the State of Palestine and Sri Lanka both submitted
such reports before joining the Convention.
28
Universalizing the norm

Adhering to the Convention is a State prerogative.
Whenever a State becomes legally bound by the Convention,
the prohibition on landmine use and the other prohibitions
of the Convention apply to anyone on the national territory,
including to non-State armed groups.65 But as non-State armed
groups cannot themselves take the formal step of joining the
Convention, several organizations active in various countries
have sought alternative methods of engaging with them to
secure their adherence to the anti-personnel mine ban principle.
For example, to date, 52 non-State armed groups around the
world have pledged not to use anti-personnel mines through
their signature of the Deed of Commitment for Adherence to
a Total Ban on Antipersonnel Mines, an initiative of the non-
governmental organization Geneva Call.66 Other members
of ICBL have also engaged non-State armed groups, such as
in Myanmar and the Philippines. References to a ban on anti-
personnel mine use and/or to cooperation on landmine clearance
were included, in recent years, in peace agreements negotiated
between the State and non-State armed groups in Nepal67 and
Colombia,68 among others.
Conclusion
The Convention successfully stigmatized the use of anti-
personnel mines and the vast majority of States that have not yet
adhered to the instrument abide de facto by its core prohibitions:
they do not use, produce or sell the weapon. The practical means
towards universalization of the Convention reviewed above
cannot work in isolation—an array of them must be deployed
by various actors in order to bring additional States on board.
Other means used in the early years of the Convention, such as
military-to-military dialogue, could also be revived as they held
great potential. ICBL believes that all States can, and ultimately
will, join the Convention.
29
Unexploded ordnance at the 2015 Bangkok Symposium. © AP Mine Ban Convention ISU
Landmine stockpiles and their
destruction
Mary Wareham
Human Rights Watch
Summary
Most anti-personnel landmines possessed by States that joined
the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention were swiftly destroyed
before it entered into force on 1 March 1999. In the 20 years
since, there has been steady progress in destroying remaining
stocks, resulting in the destruction of more than 55 million anti-
personnel landmines by 92 States parties. The vast majority of
those stockpiled anti-personnel mines were destroyed within the
treaty’s four-year deadline. This was facilitated by the treaty’s
unique cooperative compliance provisions and mechanisms, as
well as by its community of supporters. However, the impressive
compliance record by most States parties was unfortunately not
met by all as a handful missed deadlines, some significantly, in
completing their stockpile destruction obligations. Two States
remain in serious violation of the treaty’s stockpile destruction
obligation.69
Introduction
The Convention comprises an unprecedented combination
of disarmament provisions and humanitarian goals. The
comprehensive prohibitions on anti-personnel landmines
31
stigmatize these explosive weapons, which are detonated by

the presence, proximity or contact of a person. The Convention
contains firm deadlines requiring clearance of mined areas
within 10 years, while States “in a position to do so” are obliged
to provide assistance to landmine victims.
The requirement that States parties destroy their stockpiled
anti-personnel mines within four years is one of the most visible
examples of how the Convention is helping to eradicate these
weapons.
This chapter looks at how landmines were once
manufactured and transferred around the world, creating massive
stockpiles that were used to the detriment of human lives and
limbs. It reviews the largely successful implementation of the
Convention’s stockpile destruction obligations over the past two
decades despite some serious challenges. The chapter considers
how the Convention’s unique set of compliance provisions and
mechanisms, as well as its community of practice, have helped
States avoid and resolve stockpile destruction issues. Finally,
the chapter provides some lessons learned.
Unless noted, all facts and figures contained in this
chapter come from the Landmine Monitor reporting initiative
by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL),
which has closely tracked and reported on stockpiling and
destruction of anti-personnel mines since 1999.70 Human Rights
Watch provides research and editing for this civil society-
based verification initiative to systematically monitor a major
multilateral disarmament and international humanitarian law
agreement.71
Landmine stockpiles
In their seminal 1993 report Landmines: A Deadly Legacy,
ICBL co-founders Human Rights Watch and Physicians
for Human Rights described landmines as “weapons of
mass destruction in slow motion” due to their widespread
proliferation, longevity and the devastating harm caused by
32
decades of unrestrained use.72 That report showed how weak

and convoluted rules governing the use of landmines had been
widely ignored, creating a complex humanitarian tragedy over
the long-term.
More than 50 States produced anti-personnel mines at
some time, of which 41 stopped before or upon joining the
Convention. But by that point, the damage had already been
done. Hundreds of millions of anti-personnel landmines had
been transferred around the world for decades, creating massive
stockpiles. Some stockpiled landmines were abandoned or
looted and other stocks were used, but many remained in their
storage crates, untouched as the stigma against landmines grew.
The first annual Landmine Monitor report estimated that
more than 250 million anti-personnel mines were stored in
the arsenals of 108 countries. When it was presented to States
attending the Convention’s first Meeting of States Parties held
in May 1999 in Maputo, ICBL called for a major effort to
eradicate landmine stockpiles as a form of “preventive mine
action”.73
Nearly all the 33 States not party to the Convention
are still believed to stockpile landmines, despite limited
information.74 But over time, major non-signatories have
made notable announcements and disclosures concerning their
landmine stocks as a gesture of goodwill and transparency.
At the Convention’s third Review Conference in 2014, the
United States announced that it had prohibited production of
anti-personnel mines and disclosed that it possessed a stockpile
of three million mines, a significant reduction from the more
than 10 million previously reported by the United States
Government. China stated that it held fewer than five million
mines, a massive decrease from the long-standing estimate of
110 million mines.
Fewer non-State armed groups are able to obtain factory-
made anti-personnel mines now that production and transfer
have largely halted under the Convention. In States outside the
33
Case studies
Chile
Chile, a State party to the Convention, completed the
destruction of its stockpile of 299,219 mines in August 2003,
well in advance of the deadline of 1 March 2006. The process
was notable for its transparency and high-level support.
Its army and navy destroyed the stocks by open detonation
with assistance provided by the Organization of American
States. Then-Minister of Defense Michelle Bachelet attended
and spoke at several events held to mark the progressive
destruction of the stocks. ICBL, Landmine Monitor and the
media were also invited to witness the stockpile destruction at
these events. In 2003, Chile announced that it would reduce,
from 28,647 mines, the number of anti-personnel mines that it
initially reported would be retained for training and research.
It now retains just over 2,000 mines.
Japan
Japan, also a State party, completed the destruction of its
stockpile of one million anti-personnel mines within weeks of
the Convention’s 1 March 2003 deadline. It contracted three
private companies to destroy the mines at a cost of ¥2.068
billion (US$ 17.8 million). The process was notable for its
high-level political support and engagement by communities
living near the destruction facilities. Japan’s Prime Minister
addressed 300 children from around the country at a youth
summit on solutions to the landmine crisis that followed an
official ceremony organized by the mayor of Shin-Asahi to
mark the completion of the destruction process. Landmine
Monitor visited the stockpile destruction facility in 2000,
when Association for Aid and Relief Japan and the town
organized a 70-kilometer charity run with landmine survivor
and former deminer Chris Moon to raise awareness and
support for the Convention.
34
Convention, some have acquired landmines by stealing them

from government stocks or removing them from minefields.
However, most have made their own improvised landmines
from locally available materials. These are often known as
victim-activated improvised explosive devices. These are also
banned by the Convention.
Stockpile destruction
By the time the Convention entered into force, more than
12 million stockpiled anti-personnel mines had already been
destroyed by States committed to relinquishing the weapons.
Canada, Norway and 10 other signatories and States parties
had completed the destruction of their anti-personnel mine
stocks, while 18 more were in the process of doing so, including
France, Italy, Netherlands and the United Kingdom.75
By the Convention’s first Review Conference in 2004, 65
States parties had completed the destruction of their stockpiles,
collectively destroying more than 37.3 million anti-personnel
mines.76 No State party facing the first stockpile destruction
deadline of 1 March 2003 failed to meet it. Italy destroyed
the most mines (7.1 million), followed by Turkmenistan
(6.6 million), while Albania, France, Germany, Japan, Romania,
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom each destroyed
more than 1 million anti-personnel mines.
By the time of the Convention’s second Review
Conference in 2009, 86 States parties had completed the
destruction of their stockpiles, eliminating a collective total of
44 million anti-personnel mines.77 However, a handful of States
completed destruction of their stockpiles days or months after
their respective deadlines had passed.
According to Landmine Monitor’s count, a total of 92
States parties had destroyed a collective total of more than
55 million stockpiled anti-personnel mines as at 2019, the year
of the Convention’s fourth Review Conference.
35
However, there were certain exceptions to this impressive

record; four States parties missed their stockpile destruction
deadlines by years.78
Ultimately, none of the stockpiled anti-personnel mines
posed significant technical issues for States parties to destroy,
with two notable exceptions: the Soviet-made PFM-type
scatterable mines and United States–made area denial anti-
personnel mines (ADAM) that were artillery-delivered.
Referred to by Afghans as “butterfly” mines due to their
unique shape and bright colour, the Soviet-made PFM-type
scatterable anti-personnel mines contain a toxic liquid explosive
filling (VS6-D) that renders them extremely dangerous and
difficult to destroy. PFM mines are packed in containers for
delivery by helicopter, rocket or ground dispenser, which
has added another complication, as their destruction requires
sophisticated environmental pollution control measures.
Ukraine missed its stockpile destruction deadline due to
the challenges it has faced in destroying the 6 million PFM-
type mines. Belarus faced similar challenges but completed the
destruction of its 3.3 million PFM-type mines in April 2017,
while North Macedonia and Turkmenistan also destroyed stocks
of PFM-type mines.
The United States-made ADAM mines stockpiled by
Greece and Turkey contain a small amount of depleted uranium
that requires a special industrial process to destroy, so the
projectiles containing the ADAM mines were transferred to
Germany for demilitarization at a specialized facility.
Any assessment of stockpile destruction under the
Convention would be incomplete without considering Article 3’s
provision that allows a State party to retain or transfer “a
number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and
training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction
techniques”.
36
Of the 164 States parties, 71 have retained anti-personnel

mines for training and research purposes, of which 37 retain
more than 1,000 mines and 4 retain more than 12,000 mines
each.79 The remainder each retain fewer than 1,000 mines.
Another 86 States parties have declared that they do not retain
any anti-personnel mines, including 34 States that stockpiled anti-
personnel mines in the past.
Over the past 20 years, ICBL concerns that the retention
provision would be abused by a State party using such mines
in combat have not been realized. There have been some close
calls that were resolved in true cooperative compliance fashion
through quiet and sustained follow-up with the State party
concerned.
However, the retention by certain States of several
thousand or more than 10,000 mines still raises significant
compliance questions for the Convention. ICBL is especially
concerned by States parties with retained mines that have never
been used for the Convention’s permitted purposes, as these are
in essence stockpiled mines.
Cooperative compliance
Each State party facing the Convention’s stockpile
destruction deadline has met that obligation, with a handful
of exceptions, some serious. This section looks at how the
Convention’s innovative cooperative compliance provisions and
mechanisms helped contribute to this largely positive outcome.80
During the whirlwind Ottawa Process that created
the Convention, States prioritized securing an unequivocal
prohibition of anti-personnel mines over creating complex
verification provisions. According to one diplomat, “the
thinking at the time by the majority of negotiating States was
that it should be politically so costly to breach the obligations of
the Convention that it would deter anyone from doing it”.81
37
A unique “cooperative compliance” approach, proposed by

Canada in early 1997, was ultimately incorporated into the final
text of the Convention. Under Article 8, States parties commit
to “consult and cooperate with each other” and “work together
in a spirit of cooperation” to implement provisions by providing
financial, technical and other assistance.
According to ICBL Chair, Stephen D. Goose of Human
Rights Watch, the cooperative compliance approach “assumes
goodwill on part of all States parties … to try to resolve issues
in the quietest, friendliest, least confrontational manner” by
emphasizing assistance to States parties to meet their obligations
rather than criticism for failing to do so.82
Article 8 also lists five compliance steps that the
Convention’s States parties can follow, but none have been
attempted over the past 20 years.83 In addition, the Convention’s
Article 6 provision stipulates that States parties requiring
assistance to fulfil their implementation obligations should
“seek and receive assistance” from other States parties.
Furthermore, Article 7 requires States parties to provide a report
on transparency measures detailing their implementation within
six months of the Convention taking effect for that country and
annually thereafter, by 30 April.84
The transparency reporting requirement has provided
States parties, Landmine Monitor and others with a particularly
valuable tool to review and confirm data on stockpiled
landmines, as well as track efforts to destroy them.
From the outset, the Convention lacked a standing
institutional structure. This reflected the desire of States to
spend funds in the field on mine clearance and victim assistance
rather than on costly secretariats.85 It also was due to concern
that States parties remain actively involved in overseeing
implementation and addressing challenges.
Over the past two decades, States parties and the Anti-
Personnel Mine Ban Convention community have gradually
put in place a web of mechanisms and structures to enable
38
implementation concerns to be resolved cooperatively before

they escalate. A lightly staffed Geneva-based Implementation
Support Unit supports States parties, including the chairs of
various committees that oversee the implementation of specific
Convention provisions.
The Convention’s system of regular meetings and informal
sessions have facilitated support for stockpile destruction
by issuing joint action plans urging States parties that missed
their deadline to comply without delay and communicate their
plans to do so, as well as request assistance. The Convention’s
rotating stockpile destruction chairs have overseen destruction
efforts, helping States parties to overcome challenges.
Lessons learned
Below are seven lessons that can be drawn from stockpile
destruction under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.
First, establish a clear deadline and robust transparency
mechanisms. Without the four-year stockpile destruction
deadline, it is highly unlikely that the Convention’s impressive
compliance rate could have been achieved. ICBL fostered
positive competition, challenging States parties to declare
and destroy their stockpiled mines in advance of the four-year
deadline, setting certain events and earlier dates as completion
targets.86
Second, ride the political momentum generated from
the Convention negotiation process. ICBL encouraged swift
destruction of stockpiled mines as an optimal and highly visible
way for States to demonstrate their strong commitment towards
implementation. Heads of States and senior ministers attended
completion events covered by media with campaigners and
survivors present.87
Third, ensure that States parties requiring implementation
support receive the financial and technical aid they seek. Most
national militaries disposed of their own landmine stocks,
39
sometimes with external donor funding, but more often after

their governments allocated a budget to ensure destruction.
Mine action operators, police and others played a supportive
role by assisting with inventory reviews, determining how to
safely destroy landmines and assisting with physical destruction
of stocks.
Fourth, realize that physical destruction of landmines
generally does not require sophisticated facilities. The vast
majority of stockpiled anti-personnel mines were destroyed
through open burning or open detonation. Where the size of the
stockpile or environmental constraints precluded this, States
parties often transferred mines to be destroyed at facilities in
other countries operated by private companies. Ultimately, no
stockpiled anti-personnel mines posed significant technical
issues for States parties to destroy with two notable exceptions:
the Soviet-made PFM-type scatterable mines and ADAM
artillery-delivered mines.
Fifth, the Convention experience demonstrated some of
the side benefits that can come from the stockpile destruction.
Several States parties developed industrial processes to recover
and recycle components with economic value as scrap metal.
In some cases, the components were directly recycled into
products. For example, Afghanistan melted the metal bodies
of bounding fragmentation mines and refabricated them as
manhole covers, while Ukraine has recycled the plastic bodies
of some of its mines and made toy pelicans for children.
Sixth, civil society support and scrutiny are crucial to
ensuring full compliance. Landmine Monitor published its first
report prior to the submission deadline for States to provide
their initial transparency reports under Article 7, thereby
setting the standard for comprehensive and detailed reporting.
Landmine Monitor’s analysis of Article 7 reports, together with
its inquiries, reminders and offers of assistance, have helped
generate momentum towards stockpile destruction. When
Landmine Monitor finds inconsistencies and irregularities, it
40
engages with the State party concerned to seek clarification and

try to resolve the matter directly.
Finally, the experience shows how no one wants to be at the
top of the list when it comes to stockpiling weapons. In addition
to tracking stockpiled mines, Landmine Monitor closely reviewed
the quantities of mines retained by States parties, drawing special
attention to those retaining several thousand or more than 10,000
mines. Dozens of States parties perceived this as negative publicity,
especially if they were at the top of the list with the most mines,
and responded by reducing the number retained or destroying the
mines altogether.
Conclusion
Over the past 20 years, the United States and other non-
signatories have declined calls to join the Anti-Personnel Mine
Ban Convention yet tacitly supported it from the sidelines. Their
arguments against joining have diminished and now boil down
to a general scepticism over the utility of multilateral treaties, as
well as objections with the unconventional and unprecedented
way in which the Convention was negotiated outside of United
Nations auspices (but with firm United Nations support).
Yet the Convention is thriving and provides a prime
example of a multilateral instrument that is working to reduce
and prevent human suffering. This is seen vividly in the way
in which States parties have swiftly destroyed their stockpiled
mines.
Those facing such challenges in completing their stockpile
destruction obligation have not been met with condemnation but
rather with the cooperative compliance approach. The method
seems to be working as 20 years on, no State party has triggered
the Convention’s Article 8 provisions, yet.
41
A female deminer in Juba, South Sudan. UNMAS/Marco Grob
Clearance under the Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention
Lucy Pinches
Norwegian People’s Aid
Stuart Casey-Maslen
University of Pretoria
Introduction
In early 1997, Diana, Princess of Wales, walked in an active
minefield in Huambo, Angola, spurring international action
to ban anti-personnel mines. Sadly, she did not live to see the
adoption of the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. But
22 years later, in September 2019, her son, the Duke of Sussex,
visited that former minefield, which has become a “bustling
community”.88 Such is the transformative power of mine
clearance.
At the outset of negotiations that led to the Convention,89
it was, however, far from certain that a duty to clear emplaced
anti-personnel mines within a set period of time would be part
of the Convention’s substantive obligations. The draft text put
forward by civil society did not contain any deadline (although
the importance of clearance was certainly underscored in
the body text)—nor did the first draft text of the Belgian
Government. In contrast, the Austrian Government’s draft texts
did incorporate deadlines—five years at first and, subsequently,
43
10 years—but without possibility for any extension. Separately

during the negotiations, the United Kingdom, mindful of the
contamination remaining on the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),90
sought—but failed—to restrict the duty to clear to only those
anti-personnel mines having a humanitarian impact.91 In any
event, a clearance obligation would mark a departure from
earlier disarmament treaties.
Article 5, as ultimately adopted, sets out a series of
clear obligations. The overriding responsibility upon each
State adhering to the Convention is to clear and destroy all
anti-personnel mines in all mined areas under its jurisdiction
or control as soon as possible but not later than ten years
after becoming party to it.92 The notion of “jurisdiction” over
geographical area concerns, first and foremost, sovereign
territory (whether metropolitan or non-metropolitan), whereas
“control” concerns other territory that a State occupies abroad.93
The survey of mined area was not explicitly made part
of the substantive obligations set out in the Convention.
It is, however, encapsulated in the duty in Article 5 (2) to
“make every effort to identify” all mined areas containing
anti-personnel mines. Honoured more in the breach than the
observance has been the consequent duty to mark and fence
mined areas, once they have been identified,94 but this remains,
notionally, a substantive requirement under the Article.
The crux of the Article is the duty to clear and destroy all
anti-personnel mines in mined areas. The negotiating States
understood that, for heavily affected States, 10 years would
not suffice to complete clearance of all mined areas. For this
reason, an approach adapted from the Chemical Weapons
Convention’s provisions on the destruction of stockpiles was
incorporated in Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention. Paragraph 3 of the Article allows a State party
that believes it will be unable to complete clearance within
10 years to request at a meeting of States parties or a review
conference to extend the deadline for a further period of up to
44
10 years. There is no limit laid down in the Convention upon the

number of deadline extensions that may be sought, although the
obligation to complete clearance as soon as possible should not
imply that slow progress will result in the open-ended granting
of extension requests.
Successes in implementing the duty to clear and

destroy
In some ways, Article 5 has been an astonishing success.
As the Convention was being negotiated, it was not even known
exactly how many States were affected by anti-personnel mines.
A baseline was swiftly established by the Landmine Monitor,
published by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines
(ICBL). In 1999, the Landmine Monitor suggested that as many
as 91 States were affected by mines or unexploded ordnance.
Over time, five further States were found to have confirmed or
suspected mined area—three as a result of new information95
and two as a result of existing States allowing part of the
sovereign territory to secede and become a new State,96 while
seven States were found to be affected only by unexploded
ordnance.
In the past 20 years, however, 33 States have completed
mine clearance, including several heavily affected States, such
as Algeria and Mozambique.97 All but one of the 33 States
(Nepal) are party to the Convention. Jordan and Palau are
the most recent States parties to have fulfilled their Article 5
obligations. Thus, as at 1 October 2019, globally, 56 States were
suspected or confirmed to be contaminated by anti-personnel
mines. Of these, 34 are States parties to the Convention:98
Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina99, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Iraq, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, State of Palestine, Peru, Senegal,
Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan,
Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom,100 Yemen and
45
Zimbabwe.101 Twenty-two States not party are also suspected or

confirmed to have mined areas.102
Globally over the past 20 years, a total of at least 2,880
square kilometres of mined area have been cleared (an area
greater than the sizes of Nairobi, New York City and Rome
combined), with the destruction of more than 4.6 million anti-
personnel mines. Countless lives and limbs have undoubtedly
been saved as a direct result of mine action and an untold
number of communities have been freed from the fear of mines,
while the contribution to development through the handing back
of land for safe and productive use cannot readily be overstated.
During the past two decades, the high-water mark for global
clearance was in 2010 when more than 200 square kilometres
of land were cleared, along with the destruction of more than
388,000 anti-personnel mines. Afghanistan and Cambodia have
led the way, together accounting for almost half of all global
clearance in several years. Since then, global clearance has
fallen to around 150 square kilometres annually, with austerity
measures in many countries leading to a reduction in donor
funding.
Although all estimates should be treated with caution—
and the picture is complicated by the addition of significant
amounts of new contamination from anti-personnel mines of an
improvised nature in a relatively small number of countries—
probably less than 2,000 square kilometres remain to be cleared.
This points to a finite problem, capable of positive resolution.
Lessons learned
While the concept of land release (i.e., the process of
applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and remove
all presence and suspicion of mines through non-technical
survey, technical survey and/or clearance) did not exist when
the Convention was drafted and entered into force, it has
rightly become the backbone—and mainstream—of demining
methodology in the intervening years. At the heart of efficient
46
land release is high-quality evidence-based survey to identify

mined areas and help ensure that clearance is only undertaken
in areas where there is direct evidence of contamination.
During the first 15 years of the Convention’s life, the quality
of survey by international mine action organizations and others
typically left a lot to be desired. Particularly at issue was the
Landmine Impact Survey (LIS). It was conceived with the best
of intentions: to identify all the mined areas and explosive
remnants of war–affected areas in a country and to determine
their impact on nearby communities. But instead of generating
a robust baseline of contamination for the purpose of Article
5 implementation, it led to many suspected hazardous areas
being entered in the national mine action database that would
prove to contain no contamination at all, while the size of those
suspected hazardous areas that were actually contaminated was
often vastly inflated.
Globally, mine action has paid, and continues to pay, a
heavy price for these early mistakes in surveying. Bosnia and
Herzegovina, for instance, one of those countries in which an
LIS was conducted in 2003, still does not have an accurate
picture of baseline contamination more than 20 years after
becoming a State party to the Convention. A nationwide survey,
termed a “country assessment”, is now under way with a view
to enabling a far more accurate baseline to be established.103
In Angola, more than 90 per cent of suspected hazardous areas
recorded as a result of inflated estimates from a 2004–2007
LIS were cancelled during re-survey, now almost complete.104
In Thailand, precious time is similarly being used up correcting
problems from the LIS conducted there in 2001. Since 2016,
the Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) and Norwegian
People’s Aid have been working on a pilot project to re-survey
the inflated suspected hazardous areas in the national mine
action database. Taking into account the results of the pilot
project, TMAC has forecast that up to 80 per cent of existing
suspected hazardous areas can be cancelled or reduced through
surveying, so it will be focusing their efforts in 2019 and 2020
47
Training of a deminer in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in March 2011.
UNMAS/Gwenn Dubourthoumieu
on cancelling land through non-technical surveys before moving

on to technical surveys and full clearance from 2021 to 2023.105
The International Mine Action Standards, which were
developed collaboratively by experts in the sector, have
continued to evolve throughout the 20 years of the Convention
to capture and promote minimum good practice (including,
crucially, on land release). They serve as an invaluable tool
for helping national authorities develop their own national
standards.
Increasingly, and justifiably, there has also been a growing
appreciation of the value of adopting a country-focused approach
to Article 5 implementation, in which national authorities and
implementing in-country partners (including clearance operators
and donors) meet regularly in a collective forum to openly and
transparently discuss progress and challenges to surveying and
clearance. Effective country-focused partnerships will be a
crucial element in helping the remaining affected States parties
to clear all mined areas on their territory.
Challenges of implementation
Until recently, the greatest challenges to successful
implementation of Article 5 have not been new contamination
but slow progress in ridding affected States of long-standing
“legacy” contamination. There are various reasons impeding
progress. Although funding shortages are certainly a factor in
some cases, they are not the primary obstacle; donor nations
have been remarkably generous to mine action over the past
20 years, contributing upwards of US$ 10 billion, first and
foremost to demining operations. The authors believe that
political will is typically the deciding factor, as borne out by
States parties who have demonstrated commitment to meeting
their obligation to conduct and complete clearance as soon
as possible. Their successes offer an example to other States
parties that have requested extensions—although some could
conceivably have completed clearance years ago. Some States
50
allowed their original Article 5 deadline to expire without

clearing a single mined area. In 2018, several States parties did
not release any mined area, putting their compliance with the
duty in Article 5 to complete clearance “as soon as possible”
into very serious question.106
The Convention machinery has sought to address some
of the challenges in implementing Article 5. The scenario that
a State party would not be aware that it was contaminated was
simply not envisaged. Yet the governmental authorities in the
Niger found they had colonial-era contamination remaining
when a non-governmental organization visited the northern
border in 2012—after the Niger’s Article 5 deadline had
expired.107 Nor was it envisaged that, even when survey and
clearance operations had concluded, significant numbers of
previously unrecorded mined areas might be subsequently
discovered.
To address this unforeseen or unrecorded contamination,
the States parties agreed in 2012 that if new or previously
unreported anti-personnel mine contamination were identified,
the affected State party should inform all other States parties
of its discovery; undertake to clear the anti-personnel mines as
soon as possible; report the situation in accordance with Article
7 of the Convention; and, if unable to clear the mined area
before the next Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference
(whichever falls earlier), submit a request for an extended
Article 5 deadline.108
New mines were not expected to be laid. While
States parties themselves have occasionally added to the
contamination, the vast majority of new contamination among
States parties is from the use of mines, especially anti-personnel
mines of an improvised nature, by armed non-State actors. This
includes, among others, the Islamic State across Iraq (and in
the Syrian Arab Republic,109 a State not party), by the Taliban
and other non-State armed groups in Afghanistan,110 by the
Houthis in Yemen111 and by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad
51
Basin region.112 These improvised mines are captured by and

prohibited under the Convention whenever they are designed
to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a
person. The mine action sector must ensure that best practice
and lessons learned over the past 20 years of the Convention are
applied to the recording, survey and clearance, along with the
reporting of this new contamination.
Other challenges to the Convention architecture have
involved a refusal or failure to request an extension to an
Article 5 deadline before expiration—a potential serious
violation of international legal obligations. In formal
communications in 2016 and 2018 to the United Nations
Secretary-General, the depository of the Convention,113 Ukraine
asserted that application of the Convention was “limited” as a
consequence of its lack of control of the territory. In November
2018, Ukraine submitted an Article 5 deadline extension
request, which was considered and granted at the seventeenth
Meeting of States Parties.114
Going forward
Overall, the Convention is in good health. While some
major military powers remain outside its purview, use of this
inhumane weapon is largely restricted to groups that employ
terror as a method of warfare. In less than 25 years, a once
indispensable and ubiquitous weapon of war has rightly come
to be perceived as a cold-blooded killer of civilians. This is a
testament to the Convention.
Globally, more than 96 per cent of the total recorded
clearance of more than 155 square kilometres in 2018 occurred
in States that are party to the Convention. This shows the
importance of the Convention as a motivation for action. But,
at the same time, several affected States parties seemingly
released no mined area through survey or clearance in 2018.
For two of those States, there are issues relating to access to
mined areas that they claim to be under their jurisdiction but
52
that are not under their control. Two States from the Lake Chad
Basin are seemingly contaminated by anti-personnel mines of
an improvised nature resulting from ongoing conflict, and they
need to report mined areas and efforts to address them under
Article 7, as well as request a new Article 5 deadline. Three
others have not been able to provide justification for their lack
of land release.115
More positively, over the coming 18 months, both Chile
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are expected to
complete mine clearance in their respective territories. Chile has
an Article 5 deadline of 1 February 2020 while the Democratic
Republic of the Congo is obligated to complete clearance by
1 January 2021. In addition, Sri Lanka may complete mine
clearance in the course of 2021 (well in advance of its Article 5
deadline), which would make it one of the most heavily affected
States yet to do so.
However, it is not only about States parties completing
their Article 5 obligations, but also about how they get to
completion. Ensuring high-quality survey and clearance
operations, supported by solid information management and
quality management systems, helps avoid issues further down
the line. The mine action community is also rightly seeking
to strengthen performance in areas that were not adequately
covered in the initial Convention text 20 years ago. Two
such examples are the need for affected States parties to
prepare sustainable national capacity to tackle residual risk
after completion of Article 5 obligations, and the importance
of ensuring gender- and diversity-sensitive mine action
programming. In most States parties, significant work is still
needed to integrate gender and diversity considerations in mine
action, including by removing barriers to the full, equal and
meaningful participation of women.
The third Review Conference of the Convention in Maputo
set the aspiration of completing by 2025 the clearance of all
mined areas, in affected States parties, containing anti-personnel
53
mines. This target—which encourages affected States parties to

set an end date for completion of clearance and strive to avoid
recurrent requests to extend their Article 5 deadlines—was
never going to be fully achieved, but as at late 2019, the figures
are discouraging. Initial analysis by the Mine Action Review,
based on current progress, suggests that only one in five of all
affected States parties would meet the 2025 aspiration, a further
one in five might meet it, while the remaining three in five
would be unlikely to complete clearance by 2025.
It is, however, not too late to improve this trajectory. With
the exception of the most contaminated countries or those with
ongoing conflict or access issues, most States parties could still
complete clearance by 2025 if national authorities, operators,
and donors were to employ the right resources in the right way.
But this is a big “if”, which will require stronger leadership and
commitment from all, sustained funding and adoption of the
most efficient and effective land release possible.
Even if the 2025 deadline is missed by some countries, a
further significant date is 2030, the deadline for the achievement
of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. Target
16.1 seeks a significant reduction in all forms of violence and
related death rates everywhere.116 This could leave just a small
number of conflict-affected regions to be addressed in the
2030s.
The pledge to “leave no-one behind”, contained in the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development, should be embraced by
States parties to the Convention and the mine action community.
We must collectively ensure that all affected States parties—
with long-standing contamination or with more recently laid
mines—are helped to complete clearance and make it across
the finishing line. We owe this to the women, men, boys and
girls whose lives continue to be impacted by these pernicious
and devastating weapons. The full implementation of Article 5
of the Convention will be a landmark of human achievement.
54
A 10-year-old boy from Dar Al Salam, North Darfur, Sudan, who suffered burns to more
than 90 per cent of his body due to the detonation of a device in November 2006.
UN Photo/Albert González Farran
International cooperation and
assistance: A Norwegian perspective
Ingrid Schøyen
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway
The 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention was the result

of a partnership between States, civil society, the United
Nations and other international organizations based on a shared
goal: to protect people from weapons that continue to kill and
injure long after a conflict has ended and to assist those who
have already been harmed. Throughout the negotiation of the
Convention, it was understood that implementation by some
States parties of their obligations would require outside support
of a technical, material and financial nature. The result was
Article 6: a comprehensive approach to promoting fulfilment of
the duties to destroy stockpiles, clear and destroy all emplaced
anti-personnel mines, and assist mine victims.
Thus, whereas each State party is responsible for
implementing the Convention in areas under its jurisdiction or
control, the Convention obliges all States parties in a position
to do so to provide assistance for mine-affected States. This
chapter explores some approaches to cooperation and assistance,
building on Norway’s experience as a donor for mine action
over the past 25 years. Norway currently contributes funding for
survey and clearance of anti-personnel mines, cluster munitions
and other explosive remnants of war in 20 countries, in direct
57
partnership with the international humanitarian demining

organizations Norwegian People’s Aid, Mine Advisory Group
and The HALO Trust. Norway also contributes to victim
assistance through the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), the International Campaign to Ban Landmines–
Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC) and national
non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
It has been a priority for Norway’s presidency of the
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention’s Review Conference in
2019 to increase political awareness of the continued relevance
of the Convention in order to push the pace of implementation
of all pillars of the Convention. A thematic debate held during
the intersessional meetings of the Convention in Geneva in May
2019 at the initiative of the presidency engaged participants in
a discussion on international cooperation and assistance around
the following questions:
• What can be done to encourage more States to become
donors for mine action?
• What role do donors play? How can donors partner around
completion goals?
• Are there elements other than financial support that are
important for countries in a position to provide assistance
to keep in mind?
• How can cooperation and assistance within the Convention
best support individual countries to reach completion of
their Article 5 obligations, including those that may have
new contamination resulting from new use of improvised
mines?
• How can cooperation and assistance under the Convention
be more closely linked to other areas of development
cooperation (i.e., the Sustainable Development Goals,
health, economic development, etc.)?
This chapter will not attempt to answer all the questions
but will point to some factors that we consider to be essential
58
International cooperation and assistance: A Norwegian perspective
to strengthening both the incentives for—and the impact of—

cooperation and assistance.
*
Norway has been a staunch supporter of the Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention since it was adopted in Oslo in 1997. We
believed in 2014—along with many others—that the Maputo
Declaration’s goal for States parties to intensify efforts to fulfil
their obligations as soon as possible and to the fullest extent
possible by 2025 was within reach.
Over the past few years, we have witnessed an increase
in the use of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature
(also known as improvised mines), mainly by non-State armed
groups. This has resulted in an increased number of civilian
casualties. Improvised landmines are not a new concept. What
is new is the magnitude of the problem. Addressing the large-
scale contamination from improvised mines—and the suffering
they cause—will require a coordinated humanitarian effort
and dedicated resources from the international community.
According to Mine Action Review’s Clearing the Mines 2019
report, published by the Norwegian People’s Aid, 56 States
(including 34 States parties to the Convention) and three other
areas are affected by anti-personnel mines.
Clearing areas in countries where improvised anti-
personnel mines and explosive remnants of war have been used
in recent armed conflict is necessary to ensure the return of
internally displaced persons and refugees, as well as a return to
normality for the population. This will be dangerous and time-
consuming work. Donor countries must be committed for the
long haul and the international community must be coordinated
in their approach.
The challenges related to new use of improvised landmines
have increased global political attention and funding for mine
action. This is necessary and welcome but should not come
at the expense of efforts to clear legacy contamination, which
continues to be the main challenge in the majority of affected
59
States. Cooperation and assistance activities must strive to

find a balance. The Landmine Free 2025 campaign has been
instrumental in refocusing attention on the commitment from
Maputo.
What are the main obstacles to reaching the 2025 goal?
Three suggestions were offered during the thematic debate in
May: insufficient funding, limited political will and inadequate
national mine action standards and baselines of anti-personnel
mine contamination. These three factors are interrelated, and
cooperation and assistance are relevant to all of them.
*
Through Landmine Monitor, the ICBL-CMC monitors
funding levels and reports annually on international and national
support for mine action. According to the 2018 report, the
combined level of funding in 2017 was the highest ever reported
and represented an increase of 36 per cent compared to 2016. A
total of 38 States and three other areas received contributions
from 37 donors in 2017. Eleven States and one area had only
one donor. Ten affected countries reported providing national
support for their own mine action programmes.
Landmine Monitor devotes some attention to patterns of
change, such as increases and decreases in mine action funding
by thematic sectors, recipient countries and donors. Although
such figures tell us something about overall trends, they do not
provide the full picture. Changes in donor contributions may be
the result of currency fluctuations and funding shortfalls rather
than shifts in political priorities and local situations. In addition,
national contributions to mine action in affected countries
tend to be under-reported, as few States parties report national
funding as part of their Article 7 reports.
According to Landmine Monitor, almost 60 per cent of
funding for mine action was dedicated to clearance and risk
education in 2017. Risk education activities are often integrated
into survey and clearance activities in local communities and
are not always specified. Landmine Monitor further reports that
60
A carpet weaver in Afghanistan with a tapestry featuring the logo used for the
Convention’s meetings and conferences, 2006. ©AP Mine Ban Convention ISU
support dedicated to victim assistance represented 2 per cent

of total international support for mine action. The real figure
is likely to be higher since 37 per cent of all contributions
are not disaggregated by donors or specifically earmarked
for a particular pillar of mine action. Non-earmarked funding
for mine action is provided to trust funds, United Nations
agencies and NGOs. In addition, many donor States integrate
support for mine victims into their contributions for broader
development assistance frameworks relating to the rights
of persons with disabilities, health, education, employment,
development and poverty reduction. There is an issue of under-
reporting for victims and other persons with disabilities since
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/
Development Assistance Committee markers for official
development assistance do not provide a wide range of thematic
objectives. Contributions channelled for instance through
ICRC’s annual landmine appeal are more easily identified as
victim assistance than contributions to general programmes for
development and for the rights of persons with disabilities.
Although 2017 saw the highest funding level, there is
no doubt that financial support is unevenly distributed among
donors and affected countries. Five States contributed 79 per
cent of international support in 2017. The record 2017 total was
primarily the result of massive increases in the contribution
of United States and Germany for a few countries. The largest
increases were for activities in Iraq and the Syrian Arab
Republic. Mine action in five countries (Afghanistan, Colombia,
Iraq, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Syrian Arab
Republic) received 65 per cent of all international support in
2017. Iraq received the largest amount of funding (30 per cent)
from the largest number of donors (17). More than 60 per cent
of international support was provided for 16 countries and one
other area, which has massive or heavy contamination.
*
62
The figures above indicate that there is a potential to widen

the donor base. Norway would like to see many more countries
become donors and contribute to transparency in cooperation
and assistance for mine action.
What motivates donors? Donor countries have different
approaches to cooperation and assistance with affected
countries. A humanitarian perspective takes as its point of
departure the need to protect people living in contaminated
areas and the legal obligation of the Anti-Personnel Mine
Ban Convention to provide assistance to affected countries. A
development perspective takes as its point of departure the need
to release previously contaminated land to local communities
to enable investments in infrastructure, agriculture, forestry,
tourism and other drivers of social and economic development.
Some donors prefer direct partnerships with humanitarian
demining organizations, victim assistance organizations or
government agencies of affected States as part of bilateral
development cooperation. Other donors channel funding
through the United Nations Development Programme, funding
mechanisms such as the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund
for Assistance in Mine Action administered by the United
Nations Mine Action Service, or ITF (International Trust Fund)
Enhancing Human Security.
It is Norway’s view that more important than the volume
of support, as measured by funding figures alone, is how
resources are spent to create the greatest possible impact. It
is our view that cooperation and assistance partnerships can
contribute greatly to increasing the impact of ongoing mine
action programmes in many countries, helping them complete
clearance more efficiently.
Increased focus during the past few years on the goal of
States parties becoming landmine-free by 2025 has fuelled
debate among donors on whether to focus on helping selected
countries cross the finishing line or on the 20 or so affected
countries that receive little or no assistance for mine action.
63
Priority lists of affected countries can be drawn up on the

basis of urgency and the potential for completion. It is possible
to identify, for example, countries with limited contamination
where progress can be accelerated with increased external
funding over a short period of time, as well as countries with
medium to heavy contamination, which will require a more
coordinated approach and significant external funding levels to
make real progress towards 2025.
Affected countries that demonstrate strong national
ownership and political will towards completion are more likely
to attract cooperation and assistance from other States. At the
same time, the political will among donors to give priority to
funding mine action will be influenced by national priorities and
the degree to which investments in mine action are considered
to achieve results.
The Norwegian presidency of the Anti-Personnel Mine
Ban Convention’s Review Conference in 2019 is dedicated to
increasing political awareness internationally of the continued
relevance of the commitments in the Convention. It is our hope
that the new action plan to be adopted at the Review Conference
in Oslo (25 to 29 November) for the next five-year period will
provide new energy to implementation of all the pillars of the
Convention.
*
National ownership of the problem and the political will
to assist are key factors of partnerships in cooperation and
assistance. As 2025 moves closer, Norway would like the
global mine action community to come together to make clear,
concrete, country-specific and time-bound plans for how each
country will become mine-free.
The individualized approach established by the Convention
is an important tool in this regard. It provides a platform for
dialogue on the status and challenges faced by States parties in
the implementation of their obligations under the Convention. It
enables donors and national authorities to meet in the margins
64
of intersessional and States parties’ meetings to address the

gap between needs and available resources in mine-affected
countries. The challenge is how to follow up on this dialogue.
In addition to a formal individualized approach, it is
clear that cooperation and assistance can be fostered through
a variety of approaches. For example, there is an increasing
understanding of the role that national dialogues involving all
relevant stakeholders can play in monitoring and accelerating
progress in mine action. A platform for such dialogue can
provide the basis for consultations and consensus building,
identify priorities and policy needs, and monitor activities with
an emphasis on ensuring progress towards 2025. Additionally,
a mine action platform can contribute to increasing the national
visibility and clout for national mine action authorities, raising
the interest and commitment of donors at the country level,
providing a forum where stakeholders can share experience,
and encouraging changes in national standards and practices if
they are not up to date. The European Union–initiated national
stakeholder dialogues, which are financially supported by the
European Union’s Council decisions, are such an approach
and have played an important role in facilitating national
workshops—for instance, to discuss the establishment of
national action plans—in a number of affected countries.
Whereas workshops can be instrumental in their own right,
it is Norway’s experience that workshops that are used to
establish platforms for regular and ongoing dialogue between
all stakeholders in mine action at country level can contribute
to progress.
There are, in fact, surprisingly many affected countries
where there are no opportunities for donors, national mine
action authorities and demining organizations to meet to discuss
challenges and experiences in a frank and open atmosphere. A
donor that has a diplomatic presence in a mine-affected country
could volunteer to serve as a “lead nation” and promote the
establishment of a platform for dialogue by offering to host
workshops at a technical level or by facilitating a mine action
65
stakeholder dialogue. Such a platform should be nationally

owned and led; therefore a presence of a competent and
committed national mine action authority is a precondition for
success. Furthermore, this platform could be strengthened by
operational assistance from a larger humanitarian demining
organization.
It is essential that all voices can be heard and that even
sensitive issues can be brought to the table among stakeholders
who share a common interest of progress in mine action.
Resources such as Mine Action Review’s country-specific
recommendations for action on Article 5 implementation can
often serve as a useful starting point for discussions. A priority
issue for a national dialogue should be the establishment of
accurate baselines of contamination so that the extent of the
problem is known. So far, only around 12 affected States parties
have done so.
Although national ownership, defined by a high-level
political interest and commitment to fulfilling the obligations of
the Convention, is vital to ensuring progress in mine action, it
is not necessarily a prerequisite for the establishment of a mine
action platform. In fact, strengthening national ownership of an
affected State could be one of the objectives of a mine action
platform.
National ownership can be demonstrated by a clear
understanding of the current situation or a commitment to
undertake baseline surveys of contamination in the country, a
realistic but ambitious plan to address the challenge as soon as
possible and a national financial commitment by the affected
State.
The convening power of a local “lead nation” or
“champion donor” should not be underestimated. At the same
time, the role of institutions such as the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining and other experts who can
act as honest brokers in facilitating meetings and providing
action points to be followed is essential—as is the requirement
66
for agreed action points to be circulated to participants after

each meeting.
The case of Lebanon provides an interesting example.
The Lebanese Mine Action Centre has shared the experience
of Lebanon’s recently established national mine action forum
at several side events in Geneva. An initiative was taken by
Norway in November 2017 to improve dialogue at the technical
level between national authorities, demining organizations and
donor embassies to address the slow pace of clearance of cluster
munitions and anti-personnel mines in Lebanon. The Norwegian
embassy in Beirut facilitated the first of several workshops that
resulted in the establishment in 2018 of a national mine action
forum. This forum continues to be convened twice a year by the
Norwegian embassy and employs external moderators to enable
all relevant issues to be addressed and follow-up points to be
formulated. This has proven to be a success. Within a short
period of time, Lebanese national mine action standards were
brought in line with the international clearance standards, donor
funding increased, and the operational efficiency of survey and
clearance efforts improved considerably. It is envisaged that the
present convening role of Norway in Lebanon will be passed on
to other interested donors on a rotational basis.
There is no set formula for the composition of a national
mine action platform. Existing mine action coordination
structures need to be considered. The participation and buy-in
of representatives from Governments, donors, international
organizations and United Nations agencies, and NGOs are
relevant.
From the Norwegian experience, focusing on survey and
clearance at the technical and operational level has worked
well in Lebanon. However, there are no reasons why other
mine action forums should not also focus on other areas where
challenges remain, such as victim assistance or the link to
broader development policies and the Sustainable Development
Goals. We would, however, caution against introducing a very
67
wide agenda to a very diverse group of stakeholders within one

platform because it may make the dialogue less manageable and
dilute responsibility for following up on action points.
*
Cooperation and assistance partnerships at the country
level as described above can also contribute to establishing or
strengthening South-South capacity-building between mine
action authorities in neighbouring countries or within the
region, or sharing experiences of civil-military cooperation in
mine action.
In many countries, mine action authorities are organized
within the Ministry of Defence or a military command structure
but may nevertheless cooperate closely with international
humanitarian demining NGOs. Many of these NGOs have been
instrumental in organizing visits for national mine action centre
officials to other countries to learn practices and standards
applied there. National mine action centres in heavily affected
countries with long-standing programmes have the potential to
serve as regional hubs that provide capacity-building and share
best practices.
To conclude, national platforms for dialogue can ensure
the continuation of an individualized approach with affected
countries and should be established in all of them. They can
ensure that national dialogues on mine action are maintained
over time and can address both technical and operational issues,
as well as government-level policies. They can make a tangible
difference to standards, funding and political will—and thus to
the prospect of reaching the 2025 goal.
68
A landmine victim in the Democratic Republic of the Congo who lost
her leg near a river in 1997. UNMAS/Gwenn Dubourthoumieu
Victim assistance: There is a face and
name behind each casualty
Firoz Alizada
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention Implementation
Support Unit
Ken Rutherford
James Madison University
Introduction: Global humanitarian landmine crisis

The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention marks the world’s
first legal obligation to provide victim assistance for the
survivor population of that particular weapon system.117 In
1998, the International Committee of the Red Cross estimated
that landmines were killing or injuring more than 24,000 people
per year118 and the United States Department of State labelled
landmines “one of the most toxic and widespread pollution[s]
facing mankind”,119 with victims who are mostly civilian.120
Fortunately, we, the authors of this chapter, survived—
barely—from the landmine explosions that took both our legs.
We were not soldiers. One of us (Firoz) was a 13-year-old
school student in Afghanistan, while the other (Ken) was in
Somalia conducting humanitarian relief operations for recently
returned refugees.
71
We each held our breath until receiving proper medical

care and ultimately amputations, many miles away and hours
later. We were able to survive and thrive after these accidents
thanks to the efforts of many, as well as inspiration garnered
from fellow landmine survivors from around the world. We
have been privileged to work with these survivors over the past
two decades of advocating for this Convention.
Landmines were legal and victim assistance was unheard
of before the Convention, which includes a clause to provide
humanitarian relief for the hundreds of thousands of children,
women and men who have been maimed by landmines. This
language was an unprecedented achievement that came about
through the efforts of many people. Most importantly, landmine
survivors themselves played a central role in ensuring that the
people most wounded by these inhumane devices would not be
forgotten in the first treaty to ban their use.
Incredibly, we are now celebrating the complete
prohibition of landmines by a majority of the world’s countries.
Landmine victim statistics were, and are, well known to
many people, but after a while, the numbers become mind-
numbing. It is easy to forget that there is a face and name
behind each landmine casualty. Also, less well understood is the
personal horror that each survivor experiences in the moments
after the explosion. Landmines tear off limbs and shoot shrapnel
and dirt into the body. Even one’s own bones become projectiles.
If the eyes are not blinded during the explosion, a survivor can
see his own body torn, mangled and bleeding without nearby
help. The unfortunate victim usually dies alone.
The survivor voices—RISE! Putting a human face on the

suffering
The voices of landmine survivors were first heard at the
international diplomatic level in Vienna at the first Review
Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons (CCW) landmines protocol, held 24 years ago in
72
Victim assistance: There is a face and name behind each casualty
1995. In an unusual development at the time, survivors and

representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
working directly to clear and destroy landmines were invited
to speak to the assembly of delegates. Many of the NGOs were
members of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines
(ICBL), led by its coordinator Jody Williams. It was not just
another diplomatic discussion with government officials
stating the same stale points of view. Instead, people who were
experiencing the tragedy first hand were helping to set the
tone of the discussion. During their speeches, persons injured
by landmines from Afghanistan, Cambodia and the United
States provided powerful evidence for urging the ban on these
weapons.
By late 1995, very few people were pushing for victim
assistance. At the time, the pursuit of a global ban was the
central, unrelenting focus of ICBL. On the surface, at least, it
seemed logical that wealthier States would resist the inclusion
of landmine victim assistance in the Convention, as many
of them are not directly affected by landmines. Any mine
victim assistance provided by these States would necessarily
go to affected States. And poorer countries, those affected by
landmines, have limited means and infrastructure to support
the growing number of survivors. Victim assistance seemed a
no-win situation for garnering potential support.
The final CCW landmines protocol review session
convened with 51 participating Governments at the end of April
1996 in Geneva. With her opening plenary address, Jody set the
urgent tone for the meeting by stating, “[m]ore people have been
killed or maimed by landmines since the end of the first session
of the Review Conference in Vienna. How many more will it
take?”121 If they had not already done so, government leaders
immediately realized that Williams was more formidable than
other activists they had tried to circumvent.
After Jody’s speech, Ken and Jerry White, an American
landmine survivor who lost his leg as a college student in Israel,
73
launched the Landmine Survivors Network to give a voice to the

voiceless. The first organization for and by landmine survivors,
the Network advocated for victim assistance to be included in
the negotiations when—at the time—there was little support
from Governments for and attention to this issue.
In the main conference hallway at the Palais des Nations,
Cambodian landmine survivor, Tun Channareth and Ken
co-introduced the “Wall of Remembrance”, a photographic
collection of Cambodian mine victims. The victims were injured
between the closing of the Vienna CCW conference in October
1995 and the opening of the Geneva conference in April
1996. During the brief period, there were more than 230 mine
accidents in the province of fewer than 250,000 Cambodians.
Behind the Wall of Remembrance display, ICBL had set up an
electronic clock that clicked every 22 minutes to signal another
mine victim injured somewhere in the world. Like the Wall of
Remembrance display, the scoreboard only counted victims
since the end of the CCW landmine conference in Vienna. By
the end of the Geneva Conference, the haunting electronic clock
had registered nearly 15,000 new victims.
Codifying victim assistance into international law:

Ottawa 1996 strategy landmine conference
Survivors found an ally in Canada’s Department of
Foreign Affairs and its foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy, who
understood through Canada’s peacekeeping tradition that
landmines posed a threat to its soldiers.
Among the campaigners attending the Ottawa Conference
was Brian Isfeld, the father of one of Canada’s finest military
sons, Mark Isfeld. Brian said that before his son was killed by
a landmine in 1994 in Croatia, he wanted the weapons banned
because he had seen them kill children.
By the end of the Conference, victim assistance received
rhetorical support as something that should be included in the
Convention.
74
At this point, the world’s “People’s Princess”—Diana,

Princess of Wales—brought the plight of landmine victims to
the world’s television audience and diplomatic community. In
June 1997, at the Royal Geographical Institute in London, she
called for a global ban on these horrible weapons, saying that
through landmines, “the evil that men do live long after them”.
In August, she travelled to Bosnia with Jerry and Ken, visiting
a diversity of Bosnian survivors—Croatian Catholic, Bosnian
Muslim and Serbian Orthodox Christian. They also visited
survivors who were former military personnel and civilians,
including women and children. Princess Diana brought hope
and inspiration to the living rooms of survivors in Bosnia and
the global landmine crisis to the living rooms of the world.
During the negotiations in Oslo that September, victim
assistance was included in the Convention’s draft for the first
time. The Oslo negotiations came on the heels of a week of
emotional outpouring for the death of Princess Diana, who was
killed in a car wreck in Paris on August 31, just a few days
before the negotiations were scheduled to begin. Her funeral in
London the following week was beamed by the media around
the world, while more than seven million people lined the
downtown London funeral procession route. The international
shock and attention generated by her death galvanized an
international public and media to focus on the landmine issue.
One leading international newspaper ran an editorial in the first
week of the Oslo Conference that called upon States for “the
eradication of land mines and help for their victims” as the best
way to remember her life.122
In the end, victim assistance made it into the Anti-
Personnel Mine Ban Convention due to the efforts of many
people, but considerable credit must be given to the landmine
survivors themselves for achieving the seemingly impossible:
for the first time in the world’s history, a humanitarian
disarmament convention included victim assistance provisions
and banned the weapon that had indiscriminately caused
impairments to thousands of people every month in the 1990s.
75
Evolution in understanding victim assistance

The Convention’s Article 6 (3) requires that “Each State
party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the
care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration,
of mine victims and for mine awareness programs.” Twenty
years after its adoption, this provision is still considered
a breakthrough for creating a precedent in international
humanitarian law and giving hope for victims around the world.
Victim assistance provisions were new to international
humanitarian law obligations. It took years for the humanitarian
disarmament community to create a better understanding
of what victim assistance is and how it can best be achieved.
During the first five years after the entry into force of the
Convention, States parties struggled to understand who exactly
victims are and what victim assistance would include, primarily
due both to the natural complexities of victim assistance and
to the absence of data on mine victims and poverty in affected
States. At the first Review Conference of the Convention in
2004, States parties achieved the following three substantial
developments,123 which continue to shape victim assistance
activities today:
1. The introduction of a clear definition of who are
considered victims under the Convention. States parties
agreed that victims include “those who either individually
or collectively have suffered physical or psychological
injury, economic loss or substantial impairment of their
fundamental rights through acts or omissions related to
mine utilization.” This clarification drew attention to the
full breadth of the suffering and casualties caused by
mines.
2. A recognition that victim assistance is a human right and
that efforts in this regard should be guided by this and other
principles such as non-discrimination. States embraced the
notion of inclusive development and agreed that “victim
assistance does not require the development of new fields
76
or disciplines but rather calls for ensuring that existing

health care and social service systems, rehabilitation
program and legislative and policy frameworks are
adequate to meet the needs of all citizens—including
landmine victims.”
3. The victim assistance provision was unpacked into six
elements, as follows: understanding the extent of the
challenge faced; emergency and continuing medical
care; physical rehabilitation, including physiotherapy,
prosthetics and assistive devices; psychological support
and social reintegration; economic reintegration; and, the
establishment, enforcement and implementation of relevant
laws and public policies.
These elements (also known as the six pillars) still guide
victim assistance policies and programmes.
In 2006, a “paradigm shift” came with the adoption of the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which
codified a human rights–based approach into human rights law
and changed the perception of looking at persons with disabilities
as subjects of charity and treatment, towards an understanding
that persons with disabilities are individuals entitled to human
rights. This shift strengthened the application of the human
rights principle in victim assistance. The Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities is increasingly enforced to
promote a more “systematic, sustainable, gender-sensitive and
human rights-based approach”,124 including by the 28 of the 30
States parties with significant numbers of mine survivors that
have joined it. It has provided an appropriate framework for the
integration of victim assistance into the most relevant national
policies and programmes, thus sustaining assistance to mine
survivors.
77
Realizing the rights of landmine survivors and meeting

their needs
While any States parties “in a position to do so” has
a responsibility to support mine victims—regardless of the
number of landmine victims since 2004—attention has been
focused on a group of States parties reporting “hundreds,
thousands or tens-of-thousands of landmine survivors” living
in their territories. This group of States accepted having “the
greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and
expectations for assistance”.125 As at September 2019, a total of
30 States parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
have declared having responsibility for a significant number of
mine survivors.126
National victim assistance implementation can be
described at two levels: (a) at the level of processes, namely
efforts such as planning, assessing needs, policy development,
coordination mechanisms, data collection, capacity-building,
resource mobilization, reporting and monitoring; and (b) at the
level of delivering tangible services to mine survivors, affected
families and communities.
Most of the 30 States have created certain mechanisms to
plan and coordinate victim assistance efforts among national
actors such as ministries of health, social welfare, mine action
authorities, parliament committees, organizations of persons
with disabilities/networks of landmine survivors, NGOs, United
Nations agencies, the International Committee of the Red
Cross and others. They have acted in developing or aligning
relevant plans and policies. Whereas, in a handful of these
countries, such efforts were triggered through victim assistance
implementation, gradually in nearly all cases, coordination of
victim assistance activities is undertaken within the broader
frameworks of disability rights, health, social protection and
development. Challenges such as concentration in the capitals
or big cities, limited resources and irregularities in coordination
meetings are often reported.
78
Prosthetics at a rehabilitation centre in Colombia, 2013. © AP Mine Ban Convention ISU
Progress has been reported in assessing the needs of

mine survivors, data collection, reporting and, to some extent,
monitoring by most of the 30 States over the past many years.
However, except for recording casualty data—work that has
been frequently conducted by national mine action centres, often
as part of efforts to assess needs—reporting and monitoring
activities have been carried out on an ad hoc and project basis.
Despite these efforts, shortages of comprehensive, accurate and
up-to-date data in some places and its absence in others have
been among the common challenges, significantly affecting
planning, implementation and tracking of progress.
Tangible achievements have been reported in the provision
of physical rehabilitation (prosthesis, orthosis, wheelchairs,
crutches and other mobility devices). Rehabilitation support is
available in all 30 States, although the vast majority have yet
to meet rehabilitation needs of all mine survivors, especially
in remote and rural areas. The International Committee of
the Red Cross and other international, regional and national
rehabilitation actors continue to play vital roles in this regard.
In some places, without the support of these actors, there is no
possibility of rehabilitation assistance at all.
It is worth noting that, due to the nature of the injuries
caused by mines, survivors acquire severe physical impairments,
such as from the amputation of limbs. Therefore, the provision
of prosthesis and orthosis to mine survivors remains one of the
most vital parts of assistance in affected countries and, due to
ongoing casualties and amputations, the need for such assistance
has been on the rise.
Survivors’ access to health care, psychological and peer
counselling and socioeconomic support continues to encounter
various challenges due to physical barriers, behavioural
obstacles, expensive service fees, absence of specialized
services, being left out of budget priorities and living in some
of the poorest places in the world. The ultimate objective of
victim assistance is the full inclusion of landmine survivors in
80
society, and all of the above-mentioned activities are essential

to achieve this goal. Unless they are all appropriately carried
out, the objective cannot be achieved.
International cooperation and assistance have been
instrumental in victim assistance. In the lead-up to the 2019
Oslo Review Conference, the European Union sponsored a
series of national dialogues on victim assistance and a global
conference in Jordan to “Foster Partnerships” in meeting the
needs of mine victims.
Continued and progressive national and international
dialogues on victim assistance have been proven to be useful,
as they create an opportunity for national and international
experts, practitioners, policymakers and other actors to
address challenges facing victim assistance. Gatherings such
as the “Fostering Partnerships Conference”,127 which brought
together over 150 experts and policy makers from around the
world in Jordan prior to the Fourth Review Conference of
the Convention, are the type of timely dialogues that help the
international community to collectively seek better ways to
empower mine victims.
The work is not finished

The Convention has made a difference, but the work
must continue to achieve the “enduring obligations to mine
victims”.128 Victim assistance cannot be realized without
strong partnerships among States and other actors at global
and national levels. States should take advantage of lessons
learned over the past two decades, the wealth of guides and
tools developed. States should count on the expertise and
commitment of landmine survivors, such as the authors of this
chapter, and thousands of others actively working to empower
mine survivors.
Global mine casualties have drastically decreased since
the 1990s, thanks to the relentless work of deminers, donors,
risk educators and others, but people continue to fall victim to
81
landmines and the need for more sustainable efforts continue to

grow.
We must remember that survivor assistance is all about
people. It is about the children who cannot return to school, it is
about the shepherds and farmers who struggle to earn an income,
it is about the families that are left without a breadwinner, it
is about the girls who are haunted by social stigmas because
of their impairments, and it is about the veterans who fight to
overcome trauma. It is about innocent people living in some of
the poorest countries in the world. Victim assistance does not
need a new discipline, it is just a basic human right.
Unlike other provisions of the Convention, victim
assistance is a process that must proceed with a clear, long-term
and sustainable strategy. States should continue to include the
needs and rights of mine victims in all relevant national policies
and programmes. New battles are on the horizon that will
sadly add to the numbers of mine victims. Support for survivor
assistance must not be forgotten if the global community wishes
to provide a comprehensive response to the global landmine
crisis.
82
A landmine survivor at the Mindol Metta
Karuna Reflection Centre in Cambodia,
2011. © AP Mine Ban Convention ISU
Emergency medical training in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
in March 2011. UNMAS/Gwenn Dubourthoumieu
Mine risk education at Leich Primary School, Bentiu Protection of Civilian site,
South Sudan, 2017. UNMAS/Martine Peret
Mine risk education: From infancy to
maturity?
Hugues Laurenge
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
Introduction
This chapter explores the birth and evolution of mine risk
education as a new discipline, how it is captured in the Anti-
Personnel Mine Ban Convention and how it evolved and
matured over the past 20 years.
The chapter discussion starts with a careful reading of the
mine risk education component in the Convention and analyses
how the text of the Convention—to this date—oriented, or
misoriented, the sector on understanding mine risk education,
including its role and mission.
A recounting of the mine awareness “boom” typical
of the early years (1997–2002) and the way the sector was
muddling through is then presented, followed by how the quest
for rationalization shaped mine risk education policy in the
following decade.
Difficulties in applying rational decision-making in mine
risk education, the relationship with evidence and the rise in the
use of public health approaches through an increasing interplay
85
with the “research world”, as well as how the sector performed

in terms of knowledge management, are also discussed.
Finally, the chapter covers the post-2012 period, when
the sector became immersed in the results-based management
(RBM) world and mine risk education increasingly became
the key—or the only active—pillar in many humanitarian
fronts. It concludes that in an alarming context characterized
by continuous increase of victim numbers, mine risk education
in 2019 found its rightful place in the mine action architecture,
even though distortions about its role still persist and the way
ahead is still long, as the mine risk education logic model is yet
neither fully built nor understood by everyone.
From awareness to education

When the Convention was adopted on 18 September
1997, the term “mine risk education” did not exist yet. The
Convention—and the sector—used the language “mine
awareness”. Even though by 1992 some organizations had
already developed the concept of “education of populations
in the prevention of mine accidents”,129 it is a fact that the
nascent mine risk education sector was dominated by awareness
approaches primarily focused on knowledge change (i.e.,
people should be aware of the mine problem and of the desired
behaviour change) rather than by education approaches aiming
at behaviour change (i.e., people should practice the desired
behaviour and work to sustain it).130
The terminology used—awareness versus education—was
actually not a major issue for the sector, but the way “mine
awareness” is introduced in the Convention in comparison to
other mine action components created some misinterpretations
of what became—and is—the primary normative framework for
mine action (i.e., the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention).
86
Mine risk education in 1997 is perceived as a

“secondary branch” of mine action but with an
important and distorted accountability
In the text of the Convention, “mine awareness” is
prominent in terms of accountability but has little presence in
terms of space. This original paradox had a determining role
in the way mine awareness—that is, mine risk education—was
perceived, implemented and funded during the past 20 years,
and to this day.
On one hand, mine risk education in the Convention is
introduced as a fundamental component of mine action as
“activities to reduce the incidence131 of mine-related injuries or
deaths”.132 The text and accountability are without ambiguities:
the role of mine risk education is to save lives and limbs. This
point is directly linked to the preamble, which says States
parties are determined “to put an end to the suffering and
casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim
hundreds of people every week”.
On the other hand, this vast and mighty mission of mine
risk education is not translated into a dedicated article. Mine risk
education in the Convention is limited to one sentence (Article 6
(7) (d)) and one brief mention in Article 6 (3). In comparison,
Articles 4 and 5 are specifically developed to frame in detail
the obligations of States parties for stockpile destruction and
clearance. Those articles are written with a clear eradication
objective as the Convention expects that each State “undertakes
to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines
in mined areas”. In 1997, for the Convention drafters, the
priority was to ban and to eradicate anti-personnel landmines,
while mine risk education and victim assistance were still seen
as secondary branches, still growing out from the mine action
trunk. At the Nobel Prize award ceremony in 1997, one of the
key contributors to the Convention declared, “There are tens of
millions of landmines around our world … What matters is that
we eradicate them.”133.
87
Whereas mine risk education in the Convention is seldom

mentioned but presented as outcome- or even impact-oriented
(i.e., reducing incidence), stockpile destruction and clearance
form the core of the Convention but tend to be presented as
output-oriented (i.e., destroying landmines without explicit
accountability to reduce incidence).134
In the sector, such a discrepancy should not happen; mine
risk education clearly does not have a monopoly on the reduction
of incidence. The destruction of landmines also contributes to
reducing incidence. Actually, all mine action components—
mine risk education, clearance, stockpile destruction, advocacy,
and even victim assistance as a secondary or tertiary prevention
measure—are pillars of equal importance and should all
serve, and be accountable to, the same humanitarian goal: the
reduction of incidence.135
The way mine risk education is presented in the
Convention vis-à-vis other components contributed to these
discrepancies or misinterpretations that are summarized in
table 1 (left column):
Table 1. Mine risk education in the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban

Convention: Various interpretations
Common misinterpretation Adjusted and desired interpretation
The expected outcome for mine risk The expected outcome for mine risk education
education is to reduce incidence. is positive behaviour change (people practice
the desired behaviour and work to sustain
it). This immediate or intermediate outcome
may contribute to reducing incidence (i.e., a
desired humanitarian outcome or impact for
all mine action pillars).
88

The mine risk education pillar All pillars together should at least attempt
should measure and demonstrate to measure and demonstrate ability to
its ability to reduce incidence. contribute to the “reduction of incidence”.
Other pillars are not expected to
demonstrate this.
Prioritization of mine risk education In a mine-affected region, if reversing
is guided by incidence patterns casualty trends is the primary goal for mine
while prioritization of clearance is action, the same prioritization mechanisms
guided by contamination patterns. should be used for mine risk education and
clearance, with both primarily based on
incidence patterns.
By default, we should assume there By default, we should assume there is no
is a strong cause-and-effect link strong cause-and-effect link between
between mine risk education and mine risk education and the reduction of
the reduction of casualties. casualties.
If reduction of incidence is The reduction of incidence does not
observed, it means mine risk prove mine risk education effectiveness.
education works. If reduction of incidence is observed, it is
the result of a number of factors that may
include some or a combination of effective
mine action interventions (clearance,
mine risk education, victim assistance,
stockpile destruction, advocacy) and non-
mine action interventions or events (e.g.,
coping mechanisms, less displacement
in contaminated areas, more economic
alternatives provided to communities
dependent on contaminated areas for
livelihood, and market price fluctuations that
may, for example, decrease the incentive for
people to collect scrap metal and potentially
encounter unexploded ordnance).
89

If an increase of incidence is The increase of incidence does not prove mine
observed, it means mine risk risk education ineffectiveness or lack of it. If
education does not work or was not an increase of incidence is observed, it is the
provided. result of a number of factors that may include
ineffective—or an absence of—some or a
combination of mine action interventions
and non-mine action interventions or events.
“The reduction of incidence is not The reduction of incidence is a humanitarian
our business. For information on imperative and everyone’s responsibility in
this theme, go to the mine risk mine action.
education team.”
As described above, mine risk education was not yet a

clear and mature concept in 1997. The new “pillar” would have
to be built progressively.
1997-2002: The mine awareness boom and progressive

construction of mine risk education
In the late 1990s, mine risk education was neither a
discipline nor a pillar, and guidelines and standards were just
emerging. Organizations kept reinventing the wheel from one
context to another and often repeated the same mistakes, and
worse, the same deviations or excesses. In 1999, in Kosovo, in a
context where more than 20 organizations were involved in mine
risk education, some schools received visits from three different
mine awareness organizations in the same week, with messages
that were not properly tested and often contradictory.136
At the same time, powerful private and public actors
conceptualized and initiated a global campaign that planned to
reach affected countries on four continents with comic books
featuring renowned Western superheroes who would rescue
children from minefields137—a campaign overturned after a
90
series of independent tests demonstrated the limitations and

inherent risks of such an approach.138
Some stakeholders, including donors, understood that mine
awareness was a powerful tool for visibility and, unfortunately,
this was often to the detriment of quality. Competition for
visibility, amateurism and rapid printing of large quantities
of awareness material without field testing of messages and
materials were common practices, sometimes with disastrous
results. In Mozambique, basic mine risk education leaflets were
used by communities as cigarette paper.139 In other contexts,
some printed materials had logos that took more space than the
actual prevention messages.
However, while the new sector was extending fast,
stakeholders experimented with new and promising behaviour
change approaches. Progressively, a myriad of national and
international organizations started to capitalize on their
experiences, producing and sharing good practices and
guidebooks.140
The quest to rationalize mine risk education

The need for mine risk education starts from the premise
that the contamination of landmines and explosive remnants
of war (ERW) in a conflict-affected area cannot be cleared
instantaneously.141 Since people are forced to live in a dangerous
environment for months (less often), for years or decades (more
often), people have to learn how to manage this risk.
Like in any awareness-raising or injury/disease prevention
approach (e.g., road safety education and AIDS prevention),
mine risk education may mobilize an incredible diversity of
strategies, channels and materials.
Such diversity is both a strength and a trap. Diversity of
choice means flexibility, but, if we embrace the rationalist
approach to policy making by which possible solutions are
explored and weighed until the best one is selected, rationally
91
choosing the best mine risk education approach looks like an

impossible challenge. Shall a campaign for such education
favour radio and TV, or lessons in schools, or public distribution
of brochures, or training of religious leaders? There are very
few appropriate alternatives to conduct an immunization
campaign, but there may be dozens or hundreds of different
strategies for mine risk education that would be—at first sight—
valid. The more options are available, the more complicated the
decision-making process becomes. The multiplicity of possible
strategies and complexity of pathways to deliver a given service
is not inherent to mine risk education; it is inherent to the social
sector.142
Relationship between mine risk education and

evidence: Rare but decisive contributions from the
academic sector
Research is key to clarifying the “landscape” of a given
policy143 and mine risk education is no exception. Despite
many years of experience, the sector had not produced
consistent research literature. Exceptions include, for example,
an attempt by Andersson et al.144 to use scientific evidence to
measure the effectiveness of mine risk education in Angola
and Afghanistan,145 and a retrospective analysis by Durham
et al.146 of the limitations of traditional mine risk education
activities in Lao People’s Democratic Republic. The findings
of the first study shook up many prejudices about the perceived
usefulness of mine risk education. Quasi-experimental design
was used with people not exposed to such education as the
“control groups”, and the paper raised essential questions that
most mine risk education practitioners had not considered,
especially by raising evidence that such education can have
negative consequences (increasing risk instead of decreasing it),
something almost unthinkable until the study was published.
In the second paper, authors promoted and used the
“ecological model of health and safety promotion”,147 a useful
framework to distinguish the factors contributing to a specific
92
at-risk behaviour. They concluded that traditional mine risk

education cannot modify behaviour of people and thus is
incapable to fulfil its goal because economic pressures to collect
and sell scrap metal from ERW are so high that education
alone cannot be the right response. The study highlighted
the need to integrate a socioeconomic analysis within needs
assessments and generated globally a new interest in alternative
economic risk reduction activities148 that should complement
mine risk education, such as those reflected in the policy of the
International Committee of the Red Cross.149
Increasing influence of the health sector

The publishing of academic research was only the tip
of the iceberg of a vast movement in the mine risk education
community to “professionalize” and rationalize the discipline.
In 2000, the first Knowledge, Attitude, Practice surveys were
initiated—using cluster sampling techniques derived from the
World Health Organization methodologies150—and since then,
such surveys have been implemented in dozens of countries.151
The impetus for more evidence-based approaches came mainly
from the health sector: quasi-experimental design; ecological
models for health and safety promotion; and cluster sampling
methodologies directly imported from the World Health
Organization. But one of the most important “rationalist”
influence efforts started in 2003 through an ambitious 10-year
partnership between the United States Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention and the United Nations Children’s Fund.
The two organizations developed field epidemiology courses
for 121 mine risk education practitioners from the Americas,
Europe, Asia and Africa.152 This programme revolutionized
such education in the sense that practitioners and managers
were trained to utilize different techniques of qualitative and
quantitative surveys, sampling methodologies, evaluation tools
and injury surveillance systems. Many of these techniques were
completely new to the mine risk education audience153.
93
The paradigm shift for the mine risk education community

was that, starting from 2003, for the first time, specialists of
such education began to perceive and analyse their discipline
not as a purely educational issue (the social science perspective)
but, above all, as a public health issue (the natural science
perspective). While mine risk education was previously seen
as a “machine” for knowledge and behaviour change, it became
a strategy to address the epidemic: more people are killed in
certain contaminated areas than others, thus the communities
living in or moving to those areas need to be identified and
prioritized through the ongoing mapping of mines and ERW
incidents. With this new logic, the understanding of the
magnitude, nature and dynamics of the epidemic (where do the
recent incidents occur, who are the victims, why, when, how)
forms the evidence base of strategies to address the epidemic.
This public health approach paradigm shift also partly influenced
other pillars such as clearance,154 an activity that can be seen as a
radical way to get rid of the agent of contamination responsible
for the epidemic (mines/ERW), while mine risk education is the
way to teach how to manage it (i.e., how to recognize symptoms,
how to avoid it and how to report information about it).
The evidence-based movement in mine risk education
is a process not yet accomplished—not all practitioners are
familiar with the existing range of research tools—and in 2018,
surveillance systems themselves were not yet highlighted in the
main normative frameworks for mine action.155
Overall, the sector evolved relatively well in the first 20
years in terms of evidence-building, but it was also confronted
with a recurrent issue: the outcome of mine risk education
research too often did not grow, or ended in stalemate, simply
because the knowledge gained was far too “static”.
94
Static knowledge management

Mine risk education knowledge can be divided into two
categories, either tacit (i.e., not written and scattered among
individual practitioners) or explicit (i.e., written in norms
and guidelines). With the release of the solid International
Mine Action Standards best-practice guidebooks156 on mine
risk education in 2005 (768 pages in total), explicit mine risk
education knowledge reached an incredible peak. However, this
knowledge was not converted, not conveyed. Internalization of
knowledge or “institutionalization”157 was often not happening.
In particular, training as a vehicle for learning was not
standardized and tended to be an eternal prototype, constantly
reshaped and largely underexploited.158
Knowledge in mine risk education was too static, not
dynamic, and not sufficiently socially constructed. As a result,
the industry was stuck in a single-loop learning cycle,159 and
performance was weak because the “wheel” continued to be
reinvented.
One possible contributing factor to—and consequence
of—this lack of dynamic circulation of knowledge is the
impressive rotation of mine risk education staff and consultants
over the past 20 years. This hypothesis is highly related to the
“risk of deterioration”:160 when knowledge is too dependent
on individuals, excessive turnover can negatively impact
performance.
To rationalize mine risk education, another fundamental
element was also missing even around the time of the Third
Review Conference (2014): the adoption of RBM approaches.
Rationalizing mine risk education through results-

based management
In 2012, the United Kingdom Department for International
Development commissioned a global meta-evaluation that
concluded that mine action was essentially output and process-
95
oriented, that most prioritization mechanisms were based on

the rule of thumb,161 and that the monitoring and evaluation
culture was poor with absence of use of theories of change
and results frameworks.162 All these issues were obviously
relevant to mine risk education and it appeared clearly that,
15 years after the Convention was signed, simple concepts
such as outputs, outcomes and impact were far from clear. In
2016, the United Nations Children’s Fund, with the support of
the Swiss Government and other partners, developed a global
annual RBM/integrated mine action course163 for the sector to
break down silos between pillars, and between organizations,
and ensure that stakeholders have the capacity to develop a
collaborative results framework that is outcome-driven.164
Strengthening mine risk education also meant strengthening
its integration with other pillars as the best way to effectively
contribute towards reducing incidence. Figure 1 illustrates the
results chain for mine risk education in line with RBM and
“Value for Money” principles.
In the same vein, a newly certified 10-day RBM/mine risk
education course was piloted in 2017 and proposed every year
to 16 organizations165 and more than 20 mine-affected countries
to ensure that the sector is equipped with both forms of mine
risk education knowledge—tacit as knowledge circulates among
practitioners, and explicit as norms and guidelines are promoted.
When combined with a solid RBM know-how, this substantially
reinforces the mine risk education pillar.
96
Figure 1. The mine risk education results chain
Later developments
From 2012 to 2019, the mine risk education sector
continued to gain maturity despite chronic underfunding. Mine
risk education was no longer considered an optional pillar,
and it became increasingly integrated with other mine action
activities.166 Organizations that once were not engaged or did
not prioritize such education became proponents.167 Mine risk
education was increasingly seen as an entry point able to open
the humanitarian space for mine action in countries affected by
ongoing conflict and it was thus often seen as the only mine/
ERW prevention measure that was implementable. The global
platform of the mine risk education community of practice,168
almost dormant after 2005, experienced a revival in the past
several years. The year 2019 was a watershed, particularly with
the impetus of Norway, as mine risk education was prioritized
at the global level to a point not seen in 20 years, including
through the establishment of the Explosive Ordnance Risk
Education Advisory Group169 in May 2019. This Advisory
Group, a new coalition of at least 16 organizations, will raise the
97
profile and strengthen mine risk education, including through

the development and implementation of the Oslo Action Plan.
Conclusion
Mine risk education entered into the Convention through
a narrow door, with a mandate paradoxically over-magnified:
the pressing need to save lives and limbs. Reducing incidence
was seen as the specific task and product of such education.
In a mine action context, it is not. All combined mine action
interventions should lead to the reduction of incidence. From an
epidemiology viewpoint, mine action is a set of public health
interventions designed to contain, curb or halt the epidemic of
mines/ERW explosions.
Over the past 20 years, the original 1997 misrepresentation
of mine risk education exacerbated a number of existential
crises and misunderstandings. To name a few: is mine risk
education an intervention that has value, considering it is unable
to prove that lives are saved? Is mine risk education the sole
pillar accountable for addressing casualty rates? Can mine risk
education possibly lead to the reduction of incidence? Despite
doubts, lack of funding and years of knowledge exchange
inertia, mine risk education grew up through a long incremental
rationalization process that is well advanced in 2019, although
not yet accomplished, as theories of change and norms for
metrics and risk education for improvised explosive devices
remain to be fully articulated.
However, the discipline has matured sufficiently to
“change the rules of the game”, redefining its role and, by
extension, some functions of other pillars. With the global rise
of casualties, all eyes turn to the mine risk education community.
This is, in one way, positive for elevating a pillar often set aside
by decision makers since 1997 and it is meaningful in contexts
where mine risk education is the sole pillar activated. In another
way, however, there remains a need to correct this perspective,
98
as reversing casualty trends is a responsibility for the entire

sector.
Effective and enlightened mine risk education will
contribute to combating the epidemic, but this should be a
collective effort that embraces as many mine action pillars as
possible.
99
A landmine. Afghanistan was covered with metal scraps and live munitions from
20 years of fighting, 2001. UN Photo/Luke Powell
The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention: The importance of
transparency and exchange of
information and opportunities under
the Convention
Juan Carlos Ruan
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention Implementation
Support Unit
Introduction
The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention has been hailed
as one of the most successful humanitarian disarmament
conventions. Apart from the personal efforts of a number of
people representing Governments, international organizations
and non‑governmental organizations that have, both figuratively
and literally, given their blood, sweat and tears for the
Convention’s implementation, its success can be attributed to
its established culture, which is underpinned by unprecedented
transparency and exchange of information. The drafters of
the Convention and those tasked with its implementation
over the past 20 years should be credited with establishing an
implementation structure that has nurtured these principles and
ensured a spirit of community in achieving the determination
of the States parties in “putting an end to the suffering and
casualties caused by anti-personnel mines”.
The author was not lucky enough to have been party to the
negotiations of the treaty. Nonetheless, those involved have time
and time again shared stories of how the energy surrounding
the negotiations hinted that what was unfolding was very
different than anything ever before seen in treaty negotiations.
The result was unprecedented: a Convention prohibiting the
101
use, stockpiling, production and transfer, as well as obligating

the destruction of, a weapon that, at the time, sat ready to be
deployed in the arsenals of the great majority of States.
The final text of the Convention not only prohibits the
actions highlighted in the Convention’s title, but also obligates
States parties to carry out a number of related time-bound
activities. These include identifying and clearing mined areas,
ensuring the exclusion of civilians from affected areas until anti-
personnel mines in these areas are destroyed and destroying all
stockpiled anti-personnel mines. States parties are also required
to provide cooperation and assistance—including for the care
and rehabilitation as well as the social and economic integration
of victims—and to take appropriate legal, administrative and
other measures to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited
under the Convention, among other provisions. Those
negotiating and drafting the text of the Convention also had the
foresight to ensure that the Convention contained several formal
opportunities for States parties to demonstrate transparency
and exchange of information on their implementation efforts.
In addition to these opportunities, the States parties have
established implementation machinery that further supports
transparency and the exchange of information, safeguarding
the spirit of cooperation that is a central characteristic of this
instrument.
Since the moment that the social and economic impact
of anti-personnel mines was brought to the attention of the
world, and over the course of the 20 years of implementation,
all stakeholders have reiterated that the implementation of
the Convention—shot-putting anti-personnel mines into the
doldrums of history—and support to mine victims are urgent
joint commitments. The desire of all stakeholders to see the
aims of the Convention achieved makes the completion of a
State party’s stockpile destruction or clearance programme, or
any other success and achievement by one State party, a win
for all. Such success provides impetus to our continued efforts
to see every State party cross the finish line and achieve key
102
The importance of transparency and exchange
of information and opportunities under the Convention
milestones. Measuring and witnessing progress is therefore

of interest to all stakeholders. Not only are transparency and
exchange of information vital for monitoring implementation
of the provisions; they also demonstrate the Convention’s
important contributions as a confidence- and security-building
measure between States parties, in particular those that may
have at one time been involved in armed conflict leaving
behind a legacy of contamination. Additionally, they serve as an
important catalyst for the flow of cooperation and assistance.
Ensuring information exchange

Central to transparency and the exchange of information
are the Article 7 obligations. Transparency measures under the
Convention require a State party to report to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations “as soon as practicable, and in
any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of
this Convention for that State party” detailed information on
the status of implementation of the Convention, providing a
baseline from which progress can be continuously measured.
States are then required to submit updated information on
the status of implementation on an annual basis, no later than
30 April. Since the entry into force of the Convention, these
initial and subsequent reports have been made public for
all stakeholders to view and use, making them an important
implementation measuring tool. This information is available
on the website of the United Nations Office for Disarmament
Affairs’ Geneva Branch and posted in each State party’s page
on the Convention’s website. All but one State party have
submitted an initial transparency report.
Since the Convention’s entry into force, a significant
amount of effort has been placed on ensuring that States parties
report on an annual basis. The States parties also created a
simplified tool for States that do not have progress to report
to provide a simple notification in this regard. Reporting rates
for States parties implementing key obligations under the
Convention, such as mine clearance (90 per cent), stockpile
103
destruction (100 per cent) and victim assistance (76 per cent),
have remained relatively high. However, the overall reporting
rate by States parties (47 per cent) and the reporting rate of
States parties implementing other obligations, such as those that
have not reported on national implementation measures (19 per
cent), remain low.170 Continuing to ensure progress in raising
the level of reporting among States parties remains an important
goal. However, emphasis has not only been placed on the rate of
reporting but also on the quality of reporting, both through the
development of templates and, most recently, the development
of a Guide to Reporting. States parties have been encouraged
to employ this Guide in drafting their Article 7 reports to help
ensure a high level of clarity on the status of implementation
of the Convention’s provisions, including cooperation and
assistance efforts.
In the 2014 Maputo Action Plan, the States parties
emphasized that “transparency and the open exchange of
information, through both formal mechanisms under the
Convention and other informal means, are essential to achieving
the Convention’s aims. The States parties also recognize that
dialogue informed by accurate and high-quality information
can support cooperation and assistance and accelerate the
Convention’s implementation”. Therefore, in addition to the
formal meetings mandated to review the operation and status of
this Convention, the States parties have established an informal
work programme with intersessional meetings, providing a
window to informally discuss progress in implementation and
important matters affecting implementation. These formal and
informal gatherings have supported continuous momentum in
implementation, with States parties and stakeholders taking
advantage of these opportunities to exchange information
and share ideas on how to strengthen or improve on joint
implementation efforts.
The wealth of information that flows from States parties
concerning their implementation efforts complements formal
reporting requirements under Article 7, often providing
104
additional insight on implementation challenges. This additional

information is also made public on the Convention’s website.
How does the Convention machinery ensure

transparency and the exchange of information?
Monitoring implementation of the various aspects of the
Convention falls to the President of a Convention meeting and
its four thematic committees. In accordance with the mandate
given to them by the third Review Conference, they have
placed increasing emphasis on interaction with information
provided by States parties. As previously mentioned, formal and
informal meetings provide the implementation machinery with
enhanced opportunities to obtain new or enriched information,
in particular through bilateral meetings with experts on
national mine clearance, victim assistance and other areas.
This interaction between the Convention’s implementation
machinery and States parties has been welcomed by the Parties,
as it has increased the exchange and flow of information,
provided increased clarity on the status of implementation and
fostered cooperation to achieve implementation as soon as
possible. This interaction has also supported the Committee
in implementing their mandates of developing preliminary
observations on implementation at informal meetings and final
conclusions at formal meetings.
Cooperation and assistance

The Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation and
Assistance is mandated in part to “promote cooperation and
assistance under the Convention, including by organizing or
encouraging the organization of multilateral, regional or national
dialogues on cooperation and assistance” and to “facilitate
the fostering of partnerships between States parties seeking
to receive assistance and those in a position to provide such
assistance, including through the use of information exchange
tools”. This Committee has carried out efforts to promote a
105
more robust exchange of information between stakeholders at

an international and national level. One of these recent efforts is
the establishment of the Individualized Approach, which offers
a platform on the margins of informal and formal meetings for
interested States parties to invite partners and stakeholders to
discuss remaining challenges and their requirements for support.
In addition to the individualized approach, the Committee
further recognized the need to ensure that a regular dialogue
and exchange of information with partners are fostered at the
national level. In a paper it presented for a model National Mine
Action Platform, the Committee promoted the establishment of
a platform for dialogue to periodically call on all stakeholders to
come together and discuss progress made, as well as challenges
faced in implementation. Continuous dialogue with stakeholders
on implementation has been noted as a critical component of
implementation and support for mine action programmes to
strengthen cooperation and assistance.
Confidence- and security-building

Transparency and the exchange of information have also
proved essential as a confidence- and security-building measure.
One example is that of Ecuador and Peru, who in 1995 were
engaged in a border conflict in which both States employed
anti-personnel mines. Following three years of negotiations,
the Governments signed a comprehensive peace accord on
26 October 1998, which opened the door for the States to
ratify the Convention on 29 April 1999 and on 17 June 1998,
respectively. Since this time, Ecuador and Peru have had
regular meetings for their National Mine Action Authorities to
exchange information on demining operations along their joint
border, including to facilitate the exchange of best practices and
expertise in meeting their treaty obligations. These meetings
have also led to valuable information being exchanged on
the location of mined areas, supporting their subsequent
eradication. Ecuador and Peru also carried out several activities
to share information with the international community on
106
progress in their joint efforts under the name of “Ecuador and

Peru: Walking Together”. As a result of this cooperation, they
have developed a binational Humanitarian Demining Unit and
a binational humanitarian Demining Manual to carry out joint
operations along the border in the square kilometre of Tiwinza,
an area that was part of the peace accord, starting in 2013 and
successfully culminating in 2018.
Today, a number of States parties that face challenges
from mined areas along their joint borders could benefit from
this type of regular dialogue and exchange of information, as a
means not only to ensure the safety and security of communities
living in the border area but also to address mine contamination
in an effective and efficient manner. Transparency and the
exchange of information can also provide an opportunity
to carry out efforts to separate what is essentially a technical
activity for humanitarian ends from the political aspects
associated with delineation and demarcation of the border. The
work carried out by Ecuador and Peru is a good example of
possible collaboration.
Conclusions
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of
transparency and the exchange of information in fostering
cooperation and assistance, strengthening confidence
between States and ultimately contributing to the effective
implementation of the Convention. While it is not always easy
to attribute success to these two critical elements, without them
in place, conversations on cooperation and assistance and the
building of confidence are simply non-starters.
The opportunities mentioned in this article are not
exhaustive.
Several other opportunities that demonstrate the important
role of transparency and exchange of information exist. These
include, for example, the important process established by the
States parties for the submission and consideration of requests
107
for extension of mine clearance deadlines. While outside of this

article’s scope, it is also important to mention the important
contribution by civil society organizations through, for example,
the research carried out by the Landmine Monitor and the Mine
Action Review, as well as from the platform provided by the
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction. Several other
forums that help further the Convention’s aims include the Mine
Action Support Group, a forum composed of donor States that
meet twice a year to exchange information, as well as coordinate
financial support and resources. Likewise, States parties and/
or civil society organizations often hold international, regional
and national events to share information on implementation and
for stakeholders to collectively discuss ways to improve the
effectiveness and efficiency of their work. All these activities
contribute to the work of the Convention.
Things are not perfect, but they can be improved.
Thankfully, transparency and the exchange of information are
deeply engrained in our work culture.
The high level of transparency and exchange of
information within this Convention, as well as the close
dialogue of its machinery with civil society and representatives
of States parties—including national mine action centres and
authorities—are often non-existent within other conventions.
Likewise, the ability of the machinery to adapt to improved
working methods has also contributed to the success of the
Convention.
We will all need to continue improving in our work. We
will also have to ensure that those States that make a concerted
effort to demonstrate a high level of transparency and provide
high quality information on their efforts to implement the
Convention also receive the necessary support to meet their
commitments. It is this information exchange and openness
that will continue to foster collaboration and build trust so that
mine-affected States parties and those in a position to assist
can enter into partnerships to address, as soon as possible, the
108
remaining challenges and further the ambitions of the States

parties to complete the Convention’s time-bound obligations, to
the fullest extent possible, by 2025.
109
Croatian deminers, 2017. © AP Mine Ban Convention ISU
Afterword
This edition began with an idea, in early 2019, to undertake a

broad examination of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
in celebration of its twentieth anniversary. The aim was to
bring together diverse perspectives on this key instrument
of humanitarian disarmament, giving readers insight into its
accomplishments to date and, of equal emphasis, challenges
that the world still must overcome to finally end the appalling
suffering caused by landmines.
During early preparations, the United Nations Office
for Disarmament Affairs consulted with the Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit, based in
Geneva, on the structure of the publication and possible authors.
It was decided that a chapter would be dedicated to each
element of the Convention, enabling a comprehensive reflection
of its development and first 20 years in force. Over two and a
half months of intensive outreach, pioneers and luminaries of
the movement that helped achieve the Convention, and continue
to save lives and limbs today, kindly agreed to contribute as
authors. It was a privilege to work with and learn from this
multidisciplinary group of officials, scholars and advocates
who have committed themselves over the past two decades
towards realizing the Convention’s full implementation. The
passion and rigour behind their contributions offered a unique
window into the qualities that have advanced progress within
the Convention’s framework.
111
We extend our sincere gratitude to all the authors and

photographers whose work is in this publication. With respect to
the authors, we offer our deepest appreciation for their profound
reflections on the subject matter, and for the flexibility and
grace they displayed during the challenging pre-publication
process. To the photographers, their work in illustrating all the
many facets related to this Treaty, from negotiations to adoption
to capturing the work taking place in clearance, education and
victim assistance, reveals the human dimensions of mine action.
Many thanks to our colleagues in the United Nations Mine
Action Service for allowing us to draw from their collection of
photographs.
Finally, we thank in particular the Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit for its
encouragement and assistance throughout this project. The
fruits of their enduring commitment already extend far beyond
these pages.
Takuma Haga
Associate Political Affairs Officer
Publication Research Lead
Diane Barnes
Political Affairs Officer
Editor-in-Chief of Publications
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

November 2019
112
Notes
1. This is an edited version of a chapter originally published as “The
Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines”, in Andrew F. Cooper,
Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakur, eds. The Oxford handbook of Modern
Diplomacy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 797-809,
reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press.
2. A Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of Waterloo,
John English has been a Liberal Member of Parliament, a Special
Ambassador for Landmines and a Special Envoy for the election of
Canada to the United Nations Security Council, and a Board member of
the Canadian Landmine Foundation. He is currently the Director of the Bill
Graham Centre for Contemporary International History at Trinity College.
3. This was the Oslo Diplomatic Conference on an International Total
Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines, which took place in Oslo during
1-18 September 1997. See https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVI-5&chapter=26&clang=_en.
4. The best source for the ratification process is the website of the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines. The site also provides a short
history of the landmine campaign and traces the success of mine eradication
efforts. The major history of the landmine ban was compiled shortly after
the treaty was signed in Ottawa: Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson
and Brian W. Tomlin, eds. To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to
Ban Landmines (Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1998).
5. Several of the leading activists make these arguments in Jody Williams,
Stephen D. Goose and Mary Wareham, Banning Landmines: Disarmament,
Citizen Diplomacy, and Human Security (Lanham, Maryland, Rowan &
Littlefield Publishers, 2008). They are accepted by Lloyd Axworthy, foreign
minister of Canada between 1996 and 2000, in his Navigating a New World:
Canada’s Global Future (Toronto, Knopf Canada, 2004).
6. International Committee of the Red Cross, Symposium on Anti-
Personnel Mines, Montreaux, 21-23 April 1993.
7. This argument was later developed as a major explanation for the
successful achievement of the mine ban by Ramesh Thakur and William
Maley, “The Ottawa Convention on Landmines: A Landmark Humanitarian
Treaty in Arms Control?”, Global Governance, vol. 5, no. 3 (July-September
1999), pp. 273-302.
8. Leahy describes his personal efforts at a Senate hearing whose
testimony was published: “The Global Landmine Crisis”, Subcommittee
113
of the Committee on Appropriations United States Senate, One Hundred

Third Congress, Second Session, 13 May 1994 (Washington, United States
Government Printing Office, 1994), pp.1-3.
9. The best description of Leahy’s role and the early organizational
efforts is found in Mary Wareham, “Rhetoric and Policy Realities in the
United States”, in Walk Without Fear, Cameron et. al., eds. (Toronto,
Oxford University Press, 1998).
10. Williams and Stephen Goose of Human Rights Watch have written
their own account of the creation of the ICBL: “The International Campaign
to Ban Landmines”, in Walk Without Fear, Cameron et. al., eds. (Toronto,
Oxford University Press, 1998).
11. Lewis’ important article was published on 25 June 1989.
12. Williams and Goose, “The International Campaign to Ban
Landmines”, p. 24.
13. ICRC, Report: Symposium on Anti-Personnel Mines.
14. Quoted in Human Rights Watch, In Its Own Words: The US Army and
Antipersonnel Mines in the Korean and Vietnam Wars (New York, Human
Rights Watch, 1997), p. 13.
15. See, for example, Chris Smith, The Military Utility of Landmines
(London, Centre for Defence Studies, University of London, 1996).
16. Williams and Goose, “Citizen Diplomacy and the Ottawa Process: A
Lasting Model?” in Williams et. al., Banning Landmines, p. 188.
17. Williams and Goose, “The International Campaign to Ban
Landmines”, p. 33.
18. Axworthy, Navigating a New World, p. 135.
19. Ibid., p. 138.
20. The Halo Trust took Diana to Angola and the Landmine Survivors
network escorted Diana to Bosnia just weeks before her death.
21. See https://www.apminebanconvention.org/en/ottawa-process/overview/.
22. The best account of this negotiation is in Axworthy, Navigating a
New World, 144ff.
23. The author is a former Policy Manager and Acting Director at the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines, a global coalition of non-
governmental organizations working to end the suffering caused by
antipersonnel mines, laureate of the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize.
114
Notes
24. Remarks by Mr. Annan at the High-Level Segment of the Pledging

Conference for the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, 2 March 2016,
Geneva, Switzerland.
25. See for instance: In message to Maputo conference, Ban calls
for accelerating efforts towards mine-free world, press release by the
United Nations, 26 June 2014, and United Nations Secretary-General’s
Video Message on the 20th Anniversary of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention, 16th Meeting of States Parties to the Convention, 18 December
2017, Vienna, Austria.
26. Message to the 16th Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 18 December 2017, Vienna,
Austria.
27. List of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General
which are Close to Achieving Universal Participation, United Nations
Treaty Collection, 31 May 2019.
28. See for example the List of Multilateral Treaties Highlighted at the
2019 Treaty Event, United Nations Treaty Collection.
29. McCartney pushes for landmine ban, BBC News, 20 April 2001.
30. Juanes se une a campaña contra las minas antipersonal, El Universal,
12 November 2009.
31. Actor Daniel Craig designated United Nations global advocate for
elimination of mines and other explosive hazards, press release by the
United Nations, 14 April 2015.
32. Angelina Jolie joins Diana’s crusade to ban landmines, The Guardian,
20 October 2002.
33. Neymar Jr becomes Handicap International Ambassador, press
release by Handicap International United Kingdom, 15 August 2017.
34. Prince Harry calls for a redoubling of efforts to achieve a Landmine
Free 2025, press release by The HALO Trust, 19 December 2017.
35. London. Archbishop Desmond Tutu supporting the anti-personel
(sic) mines campaign, audio-visual archives of the International Committee
of the Red Cross, 25 October 1995.
36. See for example: Special envoy Princess Astrid of Belgium welcomes
Oman’s decision to join the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, press
release by the Implementation Support Unit of the Convention, 19 March
2014; Convention Special Envoy welcomes Sri Lanka role in fostering
115
treaty norm in South Asia, press release by the Implementation Support

Unit of the Convention, 7 March 2018.
37. 20 years on: Remembering Princess Diana’s contribution to the
landmine movement, press release by the Implementation Support Unit of
the Convention, 31 August 2017.
38. H.E. Amb. Suraya Dalil, Ambassador of Afghanistan to Switzerland
and President of the 17th Meeting of States Parties, “On Convention
anniversary, Afghanistan calls for full acceptance of landmine ban in
Asia”, press release by the Implementation Support Unit of the Convention,
1 March 2018.
39. H.E. Amb. Hans Brattskar, Permanent Representative of Norway
to the United Nations in Geneva and President of the Fourth Review
Conference of the Convention, “On 20th anniversary, Convention President
calls on States that have not yet done so, to take the right side of history by
abolishing these weapons”, press release by the Implementation Support
Unit of the Convention, 18 September 2017.
40. H.E. Amb. Thomas Hajnoczi, Permanent Representative of Austria
to the United Nations in Geneva and President of the 16th Meeting of
States Parties, “Treaty president calls for immediate end to landmine
use in Yemen”, press release by the Implementation Support Unit of the
Convention, 24 April 2017.
41. H.E. Amb. Thomas Hajnoczi, Permanent Representative of Austria
to the United Nations in Geneva and President of the 16th Meeting of
States Parties, “Landmine treaty President calls for fact-finding mission
in Myanmar”, press release by the Implementation Support Unit of the
Convention, 22 September 2017.
42. Ending the suffering caused by anti-personnel mines: Nairobi Action
Plan 2005-2009, APLC/CONF/2004/5, p. 95.
43. Ending the suffering caused by anti-personnel mines: the Cartagena
Action Plan 2010-2014, APLC/CONF/2009/9, p. 141; Maputo Action Plan
2015-2019, APLC/CONF/2014/4, p. 12.
44. At www.apminebanconvention.org.
45. Andras Kos, Head of Disarmament of the European Union delegation
to the United Nations in Geneva, “The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
becomes binding law through the European Union”, press release by the
Implementation Support Unit of the Convention, 31 May 2013.
116
Notes
46. Council Joint Action 2008/487/CFSP of 23 June 2008, Council

Decision 2012/700/CFS of 13 November 2012, and Council Decision
2017/1428/CFSP of 17 August 2017.
47. See section on high-level representation.
48. High-level visits to three other states not party are planned for 2019–
2020.
49. Thirteen States not party participated in the Geneva event: Armenia,
Azerbaijan, India, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon,
Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Palestine, Singapore, Sri Lanka, the United Arab
Emirates and the United States.
50. See section on interim steps.
51. A/RES/52/38/A; A/RES/73/61.
52. A/RES/73/61.
53. Idem.
54. Belarus, Bhutan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Oman, Papua
New Guinea, Sri Lanka, and Turkey. Source: Landmine Monitor 2018.
55. See Shannon Smith, Surround the Cities with the Villages:
Universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, in Banning Landmines, Rowman
& Littlefield, 2008.
56. Information on the Coordinating Committee of the Convention is
available at https://bit.ly/2lQrCvY.
57. See https://bit.ly/2b6MNEL.
58. Statement by the International Committee of the Red Cross, 17th
Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention,
30 November 2018.
59. Joint Statement by Ýsmail Cem, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Turkey, and George Papandreou, Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the Hellenic Republic, Ankara, 6 April 2001.
60. Letter from Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Ismail Cem to Jody
Williams, ICBL, 7 June 2001.
61. H.E. Amb. Murat Sungar, Permanent Representative of Turkey to the
United Nations in Geneva, reported in “Conference on Disarmament Starts
Second Part of 2001 Session”, press release by the United Nations, 17 May
2001.
117
62. Singapore Technologies Engineering, the government-linked

company that produced antipersonnel mines, confirmed in 2015 that it
no longer did. See Landmine Monitor information on mine ban policy in
Singapore at https://bit.ly/2lz1XIe.
63. See Landmine Monitor information on mine ban policy in the United
States at https://bit.ly/2kv95Fo.
64. Under Article 7 of the Convention, States must report each year in
writing on measures taken at the national level to implement the Convention.
65. Kathleen Lawand, Non-State Actors and the mine ban: The Ottawa
Convention framework, in Beyond States: Engaging non-state armed
groups for a truly effective mine ban, Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines,
not dated.
66. Geneva Call, Annual Report 2018.
67. The November 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement committed
the Government of Nepal and the former Communist Party of Nepal/Maoist
to halt the use of mines and required the parties to assist each other to mark
and clear mines and booby-traps. See Landmine Monitor.
68. On 24 November 2016, the Government of Colombia and the FARC
signed an agreement committing both parties to end their long-running
armed conflict and to build peace, including through mine clearance. An
October 2017 ceasefire agreement between the Government and the ELN
included a commitment not to use anti-personnel mines. See Landmine
Monitor.
69. See “Conclusions on the status of implementation of Article 4
(Stockpile Destruction) of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention”, Mine
Ban Treaty Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties, 25 September 2018. See
also Landmine Monitor 2018, p. 4.
70. See the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor website for annual
reports and country profiles.
71. See also: Mary Wareham, “Evidence-Based Advocacy: Civil Society
Monitoring of the Mine Ban Treaty”, in Wareham, Stephen D. Goose,
and Jody Williams (eds.), Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Citizen
Diplomacy, and Human Security (Rowman & Littleford, 2008).
72. Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Landmines:
A Deadly Legacy, October 1993. .
73. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor
Report 1999: Towards a mine-free world, April 1999. This first report is
available from the Monitor’s archived site.
118
Notes
74. States not party that have stockpiled anti-personnel mines: Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
Egypt, Georgia, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar,
Nepal, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, United States,
Uzbekistan and Viet Nam.
75. Austria, Belgium, Canada, El Salvador, Germany, Guatemala,
Luxembourg, Namibia, Norway, Philippines, South Africa and Switzerland.
See Landmine Monitor Report 1999.
76. See Landmine Monitor Report 2004.
77. See Landmine Monitor Report 2009.
78. See Landmine Monitor 2018, p. 4.
79. See Landmine Monitor 2018, p. 19.
80. See also: Stephen D. Goose, “Goodwill Yields Good Results:
Cooperative Compliance and the Mine Ban Treaty”, in Goose, Jody
Williams and Mary Wareham (eds.), Banning Landmines: Disarmament,
Citizen Diplomacy, and Human Security (Rowman & Littleford, 2008).
81. Interview with Steffen Kongstad, Deputy Director General, Royal
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 5 April 2006.
82. Telephone Interview with Steve Goose, Executive Director Arms
Division, Human Rights Watch, 11 April 2006.
83. The treaty provides for five steps to be taken: 1) One or more States
parties can request information regarding allegations of non-compliance
from the requested State Party that has 28 days to respond; 2) If the requested
State Party fails to respond satisfactorily (or at all), the requesting state or
states may either refer the matter to the next meeting of States parties or,
if one-third of members agree, convene a special meeting of States parties;
3) If unable to resolve the issue, the meeting or special meeting of State
Parties can authorize by majority vote a fact-finding mission to the State
Party concerned by a team of experts selected from a list maintained by the
United Nations Secretary-General; 4) The fact-finding mission must give
at least 72 hours notice before its arrival, and may stay up to fourteen days
after which it reports its findings to the meeting or special meeting of States
parties; 5) The meeting or special meeting of States parties reviews the fact-
finding mission’s report and then, by a two-thirds vote if consensus cannot
be reached, may ask the requested State Party to take measures to address
the compliance issue within a specified period of time, and suggest ways
119
and means to resolve the matter, “including the initiation of appropriate

procedures in conformity with international law.”
84. The treaty requires that each State party with stockpiled anti-personnel
mines report and provide updated information annually on: 1) The total
number of anti-personnel mines in its ownership or possession, or under
its jurisdiction or control, including a breakdown of the type, quantity and,
if possible, lot numbers of each type of stockpiled mine; 2) The status of
programmes to destroy stockpiled anti-personnel mines, including details
of the methods to be used in destruction, location of all destruction sites
and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed; and
3) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed during the
previous calendar year, including the full breakdown of the quantities, types
and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of stockpiled mine. See Office for
Disarmament Affairs’ Article 7 monitoring website.
85. By 1997, there was already fatigue over the cost and needs of treaty
support structures after the Chemical Weapons Convention created the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in 1993 and
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty established its International
Monitoring System in 1996.
86. See for example, ICBL Press Release, “Landmines Campaign
Challenges Governments to Complete Stockpile Destruction by September
2001”, (Buenos Aires, 6 November 2000).
87. Such stockpile destruction events took place in Algeria, Croatia,
Japan, Mozambique, and other states.
88. BBC, “Prince Harry walks through Angola minefield 22 years after
Diana”, 28 September 2019.
89. Art. 5 (1), Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction;
adopted at Oslo, 18 September 1997; entered into force, 1 March 1999.
90. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty
over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).
91. See S. Maslen, Commentary on the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention, Oxford University Press, Oxford, paras. 5.10 and 5.35.
92. Art. 5 (1), Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.
93. Three locations reported in the Mine Action Review to have mines are
not mentioned specifically in this article, as they do not have the status of
being States which could independently join the Convention. Mine Action
120
Notes
Review, Clearing the Mines 2019, Norwegian People’s Aid, London,

October 2019.
94. Art. 5 (2), Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.
95. Bhutan, Cameroon and Palau.
96. Montenegro and South Sudan.
97. Albania, Algeria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burundi,
Congo, Costa Rica, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Estonia, Eswatini,
France, Gambia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras,
Hungary, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Malawi,
Mauritania, Mongolia, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal,
Nicaragua, North Macedonia, Palau, Philippines, Republic of Moldova,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Suriname, Tunisia, Uganda, United
Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Zambia.
States parties in italics are those that reported mined areas under the
Convention, and which have subsequently reported completion under the
Convention. State not party in bold.
98. Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2019, Norwegian People’s
Aid, London, October 2019. As at September 2019, Cameroon and Nigeria
had yet to request an extension to their Article 5 deadlines.
99. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty
over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).
100. Ibid.
Aid, London, October 2019.
102. Armenia, Azerbaijan, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, Egypt, Georgia, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Kyrgyzstan,
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Myanmar,
Pakistan, Russian Federation, Republic of Korea, Syrian Arab Republic,
Uzbekistan, and Viet Nam. Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2019,
Norwegian People’s Aid, London, October 2019.
Aid, London, October 2019.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
121
107. Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines, Norwegian People’s Aid,
London, June 2014.
108. Doc. APLC/MSP.12/2012/7.
109. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor 2018,
International Campaign to Ban Landmines—Cluster Munition Coalition,
November 2018.
110. In 2019, Afghanistan became the first country programme to release
a national standard for tackling mines of an improvised nature. AMAS
06.10: Abandoned Improvised Mine Clearance was released in March
2019. As its title makes clear, and to protect the neutrality of humanitarian
mine action, the Department of Mine Action Coordination in the Afghan
Government permits clearance only of items that are not subject to areas of
active hostilities. Under international humanitarian law, direct participation
in hostilities (which includes mine clearance in contested areas without the
consent of all the parties to the conflict) makes a person a lawful target of
lethal force by a party to an armed conflict.
111. See, e.g., “Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations
and abuses since September 2014”, Report of the Group of Eminent
International and Regional Experts, United Nations, A/HRC/42/17,
9 August 2019, pp. 8−9.
112. See, e.g., International Organization for Migration, “Cameroon, Far
North Region, Displacement Report, Round 15, 3−15 September 2018”,
Geneva, 2018; United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), “Mission
Report: UNMAS explosive hazard mitigation response in Cameroon,
9 January–13 April 2017”, 30 April 2017; and UNMAS, “Mission Report:
UNMAS Explosive Threat Scoping Mission to Nigeria 3 to 14 April 2017”,
New York, 2017.
113. At bit.ly/2QeQWXX; and at bit.ly/2kwnstd, respectively.
114. The obligation in the Convention is to address mined areas under a
State party’s jurisdiction or control.
115. For details, see the overview in Mine Action Review, Clearing the
Mines 2019, Norwegian People’s Aid, Oslo, October 2019.
116. See https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg16.
117. Officially known as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their
Destruction.
118. International Committee for the Red Cross, “Landmines Must Be
Stopped”, ICRC 1998, p. 16.
122
Notes
119. Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines

(United States Department of State, Washington, D.C., July 1993), p. 2.
120. 1998 Hidden Killers, p. 1.
121. Statement of Jody Williams, VVAF, representing the ICBL to
the Opening Plenary Session, Review Conference of the CCW, Geneva,
Switzerland, April 22, 1996.
122. “The Land Mine Cause”, Christian Science Monitor, September 8,
1997, 20. The USA Today said that “Princess Diana’s death may ultimately
achieve what she had fought for much of her adult life: new limits or even a
global ban on land mines.” Jack Kelly and William M. Welch, “Death could
be impetus for land mine ban”, USA Today, September 2, 1997, 20A.
123. APLC/CONF/2004/5.
124. Assisting Landmines and other Explosive Remnants of War Survivors
in the Context of Disarmament, Disability and Development, Anti-Personnel
Mine Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit.
125. APLC/CONF/2004/5. In the lead up to the Nairobi Summit, 23
States parties had indicated having significant numbers of mine survivors
(Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi,
Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, El Salvador, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru,
Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda and
Yemen).
126. 30 States parties with significant numbers of landmine survivors:
Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi,
Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique,
Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, Yemen and Zimbabwe.
127. Fostering Partnerships was a global conference on victim assistance
in the contexts of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention took place in
Amman in September 2019, as an effort to provide support to landmine
affected countries with regard to victim assistance.
128. Maputo+15 Declaration, 2014.
129. E.g. “Acting Against Landmines, the position of Handicap
International”, 2001.
130. “The stages of behavior change” (Grimley 1977 and Prochaska
1992).
123
131. Incidence refers to the number of new casualties during a particular

time period (such as a month or year or more) and may be expressed as a
percentage of the population.
132. Article 6, paragraph 7d.
133. McGrath, 1997.
134. Perhaps, it was taken for granted that destroying landmines would
reduce incidence—though it can be argued that these activities do not
automatically imply the reduction of mine incidents. In any case, the
link between destruction of landmines and reduction of incidence is not
mentioned in the Convention.
135. The five mine action pillars not only share the same humanitarian
vision, they also share the same development vision as reflected for
example in the previous and current United Nations Mine Action Strategy
“a world […] where individuals and communities live in a safe environment
conducive to […] development”.
136. “a chaotic start with too many NGOs trying to implement mine
awareness programs with no experience” (Landmine Monitor 2000).
137. “It was feared that children would intentionally walk into minefields
in the hope that Superman would come and rescue them (Taylor, 2003)”
quoted by Han Yu “Comics in technical communication” (2015).
138. The most decisive field test was the “Superman Mine & UXO
Awareness Comic Testing”, Prim Research, 2000.
139. Or transforming mine risk education posters into cigarette paper,
“Les outils du PEPAM au Mozambique—Capitalisation” p.31—Handicap
International (2000).
140. For example, Handicap International in 1999-2000 “capitalized”
all its mine risk education activities and materials in 8 countries and
subsequently published guidelines in various languages. ICBL formed the
“International Mine Risk Education Working Group in 2000”, a community
of practice of still active in 2019 with currently more than 300 members.
141. See for example the notes for ICRC intervention on “mine risk
education” presented at the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance,
Geneva, May 2009.
142. Davies and al. (2000). What Works? Evidence-based Policy and
Practice in Public Services. Bristol: Policy Press.
143. Young and al. (2002) “Social science and the evidence-based policy
movement”, Social Policy and Society, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 215-224.
124
Notes
144. Andersson et al. (2003) “Mine smartness and the community voice in
mine-risk education: lessons from Afghanistan and Angola”, Third World
Quarterly, Vol 24, No 5, pp. 873-887.
145. Another remarkable exception is the “Capitalisation on network
strengthening, community-based approach and partnership in mine risk
education project. Lessons learned from experience in Angola” (Handicap
International, 2006) with an analytical framework using the combination
of two variables: 1. Project Cycle Phase, and 2. Degree of Participation
of Affected Populations (GRET, 1999, quoted by Handicap International,
2006).
146. “Effective mine risk education in war-zone areas—a shared
responsibility”, Health Promotion International, Vol 20, No 3, pp 213-220.
From Lao, see also the paper “Unexploded Ordnance Risk Education Needs
Assessment in Lao People’s Democratic Republic” (Mines Advisory Group,
Laos Youth Union, 2006) with the Combination of KAP survey and Injury
Surveillance analysis as well as introduction of the “Triangular Formula”
that promotes the combination of three approaches i) mass medium,
ii) face–to–face communication and iii) print or electronic IEC material.
147. Green and Kreuter (1999) “Health Promotion Planning: An
Educational and Ecological Approach”, 3rd Edn. Mayfield Publishing
Company, Mountain View, CA.
148. For instance, providing solar stoves to communities to prevent the
use of firewood from contaminated areas.
149. Notes for ICRC intervention on “mine risk education” presented at
the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, May 2009.
150. WHO (2001). Description and comparison of the methods of cluster
sampling and lot quality assurance sampling to assess immunization
coverage.
151. For example, Handicap International (2009). “Knowledge, Attitudes
and Practices for Risk Education. How to implement KAP surveys”.
152. The United Nations Children’s Fund: Evidence-based approaches to
war-related injuries and humanitarian public health. Funding Opportunity
Number: CDC-RFA-EH09-904—Unpublished, 2009. See also United
States Foreign Policy Agenda, vol. 9 number 1 (2004) “Protecting Lives,
Restoring Livelihoods: The U.S. Program To Remove Landmines”.
153. Anderson and Gerber, 2004 “Applying Epidemiology to the Field of
Mine Action”, United States Foreign Policy Agenda, an Electronic Journal
of the United States Department of State, Vol 9, No 1, pp. 11-13 (online).
125
154. BILUKHA, O. (2005) “Injuries and deaths caused by unexploded

ordnance in Afghanistan: review of surveillance data, 1997-2002”, British
Medical Journal, Vol. 330, No 7483, pp.127-128.
155. However the new 2019-2023 United Nations Mine Action Strategy
has now solid language on injury surveillance: Cross-cutting Strategic
Outcome 1, Output 2.2: “Facilitating and supporting the development
and maintenance of injury surveillance systems as a prerequisite for
prioritization of risk reduction efforts (SO1, SO2, SO3)”.
156. IMAS Mine Risk Education Best Practice Guidebooks, the
United Nations Children’s Fund and the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining. (2005).
157. Vera and Crossan (2004).
158. Between 2009 and 2017, no dedicated global mine risk education
courses were offered for the mine action sector.
159. Thinking inside the box and using repeated attempts to answer the
same problem. Single-loop and double-loop learning (Argyris, 1976) appear
as a central concept to distinguish how organizations continuously adjust
theirs actions either superficially (single-loop) or fundamentally (double-
loop).
160. Carley, K. (1992) “Organisational Learning and personal turnover”,
Organisation Science, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 20-46.
161. “The definition of a rule of thumb is a generally accepted guideline,
policy or method of doing something based on practice rather than facts”.
162. Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development, IOD Parc (2012).
163. Since 2016, every October, the one-week Integrated Mine Action
Course is conducted in Spiez, Switzerland, with participation of at least
a dozen organizations. As part of the same training program, another ten-
day RBM course is also proposed on “Developing Effective Mine Risk
Education”.
164. The fact sheet of the course argues that “the five-pillar structure
is universally used in standards, guidelines and treaties. However, most
programmes address the pillars and deploy their human and material
resources in silos”.
165. The United Nations Mine Action Service, the United Nations
Development Programme, the United Nations Children’s Fund, ICRC, the
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, the Norwegian
People’s Aid, the Mines Advisory Group, HALO Trust, the Swiss Foundation
for Mine Action, the Danish Demining Group/Danish Refugee Council,
126
Notes
the DanChurchAid, Humanity and Inclusion, AAR, Save the Children,

the Korea International Cooperation Agency, Swiss Armed Forces. A few
national authorities, national NGOs, and universities also participated in
this course.
166. For example, the use of mine risk education teams in Non-Technical
Surveys becoming a norm rather than the exception.
167. To name a few: United Nations Mine Action Service, HALO Trust
or the Norwegian People’s Aid. After a decade without in-house mine risk
education capacity, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining created two mine risk education-related posts in 2019.
168. International Mine Risk Education Working Group.
169. “Establishment of the Explosive Ordnance Risk Education Advisory
Group” (GPC, 2019).
170. Data from 2018.
127
EMINARS STATEMENTS SYMPOSIA WORKSHOPS MEETINGS PRESENTATIONS PAPERS SEMINAR
The Anti-Personnel
SHOPS MEETINGS PRESENTATIONS PAPERS SEMINARS STATEMENTS SYMPOSIAMine
WORKSHOPS M
Ban Convention
SHOPS MEETINGS PRESENTATIONS PAPERS SEMINARS STATEMENTS SYMPOSIA WORKSHOPS
Preventing Indiscriminate Harm M
ISBN 978-92-1-139176-3

19 18715


UNODA Occasional Papers: No. 34, November 2019

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

UNODA Occasional Papers: No. 34, November 2019

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

EMINARS STATEMENTS SYMPOSIA WORKSHOPS MEETINGS PRESENTATIONS PAPERS SEMINAR

UNODA Occasional Papers

S SEMINARS STATEMENTS SYMPOSIA WORKSHOPS MEETINGS PRESENTATIONS PAPERS SEMIN

S SEMINARS STATEMENTS SYMPOSIA WORKSHOPS MEETINGS PRESENTATIONS PAPERS SEMIN

The Anti-Personnel Mine

Twenty Years of Saving Lives and

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters

This publication is available from

The history of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention

Universalizing the Convention: Practical means

Landmine stockpiles and their destruction

Clearance under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention

International cooperation and assistance: A Norwegian

Victim assistance: There is a face and name behind each

Mine risk education: From infancy to maturity?

The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention:

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,

Juan Carlos Ruan

albErt gonzálEz Farran

The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention—also known as the

International Campaign to Ban Landmines: A multi-

major Governments embraced the movement. The Norwegian

political world in the late 1980s, most notably in the United

President George H.W. Bush on 23 October 1992, echoed the

issue, its successful (although loose) linking of diverse NGOs

International Committee of the Red Cross

including an influential group of British deminers (mainly

was facilitated by the experience of Operation Desert Storm (the

Human security network

This coalition formed around the review of the CCW

last day of the CCW meetings on 3 May 1996, the Canadians

Government through the Leahy direction of State Department

landmines. The media, Axworthy later wrote, “couldn’t decide

a powerful “story” as victims told tales of lives lost, limbs

campaign. Backbenchers signed on in the meetings of the

When the British agreed to support the Convention, there

separately, on a perimeter around them was a bridge too far to

Women campaigners and delegates to the Mine Ban Convention negotiations in

The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention benefited from

Appeals by United Nations officials

endorsement helps to keep the Convention on the agenda of

States parties can encourage adhesion by explaining how

Regular appeals by presidents of Convention meetings

Action plans adopted by States parties

Political declarations adopted at Review Conferences also refer

Support from the European Union since 2008

a significant role in convincing Oman (2014), Palestine

Annual United Nations General

Universalization contact group

information and coordinate action. The Universalization Contact

Work of the International Committee of the Red Cross

Advocacy by the International Campaign

during a visit to Ankara by the Greek foreign minister, both

Universalizing the norm

stigmatize these explosive weapons, which are detonated by

decades of unrestrained use.72 That report showed how weak

Convention, some have acquired landmines by stealing them

However, there were certain exceptions to this impressive

Of the 164 States parties, 71 have retained anti-personnel

A unique “cooperative compliance” approach, proposed by

implementation concerns to be resolved cooperatively before

sometimes with external donor funding, but more often after

engages with the State party concerned to seek clarification and