Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Notice of Removal
Notice of Removal
To: The Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York.
President Donald J. Trump, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby removes this
case from the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York, to the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442 and
1455.
1. The pending action is styled People of the State of New York v. Donald J. Trump,
Indictment No. 71543/2013, before the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New
York, located at 100 Centre Street, New York, New York, 10007. A true and correct copy of the
2. As explained below, this Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over this
criminal action because the case involves important federal questions since the indictment
charges President Trump for conduct committed while he was President of the United States that
was within the “color of his office,” and the charges involve alleged federal and state election
elected prosecutor criminally prosecuted a defendant either for conduct that occurred entirely
while the defendant was the sitting President of the United States or for conduct that related to
4. This removal is timely, since it is filed within 30 days of April 4, 2023, the date
on which President Trump was arraigned. See 28 U.S.C. §1455(b)(1) (“A notice of removal of a
criminal prosecution shall be filed not later than 30 days after the arraignment in the State
court”).
5. Under 28 U.S.C. § 112, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York is the proper venue for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1455(a), because the Southern
District of New York encompasses New York County, where this state action is now pending.
III. BACKGROUND
6. The allegations against President Trump in this case are based on checks allegedly
written to Michael Cohen by President Trump in 2017, while he was President of the United
States. The District Attorney’s Office alleges that these checks, which President Trump
allegedly signed while sitting in the Oval Office, as well as related records, are false because
they characterize these payments as “legal expenses” and “retainer” payments when, according
to the District Attorney’s Office, they were allegedly reimbursements to Michael Cohen for
payment made by Cohen to Stormy Daniels for campaign purposes. The defense denies that
2
7. After investigating this case for five years, on March 30, 2023, a grand jury
returned a 34-count Indictment against President Trump. All 34 counts charge the same offense,
i.e., felony falsifying business records in violation of New York Penal Law §175.10.
Penal Law §175.05. As relevant to this matter, it punishes as a misdemeanor one who, with
intent to defraud, “[m]akes or causes a false entry in the business records of an enterprise.”
§175.05(1).
9. Under New York law, the misdemeanor offense is elevated to a felony when the
person “commits the crime of falsifying business records in the second degree, and when his
intent to defraud includes an intent to commit another crime or to aid or conceal the commission
10. The District Attorney’s Office alleges that the other crime that President Trump
intended to commit or conceal was election law violations in connection with the 2016 federal
11. This is a novel theory—that President Trump committed a felony under New
York law because the payments to Michael Cohen were supposedly mischaracterized in the
records of an enterprise, and that this mischaracterization was allegedly done in order to conceal
an election law crime. There has never been a prosecution under New York State law based on
an alleged violation of election law pertaining to a federal election. And there are serious federal
12. Indeed, as noted by the Hon. Mary Kay Vyskocil in a recent decision, a former
ADA who wrote a book about this case conceded, inter alia, the following about the legal theory
3
● The facts surrounding the payments did not amount to much in legal terms as
paying hush money is not a crime under New York State law, even if the payment
● The Trump investigation should have been handled by the U.S. Department of
● Federal prosecutors previously looked into the Clifford “hush money payment”
See Bragg v. Jordan, 2023 WL 2999971 at *3–6 (S.D.N.Y. April 19, 2023) (bullet points in the
original).
13. Judge Vyskocil also recognized that D.A. Bragg faced political pressure to bring
this case, writing that Bragg “is an elected prosecutor in New York County with constituents,
some of whom wish to see Bragg wield the force of law against the former President and a
14. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1442 (a)(1), upon the application of the federal officer, a
“criminal prosecution that is commenced in a State court and that is against or directed to” any
“officer” of the United States, “in an official or individual capacity for or relating to any act
under color of such office” must “be removed by them to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending.”
15. The removal statute applies to former officers of the United States if the charged
16. In officer-removal cases, a district court applies a two-step test: “First, the officer
4
must ‘raise a colorable federal defense.’” K&D LLC v. Trump Old Post Office LLC, 951 F.3d
503, 506 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). “The federal defense need only be colorable, not
clearly sustainable.” Id. Second, “the officer must show that the suit is one ‘for or relating to any
act under color of [his] office.’” Id. For the second step, it “is sufficient for there to be a
‘connection’ or ‘association’ between the act in question and the federal office.” In re
18. President Trump, in his defense of this case, will raise a number of federal
defenses.
19. President Trump will assert that the statements in the purported business records
at issue were in fact truthful statements because the money paid to Michael Cohen was, in part,
“retainer” or legal payments to Michael Cohen to act as President Trump’s personal attorney. At
the time of his election, there was some public expressions of concern about potential conflicts of
interest, corruption, and possible constitutional violations due to President Trump’s extensive
business interests and wealth. Thus, shortly before assuming the Office of the Presidency, and in
order to assure the American public that he had separated his personal business from his public
duties, see Morgan Lewis White Paper, attached as Exhibit B, as well as to fulfill various
constitutional obligations, e.g., the Foreign Emoluments Clause, Art. I, sec. 9, cl. 8, and the Take
Care Clause, Art. II, sec. 3, President Trump, in an abundance of caution, placed his businesses
5
his personal affairs. These steps were taken solely because he was President of the United
States.
20. As such, President Trump’s decision to retain Michael Cohen to act as his
personal lawyer arose out of his duties as President and therefore gives rise to a federal defense
21. Moreover, the District Attorney’s Office has made clear in court filings that the
felony charges in this case are predicated on an alleged intent to violate New York Election Law
§ 17-152 and the Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. § 30101. See People’s Motion for a
with the repayments to be falsified to disguise his and others’ criminal conduct including
violations of New York Election Law § 17-152 and violations of the individual and corporate
campaign contribution limits under the Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. § 30101 et
seq.”).
predicate charges. See Orange County Water Dist. V. Unocal Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl
Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig.), 364 F. Supp.2d 329, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“conclud[ing]
that preemption is a colorable federal defense for purposes of the federal officer removal
statute”).
23. New York Election Law § 17-152 makes it a misdemeanor offense for “[a]ny two
or more persons [to] conspire to promote or prevent the election of any person to a public office
by unlawful means and which conspiracy is acted upon by one or more of the parties thereto.”
Applying §17-152 to President Trump, who has only been a candidate for federal office, would
violate the preemption provisions of 52 U.S.C. § 30143, which provides that “[t]he provisions of
6
[the Federal Election Campaign] Act, and of rules prescribed under this Act, supersede and
preempt any provision of State law with respect to election to Federal office.” (emphasis added).
24. Similarly, that preemption provision preempts the ability of a state prosecutor to
charge a crime where an element of that crime is a federal campaign contribution violation, as
25. In determining whether the underlying conduct “relat[es] to” acts performed
under color of office, within the meaning of the federal removal statute, “the officer must show a
nexus, a causal connection between the charged conduct and asserted official authority.” Trump
27. All of the indictment’s charges relate to a claim that President Trump falsified
business records maintained by the Trump Organization by allegedly falsely indicating that the
payments to Michael Cohen were for “legal expenses” or “retainer” payments when, according
to the District Attorney’s Office, the money was in fact reimbursement for payments made by
Cohen.
28. As discussed, supra ¶¶17-18, as part of his defense in this case, President Trump
will demonstrate that Mr. Cohen was in fact his personal lawyer who was only hired as a direct
result of President Trump’s role as President of the United States and his obligations under the
Constitution, and in order to separate his business affairs from his public duties.
7
29. Additionally, acts taken as part of the election to the office of President of the
United States “relat[e] to,” § 1442(a)(1), President Trump’s position as President, and therefore
conduct underlying the charges “relat[es] to” acts performed under color of office.
30. In other words, there is a clear nexus between the payments to Mr. Cohen and
31. Finally, because the instant indictment is politically motivated and was brought
because a local politician—here D.A. Bragg—disfavored President’s Trump’s acts and policies
as President of the United States, federal courts have so-called “protective jurisdiction” over this
case. Although the Supreme Court has never definitively decided whether §1442 provides
federal protective jurisdiction in cases of state hostility to the federal officer, at least some
Justices has said it does. See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 140 (1989) (Brennan, J.
concurring) (“It is not at all inconceivable, however, that Congress’ concern about local hostility
to federal authority could come into play in some circumstances [even] where the federal officer
is unable to present any ‘federal defense.’ . . . Such harassment could well take the form of
unjustified prosecution for traffic or other offenses, to which the federal officer would have no
immunity or other federal defense. The removal statute, it would seem to me, might well have
been intended to apply in such unfortunate and exceptional circumstances.”). See also Trump v.
Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2428 (2020) (recognizing “the possibility that state prosecutors may
8
Dated: New York, New York
May 4, 2023
Respectfully submitted,
Todd Blanche /s
Blanche Law Susan R. Necheles
99 Wall Street, Suite 4460 NechelesLaw LLP
New York NY 10005 1120 Sixth Avenue, 4th Floor
212-716-1250 New York, NY 10036
[email protected] 212-997-7400
[email protected]
Joseph Tacopina
Tacopina Seigel & DeOreo
275 Madison Avenue, 35th Floor,
New York, New York 10016
212-227-8877
[email protected]