PHILOSOPHICAL MOVEMENTS IN OTTOMAN INTELLECTUAL LIFE AT

THE BEGINNING OF THE 20TH CENTURY AND THEIR IMPACT ON

YOUNG TURK’S THOUGHT

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

FATİH TAŞTAN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

SEPTEMBER 2013

i
Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık

Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam

Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully
adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Yasin Ceylan

Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Yasin Ceylan (METU, PHIL)

Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam (METU, PHIL)
Prof. Dr. Erdal Cengiz (A. U., DTCF)
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Elif Çırakman (METU, PHIL)
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ertuğrul R. Turan (A. U., DTCF.)

ii
I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and
presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also
declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and
referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name : Fatih Taştan

Signature :

iii
 ABSTRACT

PHILOSOPHICAL MOVEMENTS IN OTTOMAN INTELLECTUAL LIFE AT

THE BEGINNING OF THE 20TH CENTURY AND THEIR IMPACT ON
YOUNG TURK’S THOUGHT

Taştan, Fatih
Ph. D., Department of Philosophy
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Yasin Ceylan

September 2013, 316 pages

The aim of this study is to examine scientific and philosophical understanding of

the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress (CUP in short), which takes an
important place in Turkish history of politics, and the Young Turks who vitalized
it.

CUP is an organization remained in the power, during Ottoman Empire, between

1908 and 1918. The great majority of both national and international sources,
subjecting the rulership period of CUP, identify this term with Young Turks’
power. This identification is right to a large extent. For, the mentality vitalized the
Ottoman CUP directly refers to a modernist group which is called Young Turks.
iv
Our study does not have an aim of realizing a purely historical discussion. It
rather scrutinizes the reasons of how and why a political organization, mentality
of which is subjected, even today, to different discussions, needed scientific and
philosophical arguments. Understanding the kind of shape it has given to its own
political program by starting from those arguments is one of the purposes taken
into consideration throughout the study.

In terms of the goals of our study we first identified the scientific and
philosophical approaches commonly adopted in Young Turks’ period, both in the
West and in the Ottoman world of thought. We observed that these approaches
consist of positivism, evolutionism and materialism and that they are defended by
Young Turk figures very single-mindedly. This observation is deduced from the
examination we carried out on the periodicals published by Young Turks
individually and institutionally. One needs to point that these periodicals
determined the limits of our study as well.

We scrutinized the effect that is created by the positivist, evolutionist and

materialist understandings of science and philosophy on the traditional
philosophies of religion, ethics and aesthetics. At the end, we found the
opportunity of observing how Young Turks reinforced their nationalist approach
by means of a discourse which is decorated with modern scientific and
philosophical concepts. This circumstance constitutes one of the conspicuous
themes of our study since it refers to the reality that science and philosophy have
been instrumentalized by Young Turks.

Keywords: Young Turks, Science, Religion, Ethics, Aesthetics

v
 ÖZ

YİRMİNCİ YÜZYILIN BAŞLARINDA OSMANLI DÜŞÜNCE

HAYATINDAKİ FELSEFİ AKIMLAR VE BUNLARIN JÖN TÜRK
FİKRİYATI ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ

Taştan, Fatih
Doktora, Felsefe Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Yasin Ceylan

Eylül 2013, 316 sayfa

Bu çalışmanın amacı Türk siyasi tarihinde önemli bir yeri bulunan Osmanlı İttihat
ve Terakkî Cemiyeti (İTC) ile ona hayat veren Jön Türklerin bilim ve felsefe
anlayışlarını incelemektir.

İTC 1908-1918 yılları arasında iktidarı elinde bulundurmuş bir örgüttür. İTC
iktidarını konu edinen yerli-yabancı kaynakların büyük bir kısmı bu dönemi Jön
Türk iktidarı olarak nitelendirmektedir. Bu nitelendirme büyük oranda haklıdır,
zira İTC’ye hayat veren zihniyet doğrudan Jön Türkler olarak isimlendirilen bir
zümreye işaret etmektedir.

vi
Çalışmanın amacı hiç şüphesiz salt bir tarih tartışması gerçekleştirmek değildir.
Daha ziyade kendisi tarihe mal olmakla birlikte, temsil ettiği zihniyet günümüzde
dahi çeşitli tartışmalara konu olan siyasal bir örgütün bilimsel ve felsefî
argümanlara nasıl ve niçin ihtiyaç duyduğunu incelemeye çalıştık. Bu
argümanlardan hareketle İTC’nin kendi siyasi programına nasıl şekil verdiğini
ortaya koymak çalışmamızda gözettiğimiz amaçlardan birini teşkil etmektedir.

Çalışmamızın amaçları bakımından öncelikle Jön Türklerin yaşadığı dönemde

yaygın olarak benimsenen bilimsel ve felsefî yaklaşımları tespit ettik. Söz konusu
yaklaşımların pozitivizm, evrimcilik ve materyalizm olduğunu ve Jön Türk
figürleri tarafından bunların kararlı bir şekilde savunulduğunu gördük. Bu
tespitimiz Jön Türkler tarafından bireysel veya kurumsal bir şekilde yayınlanmış
süreli yayınların incelenmesine dayanmaktadır. İşaret etmek gerekir ki bahsi
geçen süreli yayınlar aynı zamanda çalışmamızın sınırlarını da belirlemiştir.

Pozitivist, evrimci ve materyalist bilim ve felsefe anlayışlarının din, ahlak ve

estetik felsefeleri bakımından yarattığı etkileri irdeledik. En nihayet Jön Türklerin
modern bilimsel ve felsefî kavramlardan örülü bir söylemle kendi milliyetçi
yaklaşımlarını ne şekilde tahkim ettiklerini izleme fırsatı bulduk. Bu durum, Jön
Türklerin bilimi ve felsefeyi araçsallaştırmış olduğu gerçeğine işaret etmesi
bakımından çalışmamızın dikkat çekici bir temasını oluşturmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Jön Türkler, Bilim, Din, Ahlak, Estetik

vii
To My Family

viii
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are too many thanks that I want to send, but I think the most special ones
must go to Prof. Dr. Yasin Ceylan. I am grateful to him because of the excellent
supervision he realized. He has always been a source of inspiration for me.

I would also like to thank to the honourable members of the Examining

Committee: Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam, Prof. Dr. Erdal Cengiz, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Elif
Çırakman and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ertuğrul Rufai Turan. Their advices made this
study less imperfect. No need to say that all deficiencies in terms of the study
belong to the writer of these lines.

I am grateful to Assistant Prof. Dr. Coşkun Taştan because of the suggestions he

supplied to me before and during the preparation of this study. He is both an
excellent academician and a good brother. His efforts in helping me to gather the
periodicals, that constitute the backbone of this study, were especially
praiseworthy.

Every members of my family deserve to be mentioned here. They always

encouraged me and made things easier for me to complete this study.

Last but not least, I owe a special thank to my friends: Fatma and Akif Erkan.
They are two of the most perfect peoples on earth that one can have the chance of
meeting.

ix
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM……………………………………………………………………iii
ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………iv
ÖZ………………………………………………………………………………...vi
DEDICATION…………………………………………………………………..viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………....ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………….x
CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………....1
1.1 Some Introductory Remarks…………..…………………………...1
1.2 General Framework of the Chapters…….…………………………9
1.3 Descriptions of the Young Turk Periodicals Examined….………11
1.3.1 Meşveret……………………………………………….…11
1.3.2 Şura-yı Ümmet……..……………………………………..12
1.3.3 İçtihat…….……………………………………………….13
1.3.4 Ulûm-u İktisâdiye ve İçtimâiye Mecmuası.………………15
1.3.5 Muhit-i Mesai………….…………………………………16
1.3.6 Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası……….………………………….16
1.3.7 Genç Kalemler………………………..……...…………...17
1.3.8 Yeni Mecmua……………………………………..………18
1.3.9 İslam Mecmuası……………………………...…………...19
1.3.10 Tabiat…………………….……………………………….20
2. A SHORT HISTORY OF OTTOMAN COMMITTEE OF
UNION AND PROGRESS (CUP)
AS A YOUNG TURK ORGANISATION………………………………23
2.1 History of Establishment of the Committee……….……………..24
2.2 Founders of the Committee…….………………………………...24
2.3 Denomination of the Committee………………………….……...25
x
 2.4 General Profile of Founders………………………….…………..27
2.5 The Relation of the Ottoman Committee of Union and
Progress as a Young Turk Organization with other
Young Turk Movements…………………………….……………29
2.6 Purpose of the Founders of the Committee……………….……...34
2.7 Young Turks’ Problem with Abdülhamit………………….……..35
2.8 The Methods Abdülhamit Followed to Cope with
Young Turks………………………….…………………………..37
2.9 Young Turks’ Struggles for Unification……….…………………40
2.9.1 First Young Turk Congress………………………………40
2.9.2 Second Young Turk Congress…….……………………...43
2.10 Announcement of the Constitutionalism….……………………...46
2.11 The Ottoman CUP’s Seizure of Power….………………………..47
2.12 A Government Unable to Raise its Head
amid Wars and Political Turmoil…………..……………………..50
3. PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE AS THE WAYS
TO “NEW LIFE” IN THE THOUGHT OF
YOUNG TURKS……...…………………………………………………54
3.1 Science and Philosophy in the Thought of
Young Turks or “Reproducing a Result”………………………...54
3.2 Scientific and Philosophical Quests against Crisis……………….59
3.2.1 The Place of Positivism in Young Turks’ Thought……....59
3.2.2 Law of Three Stages…….………………………………..62
3.2.3 Auguste Comte’s Classification of Sciences………….….64
3.2.4 Determinism……………………………………………...65
3.2.5 Universality…………………………………………….…67
3.2.6 The Exclusion of Metaphysics…………….……………...67
3.2.7 Quality of Scientific Knowledge……………….………...75
3.3 Young Turks and the Idea of Evolution………………….………78
3.4 Young Turks and Materialism……….…………………………...91
4. PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION IN YOUNG TURKS’
UNDERSTANDING…..………………………………………………..104
4.1 Approaches to the Existence of God………………….………...105

xi
 4.1.1 Agnosticism and Deism…………………….…………...105
4.1.2 Pantheism………………………….…………………….109
4.1.3 Atheism………….………………………………………115
4.2 Immortality of the Soul and the Life after Death…………….…117
4.2.1 Young Turks and the Idea of Immortality……………....119
4.2.2 The Real Sense of Immortality in
Young Turks’ Approach…………………….…………..124
4.3 Predestination……………………………….…………………..129
4.4 Relationship between Religion and Science……………….……136
5. ETHICS, VALUES AND PHILOSOPHY
IN YOUNG TURKS’ UNDERSTANDING…………………………...149
5.1 Reflections of Anti-Metaphysical Attitude
in the Ethical Realm…………………………………………….150
5.2 The Ethical Relativism or the Collapse of Belief
in Absolute and Ethical Tremor………………………………...161
5.3 The Attitude towards the Schools of Ethics………………….…172
5.3.1 The Attitude towards Hedonism……………….………..174
5.3.2 The Attitude towards Ascetic
Understanding of Ethics………………………………...181
5.4 Sacrificing the Individual to the Society
or the Ethical Necessity of Union…………………………….…186
5.5 The Philosophy of Values and Ethics or the
Possibility of New Ethics and New Values……………………..194
5.6 Philosophy as a Mechanism of Value-Production………………204
5.7 The Institutional Dimension within the
Constitution of New Ethics: Professional Ethics………………..214
6. PHILOSOPHY OF ARTS AND AESTHETICS
IN YOUNG TURKS’ UNDERSTANDING…………………………...218
6.1 The General Framework of the Meaning Young Turks
Attributed to Arts and Aesthetics……………………………….218
6.2 The Basic Debates with Regard to the Philosophy of Arts
and Aesthetics in Young Turk Periodicals……………………...222
6.3 Problems of Aesthetics………………………………………….224

xii
 6.3.1 Aesthetic Subject………………………………………..225
6.3.2 Aesthetic Object………………………………………...230
6.3.3 Aesthetic Pleasure……………………………………….234
6.3.4 Aesthetic Value………………………………………….242
6.3.5 Aesthetic Judgment……………………………………...243
6.4 Arts as Imitation………………………………………………...245
6.5 Arts and Ethics…………………………………………………..251
6.6 National Art……………………………………………………..255
6.7 Aesthetics, Arts and Milieu …………………………………….259
7. CONCLUSIONS………………………………………………………..264
REFERENCES……………………………………………………………...273
APPENDICES
A. TEZ FOTOKOPİ İZİN FORMU ……………………………………299
B. CURRICULUM VITAE……………………………………………..300
C. TURKISH SUMMARY……………………………………………..301

xiii
 CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Some Introductory Remarks

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of modern Western scientific and
philosophical understandings on Young Turks and the Ottoman CUP as a Young
Turk organization. Leading periodicals which are published by them, whether
individually or institutionally, have been chosen as the subject of examination with
this purpose in mind. The primary criteria taken into consideration in selecting a
periodical related with Young Turks is to see if it starts from a certain philosophical
ground with regard to scientific, religious, ethical and aesthetical issues constituting
the framework of our study. Further information about the general qualities of
selected periodicals will be provided in the following pages.

The phrase of Young Turks refers to an important period in terms of Turkish history
of politics. They are the figures of an era in which Ottoman Empire came across with
modern scientific and philosophical concepts intensively. What makes Young Turks
special as of the position they occupied is that they represented a mentality which is
knitted with those philosophical and scientific concepts. As it shall be pointed within
the next chapter, Young Turks studied in schools which can be regarded as modern
vis-a-vis their contemporaries and wherein Western curriculums are followed. The
education they received changed their weltanschauung and yet caused them to
envisage the political struggle they undertook as a philosophical and scientific fact.

There are two interrelated hypothesis, among others, on which this study depends.
The first one is that Young Turks moved from a philosophical and scientific point of
view in their political careers. And the second one is that the philosophical ground

1
which constituted a starting point for Young Turks take part, within a certain unity,
in periodicals published by them.

One of the most important reasons of our selection of Young Turks’ understanding of
philosophy and science as a topic of study is the connection they structured between
philosophical thought and corporatism. This connection, which is regarded by them
as a matter of life or death, resulted in an important historical experience in terms of
Turkish intellectual history. How is it possible to transform a society through an
institutionalized understanding of philosophy? On which philosophical background
is based the critical perspective, which is also initiating the corporatism? What kind
of reflections this perspective has in the areas of philosophies of religion, ethics and
aesthetics in particular? Such like questions are the ones that must be answered to
ensure an analysis with regard to the situation which can basically be regarded as the
institutionalization of philosophy.

As a matter of fact, these can be seen as questions that must be taken into
consideration with regard to human beings’ adventure of thought. The transition
from individual state of consciousness to the level of social existence is a story about
philosophy’s acquirement of an institutional character. If one thinks about human
being’s trial with philosophy, recognition of a number of interrelated points would
always seem possible.

First of all, philosophy is defined as –a cliché statement though- love of wisdom.

Human being exists, in the truest sense of the word, when he explores that he has the
ability of thinking. And the meaning of this existence depends on his comprehension
of the differences he observes between himself and other things within the universe.
Therefore, philosophy can be characterized as the activity of self-disclosure of the
individual consciousness. The contact with the outer deploys human being’s curiosity
and enables him to produce several successive reasoning. These thoughts head
towards a certain systematic, which also refers to another essential character of
philosophy. In other words, putting aside the system owner philosophers in
particular, philosophy presents a cumulative nature. On the other hand, one needs
also to point that philosophy carries within itself a continuous revolutionary soul.

2
For, as a result of the authentic structure of thinking, consciousness is always on a
movement. And this is why philosophy needs to be seen as an uninterruptable
process.

Although philosophy depends on an individual basis, it nonetheless starts to acquire

an exceeding nature with regard to the effect it creates. Thus, it is demanded by the
cumulative nature of philosophy as well. Contemplations of different
consciousnesses about the same object bring philosophy in a creative power.
Different states of consciousnesses make it possible to catch the points overlooked
previously. In this way, selecting the most suitable form through the whole possible
states of things that corresponds to the truth becomes possible.

That philosophy is an intellectual activity depending on an individual basis

constitutes its most crucial aspect. It is because of this circumstance that the way to
truth is more than one and, therefore, conceptions about truth are manifold. The fact
that truth cannot be restrained within a single conceptual framework is another issue
supporting philosophy’s productivity. Philosophy migrates from a world of thought
wherein it becomes fixed in a certain framework and thinking is encouraged in that
direction. One can come across with different instances of this circumstance in
human history. Scholasticism, as an approach representing the established way of
thinking of the middle ages, is the most remarkable example of it.

The most important reflection of scholasticism in the history of thought is that it

attempted to strangulate the rebel spirit of philosophy. Since philosophy stays away
from obedience, it can be satisfied only within a soul which is in a constant
movement and the intellectual creativity of which is at the highest level. It seems
possible to say that no thinking can be philosophy in the truest sense of the word
unless it depends on a constantly questioning and never satisfying doubtful state of
mind. It can be argued, on the other hand, that the annihilating attitude scholastic
understanding maintained towards philosophy arises from its institutional
framework.

3
Well, can it be argued that all institutional glances result necessarily in the
devastation of philosophy? As a matter of fact, this is one of the basic questions that
led us to prepare this study. Some historical examples remind that this may not be the
case prevailing in all times. In other words, one may be able to mention some
circumstances reminding that institutionalization of philosophy or its establishment
by way of certain institutions do not entail the execution of philosophy but imply, on
the contrary, its revitalization. In effect, the Ottoman Committee of Union and
Progress as a Young Turk organization refers to a historical example that can be
thought strengthening such an argument.

One can say, as a part of the hypothesis mentioned earlier, that although
institutionalization does not necessarily annihilate philosophical thinking it still
keeps this situation on the agenda as the strongest possibility. For, every
institutionalized and established thought starts to become conservative and
introversive and loses its creative energy. Considered from this perspective, it is
possible to argue that all institutional schemes, no matter of what kind they are,
possibly remove philosophy from its essential nature.

One of the basic assumptions of the Ottoman CUP, and the Young Turk mentality
which generated it, seem to be that philosophy must be supported and fortified by a
certain structure in order to exist. Thus, philosophy will grow stronger as a world
view and solve all the problems experienced by Ottoman society whether they are
political or cultural or ethical. However, as it will be brought to the agenda within
next chapters on several occasions, this argument implies that philosophy must be
seen as a process progressing within a given set of conceptual framework. One needs
to point, as a start, that this supposed circumstance refers to a problematic approach
with regard to the nature of philosophy. Is it making analysis by using accepted
concepts, for example, that philosophy is expected to do? It will most probably be
responded negatively. It seems difficult to be realized within the terms of rebel soul
of philosophy at least. It could not go beyond a scholastic thinking even if one
responds that question in a positive way.

4
To put the main theme of this study, which subjects the effects of modern scientific
and philosophical concepts on Young Turks, one needs to open the intention by the
terms of philosophical institutionalism or institutionalization of philosophy a bit
more. Institutionalization of philosophy does not imply an accumulation that
philosophy creates on its own specific direction but rather refers to a supposition that
this accumulation can be taken and used as a whole.

The Ottoman CUP represents an interesting example within the terms of Turkish
history of thought. It tried to accomplish a political agenda, which is intensively
woven into scientific and philosophical concepts, by a methodology yet is decorated
with scientific and philosophical discourses. As it is going to be examined
circumstantially within the next chapter, it is possible to see the subject of their
struggle as a living monument of philosophy. Young Turks’ individual backgrounds,
which have ultimately turned into an institutional attitude, convinced them that the
construction of a new philosophical language is inevitable. Modernity resembled, in
the eye of Young Turks, a doomsday of philosophical paradigms. The only possible
way out of this milieu is to use a language which overlaps, or shares the same
philosophical or scientific ground, with it.

When considered from the view of Committee’s establishment and rulership periods,
it can be witnessed that they attempted to create the philosophical framework by
means of institutions directly. The most concrete example of this circumstance is the
periodicals they published; some of which constitute also the subject of our study.
Modern philosophical and scientific understandings transferred into Ottoman world
of thought institutionally through the agency of periodicals. Of course it can also be
seen as a crime committed against the authenticity and weight of philosophical
thinking. Philosophy does not depart, at the end of the day, by a desire of
indoctrination or of becoming accepted. It rather makes every type of established
thoughts a subject to itself, without being liable to any limit, and leaves a
transformative effect on them.

The connection between philosophy and institutionalism brings an interesting

situation into agenda. One can argue by taking the philosophical and scientific

5
adventure of the West into consideration that philosophy has given birth to an
authentic institutional structure by itself. It can also be read, essentially, as a
relationship between thinking and result. To put it a bit more clearly, Western
thinking firstly established a philosophical ground and then this ground created a sui
generis transformation. Renaissance, Reformation and Industrial or French
revolutions are the most remarkable examples of this circumstance. Of course these
historic breakups cannot be said to happen without a cause. There is a serious
philosophical accumulation that created them. The Ottoman CUP can be seen as the
incarnational state of the struggle towards actualizing historical events mentioned
above within Ottoman intellectual life as well. One can come across with quite plain
expressions, in Young Turk periodicals, supporting this assertion. In an article
published in the journal of Şura-yı Ümmet, for example, the period of 2nd
Constitutionalism (Meşrutiyet), which represents the taking over of Young Turks,
and the French Revolution is compared and characterized as two important
revolutions that changed the history of human being.1 Accordingly, the
Constitutionalism is an enlightened Turkish revolution and the Young Turks, who
pioneered it, are the projections of the philosophical reason that created the French
Revolution.

Likewise, articles written and published by Musa Kazım Efendi in İslam Mecmuası2
are remarkable in terms of the connection they establish between Young Turks’
mentality and French Revolution. In these articles, Musa Kazım Efendi argues that
the terms of “liberty”, “fraternity” and equality”, which also constitute the basic
concepts of the French Revolution, are accepted by Islam as well. These articles are
conspicuous also as they are reflections of the typical Young Turk approach of
reconciliation. What lies at the basis of Musa Kazım Efendi’s struggle of reconciling
is a concern with regard to showing that the scientific and philosophical
understandings adopted by Young Turks are not contrary to the essence of Islam. We

1
İ. C., “İki İnkılâp,” Şura-yı Ümmet 9, no. 205 (14 January 1325/27 January 1910), pp. 3-4.
2
The full identity of articles by Musa Kazım are as follows: “İslam ve Terakkî-1”, İslam Mecmuası 1,
no. 1 (16 Rabīʿ al-Awwal 1332/30 January 1329/12 February 1914/), pp. 1-6; “İslam ve Terakkî-2”,
İslam Mecmuası 1, no. 2 (30 Rabīʿ al-Awwal 1332/13 February 1329/26 February 1914), pp. 34-36
and “İslam ve Terakkî-3”, İslam Mecmuası 1, no. 3 (14 Rabīʿ al-Ākhir 1332/27 February 1329/12
March 1914), pp. 75-77.

6
will have the opportunity of touching on similar attempts of reconciliation
throughout the study.

However, one needs to point to the fact that Young Turks seem to read the adventure
of science and philosophy in Western world of thought backward. In other words,
they firstly established certain institutions. And then, they tried to provide the
development of a philosophical language and thought through the agency of these
institutions. This circumstance can also be seen, with respect to the purposes we
determined for our study, as a struggle of re-defining or re-designing the relationship
between language and thinking. The issue to which we point can be problematized
by searching for the preceding factor in this relation. In other words, one needs to
specify whether the language precedes the thinking, or the thinking precedes the
language. As a result by nature, thinking is expected to precede the language. For, we
seem to think before anything else and construct a specific content. And then we
match up this content with certain concepts which are also created by us. Language
can only be possible just after this matching up. But Young Turks’ mentality seems
to follow this process backwardly. To put it more clearly, they seem to think that one
needs first to construct a philosophical language and then develop a type of thinking
which is compatible with that language. There are several examples of this
circumstance and these examples provide important clues in terms of the connection
that we attempted to establish between institutionalism and philosophical thinking
above. In the 54th, 55th and 57th issues of the journal of İçtihat, for example, an article
titled “Istılah İstimzacı”3 is published. In this article, ten scientific and philosophical
concepts in French language (Concret, Abstrait, Objectif, Subjectif, Induction,
Déduction, Type-Sous-Type, Conscient, Inconscient, Constatation) are selected and
readers are invited to coin Turkish meanings for these concepts. One can argue that
the purpose of the publishers of this article is not restricted solely with finding
Turkish equivalents for different concepts. When the periodicals are taken into
consideration as a whole, it can be said that they were trying to reach to an idea from
concept. To reach to an idea by starting from a concept can be a way of learning or

3
See Anonymous, “Istılah İstimzacı,” İçtihat 4, no. 54 (14 February 1328/27 February 1913), p. 1222;
Anonymous, “Istılah İstimzacı,” İçtihat 4, no. 55 (21 February 1328/6 March 1913), p. 1238;
Anonymous, “Istılah İstimzacı,” İçtihat 4, no. 57 (7 March 1329/20 March 1913), p. 1270.

7
thinking but it obviously is a difficult endeavor when it conceived in terms of the
spontaneity of thought.

Another concrete indicator of the relationship that is tried to be constructed between

philosophy and institutionalism is the works of reformation actualized delicately by
Young Turks’ governments to create a modern philosophical thinking and language.
They established, for example, a Council which is called “Istılahât-ı İlmiye
Encümeni” [Council for Scientific Terminologies]. This Council has been
established in 1913 and aimed to find Turkish equivalents for foreign scientific and
philosophical terms. The Council completed its activities with 3 works. These works
are dictionaries comprising Turkish equivalents proposed for scientific, philosophical
and aesthetical concepts respectively.4 However, it seems that this Council could not
find the opportunity of realizing the obligations, encumbered to it, at full length. On
the other hand, “importing” the western scientific and philosophical concepts by
means of institutions gives hint about the quality of their attitude towards philosophy.
In the third chapter, some interesting examples regarding how Young Turks
legitimized this idea of “importing” shall be presented.

One can witness that a similar language, to the one which is tried for science,
philosophy and arts, is attempted for the area of religion also yet by depending on an
institutional basis. Daru’l-Hikmeti’l-İslamiyye, the founding declaration5 of which
takes part in the 63rd issue of İslam Mecmuası, can be seen as the projection of the
struggle of constructing a modern philosophical language within religious area.
Created in 1918, at the end of the Young Turks’ sovereignty, this institution could
not find enough time to fulfill obligations attributed to it.

4
The respective titles of these dictionaries are as follows: Islahat-ı İlmiye Encümeni Tarafından
Kâmus-u Felsefede Münderic Kelimât ve Ta’bîrât İçin Vaz’-u Tedvîni Tensîb Olunan Islahat
Mecmuası (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1330 [1911]); Islahât-ı İlmiye Encümeni Tarafından Sanâyi’-i
Nefîsede Mevcûd Kelimât ve Ta’bîrât İçin Vaz’-u Tedvîni Tensîb Olunan Islahât Mecmuası (İstanbul:
Matbaa-i Âmire 1330 [1911]) and Kâmus-u Islahât-ı İlmiye. For a detalied information with regard to
the studies of the Council of Scientific Terminologies see İsmail Kara, Bir Felsefe Dili Kurmak:
Modern Bilim ve Felsefe Terimlerinin Türkiye’ye Girişi (İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2005), 392 pp.
5
Daru’l-Hikmeti’l-İslamiye, “Daru’l-Hikmeti’l-İslamiye Beyannâmesi,” İslam Mecmuası 5, no. 63
(24 Muḥarram 1337/30 October 1335/30 October 1918), pp. 1173-78. For a detailed information
about this institution’s activities, see Zekeriya Akman, Osmanlı Devleti’nin Son Döneminde Bir Üst
Kurul: Dâru’l-Hikmeti’l-İslâmiye, (Ankara: DİB Yayınları, 2009), 152 pp.
8
1.2 General Framework of the Chapters

One must denote, with regard to the restrictions of our study, that the activities of the
institutions touched upon briefly above do not constitute the subject of our study.
The basic purpose set here is to put forward the scientific and philosophical
approaches played a role in shaping the mentality of Young Turks’ who materialized
those institutions as well.

In the second chapter the history of Ottoman CUP as a Young Turk organization is
being outlined. Making direct historical discussions is out of the limits of our study.
However, it seems inevitable to consider the political power Young Turks
constructed by depending on this intellectual framework. Therefore, a quick glance at
the issues dealt with by Young Turks before and after the establishment of the CUP,
the general profiles of the founders and the impact the Committee created on the
Ottoman political life seemed to be useful.

The third chapter functions as the skeleton for our study. Because the discussions
carried out within next chapters are based, in large part, on the results acquired in the
third one. The scientific and philosophical approaches, effects of which can be
observed clearly in periodicals, are examined under three titles: positivism,
evolutionism and materialism. Impact of these movements on Young Turks’
mentality is traced through the ideas put forward by Young Turks themselves.

The fourth chapter examines the results, specific to the philosophy of religion,
created by the scientific and philosophical approaches adopted by Young Turks. This
chapter includes the most obvious reflections of the observable effects that modern
thinking caused in Young Turks’ intellectual world. For example, the discussions
about agnosticism, deism, pantheism and atheism that are revived with regard to the
existence of God can be seen as indicators showing the extent of importance Young
Turks attributed to the problem. Similarly, the concrete reflections of the paradigm
shift within the context of some classical issues of philosophy of religion like the life
after death, predestination, miracle and the relation between science and religion are
being discussed in this chapter.

9
The fifth chapter is devoted to the connections between Young Turks’ philosophical
and scientific approaches and their idea of ethics. This chapter, wherein the essential
issue of discussion is the possibility of a philosophy of ethics in Young Turks’
mentality, also presents remarkable examples of the intellectual breakage. The
chapter observes that they tried to rescue the idea of ethics from mediocrity and raise
it to the position of “first philosophy”. These results are worthy of insistence within
the context of purposes of this study. The discussions made by Young Turks within
the area of ethics imply that their goal of creating a new philosophical language is
expanded in a way to include the goal of constructing a new consciousness as well.
This circumstance is important since it shows the place where Young Turks wanted
to arrive by constructing a new philosophical language.

Young Turks’ discussions about philosophy of arts and aesthetics are examined
within sixth, and the last, chapter. In this chapter the aesthetical terminology used by
Young Turks and the main aesthetical problems they addressed are being studied.
Young Turks characterize the arts and aesthetics as the way of “returning to the
essence” or “discovering the essential nature”. And this characterization functions as
a founding principle for their intellectual systematic. Therefore, an examination of
the aesthetical aspect of the effects they received from modern scientific and
philosophical approaches seems to be a complementary part of this study. Although
the problems of aesthetics are handled by Young Turks within an aesthetical
terminology, the duty that it is obliged to fulfill is covering a much larger frame. It
would be useful to note that they identified the idea of “returning to the essence” and
the historical fact of Renaissance and that the “new life” which is attempted by them
can be seen as a struggle to create a Turkish Renaissance. Within this regard,
examination of the writings appeared in Young Turks’ periodicals about the
philosophy of aesthetics seemed as a necessity for our general purposes.

Of course, one needs also to draw a frame about the Young Turk periodicals which
constitute the backbone of this study. First of all, it must be noted that the periodicals
examined within this study are not the whole periodicals published by Young Turks.
However, there are some important qualities differentiating the periodicals that are

10
selected as subjects to this study from others. In these publications, leaving Meşveret
and Şura-yı Ümmet aside, the propagandist discourse appears at the minimum level.
On the contrary, scientific and philosophical approaches make their presence felt.
There are some other periodicals which we examined but not included in our study
and these were lacking an intellectual dimension and rather devoted to a pure
political propaganda.

1.3 Descriptions of the Young Turk Periodicals Examined

Eleven periodicals, in total, have been examined within the context of this study.
These are Meşveret, Şura-yı Ümmet, İçtihat, Ulûm-u İktisadiye ve İçtimaiye
Mecmuası, Muhit-i Mesai, Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası, Genç Kalemler, Yeni Mecmua,
İslam Mecmuası and Tabiat. The journal of Servet-i Fünûn also examined within this
scope. Although it is not a Young Turk periodical yet it includes articles by many
Young Turk figures. Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’s articles about philosophy of aesthetics,
which are published in Servet-i Fünûn, are particularly remarkable.

The basic characteristics of the periodicals examined can be summarized as follows:

1.3.1 Meşveret

Meşveret is the first Young Turk periodical published by the Ottoman Committee of
Union and Progress. Its first issue carries the date of 1 December 1895. It is
published bimonthly and the total number of its issues is 30. The publication date of
the last issue of Meşveret is 7 May 1898.

The founder and editor in chief of this journal is Ahmet Rıza Bey. The journal carries
a superscription which says that it is “the media organ of the Ottoman Committee of
Union and Progress”.

The journal generally includes articles relating to the issue of rescuing Ottoman
Empire politically. There is an anxious and severe style within articles it covers. It is
also possible to say that a nationalist approach stand occasionally out in these

11
writings. However, Meşveret’s basic purpose is to ensure the re-announcement of
Constitutionalism which is conceived by it as the only way of keeping Ottoman
elements together. Considered in terms of its intellectual character Meşveret can be
said to be the most superficial journal among Young Turk periodicals. For example,
concepts of “philosophy” and “philosopher” appears at two points6 only and the
philosophical discussions can be observed nowhere in it. It essentially is an
understandable circumstance. For, the basic purpose of its publication is to make the
propaganda of CUP. Therefore, it does not concentrate on serious intellectual
matters. It is used effectively, however, in expressing the basic political concerns of
Young Turks and is a useful source for acquiring information with regard to the
establishment and purpose of the CUP.

Ahmet Rıza Bey, Halil Ğanem, Mizancı Murat Bey, Şerafeddin Mağmumi and
Abdullah Cevdet (by the pseudonym of “Bir Kürd”) are among Unionists who made
publications in Meşveret. One may note that the majority of the articles published in
Meşveret are signed within the form of abbreviations, like “H. H.”, “F. M.” and “S.
T.”. It is because Meşveret is the media organ of CUP, being regarded as an outlawed
organization yet. Those signing their articles by their full names are generally people
who declared their opposition to the regime openly.

On the other hand, Meşveret has a supplement in French. This supplement is first
published on 7 December 1895. Only the issues published in Ottoman Turkish are
examined within the context of this study.

1.3.2 Şura-yı Ümmet

The first issue of the newspaper of Şura-yı Ümmet is published on 10 April 1902.
Purpose of the publication of this newspaper is to gather opposition movements
together around a Unionist organization. Thus, newspapers like İntikam, İstirdad and

6
Adzî (?), “İstanbul’dan Mektûb,” Meşveret 1, no. 4 [Supplement] (15 January 1108/10 Şaban
1313/26 January 1896), p. 4; H. H., “Habs, Nefy, İdam,” Meşveret 1, no. 6 (15 February 1108/2
Ramaḍān 1313/16 February 1896), p. 3.

12
Sancak, which are published by different fractions, are united with Şura-yı Ümmet.7
Bahaeddin Şakir and Samipaşazade Sezai are the first editors of Şura-yı Ümmet. And
it is published, in due course, in Thessaloniki, Paris and Istanbul as well. The 220th,
and the last, issue of the newspaper is published on 12 March 1910. One can observe
that it carries the superscription stating that it is “the media organ of Ottoman
Committee of Progress and Union”, as of the 96-97th issue.

Among the writers of the Şura-yı Ümmet, which is published bimonthly, are Yusuf
Akçura, Selanikli Nazım, Ahmet Saip, Bahaettin Şakir, Samipaşazade Sezayi, Rıza
Tevfik, Cenap Şahabettin, Bedii Nuri, Mahir Sait, Resmolu Cevat and Ahmet
Agayef. The situation encountered within Meşveret is valid for Şura-yı Ümmet as
well. Accordingly, the majority of the articles in the newspaper are published either
anonymously or in a manner to include just the first capitals of the writers’ names.
This is probably to protect the writers since the newspaper is an opposing media
organ.

Discussions carried out in Şura-yı Ümmet resemble the ones handled in Meşveret.
Political problems experienced by Ottoman Empire constitute the topic of the large
part of the articles published in Şura-yı Ümmet. However, this journal differs from
Meşveret in terms of the language it used, which can essentially be seen as a related
issue with the profile of the persons whose writings published in it. For, the topical
variations in Şura-yı Ümmet are larger in proportion to Meşveret. Additionally,
articles taking part in Şura-yı Ümmet can be said to have a more intellectual deepness
compared to the ones in Meşveret. Philosophical analyses are encountered more
frequently within this regard. This circumstance becomes clearer in due course of the
time and the intellectual perspective within the periodicals, which will be touched
upon in the following pages, takes a well-coordinated shape.

1.3.3 İçtihat

The journal of İçtihat is established by Abdullah Cevdet. As it is going to be handled

within the next chapter, Abdullah Cevdet is one of the founding figures of CUP.

7
This information is given in Anonymous, “İhtar”, Şura-yı Ümmet 1, no. 1 (10 April 1902), p. 3.
13
Publication of the journal of İçtihat continued even after the announcement of
Republic, until 1932. When the general publication policy of İçtihat and the topics
handled within it taken into consideration one can argue that it had a function in
terms of supplying an intellectual basis within the foundation period of Republic. It
defends, for example the acceptance of the Latin alphabet, application of the
principle of secularism, changing the role of women in society etc., all of which are
adopted after the Republic. The purpose of this study made it necessary to limit the
examination on the journal of İçtihat with the issues published in Ottoman Turkish,
before the announcement of Republic.

The first issue of İçtihat carries the date of 1 September 1904. There are some
postponements, caused by different reasons, in its publication. The last issue we
examined within the context of this study is published on 2 January 1919, with the
number of 137. One can observe that it is published with different names like İştihat,
İstişhat, Cehd etc. particularly in the periods of marital law.

The most remarkable character of the journal of İçtihat is the commitment it showed,
from beginning to the end, to the Unionist idea(l)s. Its basic purpose was the
westernization of Ottoman society. With this purpose in mind, it included
translations of the articles and books of western writers and philosophers. Most of
these translations are made by the founder and editor in chief of the İçtihat, Abudllah
Cevdet, himself.

Another important feature of this journal can be observed within the content of the
writings it included. As it is the case with almost all Young Turk periodicals, the
journal of İçtihat also gives a great importance to political issues. However,
assuming that the social, political and cultural problems with which Ottoman society
came across are the results of its distance from modern scientific and philosophical
understandings, it made a great effort to get the Western approaches accepted by it.
Therefore, in addition to its propagandist aspect the journal of İçtihat can be said to
have a significant intellectual basis and it has a serious publication policy due to its
philosophical articles in particular.

14
Abdullah Cevdet, Rıza Tevfik, Celal Nuri [İleri], Haydar Rıfat, Ahmet Agayef,
Kılıçzade Hakkı, Satı [el-Husrî], Şevketî, Ethem Necdet, Peyami Safa, Bahor İsrail,
Suphi Ethem, Ali Suat and Keçecizade İzzet Fuat are among writers who published
in İçtihat. On the other hand, one can witness that innumerable articles are published
in it either anonymously or just by the first letters of writers’ names.

1.3.4 Ulûm-u İktisadiye ve İçtimaiye Mecmuası

Publication of Ulûm-u İktisadiye ve İçtimaiye Mecmuası is started by Mehmet Cavit

Bey, Ahmet Şuayip and Rıza Tevfik, in İstanbul. Although it is said in the first issue
of journal, which carries the date of 28 December 1908, that it will be published once
in a month, one can observe that this period is shortened sometimes. Its last issue is
published on 1 March 1911. Total number of the issues of Ulûm-u İktisadiye ve
İçtimaiye Mecmuası is 24. It is quite voluminous compared to other Young Turk
periodicals. Some of the articles taking part in it are longer than 60 pages.

The purpose of the publication of the journal is to make suggestions for the CUP
with regard to economic, financial, social and cultural areas. The articles it covered
are expected, by the publishers, to function as a source of inspiration for the
parliament and the writers were asked to make policy suggestions within this
direction.

Topics examined within it resemble the ones held in İçtihat rather than in Meşveret
or Şura-yı Ümmet. Just like the journal of İçtihat, Ulûm-u İktisadiye ve İçtimaiye
Mecmuası also gives a great importance to philosophical issues. Articles about
different philosophical issues by Rıza Tevfik and Bedii Nuri, for example, are
particularly remarkable. In philosophical articles, the positivistic character of the new
scientific and philosophical framework, adopted by Young Turks, come into
prominence.

Writers of the journal include Mehmet Cavit Bey, Ahmet Şuayip, Rıza Tevfik, Bedii
Nuri, Salih Zeki, Faik Nüzhet, Ahmet Muhtar, Âsaf Nef’î, Satı el-Husrî, Ethem
Necdet, Fazıl Ahmet, Hasan Tahsin, Mahmut Esat, Nazım Ragıp and Ali Kami.

15
1.3.5 Muhit-i Mesai

The journal of Muhit-i Mesai is published in İstanbul by Abdullah Feyzî, H. Faik and
İ. Hamdi. It is published 10 issues in total, first of which carries the date of 6 January
1911.

Most of the articles in Muhit-i Mesai have rather philosophical contents. And the
ideas put forward within these articles generally seem to be written under the effect
of positivistic and evolutionist understandings of science. This circumstance can
clearly be observed particularly in Suphi Ethem’s articles.

Editorial staff of the journal includes Suphi Ethem, Cemaleddin Efendi, İ. Hamdi,
Kavukçuzade Ahmed Hamdi, M. Adil and Ahmet Mithat.

Articles by Cemalettin Efendi, who signs his writings as “Hukuk Reisi Cemalettin”,
are among most remarkable articles of the journal. His articles carry the most
observable effects of John Locke and can be evaluated within the context of
philosophy of law. On the other hand, Suphi Ethem’s article titled “Yenilik” revives
some of the ideas, defended by Young Turks consistently, in a well-coordinated
manner. The journal includes translations from western thinkers, Gustave Le Bon
being in the first place, as well.

1.3.6 Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası

Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası is the only journal, among Young Turk periodicals,
established for making publications in the area of philosophy. Its founders are
Nebizade Ahmet Hamdi and M. Zekeriya Sertel. As a matter of fact Yeni Felsefe
Mecmuası is established in place of Muhit-i Mesai. Its first issue is published on 15
August 1911. And the last issue of it carries the date of 15 April 1912. It is published
for 17 issues in total.

The most obvious character of the articles published in this journal is that they
include ideas reinforcing the conception of “new life” which is a Young Turk motto.

16
This, in fact, refers to an intellectual framework supported by new understanding of
philosophy away from tradition. Positivistic and evolutionist approaches are
particularly prevailing in the journal. In addition to these approaches one can also
come across to some understandings, which deserve to be regarded as materialistic.
Another remarkable aspect of the Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası is that a distant attitude
towards religion is put forward quite clearly. Moreover, there are strong indications
that a Turkist policy is adopted within it.

The editorial board of Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası is composed of Nebizade Ahmet

Hamdi, M. Zekeriya Sertel, Suphi Ethem, Kazım Nami, Ali Haydar, Rıza Nüzhet,
Rasim Haşmet, Selahattin Asım, Mustafa Nermî, Nezihi Cevdet and İsmail Hakkı.
Additionally, philosophical understandings of western philosophers like Charles
Letourneau and Alfred Fouillée are examined in a comprehensive manner. There is
an article in the journal which is written for the journal by Alfred Fouillée himself.8
On the other hand, it includes many anonymous articles as well.

1.3.7 Genç Kalemler

The journal of Genç Kalemler is established as a continuance of the journal of Hüsün

ve Şiir which is published previously by a group of men of letters. Since the journal
of Hüsün ve Şiir is published for 8 issues in total, the first issue of Genç Kalemler is
numbered as 9 (1). And the fact that it is the continuance of the journal of Hüsün ve
Şiir is plainly expressed in an article written by the editorial board of Genç Kalemler.

The first issue of the journal of Genç Kalemler is carrying the date of 11 March
1911. Managing editor of the journal is Nesimi Sârım Bey. It is published bimonthly.
The last issue of it is published on 15 October 1912. It is published for 33 issues in
total.

Ali Canip (sometimes with the pseudonym of Yekta Bahir), Ziya Gökalp (sometimes
with the pseudonyms of Demirtaş, Celal Sakıp or Tevfik Sedat), Âkil Koyuncu,

8
Alfred Fouillée, “Le Rapprochement des Races,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası, 1, no. 8 [Supplement in
French] (1 December 1327/14 December 1911), pp. 1-10.
17
Cenap Şahabettin, Ömer Seyfettin, Mustafa Nermî, Rasim Haşmet, Suphi Ethem,
Kazım Nami and Reşat Nuri Güntekin are among the writers of the journal.

When the general profile of the articles published in Genç Kalemler is considered,
one can observe that the literary articles are predominant. Literary works such as
poems, novels and essays are given a wide coverage. In addition to this, it is
remarkable that there are an un-ignorable number of articles devoted to the different
areas of social sciences. Philosophical articles by Ziya Gökalp, Suphi Ethem and
Mustafa Nermi, in particular, are of a great importance. It seems possible to argue
that Ziya Gökalp’s article titled “Bugünkü Felsefe”, for example, represents an
extremely authentic approach.

Genç Kalemler represents itself as the proponent of the conceptions of “new

language” and “new life”. New language and new life are essentially mottos used by
Turkish nationalists of the time. As a result of cleansing Turkish off foreign
vocabularies, or rather turning to the essence of Turkish, a new language different
from Ottoman will be emerged. And this new language will result in a new way of
thinking, which is the ultimate objective for Young Turks. A new life also needs to
accompany with this language overlapping with the requirements of the period.
Considered from this aspect, the prominence must be given to Turkish language and
construction of a new life suitable for the world view of Turkish nation. Genç
Kalemler represents the most obvious Turkist attitude among the Young Turk
periodicals, except the journal of Yeni Mecmua, which are examined within this
study. It can even be seen, in consequence, as the pioneer of Turkism, which became
widespread among Young Turks.

1.3.8 Yeni Mecmua

Yeni Mecmua is established by Ziya Gökalp. It is published weekly. The first issue of
it showed itself on 12 July 1917. It is published for 66 issues in total, the last of
which carries the date of 26 October 1918.

18
Ziya Gökalp acted also as the editor in chief of Yeni Mecmua and his Turkist
tendency can be said to be prevailing in the generality of articles published within it.
One can argue, in this respect, that it is the journal of Yeni Mecmua which most
obviously and systematically defended Turkism following Genç Kalemler. It also
supported the Turkist conceptions of new life and new language.

The journal of Yeni Mecmua includes articles spreading through a large area from
economics to arts, from politics to sociology and from religion to philosophy.
Figures like Ziya Gökalp, Ali Canip, Köprülüzade Mehmet Fuat, Nazmi Ziya,
Mehmet Vahid Bey, Necmettin Sadık, Tekin Alp, İsmail Hakkı, Şerafeddin
Yaltkaya, Zekeriya Sertel, Yahya Kemal and Refik Halit are among its writers.

1.3.9 İslam Mecmuası

İslam Mecmuası has an exceptional place among Young Turk periodicals. This
journal is published to examine discussions directly devoted to Islamic issues.
However, one needs to point that the reformist identity of the journal is highly
remarkable. It carries the superscription of “life with religion, religion with life” and
better be characterized as an important struggle towards developing an understanding
of Islam corresponding to the conditions of the time.

On the other hand, it is an extension of the nationalist attitude that became obvious
particularly following the publication of Genç Kalemler. That the nationalism is
contrary to Islam is a criticism directed by Islamists to nationalists all along the line.
It can be argued, keeping this criticism in mind, that one of the reasons led Young
Turks to publish İslam Mecmuası is the need of showing the reconcilability of
religious belief and the emphasis on nationality.

Editor in chief of İslam Mecmuası is Halim Sabit. The first issue of it is published on
12 February 1914 while the last issue carries the date of 30 October 1918. It is
published bimonthly. However, one needs to add that some postponements happened
in its publication periods and that the regular publication period could not be
followed from the second volume on.

19
İslam Mecmuası is a voluminous journal and the total number of its issues is 63. Its
editorial staff includes Ziya Gökalp, Musa Kazım Efendi, Ahmet Agayef, Ragıp
Hulusi, Halim Sabit, Mustafa Şerif, Ahmet Besim [Besim Atalay], Şerafeddin
Yaltkaya, Şemseddin Günaltay, Ömer Seyfeddin, Ahmet Muhyiddin, Abdüllatif
Nevzat, Mansurizade Said, Kazım Nami and Tekin Alp.

One can observe, considering the general profiles of the articles took part in the
journal, that almost all of the basic Islamic sciences like fiqh, tafsīr, hadīth, kalām,
aqāid and tasawwuf constitute the topics of discussions. Additionally, a prominent
place is given to philosophical articles.

1.3.10 Tabiat

The journal of Tabiat is a project carried out in the direction of a publication policy
which is parallel to the ideas adopted in other Young Turk periodicals. However,
only the first issue of this journal is obtained. No data with regard to the next issue(s)
of it could be acquired in centers and libraries that include Ottoman periodicals,
whether here in Turkey or abroad.

The sole issue of Tabiat is published on 23 July 1911. 23 July (10 July on Julian
calendar) is the date when the second Constitutionalism is announced, which gives
the impression that this date is specially selected for the publication of the journal of
Tabiat. Thus, this circumstance is expressed on the cover page of the journal by the
sentence of “happy supreme day of 10 July for all Ottomans”.

The purpose of Young Turks in publishing Tabiat is to promote western

understanding of science and philosophy among Ottoman society. In the introductory
article, written by editorial board, this purpose is expressed quite clearly. It is
possible, in this regard, to argue that the journal of Tabiat also has an aim similar to
other periodicals’.

20
Tabiat is established by Suphi Ethem. He planned to publish the journal monthly. Its
editorial board is composed of Suphi Ethem, Ragıp Hulusi and Mustafa Nermi.
There are 7 articles in it. All of them, except the article titled “İlk Söz” by Editorial
Board and Suphi Ethem’s article of “Felsefenin Mesâili”, are translations from
western thinkers. Quality of these translations is of a great importance for this study.
Translations made by Ragıp Hulusi, who thereafter will make a name for himself
because of his articles on philosophy of religion published in İslam Mecmuası, by the
titles of “Felsefe-i Müspete” and “Wundt’un Felsefesi: Psikoloji ve Ahlaka Dair” are
particularly remarkable. Other articles that took part in the journal are translations
from one of the most prominent materialist philosopher of the time, Erns Haeckel.
One of these translations is made by Sadrettin Kasım under the title of “Ernst
Haeckel’den: Havarik-i Hayat-1” and the other one is made by A. Rafet with the
name of “Tarih-i Hilkat-i Tabî’î veya Meslek-i Tekâmülün İzah-ı Fennîsi”.

The last periodical which is examined within the context of this study has been the
journal of Servet-i Fünûn. As a matter of fact, one needs to say that this journal is
examined partly. For, Servet-i Fünûn is not a periodical which is published by Young
Turks or CUP institutionally. However, articles of many Young Turk figures are
published within it. Ahmet Şuayip and Suphi Ethem, for example, are among those
figures. And the articles having importance in terms of the purposes of this study
have been those by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, written within the context of philosophy of
aesthetics, under the title of “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair”. Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın is an
important figure because he was both one of the ideologues of the Ottoman CUP and
following the scientific and philosophical understanding of the time very closely.
Therefore, his ideas associated with philosophy can be seen among factors
constituting philosophical ground for the political activities tried by CUP
institutionally. It is also possible to say that he had a serious impact on Ziya Gökalp,
who becomes one of the leading figures in CUP. Thus, Ziya Gökalp indicates that he
owes his acquaintance with Durkheim’s ideas to Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın.

Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’s first article in Servet-i Fünûn appears in its 370th issue which
is published on 14 April 1898. And his last article takes part in the 396th issue of

21
Servet-i Fünûn which carries the date of 5 November 1898. Total number of his
articles subjecting the philosophy of aesthetics is 18.

These articles reflect the obvious impacts of positivistic and evolutionist

philosophies. It is also possible to observe a materialistic approach in them. Despite
the fact that these articles were written during a period in which the Young Turk
movement was still in its formation stage, they represent an intellectual deepness
with regard to their content.

One of the issues, which need to be mentioned particularly within the context of
periodicals, is related with the type of calendar used in them. Some of the periodicals
used Hijrī calendar while some others used Julian or Gregorian calendar. It is even
possible to observe that some of the periodicals used both of them while some others
used all at once. Moreover, it is observed that the journal of Meşveret included the
positivistic calendar as well, in which the history begins with French Revolution. In
order to refrain from the confusion that these manifold of calendars would possibly
create, and to ensure that a consistent method is followed during the study, Gregorian
equals of the dates that are given on periodicals also added in parenthesis both in
footnotes and references.

22
 CHAPTER 2

A SHORT HISTORY OF OTTOMAN COMMITTEE OF UNION AND

PROGRESS AS A YOUNG TURK ORGANISATION

The main objective that we are going to pursue through this chapter is to provide
information on the historical background of Ottoman Committee of Union and
Progress.

As it has been pointed out in the previous chapter, analyzing the philosophical and
intellectual roots of an organization that played an important role in the Ottoman
political life is our aim and, therefore, we think that one needs to take its historical
background into consideration. However, we would like to undertake our discussions
by clarifying two points which have direct relations with our general aim.

Our study is not a historical one in the truest sense of the word. Consequently,
information that is going to be given here is not aimed to be as detailed as it can be
expected from a historian. There are a number of reasons retaining us from providing
such a detailed historical discussion.

First of all, we do not aim to enter into pure historical discussions. Although we try
to scrutinize the intellectual basis of a political organization which have made
history, our main objective will be to put forward the transformative effects of CUP
within political and cultural areas and the philosophical context that created this
effects. And secondly, the Ottoman CUP’s history has already been a subject of
numerous detailed valuable scholarly works to date.

23
2.1 History of Establishment of the Committee

It seems relatively difficult to give an exact date on which the Ottoman CUP has
been established. Different dates have been referred to in different sources as the date
of establishment of the organization. İbrahim Temo, for example, one of the
establishing figures of the CUP, states in his memoires9 that the Committee has been
instituted in May of 1889.10

In an article published in Meşveret on 2 February 1896 it is said that the Committee

has been established “twelve years earlier”.11 As a result of this assertion one needs
to conclude that the Committee has been instituted on the year of 1884.

12,
In his article titled “Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti” which has been
published in the journal of Şura-yı Ümmet, Bahaeddin Şakir, who is also one of the
persons played an important role in the latter times of the CUP, gives the year of 310
as the date of establishment of the Committee. And the year of 310 in Julian calendar
corresponds to 1895/1896 in Gregorian calendar.

On the other hand, in worthy of consideration studies carried out both in national and
international levels the year of 1889, the year that has also been referred to by
İbrahim Temo, is being accepted as the date of establishment of the Committee.13

2.2 Founders of the Committee

As to the information we received from İbrahim Temo, the CUP has been instituted
by a number of students studying at the military faculty of medicine.

9
See. İbrahim Temo, İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyetinin Teşekkülü ve Hidemat-ı Vataniye ve İnkılâbı
Milliye Dair Hatıratım in Biz İttihatçılar. Edited by Nurer Uğurlu. İstanbul: Örgün Yayınevi, 2009.
pp. 47-285.
10
Ibid, p. 64.
11
Sâ’î, “Tohum ve Semereleri.” Meşveret 1, no. 6. (15 February 1082/Ramaḍān 1313/16 February
1896): 3.
12
Bahaeddin Şakir, “Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti.” Şura-yı Ümmet 8, no. 203 (31 December
1325/13 January 1910): pp. 1-2.
13
Mithat Şükrü Bleda, İmparatorluğun Çöküşü (İstanbul: Destek Yayınevi, 2010), p. 80.
24
Among other founding figures of CUP were İshak Sükuti (1868-1902), Abdullah
Cevdet (1869-1932) and Mehmet Reşit (1873-1919).14 In a later time Şerafettin
Mağmumi, Giritli Şekik, Cevdet Osman, Kerim Sebati, Mekkeli Sabri ve Selanikli
Nazım have joined to this quadripartite.15

2.3 Denomination of the Committee

There are various views with regard to the original name that the Committee has
been assumed to carry in 1889. In fact İbrahim Temo does not write in his memoirs
the name which has been given to the Committee. He contents himself with
explaining the efforts made for the establishment of it. Some sources remarks that the
Committee was originally instituted by the name of “İttihad-ı Osmani” (Ottoman
Union) and denominated as “Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti” following the
connections entered with Young Turks in Paris.16 As for Ahmet Rıza Bey, the
Committee was carrying the name of “İttihad-ı İslam” (İslamic Union). According to
him, the official name has been changed as “İttihat ve Terakki” following his
objections against the name of Islamic Union.17 It is a high probability that this
change of name has been taken place in 1895, a bit later following the institution of
the Committee. 18

There is a common indication in sources that an observable delicacy came into

prominence among founding figures with respect to the name the Committee
expected to carry. It is not possible to state that this widespread delicacy of the
founding persons, like İbrahim Temo and Ahmet Rıza, was baseless. Because the

14
Temo, ibid.
15
Erneste E. Ramsaur, Erneste E. Jön Türkler ve 1908 İhtilali. Translated by Nuran Yavuz. (İstanbul:
Pozitif Yayınları, 2007), p. 21.
16
See, for example, Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler. Vol. 3. (İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı
Yayınları, 1984), p. 27.
17
Ahmet Rıza, Hatıralar in Biz İttihatçılar. Edited by Nurer Uğurlu. (İstabul: Örgün Yayınevi, 2009),
p. 315. Mithat Şükrü Bleda says that the organisation has been established as “İttihad-ı
İslam”. See, Bleda, ibid.
18
Sina Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki. (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2009), p. 51.
25
Committee was established in order to unify the Ottoman components (anasır)
coming from different religious and ethnic backgrounds around a single purpose. In
the way of creating this idea of union the Committee needed to carry a more
comprehensive name. A denomination signifying a direct relation to Islam or
Turkness would be creating disaffection among other national subject belonging to
different religions and nations. As a result of this concern the founding figures took
over the name of “İttihat ve Terakki” that seemed to them as a more inclusive name.

Ibrahim Temo writes in his memoirs that during the works to establish the
Committee different discussions happened relating to the procedure of electing
people as members. In the course of these discussions some members states that only
Turkish and Muslim people need to be allowed as members. But as a result of
İbrahim Temo’s objections the idea of accepting people, regardless of their religious
or ethnic identity, who are reliable and have good personality, has been adopted. 19

That direct references to be made to the religious and national identity brought to the
agenda even at the phase of establishment carries a remarkable meaning for the latter
periods as well. Because, as we are going to point out in further chapters of our study
for a variety of reasons, Turkish and Islamic identities had been two determining
elements within the official ideological line of the Ottoman CUP. So much so that,
Ziya Gökalp, who can be regarded as political brain of the Committee, determined
Turkish language and Islam as main constituents of the Ottoman identity which has
been tried to be reconstructed as a modern nation. In other words, religious and
lingual unity can be said to have drawn a new direction for the idea of union (ittihat).
When viewed from this perspective, it seems reasonable to claim that Turkism and
Islamism -as a related political view to Turkism- are deeply rooted principles in the
political mind of the Committee from the beginning rather than reflections of an
ideology which has temporarily been accepted due to different historical reasons. As
a matter of fact, the “first official statement” 20 issued by the Committee on the 5th of
October in 1895 upon the incident of Armenian raid into the Sublime Porte (Babıali)
19
Temo, ibid, p. 66.
20
M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük (İstanbul:
İletişim Yayınları, 1986), p. 185.

26
which took place on 30th of September in 1895, carries the title of “O Muslims and
beloved Turkish citizens!”. 21

It cannot be said that the Committee used the name of “Ottoman Committee of
Union and Progress” continuously during the whole period starting from 1889 until
1918 when it’s political activities are came to an end to a large extent and it re-
denominated itself as “Teceddüd Fırkası”. For, even starting from the First Congress
of Young Turks, conducted in 1902, separations between members have already
begun. As a result of this separation the Committe has taken the name of “Terakki ve
İttihat Cemiyeti” (Committee of Progress and Union) for a short period of time and
then, after uniting with “Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti” (Ottoman Committee of
Freedom) which instituted in Selanik, it restarted to use its previous name, the
Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress.

2.4 General Profile of Founders

If we look at the general profile of the persons established the Ottoman CUP, we see
that beyond personal differences they meet on a common ground. This ground is that
they have been studied in educational institutions which can be regarded as modern
in respect to their era. İbrahim Temo being in the first place, Abdullah Cevdet, İshak
Sükuti, Şerafettin Mağmumi and almost all of the other famous founding figures of
the Committee have studied at the military faculty of medicine. This organization
among the students of military faculty of medicine were started quite secretly and
gained wide currency in other higher education institutions, especially in the School
of Civil Services (Mülkiye) and the Naval School (Bahriye). 22 In other words, the
Ottoman CUP came about as the political organization of the students who were
either graduated from the School of Medicine (Tıbbiye), instituted in 1827; the
Military Collage (Harbiye), instituted in 1834; the School of Civil Services

21
For the whole text of the announcement see. Temo, ibid, pp. 87-88.
22
Temo, ibid, p. 67. For a detailed explanation with regard to the organisation in the abovementioned
schools see also Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, İnkılâp Tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler (Tan Matbaası, İstanbul,
1945), pp. 223-233.

27
(Mülkiye), instituted in 1859; or still studying in these institutions.23 As we are going
to argue in future chapters, this condition constitutes one of the reasons of their
adopting an approach that can be seen as “elitism”.

It is remarkable that this rebellion against Abdulhamit regime starts to obtain basis in
educational institutions. But we think that is not accidental. It is not accidental,
because those who felt the impact of the West were the generations not entered into
the line of their fathers yet. And secondly, they had no enough opportunity of
studying but in those intrastate military institutions.24

It is important for us to note here that the education received by Unionist figures has
shaped their world of thought. It is certain that the Committee emerged in modern
educational institutions. And the most important element giving vitality to this fact is
that these schools met with modern scientific thought earlier and denser compared
with other educational institutions implementing traditional training programs, i.e.
medreses. As it has reasonably been pointed out by M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, the huge
difference between the thinking style of the students studying at aforementioned
higher education institutions and the scientific activities and findings of the time
created serious impacts on their minds. M. Şükrü Hanioğlu felicitously regards the
reflection of this circumstance as the “problem of mentality”.25

This mentality constitutes the primary source of objections Unionists articulated

against Abdülhamit’s regime, as well as the starting point of the severe critical
discourse they have adopted, with regard to the social living and thinking styles,
following the announcement of Constitutionalism (Meşrutiyet).

The basic discourse which determined the mentality of Unionists’ was “new versus
old.” What has at the start been meant by “old” was purely political. They were
demanding a transition from a political structure in which the Sultan had an absolute

23
Akşin, ibid, p. 17.
24
Ramsaur, Ibid, p. 35.
25
Hanioğlu, ibid, p. 173.

28
sovereignty to a political system where the power were restricted and allocated
between relatively different centers.

And in the next phase, the areas of the things subjected to the demand of change have
enormously been widened and consequently this brought a serious power to that
demand. The change is no longer limited with a restriction to be imposed on the
sovereignty of the Sultan. The social life as a whole is wanted to be changed from
top to the bottom. The thinking and living style of the society would be renewed by
means of creating new values. It is also possible to characterize the new demand as
the first step of the process of reconstruction. The tools of the process of
reconstruction are meant to be new values to be created in political, ethical,
philosophical, scientific, aesthetical and economical areas.

2.5 The Relation of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress as a Young
Turk organization with other Young Turk movements

Although the adjective of Young Turk seems to be used to characterize the

prominent figures of the CUP, it has a much longer history in fact.

It is possible to state that the identification of Young Turk has been used to
characterize educated fractions which were estranged from traditional Ottoman living
and thinking styles in one way or another. Those who are interested in Ottoman
literary or intellectual life are familiar with various similar characterizations
attributed to the mentality described above. Young Ottomans or New Ottomans has
also been used synonymously with the characterization of Young Turks. All of these
characterizations were applied to those persons who were affected by Western way
of thinking, literary movements being in the first place. Of course the usage of the
idiom of Young Turk in a way to describe the major part of the disaffected Ottoman
thinkers and activists is not coincidental. Hence, with regard to the ideals and
methods followed there are so many similarities between the Unionist intellectuals
and the thinkers who were members of the group called New Ottomans. In addition,
one needs to note that there are also some persons who played a part in both
organizations. For example, İsmail Kemal Bey, Samipaşazade Sezai Bey, Murat Bey

29
and Salih Münir Bey were among the members of the CUP who were previously
took part in the activities of the organization of New Ottomans.26 Besides, it has been
argued in Meşveret that the struggle pursued is a fruit of the seed sprinkled by New
Ottoman thinkers like Ali Suavi, Namık Kemal and Ziya Paşa.27

On the other hand, the connection between New Ottomans and the later Young Turk
generation does not arise solely from a partnership on thoughts. One of the major
elements brought about the Unionist opposition was the oppressive attitude shown by
Abdülhamit to the representatives of New Ottoman ideals including Mithat Paşa and
Namık Kemal.28

“Freedom” takes the first place among the ideals shared by the members of the group
of New Ottomans and the CUP both. The most important change they referred to by
“freedom” is limitation of the absolute power of the Sultan. This limitation would be
realized by implementing the Western parliamentarian system in Ottoman Empire as
well. Sultan’s absolute authority would be limited by means of a Constitution
(Kanun-u Esasi) and a Constitutional (Meşruti) regime would be established instead.
Thus the people would have a voice in administration and the discretionary ruling
would come to an end.

Another similarity between the Ottoman CUP and the group of New Ottomans shows
itself in the method they followed. Just like the members of the Ottoman CUP are
going to do in the future, New Ottomans started to live abroad and to tried to
propagate their ideas within the borders of Empire through various periodicals. The
first periodical coming to mind within this context is Hürriyet which has been
published by New Ottomans in 1864 in London.29 And Meşveret, İçtihad, Şura-yı

26
Şerif Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasî Fikirleri: 1895-1908 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010), p. 34.
27
See, [Mekteb-i Tıbbiye Firarilerinden] Nazım, “İstibdad Hizmete Mani Olur Mu?” Meşveret 1, no.
3 (6 January 1108/15 Rajab 1313/1 January 1896): 1.
28
For interpretations about this relationship see. Cevrî, İnkılâp Niçin ve Nasıl Oldu (Mısır: Matbaa-i
İçtihat, 1909), p. 25.
29
Ramsaur, ibid, p. 20.

30
Ümmet and Osmanlı are among first official periodicals published by the Ottoman
CUP itself.

There is one another point which can be regarded as constituting a similarity on

method they used. Both the group of New Ottomans and the Ottoman CUP
maintained their activities secretly. There is nothing surprising in it if the extent of
the power and sovereignty of the central authority taken into consideration.

The movement of New Ottomans emerged in 1865 after the establishment of a secret
organization called “İttifak-ı Hamiyyet” (Alliance of Patriotism) by a group of young
persons among of which were Namık Kemal also.30 The organization of İttifak-ı
Hamiyyet and whole of the subsequently generated political entities were organized
according to Carbonari model.31 The Ottoman CUP is not an exception as such.

Carbonari organization was constituted in Italy in 19th century and its members were
recognizing each other just as fractional numbers.32 While making reference to the
division of labor made between members following the establishment of the Ottoman
CUP, İbrahim Temo gives us the clues of getting organized according to Carbonari
method by saying, for example, that “Ali Ruşdî Efendi elected as chairman -because
he was oldest person among us and turbaned-, Şerafeddin elected as recording clerk
and Asaf Derviş elected as treasurer. And I became top of the line in 1/1 series of the
sequence numbers to be used.”33

It is also possible to observe that this method has continued in later years. In some
issues of Meşveret, for example, names of the people, who supplied financial aid to
the families of the persons accused of being members to the Committee and

30
Akşin, ibid, p. 45.
31
Niyazi Berkes, Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma (Ankara: Bilgi Basımevi, 1973), p. 202. See also Enver
Ziya Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi: Islahat Fermanı Devri (1861-1876). Vol. 7. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu
Yayınları, 1977), p. 129.
32
Ramsaur, ibid, p. 33.
33
Temo, ibid, p. 66.

31
consequentially banished, have been given as numbers instead (like “five hundred
and sixteenth person of the fifth division”.)34

However, it would be highly assertive to state that there was a perfect similarity
between the members of New Ottomans and the CUP. Therefore, we need to point to
the fact that there were also some serious differences between the qualifications of
the members of both organizations. For example, the group of New Ottomans was
constituted largely by the persons experienced with regard to administration. While
knowledge about how to administer the state was giving acceleration to the
movement carried out through persons, on the one hand, and insuring to have a
weight and reputation among the people on the other. In spite of this, members of the
CUP were belonging to nascent occupational groups which was generated by
teachers (müderris) teaching at newly instituted public schools, advocates studied
Western law, journalists, civil servants, bureaucrats, secondary officers working at
Western type military collages. More importantly, there were no persons in the CUP
who were experienced within the administration of state.35 This lack of experience
created the biggest problem encountered by the members of CUP after the
announcement of Constitutionalism. After its failure in showing the success of
bringing out people competent to administer the state among its own staff the CUP
had to share the government with those Paşa’s of the Sublime Porte who were
dexterous in political conspirations.

This case of alienation made the Unionists face a difficulty with regard to getting the
values they shared and defended acceptable before the ordinary Ottoman citizens.
That the members of the CUP received education in institutions which can be
regarded modern as far as their period concerned and that the Western ideals they
were defending over against large mass of people enables us to claim that they
became alienated to the traditional Ottoman world of thought. What can be seen as

34
See, for example, Meşveret 1, no.19 (23 September 1108/12 Rabīʿ al-Ākhir 1314/20 September
1896): p. 6; Meşveret 1, no. 20 (8 October 1108/27 Rabīʿ al-Ākhir 1314/5 October 1896): p. 6;
Meşveret 1, no. 8 (23 October 1896/23 Jumādā al-Ūlā 1314/30 October 1896): p. 8; Meşveret 1, no.
23 (23 November 1896/27 Jumādā al-Ākhira 1314/3 December 1896]: p. 8.
35
Feroz Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914. Translated by Nuran Yavuz. (İstanbul: Kaynak
Yayınları, 2007,), p. 34.

32
the biggest reflection of this situation has been that the Unionist demands toward
Westernization and modernization put forward in exceedingly traditional forms. In
other words, once Unionists saw that their claims were creating a resistance among
people, they had to articulate their demands by decorating them with Islamic
motives. At the start Young Turks seemed to be moving from the same social values
defended by New Ottomans. However, this later orientation also could not provide
Young Turks with the same dignity in the eye of the ordinary people.36

One another difference, which can be said to exist between New Ottomans and
Unionists, originates from the interest shown by members of both groups to the
Islamic thoughts and notions and the source of this interest. For example, it is known
that “the formative affect of the concept of justice, the special place and function of
Sharia in society … and mysticism [tasawwuf] on thinking” 37 has left deep traces on
New Ottomans. As against the central role which played by Islam within the thinking
of New Ottomans, the CUP has used Islamic concepts and thoughts as means to
reach its political purposes instead. Young Turks, as persons who felt detached from
Islamic thinking, rather preferred to formulate their ideas within the frame of certain
Islamic concepts. Otherwise these ideas would obviously be found unfamiliar by and
get serious reactions from Ottoman society. “What has needed to be done was to
refrain from making the approaches, which the society would most probably
38
ostracize, a matter of debate in an effort to influence the mass” at least until
coming into power.

The major case made by similarities and differences between the members of the
Ottoman CUP and New Ottomans shows itself in the commitment towards the will of
changing the present structure. No matter from which source it was inspired and
which ideal it targeted to achieve, the disaffection felt from the actual constitutes the
prime element that created these political ideas. The ideals of changing the old and
replacing it with the new one have left deep traces on members of both sides that can
somewhat be regarded as “fetishism of newness”.
36
Ahmad, ibid, pp. 33-34.
37
Mardin, ibid, p. 13.
38
Hanioğlu, ibid, p. 625.
33
2.6 Purpose of the Founders of the Committee

The major purpose of the founders of Ottoman CUP can be summarized in a

seemingly quite simple demand.

This demand was to reactivate the Constitution which has been announced in 1876
but suspended in 1878 by Abdülhamit. Even a superficial study on the first official
publications by Unionists would be enough to put forward the extent of the
importance they attributed to the announcement of Constitution. This demand carries
within itself both symbolic and vital meanings. The symbolic meaning of it lies in the
fact that following the announcement of the Constitution Abdülhamit’s autocratic
governance would come to an end.

When we keep in mind the Unionists’ perspective of life the vital meaning of this
demand will be better understood. Because, as it is pointed out earlier, Unionists are
representatives of a new mentality which is not restricted solely by a demand
regarding to type of governance. A possible alternation in the type of governance
would also pave the way for realizing the background that created this demand of
change. As we are going to elaborate in later stages, the emphasis on political change
and transformation will be started to be made on social and cultural change and
transformation.39

There is no doubt that this circumstance was also a sign of political disengagement
from traditional thought. It is interesting enough to read, for example, in an article by
Mizancı Murat Bey (1854-1917) which he published in Meşveret that Unionists are
characterized as “conservatives”.40 Why these people called themselves
conservatives while they were trying to change the traditional political structure with
a modern one? Can a struggle towards replacing Absolutism with Constitutionalism
be regarded as conservatism? We think that the answer lies in the fact of their

39
See, for example, Ziya Gökalp, “Türkçülük Nedir?” Yeni Mecmua 1, no. 25 (27 December 1917):
pp. 482-83.
40
Mehmed Murat, “İkiden Hangisi?” Meşveret 1, no. 17 (23 August 1108/12 Rabīʿ al-Awwal 1314/21
August 1896): p. 1.

34
awareness about the strong social commitment to the Sultan. Therefore, they tried to
use as much careful language as possible to refrain from creating reactions among
society. This Unionist sensitivity leads us to a conclusion which has also quite
reasonably been referred to by M. Şükrü Hanioğlu that they were supporters of a
reconciliatory modernism. 41 Thus, it has continuously been argued by Unionists that
changing the traditional governance style with modern one is also a religious
requirement because the Western political model of parliamentarianism and Islamic
methods of council (şûra) or consultancy (Meşveret) were overlapping. Hence, when
we look at the first periodicals published by Unionist staff we come across to
different denotations referring this argument. This is why election of names making
reference to Islamic consultation procedures like Meşveret or Şura-yı Ümmet cannot
be seen as accidental. That is also why Şura-yı Ümmet carries a verse from Qur’an as
superscription which states that “amruhum shura baynahum” (“their affairs are run
on the basis of their consultation.”)42

This demand caused to serious frictions between Unionists and Abdülhamit until the
announcement of Constitutionalism in 1908 for the second time.

2.7 Young Turks’ Problem with Abdülhamit

As a matter of fact, the problem that the Ottoman CUP had experienced with Sultan
Abdülhamit was very similar to the one that is experienced by the group called
Young Ottomans or New Ottomans with Sultan Abdülaziz.

Both of the groups were seeking for “freedom”. New Ottomans has tried and
partially been succeeded in persuading Sultan Abdülaziz that a reform in the
administration of the Empire is necessary. But there was a big difference between the
expectations of Sultan Abdülaziz and New Ottomans from reform. Sultan Abdülaziz
was expecting that Mithat Paşa, the leader of New Ottomans, and his proponents will
show a serious performance to meliorate the Empire’s financial condition. However,
New Ottomans were trying to carry out their intention of limiting authority of the
41
Hanioğlu, ibid.
42
Qur’an, 42:38.
35
Sultan by means of diminishing the power of his inner circle. Ultimately, the
scramble between Sultan and New Ottomans came to an end with deposition of
Abdülaziz after a coup d’état designed by New Ottomans on 30th of May 1876. After
a while later from coup d’état Sultan Abdülaziz committed suicide. In substitution of
him Murat the 5th were enthroned. Murat the 5th’s Sultanate endured nearly three
months. But thereafter he has lost his mental balance and been replaced with
Abdülhamit the 2nd who promised to get the Constitution prepared and to announce
the Constitutionalism.

After he became the Sultan, Abdülhamit appointed Mithat Paşa as his Grand Vizier
(Sadrazam) and authorized him to prepare the Constitution. Thusly the
Constitutionalism was announced by the Sultan on 23rd of December in 1876 in
accordance with the Constitution (Kanun-u Esasi) prepared under the leadership of
Mithat Paşa.

Preparation of the Constitution and announcement of Constitutionalism has been

perceived as great achievements by New Ottomans. However, this sense of
achievement did not last long and Abdülhamit sent Mithat Paşa into exile holding
him responsible from the death of Sultan Abdülaziz. And in 1878 he abolished the
parliament (Meclis-i Mebusan), which were generated in accordance with the
Constitution, and announced that he temporarily suspended the Constitutionalism.
Although Abdülhamit said that the duration of this suspension will be short, it
continued exactly for 30 years, starting from 1878 until 1908 when the
Constitutionalism announced for the second time.

As of 1878, when the Constitutionalism was suspended, Young Turks never got
along with Abdülhamit. The truest concept to describe Abdülhamit’s regime has
been “oppression” (istibdat) in Young Turks’ discourse. According to them,
Abdülhamit was using an insufferable policy of oppression throughout the Empire by
means of a wide network of sleuth he created. Their major purpose was to put an end
to this policy of oppression and to ensure the re-announce the Constitutionalism
suspended in 1878.

36
One of the noteworthy points is that the accusations made by members of the
Ottoman CUP against Abülhamit’s regime have firstly been directed to the interest
groups aggregated around the Palace. Criticisms directly targeting the personality of
the Sultan are extremely rare. Even the most ingrained opponents of Abdülhamit
were submitting some petitions to and feeling hopeful about him nonetheless. The
respect shown to the post of Sultanate can be arising both from the conservative sides
of Young Turks and a pragmatic method they followed to refrain from getting
people’s reaction. After a certain period of time this method has been renounced and
Abdülhamit became a direct target of criticisms by any means.

2.8 The Methods Abdülhamit Followed to Cope with Young Turks

Just like every rulers wanting to preserve the might and potency they have,
Abdülhamit also acted very unpermissively against oppositional movements. A short
time after his enthronement Abdülhamit had banished Mithat Paşa, to whom he
promised the announcement of the Constitutionalism, deeming him responsible from
the death of Sultan Abdülaziz. Then, Mithat Paşa has been killed and his death
remained unsolved. Opponents of Abdülhamit considered him, quite reasonably,
responsible from this death. Although death of Sultan Abdülaziz has been used as an
occasion for sending Mithat Paşa into exile, it can be said that the main reason of this
exile was Abdülhamit’s regarding New Ottomans as a danger in terms of his regime.
Mithat Paşa’s banishment and his subsequent death are seen as primary reasons of
rise of the Ottoman CUP.43 It would be useful pointing to a case in Mithat Paşa
example. In Abdülhamit’s era execution essentially remained as an exceptional
punishment. “In course of Abdülhamit regime, death penalty was an exception, not a
rule. Insurgents were being incapacitated by means of segregation. It was always
possible to return for those who were sent into exile because of their insurgency.” 44

Existence of strong intelligence agency was the most remarkable aspect of

Abdülhamit regime. By means of its paid sleuths, the Palace was able to receive
intelligence about and take measures against the activities of opposition movements

43
See Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, İnkılap Tarihimiz ve İttihat ve Terakki (İstanbul, 1948), p. 54.
44
Ahmad, ibid, p. 197.
37
within the Empire particularly those located in Istanbul. It was because of this
intelligence agency that the Ottoman CUP arose as a secret organization and
maintained its activities underground for a long time.

Money was Abdülhamit’s biggest ammunition he used against opposing movements.

A great majority of opponents were trying to continue their lives without having
financial opportunities. Ahmet Rıza’s memoirs, for example, include the most
conspicuous expressions about the extent of negative influence created by financial
problems on members of the Committee. As we learn from his memoirs, Ahmet Rıza
had to sell his books because of indigence.45

To what extent would it be possible, for those who were also having difficulty even
in maintaining their daily lives, to scramble successfully against an Empire? Thus, a
big part of prominent Young Turks either cancelled their activities or suspended
them for a certain amount of time in return for the money offered by Abdülhamit.

It was not only the members of the Ottoman CUP who experienced a deprivation of
financial opportunities needed for enabling an organization to sustain its fight. New
Ottomans also had similar difficulties before them. New Ottomans were a bit luckier.
They “had the opportunity of working as an organized power by virtue of the wealth
of Mustafa Fazıl Paşa.”46

Mustafa Fazıl Paşa’s role in protecting New Ottomans similarly played by Damat
Mahmut Paşa for the Ottoman CUP. Damat Mahmut Paşa was brother in law of
Abdülhamit and has taken refuge in France together with his sons Prince Sabahattin
and Prince Lütfullah in 1899. Damat Mahmut Paşa was a person who adopted the
activities carried out by the members of Ottoman CUP and supported them
financially. It is also possible to state that the Khedive of Egypt has also undertaken a
partial role of protection for Young Turks. For example, Khedive Abbas Hilmi

45
Ahmet Rıza, ibid, p. 306.
46
Mardin, ibid, p. 143.

38
supplied financial support for enabling the publication of Osmanlı, one of the official
periodicals of the Ottoman CUP, in Egypt.47

Having enough intelligence about the difficulties experienced by Young Turks

Abdülhamit found the best way of using it in his favor. He planned, accordingly, to
suggest Young Turks to stop their activities in exchange of money. He assigned duty
48
of persuading Young Turks to Ahmet Celalettin Paşa, the sleuth in chief. As a
dexterous negotiant Ahmet Celalettin Paşa realized this duty with a great success.
Mizancı Murat Bey, for example, who contributed to the Committee as a
psychologically reinforcing figure among its leader staff, decided to suspend his
activities and returned to Istanbul on 20 July in 1897 following the negotiations he
made with Ahmet Celalettin Paşa.49

Of course Mizancı Murat Bey was not the only person who made a deal with Ahmet
Celalettin Paşa. Abdullah Cevdet and İshak Sükuti were also among the persons,
who played a prominent role in the Committee, made a similar deal with him and
suspended their activities. “In 1900 İshak Sükuti accepted the position of doctorship
at the Ottoman embassy in Rome and Abdullah Cevdet accepted a similar position at
the embassy in Vienna.”50

In the deal they made with Ahmet Celalettin Paşa Young Turks generally stipulated
the realization of reforms. Abdülhamit were supposed to make the reforms and
Young Turks closed the journals and papers making news against Abdülhamit and
returned to Istanbul.

That Mizancı Murat Bey agreed with Ahmet Celalettin Paşa and accepted to return to
Istanbul constituted a destructive impact on the Committee and it could not

47
Akşin, ibid, p. 98.
48
See Tahsin Paşa, Abdülhamit ve Yıldız Hatıraları in İkinci Meşrutiyetin İlanı. Edited by Ö. Andaç
Uğurlu. (İstanbul: Örgün Yayınevi, 2008), p. 433 and Mardin, ibid, p. 112.
49
Hanioğlu, ibid., p. 241.
50
Ramsaur, ibid, p. 73.

39
recuperate for a long time after this disengagement. Although the Committee is
refreshed following Damat Mahmut Paşa’s desertion to Paris in 1899 it could not be
reconstructed within Turkey until 1906.51 And it is really interesting to see that
Ahmet Celalettin Paşa also participated in the opposition movement of Young Turks
in 1904.52

2.9 Young Turks’ Struggles for Unification

2.9.1 First Young Turk Congress

We have pointed out above that Damat Mahmut Paşa undertook a role of “protector”
for Unionists, who were carrying out activities against Abdülhamit in Europe to a
large extent by publishing periodicals. This role of protectorate can be seen as a
natural result of Mahmut Paşa’s financial support for Unionists. But if we examine
closely, we see that the meaning attributed to him was a reflection of the search for a
unifying figure. It is because they were constantly having heated arguments with
each other and consequently experiencing partitions among themselves. On the
occasion of Damat Mahmut Paşa’s desertion to Europe, Young Turks reached the
conclusion that it was possible for them to reunify and create goal congruence.

Along with Damat Mahmut Paşa’s directions and the invitation published by Prince
Sabahattin and Prince Lütfullah Beys’, which carries the title of “General Invitation
for Ottomans”, Young Turks living in different countries came together on 4-9
February of 190253 in Paris.

Prince Sabahattin and Prince Lüftullah Beys’ purpose in publishing this invitation
was to unify persons who were sharing common interests but were also dissociating
because of methodological differences. They were struggling to gather all the
Ottoman citizens -who are assumed to be exposed to a disaster compensation of
which is impossible- including Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Albanians, Armenians,
51
Ramsaur, ibid, p. 69.
52
Kuran, ibid, p. 184.
53
Ramsaur, ibid, p. 86; Akşin, ibid, pp. 80-81.
40
Macedonians, Greeks, and Jews etc to meet in the middle. In this way, they were
targeting both to give an end to the current regime and to try to build up the basis of
new government by depending on the consensus of Ottoman elements.54

The 1st Young Turk congress has not been successful because of sharp disagreements
between two groups. These disagreements can be said to have essentially arisen from
two subjects. One of them was the role and limit of the central authority in the
administration of state. And the other was the attitude to be adopted with regard to
intervention of foreign states.

Although both of the groups were feeling anxious about preserving the unity between
Ottoman elements, they were failing to reach an agreement on methodology of that.

The group under the presidency of Ahmet Rıza Bey was requesting that the central
authority should be preserved in any case. On the other hand, the second group,
which is represented by Prince Sabahattin Bey, was supporting the idea of
application of a decentralized structure. Ahmet Rıza Bey and some other Unionists
like Doctor Nazım were interpreting the idea of decentralization as “lack of state” 55
(adem-i devlet).

Prince Sabahattin Bey was regarding the intervention of other states as a

methodology to be employed at the point of changing the regime. But Ahmet Rıza
Bey and his proponents were against foreign intervention in any case.

Prince Lütfullah Bey established the group of “Private Enterprise and

Decentralization” (“Teşebbüs-i Şahsî ve Adem-i Merkeziyet”) which negotiated in
terms of liberal ideas he has. Ahmet Rıza Bey and his supporters, who constituted the
minority in Congress, called themselves as “proponents of constitutional government

54
Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi. Vol. 1. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991),
pp. 295-296.
55
Kuran, ibid, p. 171.

41
and general reform”.56 Afterwards, this later group has taken the name of
“Committee of Ottoman Progress and Union”.

Prince Sabahattin Bey tried to propagate his ideas through the newspaper of Terakki,
first issue of which has been published in 1906.57 Ahmet Rıza Bey and his
proponents started to publish the newspaper of Şura-yı Ümmet in 1902. 58

Prens Sabahattin has a profile drawing attention with liberal ideas. Following
Edmond Demolins he presents an approach prioritizing the individual and giving
importance to the idea of free enterprise. He can be said to have adopted a liberal
economical view. In this respect, his ideas differ from other Young Turks’. On the
other hand Ahmet Rıza Bey seems to have more inflexible and authoritarian
approach with regard to political and economical issues. His idea of unification can
be said to be Jacobin and not prefer demands of social basis or individual freedoms.

Ahmet Rıza Bey and his proponents continued to criticize Prens Sabahattin Bey in
later years also. Hence, in different issues of Şura-yı Ümmet we come across
important critiques directed towards the political approach adopted by Prens
Sabahattin.59 This shows us how big is the extent of separation took place in the
Congress of 1902.

For example “Osmanlı İttihat ve İnkılâp Cemiyeti [Committee of Ottoman Union and
Revolution], Cemiyet-i İnkılâbiye [Revolutionary Committee], Vatan ve Hürriyet
Cemiyeti [Committee of Motherland and Freedom], Ohri Cemiyet-i Hususiye-i
İslamiyesi [Special Islamic Committee of Ohrid], Cemiyet-i Ahadiye-i Osmaniye
[Committee of Ottoman Union], İhtilalci Asker Cemiyeti [Committee of

56
Mardin, ibid, p. 257.
57
Kuran, ibid. pp. 172 and 234.
58
The first issue of Şura-yı Ümmet, published on 10 April 1902, explains the purpose of the
publication of newspaper as “to transform the arbitrary regime into a constitutional government and
get the rules of Constitution –dated 7 Dhū al-Ḥijja 1293- applied.”
59
For criticisms directed by Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir, see Şura-yı Ümmet 5, Supplement of no. 95 (27 July
1906): p. 4.

42
Revolutionist Soldier], Harbiye Yüksek Mektepleri İttihadı [Union of Military High
Schools]” 60 and “İntikamcı Yeni Osmanlılar Cemiyeti [Committee of Avenger New
Ottomans]” 61 are some of them.

2.9.2 Second Young Turk Congress

As the analysis made above makes it clear the 1st Young Turk Congress has given
diametrically opposed results to the expected ones. In other words, it caused to
disengagements in main political body. Therefore, in 1907 a 2nd Congress has been
convened in Paris in the autumn of 1907, approximately 5 years later then the 1st.

The 2nd Young Turk Congress convened as a consequence of Armenian

Dashnaksution’s insistences. Prince Sabahattin Bey’s group of “Private Enterprise
and Decentralization” and Ahmet Rıza Bey’s group of “proponents of constitutional
government and general reform” have participated into this Congress In addition to
Dashnaksution.62

Although it has not met the expectations, the Congress has produced a useful result
to a large extent. Parties have decided to refrain from discussions about
decentralization causing disengagement. After completing the discussions a mutual
declaration published in which the attendants specified 3 purposes, including: a)
compelling Abdülhamit to abdicate, b) changing the current administration
fundamentally, and c) establishing the methods of counseling (Meşveret) and
constitutionalism (meşrutiyet).63 And the steps specified to realize these purposes
were: a) resisting with guns against the actions and behaviors of the government, b)
carrying out civil resistance by means of strikes in political and financial areas, c)
withholding the taxes to be paid to current government, d) making propaganda

60
Nurer Uğurlu, ed. Biz İttihatçılar (İstanbul: Örgün Yayınevi, 2009), pp. 34-37.
61
Hanioğlu, ibid, p. 377. [Brackets added.]
62
Kuran, ibid, pp. 234-238; Temo, ibid, p. 202-203; Ramsaur, ibid, p. 148.
63
Kuran, ibid, pp. 240-241.

43
among military men, e) starting a general movement of insurrection, and f) appealing
to different kinds of actions needed according to the stream of events.64

It can be said that the decisions taken in the Congress constituted a turning point for
Young Turks. Because the acceptance of armed struggle as a method shows that the
Young Turks have moved to another phase. Of course there have been persons who
defended this method in previous phases as well. But the main body has always
consciously preferred to stay away from guns. For example, Ahmet Rıza Bey –
maybe because of the effect of his positivist tendencies- has always protested against
the ideas of revolution and armed struggle. Hence, by his draft resolution requesting
that the sultanate and caliphate should not be made subjects of discussion in the
course of Congress, he attempted to get it finished even before it was kicked off. In
this respect, it is reasonable to argue that the decisions written on the declaration of
Congress adopting both revolution and armed struggle as methods have not pleased
Ahmet Rıza Bey.

Despite the fact that Ahmet Rıza Bey has not found the final decisions taken during
the Congress, he has not objected to them -which is remarkable. The most probable
explanation of this case can be found in unification of the Committee of Progress and
Union with the Committee of Ottoman Freedom, which is another Young Turk
organization centered in Thessaloniki.

The Committee of Ottoman Freedom established in 1906 by a group of military

officers working at the 3rd army in Thessaloniki.65 The aim of this Committee was,
like any other Young Turk Organizations’, to depose Abdülhamit.66 It is argued in
some sources that founders of this organization were members of the Ottoman CUP.
But some other sources remark that the members of the Ottoman CUP were not

64
Ibid, p. 242.
65
Tunaya, ibid.
66
For a detailed information with regard to the establishment of the Committee see Bleda, ibid, pp.
28-30.

44
aware of existence of the Committee of Ottoman Freedom until 1907 and that two
groups were unified just incidentally.67

Ahmet Rıza could not object to the decisions taken in the 2nd Congress of Young
Turks because he remained in minority. Similarly, he acquiesced to the acceptance of
armed struggle and intimidation as means by the members of the organization which
established as the Committee of Ottoman Freedom and redenominated as the
Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress after unifying with the Committee of
Progress and Union.

As a matter of fact, one can say that there was a mutual distrust between the cliques
of Thessaloniki and Paris. According to Tarık Zafer Tunaya, the clique of
Thessaloniki constitutes the real CUP which has always remained distant to the
clique of Paris. Ibrahim Temo gives detailed information about this case in his
memoirs.68

The reason of the attitude of the clique of Thessaloniki is, possibly, that the armed
struggle securing announcement of the Constitutionalism has been coordinated by
them. And the clique of Paris, as pointed out earlier, has always protested against
armed struggle.

Despite all of these conflicts, Ahmet Rıza Bey elected as the speaker of the
parliament by the Ottoman CUP after announcement of the Constitutionalism. This,
in fact, was an appreciation shown to a person who lost nothing from his tenacity of
struggling in spite of numerous material or spiritual boredoms he faced. Although he
has been elected as the speaker of the parliament, he could not have a power –just
like other Unionists belonging to the clique of Paris- with regard to administration of
the Committee. It has been administered by the Headquarters which carried out its
activities in back of the stage and the center of which remained in Thessaloniki until
1911.

67
Erneste E. Ramsaur also makes similar interpretations. See, Ramsaur ibid, p. 144.
68
See Temo, ibid, pp. 214-215.
45
In later stages Ahmet Rıza Bey’s relations with the Committee are streched and he
started to direct severe criticisms against the Ottoman CUP following his election to
membership of the Senate (Meclis-i Âyân).69

2.10 Announcement of the Constitutionalism

There has been a serious increase in the number of rebellious movements in

consequence of adoption of armed struggle as a method. These revolts were
happening rather in the Balkans and they were getting organized and carried out
especially by military men. For example, Resneli Niyazi, who was a senior captain
(kolağası), started a gang together with a group of his friends and became outlaw by
revolting against administration.70 On the other hand, the wave of rebellion has not
remained limited with Balkans and spread in Anatolia as well.71

Members of the Ottoman CUP were especially targeting, within armed struggle, the
high level officers of Abdülhamit. Hence, Sami Paşa, who has been assigned by
Abdülhamit to investigate and quell the riots, was died following an armed attack run
against him.72 Similarly, Mufti of Manastır [Bitola] was killed and Nazım Paşa,
central commander of Thessaloniki, wounded by Unionists as well.73

Intimidation policy pursued by the Ottoman CUP has given result sooner than
expected and Abdülhamit had to announce the Constitutionalism on 23 July in 1908
after coming to the conclusion that turmoil is no longer manageable.

69
Rıza, ibid, pp. 326-327.
70
Temo, ibid, p. 154.
71
Ramsaur, ibid, p. 154.
72
For an explanation of this event that is regarded as one of the reasons prepared the announcement of
Constitution, see Ahmad, ibid, p. 23; Temo, ibid, p. 208; Bleda, ibid, pp. 56.
73
Bleda, ibid, pp. 47-49, 51-52.
46
2.11 The Ottoman CUP’s Seizure of Power

As a result of its long struggle, the Ottoman CUP finally achieved its goal and got the
Constitutionalism announced. Together with the announcement of Constitutions after
nearly 30 years the absolute power of Sultan has been limited and the Ottoman
Empire met with Constitutional regime for a second time in its history. The alteration
of the regime welcomed enthusiastically by opposition movements.

Although the alteration of the type of regime brought prestige to Young Turks it
caused to some interesting cases also, which they were not expecting to happen very
swiftly. The first of these cases, maybe the most interesting of them, was that the
Committee caught unprepared to the Constitutional regime for the announcement of
which it struggled for years.

The Committee has come to the power after the announcement of Constitutionalism.
No need to say that it had a political program to be applied after taking over the
government. This official program was published in Şura-yı Ümmet.74 Despite the
existence of a political program, Unionists have lacked a clear program reflecting the
philosophical background -which we are going to examine in future chapters- with
regard to the social and cultural transformation they were aiming to apply just after
the transition to Constitutional regime. The absence of the latter can be regarded as a
sign of an important intellectual gap between the weltanschauung they had and the
transformation they were striving for.

What is interesting is that the issue of the absence of a program were ascertained by
Young Turks themselves and handled as a subject of concern. For example İbrahim
Temo, narrating a meeting he made with Ahmet Rıza, says that:

We are gathering, chitchatting and sharing concerns. We are also continually

criticizing the Ottoman administration and this bane of despotism on our heads.
What if one day Abdülhamit comes to reason, understands that the way he is
taking is dead ended and says to us, by disinfecting his surroundings,

74
Anonymous, “Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti: Siyasi Programı”, Şura-yı Ümmet 7, no. 140 (1
September 1908): p. 2.

47
 something like this: “come on gentlemen, let me give the bridles of the cart of
administration to you; please come and start the reform and rescue the
motherland”? Since we are passing the time just by a vain criticism we do not
have a preparation or a serious program. What can we do if we take over
following our return to the motherland? We need to get ready and train
personnel to function within a program and to start to reform in every branch.75

The second interesting case that the Ottoman CUP encountered following
Constitutionalism is inexperience. Along with their lack of comprehensive program
Unionists lacked experienced members also whom they could appoint to
administrative levels. The fact that they showed no skill of producing a leader among
themselves constitutes one of the most serious criticisms against the members of the
Ottoman CUP.

Of course there are some concrete truths that these criticisms were depending on. For
example, after the announcement of the Constitutionalism the Committee executed
an “observer” role on government. It was interpreted as having the power without
taking any responsibility. Thus, those who criticize the Ottoman CUP are generally
regarding it as an unaccountable organization which intervened into the function of
government without responsibilities required for a ruling body.76

To beat this weakness, the Ottoman CUP followed a pragmatic way and shared the
power with experienced Paşa’s of the Sublime Porte, who have already gained a
permanent seat as important centers of power in traditional government games.

Governments, for example, of experienced statesmen like Sait Paşa, Kamil Paşa,
Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, İbrahim Hakkı Paşa, Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa and Tevfik Paşa
were formed by the Ottoman CUP’s support. However, there happened a continuous
tension between those Paşas and the Committee. Both parties had a share on this
political tension. On the one hand, the Ottoman CUP imposed its agenda on Grand
Viziers which means that it blocked them to function freely. On the other hand, Paşas
continued their political activities in accordance with their own personal agendas and

75
See, Temo, ibid, p. 191.
76
Ahmad, ibid, p. 32.

48
pursued, from time to time, policies directly targeting existence of the Committee. It
is argued, for example, that the government of Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa, which has
been called as the “great cabinet”, was functioning to erase the Committee from
political stage.77

In order to keep up with the inexperience issue the Committee wanted to nominate
parliamentarians as deputy ministers into the cabinet. Thereby the Unionist
parliamentarians were going to gain experience with regard to the administration of
the state. And, as a result of this, the Committee would, supposedly, be able to stop
sharing the government with the Paşas of the Sublime Porte. But this plan could not
be applied for a variety of reasons and the Unionists failed in this respect. The basic
reason of this failure was the Constitution’s 67th article, mandating that “membership
of parliament and a governmental mission cannot be convened in one person”.78

The Committee has tried so hard to change aforementioned article of the

Constitution. But it could not get it changed and, consequentially, preferred to
nominate ministers themselves. It was Manyasizade Refik Bey who participated in
the government as the first Unionist. He was appointed as the Minister of Justice and
died after a while. Following his death, Cavit Bey, the representative of Thessaloniki,
has participated in the government as the Minister of Finance.79

The battle of power between the Committee and the Paşas of the Sublime Porte, who
were very dexterous in political intrigues, continued for a long time. It is because of
these battles of power that at least 11 governments have been formed, as far as we
determined, between 1908 and 1913, when Sait Halim Paşa was appointed as the
Grand Vizier.

77
Ahmat, ibid, pp. 137-142.
78
For the full text of the Constitution (Kânun-u Esâsî) come into effect in 1876 see Şeref Gözübüyük
and Suna Kili. Türk Anayasa Metinleri: 1839-1980. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler
Fakültesi Yayınları (No: 496), 1982, p. 35.
79
Ahmad, ibid, p. 75.

49
2.12 A Government Unable to Raise its Head amid Wars and Political Turmoil

The Committee’s 10 years of sovereignty have been passed under the shadow of
various acts of violence and wars which caused to repressive policies.

The first act of violence experienced by the Committee was the case of 31 March,
which organized by opponents and has almost been successful.

The surface cause of this case was the unsolved murder of the editorial writer of the
newspaper of Serbestî, which is known by its opposition to the Committee. The
opposition regarded this murder as a political assassination and held the Committee
responsible. That the murderers have not been identified reinforced this accusaiton
among the ordinary people as well.80

Following the tension, opposing fractions have started a rebellion and caused a huge
chaos by taking the support of some of the military forces on 13th April in 1909
which corresponds to 31st March of 1325 in Gregorian calendar.

Insurgents have descended the Parliament and the government of Hüseyin Hilmi
Paşa has resigned. The Committee has completely lost its control on Istanbul during
the revolt.

A great deal of sources seems to be of the same opinion that the case of 31 March
was a purely religious movement of revolt. Indeed, if the important role played by
the newspaper of Volkan -the media organ of Derviş Vahdeti’s Committee of
Mohammedan Union (İttihad-ı Muhammedî Cemiyeti)- in rising the revlot taken into
consideration, the truth of this assertion can be acknowledged. However, one needs
to bear in mind the political fragility of the period as well. The event has taken place
just after months following the announcement of the Constitution. It can be regarded
as quite natural for parties, for the proponents of old and new regimes both, to use
Islam as an instrument among their struggle of power. But an argument identifying

80
Ibid, p. 60.

50
the Islamic tendencies as the unique reason of this event may keep it partly in
darkness.

The continuance of the revolt has just been quelled by Army of Movement (Hareket
Ordusu) at Mahmut Şevket Paşa’s command.

It is observed that, the Ottoman CUP has headed towards oppressive policies
following the case of 31 March. Thus, the state of siege has been declared on 25th of
April in 1909, when the revolt has been appeased by Mahmut Şevket Paşa’s forces. It
has been maintained until 23rd July of 1912. Normalcy did not last long and,
consequently, the stage of siege has been declared for the second time on 6th of
August in 1912. This second state of siege has been the longest one in the history of
Ottoman Empire and lifted in 1919. It seems possible to characterize the period that
Ottoman CUP remained in power as a period in which the state of siege becomes
ordinary.

There is nothing astonishing in the fact, actually, that the Ottoman CUP, as an
organization which had a strong basis within army from the very beginning and came
to power by an armed struggle, has taken the advantage of the conditions of the
period and used the state of siege, oppression and violence as opportunities to deepen
its sovereignty.

Hence, the political assassinations realized during the Committee’s sovereignty are
not limited with the murder of Hasan Fehmi that mentioned above. This time, Ahmet
Samim -a severe critic of the Committee and also the editorial writer of the
newspaper of Sada-yı Millet- has been a victim of murder on 9th of June in1910.

Another example of the oppressive and violent policies applied by the Ottoman CUP
is the event which passed into history as the “raid on the Sublime Porte”.

This raid has taken place on 23rd of January in 1913 when the Grand Vizier was
Kamil Paşa. Kamil Paşa has never gotten along with the Ottoman CUP. The reason
of the raid seems to be an idea that the government was planning to give Edirne to

51
Bulgarians in order to finish the Balkan war which erupted in 1912. A group of
Unionists, arguing against the exchange of Edirne, has raided the Sublime Porte
under the leadership of Enver Paşa. Nazım Paşa, the Minister of War, was killed
during the raid and Kamil Paşa has been compelled to resign.

After the resignation of Kamil Paşa, Mahmut Şevket Paşa has been appointed as
Grand Vizier by the support of the Ottoman CUP. But, strangely enough, he has also
been murdered on 11th of June in 1913 following an armed assault.

The assassination of Mahmut Şevket Paşa is quite meaningful. Because, despite the
fact that he become the Grand Vizier after the raid on the Sublime Porte, he also
created problems for the Committee as a result of the strength he got by controlling
the army, particularly following the case of 31 March. The actors of this murder have
never been found. If the struggle of power between Mahmut Şevket Paşa and
Unionists taken into consideration, it can be argued that there are enough reasons to
suspect that the Committee were behind his assassination.

A government, which can be regarded as purely Unionist, under the presidency of

Sait Halim Paşa has been formed after the murder of Mahmut Şevket Paşa.

Sait Halim Paşa can be seen as an interesting political figure when we keep in mind
the mentality that Unionists generally had. The point which makes Paşa interesting
has been put forward by Niyazi Berkes in the following way:

[His books] were probably translated into Turkish from French by Mehmed
Âkif, as the Sadrazam could not write in Turkish. At a time when the
Turkish Government was accused of pursuing a policy of Turkification, its
Sadrazam was an ardent Islamist who wrote only in French and Arabic.81

Sait Halim Paşa’cabinet took the office from the middle of 1913 until the beginning
of 1917. His cabinet resigned following the debates about the entrance of Ottoman

81
Berkes, Niyazi. The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Hurst&Company, London: 1998), p.
349.

52
Empire into the World War I. After his resignment, the last unionist government
under the presidency of one of the most influential unionist figures, Talat Paşa, is
formed. As a result of the conditions created by the war, the Committee of Union and
Progress literally terminated its political existence (1918). Following the end of the
war, unionists created another political organization, in 1918, which is the
continuation of CUP. It is named “Teceddüd Fırkası”. This party, as one of the latest
remainders of the unionist mentality, is dissolved.

53
 CHAPTER 3

PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE AS THE WAYS TO “NEW LIFE” IN THE

THOUGHT OF YOUNG TURKS

3.1 Science and Philosophy in the Thought of Young Turks or “Reproducing a

Result”

Science and philosophy are the results of the process of an inquiry immanent to
human beings’ nature. Human being regards the universe as an autonomous fact and
tries to understand it. The universe, seeming at first as a “totality of unknowns”,
starts to be known slowly as a result of this process. There is no doubt that this
inquiry has been dominated by a pure curiosity before anything else. Human being
strives to satisfy his curiosity by asking questions, like “what is …?” or “how it
becomes?” or “why?” It is also possible for the mind of human being, depending on
the more systematical form science takes, to adopt a more pragmatic approach and to
ask questions like “how can I change?” or “how can I use?” However, if there is an
element nonexistence of which cannot be imagined within the scientific form of
thought, it is the hunger of the mind towards learning and knowing.

If we take the essential character of science and philosophy into consideration and
ask a question, like “what kind of a scientific and philosophical approach has been
adopted by Young Turks?” we come across with a vital difference in their approach
from the one that is described above. It is because Young Turks’ thinking about
science has been dominated by the way in which they encounter with science, not by
an intellectual curiosity. Their way of encountering with it has led them to
concentrate directly on the “result”, by compressing the process of scientific activity
or by realizing a mental bounce. And the same can be regarded as valid in terms of
the philosophical ideas they had.

54
In the following pages we are going to examine the scientific and philosophical ideas
fitting into their mentality on the one hand and the reasons that led them to adopt a
more pragmatic approach on the other. Still, one needs to point to the fact that Young
Turks’ experience of science as a pure result does not mean that they had no desire to
learning. However, when we look closely into the thing that they problematized
within the context of their discussions about science and philosophy, we see that it
was not an issue to be resolved by a demand for a pure learning. In other words,
Young Turks have concentrated on the practical aspect of science and philosophy
rather than their theoretical sides. The clearest expressions of this circumstance come
in an article published in Ulûm-u İktisadiye ve İçtimaiye Mecmuası. It is said in this
article that:

The universe is a book and a bewildering thing presented all along to our full
of admiration glances. All the ins and outs of the images and figures it has are
mysteries desired to be resolved. I said desired; but not just for satisfying our
curiosity. It is for making us continue our lives and reach to the amenity and
salvation on this world.82

Young Turks’ ideas of science and philosophy depend on the questions of “what can
I change?” and “how can I change”, rather than the questions of “what can I know”
and “how can I learn?” They have quite clear answers for both of the questions. We
will argue that the term of “status quo” constitutes the answer of their question of
“what can I change?” The thinking type, shaped by tradition and reflection of which
can be found both in the idea of political sovereignty and in the social life of the
period, represented the status quo for the Young Turks. And their answer for the
question of “how can I change?” lies in science which is referred above as a concrete
circumstance they met. Science and, as a discipline nested with it, philosophy are the
only ways to be followed for the purposes of the Young Turks. When viewed from
this perspective, the scientific and philosophical thought of Young Turks can be said
neither adopted through discussions at theoretical level nor functionalized after it
grew into maturity to a certain degree. Young Turks have accepted scientific
approaches theorized in different thinking climates as instruments without
questioning.

82
Rıza Tevfik, “Tasnif-i Ulûm: Bazı Mukaddemât-ı Felsefiye [1].” U.İ.İ.M. 1, no. 3 (15 February
1324/28 February 1909): p. 364.
55
Of course science has a transformative function on the living and thinking styles.
Thus, when we look into the history of science we can see various examples of
transformations produced and fed by this function. But one might argue that such
changes and transformations can only be regarded as natural results or “side
benefits” and not as purposes in themselves. Scientific approach focuses on research,
inquiry and production and pays attention to its results just after they become
established. Although it is true that human beings use scientific data in the direction
of this or that purposes, this circumstance needs not to erase the intellectual
impartiality or objectivity of science. To talk about the history of science means to
talk about this intellectual impartiality, to a large extent.

Young Turks seem not to encounter with science and philosophy within a natural
process in this respect. In other words, the scientific and philosophical ideas they had
are not results of inquiry into and wonder about the universe. They met with science
just as a “result”. Besides, this encounter has not taken place in a normal way. There
are, of course, a number of historical and cultural causes prepared this extraordinary
encounter. There is a point on which all of these historical and cultural causes
intersect. The most suitable term to use in describing it can be “crisis”. Using a
similar point made by İsmail Kara, it is possible to argue that the encounter of Young
Turks “with western philosophy has been manifested in the form of a result or
pressure of a crisis period, various dimensions of which were still continuing.”83
Indeed, one of the primary results to be reached in any possible examination on
Young Turks’ periodicals would indicate that they were products of a crisis period.
Therefore, it can be said that the whole Young Turk thoughts were determined by
this sense of crisis.

So, what kind of a crisis was that?

What we refer here as a crisis is seemingly lies in the question of whether Ottoman
Empire will be able to survive or not. However, the real crisis lies in somewhere

83
İsmail Kara, ibid, p. 6.

56
deeper as a problem of mentality. The tension between old and new, the traditional
and the modern, presents itself both in the forms of an existential and intellectual
crisis.

Since the great majority of the Young Turks were craving for the sumptuous days of
the past, the crisis can also be characterized as “emotional”. They are romantic in this
respect, and the weight of reality is deepening the perception of crisis in their minds.

One needs to refer to another point with regard to the crisis. Just as it is possible to
speak of a crisis which science causes by its existence, it is also possible to talk about
a crisis it causes by its absence. The existence of science is a crisis for Young Turks
because the irrational circumstance experienced by the Ottoman Empire was
originating from uninterested attitudes towards scientific developments. On the other
hand, the absence of science was also a crisis because the distance from it was
securing the continuance of what is non-scientific and, consequently, irrational. This
is why becoming subject to the current understanding of science seemed to the
Young Turks as the only solution to the crisis.

While Young Turks were trying to get the traditional Ottoman society out of the
crisis that we are currently describing, they can actually be said to open some doors
to a different crisis. A struggle to overcome the crisis by means of imported notions
or ideas caused to disengagement from tradition. Hence we know that Young Turks
were remaining very distant from tradition. They were disengaged from tradition
and, as a result, positioned themselves out of the common way of thinking. On the
one hand, they underestimated the crisis by their superficial approach to Western
science and philosophy, and caused to a more essential crisis by refusing tradition
categorically on the other.

Undoubtedly, the perception of crisis affected the Young Turks’ thinking is not a
blank one. The periods when the description of Young Turk has been made were the
ones in which Ottoman Empire were constantly losing ground in front of the West.
The Ottoman society has experienced an exact opposite situation for centuries and
had self-confidence as if it would go on forever in this way. However, the scientific

57
developments which proceeded in the West uninterruptedly and hit the top by
industrial revolution run the usual reading and observing styles upside down.
Moreover, it was not the Ottoman society alone that effected by these developments
and revolutions. Western societies themselves also have experienced serious crisis as
a result of these rapid transformations. What has made the Western societies lucky
was the fact that they have been able to produce sophisticated thinkers through their
struggles of overcoming crisis. Setting aside the discussion of whether it was a
matter of luck or not for a moment, this fact can also be seen as Ottoman society’s
misfortune. For example, as opposed to the existence of Auguste Comte who created
a new scientific and philosophical framework in the wake of social crisis lived in
France, it is meaningful to see in Ottoman society an intellectual circle which did
nothing except reiterating Comte’s statements. Western world of thought has been
able to develop intellectual mechanisms to deescalate the breakage created by the
transformation in scientific thinking. But the same situation is not valid for the
Ottoman society which was following the scientific developments from the outside.
Traditional Ottoman thinking lived without having enough intellectual security
mechanisms and experienced the effect of Western scientific developments severely.
Since the society was left intellectually vulnerable, the intensity of effect has become
much stronger.

The crisis can be said to carry the rebirth as a possibility within itself. But to be able
to talk about this possibility an intellectual view, which equipped against the crisis, is
needed to exist. Western thinking is ingenious within this context. Because an
intellectual accumulation is always out there to foresee the crisis arose in theoretical
and practical levels, and to transform these crisis by their felicitous diagnosis once
they appear. But, the crisis has not been seen by Young Turks as a fact that can be
overcome with reference to a theoretical basis. And this is why science and
philosophy has been reduced to a mere function. It is true that science and
philosophy have “enlightened” Young Turks. But they welcomed it not as a mental
enlightenment but as a salvation. And the salvation was only possible with progress
(terakki) which is the most concrete result of science and philosophy.

58
3.2 Scientific and Philosophical Quests against Crisis

The philosophical approach that helped Young Turks most in their search for a way
out of the crisis they experienced burningly has been the positivistic understanding of
philosophy and science which put forward by Auguste Comte.

3.2.1 The Place of Positivism in Young Turks’ Thought

The concept of “progress” (terakkî), which has been used in denomination of the
Committee of Union and Progress as a Young Turk organization, inspired by
positivistic thought. With the guidance of Ahmet Rıza Bey, who lived in France for a
long time and collaborated with Pierre Lafitte (1823-1903), the Committee has been
given this name and inspired by Auguste Comte’s motto of “ordre and progress”.
Ahmet Rıza Bey initially wanted to denominate the Committee as “Ordre and
Progress” (Nizam ve Terakkî) but in consequence of various discussions the name of
“Union and Progress” (İttihat ve Terakkî) has been accepted.84 However, one can
witness to the usage of “proponents of ordre and progress” which refers to the
members of the Ottoman CUP in Young Turk periodicals.85

In fact, it is not a wonder that positivism become very attractive to Young Turks.
Because it has a content which overlaps with the meaning Young Turks attributed to
science. Just a single glance at the classification of sciences designed by Auguste
Comte, who has been accepted as the founder of positivism, would be enough to get
it understood why Young Turks gravitated towards positivism.

It would be useful to refer to one more point before passing on the positivistic
classification of science. Positivism stays distant from speculative thinking and sets
its sight on physical universe. The primary criticism directed towards Young Turks
in remarkable studies about them is that they were away from producing speculative

84
Kuran, ibid, pp. 61-62.
85
Anonymous, “Ermeni Konferansı-Paris Sefîri.” Meşveret 1, no. 4 [Supplement] (15 January
1108/28 January 1896), p. 5.

59
thoughts.86 This criticism is substantially legitimate. But it is possible to put forward
various rationales with regard to the causes of Young Turks’ distance from
speculative thinking. For example, none of the prominent Young Turks were a
regular philosopher. But it seems that the type of Young Turks’ encounter with
science and philosophy needs to be taken into consideration as one of the reasons of
the aforementioned distance. Hence the following statements appearing in the
newspaper of Şura-yı Ümmet can be seen as a reflection of a mentality in need of an
immediate solution against crisis:

We receive beneficial articles from persons who have a desire to serve our
country. Some of them include redundant methodology and theory. However,
our country is exclaiming that “I am burning into flames, haven’t you heard?”
and waiting for urgent remedy and devices from us.87

Whatever the reason of their staying away from the speculative philosophy is, it is
for sure that they attributed a practical value to science and philosophy. And this
emergent need for solution led Young Turks to adopt certain scientific and
philosophical approaches, notably positivism, which have been broadly discussed
and accepted within Western circles of thought.

Positivism is both a scientific and philosophical understanding. According to it, there

is an overlap between the historical developments of science and philosophy. This
overlapping is handled within the scope of “law of three stages”. Because of this
correspondence in the history of thinking, the methodology that should be followed
by philosophy needs to be compatible with positive sciences. In other words,
positivist philosophy is a scientific philosophy as well. Therefore, positivism
compounds science and philosophy in its framework and constitutes a philosophy of
science for Young Turks as such.

Although the Young Turks remained under the influence of positivist understanding
of science, the periodicals we examined show us that they do not get into theoretical

86
For a criticism to this effect, see Mardin, ibid, p. 13.
87
Anonymous, “İhtar ve İ’tizar.” Şura-yı Ümmet 1, no. 12 (18 September 1902): 4.

60
discussions regarding to positivism either. Nevertheless, existence of some articles
examining the basic principles of positivistic philosophy of science comprehensively
can also be witnessed. For example, a mutual article which is titled “Auguste Comte:
Felsefe-i Müspete”88 (“Auguste Comte: Positive Philosophy”) and published by
Salih Zeki89 and Halide Salih in Ulûm-u İktisâdiye ve İçtimâiye Mecmuası.

In this article, written to examine philosophical and scientific understanding of

Comte, science has been described as an ability of explaining an event with reference
to another one by depending on their clearly observable relations. In other words,
science is a process of deduction by means of data procured. 90 The distinctive sign of
positivism lies in its assertion that these relations have an unchangeable character. It
is because of this assertion that positivist philosophy calls these relations as “laws of
nature”.91

Of course it is true that the terms of “law of nature” or “scientific law” have not
penetrated into scientific literature just after Comtean positivism. They rather have a
longer history. Moreover, it has been argued that Auguste Comte appropriated some
concepts put forward by others while developing his own positivist understanding of
science. Some sources argue, for example, that the famous Comtean idea of “law of
three stages” is taken from Turgot92, while some others attribute it to Condorcet.93
Our purpose is not to examine the way wherein positivism has been formed or the
historical and intellectual processes that produced positivism. What we want to do
here is to analyze the kind of effect that Comtean positivist understanding of

88
Salih Zeki and Halide Salih. “Auguste Comte: Felsefe-i Müsbete.” U.İ.İ.M. 1, no. 2 (15 January
1324/28 January 1909), pp. 163-197.

89
Salih Zeki is one of the famous positivist among the figures who wrote in Youn Turk periodicals.
Information about his general understanding see Remzi Demir, Philosophia Ottomanica (Ankara:
Lotus Yayınevi, 2007), Vol. 3, pp.145-148.

90
Ibid, p. 184.
91
Ibid, p. 189.
92
See Murtaza Korlaelçi, Pozitivizmin Türkiye’ye Girişi (Ankara: Hece Yayınları, 2002), p. 84.
93
See M. Zekeriya Sertel, “Condorcet.” Yeni Mecmua 2, no. 45 (23 May 1918), p. 362.

61
philosophy and science created on Young Turks. Therefore, what we refer to as
positivism is the philosophy of science put forward by Auguste Comte.94

Positivism conceives the nature as a unity which functions systematically under the
effect of some laws. It is because of these laws that positivist sciences are able to
reveal the relation between events and to show the success of explaining other events
by starting from those relations. What have been referred to here as “other events”
are “social” events. To be more precise, Comtean positivism argues that not just
natural events but also social events are dependent on some unchangeable laws.95
Viewed from this perspective, positivism does not depend on speculative thoughts
and is not an approach systematized as a result of intellectual fantasies detached from
life and factual reality. It reflects the skill of constructing a concrete link with life. It
has been this skill of positivism that appealed to Young Turks.

Before detailing this point a bit more it would be useful to deal with the “law of three
stages” that put forward by Auguste Comte and his positivistic classification of
sciences within this regard.

3.2.2 Law of Three Stages

According to Auguste Comte, human mind, in its effort to explain the natural events,
has passed through three stages. These are theological, metaphysical and positive
(scientific) stages respectively.

94
For the general framework of Comte’s positivist understanding of philosophy and science see, for
example, Auguste Comte, A General View of Positivism, Translated by J. H. Bridges (London: Reeves
and Turner, 1880). A short but a concise discussion about Comte’s positive philosophy can be found,
e.g., in Annie Besant, Auguste Comte: His Philosophy, His Religion and His Sociology (London:
Freethought Pub. Co., 1880. See also Andrew Wernick, Auguste Comte and the Religion of Humanity:
The Post-Theistic Program of French Social Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
95
Salih Zeki and Halide Salih, ibid, p. 185. For the detailed discussions Comte makes about these
three stages see Auguste Comte, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, Translated and
condensed by Harriet Martineau, (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1896), e-book, vol. 3, pp. 5-223. For a
further discussion about the said division see also Mike Gane, Auguste Comte (London and New
York: Routledge, 2006).
62
In the first stage, the human mind concentrates its attention on the first causes and
purposive causes of events it is observing. In the theological stage, which is
composed of fetichism, polytheism and monotheism, human beings characterize the
events occurring in nature as “immediate results of the absolute will of various
agents.” 96

In the second stage some more “abstract powers” substitute the concrete divine
entities. Metaphysical stage is, actually, a revised version of the theological stage. It
is witnessed, in this stage, that some abstract powers take the place of effective
entities which have been conceived as having a transformative power on nature.
Those abstract powers exist without having a personality and they have the power of
causing the natural events to happen. The explanation of an event is possible only
with the acceptance of an “abstract power” or an “abstract property” that is able to
produce it.97 The essential difference between theological and metaphysical stages
lies in this point. In the metaphysical stage, “the thing that conducts the universe is
not an anthropomorphic god; this is rather a power, a might, a principle. These
powers govern the whole events.”98

The third stage is the positive stage. In this stage, the major objective is to find the
relation between events or, in other words, to discover the laws of nature. And
human being prohibits himself, in this stage, from doing meaningless things like
examining the true quality of these events.99

After enumerating the stages which have been followed by the development in
human thought, Auguste Comte identifies three types of philosophy corresponding to
these stages. There is a theological philosophy in theological stage, a metaphysical
philosophy in metaphysical stage and a positive (scientific) philosophy in positive
stage.

96
Ibid, p. 188.
97
Ibid, p. 187.
98
Korlaelçi, ibid, p. 87.
99
Salih Zeki&Halide Salih, ibid, p. 189. See also Auguste Comte, ibid.

63
3.2.3 Auguste Comte’s Classification of Sciences

The ultimate stop of human mind, passing through these stages, is positive stage.
Auguste Comte classifies the poisitivstic sciences as follows: Mathematics,
Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Organic Physics, and Social Physics.100

One can say that this classification of sciences is one of the most important reasons
that have gotten the positivism appealing to Young Turks. What has been meant by
“social physics” is the idea that the social events also are taking place within certain
“laws of nature”. In the positivistic understanding of science, social events as well as
natural ones are included within this classification. That means that events taking
place in social realm are not happening without any reason. Discovering these
reasons or “laws of nature” will enable human beings to make some precise
predictions with regard to society. The concept of “social physics” is an important
concept in this respect.101

The concept of social physics has led the Young Turks to the idea that there is not an
essential difference between human beings and other existents.
Ahmet Şuayip, for example, says that:

Human being also is a part, like any other chemical and physical objects, in
the lake called nature. They are also subject to laws like various complicated
objects. … Therefore, one needs to examine human being like the nature
itself. … Human being has always insisted that he and the nature are subject
to different laws. Philosophers of the eighteenth century are gradually trying
to connect the chains between the laws of nature and laws of human being.
They are interconnecting the natural sciences and social sciences by
constructing an iron bridge on the deep hole which has been dug between the
two.102

100
Ibid, p. 191. Cf. Auguste Comte’s comprehensive account of classification of science in the first
volume of his Positive Philosophy that is translated by Harriet Martineau.
101
See Auguste Comte, Social Physics: From the Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte (New York:
C. Blanchard, 1856). This book comprises book V, chapters 1 and 2 of Harriet Martineau's translation
of Auguste Comte's Cours de Philosophie Positive.
102
Ahmet Şuayip “Fransa İhtilal-i Kebiri-3,” U.İ.İ.M. 1, no. 3 (15 February 1324/28 February 1909),
p. 419. Ahmet Şuayip has continued this attitude throughout his authorship career. For another
example where he represents a similar approach, see Ahmet Şuayip, “Yirminci Asırda Tarih,” U.İ.İ.M.
1, no. 1 (15 December 1324/28 December 1908), pp. 23-24. Bedii Nuri also supports this attitude
64
We come across to a similar approach in the articles published by the signs of Satı
and Doctor Ethem. Satı tries to show “the strength of the relation between social and
natural sciences”103 by referring, generally, to data obtained through natural sciences.
On the other hand, Doctor Ethem emphasizes the necessity of adoption of an
understanding of a monist science by arguing, for example, that “material and
spiritual things are completely interconnected and they cannot be disassembled.”104

3.2.4 Determinism

As it is seen, the difference between human being and other existents is removed.
This approach, showing the effect of positivism in a clear way, hereafter adopts the
ideas that the type of existence observed in the physical realm survives within certain
rules and that this is true of social realm as well. There is no doubt that this kind of
idea will bring a deterministic approach within itself. If any event occurring in the
nature are happening within certain laws and, consequently, if the anomaly is not
running as a general mode of existence, then the final point that we can reach seems
to be determinism. In that case, the most important role of the human mind will be to
extract these laws and rules from nature. The understanding of science adopted by
Young Turks led them to such a deterministic approach, the clearest statements of
which can be seen in Hüseyin Cahit’s articles. According to Hüseyin Cahit, the
supreme scientific discovery of the nineteenth century is the general law which
suggests that none of the events taking place in the universe, whether it is material or
spiritual, can do so suddenly and incidentally and that they are occurring as
unavoidable results of various preexisting large and small or hidden and explicit

particularly in his “Tahavvülât-ı Fikriyye,” U.İ.İ.M. 3, no. 24(12) (1 December 1326/14 December
1910), p. 1157.
103
Satı, “Uzviyetler ve Cemiyetler,” U.İ.İ.M. 2, no. 8 (1 August 1325/14 August 1909), p. 454.
104
Doktor Ethem, “Terbiye-i Akliyye -1- Terbiye-i Akliyyede Usûl-i Umûmi,” U.İ.İ.M. 2, no. 8 (1
August 1325/14 August 1909) , p. 525.

65
causes.105 In this respect, we can say that at the top of the characters attributed to
scientific knowledge by Young Turks comes the deterministic quality.

Since the concept of “social physics” does have certain reflections with regard to the
very basic dynamics of the social life, it can be handled in a connection with Young
Turks’ demand for social transformation.

The term which has been used most by Young Turks in their efforts to overcome the
aforementioned crisis is “terakkî”. And it means the progress and evolvement of
Ottoman society in a direct proportion to the ground it covered within the scientific
area. The West, think Young Turks, has developed in virtue of science. And that the
progress is the fate of human beings in positivistic approach. But there are some
requirements to be met for realizing this fate. First of all, one needs to have the
ability of thinking independently of conditions in any type by having a free point of
view. The case that makes the approach of Young Turks to science and progress
problematic appears at this point. Because they regard the science itself as a result
and rule out the entire process that brought it out. As a result of the deterministic
approach they adopted, it has been assumed by them that this process will be both
taking place in every society and causing to the same results necessarily.

The deterministic quality attributed to scientific knowledge by Young Turks makes it

easier for us to understand why they regarded the presumptions referred to by
concepts like “terakkî”, “temeddün” (civilizing) or “teceddüd” (renaissance) as
having contents above of suspicion and being uncriticizable. It is emphasized in
Young Turks’ periodicals that the progress made by the West due to science is an
unavoidable process106 and that the Ottoman society has to participate in it. We come
across with the following statements, for example, in Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası:

Today we see that it is the West that progressed most in the areas of science,
technology and civilization. The West is far away from the century that we

105
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -5- Edebiyat-ı Cedîde, Menşe’ ve Esasları,”
Servet-i Fünun 15, no. 376 (14 May 1314/26 May 1898), p. 183.
106
Anonymous, “Yine Neşriyat,” Şura-yı Ümmet 3, no. 61 (10 October 1904), p. 1.

66
 are currently living in. The laws of progress necessitate it for us to follow the
way of progress that is followed by it. Yet, in order to progress we have to
use the tools that have been used by developed societies.107

3.2.5 Universality

One needs to point also to the emphasis that made by Young Turks on the
universality of scientific knowledge. What is meant by universality here is not the
fact that the scientific data are valid in everywhere. Of course science purports to be
universal in this sense. But the universality of science meant for Young Turks that
the efforts made for obtaining scientific data need to be seen as efforts made for
everyone. It is surprising, in this respect, to see that the scientific achievements
accomplished by others have been regarded as the results of efforts made for all.
Because, as it is partly pointed to above, Young Turks’ relations with science has not
been realized by means of scientific theories they produced themselves. On the
contrary, they have met with science as a result produced by others. In other words,
Young Turks tried to justify their shortcomings in theoretical level with the character
of universality they attributed to scientific knowledge. According to them, “the
intellect always has to progress and maturate by means of the products of the
intellect of others.”108

3.2.6 The Exclusion of Metaphysics

In its efforts to explain the natural events, including the social ones, positivistic
science never tries to show their “purposive causes”. It rather tries to analyze the
conditions generating these events and to put forward the kind of relations they have
with other events about which it has information. The case of explaining facts in a
factual way, in other words, clarification of an event with another event determines
the limit of science. Positivism applies to the explanations emerging as a result of the
immediate contacts of human mind with physical realm and corresponds to the thing
Young Turks were expecting from philosophy and science or from a philosophy of
107
M. T., “Yeni Hayat Cereyanı.” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 2 (30 August 1327/12 September
1911), p. 2.
108
Anonymous, “Erbab-ı Kalemin Vazifesi,” Şura-yı Ümmet 1, no. 2 (24 April 1902), p. 4.

67
science. Hence Ragıp Hulusi, for example, regards the positivistic approach as a
“philosophy of sciences” (felsefe-i ulûm).109

This quality of positivistic science has led Young Turks to assume a distanced
attitude against metaphysics. Indeed, when we take a glance at the Young Turks’
periodicals we see that the metaphysical approach, as an interpretation of the facts,
has become a subject of keen criticisms. One can mention the criticisms put forward
by Rıza Tevfik. In his article which is titled “Canlı mı Cansız mı?” and published in
İçtihat110 Rıza Tevfik gives us the clues to answer the question of why new
understanding of philosophy and science has been accepted by Young Turks, by
comparing it with the old one.

According to him, philosophy has been conceived as a pure metaphysical discipline

or as metaphysics in itself to the extent that the term of metaphysics replaced the
term of philosophy. And the major problem of metaphysics was the “absolute being”
and its relation with the universe. But when the human mind turned back and
examined the distance it covered, it suddenly realized that it has not advanced even a
step.111 Together with this awareness there happened an essential change in
philosophical thinking. Human being recognized that he has not comprehended yet
the place where he lives. And then he saw the impossibility of apprehending the
absolute being or eternity. This is why he diverged from the metaphysical thinking
style which is processing independently from experience. And, consequently, he
adopted a new approach carrying an experimental attitude within. Rıza Tevfik calls
this way of thinking as “exact and experimental science”. 112

This anti-metaphysical attitude caused Young Turks to accept the method of

observation and experience which have an important place in positivistic sciences. If

109
Ragıp Hulusi, “Felsefe-i Müsbete,” Tabiat 1, no. 1 (10 July 1327/23 July 1911), p. 22.
110
See Rıza Tevfik, “Muhasebe-i İçtihat: Canlı Mı Cansız Mı?,” İçtihat 4, no. 101 (10 April 1330/23
April 1914), pp. 1-5.
111
Ibid, p. 2.
112
Ibid.

68
the scientific and philosophical level of the time taken into consideration, it is
inevitable to regard this acceptance as an overdue approach actually. However, the
place that observation and experiment have as methods in scientific thinking is really
important in terms of signifying the disengagement of Young Turks from tradition.
One can come across with this approach in almost all of the Young Turk
periodicals.113

It would be useful to point to the fact that experiment, as it is used by Young Turks,
is unable to go beyond rhetoric. And experience as a pure rhetoric is a sign of an
essential deviance in their understanding of science. The clearest indication of this
deviance is the fact that experience has stopped to be something carried out
personally and started to become experience of others.

One can argue that there are various reasons of this deviance. The most important
reason that can be brought to the agenda within the context of studies we realized on
Young Turk periodicals is the deterioration took place in their conception of time. It
is the crisis to which they ascribed a vital meaning that deteriorated their conception
of time.

113
For the emphasis made on the place of experience and observance in scientific and philosophical
understanding see, for example: Bedii Nuri, “Tahavvülat- Fikriyye”, p. 1156; Rasim Haşmet, “Felsefe
Karşısında Fen,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 5 (15 October 1327/28 October 1911), p. 17; Suphi
Ethem, “Felsefenin Mesâili,” Tabiat 1, no. 1 (10 July 1327/23 July 1911), pp. 4-8; Dr. Julius A.
Wenchel, “Wundt’un Felsefesi: Psikoloji ve Ahlaka Dâir,” translated by Ragıp Hulusi, Tabiat, 1, no.
1 (10 July 1327/23 July 1911), pp. 9-15; Doktor Sadrettin Kasım, “Earnest Heackel’den: Havarik-i
Hayat-1,” Tabiat 1, no. 1 (10 July 1327/23 July 1911), p. 17; Kazım Nami, “Yeni Ahlak-1,” Yeni
Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 2 (30 August 1327/12 September 1911), pp. 18-21; M. Nermi, “Alfred
Fouillée ve Kuvvet-Fikirci Ahlâk,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 11 (16 January 1327/29 January
1912), pp. 18-27; Ziya Gökalp,“Ahlâk Buhranı,” Yeni Mecmua 1, no. 7 (23 August 1917), p. 123;
Ziya Gökalp, “Muhtelif İlim Telakkileri,” Yeni Mecmua 2, no. 46 (30 May 1918), pp. 382, 383;
Ahmet Şuayip, “Hürriyet-i Mezhebiye: Hilafet ve Saltanat 3,” U.İ.İ.M. 1, no. 4 (15 March 1325/28
March 1909), p. 437; Charles Letourneau, “Milletlerin Rûhiyetleri: Birinci Kitap – Hayvanlarda Ruh
Tekâmülü – Vicdan,” translated by A. Rıfat, Genç Kalemler 2, no. 11 (23 October 1327/5 November
1911), p. 182; Ali Canip, “Bedî’iyyât Bahisleri: Hazzın Bedî’î Hayatta Mevkii,” Yeni Mecmua 1, no.
26 (3 January 1917), p. 506; Rıza Tevfik, “Adi Fakat Pek Büyük Endişeler,” İçtihat 4, no. 99 (27
March 1330/9 April 1914), p. 2223; Rıza Tevfik, “Tasnif-i Ulûm: Bazı Mukaddemât-ı Felsefiye – Mâ-
ba’d ve Son,” U.İ.İ.M. 1, no. 4 (15 March 1325/28 March 1909), pp. 515, 520; Ragıp Hulusi, “Din
Felsefesi: Dinin Manevi Hayatta Mevkii-2,” İslam Mecmuası 1, no. 5 (13 Jumādā al-Ūlā 1332/27
March 1330/9 April 1914), p. 152; Ragıp Hulusi, “Din Felsefesi: Dinin İlmî Marifete Karşı
Hususiyeti,” İslam Mecmuası 1, no. 7 (1 Jumādā al-Ākhira 1332/24 April 1330/7 May 1914), p. 212;
D. A. Mensi, “İlmî Tetkikler: Psikoloji Tetkikatının Takip Ettiği Yol,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 2
(30 August 1327/12 September 1911), p. 14; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “ “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -6- On
Dokuzuncu Asrın Temâyülât-ı Rûhiyesi: Dekadanizm-Sembolizm,” Servet-i Fünun 15, no. 377 (21
May 1314/2 June 1898), p. 195.
69
The deterioration in their conception of time appears in the form of concentrating on
the scientific productions as if the long historical process that secured the
development of scientific thought and production, which is the theory and practice,
has never been actualized. In other words, the cause of the deterioration in Young
Turks’ conception of time is the tension created by the demand for compressing time.
And the deterioration finds its most apparent reflection in the idea of reproduction.

It seems that there are two remarkable liaisons between reproduction and the case
that we referred above as deterioration in the conception of time. The first one is the
sense of belatedness. And the second one is a related sense, which is the sense of
precipitation. Thus, it can reasonably be argued that Young Turks’ understanding
about philosophy of science settles on an emotional ground rather than a rational one.
It is interesting enough to see that the deterioration of the perception of time has been
tried to be legitimized in different ways. For example, Tekin Alp writes in an article
published in Yeni Mecmua (New Journal) that:

We are the latest nation awoke in Europe. We will bear the ominous results of
this delay for a long time. But it is not possible to deny one point. This delay
has also a good aspect. By behaving with reason, precaution, discretion and
premonition we can research the way followed by the nations that awoke
before us; take advantage of their experiences thoroughly; and acquire quite
easily the things they produced in decades at the cost of too many sacrifices
and experiences.114

A similar attempt of legitimization can be seen in Ziya Gökalp’s articles as well.

Ziya Gökalp also, just like Tekin Alp, sees the delay in scientific area as a serious
problem for the Ottoman society. He tries, with a pragmatic point of view, to
legitimize devastation this delay has created in their conception of time:

We will take advantage of the newest theories and truths in every levels of
civilized life. In order to get into the new life we will apply to the torches of
new sciences and new philosophy. Therefore, the philosophical systems that
we are going to accept in every levels of life will be more contemporary. For
example, we will not deign to small businesses and will attempt to become
industrialists. In order to dominate the seas we will possess the dandiest trade

114
Tekin Alp, “Tesanütçülük – Solidarizm,” Yeni Mecmua 1, no. 26 (3 January 1917), p. 518.
70
 ships. Our social life will not be based on the principle of community but on
the principles of solidarity and organization which are the productions of free
wills.115

One needs to add that this deterioration was permanent rather than having an
accidental quality. We find traces of it even in Meşveret which is one of the first
Young Turk periodicals. And the same can be said of other periodicals that have
been published by Young Turks until 1918 wherein they were overthrown.

As to the anti-metaphysical discourse: There is no doubt that this discourse has not
been used by Rıza Tevfik alone. Except Rıza Tevfik, there are many writers, who
directed similar criticisms at metaphysical thinking in various Young Turk
publications.116 Although metaphysics is a “negative science” which exceeds human
beings’ knowledge domain and leaves them to some inextricable questions, one
needs also to take into consideration the positive impact it has with regard to the
development of new sciences. Using Rıza Tevfik’s own words one can say that “a
negative science also is beneficial though not inasmuch as the degree of a positive
science. Knowing where a thing stands in reality is very useful knowledge. But in
case that it is not possible, knowing what something is not is better than remaining
on an absolute ignorance about it.117

When we look into the criticisms directed by Young Turks, under the influence of
positivism, to metaphysics we see that these criticisms can become more
understandable together with Young Turks’ expectations from science and

115
Ziya Gökalp, “Türkçülük Nedir?,” p. 485. The statements are not the results of an exceptional case
but of a conscious approach that can be come across within the writings of several Young Turk
figures. For a similar approach, see, Ahmet Şuayip, “Avamil-i İçtimaiye 1 – Irk Nazariyesi,” U.İ.İ.M.
2, no. 5 (1 May 1325/14 May 1909), p. 50.
116
For a similar criticisms against metaphysics, see, for example: Rıza Tevfik, “Muhasebe-i İçtihat:
Mesâil-i Hakikiye,” İştihâd 4, no. 92(3) (6 February 1329/19 February 1914), pp. 2049-53; Bedii
Nuri, “Hikmet-i İctimâiye -1: Tarih-i Hudûs ve ve Neş’eti,” U.İ.İ.M. 2, no. 5 (1 May 1325/14 May
1909), pp. 81-108. Bedii Nuri, “Tahavvülat-ı Fikriyye”, p. 1154; M. Nermi, “Ertuğrul’a Mektuplarım
1: Aile-Vatan-İnsaniyet,” Genç Kalemler 3, no. 15 (1 February 1327/14 February 1912), pp. 51-53,
56-59; Ragıp Hulusi, “Felsefe-i Müspete”, pp. 18-26; Ahmet Şuayip, “Fransa İhtilal-İ Kebiri 3,” pp.
413-424; Suphi Ethem, “Felsefenin Mesâili,” pp. 4-8; Ahmet Şuayip, “Yirminci Asırda Tarih,” pp.
11-24; Harold Höffding, “Alfred Fouillée’nin Tekâmülcü Felsefesi,” Genç Kalemler 2, no. 3 (6 May
1327/19 May 1911), p. 47.
117
Rıza Tevfik, “Muhasebe-i İçtihat: Canlı Mı Cansız Mı?,” p. 2.

71
philosophy. If philosophy and science are to have a meaning, they need to put it
forward only with their functions. In other words, Young Turks are expecting science
and philosophy to get into contact with the real life. Getting into contact with life
needs to be understood as being deduced from life itself. As we are going to examine
later, it is one of the reasons that led them to a materialistic philosophy. The
following statements can be seen as typical expressions of Young Turks’
expectations within this regard:

If we accept that science and philosophy on the one hand and philosophy and
real life on the other are converging in our time to enable the human mind and
human dignity evolve, would science’s esteem to philosophical theories seem
weird? For, we are no more standing in the face of some brilliant but
ambiguous and barren methods and ways of thinking that viewed as
philosophy. … That means that philosophy, science and life are becoming
philosophy in its truest sense by converging again.118

It seems that we need to interpret these statements to the effect that philosophy and
science are processes not excluding but supporting one another mutually and that
they are strengthening by means of taking a more vital state through data put forward
concurrently. Thus Ziya Gökalp, for example, re-determines the area of philosophy
from a positivist point of view and gives the signs of a philosophy of science by
stating that “no approach, which is not based on science or is contrary to it, can be
called as philosophy today” 119

What kind of a relation is there between science and philosophy? Or, how the
scientific developments change the way of philosophizing (tefelsüf)? There was an
assumption since Bacon that human knowledge is obtained by depending purely on
sense organs and in an experimental way. There are some Young Turks also,
remaining under the influence of Comtean criticisms directed to this approach, who
are criticizing the understanding of knowledge that depends solely on senses and
assert that the quality of knowledge has been changed together with psychology.
Psychology, as a positive science, has founded the experimental point of view onto a

118
Anonymous, “Felsefede Teceddüd,” İçtihat 4, no. 97 (13 March 1330/26 March 1914), p. 2189.
119
Ziya Gökalp, “Eski Türkçülük, Yeni Türkçülük,” Yeni Mecmua 2, no. 42 (2 May 1918), p. 302.
72
much stronger base by adding the emotion, reflection and volition into the process of
emergence of knowledge.120

When viewed from Young Turks’ perspective, philosophy is philosophy as long as it

opposes to the current ways of living and thinking; just as science is science as long
as it transforms the existing political and social structure. It is because Young Turks
regarded science and philosophy as tools in their struggle against status quo. Pulling
down the status quo can be realized only by an efflorescence of scientific and
philosophical thinking in Ottoman society. According to Young Turks, there is an
inherited attribute of status quo like obstructing people to think freely and to express
their ideas freely. This is a method used by all types of status quo, whether it is
Western or Eastern, in order to protect its sovereignty. And this is why there is no
difference between the oppressive policies Roman Catholic Church used against
those philosophers who opposed to its official doctrine and the one that used by
Abdülhamit against Young Turks.121 Policies adopted toward blocking scientific
thinking had a unique objective which is to keep the masses ignorant. For, the
continuance of the irrational administrations can be secured only by an unconditional
obedience of the ignorant masses. The scientific thought is the unique mentor to be
followed in getting human being free from all types of restrictions and tendencies
that are contrary to his essential nature. Since Western societies followed this real
mentor they became able to “take the sovereignty, happiness and welfare of their
societies under their control and downgrade the monarchs from the position of
mastership to the degree of servants.”122

“Zulmet” (darkness) is the synonym of status quo in Young Turks’ literature while
“nur” (enlightenment) is synonym of science. “Zulmet” is an eclipse of reason within
social level. And “nur” is a situation in which this eclipse of reason is disappeared,
thinking became free and human being is enlightened. According to Young Turks,

120
Rıza Tevfik, ibid, pp. 2-3.
121
A remarkable examination about the conflict taking place between scientific thought and
oppressive regimes can be found in L., “Nur ve Zulmet,” Şura-yı Ümmet 1, no. 21 (29 January 1902),
pp. 2-3.
122
Ibid, p. 3.

73
“all of the social revolutions evolve out of the unification of reason with the light of
science.”123 Science is not going to take a back seat after helping the realization of
this revolution. The social revolution also, which has to be realized just after the
political revolution, needs to move forward in the light of science. Therefore,
societies –that actualized their social revolutions- need to have minds full of the
latest and liveliest scientific thoughts and studies in order to continue their evolution
(tekâmül) and progress (terakkî).124

This is the classical Young Turk approach to science. In fact, such an approach
makes it easier for us to understand why Young Turks have developed a scheme
which is away from theoretical discussions, indifferent to speculative philosophy,
unscheduled and rather propagandist.

We had referred that the Comte’s classification of sciences has been brought to the
agenda in different Young Turk periodicals. We see that the classifications about
science made by positivist thinkers, like Auguste Comte or Herbert Spencer, are
accepted by Young Turks just because of their catalyzer role in the realization of the
“new life” and “new way of thinking” they idealized. In other words, these
classifications have been regarded as meaningful according as they support the
disengagement from traditional way of thinking but not as an important part of a
scientific theory. Thus, while the writer of the article titled “Nur ve Zulmet” was
talking partly about Comte’s and Spencer’s classifications of science, he interjected
that sciences are classified into two groups, as “appropriate” and “forbidden”
sciences, by Abdülhamit’s administration. We understand from the article that almost
all of the social sciences directly related to freedoms of thought and personal
liberties, like philosophy, law and political and economic sciences, 125 have been
banned. Young Turks regarded this oppressive attitude towards sciences as the
clearest reflection of the eclipse of reason experienced by Ottoman society.

123
Ibid.
124
Tahrir Heyeti, “Mesleğimiz,” Muhit-i Mesai 1, no. 1 (24 December 1326/6 January 1911), pp. 1-2.
125
Ibid, p. 2.

74
3.2.7 Quality of Scientific Knowledge

According to Young Turks, the major property of scientific knowledge is its

dependence on experience before anything else. Observation and experiment are
principal methods to be used in the process of acquiring empirical knowledge. In this
respect, they have a factual approach. On the other hand, it is also possible to come
across with some further interpretations, in Young Turk periodicals, with regard to
the experimental character of scientific knowledge. For example, Rıza Tevfik’s
aforementioned trio of “emotion, recognition and volition” can be said to express a
positivistic suspicion with regard to the idea that knowledge depends on pure data
received through sense experience.

The process of acquisition of knowledge starts within senses. When viewed from this
aspect the scientific knowledge is an experimental knowledge. But senses cannot
secure the maturation of knowledge by themselves. To process the data received
from senses and to transmute them into knowledge a second mechanism, which is
human mind, also needs to be included in the course of construction of knowledge.
And this is another version of an idea stating that knowledge cannot exist
independently of the subject. Together with the inclusion of the subject into the
process of construction of knowledge subjectivism comes, unavoidably, to the
agenda.

This is a point in need of examination in terms of Young Turks’ understanding about

objective science. The belief in the objectivity of scientific knowledge is very
common in the Young Turk periodicals that we examined. According to Bedii Nuri,
for example, “since the scientific knowledge is completely out and independent of
human beings’ desires, it continually emerges in accordance with a number of fixed
and unchangeable laws.”126 Likewise, it is said in Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası that the
way to scientific knowledge passes from “behaving objectively and keeping out of
any kind of effects including spiritual, material and even religious ones.”127 And,

126
Bedii Nuri, “Tahavvülat-ı Fikriyye,” p. 1149.
127
D. A. Mensi, “İlmî Tetkikler: Psikoloji Tetkikatının Takip Ettiği Yol,” p. 16.

75
similarly, Ziya Gökalp sees science as “consisting of examination of all events in the
world with an objective method.”128

Indeed, one can say that if it is asked to Young Turks whether the scientific
knowledge is objective or subjective, we receive the answer of “both”. It is true that
science is independent of us in its collection of data. It examines the reality which
exists independently of us, our thoughts and expectations. Therefore, it is objective in
this respect. However, it is subjective in terms of procession of data and creation of
judgments. Ragıp Hulusi, for example, seems to think in this respect that scientific
knowledge exists with respect to human recognition but not to nature itself.129
According to him, the major function of scientific knowledge is sorting out the
senses and, therefore, the existents that reveal the nature to us. And this case, he
assumes, reminds us that the scientific knowledge is in need of being handled with
regards to the “subject” but not to the “object”.130 Rıza Tevfik explains this situation
with reference to scientific data as follows:

For example, we see the light by our eyes and hear the voice by our ears. But
science demonstrates positively that the thing we feel as light or voice is
different from those extrinsic causes revealing these senses. It is understood
that the capital of our recognition is the inferences which our consciousness
makes! Who loses a sense loses a science.131

In fact it seems also possible to characterize this approach as relativism. What we

mean by relativism is not a type of absolute skepticism. An argument stating that the
scientific knowledge is relative is not an abnegation of the possibility of knowledge.
It rather is a reforming view towards the empirical quality of knowledge.
Accordingly, knowledge is restricted. The relativity of scientific knowledge that
subjected to various articles in Young Turk periodicals is a restriction of this kind.
And this restriction needs to be interpreted connectedly with the participation of
subject in the process of knowledge. Young Turks seem to have adopted a relativistic
128
Ziya Gökalp, “Eski Türkçülük, Yeni Türkçülük,” p. 302.
129
Ragıp Hulusi, “Felsefe-i Müspete,” p. 22.
130
Ibid.
131
Rıza Tevfik, “Tasnif-i Ulûm: Bazı Mukaddemât-ı Felsefiye [1],” p. 371.

76
understanding of scientific knowledge in the sense that the reality cannot be
comprehended as a whole. Viewed from this perspective, it is argued that the truth
can only be known just as it seems to us but not in its entirety. Thus Rıza Tevfik, in
his discussion about the properties of knowledge, characterizes relativism as a matter
regarding the limits of knowledge and concludes that the scientific knowledge is
relative.132 Of course Rıza Tevfik is not the only writer in putting forward this claim.
One needs to point to the fact that there are other writers also, who have written in
Young Turks periodicals, supporting this idea. For example, Nebizade Ahmet Hamdi
[Ülkümen]133 (1888-1969), Rasim Haşmet134 (1886-1918), M. Zekeriya Sertel135
(1890-1980) and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın136 (1875-1957) have put forward their
arguments, in different ways, that the scientific knowledge is relative.

There is one more remarkable quality of scientific knowledge which has been
revived by Rasim Haşmet. It is the temporality of scientific data. Science does not
claim that the theories it puts forward are eternally prevailing. Scientific laws present
us data explaining the nature of things. But these data needs to be accepted
temporarily. In the course of time, the way of interpreting the scientific data obtained
will be changed and, therefore, new scientific theories will be able to replace the old
ones. Thus, Razim Haşmet brings this case to the agenda quite reasonably and says
that there are no unchangeable truths in science but rather temporary truths. And
these truths are depending on experimentally examinable and controllable hypothesis
and knowledge obtained. There are also, in scientific process, laws ensuring to
identify the relation between causes and results.137

132
Ibid, p. 370.
133
Nebizade Ahmet Hamdi, “Sanatta Güzellik İlimde Hakikat,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 4 (30
September 1327/13 October 1911), p. 23.
134
Rasim Haşmet, “Felsefe Karşısında Fen,” p. 13.
135
M. Zekeriya Sertel, “Ahlak, Fazilet ve Namusun Manası,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 15 (15
March 1328/28 March 1912), p. 18.
136
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -6- On Dokuzuncu Asrın Temâyülât-ı Rûhiyesi:
Dekadanizm-Sembolizm,” p. 194. See also Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -7- Bir
Eser-i Edebînin Kıymeti Hâvi Olduğu Vesâik-i Beşeriyyenin Mikdârı İle Mukâyese Olunur,” Servet-i
Fünun 15, no. 378 (28 May 1314/9 June 1898), p. 214.
137
Rasim Haşmet, ibid. For another interpretation regarding the objectivity and relativity of science
see: Tahrir Heyeti. “Yeni Hayat,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 15 (15 March 1328/28 March 1912),
77
Strictly speaking, this relativistic interpretation with regard to the limitedness of
science and scientific knowledge is ideally suited for the general political attitude of
Young Turks. Because Young Turks think that the current social foulness arises from
an unfaltering obedience. And the unfaltering obedience is expression of an attitude
distant from the mentality interrogating the thing accepted as truth. Society is prone
to accept those temporary truths in an unconditional way. However, the most
fundamental quality of a developed society is not an absolute obedience but having
an interrogating mentality. Comprehending that there is not an absolute truth is the
major element to enlighten the human mind. Even if science, which is the only
mentor leading human beings to the light, does not have a claim of absoluteness, the
traditional ways of thinking and living can never have an absolute truth. The way to
freedom passes through the belief in the absence of an absolute truth.

3.3 Young Turks and the Idea of Evolution

There are some other writers also, like Charles Darwin (1809-1882) and Jean-
Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829), who had an impact on Young Turks’ approach to
science except for Auguste Comte. Darwin’s and Lamarck’s theories of evolution are
subjected to both a wide range of articles published in periodicals and books written
by some prominent Young Turks.

If one takes the general profile of Young Turks into consideration, the effect of the
theory of evolution on them can be reacted naturally. For, most of the prominent
figures of Young Turks have studied in the area of natural sciences. As has been
pointed out in the first chapter, the four persons who established the Ottoman
Committee of Union and Progress were students of a military medical faculty. This
profile cannot be said to change substantially in later periods. For example, Ziya
Gökalp and Suphi Ethem were Unionists following the scientific developments of the
time very closely and intellectually productive figures of the Ottoman CUP.
However, the education they received has been in the area of veterinary medicine.

p. 1; and also Rıza Nüzhet, “Hıristiyanlık: Mazisi ve Âtîsi,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 6 (1
November 1327/14 November 1911), p. 26.

78
This circumstance is noteworthy because it shows the relation between the education
Young Turks received and the mentality they had. The emphasis made in Şura-yı
Ümmet, for example, on the fact that “those who struggled against the administration
of Abdulhamit have received education in the area of natural sciences”138 is also
remarkable.

It would be useful to point a case before starting discussion about the way theory of
evolution impacted the Young Turks’ systematic and the results they collected from
it in terms of their agenda.

It seems possible to assume a remarkable affinity between the theories of evolution

and positivism though they are theorized by different scientists. This affinity can be
deduced from the logic of the famous “law of three stages” that is put forward by
Auguste Comte. What Auguste Comte deals with, when he talks about the levels that
human thought crossed through, can be regarded as a parallel evolution to the one
took place in biological area. The transition from the primitive way of thinking to the
most advanced one, in other words from the theological to the positive (scientific)
level, is the story of mental evolution. Moreover, both theories are sharing a common
ground in the sense that they are trying to explain the factual reality by depending on
the facts. This later circumstance constitutes a methodological aspect of the affinity
we assumed between them.

It is because of this affinity between the theories of positivism and evolution that
Young Turks used the concepts of “terakkî” and “tekâmül” which are referring to the
mutual central theme of the positivist and evolutionist theories respectively.139 The

138
L., “Nur ve Zulmet,” p. 3. There are particularly remarkable expressions in this article: “… Is not it
the case that the cardinal source, which educated the majority of the proponents of freedom, is
especially those schools of medicine that occupy themselves with natural sciences in particular?”
139
“Tekâmül” (evolution) is one of the most frequently used concepts within Young Turk periodicals.
Tekâmül, which is accepted by them as a deterministic process prevailing within the universe, points
to a natural law as well. For articles emphasizing on the conception of “kanun-u tekâmül” (law of
evolution) and referring to the inevitability of evolution, see: Ahmet Şuayip, “Yirminci Asırda Tarih,”
p. 19; Ahmet Şuayip, “Fransa İhtilal-i Kebiri-3,” p. 420; Ahmet Şuayip, “Devlet ve Cemiyet,”
U.İ.İ.M. 1, no. 1 (15 December 1324/28 December 1908), p. 55; Âsaf Nef’î, “Demokrasi ve
Sosyalizm,” U.İ.İ.M. 2, no. 6 (1 June 1325/14 June 1909), p. 163; Salih Zeki and Halide Salih
“Auguste Comte: Felsefe-i Müsbete,” p. 187; Abdullah Cevdet, “Kastamonu’da Kurûn-u Vusta,”
İçtihat 4, no. 58 (14 March 1329/27 March 1913), 1273; M. Zekeriya Sertel, “Tarih Muzırdır,” Yeni
79
theory of evolution, as it is put forward by Charles Darwin and Jean-Baptiste
Lamarck, seems to point a rule going for the biological area. Positivism, on the other
hand, widened the area of evolution by applying it to the mental area within the
framework of the concept of “terakkî”. It can be argued that the form of change is
constituted by the concept of “tekâmül” while its spirit is constituted by the concept
of “terakkî”, in Young Turks’ understanding of new life. Thereby, Young Turks
reached to a complete conception of change by adopting both the mental and
biological evolutions. It also can be seen as a result of the perfection they attributed
to the development.

The fact that Young Turks adopted scientific and philosophical approaches reflecting
the same intellectual spirit, even though they are created by different scientists within
the framework of different concepts, makes it easier to state that they did not
approach to science as a result of a pure ostensible interest. For, deciding on the
scientific and philosophical way to choose is ultimately a result of an informed
choice, which is identified by the goal Young Turks aimed to achieve. Young Turks
can be said to act in an apparent consistency while specifying the scientific and
philosophical point of view that suited to them.

Adaptation, shrinking of disused organs, struggle for life and natural selection are
among the most mentioned evolutionist rules used in Young Turk periodicals within
the context of discussions about the theory of evolution.

As a matter of fact, the ideas put forward by Lamarck and Darwin supported
passionately and mustered up a crowded mass of proponents in the history of
Western thought. And Young Turks are not exceptions in this regard. The Ottoman
intelligentsia received this evolutionist effect rather through Young Turks.

Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 7 (15 November 1327/28 November 1911), p. 15; Ethem Necdet, “Fatalizm:
Tenkîd-i Felsefî,” İşhâd 4, no. 78(1) (29 August 1329/11 September 1913), p. 1722; Satı,
“Tanzimatçılık Meselesi,” İçtihat 4, no. 64 (2 May 1329/15 May 1913), p. 1382; Rıza Tevfik,
“Hürriyet: İngiliz Hakîm-i Meşhûru John Stuart Mill Hürriyeti Nasıl Anlıyor? [2] Mâ-ba’d,” U.İ.İ.M.
2, no. 6 (1 June 1325/14 June 1909), p. 206; “Hukûk-u Esâsiyeye Medhal,” U.İ.İ.M. 1, no 16(4) (1
April 1326/14 April 1910), p. 568.
80
Lamarck’s arguments are scientific as well as philosophical. Thus he expresses his
own version of the theory of evolution in his book titled Zoological Philosophy.140
Scientific explanations revived by Lamarck through biology effected the world view
of Young Turks deeply, supplied them a philosophical basis and penetrated into their
ideal philosophical understanding on which they aimed to base the social
transformation. The same applies to Darwin’s theory of evolution as well. Darwin’s
arguments are purely scientific in quality. But it is philosophical for Young Turks as
far as it is scientific. No doubt that it has a strong relation with and derived from life
and thusly corresponds to a philosophy of science for Young Turks. This is why Rıza
Tevfik calls the reflections deduced from Darwin’s theory of evolution as
“philosophy of Darwinism”.141

The main lines of Lamarck’s theory of evolution can be summarized up as follows:

Every organism maintains its life in a certain physical environment. It is inevitable
that some changes take place within this environment from time to time. The
changing environment creates observable effects on the organisms living within it.
And these effects produce a number of successive results. First of all, the organisms
react against the changes it experiences in terms of its way of living and types of
behaviors. Although it is the environment which is giving the first move to the
change, the observed transformation cuts in a second mechanism that advances
automatically. In other words, organism responds to the change in environment by a
drive of transformation it produced by itself. Changes in environment result in a
change of the needs of an organism as well. And changes in needs will change the
behaviors of the organism. Organism loads a vital role to its organs while
maintaining its life. Therefore, it is inevitable for the organism to respond to the
changes through its organs. In the mean time, organism uses some of its organs more,
while using some others lesser. At the end, organs are becoming different in
accordance with their usage. They outgrow, shrink, dwindle or disappear depending
on the frequency of its usage. While speaking of this situation Ahmet Şuayip gives
the example of giraffe. Since giraffes make a habit of eating leafs on the high trees,
140
The exact name of Lamarck’s book is Zoological Philosophy: Exposition with Regard to the
Natural History of Animals. Translated by Hugh Elliot. (New York and London: 1914.)
141
Rıza Tevfik, “Adi Fakat Pek Büyük Endişeler,” p. 2226.

81
their necks and forelegs lengthened but their less used hind legs became shorter.142
Another mostly given example with regard to the disappearance of disused organs is
lobster. As a result of change in environment, lobster’s eyes turned into bristles. That
is to say, a tool which no more has a relation with outer world disappeared after a
number of generations.143 Rıza Tevfik gives an interesting example within the
context of this issue. According to him, since a couple of generations mothers in
Western countries made a habit of not breastfeeding their children because of
scurries of the daily living or the conditions imposed by modern life. As it continued
for a long time, the nature took the quality of producing breast milk back from those
women. Their property of giving breast milk is dwindled now.144 Although Rıza
Tevfik’s example is rather related with the dwindling of a property than an organ, it
is obvious that he is inspired by Lamarck.

Another argument that became prominent in Lamarck’s thought is that the dwindle
or outgrow -caused by the level of usage- in the organs reveals itself a number of
generations later, as a result of inheritance.145

Why it is that Lamarck’s aforementioned scientific explanations attracted Young

Turks’ attention? Or, to ask it in another way, what is interesting in Young Turks’
adoption of an idea received a broad acceptance in their period?

142
Ahmet Şuayip, “Avâmil-i İçtimaiye-1-Irk Nazariyesi”, s. 40.
143
D. A. Mensi, “Psikoloji Tedkîkâtının Son Safhası,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 6 (1 November
1327/14 November 1911), p. 11.
144
Rıza Tevfik, “Ahlakın Nüfusa Tesiri,” U.İ.İ.M. 1, no. 2 (15 January 1324/28 January 1909), 241.
145
For similar discussions and expressions about Lamarck’s theory of evolution, see, for example:
Âsaf Nef’î, “Mücadele-i Hayatiye ve Tekâmül-i Cem’iyyât,” U.İ.İ.M. 2, no. 8 (1 August 1325/14
August 1909), p. 466; D. A. Mensi, “İlmî Tetkikler: Psikoloji Tetkikatının Takip Ettiği Yol,” pp. 13,
16; Suphi Ethem, “Antropoloji Dersleri,” Genç Kalemler 3, no. 14 (13 January 1327/26 January
1912), p. 31; Suphi Ethem, “Antropoloji Dersleri,” Genç Kalemler 3, no. 16 (16 February 1327/29
February 1912), p. 81; A. Mithat, “Bir Medeniyetin Esbâb-ı İnkırâzı,” Muhit-i Mesai 1, no. 6. (1 April
1327/14 April 1911), p. 14; Samipaşazade Sezai, “Fas,” Şura-yı Ümmet 5, no. 88 (24 February 1906),
p. 1; M. Nermi, “Alfred Fouillée’ye Göre Fertte Hayatî Veraset ve Terbiye,” Genç Kalemler 2, no. 12
(18 November 1327/1 December 1911), pp. 197-199, 202-203; Ahmet Şuayip, “Fransa İhtilal-i
Kebiri–Mâ-ba’d,” U.İ.İ.M. 1, no. 4 (15 March 1325/28 March 1909), p. 546.

82
If we are allowed to remind the theme that we expressed in this chapter on several
occasions, which is the argument that Young Turks used science and philosophy as
tools to achieve their purpose of modernization, the meaning of their acceptance of
this -but not other- scientific theory becomes clearer.

The “milieu”, on which Lamarck put a premium, has become an “intellectual milieu”
in Young Turks’ thought. The new milieu is not the one that human being needs to
surrender passively, but the ideal one which is in need of being reconstructed in the
light of science. Human being, just like any other organisms, lives in a certain milieu
and there is is a reciprocal interaction between these two. However, although human
being has no difference with other organisms in terms of being a subject to physical
and biological rules, he still has a fundamental character that differentiates him from
them. This character is his ability of creating an impact on the physical milieu, in
which he lives, by means of the transformation to be carried out within the
intellectual milieu. The major objective of Young Turks who were feeling a huge
unrest in front of the existing situation is to actualize this ability in a dynamic way. In
other words, the theory of evolution led them to struggle for a creation of a new
milieu.

Young Turks’ desire towards constructing a new intellectual milieu is a reflection of

their opposition to the old one. The old intellectual milieu is the tradition identified
with darkness and ignorance by Young Turks. The tradition needs to be transformed
because its obsoleteness makes it fall behind the life whereas new mentality, which is
a requisite of new life, needs not to follow human being from behind but to carry him
to a further, progressed position.

Considered together with other sources fed Young Turks, Lamarck’s theory of
evolution also can be said to lead them to enlarge the distance they kept against
tradition and to use a severer language against it. Suphi Ethem, for example,
characterizes those who protest against Lamarck’s theory because of various
religious reasons as “senile and pious people”146 Similarly, Abdullah Cevdet invites
traditionalists who are applying pressure on proponents of the theory of evolution to

146
Suphi Ethem, “Antropoloji Dersleri,” p. 81.
83
give up their reactions against it “if they do not want their heads to be smashed.”147
Keçecizade İzzet Fuat’s statements are even harder. According to him, “a nation
which subordinates itself to the laws of life after death is not subordinated to the laws
of evolution and can never do so.”148

Together with science it will be possible to develop new organs suitable for new
milieu. Social thoughts and beliefs can be regarded as vital organs of a society in
maintaining its existence. Development of new organs fitting in new milieu is to
mean a creation of new beliefs and values suitable for modern life. And the final
point it arrives is the interrogation of the tradition. Tradition is like an organ which is
losing its function and dwindling in front of the new environment. The Ottoman
society, Young Turks seem to think, has to replace its dwindled organs with newly
developed ones as well as beliefs and values that may enable it to survive. They are
seeking after their ideal of “new life”, the realization of which is possible only
together with new beliefs and values suitable for modern life.

Darwin’s theory of evolution also, like Lamarck’s, has left an impact on Young
Turks’ thought and helped them to disengage from tradition.

Young Turks attributed to Darwin’s scientific assertions, which were generally

exclusive to biological area, a role that facilitated the attainment to political purposes
for them. In fact, the political meaning that the theory of evolution assumed to carry
has not appeared together with Young Turks. There is the approach of “social
Darwinism” which has been created with reference to Darwin’s theory of evolution
and has tried, by using Darwinian conceptions of “natural selection” and “struggle
for life” as basis, to re-define social and intersocietal relations. This approach has
been broadly accepted throughout Europe. Therefore, it is an understandable fact that
Young Turks have been subject to the impact of social Darwinism and have

147
Abdullah Cevdet, “Kastamonu’da Kurûn-u Vusta,” p. 1273.
148
Keçecizade İzzet Fuat, “Kanaatkârlık,” İştihad, 15, no. 133 (5 December 1918), p. 2840.

84
interpreted the political events –which they regarded as life or death issue for
Ottoman Empire- from the point of view of this social theory. 149

Before examining the effects of Darwinism on Young Turks it would be useful to

point to the aspects of Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution that highlighted in their
periodicals.

There are some articles in the Young Turk periodicals which implie that Darwin’s
theory of evolution has an economical basis rather than biological one. This
argument is valid at least for Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834) who has been
seen as one of the most important inspirational sources of Darwin. It is argued, for
example, that Darwin has remained under the influence of Malthus’s theory of
population. Rıza Tevfik150, Ahmet Şuayip151 and Âsaf Nef’î152 are among the Young
Turk writers who share this idea and claim that Darwin has adopted Malthus’s theory
of population and reformulated it in his own theory.

Malthus seems to think that if we want to understand why human population is

increasing or decreasing, we need to look at the proportion between the amount of
food and population growth rate. Under normal conditions, human population grows
geometrically while the amount of food grows arithmetically.153 That means that the
human population always grows faster than the amount of food. There is a
mechanism in the nature to remove this imbalance. As a result of famine population

149
One can note that the effect of Darwinist understanding of science on Ottoman intelligentsia did
not start with Young Turks. It rather has a longer history. For a good examination of the effect of
social Darwinism, for example, on Ottoman intelligentsia see Atila Doğan, Osmanlı Aydınları ve
Sosyal Darwinizm (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006 .). However, there is an
important work written within Young Turk circles, on Darwinist understanding of science, by Suphi
Ethem. See his Darwinizm (Manastır: Beyne’l-Milel Ticaret Matbaası, 1327).
150
Rıza Tevfik, “Adi Fakat Pek Büyük Endişeler,” p. 2226.
151
Ahmet Şuayip, “Avamil-i İçtimaiye 1 – Irk Nazariyesi,” p. 42.
152
Âsaf Nef’î, “Mücadele-i Hayatiye ve Tekâmül-i Cem’iyyât,” p. 455.
153
For the details of Malthus’s argument about the growth of population see T. R. Malthus, An Essay
on the Principle of Population (London: 1798), e-book, pp. 4, 6-7, 33. Cf. Âsaf Nef’î, ibid, p. 456 and
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -3- Mahsulât-ı Fikriyye-i Beşeriyye, Mahsulât-ı
Tabiiyye,” Servet-i Fünun 15, no. 372 (16 April 1314/28 April 1898), p. 118.

85
decreases and in this way a rational compensation becomes ensured. The source of
the conception of “struggle for life”, which constitutes one of the main themes of
Darwin’s theory of evolution, lies in this insurance of compensation.

According to Darwin, there is a huge struggle within one or between different

species. Nature motivates organisms to survive. Because of this motivation, there
happens a constant struggle between organisms.154 Those win this struggle are those
deemed worthy to survive by nature, which are stronger organisms. Darwinian
evolution theory explains this situation as the “survival of the fittest”.155 That the
stronger organisms survive and that the weeks are eliminated in the course of process
constitutes the basic reason of another Darwinian rule’s prevailing in nature, which is
called as “natural selection”.156 The process that referred here shortly has a
deterministic character and is compatible with Young Turks’ general understanding
of science as such.

As it is seen, the economical dimension on which Malthusian theory of population

depends is transferred to biological area in Darwin’s theory of evolution. Of course
the extent of the change that took place in theory is not limited to this. The idea of
“social Darwinism” reflects another modification in both Darwin’s and Malthus’s
theories. Darwin’s theory of evolution is no longer having a purely economic or a
purely biological quality. It rather disguised in a political character which also
includes economical and biological dimensions. This is one of the aspects of
Darwin’s thought that appealed to Young Turks.

Young Turks regard the crisis, which we mentioned above on several occasions, as
the crisis of existence. And they believe that the only way of overcoming this crisis
passes through becoming stronger. The notion of struggle for living is no more valid
just for individuals. It became valid for societies as well. Ottoman society needs to

154
See Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species, A Facsimile of the First Edition with an
Introduction by Ernst Mayr (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), chapter 3.
155
Ibid.
156
Ibid, chapter 4.

86
preserve its existence in front of the West that grows stronger. And its only way is
science. As Rıza Nüzhet puts in Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası:

In this century the struggle for life caused to too many difficulties and
resulted in chaos. Nations, which are week and unable to progress, are
destroyed by others in compliance with the law of “natural selection”. Those
nations which are stronger enough to resist against all difficulties and
violence of life and that equipped with recently produced guns are
surviving.157

The idea that life is based on a struggle is highlighted in almost every issues handled
in periodicals.158

One of the clearest signs of the fact that Darwin’s theory of evolution is used by
Young Turks as a tool of opposition against the existing political and intellectual
structure prevailing in Ottoman Empire can be found in Abdullah Cevdet’s articles.
He says, for example, that “where talking about the theory of evolution and
explaining Darwin’s theories is regarded as a lingual outrage, that place can be said
to be still living in the middle age. And the middle age does not have the right to
exist in twentieth century.”159 If the Young Turk demands of renaissance, progress
and development are taken into consideration Abdullah Cevdet’s statements in this
regards can be seen as typical examples of their general approach to science. In the

157
Rıza Nüzhet, “Yirminci Asırda Türk Gençleri,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 4 (30 September
1327/13 September 1911), p. 13.
158
For the discussions about Darwinian conception of “struggle for life” see, for example: Rıza
Tevfik, “Hukûk-u Esâsiyeye Medhal,” p. 559; Rıza Tevfik, “Nüfus Meselesi ve Ehemmiyet-i Siyasiye
ve İçtimaiyesi”, U.İ.İ.M., 1. Cilt, 1. Sayı, 15 Kanunuevvel 1324 [28 Aralık 1908], s. 46; Rıza Tevfik,
“Nüfus Meselesi ve Ehemmiyet-i Siyasiye ve İçtimaiyesi,” U.İ.İ.M. 1, no. 1 (15 December 1324/28
December 1908), p. 46; Abdullah Cevdet, “Fenn-i Ruh,” İçtihat 2, no. 24 (1 June 1327/14 June 1911),
p. 733; Abdullah Cevdet, “Yaşamak Korkusu,” İçtihat 3, no. 35 (15 November 1327/28 November
1911), p. 913; Âsaf Nef’î, “Demokrasi ve Sosyalizm,” p. 168; Âsaf Nef’î, “Mücadele-i Hayatiye ve
Tekâmül-i Cem’iyyât,” p. 455; Fazıl Ahmet, “Terbiye, Tahsil,” U.İ.İ.M. 3, no. 9 (1 September
1325/14 September 1909), p. 97; Anonymous, “Şark Meselesine Dair,” Şura-yı Ümmet 1, no. 19 (31
December 1902), p. 1; A. M., “Softaperverlik mi Softakerizlik mi?,” İçtihat 4, no. 99 (27 March
1330/9 April 1914), p. 2231; Ali Suad, “Kuvvet,” İçtihat 5, no. 122 (20 November 1330/3 December
1914), 398; Abdullah Cevdet, “Türkiye’nin İdam Hükmünü Hazırlayan Şeyler: Dünkü Düşünceler
Bugünkü Neticeler,” İştihad 15, no. 131 (21 November 1918), 2807; Ahmet Şuayip, “Fransa İhtilal-i
Kebiri–Mâ-ba’d,” U.İ.İ.M. 1, no. 2 (15 January 1324/28 January 1909), p. 288; Tahrir Heyeti. “Yeni
Hayat,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 6 (1 November 1327/14 November 1911), p. 2; Harold
Höffding, “Alfred Fouillée’nin Tekâmülcü Felsefesi,” p. 47.
159
Abdullah Cevdet, “Kastamonu’da Kurûn-u Vusta,” p. 1273.

87
eyes of Young Turks science represents the new, while objections against it represent
the old. Thus, Abdullah Cevdet characterizes the struggle between those who adopt
Darwin’s theory of evolution and those who oppose to it in the same article as the
struggle of “old and new, ignorance and science, darkness and light”.160 According to
him, people who oppose to Darwin’s theory on behalf of religion or religious beliefs
are so ignorant. They are even unaware of the fact that it is pointed in Quran also that
the evolution is a law inserted into universe by God.161

Abdullah Cevdet’s struggle to legitimize the theory of evolution by characterizing it

as an idea which is also found in Quran is compatible with the conciliatory attitude
assumed by Young Turks’ in describing the relation between religion and science.
Since the great majority of Young Turks regard science as a new “religion”,
scientific data are unquestionable truths for them. It does not add up that they adopt –
in the truest sense of the word- the theological statements reflecting the first level of
intellectual evolution, that is to say “divine messages”, and use them as mentors in
their quests. In order to block the possible reactions of society to new conception of
truth they rather highlighted that there is not a conflict between religion and science.
The clearest sign of the fact that this affirmative look onto religion is a result of
conjunctural necessity and that religion is functionalized as an element in facilitating
modernism can be seen yet in Abdullah Cevdet’s articles. According to him, for
example, Muslims accept the progresses which are products of modernity as long as
they are inferred from an Islamic source.162 Therefore, it is indispensable for the
modernizing discourse to give different references to Islam. Abdullah Cevdet is one

160
Ibid.
161
Ibid. One needs to point here to the fact that there were in the history of Islamic thought also some
thinkers who talked about the process of evolution, though not in the same manner as it has been put
forward by Darwin or Lamarck. It is possible, within this regard, to mention old or relatively
contemporary thinkers like Ikhwān al-Safā, Jāhez, Bīrūnī, Mohammad ‘Abduh and Ali Shariatī.
However, arguments made by those thinkers about the process of evolution have not created a
breakage in the history of Islamic thought. For, their explanations have always carried within
themselves a connection to a divine will. In other words, the process of evolution to which Islamic
thinkers refer is a process supported by traditional thinking and belief as well. It is believed, for
example, in Islamic thought that the human being has been created by God in the “best of moulds.”
And the biggest foundation for this belief is a verse which says that “[w]e have indeed created man in
the best of moulds.” (95:4.)
162
Abdullah Cevdet, “Mısır’da Necmü’t-Terakkî el-İslamî Medresesi,” İçtihat 2, no. 1 (July 1906), p.
17.

88
of the Young Turk thinkers who used this attitude, which is called as “conciliatory
modernism” by M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, most. The articles that he has published in
İçtihat or the translations he has made from Western thinkers are typical examples of
such an attitude.163

It is witnessed in the periodicals that Young Turks have used Darwin’s theory of
evolution in a wide range of areas, from literature to art and from philosophy to
science. And this is a case that needs to be pointed separately. In an article published
in İçtihat by Bahur İsrail, for example, it is argued that the struggle for life is not
valid just between organisms but is in the area of language as well. Accordingly,
languages also carry out a struggle to maintain their existence. 164 This argument is
remarkable as a reflection of social Darwinist thought. Similarly, Hüseyin Cahit
claims that Darwinian hypothesis of “natural selection” is valid also in the area of art.
According to Hüseyin Cahit, products of human thought, just like products of nature,
can preserve their existence to the extent of their harmony with the milieu in which
they live. If a product of art goes against the milieu where it grows, natural
conditions no longer allow it to maintain its existence and ensure other works of art,
which are in harmony with it, to be in demand.165 We would like to refer to some
interesting statements, taking part in an article published in Genç Kalemler, as the
last example in this context. It is argued in this article, which is a translation from
Harold Höffding, that the process of evolution is valid between thoughts as well. To
put it clearly, movements of thought constantly try to annihilate each other in the
struggle for life. The process of natural selection gives the right to exist to the one
which is most suitable to the scientific milieu.166 Young Turks believe that they are
following such an idea. In other words, they purport both to accept a modern
understanding which has a chance in maintaining its life and to get this

163
As we are going to point within the next chapter, Abdullah Cevdet tries to reconcile religion and
science in an interesting manner. For an example of his attitude to this effect, see: Abdullah Cevdet,
“Fenn-i Ruh,” p. 732; Abdullah Cevdet, “Yaşamak Korkusu,” p. 914.
164
Bahor İsrail“Ma’reke-i Hayatta Lisanımız,” İçtihat 5, no. 109 (5 June 1330/18 June 1914), p. 172.
165
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -3- Mahsulat-ı Fikriye-i Beşeriye, Mahsulat-ı
Tabiiyye,” pp. 117-120.
166
Harold Höffding, “Alfred Fouillée’nin Tekâmülcü Felsefesi,” p. 47. See also Charles Darwin, ibid,
pp. 3, 10, 43, 85 and chapter 5.

89
understanding adopted by society. The war of power between tradition and
modernity, think Young Turks, necessitates the annihilation of the previous one.

The annihilation of tradition will necessitate also the annihilation of various concepts
related with it. Or these concepts will have to be revised at best. In this context, one
can point to three concepts that can be argued to have undergone transformation.
These are the concepts of God, nature and human being. The meaning that attributed
to them will be examined in the next chapter within the scope of discussions of
philosophy of religion. We may content ourselves for now by saying that the theory
of evolution, whether it is put forward by Darwin or Lamarck, is a serious indication
of Young Turks’ disengagement from tradition. What we mean by tradition is the
way of thinking and living decked with religious beliefs. Evolution is also a sign of
conflict, specific to Ottoman intelligentsia, with Islamic beliefs. The existence of
conflict is indispensable. Because one of the most vital questions that can be inferred
from the theory of evolution is whether the universe is created by a “will” or whether
the progress and development are determined by that will. An affirmative answer
will lead to the idea that every existent in the universe, including human being, is
created according to a purpose and that human being needs to maintain its life in line
with the aim of his creation. And the principles presented by evolutionist approach
are breaking up the patterns of traditional thought and supporting a new purpose of
existence which is more distinct from the holy and is more profane. If we need to talk
about a purpose, it can only be the purpose of surviving.

Understanding the kind of impact that scientific theories of the time, positivism and
evolutionism, created on Young Turks and the type of the relation Young Turks
established with tradition (religion) as a consequence of this impact was necessary
for the objectives of our study. However, since the concept of God and the
discussions made around it fall within the area of philosophy of religion we heal the
breach for now, to handle them in the next chapter, and move to another scientific
and philosophical approach which can be said to have an effect on Young Turks –
that is materialism.

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3.4 Young Turks and Materialism

Materialism, which is derived from the term of “materia” argues that the only
existent is matter. Accordingly, there is nothing except the matter and the changes
taking place in it. Matter –existing by itself and having the ability of movement-
forms the unique constituent of the universe. Philosophically speaking, materialism
is a reductionist approach which attributes the quality of being to matter alone by
arguing that the matter is the only substance, that there is not a spiritual substance
and that the existence has a material quality.167

Matter is the constitutive element in materialism. Consequently, materialism rejects

the philosophical teachings, like idealism, that overlook the matter. Idealism, in its
explanation of the term of being, depends on the mind. In other words, it refers to the
mind as the constitutive element. In idealist understanding, being is the reflection of
thought. However, materialism characterizes every fact we witness as the
transformed modes or functions of matter. Therefore, it is not possible to talk about
any reality apart from matter itself from a materialistic point of view.

Materialism acquires currency in the history of philosophy in different ways. In

ancient Greek era, for example, Democritus theorized it in an atomistic form. The
universe came into existence as a result of the coalescence of the atoms moving
freely. According to Democritus, atom is the only uncreated, indivisible and
indestructible substance. In this respect, it is possible to regard Democritus as one of
the pioneering naturalist philosophers who developed a materialistic language in the
truest sense of the word.

Another approach which made a distinguished name for itself within the context of
materialism is dialectical materialism. According to this approach, which has been
theorized by Karl Marx depending on Hegel’s dialectical thought, the universe is
material and matter exists outside of and independently from the mind. And the
mode of existence of the universe, of the matter in other words, is movement. There

167
Ahmet Cevizci, Felsefe Sözlüğü (Ankara: Ekin Yayınları, 1993), p. 342.

91
can be no matter without movement. And movement cannot be thought of without
matter. The universe is not an accomplished fact. It is rather a process that progresses
dialectically. The links between events are necessary connections. They are also the
necessary rules of improvement of the matter, the essence of which is movement.
The process of development appears not just as a quantitative change but as a
progress from quantitative changes to qualitative changes as well. The human mind
also has a relation with the dialectical structure of reality. 168 Starting from this point
of view, materialism characterizes the mind as the reflection of the actions of human
being in the face of nature. Human mind evolves as a result of the “modes of
productions” –the sense that attributed to material conditions in Marxist theory.

There is another remarkable approach that deserves a reference within the scope of
materialistic approach. It is biological materialism. Biological materialism can be
seen as a reflection of the monistic understanding of science. It moves from an
assumption that the data acquired by natural sciences, biological ones being in the
first place, have the power of explaining the whole reality.

The impact that materialism created on Ottoman thinking circles has a much longer
history. One can mention the names of Hoca Tahsin Efendi (1811-1881) and Ahmet
Mithat Efendi (1844-1912) as the writers who adopted the materialistic thinking and
tried to propagate it, not in a systematical way though, among Ottoman savants.169
Hence, Young Turks cannot be seen as the first Ottoman intellectuals who adopted
materialistic approach.

The access of the materialism in Ottoman world of thought is realized by means of

higher education institutions, particularly of schools of medicine, before Young
Turks. These schools were following a curriculum that can be regarded as more
modern for their era. And the curriculum followed was depending on the latest
scientific data acquired in the West. The curriculum, as well as the books made
available for students was leading them to experience an ideational change, just like
168
Bedia Akarsu, Çağdaş Felsefe: Kant’tan Günümüze Felsefe Akımları (İstanbul: İnkılâp Yayınları,
1998), pp. 118-119.
169
Mehmet Akgün, “Materyalizmde Kimlik Problemi,” Türk Yurdu 13, no. 66 (1993), p. 51.

92
it caused a similar result on Young Turks in a later time. Materialism was among the
top approaches triggered this transformation most. The example given by Niyazi
Berkes is highly remarkable within this context.170 According to Berkes, the
education given in the School of Medicine (Mekteb-i Tıbbiye) was totally
materialistic.171 The school’s library was full of books written by philosophers who
prepared the French revolution. As a matter of fact, Charles MacFarlane says that he
has never seen such a library collecting books of materialism to such an extent. One
of the most conspicuous books is Baron d’Holbach’s Système de la Nature. The
interpretation that a student makes during his conversation with MacFarlane, about
some parts of the book where d’Holbach deals with the “absurdity of belief in God’s
existence” and “the impossibility of the immortality of the soul”, is important in
showing the impact of materialistic ideas. Student characterizes d’Holbach as “a
great philosopher” and his book full of materialistic ideas as “a gerat work”.172
Adnan Adıvar also points out to the fact that reading materialistic books, like Ludwig
Büchner’s Force and Matter,173 was in vogue among students of natural sciences and
medicine.174

The materialistic approach under the influence of which can Young Turks be said to
remain has been biological materialism. It has been easy for Young Turks to adopt
biological materialism, because it is scientific before anything else. On the other
hand, the data it acquires depend on a material basis and are rolled up from mater
itself. And these data, again, put forward the natural laws to which human beings
and society are subject. When we compare this consideration with the meaning
Young Turks attributed to reality, it becomes easy for us to understand why they
adopted biological materialism. It is pointed out earlier that Young Turks did not
170
See Niyazi Berkes, Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma, pp. 205-206. Berkes adapts the information referred
here from Charles MacFarlane who visited the School of Medicine in 1847.
171
Mekteb-i Tıbbiye has been instituted in 1826, during Sultan Mahmud the Second’s era. This school
is the first School of Medicine, of the Ottoman Empire, established in European sense. For more
detailed explanations about it see, for example, Korlaelçi, ibid, pp. 159-160.
172
Niyazi Berkes, ibid.
173
Ludwig Büchner, Force and Matter, Edited and Translated by J. Frederick Collingwood
(Cambridge: 2012.)
174
Adnan Adıva, İlim ve Din (İstanbul: Evrim Matbaacılık, 1980), p. 5. See also Mehmet Akgün,
“1839-1920 Yılları Arasında Türkiye’de Aydınlanmanın Uzantısı Olarak Temsil Edilen Felsefî
Akımlar,” Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, no. 40 (1999), p. 490.
93
approach to reality with reference to a curiosity towards the whole of the universe.
They are highly detached from speculative thinking in this respect. They were
searching for results deduced from life itself. According to them, if one to speak
about a reality he or she needs to proceed from an inquiry about the meaning of
being human, the relation human beings have with other creatures, the similarities
they reflect and the general laws that govern all types of existents. In this respect, a
comprehension of reality means, in Young Turks’ thinking, finding out the way to
transform the human being and society. And the biological materialism, in their
understanding, is one of those ways to understand, interpret, change and transform
the human being and society.

Darwin’s theory of evolution played an important role in Young Turks’ acceptance

of biological materialism. For, his theory can be seen as one of the basic foundations
of biological materialism. Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) is the leading figure in
interpreting Darwin’s theory of evolution with a materialistic eye and putting
forward the biological materialism as a scientific and philosophical approach. It is
possible to come across with the name and ideas of Haeckel in numerous articles
published in Young Turk periodicals.175

In biological materialism, as understood by Haeckel, the universe is both unique and

everything. It is a moving material mass in an eternal time and space. There is
nothing out of it. Nothing can be over it. Nothing can exist before or after it. And our
world constitutes a small part of this universe. No essential difference exists between
living and non-living things. The living thing is nothing but a special and complex
type of mechanics. Darwin’s theories of “struggle for life” or “natural selection”
have taken the shape of a fascinating formula for biological materialism and made
the origin of living things comprehended. The whole spiritual life can be reduced to
the movements of atoms. And the human being is not created by the hands of God.

175
See, for example, Ernst Haeckel, “Tarih-i Hilkat-i Tabiî veya Meslek-i Tekâmülün İzah-ı Fennîsi:
Birinci Ders –Usul-i Şecerî veya Menşe’ Nazariyesinin Mana ve Mefâdı,” translated by Priştineli A.
Rafet, Tabiat 1, no. 1 (10 July 1327/23 July 1911), pp. 27-30; Doktor Sadrettin Kasım, “Ernst
Heackel’den: Havarik-i Hayat-1,” pp. 15-18; Suphi Ethem, “Antropoloji Dersleri,” p. 31; Ethem
Necdet, “Fatalizm: Tenkîd-i Felsefî,” p. 1720; Ragıp Hulusi, “Din Felsefesi: Dinin Manevi Hayatta
Mevkii,” İslam Mecmuası 1, no. 4 (28 Rabīʿ al-Ākhir1332/13 March 1330/26 March 1914), p. 108.

94
He stemmed from deepness of nature. His first condition is not a heavenly story but
being animal.176

One of the particular names, among Young Turks, that attracts attention with his
publications supporting biological materialist attitude is Suphi Ethem. The basic
reason that led Suphi Ethem to adopt biological materialism seems to be his
understanding of a monistic science. Starting from Darwin’s theory of evolution, he
is of the opinion that the laws governing material realm are effective in spiritual
realm as well.177

Suphi Ethem made a distinguished name for himself in almost all of the Young Turk
periodicals because of the works he carried out within the area of natural sciences.
Young Turk figures generally speak about him with a great praise. He published
numerous books, including translations. Darwinizm, Ulum-u Tabiiyye Lügati and
Lamarkizm are among his most notable books.178

When we read articles of Ethem Necdet we witness that he put forward some
arguments enabling us to regard him as a proponent of biological materialism. Ethem
Necdet, like any other Young Turk figure who adopted biological materialism,
received education in the area of medicine. He also seized upon a monist
understanding of science and regards the dualistic attitude, which differentiates
between material and spiritual realms, as the remainder of the thought of middle

176
Bedia Akarsu, ibid, ss. 106-107.
177
Cf. Suphi Ethem, “Antropoloji Dersleri,” p. 31.
178
Arda Odabaşı gives a comprehensive account about intellectual biography of Suphi Ethem. See
Arda Odabaşı, “Subhi Edhem Bey ve Beşer ve Tabiat Dergisi,” Bilim ve Ütopya, no. 159 (2007), pp.
28-42. For an intellectual biographi of Suphi Ethem see also Remzi Demir, ibid, pp. 149-163. Suphi
Ethem’s works have always been greatly appreciated in Young Turks’ periodicals. It is said in İçtihat,
for example, about his work of Ulum-u Tabiiye Lügati that “the world of press has not witnessed to
the publication of such a great and serious work since the announcement of Constitutionalism.” See
Anonymous, “Ulum-u Tabiiyye Lügati,” İçtihat 3, no. 25 (15 June 1327/28 June 1911), p. 758. And
his work of Darwinizm presented in Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası by saying that it is “a quite serious and
useful work of Suphi Ethem Bey, who is a member of our editorial board. Darwin’s theories, the law
of natural selection and some other issues are plainly explained in it. It is highly recommendable to
whole youth.” See the end cover of Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 7 (15 November 1327/28 November
1911). For similar complimentary statements about Suphi Ethem’s work of Darwinizm see the end
cover of Muhit-i Mesai 1, no. 1 (24 December 1326/6 January 1911).

95
ages. According to him, the only idea that needs to be taken into consideration in all
areas, from medicine to psychology and from anthropology to education, is an
approach reducing spiritual to material.179 There is no need to say that this is an
obvious materialism. As a matter of fact, Ethem Necdet argues that mental faculties
are compatible with the brain and that they differ in accordance with brain’s
qualitative and quantitative changes. Although psychological events present spiritual
character, one needs to examine them by keeping in mind what lies in the origin,
which is matter.180

It is Abdullah Cevdet, among Young Turks, who supported biological materialism in

the most systematical way. 181 In this context, one needs to point to the translations he
made from Ludwig Büchner and Felix Isnard. Particularly Büchner’s work of Force
and Matter created an enormous impact on Abdullah Cevdet’s thinking. Abdullah
Cevdet translated a part of this book under the title of “Fenn-i Ruh” and published in
his journal of İçtihat.182 Another part of this book is also translated by him and
published in İçtihat under the title of “Tefekkür”.183 The translated parts of Force
and Matter are published by İçtihat Kütüphanesi as a separate book.184

Ludwig Büchner’s work of Force and Matter is translated and published as a whole
by Baha Tevfik and Ahmet Nebil. And this translation is strongly recommended to
readers by the journal of İçtihat.185

179
See Doktor Ethem “Terbiye-i Akliyye -1- Terbiye-i Akliyyede Usûl-i Umûmi,” p. 525.
180
Ibid.
181
Şerif Mardin, ibid, p. 233; Emel Koç, “Klasik Materyalizm ve Pozitivizmin Türkiye’ye Girişi ve
İlk Yansımaları,” Dicle Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi 1, no. 2 (2009), p. 81.
182
Abdullah Cevdet, “Fenn-i Ruh,” pp. 729-733.
183
Abdullah Cevdet, “Tefekkür,” İçtihat 3, no. 29 (15 August 1327/28 August 1911), pp. 813-817.
184
For this information see İçtihat 4, no. 56 (28 February 1328/13 March 1913).
185
Anonymous, “Yeni Kitaplar: Kuvvet ve Madde,” İçtihat 3, no. 29 (15 August 1327/28 August
1911), p. 823. Baha Tevfik’s works are also praised by a short article in İçtihat, published upon death
of Baha Tevfik: “… His translation of Büchner’s work of “Force and Matter”, which created a
terrifying revolution in the minds of all, is enough to make his name unforgettable.” See Anonymous,
“Baha Tevfik Bey,” İçtihat 5, no. 109 (5 June 1330/18 June 1914), p. 168. The translation made by
Baha Tevfik and Ahmet Nebil from Büchner has been published recently. See Louis [Ludwig]
96
Büchner’s work of Nature and Science also left deep traces on Abdullah Cevdet’s
thinking. A part of this book translated by Abdullah Cevdet in an interpreted form
and published in his work of Fünûn ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sânihaları.186 This
translated part of Büchner’s Nature and Science is important to comprehend
Abdullah Cevdet’s understanding of philosophy and science.

The translation Abdullah Cevdet made from Büchner and included in his Fünûn ve
Felsefe carries the title of “Bilimler ve Felsefe” [Sciences and Philosophy] and
discusses the nature of the relation between science and philosophy. First of all, one
needs to say that the text, no matter how short it is, covers important arguments of
materialist attitude. Starting from the idea that all existents have a material quality it
is argued, for example, that human thought also is essentially material. According to
Abdullah Cevdet’s interpretation, the “materialist philosophy”187 itself puts forward
this result by depending on scientific data.

This evaluation is remarkable to understand the kind of scientific and philosophical

approach seized upon by Abdullah Cevdet as a result of the impacts he received from
Büchner. For, getting inspired by Büchner, Abdullah Cevdet draws a frame for a
philosophy of science or a philosophical science. There are a number of interrelated
questions that determine this frame. For example, can it be said that philosophy is no
longer functional after the scientific developments? Or, given that the conditions
requiring the existence of philosophy are disappeared, can it be argued that we do not

Büchner, Mâdde ve Kuvvet, translated by Ahmet Nebil and Baha Tevfik, simplified from Ottoman
Turkish by Ali Utku and Kemal Kahramanoğlu (Konya: Çizgi Kitabevi, 2012).
186
Abdullah Cevdet, Fünun ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sânihaları (İstanbul: Matbaa-i İçtihad, 1328
[1912]). For the translated part of Büchner’s Nature and Science see pp. 7-19. This book has been
simplified from Ottoman Turkish and published by a number of academicians who makes valuable
contributions, in recent years, to the studies on philosophical understanding of Ottoman intelligentsia.
See Abdullah Cevdet, Fünûn ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sânihâları/Bilimler ve Felsefe ve Felsefe
Değinileri, Simplified from Ottoman Turkish by Ali Utku and Nevzat H. Yanık (Konya: Çizgi
Kitabevi, 2009). There are two more books, published by the same academicians, that is related with
the figures and the period subjected to this study, including: Rıza Tevfik, Dârulfünun Felsefe Ders
Notları, simplified from Ottoman Turkish by Ali Utku and Erdoğan Erbay (Konya: Çizgi Kitabevi,
2009) and Ziya Gökalp, Felsefe Dersleri, simplified from Ottoman Turkish by Ali Utku and Erdoğan
Erbay (Konya: Çizgi Kitabevi, 2006).
187
Ibid, p. 10.
97
need philosophy anymore? The answer Abdullah Cevdet seems to give to such
questions is a quite clear “no”. Need for philosophy can neither be satisfied nor
destroyed. Rather, philosophy needs to be regarded as the unique guide in making
sure the continuance and sustainability of scientific activities. Science makes
determinations. But philosophy ensures that some general laws are deduced from
scientific determinations. Without these laws, it would not be possible to make sense
of the results, acquired by science, in a certain unity. This is why philosophy, in its
truest sense, is related with issues such as the origin of human being, the manner of
his emergence and his relation with organic realm. And this relation can only be
explained by depending on the results reached by sciences like geology, physiology,
anthropology, paleontology, zoology, ethnology, archeology, anatomy, psychology,
history of evolution, philology, history and sociology etc. Therefore, “philosophy
must accept a general law as a guide for itself through which it can base phenomena
–in a way to find a logical relation between them- upon exact judgments of positive
sciences.”188

It is obvious that this approach plans to re-design the relation between philosophy
and science so as to constitute a “unity”. The same attitude stands out in a text
Abdullah Cevdet translated with reference to Herbert Spencer189 and, again,
published in his Fünûn ve Felsefe. The most conspicuous point within this text is the
idea that the unity observed both between science and philosophy and in the universe
creates in human mind a desire to see the same circumstance runs in the area of
thinking as well. And, consequentially, it argues that only one single science can be
possible.190 This unity must be created between seemingly independent scientific
branches. Moreover, a separate connection between the sole science -to be deduced
from this unity- and philosophy is necessary. Therefore, philosophy must directly
depend on science.191 Considered from this perspective, it seems to be possible to

188
Ibid, p. 14.
189
Ibid, pp. 24-29.
190
Ibid, p. 25. Abdullah Cevdet’s insistence on the issue of “unity” carries the effect of Ernst Haeckel
as well. A quotation from Haeckel, in Fünun ve Felsefe, emphasizes the “unity of all natural events”
and touches on the materialistic understanding. See, ibid, p. 60.
191
Ibid, p. 27.
98
argue that the materialistic world view Abdullah Cevdet adopted grows out of this
understanding of unity.

It has been pointed out in the previous pages that Darwin’s theory of evolution has an
important place in the development of the understanding of biological materialism.
Abdullah Cevdet also brings this effect forward. According to him, philosophy
discovers the law of evolution in all sciences, whether they are interrelated or not.
And it accepts this general rule, that is to say the law of evolution, as a guide for
itself in its struggle for explaining things. Accordingly, philosophy never forgets that
it must search for the law of evolution in all material and spiritual events.192

There is no doubt that Abdullah Cevdet had a clear purpose in making translations
from Büchner, like he had similar purposes in his translations from other Western
thinkers. This purpose is to get Ottoman society accept the materialistic attitude by
means of supporting it with scientific data. Thus, the propagandist approach that is
used in all Young Turk periodicals is true of İçtihat as well. The beliefs and thinking
style of the idealized society are desired to be shaped by understandings popularized
in periodicals. This is why İçtihat frequently used Islamic references while giving
place to utter materialistic ideas.

As it is pointed out earlier, a partial translation of Ludwig Büchner’s Force and

Matter has been published in the journal of İçtihat. The translation carries the title of
“Tefekkür” and argues that whatever we talk about its existence, including the mind
itself, can be reduced to matter. In his gloss to Büchner’s claims to this effect
Abdullah Cevdet uses following statements:

Extension (tahayyüz) is taking up of an object in space. This character cannot

be separated from what it belongs to. It is not matter, but material. Thought
also is a character of the same material substance. It also cannot be separated
from what it belongs to. It is not matter, but material. Thought and extension
can be understood just as two characters of the one and the same substance.193

192
Ibid, p. 18.
193
Abdullah Cevdet, “Tefekkür,” p. 814. Abdullah Cevdet translates the texts from western thinkers
rather within a free language. The same can be said of this passage as well. For the relation Büchner
99
In the same article thought has been defined as “one of the several forms of
movement”.194 And this definition seems to correspond to the approach of
materialism which attributes the universe, the matter, to movement in respect of its
mode of existence.

Another source from which Abdullah Cevdet derived his materialist attitude is Felix
Isnard. While Abdullah Cevdet was a young student of medicine he reads, possibly
upon the recommendation of İbrahim Temo, Isnard’s Spiritualism and Materialism
and it plays an important role in his transition from a view that can be regarded
highly religious to a materialist thinking.195 Şerif Mardin characterizes Isnard as “a
French vulgarisateur”.196 Isnard’s mentioned work represents the philosophy of
materialism with a simple language and accepts the necessity of ethical values for
social development. But it argues that this duty needs to be attributed to scientific
materialism instead of religion.197 According to Isnard, religion and ethics are
independent of each other. Religion cannot be seen as the basis of ethics. Religions
may have been beneficial in old days but since they do not depend on any positive
and natural basis they will disappear in the future so long as human beings receive
education. In other words, religions will give way to a strong and real ethics
depending on principles suitable to govern humanity on their own. Scientific
materialism is future’s philosophy. For, it is only a materialistic philosophy that can
ensure recognition of the principles of a strong and real ethics. This philosophy is a
candidate for replacing all doctrines which do not depend on experimental science

assumes to exist between thought and matter see, for example, his Force and Matter, chapter XIII,
titled “Thought.”
194
Ibid.
195
Karl Süssheim, “‘Abd Allah Djewdet”, The Encyclopedia of Islam: A Dictionary of the
Geography, Ethnography and Biography of Muhammadan Peoples. Edited by E. J. Brill. Vol. 9.
Luzac&Co: (1913-1938): 55-60. See also Şerif Mardin, ibid, p. 228. Süssheim’s article on Abdullah
Cevdet is highly remarkable. For some further biographical and intellectual details about Abdullah
Cevdet see also Hilmi Ziya Ülken, Türkiye’de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi (İstanbul: Ülken Yayınları,
1999), pp. 246-256.
196
Şerif Mardin, ibid.
197
M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi (İstanbul:
Üçdal Neşriyat, 1981), p. 12.

100
and reason.198 Isnard’s ideas can be seen as one of the factors leading Abdullah
Cevdet’s essentially religious world view to evolve into materialism.199

Gustave Le Bon also created an enormous impact on Abdullah Cevdet and

strengthened his biological materialist approach. Abdullah Cevdet translated many
works of Le Bon, who can also be regarded as social theorist, and published via
İçtihat Kütüphanesi.200 Le Bon’s impact on Abdullah Cevdet can be traced in
different issues of the journal of İçtihat. In an article titled “Doktor Gustave Le
Bon”,201 for example, Le Bon’s argument that there is a relation between human
beings skulls and their abilities of thinking is narrated very excitedly. Abdullah
Cevdet interprets Le Bon’s argument to the effect that so long as scientific
developments appear in a society the number of large-skulled people will increase
therein. Thinking conversely, the thinking ability of people with small size of skulls
will decrease. As a result, it is possible to infer that Abdullah Cevdet constructs a
direct connection between matter and the ability of thinking. Because, to say that
there is a relation between biological structure and the ability of thinking is to
explain this ability on a biological, and consequentially material, basis. In other
words, thinking is shaped in accordance to matter. And this is a typical expression of
a materialistic approach assuming that the whole reality is a reflection, movement
and transformation of matter.

The basic reason of Abdullah Cevdet’s heading towards materialism is the belief that
the Ottoman society lags behind because of negative effect of religion. Religion

198
Narrated from Felix Isnard by M. Şükrü Hanioğlu: ibid, pp. 12-13.
199
Şerif Mardin, ibid.
200
Those translations include: Ruhu’l-Akvam (İstanbul: İçtihat Matbaası, 1913) which is originally
published as Les Lois Pshychologiques de l’Evolution des Peuples; Asrımızın Nusûs-u Felsefiyesi
(İstanbul: Matbaa-i İçtihat, 1913): originally published as Les Aphorismes du Temps Présent. Avrupa
Harbinden Alınan Psikolociyâî Dersler (İstanbul: Kanaat Matbaası, 1918). The latter was originally
published by Gustave Le Bon as Enseignements Psychologiques de Guerre Européenne. Le Bon’s
works of Hier et Demain and Les Incertitudes de l’Heure Présente are translated and published by
Abdullah Cevdet as Dün ve Yarın: Nusûs-i Rûhiye ve İçtimâiye (İstanbul: Kütüphane-i İçtihat, 1921)
and Ameli Ruhiyat (İstanbul: Orhaniye Matbaası, 1931) respectively. Except the translations of the
books by Gustave Le Bon himself, Abdullah Cevdet translated also a book on Le Bon as Bir Zekâ-i
Feyyaz (1925) which is originally written by Baron Motono as L’Oeuvre de Gustave Le Bon in 1914.
201
Abdullah Cevdet, “Doktor Gustave Le Bon,” İçtihat 1, no. 8 (July 1905), p. 118.

101
causes Ottoman society to move not forward but backward. In this respect, Abdullah
Cevdet’s expectation from science and philosophy, in their materialistic senses, is to
evolve a “degenerated” (mütereddî) society into a “progressed” (müterakkî) position.
He thinks that the religious obstacles hindering Ottoman society’s progress can be
removed by biological materialism and even tries to show that “biological
materialism will replace religion”202 which is a similar assertion of Isnard’s.

If we run shortly through issues handled by now we can infer that science and
philosophy have been used as transformative tools within Young Turks’ ideal of
enlightenment. First of all, it is seen that their mentality is shaped by the education
they received in modern higher education institutions. As a result of this educational
background they adopted the latest and most popular scientific and philosophical
approaches and used them as effective tools for their purposes.

We would like to touch upon a point that can be seen as a complementary part for the
discussions we made above pages and then to pass on to the next chapter.

Young Turks seized upon science and philosophy, as they are developed in the West,
without any doubt or reservation. This attitude is a result of the vital crisis they
encountered and is dependent on a psychological basis in a great part. And this is
why they did not use one of the most fundamental methods of philosophy, which is
“doubt”. Far from directing critics towards science, it would not be an exaggerated
assumption that they did not drop even a slightest hint. One can say that Hüseyin
Cahit constitutes the only exception within this regard. But one also needs to put
some reservations for this assertion. He asks whether the distance covered within
scientific area can cause any negativity in human life or not. 203 It would be useful, of
course, to remark that this question is put forward within the context of aesthetics. Is
science annihilating beauty? Is the natural mode of existence creating aesthetical

202
Aydın Topaloğlu, “Klasik Materyalizmin Mahiyeti ve Son Dönem Osmanlı Düşünürleri Arasında
Yayılışı,” Felsefe Dünyası, no. 45 (2007), p. 119.
203
For further discussions see Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -15- Sanat ve Şiirin
İstikbâli [2],” Servet-i Fünun 16, no. 395 (24 September 1314/6 October 1898), pp. 75-78 and
“Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -16- Sanatın ve Şiirin İstikbâli [3],” Servet-i Fünun 16, no. 396 (1 October
1314/5 November 1898), pp. 91-93.

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emotions in human soul is spoiled due to the scientific developments? Can science be
regarded as harmful in this respect? Although they are limited to the aesthetical area
it is important for us to see that Hüseyin Cahit asks such questions. However, he
concludes with a negative decision. According to him, science does not spoil the
beauty or aesthetical emotion. Rather, it ensures their development and strengthens
them. Even the most terrifying war machines do so. This answer removes from
agenda the only exceptional interrogative view directed towards science. Skeptical
and incredulous looks, which constitute the backbone of philosophy, have lost their
functions in the face of science. In Hüseyin Cahit’s approach, the idea that
philosophy and science must complement each other has given way to the idea that
philosophy must be liable to scientific reality. It is accepted, in Young Turks’
understanding, that the function of science is to discover the exact and absolute truth
and that human being must be subject to it.

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 CHAPTER 4

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION IN YOUNG TURKS’ UNDERSTANDING

As it is pointed out in the second chapter, the scientific and philosophical approach
adopted by Young Turks facilitated their detachment from traditional thinking
patterns. The material sense attributed to the truth enabled them to use science and
philosophy just as tools in this detachment. The most obvious sign that Young Turks
developed a new philosophical language as a result can be seen in discussions they
made particularly in the area of philosophy of religion. They put forward some direct
and indirect arguments within this regard. And these arguments showed how
different their way of explaining certain religious concepts than traditional
understanding.

When we examine the topics dealt with by philosophy of religion we see that God’s
existence stands at the top of the list. Does God exist? If so, would it be possible to
know his existence? What can be said about God’s nature and attributes? What kind
of a relation is there between God and universe? Questions like these constitute the
backbone of philosophy of religion. Thus, they are tackled with in Young Turks
periodicals on different occasions.

One can say, as a beginning, that Young Turks have not dealt with the existence of
God as a separate matter of discussion. In other words, we do not have any
observation in Young Turks’ periodicals indicating that they opened a discussion on
the existence of God and that they put forward for or against his existence and
defended them in a systematical way -as it is not the case in classical discussions of
philosophy of religion. However, we witness the existence of the clues of some
personal attitudes within this regard.

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We are of the opinion that Young Turks’ approach of conciliatory modernism plays
an important role in not dealing with the existence of God as a separate matter of
discussion. Because, if their ideas within the context of the “immortality of soul” –
which is also going to be dealt with in this chapter- be taken into consideration, it
would seem possible to argue that the great majority of Young Turks have a negative
attitude with regard to God’s existence. However, they used a more moderate
language to ensure that their project of modernity do not come across a reaction from
society. Another aspect that needs to be pointed out about their approach of
conciliatory modernism is that untraditional ideas they adopted within the context of
philosophy of religion have sometimes been supported by Islamic references. This
circumstance will be dealt with in the following pages as the occasions arise.

4.1 Approaches to the Existence of God

One can say that there are some important results to which Young Turks arrived
within the context of God’s existence. These results will be dealt with in the order of
the philosophical and scientific approaches discussed in the previous chapter. The
first result will be agnosticism and deism. And these two approaches can be seen as
the natural results of the acceptance of positivism. The second result shall be called
as pantheism. And it carries most obvious effect of evolutionism. The third and the
last result within the context of God’s existence will be atheism. Although has not
been put forward openly, it also has a place in some Young Turks’ philosophical
agenda. And it is the result of materialistic thought.

4.1.1 Agnosticism and Deism

Depending on the observations we made about Young Turks’ periodicals we can say
that the most suitable approach fitting into the positivist character of their mentality
is either agnosticism or deism. Agnosticism, in philosophy of religion, represents an
approach claiming that it is not possible to know whether God exists or not. It is also
possible to widen this definition a bit more by adding, for example, that agnosticism
depends on the idea that God’s nature cannot be comprehended by our faculties even
if he exists. According to an agnostic, the term of God points to an existent beyond

105
the limits of human comprehension. In other words, an existent transcending our
epistemological domain cannot be regarded as a subject of knowledge. Since it is not
possible for us to have an experience about him we cannot make a judgment about
his existence or nature. Agnostic attitudes put forward “silence” as a choice when it
comes to the existence of God. Therefore, the most positive utterance an agnostic can
make seems to be that “God may exist but his nature cannot be known.”204

On the other hand, according to agnosticism, arguments within the context of a

divine existence are far from being persuasive. Let us take ontological or
cosmological arguments as examples. The philosophers who support these arguments
are pretending them to be proofs for the existence of God. However, a similar
legitimacy can rationally be attributed to arguments insisting on contradictory result.
Why we should not regard an argument inferred from the “problem of evil”, for
example, as a legitimate argument against God’s existence? In other words, it is
possible to generate arguments both for and against the ideas regarding to existence
of God. Human mind can legitimately stay away from both of the options rather than
being exhausted by oscillating between them, like “Buridan’s ass”. Therefore, thinks
an agnostic, ignoring the interpretations about God’s existence will be the truest
option, unless they are exact and persuasive.

As a matter of fact, it is also possible to say that this approach is corresponding to

deism. Deism, in its classical meaning, is an approach cutting the relation between
God and the universe. Although it is a questionable circumstance, God’s existence is
within possibility. If we set aside the questions trying to answer whether God has
created the universe out of nothing as a result of his own will or whether he confined
himself with giving a shape or a movement to the pre-existing matter, the relation
between God and universe has come to an and following the acts of creation or
formation. God, deists seem to assume, has created the universe, or has injected such
an unshakeable system in matter which he shaped or moved, that it continues its
existence on its own without him. That means that the universe has a perfect order
which is in no need of a divine intervention.

204
Ragıp Hulusi, “Din Felsefesi: Dinin Manevi Hayatta Mevkii,” İslam Mecmuası 1, no. 12 (22
Shaʿbān 1332/3 July 1330/16 July 1914), p. 373.
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Now, keeping in mind the positivistic analyses with regard to the source and limits of
the knowledge, it will not be difficult to estimate that these analyses bring some
theological difficulties within themselves. The great majority of Young Turks are of
the opinion that facts constitute the unique source of knowledge. Therefore, it is not
possible for them to say that we have knowledge about things which could not
factually be subjected to experience. Factual reality, the universe in other words,
maintains its existence within an order. And this order continues within certain
natural laws which make the positivistic science possible. Natural laws do not arise,
as it is adopted in theological or metaphysical theories, from an intervention of an
existence transcending the universe. Rather they are the results of nature. This point
needs to be interpreted together with the “law of three stages” of Agusute Comte
which we discussed in previous chapter. In the positive stage, which is also the latest
stage, human mind no longer explains the order he observes in nature with reference
to a divine existence governing it without being involved in it. It rather explains
nature by depending on nature itself. Accordingly, “a fact can be explained by
another fact only”.205 This approach can be characterized as phenomenism. The
noumenal realm, including God himself, does not have an explanatory function with
regard to phenomenal realm. For, it is in need of an explanation itself already.
Moreover, since positivism believes that it has no possibility of bringing an
explanation towards noumenal realm either, it sets it aside. The eye of science does
not see anything further than what is sensible. And the world of science is world of
facts and events.206 We are of the opinion that the positivistic attitude towards
noumenal realm does not need to be interpreted as a “rejection” of it, but rather as
“taking it out” of the domain of knowledge by “labeling” it as “unknowable” because
of the impossibility of having an information about it. When we translate this
situation into a theological language we come across to a result stating that even if
there is an absolute being or power created the world, his beginning and end cannot
be thought of and, therefore, his truth cannot be comprehended by human mind.207

205
Şevketî, “Din Felsefesinden.” İçtihat 4, no. 62 (18 April 1329/1 May 1913), p. 1356.
206
Rıza Tevfik, “Tasnif-i Ulûm: Bazı Mukaddemât-ı Felsefiye [1],” p. 373.
207
Ş. Tarık, “Bir Muvahhid ile Mülhid Arasında,” İslam Mecmuası 5, no. 60 (30 Shawwāl 1336/8
August 1334/8 August 1918), p. 1151.

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It is possible to argue that the link between God and universe is thought, in
traditional understanding, in the form of a multi dimensional relation which includes
material and spiritual parts. The material dimension is directly connected with the act
of creation. Accordingly, God has brought the universe into existence from nothing.
Moreover, God has not stood aside following the creation, as he is conceived to have
done in deism. Every change and transformation taking place in the universe is a
reflection of God’s will. In material dimension, it is assumed both that God’s
existence can be known and that his attributes can be talked about on a rational basis.
It differs both from agnostic and deistic attitudes within this regard. As to the
spiritual dimension: it represents an observable qualitative difference, although it
includes the material dimension as well. In this dimension, God is conceived to be
intervening into the universe with reference to the deeds of human being. He
sometimes punishes them by earthquakes or similar natural disasters for example.
God’s intervention can also be happening within the direction of human’s demands.
Human beings’ prays are being heard by God and responded in different ways. For,
God is a “person” who is creating as well as “hearing”, “knowing”, “raging” and
“relenting”. God’s personality is possible only together with such characters. Deism,
despite the fact that it accepts the possibility of God’s existence, destructs the belief
in God’s personality because it removes the characters that can be said to enable God
to enter into an effective relation with universe. May be it is more suitable from the
deistic view to regard God as an “energy” causing the universe to exist, rather than a
“person”. There is no doubt that “hearing” creates an effect in the person who hears.
Otherwise, it would not be possible for hearing to become consummated in its real
sense. Similarly, “knowing” requires putting what is known forward and realizing
this or that behavior accordingly. One can come across to some exceptional examples
relating to this situation when it is evaluated on the part of human. You may be
hearing but you are not obliged to give a reaction. You may know but you do not
need to show what you know. However, in traditional understanding, God cannot be
conceived of as limiting himself with certain conditions or as not putting forward his
knowledge into actions. This is why God is characterized in monotheistic religions,
for example, as a person who both “hears” and “responds to prays”. The spiritual
dimension has neither a sense nor a function in deism. Therefore, no actual
difference following the prayers for God can be said to happen. For, to believe that

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prayers can create some actual differences is to believe that an observable breach in
the function of natural laws can occur. But, as M. Nermi once puts it, “natural laws
cannot be changed by human beings’ prayers or entreaties”.208

It is obvious that this approach reduces the prayers to absurdity. And, therefore, it
will not be surprising to see that it shows the “miracle”, which is another extension
of classical thought of God, as a superstition. In the monotheistic understanding of
religion miracle is regarded as a sign of God’s direct intervention into the universe. It
is also accepted as constituting one of the proofs for the existence of God and a
breach in the natural laws.

Viewed from the positivistic perspective, it is possible to observe some events in the
nature that can be regarded by human beings as “deterioration”. But the positivistic
science presents us the factual explanations of the events of this kind. Thence, what
seems to us as “mystical” drifts apart from the sense it has in theological period,
which is to say that there is no place for the belief of miracle in scientific
understanding.209 On the other hand, the belief of miracle is a belief based on
suspicious and disputable data narrated by others. The belief of miracle lies out of the
domain of senses and the reason which processes the data they gather. Therefore,
accepting such an idea is contrary to positivistic science.210

4.1.2 Pantheism

The most obvious effect of the 19th century’s philosophical and scientific approaches
on Young Turks can be said to appear as an attempt to dissociate the understanding
of being from the idea of holy. And it finds its reflection in too many differences in
the key concepts, the concept of God being in the first place, of the classical
philosophy of religion.

208
M. Nermi, “Ölüm ve Hayat: Mısır ve Berberlerin Dinleri -3- Eski Mısır,” Genç Kalemler 4, no. 26
(24 August 1328/6 September 1912), p. 76.
209
Doktor Sadrettin Kasım, “Earnest Heackel’den: Havarik-i Hayat-1,” p. 17.
210
A detailed discussion about the criticisms against the idea of miracle can be found in Bedii Nuri,
“Tahavvülât-ı Fikriyye,” pp. 1153, 1155.
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As far as we see in the Young Turk periodicals, the being is no longer standing in the
face of us to reveal holiness. Nor do we need to analyze it to discover God’s will
lying behind. These were rather old beliefs Young Turks tried to remove by the help
of modern scientific and philosophical understandings. Of course there are some
exceptions among them. But the natural results of the philosophical approaches they
seized upon can be seen immediately in innumerable articles. In these articles being
is characterized as a concept to be examined because of the vitality it presents for the
human being to maintain his existence and seen as a total of mere factual reality.
There is no place for a contemplation which stands behind the factual and which
cannot be subjected to epistemological mechanisms by some means or other. In this
respect, to characterize events taking place in the universe as manifestations of a
divine will or to apply for a divine power whenever there is a need for an explanation
is a useless and fallacious struggle.211

As a result of the endeavors to re-examine the notion of being independently from

the idea of holy, some key concepts –which can be gathered under a general term of
being- are re-interpreted within the direction of new understanding of philosophy and
science and some important results in terms of the philosophy of religion are
emerged. The aforesaid concepts are human being, nature and God respectively.

Human being is a being among other beings in the universe. He came out in
consequence of certain conditions and will maintain its existence under specified
conditions. There is not a difference between human being and other creatures in
terms of existing and dying out.212 Viewed from this perspective, it is possible to say
that human being is accepted as a “natural result” in Young Turks’ understanding. To
put it in a clearer way, human being is a “production” of nature. Since being a
production shall mean to appear in compliance with natural laws, there can be no

211
Şevketî, ibid, pp. 1357,1358.
212
For interpretations making the existence of human being ordinary see Ahmet Rasim, “İnsan-ı
İbtidai: Ensal-i Beşeriyyenin Alâim-i Mütehacciresi,” Şura-yı Ümmet 9, no. 214 (18 March 1326/31
March 1910), p. 4 and J. Weber, “Asırların Panoraması: Tarih-i Kâinata Bir Nazar,” translated by
Abdullah Cevdet, İçtihat 4, no. 51 (24 January 1328/6 February 1913), pp. 1171-73.

110
purpose transcending naturality. It is not possible to talk about a divine plan to which
human being’s appearance or his annihilation is a subject. For example, the air has
not been created billion years ago so that it ensures human’s breathing. On the
contrary, life is emerged where air exists. The conditions which prepared human
being’s appearance should be interpreted in this way. If there were another gas
instead of oxygen, for example, the development of life might follow another
direction but the same intimate relation between life and that gas would still exist.
The same applies to other conditions of life, like water, sun etc. as well. If there was
no sun then human eye would not develop; if there was no sound then human ear
would not develop; if there was no movement then human organs would not
develop.213

This approach is far from traditional understanding which sees universe as a proof of
the existence of God. God’s attribute of creation is replaced with nature’s character
of productivity. In our opinion, this change of the understanding about nature is a
virtual expression of a pantheistic thought. As a matter of fact, pantheistic approach
can be seen as the natural result of the idea of evolution. Theories of evolution are
nothing but a story of production of human being, like other factual realities, by
nature. It is apparent that the new meaning attributed to human being is totally
distinct from the one he has in traditional comprehension. For, in traditional
understanding human is not any being among others. He has been created by a divine
will in accordance with certain purposes. Besides, his creation has been taken place
“in the best of moulds”. Evolutionist approaches also, particularly Darwin’s theory of
evolution, explain human being’s existence to the accompaniment of a purpose.
Nature motivates human being so that he reaches to a specific purpose. This purpose
consists of “survival”. But it is in and for human being himself. It has not been
determined by another being. This is why there can be no purpose transcending
human being as well. Therefore, Darwin’s theory of evolution can be said to exclude
the term of a creator God. The place of God, who is conceived of as a “person” in
traditional thinking, captured by nature which produces certain results by the help of
laws it is liable to. In other words, nature is being deified. Thus, Ahmet Şuayip

213
Ethem Necdet, “Fatalizm: Tenkîd-i Felsefî,” p. 1721.

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argues that Lamarck was a “semi-pantheist”.214 It seems that Şuayip also tried to
point to the fact that the productive character of nature is replaced God’s creative
attribute. The productive ability of nature, which re-designs existing things,
subrogates the will of a transcendental being that creates everything ex nihilo. Hence,
a contingency and a subsequent evolvement, rather than a divine will, shall be
needed to be talked about with regard to human existence which is going mean that
the divine will is left out.215 As for the traditional approach, human being is not a
result of a contingency.

Detraction of human being’s existence from sanctity pulls down the belief that he
needs to continue his life by pursuing certain holy rules. Of course, the same
circumstance will be applied to society as well. Just as human being is produced by
nature within specific rules, society also needs to be thought of as a fact produced by
nature within the same conditions. And this will result in serious conflicts with
tradition. For, it rasps the effect of religion both at personal and social levels. And it
is obvious that the sense included in this conflict will not be a positive one for
traditional thinking and living styles.

Pantheism sometimes comes up as a logical result of the scientific and philosophical

understandings Young Turks adopted. The approach we noted above can be seen
such a logical result. However, one can also witness that pantheism is put forward as
an informed choice in Young Turks. Accordingly, God is not a being which exists
independently from universe. He is not staying outside and not taking care of it. He is
an immanent being. An informed pantheist approach to this effect is found in
Abdullah Cevdet’s thoughts. Particularly his work of Fünûn ve Felsefe includes too
many pantheistic interpretations.

It would be useful to note a point before passing on Abdullah Cevdet’s pantheistic

interpretations. As it is touched upon in the previous chapter, Abdullah Cevdet has an

214
See Ahmet Şuayip, “Fransa İhtilal-i Kebiri,” p. 536.
215
Rıza Tevfik, for example, points that the theory of evolution brings the idea of “creation” into
question. See Rıza Tevfik, “Adi Fakat Pek Büyük Endişeler,” p. 2227. And for another argument
claiming that human being is the result of chance and evolution see Ethem Necdet, ibid, p. 1720.

112
understanding of monist science. In his opinion, basic function of science is to put
forward the unity in universe.

He derived this idea of unity that led him to materialistic results, to a large extent,
from Ernst Haeckel. Abdullah Cevdet starts from Hackel’s principle about the “unity
of all natural events”, and constructs the same unity between God and universe.
Thus, according to Abdullah Cevdet “God is not an individual; he is the totality of
individuals and beings.”216 One observes that the same characterization is made by
him with regard to the nature itself. In Abdullah Cevdet’s thinking, the nature “is
neither the core nor the shell. It is also everything.”217

Strictly speaking, the idea of the unity of being (vahdet-i vücûd) is not an unknown
idea for traditional Islamic thought. Arguments to this effect can frequently be come
across within Sufi interpretations in particular. Therefore, it is not surprising to see
that Abdullah Cevdet expresses some pantheistic ideas in his work of Fünûn ve
Felsefe with reference to some Islamic thinkers. However, depending on the idea that
it injures God’s “personality” pantheism gets serious reactions and this should not be
kept away from attentions.

Abdullah Cevdet sometimes grounds his modernist ideas on Islamic sources. This
attitude can be characterized as typical Young Turk approach with regard to their
activities of modernization. What makes him different in his attitude is that he
interprets many of the Islamic concepts in a wide way. He uses this method both in
translating the verses and hadiths he refers to and in interpreting certain Islamic
concepts. For example, Islam calls itself as a religion of “tawhîd” (unity). Tawhîd
means to believe that there is only one God. And the people who believe in God’s
oneness are called “muwahhid”.

Abdullah Cevdet interprets being “muwahhid” as believing in oneness of existence.

According to him, rejecting the idea of the unity of being is “shirk”. And “shirk”

216
Abdullah Cevdet, Fünûn ve Felsefe, p. 49.
217
Ibid, p. 59.

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means to believe also in the existence of some other deities except from God. To put
it in Abdullah Cevdet’s own language:

The essential substance of becoming and space, the endless universe, is one.
But there are thousands of ways for their appearance. This creed is called as
“muwahhidiyyat” in religious language. And the term of “muwahhid” finds
its meaning according to the insight and reason of each believer. Everybody
gives a name to the fundamental substance of the universe. Some persons
scream by saying that:

I did not know that hidden and apparent is always you,

That what has always been hidden in languages and souls is you,
I was requesting a sign for the universe from you,
Then I learnt that the universe is you.

And some devotees of unity wonder at the conflict creating shirk, by

murmuring the tune stating that “the things that have been given different
names are one, but the names are over abundant.”218

It is not the unique example of the Islamic defense of an idea arising from
materialistic understanding of science. Another interesting example of this approach
is that Abdullah Cevdet comprehends the idea of “heredity”, found both in
Lamarck’s and Darwin’s theories of evolution, as a characteristic transferred from
God to creatures. The basic foundation of Abdullah Cevdet’s argument to this effect
is a hadith qudsi. It is said, in this hadith, that: “I am the sultan whom people
worship. I produce and bring the generations into the realm of existence just as they
are prepared by their ancestors.”219

Abdullah Cevdet’s interpretations with regard to this hadith are very interesting.
According to him, it is an expression of the transference of the being by means of
heredity on which medical sciences insist. Abdullah Cevdet calls this circumstance
as “existential heredity” (veraset-i vucûdiyye). Existential heredity is not related with
a person’s inheritance like assets and possessions that remain outside of his own
body. It means a direct transference of bodily characters. Therefore, a statement to
the effect that Abdullah Cevdet refers to a material unity between God and nature

218
Ibid, pp. 66-67.
219
Ibid, p. 67.

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would not be illegitimate. This is one of the clearest expressions of pantheism. What
makes this approach interesting is that a pantheistic interpretation inferred from a
materialistic understanding of science is based on Islamic terminology.220

Abdullah Cevdet does not bring his pantheistic approach to the agenda solely with
Islamic references. He appeals to Western thinkers’ ideas also in this context.
Another thinker who can be said to have an impact on pantheistic evolution of his
thought is Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749 –1832). There is a long quotation
from Goethe in Fünûn ve Felsefe where one can see no serious difference between
some of the qualities he attributes to nature and the qualities attributed by Islam to
God. It is said in this passage that:

It is everything. It bestows upon itself and punishes itself. It suffices for its
own happiness and pain. It is severe and merciful; nice and terrific; helpless
and omnipotent. It always includes everything. There is neither past nor
present for it; only now is eternal for it. It is good. I thank to and praise for all
of its actions. It is Wise and Benign. … It is “unity”. Still, it is not completed;
it can do whatever it does forever. It shows its being to everyone in a special
manner; it buries itself under thousands of names and is always the same. It
brought me into the world and will take me out. I trust it. It can use me
however it wants; it never nurses a grievance to its own production. I did not
say anything about it. Whatever is said, right or wrong, expressed by it. All of
the defects and virtues belong to it.221

4.1.3 Atheism

It is obvious that the final decision, to which materialism leads about the existence of
God, whether in its vulgar or dialectical or biological sense, is atheism. For, it argues
that the unique reality in the universe is matter. Matter is eternal. The universe
consists of the transformation matter undergoing in an endless period of time and the
movements taking place in it. This circumstance means that the universe came out as
an actualization of the potentialities in matter. In other words, there is not a divine
existence who can be said to create the universe from his own will out of nothing.
Just as the universe has no creator, the idea that there are some wills to intervene it

220
Ibid, pp. 67-68.
221
Ibid, s. 58.
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afterwards also is nonsensical. Therefore, the term of God being in the first place, all
religious terms are produced by human beings. There is not an outer reality to which
these terms correspond.

The impact of biological materialism on Young Turks’ mentality has been examined
in the second chapter. Of course, this impact did not remain on a purely rhetorical
level. The education they received led a notable part of them to seize upon biological
materialism as a weltanschauung. Hence, it is inevitable for them to maintain a
negative attitude when it comes to the concepts of classical philosophy of religion.
There are a number of examples of this remarkable circumstance in their
publications. However, one needs to point that atheism has not clearly been put
forward as a philosophical choice in Young Turks’ periodicals. It seems to be
because of the fact that they were trying to avoid possible reactions from society
against their agenda consisting of socio-cultural and political transformations. For,
religion has been a highly sensitive issue in traditional Ottoman society. Therefore,
one can say that the moderate language preferred by Young Turks, with regard to
religious concepts, reflects an understandable situation.

However, instead of saying openly that “God does not exist” they used rather an
indirect language. The interpretations made by Mustafa Nermi, for example, are of
this kind. He makes serious inferences with regard to the truth of religion and
religious concepts by depending on anthropological data. His articles full of ideas to
this effect are going to be examined in the following pages within the discussions
about the immortality of the soul. According to him, all of the claims of monotheistic
religions are exact copies of human beliefs prevailed in previous eras. Human
societies derived the principles of the systems of beliefs from their own daily lives.
In other words, religious beliefs are nothing but a version of the daily opinions
expressed within a more sophisticated language. Viewed from this perspective, there
can be no truth of the claims of the monotheistic religions.

Ethem Necdet’s characterization of the idea of “creation” as nonsensical also

grounds on such a logical basis. He does not regard the universe as a unity
effectuated within a certain heavenly plan. According to him, being comes out in the

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course of the time as a result of a coincidence. And we attribute the order we observe
as a factual reality to a transcendental will. However, it is a consequence of our
habits. If we come across with a different order under different conditions we would
still attribute a similar meaning to it as well. Therefore, we should support our
observations just by some observable results. Otherwise, interpretations that we
make about the things transcending the domain of our reason and knowledge would
lead us to make nonsensical assumptions. And beliefs included in monotheistic
religions may quite reasonably be argued to be depending on assumptions of this
kind.

A similar approach can also be found in Suphi Ethem’s thoughts. In his opinion, all
arguments of the monotheistic religions, like the creation of the world in six days, are
totally baseless. As a typical materialist, he thinks that it is not God but the matter
itself which is lying at the ground of the changes we observe in the universe.
Moreover, arguments of monotheistic religions are being refuted one after the other
by positivistic sciences.222 Therefore, matter needs to be explained just by matter
itself. And we are of the opinion that these ideas may be taken as typical signs of
atheistic approach.

One can say, as a result, that atheism constitutes one of the attitudes maintained by
some Young Turk figures with regard to the issue of God’s existence. But they could
not express this approach openly due to different political and cultural reasons and
concerns.223

4.2 Immortality of the Soul and the Life after Death

One another topic discussed within the context of philosophy of religion in Young
Turks’ periodicals is the issue of belief in the immortality of the sould and the life
after death.

222
Suphi Ethem, Darwinizm, pp. 61-65. See also Anonymous, “Yirminci Asır Gözlüğü: İnsan, Fikir,
His,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 5 (15 October 1327/28 October 1911), pp. 30-31.
223
Nebizade Ahmet Hamdi openly writes out these concerns which are common among Young Turks.
See Nebizade Ahmet Hamdi, “Sanatta Güzellik, İlimde Hakikat,” p. 25.

117
The desire of being immortal is, of course, one of the existential desires of human
beings. Human being wants to live as long as possible. He would, in fact, like to live
forever. But death imposes itself as an irresistible truth. The severity of this truth
causes a deep anxiety in each human being. Death is interpreted as being unable to
take the advantages of life or as becoming distanced from beloved ones. Moreover,
the process after death is thoroughly dark. Consequently, human being usually
becomes terrified in the face of death and yearns for an endless life. When convinced
that an actual immortality is impossible, he attributes different meanings to
immortality in order for satisfying his yearning. The continuance of generation, for
example, becomes a type of immortality. In this approach, which can be
characterized as biological immortality, people believe that their existence will be
maintained by their own generation. This belief, that satisfies their desire of
immortality, may have a positive contribution in terms of ensuring the continuance of
the species.

On the other hand, human being believes also that he becomes immortal if his name
is not forgotten. And he uses every means possible to warrant this circumstance. He
undertakes charitable works, for example, and establishes foundations to get his
name remembered by people for ever. And this second approach can be regarded as
social immortality.

When viewed from the perspective of monotheistic religions, it is possible to say that
the issue of immortality is examined in a quite different way than its biological and
sociological senses. Islam, Christianity and Judaism adopt the idea of immortality as
a metaphysical notion. These religions do not determine immortality just as a pure
subject of desire, but as a religious teaching as well. In Islamic thought, for example,
the belief in the life after death has been specified as a pillar of faith, which means
that a person who does not believe in it cannot be regarded as Muslim.

According to monotheistic religions, death is not the end of the existence of human
being but is the first step taken towards the new life. Death is a contingent
withdrawal of the soul from the body. Human being will be resurrected by God when
the time comes. Resurrection is the coming together of the soul and body once again

118
and means that human beings will maintain a life similar to the one they had in this
world. The difference between the first and second lives is that the previous is
limited while the later is going to be endless.

The idea of metaphysical immortality, which attained a place for itself in

monotheistic religious belief, is an ethical principle also. Human being, who is going
to be resurrected by God, is to be subjected to a divine interrogation in accordance
with his deeds in this world. God will reward those people who maintained a good
life in their first life and will punish evil people.

4.2.1 Young Turks and the Idea of Immortality

The articles including discussions about the quality of soul and immortality in Young
Turks’ periodicals are generally full of ideas quoted from Western thinkers who can
be characterized as evolutionist or materialist. Since materialism cannot exhibit a
positive attitude when it comes to the issues of the autonomous existence of soul or
the belief in immortality, it will be inevitable to bring to the agenda some
philosophical results remarkable with regard to our current topic.

As far as we could observe in Young Turks’ periodicals we examined, the idea of

immortality has been removed from its metaphysical dimension and handled on a
material ground. This circumstance must be seen as consistent for the most part. For,
as we have previously pointed out on several occasions, approaches determined
Young Turks’ world view have been positivism, evolutionism and materialism. It is
obvious that each of these three approaches is substantially having an understanding
of factual reality. Yet, each of them is regarding metaphysics as incomprehensible,
ungroundable and unacceptable for the human mind.

In order to be able to talk about immortality one needs, first of all, to examine the
qualities of the soul. The soul is accepted as a self-subsisting element in traditional
thinking. It is a transparent, imperceptible and indivisible substance. It is soul which

119
governs the organs. However, it is totally different from them qualitatively. 224 In
traditional understanding it is believed that the soul has been created by God to
bestow vitality for human being,225 and to reflect the perpetual dimension of
existence. Since it presents big qualitative difference from ordinary facts, it is not
possible to see and have positive experience about it.

And the meaning given to soul in Young Turks’ periodicals has entirely been
changed. It does not have a metaphysical quality anymore as it is adopted in
traditional understanding. The quality of soul can only be explained in a connection
with body in general and with brain in particular. Of course, the biggest foundation
will be the data of science in this matter. Therefore, there is not a definition of soul,
in Young Turks’ understanding, that cannot be included in the type of explanation of
science. The soul is re-defined, with the impact of developments in the area of
experimental psychology in particular, as the totality of the inner events like
pleasure, pain, happiness, grief, hope, fear, anger, love, hate, desire, imagination,
thinking etc. In other words, if we pose the question of “what is soul?” the answer we
most possibly get from periodicals will be that it is the “totality of the events and the
functions in the mind”.226 Now, given that the existence of the soul is the totality of
the abovementioned contingent circumstances, their annihilation shall also indicate
the non-existence of soul. Such reconsideration will naturally remove us from the
ideas that the soul is self-subsistent and immortal.

The explanation of the soul in terms of natural events brings within itself the
adoption that death must be accepted as a natural fact. In Young Turk periodicals,
particularly in the articles both translated from Charles Letourneau and written under
his impact, the belief of immortality is characterized as a consequence of having

224
Charles Letourneau,“Milletlerin Ruhiyetleri: Birinci Kitap-Hayvanlarda Ruh Tekâmülü-Vicdan,”
p. 181.
225
There are some verses in Qur’an indicating that body and soul are two different elements while the
creation of human being is talked about. It is said, for example, that “[y]our Lord said to the angels, “I
will create a human being out of clay from an altered black mud. And when I have proportioned him
and breathed into him my soul, then fall down to him in prostration.” (15:28-29)
226
Anonymous, “Ruh Nedir? -1-,“ Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 2 (30 August 1327/12 September
1911), p. 8. For similar interpretations with regard to the nature of the soul see Charles Letourneau,
ibid.

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difficulties in accepting death as a natural event. According to Letourneau, the
devastation of personality and the certainty of death is something incomprehensible
for the people whose mentality is still in the most primitive level. There is not even a
notion of “natural death” in this childhood era of humanity. In this period, death
generally understood as the continuation of sleep wherein the soul leaves the body
and lives in an imperceptible position for a long time.227

Removal of the soul from metaphysical area and inclusion of it into the physical
realm reinforced the belief that there are scientific ways and methodologies to handle
and examine it. The quality of the soul in traditional understanding includes also the
assumption that it can by no means be subjected to experience. But the developments
in scientific area especially those realized in physiology and psychology showed that
the soul can be explained by observation and experiment, the most basic scientific
methods. Thus, it is also possible to see in Young Turks’ periodicals the existence of
a belief that the term of soul acquired a quality which can be examined through
experimental psychology.228 Application of observation and experiment as scientific
methods into the area of psychology also is a revolutionary approach for Young
Turks. For, it shall mean that the traditional understanding of soul has been run
upside down. It is even possible to say that this revolution has given birth to results
similar to the revolutions we observe in natural sciences since Galileo and Bacon.229
Of course, leaving aside the ideas and prepossessions derived from external sources
like religion is inevitable for having strong information about the true character of
the soul.230 It seems to be an emphasis made on the objectivity which is one of the
cardinal qualities Young Turks thought to exist in scientific knowledge.

227
Charles Letourneau, “Umumiyet İtibariyle Din,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 4 (30 September
1327/13 October 1911), p. 27.
228
See, for example, D. A. Mensi, “İlmî Tetkikler: Psikoloji Tetkikatının Takip Ettiği Yol,” p. 14. For
another argument claiming that an experimental examination of the soul is possible together with
scientific developments and that the only and the scientific way of understanding its nature is
experiment, see Dr. Julius A. Wenchel, “Wundt’un Felsefesi: Psikoloji ve Ahlaka Dâir,” p. 12.
229
Julius A. Wenchel, ibid, p. 11.
230
D. A. Mensi, ibid, p. 13.

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The common approach we come across in Young Turks’ periodicals in respect of the
quality of soul has generally been expressed within passages from Western thinkers.
Writings of Letourneau –who is a materialist thinker- about the source of religions
and development of religious beliefs, for example, appear in various periodicals like
Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası and Genç Kalemler. Just as this new understanding has been
quoted from Western thinkers, its natural implications have also been expressed
within the language of those thinkers.

It is not difficult to foresee that the assumption which regards the soul as a reflection
and function of the matter is going to turn into an argument to be used against the
idea of life after death. Thus, we witness that the belief in life after death has been
characterized, as a natural consequence of these opinions, to be a baseless and
fictitious idea.231 Accordingly, the life after death is a content of a belief which
prevailed since the oldest periods of humanity and came out totally as a result of
some natural motives. People who never succeeded to accept the reality of death
developed a belief in which soul goes, following its abdication of the body, to
mountains, jungles or islands summoning it and feels some desires similar to the
ones it desired when the body was alive.232 This belief constitutes the primitive form
of belief in life after death and takes a more sophisticated shape in a step latter. In the
next stage people start to imagine that the souls are coming together in an unseen
location and that the life, they maintain there, is an imitation of the real life. The
belief of life after death gained an important quality since this second stage and it is
decorated by beauties taken from earthly life. It is such a perfect place that includes

231
There are also some remarkable arguments in Young Turks’ periodicals stating that the belief in
life after death is baseless. For such interpretations, see Charles Letourneau, “Umumiyet İtibariyle
Din,” pp. 26-30; Charles Letourneau,“Umumiyet İtibariyle Dinler -2- İlâhlar,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası
1, no. 6 (1 November 1327/14 November 1911), pp. 28-31; Charles Létourneau, “Milletlerin
Ruhiyetleri: Birinci Kitap-Hayvanlarda Ruh Tekâmülü-Vicdan,” pp. 180-183; M. Nermi, “Felsefe:
Ölüm ve Hayat – Muhtelif Irklarda Ölüm ve Ölümden Sonra Hayat Fikrinin Tenemmüv ve Tekâmülü
Hakkında İçtimai Tetkikler/Mukaddime,” Genç Kalemler 3, no. 21 (16 May 1328/29 May 1912), pp.
220-224; M. Nermi, “Felsefe: Ölüm ve Hayat – Ölümden Sonra Hayat Fikrinin Tekâmülü Hakkında
İçtimai Tetkikler,” Genç Kalemler 3, no. 23 (19 June 1328/2 July 1912), pp. 270-279; M. Nermi,
“Ölüm ve Hayat: Mısır Ve Berberlerin Dinleri -3- Eski Mısır,” pp. 72-80; M. Nermi, “Ölüm ve Hayat:
Mısır ve Berberlerin Dinleri -3- Eski Mısır,” Genç Kalemler 4, no. 27 (2 October 1328/15 October
1912), pp. 95-100.
232
Charles Letourneau, “Umumiyet İtibariyle Din,” p. 27.

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all the things people search for but fail to find in this miserable world.233 It is even
possible to move one step further and characterize the belief in life after death as an
animated expression of the impossible ideas that could not be acquired in this
world.234

The most perfect form of the belief of life after death manifests itself as an ethical
sovereignty. Adhering himself to the future with a great hope human being obliged,
in the face of injustices taking place on earth, to conceive an “after life” in which he
believes that an absolute justice exists. This life, where everybody will be
interrogated in accordance with his own deeds, increases the attachment of human
being to living as well as it strengthens the belief of life after death through the
ethical dimension it has.235

According to this new approach, which finds its reflection in Young Turks’
periodicals, the ideas that human beings adopted with regard to soul and life after
death are generated from their own lives. For example, the primitive mentality
distinguishes souls into two groups by characterizing them as good and bad souls.
While good souls are thought to be existents dwelling in more decent locations, the
bad souls are regarded to be living in dirty places.236 It is apparent that people
attribute qualities they do not like in their daily lives to bad souls, and qualities they
like to good souls. A similar situation can be said to be valid for the concepts of
heaven and hell also that come to the agenda within the context of belief in life after
death. This is why the heaven thought by people living in hot climates, for example,
is cool and the heaven thought by people living in cold climates is hot.237 Viewed
from this perspective, one can say that an exact opposite situation is prevailing in the

233
Ibid, p. 28.
234
M. Nermi, “Felsefe: Ölüm ve Hayat-Ölümden Sonra Hayat Fikrinin Tekâmülü Hakkında İçtimai
Tetkikler,” p. 274.
235
Charles Létourneau, ibid, p. 29.
236
M. Nermi, ibid, p. 273.
237
Ibid, p. 274.

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hell. In other words, a hell thought by people living in a hot location is hot, and the
hell thought by people living in a cold location is cold.

4.2.2 The Real Sense of Immortality in Young Turks’ Approach

The disinterested attitude maintained by Young Turks towards metaphysics and their
critics against the assumptions to this effect caused them to question the idea of
immortality in respect of its metaphysical dimension. As it is pointed out above, the
ideas that have been put forward within the language of Western thinkers constitute
expressions of Young Turks’ reactions against the tradition qualified by them as the
totality of obsolete opinions and beliefs. Therefore, involvement of articles –the great
majority of which are translations- regarding the life after death in Young Turks’
publications is highly meaningful.

One can also observe in periodicals that there are some indications with regard to
adoption of biological immortality by Young Turks, though the metaphysical sense
of it is rejected by them. And this adoption arises from their approach prioritizing not
individual but society. Young Turks, like Ziya Gökalp, who has been deeply affected
by the meaning attributed to society particularly by Emile Durkheim, dignify the
existence of individual to the extent that he contributes to the existence of society.
An individual consciousness is a null concept, in their opinion, unless it contributes
to the construction of social consciousness. As it is pointed above, the new
philosophical framework adopted by Young Turks characterizes the soul as a totality
of the cognitive functions taking place in brain. It can be said that the social
consciousness, as described by them, reminds the social soul, while the individual
consciousness reminds the individual soul. And yet the society becomes a totality of
individual consciousnesses. When it is interpreted in terms of the immortality of
soul, this circumstance will mean that individual souls exist in social consciousness
as a platform wherein they preserve their existences.

As a matter of fact, the issue is related with the nature of “subject”. Traditionally
speaking, talking about resurrection means that the individual subject starts to a new
life. The life after death is a life individual will maintain with his personality he had

124
in this world. The ethical basis, on which the belief of life after death grounds,
necessitates the existence of a subject who can say “I”. For, he has realized his deeds
in the world as a subject having this consciousness. And God’s interrogation of the
subject on these actions requires that the subject himself is responsible for such
actions and, therefore, that he has a separate personality which can be charged.
Metaphysical immortality will have no sense unless there is a subject to be
interrogated. This circumstance is valid for monotheistic religions, at least.

Is there a self-subsisting subject in Young Turks’ understanding? Is it possible to talk

about an individual soul as a “substance” in terms of its classical definition? These
questions are in need of answers to comprehend the kind of ideas Young Turks have
with regard to immortality.

One can say that the intellectually productive Young Turk figures have a negative
opinion about the existence of individual subjects. This is a valid observation for the
periodicals as far as we examined. There is not an individual soul. We need to talk
rather about society which is the total soul. The most remarkable interpretation to
this effect is to be found in one of Ziya Gökalp’s articles published in Yeni Mecmua.

According to Ziya Gökalp, two types of subjects can be discerned. One of them is
individual subject. He calls it “individual consciousness.” And the second type is
social subject which he calls “social consciousness”.238 Social consciousness has the
ability of determining the perspective of individual consciousness. When the
individual consciousness looks into the universe he may think that it is personally
observing. However, his view has been determined by society. It is individual
consciousness which looks, but it is society’s eye that sees. In other words, since the
observations of the individual about universe take part as an element in social
consciousness it is the latter which constitutes the real subject.239

Ziya Gökalp grounds the difference between individual and social consciousnesses
on the distinction he makes between the terms of “individuality” (ferdiyet) and

238
Ziya Gökalp, “Eski Türkçülük, Yeni Türkçülük,” p. 303.
239
Ibid, p. 304.
125
“personality” (şahsiyet). We are ostensibly trying to maintain our own individuality
when we eat, drink and feel the desire of reproduction etc. However, what we are
actually doing is serving unconsciously to the continuance of our species. In a similar
way, we are ostensibly being subject to our individual tendencies when we are
pursuing religious, ethical, political or aesthetical values etc. But what we are
actually doing is serving unconsciously to the unity and progress of our society.
Individuality and personality, in Ziya Gökalp’s opinion, are two different
organizations of the same soul existed within two different systems. The center of the
system of individuality is the intellect of species taking part in individuals. And the
center of personality is the “conscience” (vicdan).240

We are of the opinion that the difference made between individuality and personality
can be seen as a difference between the soul and body. In other words, individuality
refers to body while the personality refers to the soul. Individual consciousnesses can
maintain their specific existences if and to the extent that they are detached from
social mass which exists only within the form of a common quality. This detachment
does not have a sense of opposition to society. It rather refers to a separate material
existence which enables us to talk about the individual. All consciousnesses are
obliged to interlace within the deepness of society and to collaborate by means of it.
But, if their individualities are to have a meaning, another factor will be needed. This
factor will intervene into and partition off the said common quality. In other words,
there is a need for an “individuating” factor. The factor that performs this role is the
body.241

The assumption that the quality of being subject in its real sense belongs to
personality rather than the individuality can be interpreted in such a way that Ziya
Gökalp has an understanding of a transcendental subject. And it seems that there is
an inspiration from Kantian idealism at this point. For, Kantian idealism sees the
reality as a product of a sphere which includes both the subject and object rather than
as a product of any ability of a single subject. And this sphere also is a subject.

240
Ziya Gökalp, “Ferdiyet ve Şahsiyet,” Yeni Mecmua 1, no. 1 (12 July 1917), p. 3.
241
Ziya Gökalp, “Şahsî Ahlâk,” Yeni Mecmua 1, no. 8 (30 August 1917), p. 144.

126
However, it is no more a subject, but a transcendental subject. And the
transcendental subject is neither mine nor yours nor his; it is a common sphere of
existence for all of our subjects.242 The equivalent of this sphere in Ziya Gökalp’s
theory is social consciousness. If, he seems to think, we are going to talk about
consciousness we can do so by concentrating not on an individual consciousness. We
need to take into consideration the consciousness of the individuals constituting the
society in general which is also the total consciousness.243

This approach can be referred to in a struggle to answer the questions like “how to
define soul and body?” or “what kind of qualities soul has?”, and it causes us to think
that soul represents the total while the body represents individual. It obviously is
away from traditional conceptions of soul and body. For, in traditional
understanding, both of the soul and body have different existences and belong to
individual. Reducing the soul to body or melting the individual soul in social one as
an upper category is an unfamiliar approach for the traditional thinking. There is not
a difference for traditional understanding between approaches that regards the soul as
the totality of cognitive functions happening in brain and that attributes it to society
as an element. Because the later also defines the soul with reference to a social
personality but not to an individual one. Thus, according to Ziya Gökalp, elements
which constitute the notion of soul are totality of ideas and emotions originating from
society. To put it in his own words, the soul is “emotions and ideas that manifests the
society in us.”244

Change that the understanding of individual soul is undergone does not take place
only in Ziya Gökalp’s thought. This shift of meaning is a reflection of the organic
society and expressed as such by many Young Turk writers on several occasions.245

242
Takiyettin Mengüşoğlu, Felsefeye Giriş (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1997), p. 50.
243
Ziya Gökalp, ibid, p. 144.
244
Ziya Gökalp, ibid, p. 145.
245
For interpretations about the place individual consciousness has in the face of social consciousness,
see: Tekin Alp, “İçtimai Siyaset-3,” Yeni Mecmua 2, no. 30 (31 January 1918), p. 61; Tekin Alp,
“Tesanütçülük: Yeni İstikamet,” Yeni Mecmua 2, no. 37 (28 March 1918), pp. 205-207; Tekin Alp,
“Tesanütçülük,” Yeni Mecmua 2, no. 43 (9 May 1918), pp. 335-337; Suphi Ethem, “Yenilik,” Yeni
Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 4 (30 September 1327/13 October 1911), p. 9; Ziya Gökalp, “İçtimai
127
As a matter of fact, it is possible to find the roots of this semantic change on the
Young Turk notion of “union”. The new Ottoman reality Young Turks tried to
construct is a society clamped together around certain ideals. The sole meaning
individual existence has is measured according to the contribution it makes for the
social consciousness which is the total existence. Individual turns out to be a
pathologic event so long as he does not give the priority to society and pursues his
self-interests.246 What is accepted by society as normal is the individuality only
which behaves in a way not to injure social conscience. Given that this is the general
framework of Young Turks’ understanding of unity, interpretations in the direction
of melting individual soul in the social soul and of regarding soul as the totality of
ideas and emotions that emanate from society become quite natural results.

If the soul is a totality of the ideas and emotions that appear within the flow of social
life then it will be possible to accept the idea that the soul is immortal. For, there will
not be an existence death of which can be dragged in this case. Considered from this
perspective, an idea of immortality can be said to take a part in Young Turks’
thinking. However, it is not the immortality of individual but of society. Moreover, it
is not a metaphysical immortality. It can be reconciled with the biological and
sociological immortality, pointed out earlier, to a certain degree. If we are to make an
evaluation about the interrogation to which the individual is assumed to be a subject,
all we can say is that it will not take place within the terms of a life after death as it is
argued throughout the belief of metaphysical immortality. To put it clearly, this
interrogation can only be made within this material world by taking into
consideration the contributions individual made for the continuance of the species.

Mezhepler ve İçtimaiyat,” Yeni Mecmua 1, no. 26 (3 January 1917), pp. 501-503; Hüseyin Cahit,
“Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -6- On Dokuzuncu Asrın Temayülat-ı Ruhiyesi: Dekadanizm-Sembolizm,”
p. 198; Abdullah Cevdet, “Hürriyet-i İrtica Yok,” İçtihat 3, no. 47 (15 May 1328/28 May 1912), pp.
1098-1100; Rıza Tevfik, “Hürriyet: İngiliz Hakîm-i Meşhuru John Stuart Mill Hürriyeti Nasıl
Anlıyor?,” U.İ.İ.M. 2, no. 5 (1 May 1325/14 May 1909), p. 20; Ziya Gökalp, “Dinin İçtimai
Hizmetleri,” İslam Mecmuası 3, no. 36 (14 Dhū al-Qaʿda 1333/10 September 1331/23 September
1915), pp. 772-776; Daru’l-Hikmeti’l-İslamiye, “Daru’l-Hikmeti’l-İslamiye Beyannâmesi,” İslam
Mecmuası 5, no. 63 (24 Muḥarram 1337/30 October 1335/30 October 1918), p. 1176; M. Nermi,
“Ertuğrul’a Mektuplarım -2- Aile-Vatan-İnsaniyet,” p. 64; M. Nermi, “Alfred Fouillée ve Kuvvet-
Fikirci Ahlak,” p. 20.
246
Tahrir Heyeti, “Yeni Hayat,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 9 (16 December 1327/29 December
1911), p. 7; Tahrir Heyeti, “Yeni Hayat,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 12 (1 February 1327/14
February 1912), p. 1.

128
Individual perceives the immortality not as a case he can experience himself but as a
case which can be experienced by survivors as long as they maintain their existence.
This perception will determine, of course, his attitude towards death to the extent that
even the fear of death, which generally terrifies human being, loses its effect when
the immortality of society is conceived of. It is because the individual self, melted
within the society, thinks about the ideals of the total and does not hesitate to ignore
his own death to keep those ideals alive. The shadow of death cannot stand against a
society which is unified spiritually and “since there is not an individual, there is not
death either in it.”247 Death means that everything is over for individual. But the
species of individual maintains its existence by reproducing just like fruitlets.248 And
this is the greatest proof of biological immortality.

4.3 Predestination

The discussions around the term of predestination (qadar) seem to constitute another
topic of philosophy of religion handled by Young Turks in their periodicals.

The term of predestination has a religious content since it points to the belief that
everything has been determined previously by God. And this definition reminds the
idea that God intervenes in every events happening within universe including human
life. It may be seen easy to imagine or even adopt the change actively caused by
God’s power when it comes to the creation of the universe. However, inserting
human life into the area of God’s intervention brings with it some difficulties.

When we look into the history of Islamic thought we see that the discussions around
the term of predestination are concentrating primarily on three points: 1- Plan of the
creation of the universe, 2- Events we experience involuntarily, and 3- Predestination
of volitional actions of human being.249

247
Şemseddin Günaltay, “Ölmek Yok Olmak Mıdır?,” İslam Mecmuası 2, no. 18 (13 Ṣafar 1333/18
December 1330/31 December 1914), p. 492; Ali Haydar, “Ahlak Hakkında,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası
1, no. 6 (1 November 1327/14 November 1911), p. 10.
248
M. Nermi, “Felsefe: Ölüm ve Hayat: Muhtelif Irklarda Ölüm ve Ölümden Sonra Hayat Fikrinin
Tenemmüv ve Tekâmülü Hakkında İçtimai Tetkikler-Mukaddime.” p. 274.
249
Muhit Mert, Kelam Tarihinin Problemleri (Ankara: Ankara Okulu Yayınları, 2008), p. 25.
129
One can say that there is a general consensus, among theists at least, about the plan
of the creation of the universe. Accordingly, God has created the universe out of
nothing and established certain rules and laws in it. The existence of the creatures as
a whole persists pursuant to these rules and laws. Human being also is subjected to
these natural laws as a part of the universe just like the enormous galaxies, planets or
stars. It is possible to characterize God’s discretion in this sense as the physical rules.
Quran names the rules of this kind as “sunnatullah” [established way of God].250 As
we constitute a part of the universe and since we are subject to strict physical laws
the events we experience involuntarily can also be justified in this way.

The issue discussed broadly most by Islamic thinkers about the problem of
predestination seems to be the question of whether the volitional actions of human
beings are predetermined by God or not. Parties adopted three different approaches
in this respect. Since these approaches have a relation with our current topic we want
to touch upon the most basic arguments of these parties briefly.

One of the parties argues that human beings are totally free in their volitional actions.
God does not intervene in the realization of these actions under no circumstances.
Traditionally speaking, human being wills and creates his own actions by himself.
God neither intervenes in nor predetermines the actions. He has information about
human deeds just after they are realized. This approach constitutes the position
adopted by the sect named as “Qadariyya” in the history of Islamic thought. On the
other hand, there are some movements that say the exact opposite of this. According
to this second approach, human actions are not within the limits of human will. In
other words, deeds realized by a human being can never be seen as the reflections of
his own free will. Human being is like a leaf in front of the wind. He is blown about
by his destiny jus as a leaf is blown about by the wind. Human beings’ actions are
nothing but an actualization of the issues predetermined by God. This is the position
of the Islamic sect named as “Jabriyya”.

250
The concept of “sunnatullah” appears in Qur’an in different verses. See, for example, 17:77, 33:62,
40:85, 48:23.

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Several criticisms can be directed against the position both Qadariyya and Jabriyya
has with regard to the issue of predestination. For example, can a God having
information about human deeds just after they are realized be regarded as God who is
conceived of in traditional understanding of Islam? Can the exclusion of God from
the flow of events be reconciled with the belief that he is an omnipotent existent?
God, as characterized in Quran, is a being who has information about all events
taking place in the universe to the extent that even a leaf cannot fall on the ground
without his knowledge.251 On the other hand, an assumption that human actions are
predetermined by God in their entirety will naturally make both human freedom and
responsibility matters of discussion. Human beings must not be held responsible for
their own deeds if they have no freedom in actualizing them. This is what justice
requires. However, Islamic belief says that human beings are responsible for all of
their actions. Moreover, it is argued by Islam that as a result of this responsibility
they are going to be interrogated, rewarded or punished by God. Of course,
punishing a person who is neither free nor responsible cannot be reconciled with
God’s justice.

Such reservations caused the appearance of a third position with regard to the issue
of predestination. This position is a production of an understanding called Ahl al-
Sunnah. Traditionally, Ahl al-Sunnah tries to find a middle course in the issue of
predestination like it does in almost all of other disputed matters. According to it,
human beings’ actions can be regarded as pure results of neither human volition nor
a divine discretion. Human being wants to realize an action and God gives
permission for it. To put it within an Islamic terminology, human being demands
and God creates. Thus, volitional actions occur as a co-production of humane and
divine wills.

One can also observe that the discussions about the issue of predestination, to which
we briefly touched upon above, have been moved away from religious area and
handled on a political ground. For example, the argument of predestination has been
251
Qur’an, 6:59. The exact text of the verse reads that: “[A]nd with Him are the keys of the unseen;
none knows them except Him. And He knows what is on the land and in the sea. Not a leaf falls but
that He knows it. And no grain is there within the darkness of the earth and no moist or dry thing but
that it is in a clear record.”

131
applied, in the Umayyad period, both to legitimize the political sovereignty and get
the political mistakes acceptable.252 This circumstance constitutes one of the proofs
showing the shift of discussions to a political ground.

Predestination, as handled in Young Turks’ periodicals, is a subject of political

criticism to a large extent. As a matter of fact, the philosophical change in the
understanding of predestination can be said to have an effect in turning the issue into
a political criticism. Accordingly, Ottoman society started to expect everything from
Sultan instead of expecting everything from God or leaving everything to his will. In
other words, the Sultan has been deified.253 However, it is also possible to come
across with some articles in which the issue is analyzed in creedal terms. In an
anonymous article published in the newspaper of Şura-yı Ümmet, for example, it is
argued that although the Ottoman society seems as if it is affiliated with the sect of
Ahl al-Sunnah it in fact follows the position of Jabriyya. According to the writer,
Ottoman society believes –as it is adopted by the members of the sect of Jabriyya-
that the power of predestination leaves no place for a personal will, choice or
autonomy on humane behaviors. This means that there can be no free will of human
beings.254 And it is inevitable for such an understanding of predestination to bring
within itself a social and intellectual collapse. Thusly, in his examination about the
political and cultural crisis Islamic world, and Ottoman society in particular,
experiences Abullah Cevdet also refers to the false understanding of predestination
as one of the causes creating the current crisis.255

252
Muhit Mert, ibid, p. 27.
253
Critics to this effect are generally found in the newspaper of Meşveret. That the issue of
predetermination has been made a matter of discussion in Meşveret, which is also the first Young
Turk periodical, can be seen as a sign showing the extent of importance Young Turks attributed to it.
For the compliants appear in Meşveret with regard to the belief of predetermination see, for example:
Ahmet Rıza, “Mukaddime,” Meşveret, 1, no. 1 (1 December 1107/13 Jumādā al-Ākhira 1313/1
December 1895), p. 1; Ahmet Rıza, “İhtilal,” Meşveret 3, no. 29 (21 Sha‘bān 1315/14 January
1898/15 January 1898), p. 3; Nazım, “İstibdad Hizmete Mani Olur Mu?,” p. 1.
254
Anonymous, “Makale-i Mahsusa: Kader,” Şura-yı Ümmet 1, no. 3 (9 May 1902), p. 2.
255
Abdullah Cevdet, “Cihan-ı İslam’a Dair,” İçtihat 3, no. 26 (1 July 1327/14 July 1911), p. 763.
According to Abdullah Cevdet, other reasons that have a share in the collapse of Islamic world are the
oppression applied by Muslim rulers, blindness of religious scholars, and the illegitimate approach
adopted with regard to the covering of women.
132
In Abdullah Cevdet’s opinion, it is possible to talk about predestination. However,
the real meaning of predestination does not include the belief that events happening
actually are predetermined. If we are to talk about something predestined we need to
search for it not in the action or event but in the quality which cannot be separated
from things which constitute the locality of that act or event. It is because of this
quality, for example, that each matter having the quality of being burnable is being
burned wherever and whenever the conditions of burning exist collectively. This is
predestined for those matters. The quality of burning of fire can be explained in
terms of predestination. And the same applies both for poison and death as well. For,
the quality of poisoning is predestined for poisonous matters just as death is a
predestination of a person who touches upon poison.256

It is apparent that Abdullah Cevdet evaluates predestination as a term which is

directly related with physical realm. Hence, he characterizes it as the totality of “laws
of nature” or “unchangeable laws”. The concepts corresponding to these usages in
Quran and in the discipline of Kalam are “sunnatullah” and “‘âdatullah” respectively.
According to him, the verse stating that “you will not find in the established way of
Allah any change”257 is a clear expression of a terrifying philosophy of nature as well
as an explanation about the eternal law of permanence of things and events.258
Although the term of predestination, in Abdullah Cevdet’s opinion, partly refers to a
creedal issue, it nevertheless has a political character also because of its acquisition
of a quality concerning life. To reduce the effect of distortion created by the
traditional sense of the term of predestination on Ottoman society’s mind to a
minimum degree one needs to change its perspective of life. Achievement in this
endeavor requires a comprehension about Islam in its real sense. The traditional
understanding of predestination is contrary to Islam. And it paralyzes the earthly life
just as it causes deterioration in Muslim’s creedal lives. To put it in Abdullah
Cevdet’s own words:

256
Abdullah Cevdet, ibid, p. 765. For a similar approach related to the negative results caused by the
belief in predestination, see Mustafa Asım, “Memleketin Halâsı Neye Mütevakkıftır?,” İçtihat 4, no.
74 (1 August 1329/14 August 1913), p. 1641.
257
Qur’an, 33:62.
258
Abdullah Cevdet, ibid.

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 Not the burning of “Çırağan” palace is what predestined, but the burning of
the houses and perishment of incautious, unguarded and imprudent nations is.
Growth of a seed planted in a droughty and sunless place is not predestined.
What constitutes the predestination is the productivity of a seed planted in a
field which carries the whole necessary agricultural conditions. We, unwary
Muslims, find a quick consolation when we lose a country: we either
characterize it as “a twist of fate!” or say that “it was not meant to be!” This
consolation is sluggish just as it leads to infidelity.259

There are some other arguments stating that the predestination, reduced by Abdullah
Cevdet physical conditions, is not effectual in physical realm as well. The most
remarkable example of the arguments to this effect can be found in Ethem Necdet’s
article titled “Fatalizm: Tenkid-i Felsefî.”

According to Ethem Necdet, the belief of predestination is a reflection of the

primitive thought. For, primitive human beings were deriving their opinions about
the nature from their own lives. What constitute manifestation of the thought and
emotions of human being are the activities he carries out himself. Humane activities
are generally pre-determined by human being himself within a set of plans and
programs. Starting from this fact, primitive people made a habit of explaining natural
events also in the same way. Consequently, they thought that the natural events are
taking place in accordance with a certain program predestined by a greater power or
“total reason”.260 However, the belief of predestination is actually nothing but a
sophistry.261

It is not difficult to forecast that Ethem Necdet, who does not accept the existence of
a predestination prevailing even within the physical realm, rejects the idea that the
volitional acts of human beings are predestined by a divine will. As a matter of fact,
taking into consideration of the negative attitude Young Turks adopted against the
concept of metaphysics in periodicals, one needs to characterize his approach as
legitimate. For, periodicals are full of articles reflecting positivistic understanding of

259
Abdullah Cevdet, ibid, pp. 765-766.
260
Ethem Necdet, “Fatalizm: Tenkîd-i Felsefî,” p. 1720.
261
Ibid, p. 1722.

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science and philosophy. Contrary to metaphysics which is called as “negative
science” by Rıza Tefvik,262 for example, positivistic science tries to find out the real
causes of events. Accordingly, explanation of events must only be searched for
within other events. Metaphysical or theological approaches use the concept of
divine will as a tool in explaining events. Therefore, they are non-scientific. The
belief in the discretionary power of divine will blunts human beings’ ability of
thinking scientifically. Explaining all of the events within the terms of a divine will
causes overlooking even the simplest natural laws that exist in their flow.263

It would be useful to note an important point relating to the negative attitude of

Young Turks on the issue of predestination. As it is mentioned in the previous
chapter, positivism contains within itself a deterministic understanding as well. And
the term of determinism refers to an idea of pre-discretion. All of the events taking
place within the universe are occurring under the effect of natural laws. These laws
are unchangeable in quality, which means that the occurrence of events is
predestined by established laws of nature. It can be seen as a reasonable explanation
as such. Thusly one may argue that reasoning about the relationship of causes and
effects would ensure appearance of the possibility of changing results. Information
about the causes can be said to carry such a possibility within itself. Therefore,
determinism may not be taken as referring to inalterability. Now, it seems true that
information about the cause may get it a subject to change and ensure us to have an
effect on it. However, when we look into the universe as a whole, it is still disputable
that laws of nature can be identified in full; that all causes can be specified by
depending on this identification and that human being can have an accumulation of
knowledge or power to change results. Therefore, acceptance of determinism as a
principle seems to be the expression of an idea that one faces with an inalterable
reality. When the criticisms Young Turks direct against the belief of predestination
taken into consideration, the fact that they honor the idea of determinism is highly
remarkable situation. Moreover, there are also some writers in Young Turk
periodicals who argue that determinism prevails not just within the physical realm
262
Rıza Tevfik, “Muhasebe-i İçtihat: Canlı mı Cansız mı?,” p. 2.
263
Suphi Ethem, “İslamların Ulûm-u Tabî’iyyeye Hizmetleri,” Genç Kalemler 4, no. 26 (24 August
1328/6 September 1912), pp. 70,71.

135
but even amidst the volitional acts of human being as well. Volitional behaviors of
human beings are not different from natural events. Just like natural events, they are
also depending on certain causes. And yet they constitute the cause of different
behaviors. Volitional acts, which are functioning both as causes and effects, take up a
small place among the long sequence or the complex network that is formed by
general events occurring in the universe. Even the behaviors and movements that
seemed to us as the most volitional ones are a result of infinite –big or small, distant
or close- causes. Considered from this angle, volitional acts are as predetermined as
the movement of a planet or fall of an object.264

This interesting approach can only be explained within the terms of an unconditional
belief in science and a critical attitude towards religion. The ability of science in
explaining natural events brings human being in an extremely strategic power.
Human being gets a power over against nature by knowing. Sciences show us the
existence and requisition of things. And they also prepare and present us the tools of
domination over them.265 But the metaphysical and theological explanations are far
from such a quality. Having knowledge about the existence of a divine will is
condemned to remain as an abstract envisagement. As a result of its definition, it is
impossible for human being to have a transformative effect on divine will. For this
reason, one needs to adopt the term of determinism as a scientific notion and reject
the religious concept of predestination or re-examine it under the light of scientific
data. Young Turks’ view of predestination essentially grounds on this idea.

4.4 Relationship between Religion and Science

One of the questions that need to be answered, regarding to Young Turks’ thought of
philosophy of religion, is related with the kind of relationship they assume to exist
between religion and science. Actually this question can also be formulated as the
relationship between revelation and reason or more generally belief and philosophy.

264
Satı, “Mebâhis-i Ruhiye-4: İhtiyar,” U.İ.İ.M. 3, no. 10 (1 October 1325/14 October 1909), p. 154.
265
Bedii Nuri, “Hikmet-i İctimâiye -1: Tarih-i Hudûs ve Neş’eti,” p. 89.

136
We need to say as a beginning that there are several approaches different from each
other, in Young Turks’ periodicals, subjecting the relation of science and religion.
These approaches can be examined within three distinct groups. The first approach
gives priority to science and excludes religion. The second approach argues that
religion and science are factors supporting each other. And the third one
characterizes the struggle of creating conciliation between religion and science as
meaningless by grounding this argument on the idea that they belong to two
indifferent areas. On the other hand, one does not observe in periodicals an attitude
giving priority to religion and excluding science. This situation is interesting enough,
because an attitude most possibly accepted by tradition is what the missing approach
argues. According to a traditional theistic attitude of philosophy of religion, the
factors imposed by religion must constitute the starting and ending point of all
intellectual activities. That an approach to this effect could not be observed even in
İslam Mecmuası, which can be characterized as the most conservative among Young
Turks’ periodicals, is a sign showing the extent of their detachment from traditional
thinking.

As a matter of fact, the first of these approaches is quite understandable. Since, as far
as it is examined within the second chapter, the positivist, evolutionist and materialist
understandings of science are irreconcilable with the traditional understanding of
Islam adopted by Ottoman society. To be able to talk about conciliation one needs to
revise the understanding either of science or of religion. And the solution such a
revision can supply is an issue worthy of disputation separately.

According to those who adopt this approach, the cause of the exclusion of the
religious belief by scientific thought must be searched for in the methodology
followed. Science and philosophy, so far as they are developed in the West, have
undergone a big transformation throughout centuries. Proving indisputable, that is to
say divine commands or messages, by a disputable tool, which is reason, constitute
the essence of scholastic thought. Reducing the whole data, acquired in this manner,
to a divine will is the principal quality of the way of knowing which can be said to be

137
driven from religious belief.266 And the scientific methodology we need to apply in
all possible domains of knowledge rather requires us to present a material, positive
and examinable reference point or a foundation for our comparisons, inferences and
reasoning.267 According to the proponents of religious belief, the truth can only be
found to the accompaniment of commands and guidance of prophets. However,
scientific understanding refutes, in its endeavor of examination of truth, all external
factors that have an effect on the thought of human being. Together with the
methodological change, which results in the refusal of any reference point or
foundation except reason and experience, things that transcend the limits of
experience and reason or that are contrary to them are totally rejected –including
every mystical or metaphysical thoughts. Thus, the methodological transformation
showed its biggest effect in the form of detracting the scientific understanding and
philosophy from divine messages. And it makes religious belief unable to cling
against scientific thought.268

The confrontation between religious belief and scientific thought does not depend, of
course, solely on a pure methodological basis. As far as we observe in Young Turks’
periodicals, this confrontation has been handled as an essential issue. In other words,
the characteristics make religion and science exist –which are also immanent to
them- create some important differences.

First of all religion depends on emotion rather than reason. Human beings drift apart
from scientific thought, and consequently acquire a religious point of view, so far as
they do not prefer to explain things by reason itself. In this respect, religion takes the
form of “a dream of childhood”269 in terms of philosophy and scientific thought. On
the other hand, the source of all religions is not an omniscient divine existent, but the

266
Ragıp Hulusi, “Din Felsefesi: Dinin İlmî Marifete Karşı Hususiyeti,” p. 212.
267
Charles Létourneau, “Milletlerin Ruhiyetleri: Birinci Kitap/Hayvanlarda Ruh Tekâmülü/Vicdan”,
p. 182.
268
Bedii Nuri, “Tehavvülat-ı Fikriye”, pp. 1154, 1156; Rıza Tevfik, “Muhasebe-i İçtihat: Adi Fakat
Pek Büyük Endişeler”, p. 2223.
269
Charles Létourneau, “Umumiyet İtibariyle Dinler -2- İlahlar”, pp. 28, 30.

138
ignorance and fear of human beings they experience in the face of nature.270 One of
the principal duties of science is to remove the corona that is spinned around religion
by superstitions.271 A person, who examines the nature by a scientific eye, learns that
he comes from nature; that he maintains its existence in accordance with natural laws
and that he will return to nature as required by those laws. According to Abdullah
Cevdet, for example, it is difficult to understand that a big group of people are still
adhering to religious belief contrarily to the data acquired by science.272

The most obvious expressions of the essential difference between science and
religion, which are the synonyms of reason and revelation respectively in traditional
language, can be found in Abdullah Cevdet’s writings. For example, a statement –he
quotes from Ernst Haeckel- saying that “science ends wherever faith begins”273 is an
apparent sign of the difference he assumes to exist between religion and science. It
can reasonably be argued that his purpose in recounting this statement is to evaluate
religion as a pure belief and science as an impenitent questioning. Thusly, according
to Abdullah Cevdet, what science and philosophy need before anything else is a
mentality “which does not believe easily”. This is why the thoughts passing through
the mind of a philosopher, while he examines the complex issues, must present an
investigative quality like “I do not know, I’m in suspicion and I hope”. This is also
an ethical duty for a philosopher.274 Despite the fact that religion expects an absolute
obedience from its adherents, science rather expects human being to have an opposite
attitude. There is only one purpose for science, which is to acquire knowledge
concerning the reality. For a scientific investigation, no asylum can be more holy
than the asylum of truth. People must review everything down to the last detail.
Science is obliged to overcome all obstacles, including religion, which possibly
prevents its investigations. Otherwise, it may not be possible to talk about science.275

270
Abdullah Cevdet, Fünun ve Felsefe ve Felsefe Sânihaları, p. 100.
271
Charles Létourneau, “Umumiyet İtibariyle Din”, p. 27.
272
Cf. ibid, p. 122.
273
Abdullah Cevdet, ibid, p. 61.
274
Ibid, p. 64.
275
Ibid, p. 65.
139
A similar difference that exists between religion and science will of course be
observed between philosophy and science as well. For, in Abdullah Cevdet’s
opinion, philosophy must depend on the scientific data itself. In this respect, the
ways of examination and explanation of the facts followed by philosophical thought -
that takes a scientific form in Abdullah Cevdet’s thinking- and religion are
completely different. He puts this idea forward within the language of Emile
Boutmy, stating that “philosophy is a heatless light, while religion is a lightless
heat.”276

On the other hand, since science and philosophy are the products of human reason
they differ from religion within the terms of source they have. Religion explains facts
by appealing to a supernatural source while reason searches for the source of the
truth in things themselves. Abdullah Cevdet grounds this kind of difference between
religion and reason by referring to Abu’l-‘Alâ al-Ma’arrî’s words: “Human beings
are bifurcated into two groups. Some of them have reason but not religion, while
some others have religion but not reason.”277 Similarly, the statement he quotes from
Goethe says that “those who have science and arts have religion also; let those who
do not have these two felicities have religion.”278 And this statement also refers to the
essential difference Abdullah Cevdet assumes to exist between religion and science.

Another remarkable interpretation with regard to the relationship between religion

and science can be found in Ragıp Hulusi’s articles279 published in İslam Mecmuası.

276
Ibid.
277
Ibid, p. 63.
278
Ibid, p. 62.
279
Ragıp Hulusi made important publications within Young Turk periodicals. His translations, with
respect to positivistic understanding, in the journal of Tabiat are highly remarkable. Although we
could not acquire detailed information –except the articles published by him in Young Turks’
periodicals- about Ragıp Hulusi’s intellectual career, he can be said to have adopted a positivistic
approach. His series, comprising of 7 articles published in İslam Mecmuası, with regard to the
discussions about philosophy of religion are particularly of a great importance. These articles include:
Ragıp Hulusi, “Din Felsefesi: Dinin Manevi Hayatta Mevkii,” İslam Mecmuası 1, no. 4 (28 Rabīʿ al-
Ākhir1332/13 March 1330/26 March 1914), pp. 108-110; “Din Felsefesi: Dinin Manevi Hayatta
Mevkii-2,” İslam Mecmuası 1, no. 5 (13 Jumādā al-Ūlā 1332/27 March 1330/9 April 1914), pp. 150-
154; “Din Felsefesi: Dinin İlmî Marifete Karşı Hususiyeti,” İslam Mecmuası 1, no. 6 (27 Jumādā al-
Ūlā 1323/10 April 1330/23 April 1914), pp. 182-185; “Din Felsefesi: Dinin İlmî Marifete Karşı
Hususiyeti,” İslam Mecmuası 1, no. 7 (1 Jumādā al-Ākhira 1332/24 April 1330/7 May 1914), 211-
140
In one of these articles Ragıp Hulusi compares the earth to a clock by giving
reference to al-Ghazali’s work of al-Iqtisâd fi’l-i’tiqâd. According to him, religion
says that this world has been established by God. Therefore, every movement or stop
in it is a result of creator’s discretion and providence. Given that it has been setup
eternally by creator, it will work eternally either. Philosophy, on the other hand,
accepts God as the first mover and says that this clock has been set up by him. But,
considered from a philosophical point of view, results arise in the direction of
world’s own principles and rules. And the scientific thought, which starts from a
purely natural and experimental point of view, is of the opinion that world is came
into existence by itself and maintains its existence on its own. 280 Obviously, the
argument assumed by Ragıp Hulusi to be posed by scientific thought depends on a
postulate relating to the quality of knowledge. He attributes this postulate to the
mathematical character of science. According to him, “knowing means to know the
thing subjected to knowledge in a mathematical or experimental way.”281 In this
approach, which mathematized knowledge and pioneered by Copernic, Galileo,
Kepler and Newton, mystical aspect of existence, its unseen qualities, hidden sides
and powers -the metaphysical characters in short- of things are no more investigated.
What this new approach tries to do is to collect measurable things within the limits of
knowledge and define or demonstrate them in an exact and positive way. Science
needs to content itself with not the question of “why” but of “how” by explaining it
mathematically.282 Metaphysics, and consequentially religious belief, cannot produce
knowledge in its scientific sense. Since they are not dependent on a mathematical
basis thoughts about God also cannot be seen as scientific. Considered from this
perspective, the statements of “God does exist” or “God is the cause of universe” are

214; “Din Felsefesi: Dinin İlmî Marifete Karşı Hususiyeti,” İslam Mecmuası 1, no. 8 (25 Jumādā al-
Ākhira 1332/8 May 1330/21 May 1914), pp. 239-241; “Din Felsefesi: Dinin Manevi Hayatta Mevkii,”
İslam Mecmuası 1, no. 12 (22 Shaʿbān 1332/3 July 1330/16 July 1914), pp. 371-376; “Din Felsefesi:
Din ile İlim – Dinin İlmî Marifete Karşı Hususiyeti-7,” İslam Mecmuası 2, no. 13 (7 Ramaḍān
1332/17 July 1330/30 July 1914), pp. 404-407.
280
Ragıp Hulusi, “Din Felsefesi: Dinin İlmî Marifete Karşı Hususiyeti,” p. 212.
281
Ibid, p. 213.
282
Ibid.

141
nothing but ideas or judgments expressing an absolute faith.283 Religious belief
adopts this judgment as an unchangeable truth. However, science may put forward
arguments contradicting not just about the existence of God but about many issues
included in religious belief and may also support these arguments by factual data it
acquires. It is because of this, for example, that scientific data about the emergence
of the world may not be overlapping with the information about the history of
creation we received through revelation.284

As a matter of fact, leaving religious belief off the agenda by starting from scientific
thought can also be seen as the sign of a suspicion with regard to the truth of religion.
One can find important clues of such an approach within Young Turks’ periodicals.
According to Abdullah Cevdet, for example, theology is full of suppositions,
illusions and contradictions from beginning to end. Theological arguments result
from the ignorance about natural causes. There lies at the core of this ignorance
belief in a God who has attributes collection and reconciliation of which is
impossible. The only way out of this ignorance that makes humanity unhappy is to
give up superstitions.285 And this can only be realized through reason and science.

M. Nermi’s articles, published in the journal of Genç Kalemler, are highly

remarkable within the context of objections against the truth of religions, particularly
of monotheistic religions. Especially his characterization of monotheistic religions as
“superstitious religions which have no relationship with heaven”286 can be seen as a
protestation against the truth of those religions. He deduces some destructive results

283
Ragıp Hulusi, “Din Felsefesi: Dinin Manevi Hayatta Mevkii,” p. 372. For similar interpretations
with regard to the quake that mathematized scientific method creates on religious belief, see: Âsaf
Nef’î, “Mücadele-i Hayatiye ve Tekâmül-i Cem’iyyât,” pp. 455-480.
284
Rıza Tevfik, “Adi Fakat Pek Büyük Endişeler,” p. 2224; Âsaf Nef’î, “Demokrasi ve Sosyalizm,” p.
163.
285
Abdullah Cevdet, “Rahip Jean Meslier,” İçtihat 5, no. 127 (30 January 1330/12 February 1915), p.
471. For an atheistic approach neglecting the existence of God himself whom Abdullah Cevdet
conceived as an existent having irreconcilable attributes, see Charles Létourneau, “Umumiyet
İtibariyle Din,” p. 26. And for another interpretation which regards monotheistic religions as
“fictitious heavenly creeds”, see Rıza Nüzhet, “Hıristiyanlık: Mazisi ve Âtîsi,” p. 21.
286
M. Nermi, “Ölüm ve Hayat: Mısır ve Berberlerin Dinleri -3- Eski Mısır,” p. 96.

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concerning the truth of religion by depending on the following prayer argued by him
to be read in the funeral rites of ancient Egyptian religion:

Thanks and praises are to you O great God, the owner of the truth! … O great
Lord! Can I confess to you the truth? I am trembling, with a pure truth, before
you. Please cover my misdeeds and sins with your forgiveness. I did not
betray. I did not lie. I did not kill a man. I did not cut the remuneration of
workers back. I did not goof off. I did not defraud somebody. I did not leave
hungry. I did not make cry. I did not attempt to deceive anybody. I did not
take things that belong to the statues of God. I never appealed to the method
of interest. I did not keep in touch with bad women. I did not startle gazelles.
I did not turn the flow of rivers. I am innocent, innocent, innocent …287

M. Nermi argues, depending on these phrases, that all worships, rituals and prayers
established in monotheistic religions are essentially taken from ancient religions.288

Although one comes across with such harsh –even destructive- objections against the
truth of religion, the more common approach within Young Turks’ periodicals has
been reconciliation of religion and science instead of rejecting religion categorically.
This approach can also be understood as subjugation of religion to science and brings
within itself some strange circumstances. If we take into consideration the general
attitude of Young Turks, who felt an unconditional loyalty to scientific thought,
representation of these two domains as reconcilable is strange to a certain degree.
However, it is more preferable to say that this search of reconciliation does not arise
from a positive quality attributed to religion. In other words, it does not come to the
fore as a result of a recognition adopting that religion incorporates possibly true
arguments. For, as it is pointed out on several occasions, Young Turks’ modernism
presents a reconciliatory character. This is why Abdullah Cevdet, for example, seems
to be renouncing from his severe criticisms against religion289 and attempting to
reconcile religion and science by using a more moderate language. Interestingly
enough, he argues that “religion and science are twins”. Uncoupling them shall mean

287
Ibid.
288
Ibid.
289
There are in Abdullah Cevdet’s work of Fünun ve Felsefe passages full of sever criticisms, against
religion, quoted from different Western thinkers. For the most remarkable of these critics see Fünun
ve Felsefe, pp. 80, 81, 82, 99, 100 and 139.

143
to kill them both. “Science finds prosperity as long as it is religious; and religion
turns into a parterre conformably with the deepness and durability of its scientific
essence.”290

On the other hand, he is of the opinion that the correspondence between religion and
science is also supported by several verses and hatidths. Abdullah Cevdet argues that
scientific activities are commanded by God and his Messenger and refers to different
verses and hadiths in order to reinforce his argument. Starting from this point, for
example, he redefines science as “discovering the laws to which God’s attributes are
subject.”291 It is obvious that the relationship established between the term of God,
which is one of the central concepts of religion, and the vitality of science
necessitates the characterization of science and religion as factors not excluding but
including each other. Abdullah Cevdet uses the same religious references about the
synthesis he struggled to create between science and religion within the terms of
relationship he assumes to exist between religion and philosophy as well. For
example, he quotes a paragraph in Fünun ve Felsefe stating that “philosophy is a
commander and sciences are its soldiers. There is no chance of success for an army
without commander; a nation whose youth wasted philosophy is in a great loss”292
and argues that this is a hadith.293

The weirdest aspect of the relationship established between religion and science by
Abdullah Cevdet is the reproduction of materialistic arguments within religious
concepts. The attempt, for example, to legitimize the basic argument of materialism,
that the “matter is eternal”, with reference to a religious source constitutes the most
remarkable example of this situation. He translates Lavoisier’s famous argument that
“rien ne se perd, rien ne se crèe” as “nothing can be created and nothing can be

290
Abdullah Cevdet, ibid, p. 69.
291
Ibid, p. 20.
292
Ibid, p. 47. This statement, which is argued to be a haditht, can also be found in Abdullah Cevdet,
“Felsefe-Edebiyat,” İçtihat 4, no. 72. (Undated), p. 1577.
293
Abdullah Cevdet generally translates the statements within rather a free language. And it makes
difficult for the researchers to follow the exact quotations. Thus, we could not find a data showing that
the word which is quoted in the previous footnote is a hadith.

144
annihilated” and argues that this teaching is adopted by Islam as well. According to
him, Mawlana Jalal ad-Din al-Rumi has put forward this idea by depending on Quran
itself long before Lavoisier.294 Materialistic approach, in Abdullah Cevdet’s opinion,
is implicit within basic Islamic creeds. The teaching of immortality of the soul, or the
belief in the existence of heaven and hell, for example, totally depend on a
materialistic logic:

One of the perpetual accusations of the Church (that is of the religious

community) against science is that science is “materialistic”. However, I
would like to present to the attentions that the conception and the way of
thinking of the Church with regard to life after death has always been and still
is purely “materialistic”. The material body will be resurrected and live in a
heaven which is also material.295

The third argument regarding the relationship between religion and science is that the
attempts to reconcile them are meaningless. The most remarkable expressions of this
approach can be found in Şevketî’s article titled “Din Felsefesinden”.

It is argued in this article that religion and science attempt to answer the questions
emanated from human mind in order for comprehending the world and to make what
is unknown a subject to knowledge. However, there is a difference between religious
and scientific approaches about the foundation on which can the unknown be
grounded to make it knowable. The basic purpose of science is to show the cause of
an event within other events that are sensible as it is. Science examines, for this
purpose, as many events as possible and tries to put forward the close relationship
between them. In other words, science targets to “interpret nature by depending on
nature itself.”296 On the other hand, religion also tries to make what is unknown
knowable. But it does so by taking the unknown back to the known. The thing that is
referred to as “known” is God’s will. Religion wants to learn the subject to which
divine will is concerned and observes the transfiguration of this will in events. It does

294
Abdullah Cevdet, “Dilmesti-i Mevlana,” İçtihat 4, no. 86 (26 December 1329/8 Jenuary 1914), p.
1901.
295
Abdullah Cevdet, Fünun ve Felsefe, p. 65.
296
Şevketî, “Din Felsefesinden,” p. 1356.

145
not try, in this endeavor, to find out the internal connections of the events but argues
that events are manifestations of the same power.297 Religion and science are totally
different areas regarding to the basis they use to specify what is knowable and the
foundation on which can the unknown be grounded to become knowable.298

Şevketî’s approach, as described above, constitutes an example of the form in which

irreconcilable difference between religion and science came up from a scientific
angle. There are also some writes, in Young Turks’ periodicals, supported the
argument that religion and science are completely different areas by examining the
issue from a religious perspective. These figures can be regarded rather as
conservatives. According to Şerafeddin Yaltkaya, for example, religion and science
are related to two different domains. Religion subjects spiritual area while the
scientific thought subjects the material realm. Therefore, “the desire of reconciling
religion with science is an illusion that will come across with difficulties in every
point.”299 He argues that it is the only result which can most possibly be deduced
from Quran and hadiths concerning the relation of the two. Although some verses
seem to be corresponding to some scientific data, this correspondence does not
constitute the purpose of God in sending those verses.300

The facts that Şerafeddin Yaltkaya examines religion and science as two co-
excluding areas and finds the reconciliation of religion with science as a meaningless
endeavor essentially are struggles to protect religious belief. The article in which he
puts forward these ideas appears in İslam Mecmuası. Islam Mecmuası has been
published with the superscription of “a life with religion and a religion with life”. As
a typical Young Turk periodical it has an exceptional attitude in terms of its
evaluation of religion. It cannot be said that it has adopted a traditional understanding
of Islam nonetheless. In this journal, Islamic issues are handled by taking the

297
Ibid, p. 1357.
298
Ibid, p. 1358.
299
Şerafeddin Yaltkaya, “Din Aklî Değil Mâkuldür,” İslam Mecmuası 3, no. 28 (13 Rajab 1333/14
May 1331/27 May 1915), p. 653.
300
Ibid, p. 652.

146
conditions of the time into consideration and within a new perspective. Articles
published by Ziya Gökalp301 in particular are totally serving this purpose. Considered
from this angle, one can say that İslam Mecmuası pursued the goal of creating a
conception of Islam which corresponds to the conditions of the day and gets in touch
with life as far as possible.

We would like to complete this chapter by referring to the approach of İsmail Hakkı
within this regard.

It has been mentioned in the previous chapter that scientific understanding caused a
crisis, both with its existence and nonexistence, for traditional Ottoman world of
thought. The nonexistence of science constituted the cause for crisis, in the sense that
it ensured the continuance of irrational status quo. Its existence, on the other hand,
showed itself in the fact of juddering of the prevailing frame of mind. Developments
within scientific area result in collapse of established thoughts and patterns of belief
and, therefore, a successive crisis which have social dimension arise. Just as it is
possible to observe it within the area of religion, it can also be seen within ethical
realm –which is going to be examined in the next chapter. Thus, İsmail Hakkı
evaluates the scientific developments and their reflections in the social consciousness
as “crisis of religion”.302 This crisis can be seen as the natural result of adopting the
modern scientific and philosophical approaches like positivism, evolutionism and
materialism and pumping them into society through periodicals. According to İsmail
Hakkı, however, the reason is the mutual infringement of religion and science on the
area of other. Some parts of the curriculums, followed in schools, overstepped the

301
See, for example: Ziya Gökalp, “Fıkıh ve İçtimaiyat,” İslam Mecmuası 1, no. 2 (30 Rabīʿ al-Awwal
1332/13 February 1329/26 February 1914), pp. 40-44; Ziya Gökalp, “İçtimai Usûl-i Fıkıh,” İslam
Mecmuası 1, no. 3 (14 Jumādā al-Ākhira 1332/27 February 1329/12 March 1914), pp. 84-87; Ziya
Gökalp, “Hüsün ve Kubuh [İçtimai Usul-i Fıkıh Meselesi Münasebetiyle],” İslam Mecmuası 1, no. 8
(25 Jumādā al-Ākhira 1332/8 May 1330/21 May 1914), pp. 228-230; Ziya Gökalp, “Örf Nedir?
[İçtimai Usul-i Fıkıh Meselesi Münasebetiyle].” İslam Mecmuası 1, no. 10 (24 Rajab1332/5 June
1330/18 June 1914), pp. 290-295; Ziya Gökalp, “Dinin İçtimai Hizmetleri,” İslam Mecmuası 3, no. 34
(15 Shawwāl 1333/13 August 1331/26 August 1915), pp. 740-743, Ziya Gökalp, “Diyanet ve Kaza,”
İslam Mecmuası 3, no. 35 (29 Shawwāl 1333/27 August 1331/9 September 1915), pp. 756-760; Ziya
Gökalp, “Dinin İçtimai Hizmetleri,” İslam Mecmuası 3, no. 36 (14 Dhū al-Qaʿda 1333/10 September
1331/23 September 1915), pp. 772-776.
302
İsmail Hakkı, “Felsefe: Dinî ve İçtimai İçtihat.” Yeni Mecmua 2, no. 32 (14 February 1918), pp.
107-108.

147
area of positive and natural truths, accessed to the areas like social and ethical
emotions and, consequently, destructed social ideals for the sake of scientific truths.
Religious sciences, on the other hand, overstepped the area of sanctity, accessed to
positive area and, consequentially, rejected science and nature for the sake of
religious creeds and ideals.303 The only way out of this crisis is repatriation of
religion and science to their home fields. One needs to make a division of labor
between science and religion. That is to say, exclusion of all external and positive
issues from the area of religion and recantation from measuring all internal and
spiritual issues by the material and natural scales of science is necessary. 304As a
matter of fact, the idea of division of labor is a frequently discussed issue among
Young Turks’ periodicals on several occasions. Şevketî, Ragıp Hulusi, Şemseddin
Günaltay and Nebizade Ahmet Hamdi, for example, have argued for the necessity of
such a division of labor.305

To what extent a religion restricted purely to spiritual realm corresponds to the

traditional sense of religion is to stay as a matter of discussion. For, the broad
authority that religion is given in traditional understanding is not restricted with just
spiritual area. It intervenes also in the daily life of human beings by some means or
other. That such a detachment from traditional conception is evident even in the
İslam Mecmuası, which can be found as conservative in comparison to other Young
Turk periodicals, is a sign that a new era has been started for the Turkish history of
thought in respect to philosophy of religion.

303
İsmail Hakkı, ibid, p. 107.
304
Ibid, p. 108.
305
Cf. Şevketî, “Din Felsefesinden,” p. 1358; Ragıp Hulusi, “Din Felsefesi: Dinin İlmî Marifete Karşı
Hususiyeti,” p. 184; Ragıp Hulusi, “Din Felsefesi: Dinin Manevi Hayatta Mevkii,” p. 109; Şemseddin
Günaltay, “Ölmek Yok Olmak Mıdır?,” p. 194; Nebizade Ahmet Hamdi, “Sanatta Güzellik İlimde
Hakikat,” p. 25.

148
 CHAPTER 5

ETHICS, VALUES AND PHILOSOPHY IN YOUNG TURKS’

UNDERSTANDING

In the second and third chapters, how far the Young Turks got away from the
traditional ways of thinking were touched upon within the context of their
understanding of science and religion. In this chapter we will discuss the kind of
conclusions could be drawn within the context of Young Turks’ ideas of
modernization by looking at the discussions on ethics in their periodicals.

First, it is useful to point out that the ideas, put forward by Young Turks on religion
and science, are largely criticism oriented. The traditional mentality is regarded as
the reason of all evil and backwardness. As it will be seen in the forthcoming
discussions the ideas voiced by the Young Turks within the scope of ethics are
largely the product of a criticism. In this regard, it can be said that the philosophy of
ethics adopted by Young Turks is a follow-up of their critical understanding of
religion and science they employed. However, an important aspect is conspicuous in
Young Turks’ discussions on ethics which is never found in the previous ones. This
is an effort for constituting a new ethical thinking framework with criticism. It was
found convenient to discuss the new philosophical language of ethics within this
study as it shows that criticism was replaced by an idea of “construction” although
by some reasons or other it has been left incomplete.

We will examine the following discussions on the philosophy of ethics under two
titles roughly. In the first phase, what the Young Turks criticized when the problem
of ethics came up will be tackled. It is necessary to know “what” the Young Turks
criticized in terms of grasping the quality of new ethical framework that they wanted
to construct. Presenting the reasons for this will ease to find an answer for the
question of “what do they want to do?” which will be discussed in the following

149
section. Besides, the ideas that will be reached within the scope of this question will
make it possible to conduct further discussions and present substantive results for the
study.

The second discussion that we are planning to realize will focus on the questions of
“what did they want to do?” and “what could they do?” This will largely be realized
by concentrating on the ethical projections of the idea of “New Life” which is a
Young Turks motto. Young Turks are after an entirely new life. In this sense,
exploring the essential characters of the ethical framework, that is aimed to be built
independent of the traditional way of thinking, corresponding to new life seems to be
an important issue. The legitimacy of ideas that are propounded without having the
aim of “reform” and put forward just for criticism can be made a matter of
questioning. By all means, Young Turks did not criticize just for the sake of
criticizing. There are some legitimate grounds for those criticisms. Then, as it is
mentioned in the second chapter, Young Turks are products of a crisis. So, it can
easily be seen that the ideas put forward under the impact of an agonizing crisis are
for bringing a “reform” in the face of the crisis rather than an intellectual phantasm.

5.1 Reflections of Anti-Metaphysical Attitude in the Ethical Realm

One of the most obvious reflections of the positivist Young Turk approach
investigated in the second chapter appears within the scope of ethical realm. It is a
pure anti-metaphysical attitude. It was not possible for Young Turks, who interpreted
events and phenomena from a positivist standpoint, to pick up their ideas on ethics
from any other source. In this regard, it could be seen as a coherent situation for them
the fact that their scientific understanding showed up itself also in the field of ethics.

There seems to be two reasons for this situation that is characterized as the projection
of anti-metaphysical attitude in the ethical area. First, the ethics is not seen as a scope
that can be constituted in line with “apriori” principles. For this reason, as it will be
pointed out below, all thinkers, Kant being in the first place, that base the ethics on
an apriori principle become the target of Young Turks. The apriori ethical principal
is replaced with experience which is aposteriori principle of ethics. More clearly, to

150
the Young Turks the ethics should be based directly on experience. Second, what
metaphysics brings to mind are traditional ethical forms when it comes to ethics.
Hence, it is possible to mention that it is both a political and an epistemological
attitude the fact that Young Turk intelligentsia does not use the terms ethics and
metaphysics together.

Among the Young Turks figures who defend an anti-metaphysical approach are
Ahmet Şuayip, Bediî Nuri, M. Zekeriya [Sertel], Rıza Tevfik, Ziya Gökalp, İsmail
Hakkı, and Necmettin Sadık.306

In these writers’ works the most mentioned and the most criticized thinker is
undoubtedly Kant. The criticism aimed at Kant in fact presents an explanation for
why the Young Turks object to ethical metaphysics or the theorization attempts of
ethics based on an apriori principle. It is said in an article published in Yeni Felsefe
Mecmuası, for example, that “Kant’s ethical theories could not be put into practice.
For, they do not emanate from any nation or any society’s social conscience but
remain as the private opinion of a person.”307 The basic agent regarding the criticism
of Kant’s theory of ethics is that it is perceived as a theory “belonging to heavens”308
by exceeding the field of experience. As it excludes what is human, it does not
deserve to be attributed a value.

As a matter of fact these statements indicate to what extent or why the Young Turks
distance themselves from the speculative way of thinking. For the Young Turks ideas

306
See, for example: Bedii Nuri, “Mebâhis-i Ahlâkiye,” U.İ.İ.M. 3, no. 23(11) (1 November 1326/14
November 1910), pp. 1024-1033; Bedii Nuri, “Mebâhis-i Ahlâkiye,” U.İ.İ.M. 3, no. 25(13) (January
1326/February 1911), pp. 1308-1327; Ahmet Şuayip, “Devlet ve Cemiyet,” ss. 54-71; Necmettin
Sadık, “Emile Durkheim,” Yeni Mecmua 1, no. 26 (3 January 1917), pp. 509-512; Rıza Tevfik,
“Kuvvetler ve Kıymetler Felsefesi,” İçtihat 5, no. 102 (17 April 1330/30 April 1914); 25-29; Rıza
Tevfik, “Ahlakın Nüfusa Tesiri” s. 235; “Hükümet ve Hürriyet Hakkında Spencer’ın Felsefesi,”
U.İ.İ.M. 2, no. 18(6) – 21(9) (June-September 1326/June-September 1910), pp. 742-757; Ziya Gökalp,
“Ahlak Buhranı,”, pp. 122-124; İsmail Hakkı, “Ahlak Mücâhedeleri -2,” Yeni Mecmua 3, no. 64 (10
October 1918), pp. 223-224; M. Zekeriya Sertel, “Ahlak, Fazilet Ve Namusun Manası”, Yeni Felsefe
Mecmuası, 1. Sene, 15. Sayı: 15 Mart [1328] Cuma [28 Mart 1912], ss. 13-20.
307
Tahrir Heyeti, “Yeni Hayat,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 9, p. 9.
308
Cf. M. Nermi, “Alfred Fouillée’nin Kuvvet-Fikirci Ahlakı,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 14 (1
March 1328/14 March 1912), p. 12.

151
that can be put into practice are favorable. You can make up volumes of theories on
ethics or any other field but as long as these theories do not turn into the living
samples of the social conscience, in other words as long as they are not adopted by
the “social conscience”, they will not bear any meaning. Based on such an approach
it is possible to ask if Kant propounded his theory of ethics to be adopted and put into
practice by a social conscience or not. If the question is put into a more generalized
form, it can be discussed whether a thinker sees prerequisite the practicability of an
idea before constructing it. If the practicability were at the core, it would probably be
necessary to toss a remarkable corpus of the philosophy out. 309

Repudiating the experience, according to Young Turks, would entail e series of

illogical ideas. As M. Zekeriya Sertel puts it:

I think to claim that “ethics is such” would be insolence. Many geniuses, like
Tolstoy and Kant etc., put forward a number of ethical rules. But
unfortunately neither they nor their grandchildren had the chance of
exercising these ethical rules. For these rules were rather poems and dreams.
They have never been put forward by taking into consideration the needs and
fundamentals of a society. Those geniuses were ascribing absolute and
metaphysical character to good and evil. And this is where many of the
moralists were mistaken. They were saying that “good” is good because it is
good. However, confirming such a claim would be accepting that a man who
lives alone on a non-residential island is subject to a set of ethical rules and
that he needs to prohibit himself of doing certain behaviors. Although nobody
dared to such an experience yet it is childish to imagine that this would be
so.310

To Bediî Nuri, the only way to construct a coherent system of ethics is “to make the
ethics a positive science by purging it from metaphysical thoughts and

309
Thus there are some figures, even on the side of philosophy though, who argue that this exactly is
what needed to be done. David Hume, for example, is one of them. According to him, “if we take in
our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask; Does it contain any
abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning
concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: For it can contain nothing
but sophistry and illusion.” See David Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding
(Cambridge, 1977), p. 114. But as Brian Davies observes, “[r]eaders of Hume might reasonably
suggest that, on his own admission, his Enquiry should have been burned. For it hardly meets his
requirements for a book to escape the flames.” See Brian Davies, An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Religion (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 235.
310
M. Zekeriya Sertel, “Ahlak, Fazilet ve Namusun Manası,” pp. 16-17.

152
assumptions.”311 It was mentioned before that this resistance against metaphysics of
ethics stems from a positivist approach. Here, it is relevant to remind the value
positivism attributes particularly to the objectivity of knowledge. The positive
science seeks a set of objective data. But, metaphysics is made of some totally
subjective speculations that contradict objectivity. The clearest statements of the
positivist attitude against the ethical metaphysics are seen in an article by Rıza
Tevfik. Talking about specialization in sciences, Rıza tevfik claims that the method
for explaining events and phenomena can be determined only by taking into
consideration the field that those events and phenomena belong to. “As the social
events arise from the relations among people, they are just made of experimental and
objective events. In this respect, it is not related to metaphysics.”312 This being the
case, the theories that tackle ethics which is a part of the social space should have its
starting point from the social life. This can be interpreted as that philosophy should
also pay attention to what is social. The result that will be reached upon this
questioning is the fact that philosophy is needed to be re-constructed as a “social
philosophy.” Thus, Ziya Gökalp, who says that the philosophy of the time is rather a
“general ethics”,313 can be regarded as putting forward a similar argument. In the
following discussions Ziya Gökalp’s remarks on the necessity of linking philosophy
with what is social and analyses in that vein will be addressed.

Rıza Tevfik bases his idea, that ethics should be excluded from the metaphysical
sphere, on an ontological analysis done in his own way. To him, there are such ideas
and sensations in the life of society that are certain to have no existence per se in
reality. Many ideas like sensation of nationality, competition etc! These
manifestations have no numenal substancehood or “ontological” existence; therefore,
they have no relation with metaphysics!314

311
Bedii Nuri, “Mebâhis-i Ahlâkiye,” p. 1309.
312
Rıza Tevfik, “Muhasebe-i İçtihat: Kuvvetler ve Kıymetler Felsefesi”, p. 26.
313
Ziya Gökalp [Tevfik Sedat], “Bugünkü Felsefe,” Genç Kalemler 2, no. 2 (27 April 1327/10 May
1911), p. 32.
314
Rıza Tevfik, ibid.

153
Considering Rıza tevfik’s articles particularly on the philosophy of values these
seems to be important statements. They can be defined as problematical as they
evaluate the existence on an absolutely phenomenal ground, as if having an
ontological existence is applicable only in terms of absolutely phenomenal beings.
Does ontology really start out from such a claim? Cannot we talk about the
idiosyncratic “ontology” of ideas or values? Alfred Fouillée, who was the most cited
thinker of philosophy of values of the period and a source of inspiration for some
leading Young Turks, claims that it is possible. His arguments to this effect will be
discussed within the latter sections. Young Turks figures influenced by Alfred
Fouillée, Ziya Gökalp in the first place, say that ideas and values also have
idiosyncratic existences. Rıza Tevfik is probably aware of these discussions.
However, confining the being to the things that are included in the factual category
indicates the strong impact of positivist and even materialist approaches on him.
Considering the analyses he makes particularly in his article titled “Hükümet ve
Hürriyet Hakkında Spencer’ın Felsefesi”, it can be alleged that he was heavily
inspired by Spencer while building the philosophy and ethics based on a social
ground. So, without indicating the source, he mentions that the ethics should be
based on social experiences in the following lines by Spencer:

Human transactions’ acquiescence of ethical quality starts with the

separability of accepted and legitimate circumstances and states from
forbidden and illegitimate ones. And this separation is only possible with the
social life, which is to say with an actual understanding of individuals that
they are obliged to live in a community. Henceforth, they have an idea about
the kinds of behaviors that they are entitled to and of transactions they are
prohibited from doing against their fellows.315

Rıza Tevfik here tackles good and evil only within the context of social life. Things
that we call “good” or “evil” are qualities on which we can have knowledge only
after we start to live within a society. It is wrong to perceive these things independent
of concrete events, existing by themselves as abstract facts. “Good” is not good as it
is good per se, but it is good as long as it contributes to social life by any means. The
things that we are supposed to do for the other, the things that we are allowed to do
for them are good; in the contrary case they are evil.
315
Rıza Tevfik, “Hükümet ve Hürriyet Hakkında Spencer’ın Felsefesi,” pp. 748,749.

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Since the thing we call “good” comes up with the social life and the things that we
are allowed to do “the other” are good, in this case cannot we identify “good” with
what Kant calls as “duty”? Cannot we regard the order of “you should treat well to
your fellow” as an unconditional duty? Since, it can be seen as an order –which is
also similar to Kant’s ethical principle- emanating from social consciousness. Rıza
Tevfik leaves this question unanswered. But, Necmettin Sadık in his article “Emile
Durkheim”, again inspired by Durkheim, says that this is not possible. For, the idea
of duty constitutes not the concept of ethics as a whole but only a part of it. It is not
possible to obey an action just because it is ordered to us. We cannot neglect the
content of the relevant action. In other words, the ordered action should be related to
our personal sensibility. The relevant action should be “worthy of desiring”, which
means, for Necmettin Sadık, that when it comes to ethics, the fact that actions are
desirable is as important as the fact that they constitute at least a duty.316
Undoubtedly, this approach also is a drawback concerning the metaphysical
dimension of Kantian ethics. Likewise, in Kant’s philosophy of ethics what is good
“is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes or because of its competence
to achieve some intended end; it is good only because … it is good in itself.”317 The
three ways of action that Kant determined based on the concept of duty constitute a
problem in terms of Necmettin Sadık’s thoughts found their expressions above.
Then, to Kant it is possible to talk about three kinds of action. These are; actions
which are inconsistent with the duty; actions which really conform to duty, but to
which men have no direct inclination, performing them because they are impelled
thereto by some other inclination; and, actions that are done for the sake of duty. 318
Considering Kant’s classification, it can be said that the actions that are worthy of
desiring most probably overlap with the second group of actions. To put it more
clearly, the overlapping of actions that are worthy of desire with the duty can only be
accidental; they are not realized by means of the concept of duty directly. It is even

316
Necmettin Sadık, “Emile Durkheim,” p. 511.
317
Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Lewis White Beck
(Library of Liberal Arts, 1989), p. 10.
318
Ibid, p. 14.

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within possibility for them to fall within the first group which includes actions that
contradict with the concept of duty. It is also possible to criticize Necmettin Sadık’s
views by asking, for example, if ethical laws always have a content composed of
“worthy of desiring” elements? Cannot we say that certain actions we call ethical lay
an extra burden and responsibility on individual and make them feel uncomfortable?
Philanthropy may be worthy of desiring in itself; it is like that when seen from a
theoretical point of view. Yet, helping someone may not always be the result of
desiring. Sometimes it is the result of necessity. All these points are remarkable in
terms of explaining why Kant is a focus of criticism by the Young Turks. For, Kant
does not define “good” by taking into consideration something external. In this case,
considering the importance and priority the Young Turks attribute to social need and
“national perpetuity”, which will be discussed in the following chapters, good is
inevitably defined as something that is useful for the national perpetuity.

Another criticism aimed at Kantian ethics is the fact that it repudiates the experience.
İsmail Hakkı, who evaluates this circumstance as something found in all rationalist
theories of ethics, says that “rational ethics cannot constitute a new ethical life
regardless of its philosophical value. It is something beyond the competence of
theoretical reason. Ethical area is the area of experience and not metaphysics.”319
This general understanding in which the ethics is derived from the realm of
experience, in fact, also has an epistemological base. For, the experience is finalized
with the firsthand knowledge in the related field. Basing something that we can know
on something that does not fall within the domain of knowledge will bring about an
epistemological skew. For this reason, ethics as something that is in the sphere of
knowledge can only be based by means of experience. Otherwise, it would be
necessary to send it to “an unknown country” for no reason. The clearest statements
of this classical approach of the positivist epistemology can be found in Ziya
Gökalp’s article “Ahlak Buhranı”. He says:

319
İsmail Hakkı, “Ahlak Mücâhedeleri -2,” p. 223. For the similar arguments that ethics must be
depended on experience, see: Kazım Nami, Yeni Ahlak-1”; Kazım Nami Yeni Ahlak-2,” Yeni Felsefe
Mecmuası 1, no. 3 (15 September 1327/28 September 1911), p. 13; Ali Haydar, “Ahlak Hakkında-1,”
Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 4 (30 September 1327/13 October 1911), p. 2.

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 Basing ethics on a reality that is in-cognizable rather than cognizable, as
Agnostics do, is making the situation suspicious and mystical –contrarily to
positivistic sciences. For this reason, neither Kant’s totally agnostic ethics
nor Auguste Comte’s and Spencer’s positivist ethics with agnostic
tendencies can satisfy the souls that are nurtured with positive sciences. This
age is the age of positivism. But, this positivism is not like Comte’s and
Spencer’s positivism which can be reconciled with agnosticism. The real
positivism has to see that the entire corpuses that are known are cognizable
and things that are unknown cannot even be conceived.320

These lines are principal remarks regarding the positivist approach and are
reminiscent of William James’s “radical empiricist” approach. While talking about
radical empiricism, which he defines as his Weltanschauung,321 William James gives
a definition stating that “to be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its
constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them
any element that is directly experienced.”322 It may be possible to say that Ziya
Gökalp was influenced by William James given that his name passes in some articles
by Gökalp. Hence, the things that Gökalp defines as “cognizable” are things that can
be experienced. In this case, those that are “in-cognizable” remain outside of the
realm of knowledge and experience.

At this point, again the use of concept of experience in the Young Turks periodicals
and some other issues related to this will be touched on. As it is stated in the second
chapter, Young Turks attribute an important role for observation and experience as
scientific methods. This emphasis on experience, although it is regarded old
fashioned in terms of the scientific understanding of the time, points out a lively
reservoir in which “social conscience” accumulates its lively instances. Considered
from this perspective, the experience is the experience of the other. The other is not
the individual that breathes the same physical or cultural air with us; it is the social
consciousness that reflects the results, reached by all of the individuals in terms of
their material lives, as an ethical system. This issue will be evaluated below within
the framework of “the ethical necessity of union.” But, to put it shortly for now, in

320
Ziya Gökalp, “Ahlâk Buhranı,” p. 124 [emphasis added].
321
William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912), p. 41.
322
Ibid, p. 42.

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the ethical understanding of Young Turks the other as an individual does not exist;
the individual only exists as long as he participates in the social consciousness which
is in the position of “the essential other.” Therefore, X or Z as individuals cannot
constitute the essence of any ethical principle. Talking about ethicality of the
individual is possible only if he participates in the whole by getting purified from
individual qualities.

Now, it is obvious that I, as an individual, cannot experience by myself every event

that can be regarded “ethical”. It is an inevitable result of one of the basic
characteristics of my physical existence, which is finitude. However, it should be
pointed out that this will not render it impossible the fact that I can evaluate the
events that I have not experienced as “ethical” or “nonethical.” It is possible to find
many examples from daily life for this. Based on this, cannot one argue that the
qualities of “ethical” or “non-ethical”, which are attributed to events by social
consciousness “later on”, turn into metaphysical elements that exist by depending on
the other’s experience? Hence, as an individual I have not actually experienced any
condition. Besides, there is such a situation: we cannot deal with the ethics
independent of values. The distinction between values and phenomena is something
that is accepted by all philosophies of ethics. The value is something that we attribute
to the phenomena not existing in it previously. Because of the aspect charged and
added up later on, the meaning of any event or phenomenon from the viewpoint of
the individual would totally change. In other words, experience will have a
metaphysical dimension as soon as it starts to become a social one. In this case, the
new meaning of the experience can be evaluated as “being caught up by a new form
of metaphysics while escaping other.”

Some additional points supporting the above argument that “the experience” has
gained a metaphysical dimension can be found in the analysis related to the concept
of “organic” within Young Turk periodicals. For example, in his article “Ahlakın
Nüfusa Tesiri” Rıza Tevfik claims that the fundamental aspect of ethics is that it is
“organic.” “What makes this definition interesting for us is the fact that it starts out
from a necessary, one sided connection made between individual and social
experiences. What is meant by organic is the passivity of individual against the social

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consciousness rather than the cooperation amongst people. While determining ethical
events, rather than relying on our own experiences we accept the qualities like
“good”, “evil”, “beautiful”, “ugly” as they are used by the society. To Rıza tevfik,
“each individual behaves according to his genetic inheritance and his natural
faculties”.323 He calls such traits as “deeply rooted faculties” (“malakāt-ı rāsıkha”).
For him, these are innate (wahhbī). It is even possible to evaluate these as
involuntary (qasrī). Rıza Tevfik uses the term involuntary (qasrī) instead of
unconscious. A faculty first appears on the conscious level. The fact that the
consciousness accompanies a faculty indicates that our brain perceives our first
action through perception centers and a consciousness related to it is formed. The
mentioned behavior or skill becomes unconscious deeds thanks to repetitions. In
other words, the individual repeats a certain behavior so much that he does not
realize it as a consequence of informed choice but as an unconscious element by
himself. At this stage, the brain can no more be aware of such events. 324 In this way,
the behaviors or abilities that are acquiring a habitual quality can both be regarded as
secondary qualities and named as “organic.”

This approach means, of course, that the individual participates in the construction of
social consciousness not as an active element but as a passive one. I, as an individual,
get involved in the social consciousness that has dominance on me involuntarily. My
involvement is involuntary because I know how I am expected to behave and I
behave accordingly. The social consciousness as a readymade fuses me in itself. My
participation in the social consciousness is passive in that sense. On the other hand, I
have an active role in transferring the social consciousness to individuals that will be
articulated to the structure. Notwithstanding that, it is hard to say that this last role is
literally “active”, because I have been receiving and transferring the thing I
transferred as readymade. To remember what all these analyses take us: I only
transfer the experience that is fictionalized de facto. Since with my participation the
meaning of experience is not subject to change, I start out from an “apriori” ethical
principal as in the acceptance of a metaphysical principle and I obey that order of
society: “you must do it in that way!”

323
Rıza Tevfik, “Ahlakın Nüfusa Tesiri,” p 235.
324
Ibid.
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Rıza Tevfik is not the only writer mentioning the idea logical consequences of which
are being discussed presently. In fact, this is a reflection of the general Young Turk
acceptance related the individual and we come across this in the writings of many
Young Turk figures. For example, when Ziya Gökalp claims that when we act, we do
it “without knowing” to provide continuance of the species325 he seems to be wanting
to say that acts are in fact encoded by the species and society beforehand. Our
behaviors are encoded by the society and are transferred to the individual by means
of biological, psychological or sociological vessels.

It is possible to find similar ideas, claiming that the experience making ethics
possible emerges out of the social ground as a superior consciousness, in the articles
of Ahmet Besim and Bedii Nuri as well. To Bediî Nuri, for example, ethics “arises
and occurs in the form of mutual manifestations of motives and qualities that are
carried out involuntarily.”326 In other words, we repeat our actions so much that these
go beyond the sphere of will and they start to appear automatically just like animal
instincts. After this stage, “doing good or bad things becomes a natural motive or a
faculty. Once ethics arrives at this degree, ethical behaviors start to emerge from
human being unconsciously and instinctively.”327

In the context of what has been said last, it is necessary to highlight one point. We do
not name everything what we call good or evil by seeing or doing. As it is mentioned
above, one of our fundamental characteristics is that we are finite and this situation
makes possible for us only to experience to a certain degree. Since the society is not
subject to such a finitude its capacity of experience is much larger than ours.
Therefore, we cannot learn what is good or what is evil by seeing or doing
personally. We see good what the society finds good or regard bad what is regarded
as evil by it. To put it more clearly, we only repeat a lived experience, because the
society encodes us in that way. It is possible to characterize this as “the inheritance

325
Ziya Gökalp, “Ferdiyet ve Şahsiyet,” p. 2.
326
Bedii Nuri, “Mebâhis-i Ahlâkiye,” U.İ.İ.M. 3, no. 23(11) (1 November 1326/14 November 1910),
p. 1026.
327
Ahmet Besim, “Temayülât-ı Ahlâkiye ve Örf,” İslam Mecmuası 3. No. 25 (30 Jumādā al-Ūlā
1333/2 April 133/15 April 1915), p. 607.
160
of ethics.” The ethical inheritance may be posited on a practical ground in terms of
social consciousness.

Nevertheless, this situation does not prevent that the question remains at theoretical
level from the point of individual. In this case, the question of what is good or what
is evil cannot be something that can be answered directly. This can only be answered
through imitation, by means of discharging the responsibility imposed by the society
or behaving how the society wants. Here, there is a response towards the social
demand, but this “answer” does not require reasoning or reflection.

5.2. The Ethical Relativism or the Collapse of Belief in Absolute and Ethical
Tremor

Another point to be discussed about the ethical understanding of Young Turks could
be drawn from the fact that they adopted relativism. Their resistance to efforts of
basing ethics on metaphysics stems from their objection about the conception of
“absolute truth.” The evolutionary approach they employed led to their refusal to
accept any truth unquestioningly. Considering the implicit postulation of the
evolutionary thinking about the constant development in the universe, it becomes
possible to provide a basis for the Young Turks’ objections on the absolute truth.
However, it is also possible to criticize those ideas and they will be evaluated in the
following chapters.

The impact of evolutionist thought on Young Turks’ ideology has been deep. Their
use of the concept of “progress” and their reference to the concept of “evolvement”
indicate their interest and engagement in a progressive understanding of history. The
point that is wanted to be emphasized here requires keeping in mind the intimate
relation ethics has with society in Young Turks’ understanding. For, ethical
principles are destined to progress and evolve constantly like the social
consciousness from which they emerge. Young Turks strongly resist to metaphysical
theories of ethics as they rely on an apriori principle and believe that they cannot
provide a possibility of progress or evolvement. In their opinions, being is a
continuous move towards progress. Believing in the existence of an absolute

161
principle means to abolish the possibility of doing such a move. Hence, asserting
absolute and so called objective ethical criteria that are claimed to be valid every
time and everywhere, for every individual and society, contradicts with the idea of
evolution and results in a static ethical life. The natural outcome of this, to Young
Turks, is a social rottenness whose roots can be found in the traditional
understanding of ethics. An objective, absolute understanding of ethics will make the
life static. On the other hand, a subjective ethics based on the expectations and
desires of social consciousness will be more dynamic and mobile. Every society has
the skill to determine which applications will be useful under which conditions in
terms of itself. Since at the heart of such a questioning there will be the society itself,
it will be possible to follow the constant progress, revise the ethics depending on the
case and deal with the stagnation.

It is also possible to find another supporting point for our case, that Young Turks’
anti-metaphysical attitude remained under the influence of evolutionist approach, in
the meaning attributed to the concept of “milieu” by them. As far as one can observe
within the periodicals analyzed, the Young Turks believe that the ethics should be
systematized in such a way that it can meet the demands of “milieu.” As it was
shown in the third chapter, the concept of “adjustment to milieu” is picked from both
Darwinian and Lamarckian understandings of evolution and transferred to the social
sphere by Young Turks. It should be noted here that we are not talking about the
reduction of ethics to physical conditions (physical milieu). Certainly, at times some
connections may be made between actions that are called ethical and physical
conditions of a society. However, characterization of “the milieu” as a mental
environment to which ethics is expected to correspond seems to be more proper
when the meaning attributed to that concept in Young Turks’ periodicals kept in
mind. Because considering the assumptions that ethics should respond “the
contemporary needs”, it can be claimed that the milieu is largely transferred to a
mental dimension. Similarly, one observes in periodicals that an understanding of
ethics, which can also be adopted by the national consciousness, is dealt with. Here,
the milieu is interpreted as an external mental reality with which the system of ethics
must come to terms.

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Below, we will study how Young Turk figures established a direct connection
between ethics and milieu. Before doing this, a brief examination of some points
regarding the mentioned issue would be useful.

The fact that Young Turks have a progressive understanding of history with the
influence of positivist and evolutionist approaches and the ethical consequences they
reach may seem coherent in itself. For, the showing up of influenced sources in the
products is something by nature. However, without getting involved in the discussion
whether the history constantly flows towards the good, it is possible to ask whether
the milieu has always a desirable character. This question would have some ethical
dimensions. An external look into the Young Turks’ criticisms against the concept of
the absolute ethics will notice that there is the possibility of reaching some
conspicuous points. The most probable answer of Young Turks’ would be that “the
milieu will always flow towards the good. Given that the milieu, whether material or
mental, is within the universe and given that the universe constantly flows towards
the good, which is a brighter future, so, in this case it is quite possible that the milieu
will follow the same direction.” But, in fact the situation may not be hopeful this
much. There is a certain order in the universe without doubt. Probably due to this
order that our knowledge allows us to predict the future and adopt a hopeful attitude.
Yet, even the slightest observation may indicate that the things do not always change
like we desire. The mind by all means corresponds to the milieu. But, the
corresponded thing is not always the one that is desired. Regarding the ethics as
something that depends on the milieu and forming an ethical framework that fits the
milieu may result in reaching wrong culminations. For example, if someone living in
a cultural environment where murder is prohibited suddenly finds himself in an
island where people eat human flesh can adapt himself to the milieu by forgetting the
apriori principle of “you should not kill!?” Even if he adapts himself can he define
this behavior as ethical? Even if he claims that his behavior is ethical can we come
through such a conclusion?

While talking about the claims by Young Turks about experience, it was pointed out
that this actually contains a metaphysical discourse within itself. A similar
observation may also be made on the Young Turk opposition about the absolute

163
ethics. The objection to concept of absolute truth depends on the unchangeable
principle (in this case it is also absolute and a principle which can also be claimed to
be metaphysical), that is the idea of “continuous progression.” Considering the
assumption that the history continuously moves towards the good and the assumption
which is used as a base it, which is the universal law of evolution, it seems to be
possible to reach such a conclusion. We can summarize this as a move from anti-
absolutism to absoluteness of progress.

Another reason of ethical relativism is, as stated in the second chapter, the positivism
theorized by Auguste Comte. As Rasim Haşmet puts it, in the positivist epistemology
“there are no unchanging truths.” Instead, there are the assumptions that are possible
to be analyzed and controlled, the temporary truths based on obtained knowledge,
causes and laws that serve to know the relations among effects.”328 This assumption,
voiced at various occasions by several Young Turk figures as well, is important as it
shows that Young Turks were in fact following their ideas in such a way that they
could be put into a logical framework.

Rıza Tevfik is the main figure mentioning the objections against the idea of absolute
truth and struggling to keep the ethics away from the realm of metaphysics in the
periodicals. There are mainly three reasons why he opposed to the absolute ethics.
According to this, it is not possible to adopt an absolute ethics as. For, due to the
necessities of life both in individual and in society, characters and ethics are subject
to a continuous change. In other words, the impossibility of absolute ethics is
prompted by the very phenomenon of change.329 In this approach, the traces of the
principle “explaining the nature by nature itself,”330 that is influential among the
Young Turks circles, is perceived. Since man is a part of the nature, he should be
tackled within the scope of natural phenomena. All of the humane things are subject
to the natural order. So is the ethics. Hence, if we are going to talk about the ethics;

328
Rasim Haşmet, “Felsefe Karşısında Fen,” p. 13.
329
Rıza Tevfik, “Cemaat ve Efrada Mütenakız Şîmeler,” İçtihat 4, no. 95 (27 February 1329/12
March 1914), 2123.
330
Şevketî, “Din Felsefesinden,” p. 1356.

164
we need to find the natural sources of it. The related foundations cannot be revealed
with respect to a speculative ethical law at a theoretical level. Those are directly the
results of the daily life. For this reason, ethics can only be practical. And this can be
explained to the accompaniment of social life only. As an absolute truth cannot exist,
there cannot be an absolute ethics either. This can be seen the first reason that led
Rıza Tevfik to a relativistic understanding of ethics. He seems to think that the
second reason which causes relativism is “concern of preserving one’s own life.”331
The most important thing that we will struggle to protect in terms of our existence is
our own being. We should consider trying every way to protect this being and when
it is necessary “seeing everything that damages the rival not only justifiable but also
something praiseworthy”.332 In this case, tying us to an absolute truth would be a
mistake equal to shackling. One can refer to “the circumstances in the milieu and the
neighboring relationships”333 as the third reason of ethical relativism in Rıza Tevfik’s
approach. It should be mentioned that Rıza Tevfik’s approach, which can be
regarded as Darwinist, is not limited to these. His words having the essential
importance in terms of ethical relativism are as follows:

If there are various damages to get Ottomans and Turkish nation fall
necessarily in this lower ethical level we would naturally fall in that level.
For, our national life is the most desirable thing. It even outweighs our ethics.
Then national ethics exists with nation and it gets better as it deteriorates! But
if our nation dies it can never return to life. Due to this necessity we would
even consciously fall in that level to protect the self. And we believe in an
ethical principle accordingly.334

As it is understood from these statements, Rıza Tevfik interprets the thing that is
called “good” or “bad” totally in terms of the national entity. According to this point
of view, which is heavily Darwinist, everything that protects the national being is
ethical. Even the evil acts committed to protect the national being can be regarded as
“good”, hence “ethical.” That is, by all means, a clear expression of ethical

331
Rıza Tevfik, ibid, p. 2124.
332
Ibid, p. 2125.
333
Ibid, p. 2126.
334
Ibid.

165
relativism. On the other hand, a behavior can be regarded as “bad” but, in time it will
bear the potential to turn to be “good.” In this case, defining something as “good” or
“bad” entirely will not conform to the truth, at least when it comes to the “national
survival”. Rıza Tevfik would probably not evaluate it as an “amoral” action but not
as “immoral”. The concepts of “amoral” and “immoral” are commentated from an
article335 which is taking part in the journal of İçtihat. And these concepts are exaclt
correspondences of Rıza Tevfik’s envisagement. In this article, the distinction
between the concepts of immorality and amorality is made and some results,
deserving a mention in terms of our discussions, are revealed. According to the
writer, an action that seems “evil” as it damages someone else is a temporary
(muwaqqad) evil. In this respect, it cannot be regarded as “immoral.” At most, it can
be sees as amorality. Just like a child trying to grab his brother’s feeding bottle while
his is full. This would cause, in essence, not the negation of ethics but to omitting it
in actions, which is a temporary situation. This has the chance to be reformed. As the
individual formed by the social consciousness, he reflects the ethics in his actions;
hence his actions become “ethical.” But, immorality is a permanent condition. As the
interests of individual are in the foreground, it is always a “pathological” incident in
terms of the social ethics. It is a threat to the social being. 336 That means when an
action “seems to be evil” it is not necessarily “immoral.” An absolute criterion may
argue such a thing. But, considering the subjective circumstances, a different result
can be reached, because “the ethics is not something fixed and constant, it is subject
to change every day.”337 The possibility of change on the judgment about the action
comes to fore as an element reinforcing the possibility of relativism.

Similar ideas within the scope of ethical relativism are inferred by some Young
Turks writers assuming that they do not stand to reason. This is a highly remarkable
situation. M. Zekeriya Setel, for example, believes that the ethical rules arise from
the social needs but not the reason and logic. To him, there is something wrong in

335
R. S., “Türklerde Kıskançlık: Maraz-ı İçtimai,” İçtihat 5, no. 123 (4 December 1330/17 December
1914), pp. 407-408.
336
Ibid, p. 407.
337
Nebizade Ahmet Hamdi, “Sanatta Güzellik, İlimde Hakikat,” p. 24.

166
efforts of the people attempting to determine what actions are good and what actions
are evil as those people classify the doers of those actions as having good or bad
characters. But, there is something these people forget, which is that an absolute
good or an absolute evil action can never be imagined.338

The relativistic thought of M. Zekeriya becomes clearer at one step ahead. What aim
will we take into consideration when we need to decide which actions are good or
evil? Based on which criteria actions will be classified as good or evil? It is observed
that many conflicts are experienced about this issue. For example, from an
individualistic point of view the definition of good is different; from a social point of
view the definition becomes different. For this reason, without attempting to search
for an unchanging essence, we should accept the fact that “the ethical rules do not
have absolute essence like everything.”339 The fact that we do not have the chance of
getting rid of this relativism can be understood by means of any reasoning about any
action. For example;

Some moralists claim that “helping to the fellow” is the greatest ethical
virtue and in all the books they write they suggest this behavior to humanity.
It has even been accepted as an ethical rule by the Christians and turned into a
religious command. But, the nature proves that helping your fellow means
preventing the most important factor for the progress of humanity, which is
the natural selection340

It is possible to bring some criticism to M. Zekeriya Sertel’s evolutionist ethical

understanding. For example, if the principle of “help your fellow” contradicts with
principle of “the natural selection”, does it make a sense to preserve the principle of
“Thou shall not kill” as an ethical principle? So, is not murder removal of the rival?
Should we call the murders as the executers of the natural selection law? Or should
we define the treatment of disease as something immoral as the sick people are weak
ones? Does not this contradict with the natural selection law as treatment prolongs
the life and hence the weakness? Then, is treatment something immoral?

338
M. Zekeriya, “Ahlak, Fazilet ve Namusun Manası,” p. 13.
339
Ibid, p. 18.
340
Ibid, p. 14.

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We see that Ziya Gökalp also agrees with the idea that the ethics is not based on the
reason. His motive is a bit more specific. This is directly related with the definition
of reason and its function. Gökalp believes that the conscience is a different faculty
than the reason. To him, the main cause of this difference is that although the reason
is common to all people the conscience has different structures in different societies.
“It is said that there is only one way for reason; but for consciences there are a lot of
different ways. Therefore, something regarded good by some societies may be
regarded as evil by some other.341 This means that the reason cannot be source of
values, but can only be concerned with quantity; and conscience, on the contrary,
cannot be concerned with quantitative issues but can only be interested in “values”.
Since the reason is concerned with quantitative things, it does not deal with values
and quality. The quality is determined by individual consciousness while the values
can only be determined by the social conscience.342 Gökalp also divides reason into
two parts as “the abstract” and “personified” reasons. To Gökalp, “personified
reason” is such a composition that it contains also the consciousness and the
conscience apart from the abstract reason.343 It is possible to say that the argument
assuming ethics to exist with the conscience not the reason will lead us to an ethical
relativism. For, the values are classified into some categories like religious, ethical,
legal, economic, and aesthetic. None of those values emerge from the nature of
matter or the characteristic of the individual; all emerge from the belief of the society
and live in its conscience. As the communities are divided into sections and types,
there are different values for different types.344 For this reason, the ethical principles
cannot be evaluated as “the absolute truths.” They can only be regarded as temporary
and evolutionary principles. To Gökalp, producing “absolute value judgments”
should be an action that the new understanding of ethics avoids. 345 Those ideas of

341
Ziya Gökalp, “Hüsün ve Kubuh [İçtimai Usul-i Fıkıh Meselesi Münasebetiyle],” İslam Mecmuası
1, no. 8 (25 Jumādā al-Ākhira 1332/8 May 1330/21 May 1914), p. 230.
342
Ibid, p. 230.
343
Ibid.
344
Ziya Gökalp, “Kıymet Hükümleri,” İslam Mecmuası 2, no. 17 (28 Muḥarram 1333/4 December
1330/16 December 1914), p. 471.
345
Ziya Gökalp [Demirtaş], “Yeni Hayat ve Yeni Kıymetler,” Genç Kalemler 2, no. 8 (10 August
1327/23 August 1911), p. 140.

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Gökalp can be amongst the ones mentioned under the influence of evolutionist and
positivist approach. At least in terms of the idea that the ethics has an “evolutionary”
dimension it is possible to do this.

One can find a similar relationship made between social consciousness and ethics in
İsmail Hakkı’s articles as well. İsmail Hakkı uses some statements that can be
interpreted as ethical relativism while, on the other hand, he also states that the ethics
is influenced by the conditions in a society. In this respect, for each society there is a
different tradition of ethics. In other words, each community is the creator of its own
ethics and each ethics is an ethics according to the society from which it arises. For
this reason, it is possible to talk about primitive, high, weak, strong, religious and
national ethics.346 Undoubtedly, this means that there are many subjective ethics not
a single and absolute one. To İsmail Hakkı, an Austrian believing that it is an ethical
duty to take revenge of his murdered relative; an Indian widowed believing that it is
an ethical action to die following the death of his husband; the ancient Gol people
believing that it is an inevitable ethical necessity to give an end to their lives
following the death of their king; or a Spartan condemned not because he stole but
because he was caught while stealing are the clearest examples of such a subjective
ethical understanding.347 As a result of a similar questioning, it can be claimed that
the slavery can also be evaluated as an ethical element. The ideas expressed in an
article published by Ali Haydar, for example, is the clearest reflection of this
thought:

Major task of human beings is to acquire sciences and fine arts. Acquiring
science is the biggest virtue. But the talents of people in respect to learning
science are not equal. One needs to bring those who have a talent in acquiring
these virtues off from coarse occupations and get the works in need of muscle
force done by plebs. Viewed from this perspective slavery can be regarded as
an ethical exercise. For by means of slavery many persons can be employed
in a manner complying with their power and abilities and with their natural
status.348

346
İsmail Hakkı, “Ahlak Mücahedeleri -2,” p 223.
347
Ibid.
348
Ali Haydar, “Ahlak Hakkında,” pp. 7-8.

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To tell the truth, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın gets involved in discussions about the ethical
relativism from a more essential point. For, there are, in his ideas about this issue,
some points which make us think that “there is no good or evil.” It seems that like M.
Zekeriya Sertel, also Hüseyin Cahit’s understanding of ethics is influenced by the
evolutionist approach. In the chapter concerning the philosophy of aesthetics,
Hüseyin Cahit Yaçın’s ideas will be thoroughly discussed. His chief source of
inspiration is Hyppolite Taine (1828-1893). Considering Taine’s positivist ideas and
his Darwinist tendencies, it is not hard to imagine how this impact was reflected in
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’s understanding of ethics. Within the scope of the articles he
wrote on the philosophy of aesthetics, in particular, it is seen that Hüseyin Cahit
Yalçın is a strong defender of the positivist understanding. His ideas on the issues of
arts and aesthetics are full of positivist and evolutionist approaches.

First of all, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın establishes a necessary connection between “the
milieu” and the ethical realm. He seems to think that just as every climate produces
different products and every climate has different social institutions, it is necessary to
explain the systems of ethics in every climate with different ways. 349 Hence, when
we come up with some actions that are not found in our society, the thing we should
do is not define those things as “good” or “evil.” On the contrary, one needs to
“examine the reason of the occurrence of these behaviors in this way, have a good
grasp of them and deduce some lessons from this grasp if possible. In such a
situation, the concepts of good or evil are no more in force.”350

Now, the statements above contain traces from almost all the discussions made in
this chapter. First, they contain a clear idea of ethical relativism. Second, they
represent an evolutionist approach as they connect the milieu and the ethics. Third, as
they are relativistic, they also refuse the notion of absolute ethics. Again within this
scope, as they refute the concepts of “good per se” and “evil per se”, they reflect an
anti-metaphysical attitude. Beyond all of these, the most conspicuous point is that
when the external conditions are cleared, to put it more clearly, when the physical,
349
Hüseyin Cahit, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -7- Bir Eser-i Edebîdnin Kıymeti Havi Olduğu Vesâik-i
Beşeriyenin Mikdarı ile Mukayese Olunur,” p. 214.
350
Ibid [emphasis added.]

170
geographical, economic, religious, cultural, political etc. reasons which determine the
shaping of what is “good” or “evil” in a society are taken off, nothing is left behind.
What we call good or evil, in Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’s view, is the overall of these
factors. What we call good, probably, is what is beneficial to us; what we call evil is
what damages us. The ideas above can also be seen as the reflection of a pragmatist
ethical understanding. The statement at the end of the article indicates that the value
of a law increases as long as the people belonging to that given society have
tendency to obey it. However, this tendency of obeying takes place on condition that
this law corresponds to the needs and tendencies of individuals. In other words, the
respect of a nation for a law or principle depends on the fact that this law
corresponds to the needs of people and creates a positive contribution. If this happens
the ethical principle becomes meaningful, otherwise it fails.

We finalize our discussion related to relativism by turning back to the relationship

established by the Young Turks between ethics and milieu. As a matter of fact, the
importance attributed to the milieu is a different expression for the fact that the ethics
is relative. The thing we call ethical reflects the manner in which society is
influenced by the circumstances and conditions. The current ethical order Young
Turks often complain about, to them, stems from a skewed mental relationship. It is
for this reason that, for example, in the Ottoman society when there was turbulent
times and disasters, the times when people needed the unity more, the ethical
corruption show up in the form of “black-marketeering.” The physical and economic
atmosphere that the war created, in which the selfishness becomes strong, is a
testimony for the society in resisting to the hardships. In Rıza Tevfik’s words, “it is
the state of war that affects most the ethically vital balance of a nation.” 351 When we
look at the Young Turks periodicals, we observe heavy criticism aimed at black-
marketeering due to the First World War. The common aspect of this criticism is the
emphasis on the ethical collapse and the impact of milieu on ethics.352

351
Rıza Tevfik, “Hürriyet: İngiliz Hakîm-İ Meşhuru John Stuart Mill Hürriyeti Nasıl Anlıyor?”,
U.İ.İ.M. 2, no. 5 (1 May 1325/14 May 1909), s. 26.
352
For other articles emphasizing on the necessity of the relationship between milieu and ethics, see
efor example: Tahrir Heyeti, “Yeni Hayat Hakkında Vaki Olan Tenkide Cevap,” Yeni Felsefe
Mecmuası 1, no. 3 (15 September 1327/28 September 1911), p. 4; M. Zekeriya Sertel, “Ahlak ve
Ahlakiyet,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 16 (30 March 1328/12 April 1912), p. 28; M. Zekeriya,
“Ahlak, Fazilet Ve Namusun Manası,” pp. 18-19; Ahmet Besim, “Temayülât-ı Ahlâkiye ve Örf,”
171
It seems that the question asked while tackling the progressive understanding of
history was answered. To put it more clearly, the things do not always move towards
the good. Periodic circumstances at times cause unexpected, undesirable results. If
the evolution always took us to good as the Young Turks imagined, there would not
be criticism regarding the black-marketeering. If the basic function of ethics were “to
adapt the man in the milieu in which he lives”353 there would be no point in
criticizing the black-marketeering. Then, it would be possible to describe this
situation as “the adaption to milieu.”

5.3 The Attitude towards the Schools of Ethics

In the following pages, the ideas regarding the schools of ethics published in the
Young Turks periodicals will be discussed. Within this scope, the most mentioned
schools are hedonism and ascetic (zuhdī) ethics. In fact, the schools of ethics
discussed in these publications are not limited to these schools. As far as it is seen,
although there are not many, it is possible to find discussions on some other schools
like utilitarianism, energismus, which is a version of utilitarism, and
eudaemonism.354 Nevertheless, the discussions or criticisms Young Turks employ
regarding the ethics are related these two schools of ethics (hedonism and
asceticism).

As pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, knowing what the Young Turks
criticized will be helpful in understanding where they want to reach. And the
question of where they want to reach is a crucial point in understanding the general
aspects of system of ethics envisaged by Young Turks. For this reason, it is useful to

İslam Mecmuası 3. No. 25 (30 Jumādā al-Ūlā 1333/2 April 133/15 April 1915), pp. 606-608; Âsaf
Nef’î, “Mücadele-i Hayatiye ve Tekâmül-i Cem’iyyât,” p. 460; Bedii Nuri, “Mebâhis-i Ahlâkiye,” p.
1309.
353
Bedii Nuri, “Mebâhis-i Ahlâkiye,” p. 1025.
354
Ali Haydar’s articles present a detailed examination of the ethical schools. See, Ali Haydar, “Ahlak
Hakkında-2,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 5 (15 October 1327/28 October 1911), pp. 1-7 and “Ahlak
Hakkında,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 6 (1 November 1327/14 November 1911), pp. 6-10.

172
examine what kind of an attitude is employed, by them, in discussing the schools of
ethics.

The discussions involved so far are helpful in finding the point that the Young Turks
identify the actions overlapping the social interests with the ethics. The actions
overlapping with the expectations of the society are seen as “normal” the ones that
do not overlap are seen as “abnormal” or “pathological.”355 Undoubtedly, like in all
fields, the issue of ethics giving priority to the social interests will bring about some
negative results for individuals. It is inevitable for such an approach to regard the
sacrifice of individual to society as an ethical endeavor by prioritizing “the whole”.
In this respect, it is important to investigate this situation in terms of the idea of
union employed by the Young Turks.

Seen from this point of view, it is not surprising that the individualism is regarded as
something immoral and a harsh criticism is aimed at hedonism within this respect by
Young Turks’ periodicals. Many Young Turk figures believe that hedonism, which
aims to reach the individual pleasures, is immoral. However, there is one point to pay
attention. The related criticisms are not directly aimed at the concept of “pleasure.”
In fact this circumstance can be interpreted as an indication of the fact that
“pleasure” is a legitimate element in the point of views of Young Turks. For, the
pleasure is not seen as something immoral; it is criticized only in terms of the
purpose it is directed. In essence, it is clear that the character of “evil in itself” is not
attributed to anything by the Young Turks; on the contrary, it is criticized in one way
or another. The results, reached within this study, about objection to metaphysics and
relativistic approaches reveal this. Even if the pleasure is not something bad in itself,
the feeling of satisfaction that the pleasure will bring should be perceived by too
much people, even by the whole society if possible.

On the other hand, some interesting approaches are observed, within periodicals
examined, about the quality of pleasure. There are spiritual and material pleasures

355
This division, which is inspired by Durkheim, can be foun in several articles in Young Turks’
periodicals. See, for example, Tahrir Heyeti, “Yeni Hayat,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 9 (16
December 1327/29 December 1911), p. 6.

173
and the spiritual ones are preferable. The material pleasures are the individual’s
object of desire while the spiritual ones are the society’s object of desire. This
subject, tackled by Gökalp in detail, will be discussed in following pages.

There is one more point to refer before starting the discussions: the ethical school,
which is called “the ascetic ethics”, is also at the center of important criticisms. As a
matter of fact, it seems to be more proper to name this kind of ethics as “religious
ethics”. Even though those criticizing this ethical thought do not use the term
“religious ethics” it is clear that the sources of this understanding can be found in
religious approaches. Why this is so will be clarified as the discussion becomes more
intense.

5.3.1 The Attitude towards Hedonism

The most specific form of criticism aimed at hedonism comes up in Ziya Gökalp’s
article of “Ferdiyet ve Şahsiyet.” It is possible to summarize Ziya Gökalp’s ideas on
hedonism briefly in that way: Above all the pleasure should be seen as the expression
of a principle rooted in the human nature. For this reason, the pleasure cannot be
refused at principle level, but on the condition that its legitimacy has an ethical
ground. The way of reaching this ethical ground is to accept that the pleasure can be
discussed within different categories. Then, is it possible to separate the pleasure into
different categories as a rooted quality in the human nature? To Gökalp, it is possible
to do this. Moreover, the legitimacy of pleasure can be brought into question only on
condition that such a separation is done. It means that the legitimacy of hedonism
according to which the main purpose of human life is “to attain to pleasure and to
refrain from pain as much as possible” corresponds to the truth if and only if
“different types of pleasure and pain are distinguished”. 356 Let us say that we tried to
prove that there are different types of pleasure and pain. What kind of pleasures and
pains are we supposed to ascertain? In that case, seems to think Gökalp, we would
realize that there are two different types of pleasures and pains which are “material”

356
Ziya Gökalp, “Ferdiyet ve Şahsiyet,” p. 2.

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(or bodily) pleasures or pains and “spiritual” ones.357 But is it not already certain that
there are both bodily and spiritual pleasures and pains? Is it not, for example, the
case that some pleasures come through bodily behaviors like eating, drinking,
reproducing etc. while spiritual ones do so by helping a poor or remorse etc? Gökalp
does not think otherwise. But his case can be made clearer if we proceed a step
further. To him, separating the pleasures as “material” and “spiritual” is, in fact,
necessary in terms of determining the subjective styles of being. The existence of a
material or spiritual pleasure by itself will not mean anything. Here, the question to
be answered is why some pleasures are spiritual while some others are material. This
is like that, because they are the objects of two different types of being:
“individuality” and “personality.” The existence of material pleasures becomes
meaningful only if it constitutes a touching point between the individuality and the
type that individual belongs to. On the other hand, the spiritual pleasures constitute
the fundamental part of personality due to the fact that they are a social source of
inspiration. For example, when we eat, drink, desire sex, in fact, we do the necessity
that is encoded in us as a member of “the human species.” While following religious,
ethical, political, aesthetic ideals we unconsciously meet the expectation of the
society which is collective spirit. While our individual side runs after material
pleasures, our personal side seeks spiritual ones. In this respect, we should see the
pleasures that our individuality seeks to attain as individual pleasures, and the ones to
which our personality seeks to attain as “personal pleasures.”358 While the individual
pleasures have some material consequences, the personal pleasures will only have
consequences of their own kind. It is clear that the pain we feel when we see some
sacred values collapse is different from the pain felt due to hunger. And it is because
of this that the pleasures we get from eating and from helping the poor are different.
Gökalp, starting out from the qualitative differences, claims that personal pleasures
and individual pleasures cannot be reduced to each other.359 The reason why
hedonism is a matter of criticism for Gökalp stems from the question of whether such
a reduction is possible or not. To Gökalp, the hedonists are mistaken as they claim

357
Ibid.
358
Ibid.
359
Ibid.

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that the spiritual pleasures can be reduced to material pleasures.360 Here, it should be
pointed out that the matter is an individualistic hedonism. We had interpreted
Gökalp’s distinction of individuality and personality in the third chapter as a
distinction between body and mind. What distinguishes the individuality from the
society, which can be defined as a collective spirit, is his body as a material reality.
The personality, as it is totally made of ideals, is connected to the material through
the body of individual indirectly. Considering the difference between individuality
and personality, it seems to be possible to say that in fact Gökalp’s purpose is to
develop an ethical argument preserving the social balance. “Since it is not possible to
imagine a personality without individuality, the personalists never ignore the
individuality. The individuality is the ground on which the building of personality is
constructed. But, as there are many individualities without personalities, the
individualists may ignore the personality”361 It is clear that what makes Gökalp
anxious is the fact that this possibility becomes true. Once the individual desires
become more important than the social ideals, it will not be possible to talk about the
union and wholeness of society. The personal desires serve also for “the order and
progress”362 of society. In this respect, constructing the ethics on the principle of
personal desire is a major threat in terms of social existence. As it will be touched
upon later on, this leads to the sacrifice of individual to the society, and is a situation
which can also be observed within the political philosophy of Young Turks.

Considering Gökalp’s approach, outlines of which are discussed here, it is necessary

to investigate one point in particular. Gökalp’s argument that we fulfill both
individual and personal desires “unconsciously” should be emphasized. The fact that
this is true can be interpreted as a sign that we face an ethical determinism. For, if the
material pleasures we use to satisfy our desires are necessary for reproduction and
while we satisfy these desires in fact we struggle for continuing our lineage
“unconsciously” then, here there is a deterministic situation. In this case, it is
necessary to talk about determinism appearing as volitional. On the other hand, if we

360
Ibid.
361
Ibid.
362
Ibid.

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contribute to the continuation of our lineage unconsciously by means of things we
do to get pleasure or we avoid doing (depending on the material and spiritual natures
of those things), in this case, we happen to do what is necessary and avoid doing
what should not be done. By doing so, we engage in an ethical action. Is not doing
something unconsciously, without knowing it, obeying existing things –but that we
cannot bring them to the “full conscious” level? Otherwise it would be hard to
explain this situation. If the contrary situation were true; making up principles,
actions and ideals to insure the survival of our species and obeying these would be a
totally conscious activity. However, Gökalp talks about a contribution done
unconsciously. This and similar subjects will take us to “the ethical necessity of
union.” To put it more clearly, we are already subject to historical, cultural and
philosophical determinism in terms of actualizing the union.

The ideas of other Young Turks figures were also largely in line with the fact that the
ethics should be evaluated as an element emerging with the social life. The things
protecting the being of society and exalting it are ethical principles. But, a much
more important principle comes up here. While doing these ethical actions we are not
conscious, we do them in an encoded way. Whether the base of our understanding of
ethics is made of material or spiritual pleasures and pains, we seek reproduction in
the first, and continuation of our society in the latter. But, it seems that the society is
quite conscious in encoding us. It is even possible to claim that the individual realize
a “conveyance of consciousness” when it comes to ethics. The behaviors seeming
“unconscious” in terms of the individual are quite conscious when looked from the
point of view of the society. Of course this consciousness appears as “upper-
consciousness” which is described as “conscience” by Gökalp.363 The individual
consciousness is not far from individuals so as to turn them into automats.
Undoubtedly, the individual has a “consciousness.” But, this consciousness is under
the shadow of the conscience. The mechanism determining what we should do or
avoid doing seems to be “the social conscience.”

363
Ibid, p. 3.

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Another point to be discussed in Gökalp’s ideas on hedonism takes place in one of
his article written under the pen name of Celal Sakıp.364 In this article, Gökalp uses
the two concepts, borrowed from the religious literature, in a more secular form. The
concepts are “fisq” and “shirk”. To him, hedonism, which is a chief reason of
egoism, makes people to commit the crimes of “social fısq” and “social shirk”.365 To
mention it briefly, according to the Islamic jurisprudence, “fisq” means committing
an act despite knowing that it is evil (sin) and getting away from obeying Allah.366
And “shirk” means opposition to the fundamental creed of “tawhīd” (unity of God).
In other words, it means engaging in words and actions that are contradictory to the
belief that there is only one God. It is not likely that a positivist writer like Gökalp
adopted these concepts as it is used in the Islamic literature. Also, in his works
published in İslam Mecmuası on the Islamic jurisprudence he tackles the re-
evaluation of the Islamic law with a modern perspective.367 Therefore, instead of
thinking that he used these concepts just as taken from the traditional discipline, the
Islamic jurisprudence, it is more logical to think that he realized a semantic
transformation on them. For example, based on this, we can say that concepts of “the
social fisq” and “the social shirk” are in line with the idea of “deification of the
society”, a theme which is also discussed within third chapter. To put it more clearly,
hedonism would mean the emphasis on the individual instead of the society (hence
God) as it prioritizes the individual pleasures and neglects the social needs. If the
individual does not do his responsibilities even if he has the consciousness and does
the things he should not do, he becomes “fāsiq.” On the other hand, this individual,
to put it with Ziya Gökalp’s terms, would be a “mushrik” (polytheist) as he sees the
material and spiritual pleasures equal. In this case, he would bring the directives of

364
Ziya Gökalp [Celal Sakıp], “Eser ve Zat: Rıza Tevfik’in Felsefesi,” Genç Kalemler 3, no. 15 (1
February 1327/14 February 1912), pp. 60-71.
365
Ibid, p. 70.
366
Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır, Alfabetik İslam Hukuku ve Fıkıh Istılahları Kâmusu (İstanbul: Eser
Neşriyat, 1997), p. 460. One needs also point to the fact that some writers –who are specialized within
the area of Islamic jurisprudence- arguing that fisq is the most important issue after infidelity (kufr).
For an argument to this effect see Bassam Mohammad Sıhyawnī, Al-Fisq wa Ahkāmuhū fī al-fiqh al-
Islāmī (Dımaşq: Dār an-Nawādir, 2010), pp. 10-11. It is most probably because that conscious
commitment of certain acts, which are forbidden by God, leads the person to overlook the limits set by
God himself.
367
For the detailed identification of Ziya Gökalp,’s articles within this regard see 293rd footnote.

178
social conscience and desires of individual consciousness to the same level which
means to commit “shirk.”

Another Young Turk figure criticizing hedonism from an ethical standpoint is Rıza
Tevfik. Although his view on hedonism is critical, it is the product of a different
approach. Rıza Tevfik engages in the discussion from a point that can be called as
“family ethics.” He seems to be regarding hedonism as a result of “social
degeneration.” In this respect, it is the memory of regime of Abdülhamit. Before the
Young Turks took over, the status quo consciously left people ignorant. The
ignorance caused people to turn upon in their selves. And depending on this a type of
man keeping his individual interests appeared. The individual interests are based on
individual profit and individual pleasure. The quest of individual pleasure, to Rıza
Tevfik, is found in following words:

The life is too short. You will not come to this world of pleasure again. In this
short life, we should get as much pleasure as we can. The self is more
important than everything. The struggle for life makes life unbearable. The
trouble of having children and family is not something logical. Instead of
having a family and responsibilities it brings, living like parasite and not
leaving any trace is the most logical way.368

Conceiving this as a harmful approach to the society, Rıza Tevfik believes that the
first thing should be done is to bring precautions that will destroy the social
degeneration. The first point to emphasize, then, is to struggle for implementing a
mentality that can be defined as “family ethics.” The thing that is ethical for a society
is the thing that enables the population increase; the unethical is the one that makes
the population less.369 In this view, marriage is an ethical necessity in terms of its
role in increasing the population. The more a person seeks individual pleasures the
more becomes distinct to the idea of making a family. For this reason, he does not
contribute to the population increase.

368
Rıza Tevfik, “Ahlakın Nüfusa Tesiri,” p. 242.
369
Ibid, p. 237.

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The criticism made by Rıza Tevfik on hedonism can also be interpreted as a support
for utilitarianism. To him, there is no good or evil in itself; but there are actions that
are necessary for the perpetuity of the nation or serving to its destruction. 370 That
means we should be distinct ourselves from the metaphysical meanings that good or
evil bear and turn directly to the society. Whatever serves to the perpetuity of the
nation is good; whatever damages this is evil. The clearer expression of this
utilitarianist approach is: “The base of ethical actions in social matters is the common
interest of the society.” 371 In this case, the behaviors that serve to common interests
are good and the ones that do not serve are evil.

Another Young Turk figure criticizing hedonism as it leads people to seek their own
desires is Ali Haydar. To him, the thing lying behind hedonism is egoism. Egoism is
very harmful for the state and the society, because an egoist person demands from
the government the protection of only his own property and life. The ideal of that
person is to live a comfortable life and he does not want to get involved in the
struggle for life to make to society progressed. He never does his responsibilities for
the state and nation when it is necessary.372 It does not seem possible for Ali Haydar
to discus hedonism as a legitimate ethical approach. As he talks about “struggle for
life” for serving the progress of society, his approach seems to be a reflection of the
Darwinist and positivist point of view. Another conspicuous point is that duties and
responsibilities of an individual for the society become ethical.

Above, the criticism on “hedonism” or the principle “pleasure” was discussed. Those
in fact directly deal with the element of “pleasure” as an ethical principle. What
makes this important for us is the association of hedonism with individualism and its
evaluation in terms of damages for the society. But, the fact that there is criticism
against hedonism directly as an ethical school was a subject that needed to be pointed
out. This criticism is by all means constitutes a minor part of ideas expressed by the
Young Turks in the periodicals about what to do when it comes to talk about the

370
Ibid, p. 236.
371
Ibid, p. 247.
372
Ali Haydar, “Ahlak Hakkında-2,” p. 7.

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ethics. Below, in the section wherein the themes of “sacrificing the individual to the
society” and “the ethical necessity of union” will be focused on, this subject shall be
discussed more thoroughly. For this reason, by putting aside the discussion on
hedonism, “the ascetic ethics” criticized by the Young Turks in the periodicals is
going to be discussed.

5.3.2 The Attitude towards Ascetic Understanding of Ethics

The concept of “zuhd” (ascetism), which is Arabic in origin, literally means

“relinquishing something”, or “retreating.”373 In the Islamic terminology it can be
defined as “the control of the self (nefs) for gaining God’s consent.”

The concept of “zuhdī/ascetic ethics” is used by Ziya Gökalp. The reason why
discuss asceticism or ascetic ethics is that it can help us to answer the question of
how a connection is established between ethics and religion in the Young Turks
thought. Considering the lexical and terminological meanings attributed to the
concept it can be said that it refers to a religious understanding of ethics. The ethical
meaning and importance of asceticism is generally emphasized by people belonging
to schools of tasawwuf. Nevertheless, as it will be discussed later, Ziya Gökalp does
not interpret the ascetic ethics just as an attitude belonging to the Sufism. His
expressions in defining the ascetic ethics entirely correspond to a religious
framework. For this reason, it seems possible to use “the ascetic ethics” and religious
ethics synonymously considering Ziya Gökalp’s ideas.

Considering the Young Turks publications it can be claimed that two approaches
come to the fore regarding the ascetic ethics. One of them objects to the idea that an
ethics based on religion is possible. But it is useful to point out that this objection is
“conditional.” It is conditional, as a criticism indicating that there is no essential
connection between ethics and religion, and not put forward as a reservation against
the legitimacy of religion. Religion is a legitimate social phenomenon to most of the
Young Turks. In this respect, the legitimacy of its existence is not made a subject of

373
Serdar Mutçalı, Al-Mu’jam Al-‘Arabī Al-Hadīth/Arapça-Türkçe Sözlük (İstanbul: Dağarcık
Yayınevi, 1995), p. 363.

181
discussion. Of course there is some exceptional Young Turk figures employed a
more rigid approach and argued that religion, monotheistic religions in particular,
have no truth at all.374 But, the mainstream Young Turks preferred to adopt a
reconciliatory approach when it comes to religion as it was mentioned in the first
chapter. Their reconciliatory approach reveals itself as a silence about the “truth” of
religion. It seems difficult to receive a positive answer, from most of them, with
regard to the question of whether the religion emerged as a result of a connection
with a divine being as monotheistic religions argue. This hesitant state of mind
reveals itself in the form of silence. Interestingly, the Young Turks are not silent
about the function of religion contrary to their attitude about its truth. Even it is
possible to mention that the legitimacy attributed to religion stem from this
“function.” Considering the famous three states of Auguste Comte, the periods left
behind by the humanity (theological and metaphysical periods) cannot have a
determining role in the positivist period. Religion is legitimate mostly because of its
social role and function in terms of providing social order and regulation. When it is
out of this sphere its legitimacy will surely be disappeared.

Another matter should be pointed out in terms of the followers of the first approach.
These people aim to fit the ethical principles adopted in the Islamic thought to the
modern circumstances by reevaluating them within the framework of popular
scientific concepts of the day. Hence, certain traditional concepts found in the Young
Turks’ writings should be evaluated as only “borrowed” concepts.

The second approach concerning the ascetic understanding, although it critical again,
supports the idea that there can be a touching point between religion and ethics. One
needs to add that there are only few proponents of this approach. İsmail Hakkı, for
example, mentions this with statements that are no very clear. The clearest
statements in this direction are found in Besim Atalay’s articles published in İslam
Mecmuası which is probably the only periodical that can be defined, in the narrow
sense of the word, as “conservative” compared to the other Young Turks periodicals.
Although he seems to have conservative tendencies, Besim Atalay brings very harsh
374
It has been pointed within the discussions about philosophy of religion, for example, that M. Nermi
does not attribute any truth to monotheistic religions.

182
criticism to the traditional (religious) understanding of ethics. His criticism is aimed
at both the society itself dealing with the ethical crisis and the Islamic thinkers who
are thought to be the reason of this crisis. Some other points related to the ethics in
his criticisms will be discussed in the following parts.

The first of the two approaches mentioned above is found in Ziya Gökalp’s article
named “Ahlak Buhranı.”375 To Ziya Gökalp, the ascetic ethics is a phenomenon
found in both primitive and developed (monotheistic) religious systems. Both kinds
of religions are, in essence, composed of certain sets of “prohibitions” and
“liberties.” These prohibitions and liberties emerge from the responsibility felt for
the holiness believed to regulate the order in the universe. The prohibitions are for
preventing the violation of this holiness while the liberties are for implementing it.376
The attention paid by the primitive religions for these commands and prohibitions
become harsher in monotheistic religions. The monotheistic religions struggle more
for keeping people’s attentions alive for the divinity in this world based on which
their treatment in the other world will be determined.377 In this sense, it can be said
that religion has a positive role. This case, in fact, overlaps with the idea mentioned
about the function of religion above. Therefore, these statements by Gökalp are
positive aspects of religion in his ideology. But, considering the ideas mentioned in
the following parts of the article, it can be claimed that he sees the ascetic ethics
something that should remain as a historical phenomenon. To him, with the increase
in the social cooperation, the ascetic ethics will be confined to the interest of a minor
group.378 The reason of ethical state defined as “crisis” by Gökalp is this turmoil
experienced in the area of ethics. However, to Gökalp, the solution does not lie in the
revival of the ascetic ethics. On the contrary, such a situation would deepen the
crisis. To put it within his expressions:

In a period when a nation undergoes a spiritual reformation, no matter how

hard the need for ethics is, the revival of the old ethics that is residual is as

375
Ziya Gökalp, “Ahlâk Buhranı,” Yeni Mecmua 1, no. 7 (23 August 1917), pp. 122-124.
376
Ibid, p. 122.
377
Ibid.
378
Ibid.
183
 just dangerous. The more you impose a dead ethics, the stronger immorality
and individualism emerging against this as a social response becomes. The
rules and ceremonies, family and government styles that do not live in
consciences, making people live ethical duties and ideals by force, bring
about the opposite of desired results. So, the responsible for the current
ethical crisis are the thinkers that do not struggle for promoting the new ethics
in the first place and in the second place are the conservative forces struggling
to impose the old ethics by force.379

Undoubtedly, these points indicate that the ascetic ethics is dead irreversibly. Now,
to Gökalp, we should do what the Europeans did once. We should construct “social
holiness” instead of the corrupted religious one.380 The social sacred should both
correspond to the realities of the age and bear a national quality on the other hand.
These are the most conspicuous aspects of the new ethics desired to be constructed.

Another remarkable point concerning Gökalp’s approach is that he is the

representative of classical Young Turks attitude purifying the being from the idea of
holiness. The positivism, evolutionism and materialism tackled in the second chapter
had purified the being from the divine. Hene, we witness the purification of ethics
from it. As a result, what Gökalp defined as “social holiness” is questionable in the
point how really “divine” it is. Here, the regulator of society is the subject matter
rather than the regulator of the universe. What is forbidden are the things threatening
the existence of society, and what is permissible is the things reinforcing, protecting,
and supporting its existence.

The second approach within the scope of the ascetic ethics are found in Besim
Atalay’s İslam Mecmuası articles as stated above.381 He also complains of the

379
Ibid, p. 123.
380
Ibid.
381
Besim Atalay’s first article, within the series examining ethical matters, is published in the 10th
issue of İslam Mecmuası. He signed his articles as “Ahmet Besim” until the 29th issue of the said
journal. The full identities of his articles within the context of ethics are as follows: Ahmet Besim,
“Ahlak ve Din,” İslam Mecmuası 1, no. 10 ( 24 Rajab 1332/5 June 1330/18 June 1914), pp. 315-318;
Ahmet Besim, “Ahlak ve Din: Ahlakın Ehemmiyeti,” İslam Mecmuası 2. no.13 (7 Ramaḍān 1332/17
July 1330/30 July 1914), pp. 389-392; Ahmet Besim, “Din ve Ahlak -3- Nazar-ı İslam’da Ahlak,”
İslam Mecmuası 2, no. 15 (30 Zilhijja 1332/6 November 1330/19 November 1914), pp. 445-448;
Ahmet Besim, “Nazar-ı İslam’da Ahlak,” İslam Mecmuası 2, no. 20 (12 Rabī‘ al-Awwal 1333/15
January 1330/28 January 1915), pp. 526-527; Ahmet Besim, “Din ve Ahlak -4- Hakikat-i Ahlak,”
İslam Mecmuası 2, no. 22 (10 Rabī‘ al-Ākhir 1333/12 February 1330/25 February 1915), pp. 554-557;
184
existence of an ethical crisis like many Young Turks figures. He believes that the
best indicator of the crisis is the fact that Muslims adopt egoism as a principle.
However, the life styles of Muslims are only the result of this ethical crisis. The
reason of crisis is the Islamic scholars and traditional disciplines like jurisprudence
and kalām theorized by them. The Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and kalām disciplines
constructed by them have had some negative impacts on the Muslims. With Besim
Atalay’s words, fiqh “turned Muslims praying machines” and kalām “made them
very materialist and theoretical on the belief.”382 As a result, Muslims directed their
attention only to formal elements and forgot the spiritual dimensions. He explains the
essential mistake of Islamic scholars within his following statements:

The Islamic scholars deducing legal verdicts from the verses and hadiths and
filling volumes of writings also needed to deduce moral lessons from these
sacred and inspirational sources. A Muslim memorizing even the rules of
ablution did not need to learn the rules of religious ethics from the life of
prophet.383

The indifference of Islamic scholars to the field of ethics led to the adoption
individualism as a principle by Muslims. Considering the logical connection made by
many Young Turks figures between individualism and hedonism, it is possible to say
that the Muslim image mentioned by Besim Atalay gains a hedonistic characteristic.
To him, a Muslim feels guilty when he wipes his nose with his right hand while
performing ablutions, but the same Muslim does not feel guilty while taking bribery
and abusing orphan’s goods.384 It is possible to define this as “a hedonism whose

Ahmet Besim, “Temayülât-ı Ahlâkiye ve Örf,” İslam Mecmuası 3. No. 25 (30 Jumādā al-Ūlā 1333/2
April 133/15 April 1915), pp. 606-608; Besim Atalay, “Din ve Ahlak-7: Nazar-ı İslam’da Ahlak,”
İslam Mecmuası 3, no. 29 (27 Rajab 1333/28 May 1331/10 June 1915), pp. 664-667; Besim Atalay,
“Din ve Ahlak: ‘İbâdât-ı İslâmiye ve Ahlâk,” İslam Mecmuası 3, no. 32 (16 Ramaḍān1333/16 July
1331/28 July 1915), pp. 715-717; Besim Atalay, “Din ve Ahlak: ‘İbâdât-ı İslâmiye ve Ahlâk,” İslam
Mecmuası 3, no. 33. (30 Ramaḍān 1333/30 July 1331/11 August 1915), pp. 734-736; Besim Atalay,
“Din ve Ahlak: İbâdât-ı İslamiye ve Ahlak – Namaz,“ İslam Mecmuası 4, no. 39 (10 Muḥarram1334/6
November 1331/18 November 1915), pp. 835-837; Besim Atalay, “Din ve Ahlak -11- İbâdât-ı
İslamiye ve Ahlak,” İslam Mecmuası 4, no. 40 (25 Muḥarram1334/19 November 1331/3 December
1915), pp. 839-842; Besim Atalay, “Din-Ahlak: Ma’nâ-yı Ahlâk,” İslam Mecmuası 5, no. 51 (15 Rabīʿ
al-Ākhir 1335/26 January 1332/8 February 1917), pp. 1025-26; Besim Atalay, “Ahlak Değişir Mi?”
İslam Mecmuası 5, no. 52 (7 Jumādā al-Ūlā 1335/1 March 1333/1 March 1917), pp. 1040-42.
382
Ahmet Besim, ““Ahlak ve Din,” p. 317.
383
Ibid.
384
Ibid.
185
source is in religion”, because Muslims seek only the things that satisfy their own
interests and passions. Besides, these interests and passions are derived directly from
the religion. By praying they believe they can reach the rewards promoted by God
and get the pleasures of paradise by exhibiting some sets of bodily behaviors. Seen
from the other side, the fact that they do these bodily actions is the direct charm of
pleasures they want to get. This is a situation the origins of which can be found in the
religious belief.

Within the context of Besim Atalay’s ideas, a second subject can be pointed out. To
this, the divinity attributed to the society by the Young Turks is found in Besim
Atalay’s ideas as well. For example, he interprets the hadith “the bad character is an
unforgiving sin” in such a way that this hadith and many others indicate us that the
shortcomings in praying are pardonable, because these are sins against God and God
likes to forgive. But, the evil in ethics (character) is an evil both against God and the
society. In this sense there is great evil in it for the society. That’s why it is not
possible to forgive this.385

5.4 Sacrificing the Individual to the Society or the Ethical Necessity of Union

It seems possible, after all these discussions, to draw a conclusion like this: The fact
that the ideas of the Young Turks within the context of the ethical issues are largely
focused on individual hedonism and ascetic ethics in fact indicate where they want to
reach. Leaving aside individualism supports the idea of union while leaving aside the
ascetic ethics supports secularization and progress. That means that the union which
is a political concept and the progress which is a scientific concept turns into ethical
principles in the Young Turks’ ideology. This situation is remarkable both in terms
of indicating the complexity of Young Turks’ ideology and deriving certain
coherence in terms of philosophical spheres.

The vitality of mentioned ethical principles largely lies in the question of what kind
of relationship is envisaged between individual and society. Their criticism for

385
Besim Atalay, “Din ve Ahlak-7: Nazar-ı İslam’da Ahlak,” pp. 1-2.

186
hedonism provides a clue related to their views on the individual. By means of these
clues, it is possible to discuss the relationship between individual and society on an
ethical ground. Below, the ethical grounds of sacrifice of individual to the society
and the ethical necessity of the union in this respect will be discussed. Hence, it will
be seen that the Young Turks’ understanding of ethics is “deterministic” in a sense.

One of the essential issues to point out at the level reached by now is the fact that the
Young Turks’ ethical philosophy is deterministic. It has been touched upon, in the
third chapter, that the scientific method they employed made them deterministic. The
deterministic approach in terms of the philosophy of ethics that we think they adopt
has both epistemological and ontological dimensions. Our knowledge about the
objects has to overlap with the qualities exiting objectively and independent of us.
Our knowledge can only be knowledge as much as it overlaps those objective
qualities; otherwise we cannot talk about the knowledge. If we transfer this to field of
ethics, it is seen that the ethics, which is rather discussed on a practical ground, has
an epistemological dimension in one sense. It can be reasonably claimed that the
ethical action should correspond to the knowledge concerning the mentioned action.
The question of “how I should behave” in fact, even if implicitly, can be interpreted
as the equivalent of the question of “with what my behavior should correspond?” In
this regard, it will be required to talk about an epistemological dimension also in
ethics. The second question above will be answered with “the social consciousness”
by the Young Turks regarding the discussions made till now. On the other hand, to
be able to talk about this knowledge on ethics, it will also be necessary to talk about
a subject that will have the mentioned knowledge. Then, is that subject something
given? In other words, is the question above asked directly by the individual subject?
Looking at from the point of Young Turks, we should give a negative answer to this,
because the subject exists only by means of touching and arising out of the social
conscience that is defined as the collective consciousness. Only the subject that
agrees with it can claim to exist. Existence is emerging directly from that
consciousness and also the maintenance of this existence would only be possible as a
result of agreeing with that consciousness. In this case, we will unavoidably find
ourselves in a deterministic approach, because both our being and knowledge
independent of us are determined by the society as a source of external objectivity.

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What I can know and what I can do are answered by the society beforehand rather
than me. What I should do as an individual is to adapt them directly and apply. One
can object to this assumption by arguing, for example, that we see someone out of
the framework drawn by the collective consciousness. In other words, we see there
are individuals ignoring the directives of mentioned consciousness “you should do
this” and “you should stay away from that.” How should we explain these? It can be
answered by saying that they are deemed “null and void.” One of the most
conspicuous aspects of ethical determinism found in the Young Turks’ ideology is
this, and the subject should be discussed within the framework of questions like how
the individual is discussed, what kind of relationship is imagined between society
and individual (in terms of ethics). This circumstance, determined as one sided
relation between individual and society, and more importantly conceptualized in
terms of a necessary “creating” and “existing”, will be characterized as “the ethical
necessity of union.”

The main reason of the claim that the unity must be seen as an ethical necessity, in
Young Turks’ system of thought, is the existential meaning ethics has in the point of
“creating” and “existing.” The ethics is an existential problem both in terms of
individual and society. Although the existential quality of ethics may seem to be born
from different grounds, they unite at the same point. In consideration of Young
Turks, the ethics is a necessary condition of the social being. We see this not as a
sociological event that is a necessary condition for the emergence of society but as a
necessity showing an ontological event. The society as a collective consciousness
needs ethical codes and value judgments to be able remain in the sphere of being. In
other words, if there is no ethics, we cannot talk about the society. On the other hand,
the individual has to adopt a necessary altruism. To talk about the possibility of
individual being is only up to behaving in accordance with ethical codes or value
judgments. The individual is indebted to society not in terms of its physical aspects
but perhaps in terms of consciousness it owes its being to the society. Realizing this
requires a voluntary contact with “the other.” The other is not the other as an
individual, but it is the social consciousness which is “the wholly other.” The
relationship experienced with the wholly other collective consciousness has the
bindingness of the ethical duty for a source of divinity. In spite of its unconscious

188
character, this bindingness requiring a voluntary submission is, in essence, the
clearest expression of necessity. The ethical relation experienced with the other is the
manifestation a divinity. The contact made among individual consciousnesses
through the ethics generates the social holiness. From this point of view, it seems
possible to express the meaning that the ethical necessity of union has in terms of
social being in that way: the ethical necessity of union gets the “wholly other” to
become “holy other”. It can be claimed that Ziya Gökalp’s expression of “the social
holiness” is also emerged from such a belief in necessity. It arises out of an ethical
necessity, because the altruism that individual consciousness shows to collective
consciousness is not arbitrary but it is totally oppressive. The individual may exist
only if contacts with the other without expecting something in return and by
“consociating.” The main reason of the claim that the individual not having social
codes are deemed null and void in terms of the collective consciousness is, in fact,
this. The individual exists as long as he becomes ethical. In this respect, it is even
possible to say that the ethics plays the role of “first philosophy” in terms of Young
Turks’ ideology.

It was discussed in the second chapter that Young Turks used the concepts of union
and order synonymously and for example they defined the supporters of the Ottoman
CUP as “the supporters of order and progress.” In fact, as it corresponds to the
principle of “ordre” by Auguste Comte “intizām”(order) may be seen a more
appropriate concept in terms of their discussions on ethics. The function attributed to
ethics in terms of establishing the social order is the establishment of the social
harmony. However, beyond being only a sociological phenomenon, the social
harmony seems to adopt an existential quality. The making of relationships among
the consciousnesses and the possibility of contacting the collective consciousness lies
in this harmony. The most reasonable way of expressing such a harmony depends on
interpreting it similar to the relationship among monads in the thought of Leibniz.
Ziya Gökalp while talking about the existence of individual consciousnesses and
their relationships among themselves uses a language reminiscent of the terminology
of Leibniz. His articles “Şahsi Ahlak” and “Bugünkü Felsefe” clearly reveal the
influence of Leibniz. In these articles Gökalp defines Leibniz’s concept of monad as
“personality” within his own conceptual framework. It is seen that he uses

189
personality to refer to “conscience” at times and to “consciousness” at others. To
Gökalp, it is Leibniz who grasped the meaning of personality best among
philosophers. “Leibniz’s concept of “monad” is above all a personal and autonomous
being.”386Leibniz really describes the substances he calls monads similarly while
talking about them in his work Monadology.387 Yet, Leibniz mentions the autonomy
of these monads with an absolutely descriptive purpose. In Leibniz’s thought, the
monads are not substances that are independent of themselves entirely. They separate
from each other with some specific qualities (like to be open to perceive). But,
ultimately, they are in touch with the others internally so as to project a unified
universe. In other words, monads “constitute the unity in plurality.” Gökalp also
agrees on a similar idea of union. But, he imagined the universe observed by
personalities in a more ethical way. To put it more clearly, in Gökalp’s
understanding, each of personalities observes the collective consciousness from
different points of views. “As the universe is a system of visions, every conscience is
succinctly the reflection of collective consciousness. Nevertheless, each of these
consciences expresses the collective conscience from its own point of view.” 388 This
will not mean that each conscience is satisfied with expressing the collective
conscience from its own point of view and in its own way. Each conscience
experiences the collective conscience by fitting it to the ethical framework built
previously by the collective conscience. Idiosyncrasy must be confined to the way
that framework is experienced. Otherwise, the individual experience that will reach
different and incoherent results would not constitute “the unity in plurality” but a pile
of discrepancies.

Gökalp believes that the “autonomous” personalities still reach a vision of complete
universe; more precisely they have to reach this. Although he does not question in
detail how they reach this complete vision of universe, considering the discussions
made in the previous pages, one may think that some reasonable deductions can be
presented about the kind of the vision Gökalp had. According to this, the

386
Ziya Gökalp, “Şahsî Ahlak,” p. 144.
387
See G W. Leibniz, Monadology in Monadology: An Edition for Students, translated and edited by
Nicholas Rescher (University of Pittsburg Press, 1991) 313 pp.
388
Ziya Gökalp, ibid.
190
personalities, consciences or consciousnesses independent of each other are shaped
by the collective consciousness beforehand. The collective consciousness is the most
perfect consciousness. The perfection shows at the same time its skill and
competence of shaping. This power seeming natural in terms of the quality of
collective consciousness constitutes a deterministic quality in terms of individual
consciousnesses. This approach corresponds to God described in Leibniz’s
Monadology and Theodicy. Leibniz talks about a harmony pre-established by God
while tackling the questions of how the relationship between body and mind is
possible and how the monads reach the projection of a common universe. 389 If such a
regulator did not exist, it would not be possible to constitute a harmony among the
monads “having no windows opening to outside”, in other words closed to external
impacts completely. Considering the holiness attributed to it by Young Turks, the
society will come up as the most developed form of the idea of personality. It will
bring together the consciousnesses watching the universe with different eyes on a
common ground. The collective consciousness has the ability to form a determinant
making individual consciousnesses reach a coherent understanding of ethics. That is
a part of its perfection. Looking at from this perspective, it is possible to say that the
phenomenon of “eternal harmony” attributed to God by Leibniz is attributed to
society in Young Turks’ ideology. How else can it be interpreted the fact that the
individual adopts ethical codes constituted by the society “unconsciously” and turns
them into actions again unconsciously?

Seeing another way of the discussion of ethics on a social ground as a legitimate and
reasonable effort is the possibility of “evolvement” put forward for individual being.
The ethics in terms of engaging in a relationship with the other is emancipating the
individual from a closed being and taking to a real being. That means the ethics is a
way of emancipation from solipsism which is a highly remarkable point. In fact, it is
also possible to evaluate the criticism aimed at hedonism within this scope. As a
hedonist consciousness realizes an action of thought solely within itself, it excludes
contacting with the other and helping people. A consciousness following such a path

389
See G. W. Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin
of Evil, translated by. E. M. Huggard and edited with an Introduction by Austin Farrer, (Electronic
book, 2005), pp. 245-246.

191
will become a pathological incidence from the point of view of the society and will
be deemed to be null by it. The main reason why the Young Turks constantly
criticizes the individual point of view is this.

This existential and necessary connection established between the personal being of
the individual and ethics may seem to be deductive from one point. In other words,
the ideas mentioned in the previous pages may be regarded as the logical extension
of views published in the periodicals. However, considering together with some ideas
that the being of individual, as an individual, does not have any sense in terms of
ethics it will be possible to say that the mentioned deductions are not groundless.
According to Young Turks, the value of any ethical rule depends on the fact that the
individual is forced to sacrifice his individuality to his personality when it is
necessary.390 While sacrificing his individuality to his personality he will start from
this point: only a community, a mass of people can serve to the progress of
civilization. The individuals do not have value and importance in their views. I am,
as an individual in the lineages of active generations, a modest circle. Me and the
individuals sacrificing their individuality to their personality will be replaced with
new generations equipped with new forces. I may perish but the society never does.
It constantly runs towards progress and evolution. Not my happiness as an individual
but the happiness and progress of the common should be desired. 391 Then, there is no
harm in giving my being to the collective being and this is an inevitable duty for me.

This matter defined as the ethical necessity of union, is a natural result of the
passivity of individual consciousness against the collective consciousness. This result
is quite natural, because even the “will” that can be seen as the chief aspect of
personality, is produced by the collective consciousness. Ziya Gökalp’s statements
below clearly indicate this:

No matter how rich and strong the individual conscience is, it can create
neither an ideal nor a value. Egoism comes out because the individual spirit is
not transparent to the social ideals. It is for this reason that people having an

390
Ziya Gökalp, ibid, p. 143.
391
Ali Haydar, “Ahlak Hakkında,” p. 10.

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 individual life materially and spiritually get away from the social and
civilized spirit. In their spirits, you cannot find the value of any ideal, or
idealism of any value. The ideals appear in the form of “will” in individuals
by emerging from the social conscience.392

On the other hand, one needs also to point that when the unity becomes an inevitable
ethical principle, it is clear that all the actions which are vehicles for the realization
of it will be naturally ethical actions. A similar point can be found in terms of
progress. The union, from the perspective of society, constitutes the form of ethics
while the progress constitutes the spirit. While the unity leads to emergence a state of
consciousness that enables the ethics, the progress actually needs the realization that
state of consciousness. For this reason, Ali Haydar’s words “every action serving to
the progress of society is ethical”393 are agreed upon by almost all Young Turks.
Similarly, to Kazım Nami, the progress achieved by the Ottoman society to that day
is the result of collective work, that is to say the result of their union. By continuing
this union and opening new “doors of progress” to the new generations becomes
necessary ethical duties for the individuals.394 The ethics is the lively expression of
the cooperation among individuals and generations. If there is no obedience in a
society, it is not possible to talk about the existence of ethics there.395 For this reason,
the way of overcoming the ethical crisis experienced in the social life is to create a
homogeneous and unified society. This is remarkable as it shows that “the
solidarism”, which is defended by Young Turks as political issue, is grounded on an
ethical basis.

That the ethics takes individual consciousness to the sphere of being means that it
opens it to the being as a possibility. The operation of “opening” has a vital function
like emancipating the individual consciousness from the solipsist approach as it was
pointed out above. On the other hand, it is also possible to talk about a second aspect
of it. According to this, the ethics takes us to the external and above our
temperament. So, when we show a commitment to any category we understand that
392
Ziya Gökalp [Celal Sakıp], “Eser ve Zat: Rıza Tevfik’in Felsefesi,” pp. 69-70. [Emphasis added.]
393
Ali Haydar, ibid, p. 7.
394
Kazım Nami, “Yeni Ahlak-3,” p. 22.
395
İsmail Hakkı, “Ahlak Mücahedeleri-2,” p. 223.

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we are in the field of ethics.396 Going beyond our temperament means realizing
actions that are not expected to be done under normal circumstances and sometimes
that are contradictory to them. For example, our creation inspires us to protect
ourselves. Protecting the self is not always being brave. Sometimes, being brave
may mean ignoring the inspiration of creation, in other words, endangering our
selves. The ethics wants us to be brave. When the ethics and creation come across,
the pressure of ethics directs us to bravery which is not found in our creation. It is
possible to locate many more examples. Ultimately, it will be necessary to judge that
the ethics is a force contradictory to the nature of individual.397 It is for this reason
that the source of ethics or the aim of ethical rules cannot be the individual. Both the
source and aim of the ethics is the society.398 It is again for this reason that becoming
blind from the personal desire is the most evil and unethical thing in this world.399
Our actions become ethical the more we want the good of the other and the more
they make closer us to this good. And the good needs to be seen as consociation with
other.

5.5 The Philosophy of Values and Ethics or the Possibility of New Ethics and
New Values

Till now, we discussed what the Young Turks criticized for which reason when it
comes to the ethics. The points we reached were presented and we discussed outlines
of what kind of vision they had. The part discussed below aims to argue the basic
claims of “the constructive language” used by the Young Turks. As it will be seen
later, the mentioned sphere is the field of philosophy of values. The Young Turks
believe that the Ottoman society can overcome the multi-dimensional crisis it
undergoes by means of constructing a new understanding of values.

396
Necmettin Sadık, “Emile Durkheim,” p. 511.
397
İsmail Hakkı, ibid, p. 224.
398
M. Zekeriya Sertel, “Ahlak ve İlim,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 17 (15 April 1328/28 April
1912), p. 6. See also M. Zekeriya Sertel, “Ahlak, Fazilet ve Namusun Manası”, p. 14.
399
Tahrir Heyeti, “İlk Söz,” Tabiat 1, no. 1 (10 July 1337/23 July 1911), p. 3.

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Undoubtedly, there is a strong connection between values and ethics. The thing
called value is something that is not found in the matter itself. The value is not
something that is a quality found in the phenomenon itself as a rigid reality but is a
reflection of the need of classification for the human mind. While we think on the
objects, we need to categorize in different ways. For example, we qualify them as
good or bad, beautiful or ugly. But, it is not the objects themselves that we attribute
ethical and aesthetical value. We qualify them depending on how they correspond to
our expectations. In this respect, the value becomes “an excess” considering the very
existence of the phenomenon.400 This excess, not belonging to the essential nature
and charged on the objects later, is a complementary element of ethics that we come
across in the thought of Young Turks.

In Young Turks’ understanding, the consciousness becomes “ethical” as it adopts the

values imposed on it by the upper-consciousness. The realization of such an adoption
requires, before anything else, participation to the collective consciousness. To
achieve this, it is needed to constitute a “national” identity in consciousness. Ziya
Gökalp claims that this can only be possible by means of a “conceptual” thought.401
That means, by emancipating from feelings and passions, doing the actions within
the framework drawn by the collective consciousness. Considering the emphasis of
“nationality” often found in the periodicals, it is seen that the thing wanted to be
constructed through values is a new identity. For example, Kazım Nami states that
what is meant with the new ethics is “to give the ethics a national character.”402 In
fact, that is stressed almost all of the periodicals analyzed within the scope of our
study. In this respect, the value is a necessary element in terms of constructing of
“the new and national life” idealized by the Young Turks.

The meaning attributed to the values in Young Turks’ thought is constructed on the
concept of “newness.” One of the allegations coherently supported by them is the

400
Ziya Gökalp, “Hüsün ve Kubuh [İçtimai Usul-i Fıkıh Meselesi Münasebetiyle],” p. 229.
401
Ziya Gökalp, “Şahsî Ahlak,” p. 143.
402
Kazım Nami, “Yeni Ahlak-1,” p. 21.

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necessity of constructing “the new life.” In this respect, newness becomes an ethical
source of reference in the Young Turks’ views.

Concerning the structure of values the basic approach of the Young Turks’ ideology
can be summarized like this: the value is objective in terms of the individual, it is
subjective in terms of the society. It is objective in terms of the individual as it is
under the influence of the society as a source of mental objectivity that the individual
should follow in his actions. As it was stated in the previous discussions, the
framework constituted by the individual regarding the value judgments of the society
appears in the form “will.” In this respect, the individual does not determine the basis
of his behavior by means of reasoning on it. Being encoded by the society
irrevocably and unquestionably he adopts the value judgments as “no other way than
this” forms. On the other hand, it is possible to claim that the values are subjective in
terms of the society. As far as we see in the previous discussions, Young Turks
believe that the values should be constituted differently for every society. This
explains the reason why the ethics gains a “national” character.

Another point supporting that Young Turks have as subjective understanding of

ethics can be deducted from the answer of question of to what they base the ethics.
They attribute the source of value not to the reason but to the conscience. The
conscience is an appreciative means. While the reason deals with the quantity of
objects and events, the values emerge from the quality. In this respect, it is not
possible for a reason used to reach a quantitative point to produce some qualitative
and arbitrary judgments.403 Like in all fields, also in the field of ethics it is necessary
to lie on the national conscience. “The new life” ideal’s central position in the Young
Turks’ thought is very meaningful in this respect. They aim to construct a new
ethical framework in line with the new life. The old and broken-down value
judgments cannot determine the framework of the new life. For this reason, to find
some new value judgments and doing research and investigations is necessary. As
they object to the idea of absolute, they refuse to accept anything directly. The values
to be produced for themselves will undergo a second assessment and the values that

403
Ziya Gökalp, “Hüsün ve Kubuh,” p. 229.

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meet needs and are in line with the national consciousness will be accepted.404 What
is interesting is that although a general framework is drawn about what these values
can be, a mental exercise explaining the content of this framework specifically does
not exist. This seems to be stemming from the fact that they set out without plan or
program as stated briefly in the second chapter. In fact, being without a plan is a
legitimate situation for them. For example, like Ziya Gökalp Ali Canip claims that
the activities for creating value judgments cannot be realized as part of a general
program.405 In this respect, the efforts of “producing values” are legitimate according
to them. But, it is necessary to state that there are also some Young Turk figures who
do not regard being without a program as legitimate. For example, Suphi Ethem
thinks that it is largely due to setting out without a program that the new scientific
understanding does not gain popularity among the layers of society.406 However, the
main reason of failure in constructing new values is due to the fact that there is no
opportunity of applying such a plan rather than setting out without a plan. As a
complementary part of ethics, there is no point in doing any plan and program in the
field of values. Even the application of “producing” values becomes impossible. But,
Young Turks claim that it is possible to produce values. For example, Rıza Tevfik
acknowledges the emergence of religion as a new value and its spread among people
as an indication of such an opportunity. This opportunity contains the answer of what
the intellectuals should do in the face of a crisis in terms of the Young Turks. What
should be done is to make up some ideals and vitalize them.407 This is one of the
clearest indications of their Jacobin approach.

It is clear that the efforts of Young Turks in the field of philosophy of values in fact
are an extension of their elitist worldview. For example, Ziya Gökalp states that the
realization of political revolution does not mean the full realization of the Young

404
Tahrir Heyeti, “Yeni Hayat Hakkında Vaki Olan Tenkide Cevap,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 3
(15 September 1327/28 September 1911), p. 4.
405
Ali Canip [Yekta Bahir], “Millî Edebiyat Meselesi-1,” Genç Kalemler 2, no. 6 (19 June 1327/2
July 1911), p. 202 and Ziya Gökalp [Demirtaş], “Yeni Hayat ve Yeni Kıymetler,” p. 139. See also
Ziya Gökalp, “Türkçülük Nedir?,” p. 483.
406
Suphi Ethem, “Antropoloji Dersleri,” Genç Kalemler 3, no. 14 (13 January 1327/26 January 1912),
p. 31.
407
Rıza Tevfik, “Kuvvetler ve Kıymetler Felsefesi,” pp. 25-29.

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Turks’ ideology. To him, the Young Turks face heavier responsibilities following the
political revolution which is actualization of the social revolution. 408 Ziya Gökalp
clearly explains the basic qualities of the idea of “the new life” based on the
revolution:

New life means new economics, new family, new aesthetics, new philosophy,
new ethics, new law and new politics. Changing old life is possible only with
an effort to create a new life within domains of economics, family, aesthetics,
philosophy, ethics, law and politics. And you know that the explanatory
factors of the nature of a life are the values it supports. The old life had its
own economical values just as it had specific familial, aesthetical,
philosophical, ethical, legal and political ones. Disapproving the old life
means derecognizing and discrediting those values. Any afford aspiring to
create a new life must search for real values belonging to each of these
domains and dignify them. Those who accept new life as purpose are the
youngsters who search for such real values. For the new life to be intelligible
these real values must be known.409

Depending on that the values are subjective in terms of the individual and objective
in terms of the society, it is possible to claim a second point. In Young Turks’
thought the values can be categorized as “right” and “wrong.” As we can claim that
our knowledge on phenomena can be right or wrong also we can claim the same
thing for the value judgments. Our phenomenal knowledge is also a judgment and we
can test its rightness by turning to the phenomenon itself as an external source of
objectivity independent of man himself. There is a source like that by which we can
review the rightness of the value judgments. This is “the social conscience.”410
Further, there is no difference between the reality of social conscience as a source of
objectivity and factual reality.411 The value judgments that are right emerge out of
the national conscience or they act in accordance with the national conscience. In
other words, correspondence with the reality is a necessity for the value judgments.
Now, the detection of the right indicates that something else will be qualified as

408
Ziya Gökalp, “Türkçülük Nedir?,” p. 138.
409
Ibid.
410
Ziya Gökalp, “Kıymet Hükümleri,” p. 470.
411
S., “Mantıkın Tarifi (Sultani ve İdadiler İçin Felsefe Dersleri),” İslam Mecmuası 2, no. 20 (12
Rabīʿ al-Awwal 1333/15 Janurary 1330/28 January 1915), p. 524.

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wrong. So, the judgments that do not have an overlapping between collective
consciousness and national conscience should be defined as “wrong.” In this sense,
the values also adopt a cleansing role, because the ethics and values become a part of
efforts for purifying the national culture from all the foreign elements. On the other
hand, it is remarkable that the social conscience is determined as an external being.
This is an indication that Young Turks continued their logical coherency in terms of
their adoption of the positivist thought. For, as long as there is not an existence and
the being of that existence is not confirmed positively it will not be possible to base
the ethics on social conscience. They think that it is possible to do because the
society and social conscience or the collective consciousness is also an external
existence.

This attempt of constituting a new ethical framework is important in terms of

indicating the deviation from the critical approach, which generally appeared as
indictment, employed by the Young Turks. We face an effort of constructing rather
than a complaint in the field of ethics and this is a positive thing in itself. However,
this also contains an important problem, because they evaluate the ethics as
something “producible.” So, is the ethics something producible?

Considering the connection made by the Young Turks between ethics and
experience, it is not possible to say this, because they criticized Kant and similar
thinkers on a similar ground. They criticized Kant as he did not base his
understanding of ethics to the experience. Every understanding of ethics based on an
apriori principle instead of experience, to them, becomes metaphysics and the ethics
cannot be connected to the metaphysics. So, can the fact that the ethics is something
“producible” be reconciled with the idea that it should be based on experience?
Producing may be connected to the experience in a sense. But it should not be
forgotten that producing corresponds to a general framework aimed at the adoption
of all society not a simple phenomenon envisaged for the meeting individual needs.
In this respect, it seems hard to say that ethics is something producible. Ethics
becomes institutionalized in time. Institutionalizing it from the very beginning and
shaping the society accordingly can only be a Jacobean expression. In fact,
“Jacobinism” can be used to define the Young Turks and it is the expression of the

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role they cast for themselves in the field of ethics like many other fields related to the
social philosophy. They tried to correspond with the scientific and philosophical
point of view of the time and take into consideration an argument assuming that
society can transform only through some interventions. It can be said that the idea
that the ethics is producible emerges out of this. It will not be an exaggerated idea to
say that the institutional changes realized by the Young Turks did not come up as a
result of social consciousness’ history or by itself. In almost all revolutions, first we
see a narrow environment and then a comprehensive institutionalization. The efforts
of transformation backed by the institutional support ultimately struggle to spread the
new ideas among people. It may not be possible to criticize this effort in terms of the
target wanted to be reached but it seems inevitable to say that a process contradicting
the nature of objects take place. If the ethics, to the Young Turks, is the product of
social conscience it is not possible to turn that conscience into automate and get a
valuable product at each touch. What we call ethics is something that can be derived
from the social life. In other words, the ethics can be derived but it cannot be
produced. In spite of this, they claim that new values should be produced and this is
quite possible. The values that can be accepted by the national conscience will be
found and a system of ethics composed of these will be constituted. It is not possible
to realize this within a program. At least in terms of the “social revolution” they want
to realize it impossible to do within a certain time. Probably the greatest impediment
they do not realize is the way of perceiving the time, as stated briefly in the second
chapter. They perceive the time as a phenomenon that can be squeezable. With a
mental leap they forget the process and directly pass to the conclusion. Thinking
seems to be perceived directly as something that can provide the realization of that
thing. Of course society exists with changes and transformations. Also the ethics is
subject to this change as an indispensable element of the social life. But, the
determining role of time should be taken into consideration. The effort of the Young
Turks to construct a national ethics by means of new values is flawed as it ignores
the most fundamental element of change, the time.

They believe that somehow a new understanding of values can be produced. This
probability, to them, is inevitable in terms of the point to which philosophy arrived.
Philosophy becomes a philosophy of ethics and values. The fundamental function of

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philosophy as a philosophy of ethics and values is only “appreciation and
constitution.”412 In an article in Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası, we come across a mental
gymnastics regarding how to specify the special qualities of appreciation and
constitution practices. In this article, the questions below are asked to the readers:

A) What kind of principles can be introduced instead of the current ethical

codes?
B) To what extent these principles can be influential on the social
communities?
C) Do you agree with Kant’s and similar thinkers’ ideas on ethics?
D) To what principles can be based on the new ethical rules and how can
these prevent the poverty of society?413

Undoubtedly, these are the clearest expressions of the “constructive language” stated
above and mentioned upon a presupposition that the ethics is reproducible. The fact
that they are asked by the editorial board of Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası makes them
more important and worthy of examining. The editorial boards are in a sense
spokesmen of the ideas of Young Turks’ ideology. In the following pages we will
investigate an article by Mustafa Nermi in which these questions are dealt with. So, it
should be pointed out that it is hard to say that the questions above were answered by
readers thoroughly. As far as we can find M. Nermi’s article is the only answer to
these questions. But, it is clear that this is not an original answer. The article is rather
an interpretation on the “force-idea” theory by Alfred Fouillée who captured
attention of the Western philosophy circles. Nevertheless, the ideas voiced in the
article deserve to be tackled in terms of summarizing the expectations of Young
Turks from the values and philosophy of ethics.

The construction of a new and national ethics, in fact, means the foundation of a
nation from the very beginning. To Bedii Nuri, what is expected from the ethics is to
create “a developed, entrepreneur and progressive nation”414 from a nation under the
influence of old and corrupted ideas. Further, the mentioned nation should behave

412
Ziya Gökalp [Tevfik Sedat], “Bugünkü Felsefe,” p. 31.
413
Tahrir Heyeti, “Yeni Hayat,” Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası 1, no. 8 (1 December 1327/14 December
1911), p. 6.
414
Bedii Nuri, “Mebâhis-i Ahlâkiye,” p. 1033.

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within a unity and while acting should consider this unity. This, as a presupposition
of the ethics brings about the necessity of “unity of nation.” If the unity of nation is
not seen in the society, the intellectuals and thinkers should take the initiative to
create this. As Rıza Tevfik says, “a group of intelligent people by constituting a set
of ideals can bring a unity of nation to the community.”415 These statements can be
seen as the clearest expressions of the Young Turks about how they connect the
ethics, specifically, the science, generally, philosophy and social transformation.
Ethics, in its broadest sense, is the totality on which the actions should be based. In
this respect, it can be seen as a natural conclusion that “a transformation”
accompanies the ethics. But, what makes the issue problematic in the example of the
Young Turks is the manner of interpreting the connection between the social
transformation and the ethics. It can be discussed whether an essence constructing
the ethics, a philosophical and scientific society, creating a new nation and a
framework corresponding to the contemporary and national needs exists. Similarly, it
can also be discussed whether the social transformation constitutes a new ethics,
philosophy or scientific understanding or by means of invented ethical, philosophical
or scientific frameworks the society will be transformed. But in Young Turks’
system of thought the point expected to be adopted as a presupposition is the
necessity of realizing the transformation and change institutionally. In this respect,
the ethics becomes one of the most effective tools of modernization in Young Turks’
views. To create “a developed, entrepreneur and progressive nation” as Bedii Nuri
says, first, it should have “a national character”,416 in other words, it should
correspond to the needs of Turkish society and be in line with its qualities.

The newness means the clearance of the residues of previous period in the field of
ethics like in all fields. What is meant by residue is by all means are the values added
to the phenomena and events and not in a necessary connection with events and
phenomena essentially. All the value judgments of the previous period are wanted to
be annihilated by the Young Turks. Trying to protect these, for example, to M.
Zekeriya Sertel, is an indication of ethical conservatism. When the history of the

415
Rıza Tevfik, ibid, s. 27.
416
Kazım Nami, “Yeni Ahlak-2,” p. 15.

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nations is observed, it is seen that conservatism and new ideas always conflict; and
the victorious is always the new idea. The same situation is also for the ethics. The
ethical rules we inherited from previous periods prevent our steps forward. Hence,
also in the field of ethics the newness is needed.417 Ziya Gökalp has a similar idea.
To Gökalp, the new ethics means “the living ethics.”

In a time when a nation undergoes a spiritual revolution, no matter how hard

the need for ethics is, it is dangerous to bring back a residual understanding of
ethics. The more a dead ethics is imposed on people, the stronger immoral
and individualistic movements become…the immoralist movements take their
power from the force and domination of a dead ethics. The responsible of
today’s ethical crisis is first the thinkers who do not struggle to promote the
new ethics and second the conservative forces struggling to continue the old
ethics.418

It is clear that Gökalp sees the current ethical structure as the source of the crisis.
Every struggle to protect the current situation deepens the crisis instead of solving it.
Yet, in the Young Turks’ thought the ethics is projected as a means to deepen the
modernization not the crisis. In this respect, the expectation towards the fact that “the
new” ethical framework has a “living” quality is remarkable. This is not an
expectation only in the field of ethics but it is also valid for example for the religion.
In fact, that the ethics or religion has to have a “living” quality is important, because
it depends on the presupposition that the system struggled to be constructed should
base on a legitimate ground. While the legitimacy requires the qualities like
“newness” and “nationality”, on the other hand, it needs a more essential quality: “to
be within the scope of possibility.”419 If the related legitimacy elements are not
considered, in other words, if the value judgments struggled to be produced are not
investigated whether “they are possible or not,” there will be the danger of falling
into “a fictitious” realm. The possible values by turning into ideals serve to the
creation of a new nation.420 The fictions, as they do not have the chance to be ideals,

417
M. Zekeriya Sertel, “Tarih Muzırdır,” pp. 15-17.
418
Ziya Gökalp, “Ahlak Buhranı,” p. 123.
419
Rıza Tevfik, ibid, p. 25.
420
For the difference between “fiction” and “ideal” see, for example: Ziya Gökalp [Tevfik Sedat],
“Bugünkü Felsefe,” p. 31.
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instead of constructing the nation, they will destroy it. The values adopted by the old
life created the current social crisis as they did not correspond to the reality.

5.6 Philosophy as a Mechanism of Value-Production

The most remarkable statements about the acceptance by the Young Turks, that
philosophy is now a philosophy of values and ethics, can be found in Ziya Gökalp’s
article “Bugünkü Felsefe.” The article, alongside with Ziya Gökalp’s articles
“Muhyiddin-i Arabî”, “Yeni Hayat ve Yeni Kıymetler”, M. Nermi’s articles “Alfred
Fouillée ve Kuvvet-Fikirci Ahlak” and “Alfred Fouillée’nin Kuvvet-Fikirci Ahlakı”
contains the concise expression of the Young Turks’ understanding of ethics.

Ziya Gökalp, in his article “Bugünkü Felsefe,” separates the adventure of philosophy
to that day into three parts. In the first phase philosophy is the mother and
gendarmerie of all sciences. This phase continued from the beginning of philosophy
to the emergence of positive sciences based on observation and experiment. In this
period, philosophy deals with “visible” beings. Sciences, as they become more
specialized, monopolized the observation of visible beings and distanced philosophy
from that sphere. The reason why beings are defined as “visible” is that the sciences
analyze these beings with observation and experiment methods. For this reason,
Gökalp defines observation and experiment as “two careful eyes of science.”421

In the second phase, philosophy is rather seen as “metaphysics.” Since science, as

Gökalp puts it, excludes the metaphysics from its scope of examination “by
following the advice of a great reformist”, there is no relationship between
philosophy and science. However, for the aim of “not reaching wrong results”422
philosophy, even if “esoterically”, continued to use observation and experiment as
methods. The change philosophy exhibits in this second phase against the first phase
emerges in the form of being it tackles. Philosophy leaves “seen beings” to science
and determines “seeing being” as the scope of investigation for itself. While doing

421
Ziya Gökalp [Tevfik Sedat], ibid, p. 30.
422
Ibid.

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this, it particularly examined on issue deeply and reached a very important result.
This issue is about how the consciousness is possible. Sciences have deeply analyzed
the visible part of human being; they have revealed all the physiological and
biological qualities of them. “Consciousness” is not among the analyzed “visible”
qualities. This being about who we have detailed data has also a consciousness.
Science cannot explain this. This duty belongs to philosophy. Philosophy, calling this
as conscience or consciousness, accepts it as the first evolution, the first
manifestation and reaches that point: “what exist in reality are not visible, thinkable,
and understandable things, on the contrary are the selves that can see and
understand.”423 It is possible to summarize the basic principle of philosophy of this
phase within a Schopenhauerian language by saying that “the world is my
representation.”424

“Seeing” beings are sometimes defined as “appeared” beings in this article by

Gökalp. What he means by “appeared being” is the being that has consciousness and
appears to other consciousnesses in the form material. For this reason, “appeared
being” becomes a different category than “seen being.” On the other hand, this
distinction seems to be monadologic. To Ziya Gökalp, “all beings are made of
consciousness that is more or less dark or bright and existing at different levels of
evolution. Consciousness sees the consciousness in the form of material. But, it
appears in the form of consciousness to itself.”425

Philosophy deals with quantity in the first phase as it deals with “visible” beings.
And in the second phase it deals with “seeing” (or “appeared”) beings as it is about
quality. In other words, the borderline between the first and second phases is
determined by the type of being dealt with. In the first phase it is inevitable that
philosophy manifests a materialist quality, because it limits itself with “seen” beings.
In the second phase, it is rather spiritualist, because in this phase, it is limited with

423
Ibid.

424
Ibid

425
Ibid, p. 31.

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“seeing” and “appeared” beings. In the first phase, while the subjects philosophy
deals with are “objective”, in the second phase, as it deals directly with the
consciousness itself, it manifests a subjective quality. As the objects and events
consist of quantity, in the first phase, philosophy could not pass on the quantity;
hence, it failed to explain the quality. As the qualities are subjective elements of
sensations, in the second phase philosophy examines the qualities. In the first phase,
it puts forward material determinism, natural selection and evolution; in the second
phase, as stated above, it discovers spiritual determinism, spiritual selection and
spiritual evolution as a result of observation and experience method used in order not
to contradict with the conclusions of science. It indicates that like quantities qualities
can be factors in determinism, selection and evolution.426 In fact, as it was pointed
out before, the separation of “ideal” and “fiction” may be derived from a spiritual
selection. To put it more clearly, the values that consciousness produces meets the
criteria for selection as long as it corresponds to the reality and hence turn to ideals.
The ones that do not correspond to realities remain as fictions as they cannot meet
the mentioned criteria, and hence they cannot pass to the actual truth phase.

At each phase of its adventure philosophy comes across a new form of being while
leaving behind a form of being. It left “seen” beings to the science, “seeing” or
“appeared” beings to the metaphysics and discovered a form or sphere of being that
has never been explored. Gökalp defines this type of being as “desired being,”427
which is value. The fact that it is desirable, in a sense, stems from that it has the
quality of being shapeable in a desired form. In other words, the values have a
character “neither like quantity which does not increase or diminish nor like quality
which is closed to change. They gain the desired perfection and are subject to
discretion.”428 This should be thought within the framework of criticism mentioned
by Young Turks against the absolute understanding of ethics. In other words, while
they oppose the absolute ethics, in fact, they believe that the values should have
flexibility like this.

426
Ibid.
427
Ibid.
428
Ibid.

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Gökalp is of the opinion that the “desired being” is as true with regard to the
existence it has within consciousness as the factual reality of the first phase. The
value may not have an external existence but its existence in the consciousness
results in “its existence” in the real sense. The value is not made of a static existence.
It is an operative force. This force will surely be influential in an external being.
With the impact of Alfred Fouillée’s ideas on values, Ziya Gökalp defines them as
“thought-forces.”429 These thought-forces at first reveal themselves in the form of a
mental quality. Then, they become a spiritual character and finally an external
truth.430 That means there needs to be a possibility for any value to become truth.
That there is not such a possibility, which entails the existence of value to be
impossible, will lead it to remain as fiction. For avoiding fictions and producing
values corresponding to truth, philosophy should not contradict science and follow a
path that is harmonious with it. Philosophy following such a path will reveal that
“man is not just capable of seeing but also of appearing.”431 Evaluated from this
perspective, it can be claimed that the values that make possible the third phase in the
adventure of philosophy gives it a “creative” quality. Quantity and quality
respectively showing the qualities of “seen” and “seeing” beings, as Gökalp claims,
are unchangeable that means they can only be descriptive things. On the contrary, if
the values have a flexible quality; if they can gain the desired quality and transform
them when desired that will mean that they will make philosophy gain “a creative”
quality. This is exactly what Young Turks expected from philosophy. It should not
content itself with a pure description but should also make changing and
transforming possible. In this respect, the philosophy that becomes of values should
be seen as the way of transforming the society from “inside.” Philosophy that follows
a realistic methodology by depending on pure scientific data or adopts a complete
idealist approach is a descriptive philosophy. Describing the position of human mind
against reality or the fixed relation between mind and reality is repeating the truth.
But, the values orient philosophy towards a more creative path.

429
Ibid.
430
Ibid.
431
Ibid, p. 32.

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This creative identity the values give to philosophy stems from the force they have in
themselves. Then, what is the source of this force? As the idea is possible within a
conceptual framework, its source is reason. But, the value emerges from conscience
not reason. For an idea to have “force”, in other words, to reach the level of an actual
truth, is only possible thanks to its correspondence to a value. That means an idea can
only become a value having force if it is accepted by the conscience. This is the
reflection of passivity of the individual consciousness against the collective
consciousness.

Interestingly, Ziya Gökalp thinks that the mission of “producing values” that
philosophy employs at this last phase is also adopted by the Sufi schools. This is an
interesting situation, because a central theme like the philosophy of values is based
on tasawwuf as a traditional discipline. Ziya Gökalp seems to think that Ibn ‘Arabī’s
ideas correspondence to the “thought-force” theory reflects the parallelism between
the modern and Islamic thoughts.

Ziya Gökalp argues, in reference to Ibn ‘Arabī, that this intellectual sequence is
adopted by Sufi tradition and that it consists of three steps. At the bottom, there is
“the world of images” (‘ālem-i mithāl). The world of images, in essence, is a place
where the perceptible world is regarded to have no real existence. Accordingly, “the
existence consists of imagination” (innama’l-kawnu hayālun).432

At the second phase, there is “the world of spirits” (‘ālam al-arwāh). To Gökalp,
when the Sufis discover that the objects, which appears to exist in the world of sense,
are enlivened in fact by special sensations of consciousness, they explain this
exploration by saying that “the color of water is the color of its holder” (lawnu’l māi
lawn-u ināihī).433 The existence at this phase should be made meaningful directly by
referring to feelings.

432
Ziya Gökalp [Tevfik Sedat], “Muhyiddin-i Arabî,” Genç Kalemler 2, no. 4 (26 May 1327/8 June
1911), p. 61.
433
Ibid.

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At the third phase, there is the world of “fixed entities” (a‘yān-i thābita) This phase
bears a special meaning in terms of containing the sufist interpretation of “thought-
force” quality that Gökalp attributes to values. To Gökalp, at this phase, “the existing
perfections” are not favored and the “ought to be perfections” are tried to be built.
These “ought to be perfections” that exist in the objects inherently and in a hidden
form are called a‘yān-i thābita.434 The thing that Ziya Gökalp defines as the “ought
to be perfections” are in fact “values.” The values can only be manifested through a
will. This will is the social consciousness which is a collective consciousness.

Ziya Gökalp thinks that these phases, which he names “maqām”, in fact correspond
to the development phases of the Western history of thought. Berkeley, for example,
was in fact interpreting the Sufi motto of “innama’l-kawnu hayālun” while he was
claiming that the objects we see are made of our sensations and affections of our
consciousness.435 Kant, who says that our sensations are not made of objective
appearances and that these appearances are enlivened by subjective forms, does
nothing but interpreting Sufi understanding that “lawnu’l māi lawn-u ināihī.” When
philosophers like Alfred Fouillée, Guyau, Nietzsche, and William James declare the
truth that ideals are “thought-forces” and that hope, will and belief may bring a high
and clean happiness by constructing new values they were in fact interpreting the
Sufi approach that “mā hakama’l-qazāu ala’l-ashyā-i illā bihā” (the jurisdiction can
rule over objects only by means of objects).436 In other words, if the objects are made
of ideas, the element that can be influential on it can only be another idea.

The assumption that the values are “thought-forces” is a theme particularly analyzed
by some Young Turks figures. For example, M. Nermi’s article “Alfred Fouillée ve
Kuvvet-Fikirci Ahlâk” 437 is one of them. M. Nermi wrote the article to answer the
questions in the 10th issue of Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası that is referred to in previous
pages.

434
Ibid.
435
Ibid, p. 62.
436
Ibid.
437
M. Nermi, “Alfred Fouillée ve Kuvvet-Fikirci Ahlak,” p. 19.
209
M. Nermi thinks that the qualities of new ethics should be deducted from the
connection of ethics with consciousness. To him, being conscious means to get
directly involved in ethics. However, considering the general points of the article, it
is possible to say that he does not posit the consciousness, in terms of being purely a
consciousness, into the center of ethics. While talking about the ethicality of
consciousness he considers the general. In other words, the ethicality of
consciousness will only be possible if one meets on a common ground with “others.”
Consciousness may seem as a thought-force mechanism working independently for
every individual at the first phase. But that does not mean that the thought-forces
have aprirori independence and that they pick their own reasonability from
themselves. There are certain conditions for realizing thought-forces. For example,
they should have a “possible” content, which is also emphasized by Ziya Gökalp.
That the consciousness cannot give spirit to the ethics without contacting the other
stems from that “the individuality” is “an impossible” quality. Considering that in the
thought of Young Turks the individual is sacrificed to the society, it can be said that
this is a legitimate inference. The individuality is not a possible thought-force, but is
a fiction. That it is a fiction means there is no possibility of realization for it. The
individual can only be an ethical element with the total. The consciousness that is out
of the total and that has not contacted with the social conscience will have to collapse
in itself under the pressure of “fictions” in the form of thought-forces. In this
respect, contacting the other is inevitable in terms of ethics. For, “even in our “most
conscious” times we are regulated by “the ideas of others”, the psychological
rapports of the collective.438 In this case, thinking means that I produce some kinds
of values that will be adopted by the society, which are thought-forces.

The most remarkable issue in M. Nermi’s article is the meaning attributed to

Descartes’s proposition of “cogito ergo sum.” The proposition is reformulated so that
it can stress the existence of social consciousness: “cogito ergo sumus” 439 (I think
therefore we are). According to this new meaning, which is a formulation by
Fouillée, the existence of consciousness requires knowledge about the existence of

438
Ibid, p. 20.
439
Ibid, p. 21.
210
the other. The proposition of “cogito ergo sum” is the summary of the idea, in
Descartes’ understanding, that the fundamental element on which the being can be
based is the ability of thinking. Consciousness is the only source that will enable us
to leave behind any kind of suspicion when it comes to the presence of being, and
construct the world over again. And the second formulation (“cogito ergo sumus”)
Nermi mentions by an inspiration from Fouillée interprets the presence of individual
consciousness in terms of social consciousness. I think therefore we are. Thinking is
functional in terms of indicating presence of the individual consciousness but it
should be thought with an important dimension: social presence. One can define it as
social consciousness or “the social conscience” as Ziya Gökalp prefers to use.

Descartes’ proposition of “I think therefore I am” seems to point out grounding in

terms of an individual existence. However, “thinking” means to be defined by the
ideas of others, the spiritual relations of the collective. In this respect, thinking gains
an ethical dimension. By thinking we define the objects and take into consideration
the view of others, as good or evil. Without the determinative role of collective, more
precisely, without its participation having a determinative quality, we cannot realize
such a definition alone. For this reason, the individual thought becomes “ethical”
only with the society. It will be possible to reconcile this idea with the transcendental
subject.

“Cogito ergo- sumus” (I think therefore we are). There cannot be an individual

consciousness independent of collective consciousness. The connection should be
made with the consciousness of the other. Otherwise, it will be confined to a mental
isolation that does not bring about an ethical result. “Cogito.” That is all. But, the
ethics cannot be explained with only “idea.” It should be actualized. The ethics is the
transformation of force into action. For this reason, any idea that does not contain the
skill or possibility of turning into action will not be ethical. The ethics contains both
idea and force (the potential of being realized de facto). On the other hand, this can
be interpreted in such a way that the idea points out the individual consciousness, the
force points out the creative side of transcendental consciousness. Although the
individual consciousness is necessary in terms of having idea, it is not enough alone

211
in terms of ethics. The constitution of ethics can only be possible by considering the
consciousness of others or “the transcendental consciousness.”

The ethics is a subject related to the consciousness in essence. An ethicality which is

independent of thought cannot be envisaged. In this respect, it is not enough to
conduct analyses only related to the society. It is also necessary to consider what
kind of a connection has the community with the consciousness. This subject was
touched upon before within the scope of the idea of “transcendental subject” which is
thought to be derived from Kant by Gökalp. We are also facing a similar
transcendental subject in the field of ethics. The practice of thinking by the thinking
subject is an absolutely individual incident. In other words, the individual
consciousness enabling us to talk about the presence of individual, when thought
independent of transcendental subject, will have to remain as a skill of thinking
closed within itself. The only way to open this closed system is to connect to the
transcendental subject. An individual’s competence of thinking develops as far as he
contacts with and participates in the transcendental subject, which is completely
different from other individuals having the ability of thinking although it is a totality
of them. The maturation of thought should be understood as its becoming ethical.
For, all the behaviors of individual are the forces composed of ideas and feelings that
can be seen as the tools of thinking. They are also the forces having the potential of
being actualized. Actualization of a potential and the transformation of force into
action can only be possible with a leap corresponding to the point of view of the
total. In fact, it is possible to see this situation as necessary. The ethicality of
consciousness can only be possible with the social consciousness. The consciousness
is destined to be ethical. This destiny takes place within the social life, in a level in
which the inter-conscious-communication is at its peak. One can also see it as the
development of consciousness. The growth of the consciousness is made of
interpretation of this development. When we look at the history of humanity, we
never come across with a period in which the consciousness is isolated from the
external world and existing only as the competence of thinking. Consciousness
becomes consciousness only if it contact with life and actualizes the ideas and
feelings existing in it in the form of force. In this respect, the consciousness is
destined to ethics. Primitive people thought that this destiny comprises also all the

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non living things and for this reason they practiced animism. But the history of
development indicates that the destiny should be evaluated with the other
consciousnesses. For this reason, talking about the ethics is talking about the
collective that goes beyond the individual consciousness.

It was mentioned in the previous sections that the ethics “opens” the individual
consciousness to the external world. The element encouraging the individual
consciousness to contact the other by opening to external world is a pure “altruism.”
The altruism as a motive existing in the consciousness presents clues to the ethicality
of consciousness”, that is to say to its communality.440 In other words, the ethicality
of individual is only possible through its essential altruism. So, the center of ethics is
not the individual, it is orientation towards the other and the practice of prioritization
of it.

It is possible to say that the value comes into existence with the idea appearing in the
consciousness. But, this existence is short and not an existence in the full sense of the
word, because to make it an actual truth, there is a route that it should follow.
According to this, it can be said that in terms of presence of values there is such a
scheme in the consciousness: 1– Value, 2– The force of realization 3– Actual
Truth.441 This scheme answers the question of “what exists in the value?” To put it
more clearly, in order to define something as “value” it should contain the potential
of realization. In other words, it should be possible. If possible, this will mean that
this value has the force of realization. A value having the force of realization will
ultimately turn into a truth, because it is adopted by the collective. In this case, the
mentioned three principles should be envisaged as principles tightly connected to
each other not as different entities.

The scheme consisting of value, force of realization and actual truth is used in
another article by M. Nermi within a very critical context. To him, “the thought-force
ethics infers the conditions of action and cognizance from the consciousness. So,

440
Ibid, p. 22.
441
Ibid, p. 27.

213
reason, consciousness, and experience constitute a unity.”442 It seems that M. Nermi
here projects the reason as individual, consciousness as society and experience as
ethical action. What creates the idea is reason. The consciousness makes that idea
possible. The experience enables that idea to become truth/reality/action. This can be
interpreted as parallelism among reason, consciousness and experience and value,
force of realization and actual truth respectively.

Ultimately, M. Nermi believes that the ethics can only have power by means of
values. For, to him ethics takes its greatest power from understanding, appreciated
values and importance. This is probably the expression of “value construction” role
attributed to philosophy by Ziya Gökalp. Philosophy will construct its force over
masses from the values it produces through ethics.

5.7 The Institutional Dimension within the Constitution of New Ethics:

Professional Ethics

The discussions tackled so far are important as they indicate that Young Turks used
philosophical notions as vehicles in struggling to achieve “the reform.” The fact that
they use philosophical concepts in this direction does not damage the philosophical
quality of the mentioned concepts. Since they seek some solutions for the crisis the
fact that they attribute an instrumental role to philosophy is understandable.
However, it is very important for us to observe that the efforts of modernizations are
based on a philosophical ground.

It is necessary to indicate that the modernization efforts of the Young Turks are not
solely constructed with abstract concepts. That means they put forward much more
concrete ideas in the field of ethics. Their most concrete idea within this scope is to
constitute a “professional ethics.” Professional ethics is thought as a treatment of the
degeneration caused by war condition in the society.

The war is really a serious event leading the shattering of social order. It is inevitable
that various social crisis come up as a result of war. The most crucial of those crises

442
M. Nermi, “Alfred Fouillée’nin Kuvvet-Fikirci Ahlakı,” p. 12.
214
is probably the ethical crisis. Considering that the most important motive of wars is
“domination”, it will be inevitable even to annihilate the right “to live” which is the
most fundamental right. Murder can ethically be seen as the most cardinal crime. In
an environment where the war leads a serious ethical corruption, it is inevitable to
observe that become widespread. The emphasis Young Turks placed on the
professional ethics emerges from this situation. They believe that the ethical
degeneration affected the Ottoman society after the Balkan Wars and the First World
War appears in the form of “black-marketeering.” Ziya Gökalp, for example, is of
this opinion. He seems to think that if the professional and personal ethics were
established strongly in Ottoman society before the war, neither the black-
marketeering would take such a pathological form nor the moneys earned
illegitimately would be spent in an immoral way.443 The professional ethics, in this
respect, is seen as an element that can respond to the Young Turks’ quests.

This meaning attributed to the professional ethics by Ziya Gökalp should largely be
seen as the expression of making the individual gain personality. When the
individual adopts the professional codes of ethics, he will feel himself belonging to a
society and struggle to live within the framework of rules and laws of that society.
This is not an arbitrary but a coercible situation. Hence, the personality will not be
damaged for the sake of individual ambitions, and will not be distanced to ethical
rules. The individual attributing holiness to his personality never forsakes his
personal honor for personal pleasures and passions. The personalists see their
personalities as divine. For this reason, they stay away from illegal treasures obtained
from immoral actions. Yet, the individualists see this ethical sensitivity of
personalists as “ethical delusion” and stay away from this principle as much as
possible.444 When the individual becomes a part of an institutional structure, he will
learn how to behave and know that he will face institutional sanctions. So, the work
ethics will function as an aversive element on the individual.

443
Ziya Gökalp, “Şahsî Ahlak,” p. 143.
444
Ibid.

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In fact, the duty that Ziya Gökalp attributes to the professional ethics corresponds to
the expectations of the Young Turks from new ethics. As it is indicated above, the
new ethics is also expected to have a “national” quality. It is possible to say that the
professional ethics bears a national character in Ottoman context. For example, both
guilds and ahi-communities created a professional ethics. The guilds functioned as an
ethical authority on members. When a person becomes affiliated with a guild, he is
deemed to have adopted the ethical codes made up by the guild.

This approach is not only supported by Ziya Gökalp. Necmettin Sadık and Rıza
Tevfik also, for example, have a similar approach. According to Necmettin Sadık:

The first way to exalt the ethics in the country is the constitution of
professions and professional corporations. Tenancy, authorship, journalisms,
and commerce also must be professions like teaching. Then, an individual
belonging to a profession -if it is constituted in the form of a constant and
certain corporation- cannot abandon the ethics of that profession. In the
country, alongside with the general ethics, specific forms of ethics are also
needed. If the trade were a regular class of profession in our country, during
the war we would not come up with black-marketeering and other ugly and
shameful acts.445

The reason why Necmettin Sadık mentions such an idea is quite important in terms
of the context we try to indicate. He wrote that article following an argument about
the ethics in the Parliament. In the Parliamentary session this argument takes place
when the members of Parliament deliver their disturbance about the spread of
casinos. Cavit Bey, a devout unionist, responds this complaint of members of
parliament by saying “raise the ethics of the country.” At the following week, the
Darülfünûn publishes a declaration about the ethical principles to be complied by
teaching professionals.446 This declaration, to Necmettin Sadık, should be taken as
example by people from other professions about Cavit Bey’s point stated in the
Parliament. This is the way to be followed for spreading the professional ethics in
Ottoman society.

445
Necmettin Sadık, “Umumi Ahlak, Mesleki Ahlak,” Yeni Mecmua 1, no. 25 (27 December 1917), p.
497.
446
Ibid, p. 496.

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It is clear that Necmettin Sadık sees the newness he studies in terms of ethics as a
part of modernization by the hand of the state. In other words, the professional ethics
as a branch of ethics is seen as a means to transform the society. The professional
ethics should be evaluated as a sign of a renewal as it will be applied in the hands of
official institutions. Both in the practices of ahi corporations and in the guilds the
professional ethics have an informal quality. The Young Turks think that the
professional ethics should directly be practiced by the institutions managed by the
state. Necmettin Sadık may be seen as the unionist figure voicing this claim in
clearest way.

It should be indicated that the ethical degeneration is not seen, by the Young Turks,
as the result created only by war. Also before the war there is complaint about many
practices indicating that the ethical crisis exits. For example, bribery existed as a
common sickness even before war. For this reason, Rıza Tevfik believes that bribery,
which is common among civil servants, stems from the lack of the institutional
structure that creates pressure on them.447

The professional ethics may be seen as a reflection of the Young Turks’ efforts to
realize the modernization by the hands of the state. As the ethics become more
institutionalized, it creates certain sanctions by itself. This is, in fact, is a reflection of
their views on modernization in general. The established thought and behavior types
may be transformed as a result of institutional pressures. In this respect, the
professional ethics constitutes one of the most useful ways to present the society a
new ethical framework.

447
Rıza Tevfik, “Mesail-i İçtimaiyemize Dair Bazı Mülâhazât,” Şura-yı Ümmet 1, no. 140(116) (29
January 1909), s. 6.
217
 CHAPTER 6

PHILOSOPHY OF ARTS AND AESTHETICS IN YOUNG TURKS’

UNDERSTANDING

6.1 The General Framework of the Meaning Young Turks Attributed to Arts
and Aesthetics

One comes across with serious discussions taking place within Young Turk
periodicals on philosophy of aesthetics and arts. There are two important points to
which we would like to draw attention before going into the details of their
discussions on aesthetical issues. The first point is related with the general profile of
Young Turk intelligentsia. If not all, a great deal of Young Turk figures constituted
by persons who involved in artistic endeavors independently of their political
activities. Ziya Gökalp, who took charge in the administrative level of the CUP, for
example, is a poet as well as a theoretician of social sciences. Hüseyin Cahit, who
acted as the spokesman of the CUP in the newspaper of Tanin, was also a literary
critic. Ali Canip whose writings about aesthetics we read in in the journals of Genç
Kalemler and Yeni Mecmua is a poet. Halit Ziya Uşaklıgil, who is appointed by CUP
as the executive assistant of Sultan Reşat following the announcement of
Constitutionalism was among important personalities of Turkish literature. Similarly,
Ömer Seyfettin, whose short stories and tails are published particularly in Yeni
Mecmua, is a respected personality with regard to Turkish literature. It is possible to
add many other people in this list. All these names present data supporting the claim
mentioned above.

Another reason of the fact that discussions about philosophy of aesthetics and arts are
given wide coverage within Young Turks’ periodicals is that these areas seemingly
supplied an appropriate philosophical ground for the paradigmatic transformation
attempted by unionist figures. We desire to clarify the basic element, supporting this

218
argument, by referring particularly to the place Renaissance occupies within the
history of Western philosophy.

As has been touched upon in the first chapter, one of the most commonly used
concepts within Young Turks’ literature is “teceddüd.” This concept has been used
by Young Turks as the synonym of the concept of “Renaissance.” Hence in the
journal published by the Istılahât-ı İlmiye Encümeni, the concept of “Renaissance”
has been translated as “teceddüd.” 448 There is no doubt that there are very different
Turkish words that can be used for the said concept. That the concept is translated as
“teceddüd”, despite the existence of other equivalents, essentially refers to an
important point with regard to the mentality of Young Turks. Accordingly, one can
say that the philosophical breakage to which Renaissance corresponds within the
Western history of thought is attempted by Young Turks through the concept of
“teceddüd.”

The philosophical understanding that prevailed during Middle Ages, in which the
ancient Greek thought is reformulated within a Christian form, underwent to a radical
change by the emergence of Renaissance. It is possible to summarize the basic
characteristics of Renaissance, which have a certain connection with the discussions
we plan to make, as follows:

Renaissance is started as a movement of art before anything else. The changes and
conversions in the areas of architecture, sculpture and painting, started in Italy and
later spread to other countries of continental Europe, constitute one the basic
dynamics of the thinking of Renaissance.449 Artists, who previously fixed their eyes
on the heaven as a result of the inspiration they received from Christianity, turned
their attention once again to the concrete reality and the truth that they conceived to
be hidden in it, together with the idea of Renaissance. The use of experiment and
observation as scientific methods were not an independent circumstance from it. As

448
Ed. Nurcan Yazıcı, Sanâyi’-i Nefîse Istılâhâtı Mecmuası (İstanbul: Mimar Sinan Güzel Sanatlar
Üniversitesi, 2012), p. 222.
449
For the effect which is created by activities within the area of arts see Karl Vorlander, Felsefe
Tarihi, translated by Mehmet İzzet and Orhan Saadeddin (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2008), pp. 316-317.

219
it is going to be emphasized within the following pages, arts and aesthetics are
attempts of handling and making sense of the universe and the being as a whole, as
well as of putting forward concrete productions. It is even possible to characterize
them as the instruments of acquiring truth. When considered from this perspective,
the transformative effect of arts on thinking stays in front of us as an issue to be
noted.

On the other hand, it is observed that the thought of Renaissance gives a great
importance to the examination of the written works produced during ancient Greek
and Roman periods. Viewed from this perspective, one can argue that Renaissance is
developed within a philological method. The most concrete fruit of these philological
endeavors has been the movement of “humanism.” It can be said that the
philosophical character of Renaissance became more apparent together with
humanism. Renaissance philosophy, which dwells on humanism, is antagonistic and
foreign to the philosophical framework dominant in the Middle Ages. 450 For, the
Middle Ages were products of a God-centered philosophical thinking from the very
beginning to the end. In this period, the most important duty determined for human
reason is to interpret the Bible and to make the universe understandable within the
framework of these interpretations. However, Renaissance and humanism refer to an
endeavor which takes the human being at the center and tries to construct the
meaning to be attributed to life by starting from human being himself. In this respect,
Renaissance points to a philosophical breakage in terms of the history of Western
thought. Together with Renaissance, which is an important milestone on the way to
modern thinking, a more worldly and profane mentality is started to be formed. It is
possible to draw a similarity between the critical attitude Young Turks maintain
against the traditional thinking dominated by religion and this character of
Renaissance. This similarity makes it understandable why Young Turks conceived
their struggles as the dream of creating a Renaissance.

One other important side of Renaissance is its extension which can be interpreted as
the “return to the essence.” To put it more clearly, Renaissance can be defined as the

450
Cf. Ahmet Cevizci, Felsefe Tarihi: Thales’ten Baudrillard’a (İstanbul: Say Yayınları, 2009), pp.
378-79.
220
process in which the West rediscovered its own basic sources. Thus, several ancient
philosophical approaches re-appeared following the thought of Renaissance.
Aristotelianism, Platonism, Atomism, Stoicism, and Skepticism,451 are some of these
movements. One can observe that a similar “return to the essence” approach is valid
for the area of religion as well. It is claimed, in this regard, that a remarkable part of
the Renaissance period thinkers like Niccolo Machiavelli were not Christians but
rather first age pagans and feeling admiration to ancient paganism.452 It can be said
that the main reason of the appearance of paganism, which is accepted as the purest
form of religion, together with Renaissance, and its becoming popular has been this.
It is also possible to find a similar attitude towards religion, reminding that of
Renaissance, in some articles published in Yeni Mecmua. Articles by Ziya Gökalp,
for example, within the context of old Turkish religious beliefs are highly
meaningful, for, they show this similarity. A clearer expression of the same approach
can be found in an article written by Şerafettin Yaltkaya. According to Yaltkaya, “all
the entities of Arabs, belonging to their pre-Islamic period have been transferred into
Islamic period while Turkish people buried their ancient entities to the ground with
their own hands.”453

Another important aspect of Renaissance has been the differentiation within the
language of scientific and philosophical production. Which is to say that together
with Renaissance the national languages are started to be used in place of Latin, the
prevailing language throughout the Middle Ages. This circumstance can also be said
to have an important reflection on Young Turks’ mentality in the similar vein. Ziya
Gökalp, for example, sees Turkism that is adopted by the great majority of unionists
as a form of “return to the essence” and says, that:

A fruitful vitalism will grow out of Turkism of the day. But this vitalism will
not be limited only to literature but will cover all of the social organizations.
Return to the spoken language, for example, is “vitalism in language.” Return
451
For a detailed description of these movements see Macit Gökberk, Felsefe Tarihi (İstanbul: Remzi
Kitabevi, 1985), pp. 188-200.
452
Ibid, p. 192.
453
Şerafeddin Yalktaya, “Türk Medeniyet Tarihi: Türklerin Melekeleri,” Yeni Mecmua 2, no. 47 (6
June 1918), p. 406.

221
 to folk meter is “vitalism in meter.” Return to folk music is “vitalism in
music.” And return to folk stories, to old Turkish legends is “vitalism in
literature.”454

If all of the Young Turk periodicals we examined are taken into consideration, Ziya
Gökalp’s approach to this effect can be said to be adopted by almost all writers who
interested particularly in literature. Endeavors of cleansing Turkish from Arabic and
Persian words are essentially reflections of the struggle referred to as “return to the
essence” above. However, it is difficult to characterize that as a reflection of a
project carried out consistently.

If we direct our attentions to Renaissance once again: the above mentioned qualities
put forward themselves as a philosophical breakage within the history of Western
thought. In this respect, Renaissance is the first step of modern understanding and
represents the re-birth of the West, in its philosophical and religious sense, from its
own ashes. It is observed that the philosophical extensions of the thought of
Renaissance found an important reciprocation in Young Turks’ mentality.

6.2 The Basic Debates with regard to the Philosophies of Aesthetics and Arts in
Young Turk Periodicals

Human being is a value-producing existent. The domain of experience widens as

long as living area of human beings widens. The expanded experience deepens in
due course and means actually that human being mobilized an indirect process of
questioning with regard to his own existence. This is why it is possible to talk about a
wide range of values encompassing the whole areas of life. However, it can be said
that human thought as a mechanism of value production differentiates some of the
areas, wherein it feels more at home, from others essentially. Religious values, for
example, are of this kind. Similarly, values that are produced within political and
ethical areas are also evaluated to fall within this scope. Sometimes one may witness
that ethical value is seen as an element included within human beings’ daily routines
and, therefore, that it is conceived of as something purely practical and different from
its essence making ethics possible. However, this circumstance does not change the

454
Ziya Gökalp, “Maârif ve Hars,” Yeni Mecmua 2, no. 52 (13 July 1918), p. 503.
222
reality that ethical values are transcending the phenomenal realm. Ethics can be
characterized as human being’s act to get his own existence acquired a meaning. On
the other hand, one of the most important reflections of human being’s value
producing struggle can be observed within aesthetical area. It seems that aesthetics
differs from other value areas in the sense that it does not have a fictional relation
with the conditions bringing it out. It is possible, for example, to establish a link
between ethics and utility. For, a correspondence between ethical behaviors and
humanly expectations is necessary at some points. And this is why stealing or other
unethical behaviors may cause that I sustain a loss difficult to recover at personal
level. And again, this is why I may bring to the agenda a demand, for others as well
as for me, requiring the adoption of an approach knitted with ethical behaviors. I may
expect myself and other people, for example, to remain distant from robbery, lying,
killing etc. The same circumstance is valid regarding both all unethical behaviors and
demanded ethical virtues. The facts that I adopt an ethical system corresponding to
my expectations or that I attempt to develop a new ethical systematic, like
philosophers of ethics do, stem from this reason. But the factor leading us to produce
aesthetical values is not as practical as it is in ethical mechanism. In other words,
aesthetical values are not as much penetrating into daily life as ethical values. This
point may seem as a weakness for aesthetics at start, however, it transfigures
aesthetics into philosophy in the truest sense of the word. For, as it is pointed out
within previous chapters on several occasions, philosophy is a nonreciprocal process
of questioning. And the philosophies of aesthetics and arts are reflections of such a
non-reciprocality. Of course some practical elements can be said to be instituted
following this questioning. In other words, what we refer here is not an argument
stating that aesthetics does not touch upon daily life under no condition. It is rather a
reference to conditions under which any object or any circumstance is entitled for the
quality of being aesthetics. So, in which way can this relation be put forward? In
other words, what is it that reveals aesthetics or philosophy of arts as a fact which is
argued above to have no essential relation with human being’s daily life? Such
questions are among the basic ones that shall be tried to be answered from the point
of view of Young Turks within this chapter. We can say for the point we are
currently now, briefly, that the entitlement of an object to an aesthetical quality, in
other words qualification of it as an “aesthetical object” is possible only if it fulfills

223
an aesthetical subject’s need for aesthetical pleasure. It is apparent that the
relationship between aesthetical subject and object overflows the ordinary subject-
object relationship. Therefore, the realization of a thinking style which is established
on such a relationship requires a special interest, expectation, and experience with
regard to the area overflowing the limits of ordinary knowledge.

6.3 Problems of Aesthetics

Aesthetics and art are philosophical disciplines taking “beauty” as subject. Although
they seem to concentrate on a common concept, a difference is observed between
them. According to this, aesthetic is a defined as “the philosophical discipline which
engages with the analysis of the concepts and solution of the problems that appear
when we contemplate aesthetical objects.” 455 The objects supposed to be examined
by aesthetics are the objects found in the nature. This is the point where aesthetics
differs from philosophy of arts. The issues that aesthetics deals with seem to be
aesthetic subject, aesthetic object, aesthetic pleasure, aesthetic attitude, aesthetic
experimentation, aesthetic judgment, and aesthetic distance etc. And the philosophy
of arts is defined as the discipline of philosophy dealing with the beauty that is found
in the works of arts made by human beings.456 Considered from this perspective, the
philosophy of arts can be said to examine questions regarding to the source, nature,
and sense and of arts as well as the relationship between validity and work of arts
and their classifications.

Despite the existence of such a general concession that philosophy of arts and
aesthetics must be discerned at the theoretical level, we observe that these two
branches of philosophy have not been differentiated in Young Turks’ periodicals.
Therefore, it is possible to say that the characterizations of arts and aesthetics have
been used synonymously in the articles, published in periodicals, which are
examining the concept of “beauty” and other concepts related to it. Hüseyin Cahit
Yalçın, for example gives an open signal that he does not adopt such a difference.
Thus, when arranging the matters within the framework of the philosophy of

455
Ahmet Arslan, Felsefeye Giriş (Ankara: Adres Yayınları, 2010), p. 237.
456
Ibid, p. 238
224
aesthetics he goes out of the differentiation mentioned above and arranges the
subjects that fall within the areas of both arts and aesthetics as the problems of the
philosophy of aesthetics. According to him, subjects of the philosophy of aesthetics
are differ into five big groups: “feelings and thoughts about beauty, the beauty in
nature, the beauty in arts, nature of the arts, and the purpose of the arts.”457

That a difference between aesthetics and arts is not emphasized in Young Turk
periodicals, within the context of philosophical meaning and duty attributed to them,
can be considered as natural. For, as far as one can observe, art is mostly considered
as the imitation of nature in Young Turks’ mentality. Viewed from their perspective,
the philosophy of arts may take the handiwork of an artist as a “produced work” by
an aesthetical subject, this work of art cannot be considered but as an imitation of the
qualities that currently exist within nature. For any man made product to get aesthetic
value or to gain the quality of an artistic object, appropriate reflection of the
equivalent quality found in nature is a must. This approach is apparent particularly in
the articles of Ali Canip and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın.

We will try to handle the ideas expressed by Young Turks regarding the philosophies
of arts and aesthetics within the framework of the issues to which we referred as the
subjects of the philosophy of aesthetics above. One must immediately remark that
there are not detailed analyses, within periodicals, subjecting all of those headings.
While some headings had been the subject of more than one article, others have been
dealt with more superficially. However, it seems possible to argue that there is a
certain consistency and unity among these ideas. The first titles to be dealt with are
the aesthetic object, aesthetic subject, aesthetic pleasure, aesthetic value and aesthetic
judgment.

6.3.1 Aesthetic Subject

We acquired, whether in the third or fourth chapters, some important hints about
Young Turks’ understanding of subject. And we saw, particularly during the

457
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -2- Hikmet-i Bedâyi,’ His.” Servet-i Fünun 15, no.
371 (9 April 1314/21 April 1898), p. 103.
225
discussions about ethics, that there is a mechanism producing value independently of
the individual subject. As it can be remembered, this mechanism was society as the
upper consciousness. Some of the Young Turk figures named this mechanism as
“conscience.” Conscience melts all the individual consciousnesses within itself and
gives, as the upper consciousness, orders related to ethical quality of all types of
actions. These orders were so besieging that even individual subjects’ existence takes
place in accordance with the loyalty shown to them. In other words, the existence of
the subject is seen as an ethical event. The continuation of this ethical presence is
only possible in terms of the behaviors to be realized. When behaviors contradicting
the values, which emanate from upper consciousness, are realized the moral presence
of the individual subject takes the form of a pathological case and the individual is
declared null and void.

As far as we observe, a similar situation is valid for aesthetic subject as well. There
is, in the Young Turks periodicals we examined, an important which can be
characterized as the equivalent of the concept of aesthetic subject. It is “aesthetic
conscience” (bedî’î vicdan). The “aesthetic conscience”, which can be seen at the
beginning as an individual subject, must be accepted as an “upper aesthetical
authority” when the comprehensive meaning of the conscience attributed to it by
Young Turks kept in mind. Of course, this reminds that Young Turks conceived
aesthetic as a reflection of national conscience. For, according to Young Turks,
national conscience ultimately constitutes an aesthetic universe which is also
determining our aesthetic perceptions and attitudes. Therefore, for any fact to gain an
aesthetic quality, it has to be compatible to that aesthetic universe. And it means that
the aesthetic value is revealed to us by national conscience as the “upper aesthetic
consciousness.” In this case, one can characterize the national conscience as the
“nature” which is also including aesthetic conscience. As a result, “imitation”, which
is to be called art, will be an imitation of the national conscience; in other words, a
production giving vitality to values being revealed by national conscience. In the
following pages we will try to examine the “national” meaning, attributed to
aesthetics in Young Turks’ periodicals, in a more detailed manner. We will content
ourselves, for now, with glancing over the qualities of the mechanism intended by
the conception of “aesthetic conscience.”

226
It is possible to find the most conspicuous interpretations leading us to conclude that
there is a similarity between aesthetical and ethical consciences in one of Ali Canip’s
articles. He says, within this regard, that:

Just as there is a “moral conscience” separating the concepts of virtue and

disgrace from each other and exposing them under the label they deserve,
there is also an “aesthetical conscience” separating good from bad and
labeling the first as appreciated and later as degraded. This [conscience]
concerns itself with the preservation of “values” and [as a result of it] we
may, involuntarily, cheer someone’s work of art whom we never met in
person or we do not like, but hate writing of a close friend of ours’.458

Here we believe are two points that should be mentioned. The first one is that Ali
Canip’s revival of the concept of “involuntary” reminds, in essence, the discussions
about the concept of “organic” that we examined within fifth chapter. As it is pointed
within the context of those discussions, values are imposed upon us by the upper
consciousness. And we embrace these values as a result of many repetitions. After a
while, values settle down in us unconsciously and all of our assessments begin to
occur under the influence of this unconscious circumstance. There is a similar
situation here as well. We are essentially enamored by certain aesthetic judgments
when we characterize a fact or an event as good, bad, beautiful, or ugly. The
mechanism creating these judgments is aesthetic conscience which is also
functioning as the “aesthetic police.”459

Secondly, for the values to be protected they must be constructed before anything
else. Values cannot be seen as self-reproducing elements, of course. They are being
created by a certain mechanism for a number of specific purposes. The basic purpose
of aesthetic conscience’s creation of values, Young Turks seem to think, is to help to
continuance of vitality of upper consciousness. That means that individual
consciousness gains an aesthetic nature as far as it adopts these previously created
values. This is why beauty evolves out of the judgment that is made not by the artist

458
Ali Canip, “Bedî’îyât Bahisleri: Lâ-Bedî’î Hisler,” Yeni Mecmua, 2, no. 50 (27 June 1918), p. 467
[paranthesis added].
459
Ali Canip, “Bedî’iyyât Bahisleri: Hazzın Bedî’î Hayatta Mevkii,” p. 506.

227
but by the subject who subjects that work of art to an aesthetical experience. 460 On
this basis, it seems possible to say that the individual subject does not form an
aesthetic conscience but constitutes a catalyzer in ensuring the possibility of
aesthetics.

One can find the clearest expressions of the fact that Young Turks did not completely
leave the aesthetics into the sovereignty of individual subject in Hüseyin Cahit
Yalçın’s articles. He is of the opinion that the evolvement of an artist, on his way to
become aesthetic subject, requires three interrelated elements.461 First of all, the
relationship between a work of art created by an artist and other works of arts
produced by the same person must be taken into consideration. This seems like a
condition laid down to ensure prediction about aesthetical creativity by means of the
compliance to be observed between works of art. Secondly, the relation that an
artist’s works have with other artists’ works must also be shown. For, as it is
reasonably pointed out by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “these works of art, and even the
artist himself, do not live alone; they are surrounded by a number of artists living in
the same country and the products of their genius.”462 Thirdly, the nationality of the
artist, who tries to give an aesthetic quality to his work of art, and its aesthetic value
judgments, should also be considered.

For, an artist follows the ideas and customs of his nation. Today, only the
sounds of artists can be heard, among the works of art; but there is a hoarse
murmuring under these sounds with all its vibrations reaching up to us. This
murmuring is the tool of opinion of the people who once became single-
voiced with artists. The actual greatness of artists arises from the perfection of
harmony between people and themselves. Therefore, in order to understand a
work of art, an artist, and the artists of the same aesthetic understanding, the
general circumstance of the ideas and ethics prevailed in their period must be
known in the healthiest way.463

460
Ali Canip, “Bedî’î Haz -1- Tahayyür,” Yeni Mecmua 1, no. 18 (8 November 1917), p. 354.
461
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, ibid, p. 106.
462
Ibid.
463
Ibid.

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These intertwined circles, described by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, essentially point to
interrelated dimensions of aesthetic conscience. There is no doubt that aesthetic
conscience is not a single-dimensional structure. It rather is being fed through
different channels supporting each other. Depending on Huseyin Cahit Yalçın’s
argument, it seems possible to qualify these channels as “producing” and
“consuming” aesthetic subjects respectively. Producing aesthetic subject is the artist.
And the consuming subject makes judgments, by way of aesthetic values inspired to
him by upper aesthetical consciousness, about the work created by artist. In fact, it is
also possible to qualify these two aesthetic subjects as different faces of the same
function. Of course, in his creation the artist is inspired by the aesthetic universe
surrounding him. Otherwise, the potential work would be disguised in
“unaesthetic”464 character as argued by Ali Canip. On the other hand, the observing
or reading conscience can make a correct diagnosis, which means that his aesthetic
attitude would be legitimate, only if he is kneaded with the same aesthetic values.

The third, and the largest, circle surrounding the aesthetic subject is strongly
emphasized in the Young Turks’ periodicals. Mehmet Vâhid Bey, for example,
whose various articles related to philosophy of art and aesthetic can be seen in the
periodicals, emphasizes the connection between producing and consuming aesthetic
subjects. According to him, the only thing needed in terms of an artist is the people
“hearing” and “feeling” in the same way as he is doing. 465 It is mandatory for the
existence of national conscience as the upper aesthetical consciousness. One can say
that the opposite circumstance also is mandatory. Put it more explicitly, just as an
artist needs people who feel like him, a nation also needs artists who feel like it. The
later receives the mutual principle from national conscience and gives back to it.
Moreover, the art also forms an aesthetic unity between the subjects by means of
aesthetic pleasures.466 Therefore, there is such a unifying aspect of aesthetic and art.
Unifying function of aesthetic depends on that the individuals of a nation develop a

464
Ali Canip, “Bedî’iyyât Bahisleri: Lâ-Bedî’î Hisler,”, p. 467.
465
Vahid, “Sınâ’at-i Nakş ve Te’bîd-i Mefâhir,” Yeni Mecmua: Çanakkale Nüsha-i Fevkaladesi, (5
March 1331/18 March 1915), p. 45.
466
Ibid, p. 46.

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public conscience or join to a pre-existing one. Considered from the perspective of
art, this union can only be weaved by aesthetic conscience. For, aesthetic conscience
is the eye of aesthetic subject, as Mehmet Vahid Bey puts it. Aesthetic subject “does
not see the nature just as it is seen by ordinary people. Because, aesthetic excitement
helps aesthetic subject to discover the internal truth under the appearance.” 467 This
eye, engraved closely on artist’s heart, penetrates deeply into the chest of nature. It is
this ability of seeing that makes individual to acquire the quality of aesthetic subject.
As we are going to point in our examination of the relationship between arts and
nature, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın also makes interpretations resembling this. According
to him, one of the basic characteristics of aesthetic subject is to reveal the essential
nature of the things. Aesthetic subject must have certain attributes, the most
important of which is the ability of seeing mentioned above, to fulfill such a task.

6.3.2 Aesthetic Object

Aesthetic object is any object offering us a cross section from the nature. This may
be both a natural object and any piece of art. Aesthetic object must be inspired by
nature even if it is a work of art (that is, an artificial product) in the idea of The
Young Turks. In this regard, one needs to remark that a mimetic object is being
talked about. As it is going to be touched upon during our discussions about the
essential link between art and imitation of nature, Young Turks regard the art as
imitation of the nature, to a large extent.

The framework above is incomplete, although it is essentially true. Because, first of

all, any object needs to have “beauty” to achieve an aesthetic quality. Considered
from this perspective, the questions of “what is beauty?” or “what is good?” that take
part among the fundamental questions of philosophy of art and aesthetics, are
essentially different formulations of the question of “what is aesthetic object?”.
Therefore, that the aesthetic object means the beautiful object. One needs to point out
that not the beauty as a value but the beauty as a factual reality is being mentioned
here. In this regard, the aesthetic object can be defined in such a way that it is “the

467
Vahid, “Nefis Sanatlar: Sınâ’atte Hakikatperestlik – Rodin ,” Yeni Mecmua 2, no. 33 (21 Februay
1918), p. 131.

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object which constitutes the subject of aesthetics, and towards which we face for
finding an aesthetical pleasure in.”468

According to one of the most remarkable answers, in Young Turks’ periodicals,

given to the question of “what is beauty?”, the distinctive nature of beauty is to have
an original character. Character is a qualification which comes up with all the
dimensions of any nature view. The aforementioned truth, in fact, has double
qualifications in terms of both having an apparent dimension and inner dimension
that is revealed by the previous one.469 Aestheticization of an object essentially
depends on unifying these two seemingly distinct truths and reflecting them as a
single truth.

The main function of art or aesthetics is to reveal this character. In other words, this
function is constituted by the discovery of aesthetical dimension that the object has
and transmission of it to the consuming aesthetic subject as the truth. Thusly,
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın determines the mission of art as uncovering “essential
470
nature”. A work of art becomes an aesthetical object as far as it shows the success
of bringing the essential nature in object to the forefront.471 Aesthetical and artistic
“genius” makes the aesthetic aspects of natural objects more conspicuous.472
Considered from this perspective, it can be said that art represents a creativity which
does not exist even within nature itself.

No doubt, this creativity is composed of featuring some aspects that are remained
hidden due to certain effects in nature. The universe embodies any kind of the
aesthetic possibility in its own eternity. Thanks to his innate aesthetic talent the artist

468
Ahmet Cevizci, Felsefeye Giriş (İstanbul: Nobel Yayın Dağıtım, 2010), p. 174.
469
Köprülüzade Mehmet Fuat, “Rodin ve Sanat,” Yeni Mecmua 1, no. 24 (20 December 1917), p. 465.
470
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -8- Sanat: Menşei, Mevzuu, Gâyesi, Aksâmı,”
Servet-i Fünun 15, no. 380 (11 June 1314/23 June 1898), p. 250.
471
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -9- Gâye-i Hayâlî = Idéal,” Servet-i Fünun 15, no.
382 (25 June 1314/7 July 1898), p. 283.
472
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -12- Dehâ,” Servet-i Fünun 15, no. 387 (30 July
1314/11 August 1898), p. 365.

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reveals the actual truth as a fact. This can be both the discovery of a hidden truth, or
the extraordinary aesthetical reflection of a view that an object represents
inaesthetically in everyday life.

The artist's creativity (or genius) will come with the question asking whether beauty
is a subject of production or of a discovery. It would be useful to answer connectedly
with the question asking whether beauty is subjective or objective. Similarly, the
question of whether there is an absolute beauty in this context would be appropriate
to be addressed.

One of the issues on which almost all periodicals we analyzed seem to agree is that
the beauty is subjective. Of course, subjectivity is only effective in terms of aesthetic
subject we defined as "consuming" above. Otherwise, when it comes to productive
aesthetic subject, objectivity should be talked over. And this is inevitable, because, a
claim that an aesthetic object has a subjective character also against the artist who
created it cannot be regarded as reasonable and legitimate. The artist reflects an
objective truth in subjective form. As Vahid Mehmet Bey rightly pointed out, since it
reflects the light emanating from the artist’s soul,473 aesthetic object’s presentation of
a subjective character is inevitable.

The most obvious indicator of the fact that fully reflected objects, in other words,
objects carrying no signs from the creative genius of the artist, cannot gain aesthetic
capacity is the analogy of “photograph” revived in the periodicals on a several
occasions. Photograph, which is the direct reflection of the natural and non-
subjective states of objects, was not accepted as a real work of art in Young Turks’
understanding of aesthetic.474 It is true that art is an imitation of nature, but this is not
a complete imitation. It must also carry some tracks from the artist’s creative
imagination. Photograph “freezes the time also just as it freezes the space.”475

473
Vahid, “Sınâ’at,” Yeni Mecmua 2, no. 29 (24 January 1918), p. 51.
474
For interpretations to this effect see, for example, Ali Canip, “Sanat ve Mahiyeti,” Genç Kalemler
1, no. 13(5) (Undated), p. 145; Köprülüzade Mehmet Fuat, “Rodin ve Sanat,” p. 465 and Hüseyin
Cahit, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -8- Sanat: Menşei, Mevzuu, Gayesi, Aksamı”, p. 250.
475
Köprülüzade Mehmet Fuat, ibid, p. 466.

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Whereas, a true aesthetic object is a work suitable not for getting frozen in terms of
time and space but re-generated in a new form of life. An objective truth can only be
expressed in a subjective manner. The subjective becomes truth as long as it
converges to the objective. This is the reason why the photograph, as expressing the
objective objectively, is not an art in the eyes of Young Turks. For, it kills the feeling
of vitality and just “freezes” what is visible. However, the art is made only by seen.

Another remarkable comment we encountered in periodicals considers the problem

as a matter of methodology. This argument is brought about by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın
and after discussing ideas of philosophers like Aristotle, Plato, Plotinus, Kant, Saint
Augustine, and Baumgartner about beauty and aesthetics, he says that methodology
previously used by these philosophers was wrong.476 He seems to think that they
were firstly putting forward a definition of beauty and then saying that objects in
compliance with this definition are entitled to the quality of being aesthetic.
However, what should be done is to examine the history of art and clarify the
problems related to aesthetic and beauty with the general rules acquired in the result
of these examinations.477 That the issue of determining and describing the aesthetic
object is handled as a methodological problem is highly meaningful because of its
positivistic extensions. For, aesthetic is “the science of beauty”, according to
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın.478 Aesthetic, as a science, should dwell upon the factual
reality. The methodology to be followed by it should evolve out of a factual basis.
And this approach must be accepted as a projection of positivist approach that we
tried to discuss in the third chapter. It seems possible to infer a similar projection
from the claim that beauty is subjective. Because, as we discussed in the third
chapter, Young Turks think that scientific knowledge is relative. The most open
statements of this approach, which deserves being entitled as realistic because of
emphasis it makes on the factual reality, take place in Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’s critics
against Plato related to the issue of beauty. His critics to Plato can be grouped

476
Detailed information with regard to the said criticisms can be found in Hüseyin Cahit, “Hikmet-i
Bedâyi’e Dair -2- Hikmet-i Bedâyi’, His”, pp. 103-106.
477
Hüseyin Cahit, ibid, p. 106.
478
Hüseyin Cahit, ibid, p. 105.

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roughly under two titles. Firstly, Plato takes beauty as an absolute quality which is
valid for every time and every place. However, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın thinks that
history of art shows that this is not the case. There is not an absolute beauty. Beauty
varies in accordance with the time and environment. To put it more clearly, beauty is
“relative.” Secondly, Plato talks about an abstract beauty. Whereas, according to
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, beauty is not something can be abstracted from the things. The
thing what we call beauty is common qualities in things. These qualities cannot be
alienated from them. When the secondary qualities are removed from the things,
nothing remains. To put it within his own words:

A rose constitutes a union (hey’et-i mecmû’a) together with its various

qualities. By giving a name to this unity we say, for example, that it is a
beautiful table, a beautiful sculpture, and a beautiful poem. However, what
remains if we remove whiteness, hardness, space, and materiality from a
marble sculpture that we call beautiful? Can a sculpture be imagined without
these? So, the presence of the sculpture is possible just with the combination
of these qualities. If we take one of these qualities, whiteness for instance,
and say that it be neither a sculpture, nor a paper, cotton, or sugar etc. We
cannot imagine such a possibility. In order to feel whiteness it must be related
to something. And, since it is a common quality, beauty cannot be imagined
without being referred to something. This is why the claim that there is an
absolute beauty cannot be valid.479

6.3.3 Aesthetic Pleasure

Aesthetic pleasure can be identified as a sense of admiration resulting from the

experience aesthetic subject acquires through his contact with the aesthetic object. In
this respect, aesthetic pleasure makes an object a technical issue by taking it away
from simplicity. This is a technical issue since the question of what gives pleasure
and what needs to be named as an aesthetic pleasure is particularly being handled by
philosophers of aesthetics.

It is clear that not all the objects give us pleasure. More importantly, every object that
gives us pleasure does not have to be of an aesthetic quality. Aesthetic pleasure is not
only a pleasure. In other words, pleasure cannot constitute the theme of the aesthetic

479
Hüseyin Cahit, ibid, p. 103.

234
by its being pleasure. Its characterization as aesthetic is possible only provided that it
arises from an aesthetic object. The border between a rough pleasure and a more
refined pleasure may sometimes be overlooked. One of the missions of aesthetic,
seen as “the science of beauty” by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, is to differentiate the
aesthetical and ordinary pleasures from each other. As far as we see, some extremely
technical discussions were held about this matter in Young Turks’ periodicals. There
is a serial of articles by Ali Canip480 published in Yeni Mecmua which is particularly
remarkable because of the analyses, regarding to the aesthetic pleasure, it includes.
The discussions what we are going to do related to the aesthetic pleasure in this
section will largely depend on a review of these articles.

The legitimacy of the arguments about aesthetic pleasure presupposes that the
relationship between aesthetic object and aesthetic subject is grounded on a true
basis. As result of his investigation about this basis, Ali Canip reaches to the
conclusion that aesthetic subject, which is aesthetic conscience, has three states
related to aesthetic pleasure. Accordingly, aesthetic conscience reveals its aesthetic
relationship with the aesthetic object in three forms: admiration (tahayyür), sympathy
(tecâzüb) and vitality (hayatiyet).

Ali Canip defines the admiration as “the feeling into which soul falls when it
becomes fascinated under the effect beautiful”481 or “the feeling of superiority based
on a value judgment.”482 But Ali Canip appears to give these definitions under a
certain reservation. Admiration is not only felt in front of the things we may call
beauty. Things that we call ugly, under normal conditions, also may cause the
appearance of this feeling in us:

The beauty introduces itself to us with its success and victory. And the ugly
arouses a feeling of “disdain” or “blame.”… If something like a dirty,

480
The mentioned series includes the following articles by Ali Canip: “Bedî’î Haz -1- Tahayyür”;
“Bedî’î Haz -2- Tecâzüb,” Yeni Mecmua 1, no. 19 (15 November 1917), pp. 367-368; “Bedî’î Haz -3-
Hayatiyet Hissi,” Yeni Mecmua 1, no. 21 (29 November 1917), pp. 406-408; “Bedî’iyyât Bahisleri:
Hazzın Bedî’î Hayatta Mevkii” and “Bedî’îyyât Bahisleri: Lâ-Bedî’î Hisler.”
481
Ali Canip, “Bedî’î Haz -1- Tahayyür,” p. 353.
482
Ibid.

235
 execrable, and unhealthy face that we could never appreciate is reflected by a
master painter’s brush, we become ecstatic in the face of it. What we
appreciate here is not the descripted thing but the describer himself. Macbeth
displays a bad conscience; but it is a masterpiece. Makber, on the other hand,
narrates a misfortune; but it is an aesthetical work. Fikret’s “Cenab’a Cevab”
tells about the humanity’s mud; but it is good.483

These claims take us to the conclusion that there should be a discrimination made
between beauty in art and beauty in nature. Considered along with the idea that
beauty is subjective, the beauty in art may be said to be arising from “intuitional
outlook”484 or “artistic genius”485 of the artist. This qualification of the artist puts
even the ugliest thing into a beautiful form. We swarm with aesthetical feelings in
the face of objects that could not give us an aesthetical pleasure in normal times, and
become exposed to the bombardment of aesthetical pleasures.

Ali Canip defines “sympathy”, which constitutes the second form of aesthetic
pleasure in his thought, as “manifestation of happiness or grief, repulsion or
compassion of a work of art in readers”486 or “a pleasure which is invited by
another’s pleasure or the pain which is invited by the pain of others.”487

The manifestation of happiness, grief, repulsion, or compassion in readers

contemplating that work of art initially seems to point at an objective source of
inspiration. For, it means that we are standing in the face of a tangible data which
arouses in us feelings to this effect. But a closer look shows that its main function
may be said to activate the mechanism of subjective evaluation in us. The feelings
that impacted us arouse a mobilizer feeling on our own souls. For this reason, Ali
Canip does not regard sympathy as an objective instrument of evaluation in terms of
aesthetic. In other words, aesthetic subject acquires aesthetic pleasure just after
processing, within his own mechanism of assessment, the effects he receives.

483
Ibid, p. 354.
484
Ibid.
485
Ibid.
486
Ali Canip, “Bedî’î Haz -2- Tecâzüb,” p. 367.
487
Ibid.

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Subjective channels are entirely active in this regard. Therefore, sympathy cannot
constitute on its own an objective criterion of evaluation.

Ali Canip calls the third form of pleasure as vitality. According to him, vitality may
be defined as “diffusion taking place on our mental activities”488 or “generic
luminance reaching up to all of our organs.”489

We have the right of requesting from any aesthetic work of art which we read, listen
or watch to give us a feeling of vitality. This is one of the most legitimate forms of
aesthetic attitude at the same time. Our aesthetic attitude happens to follow a quite
reasonable direction while we do not attribute an aesthetic value to the things which
we loathe while listening or we feel never read after reading. No doubt, the effects
arouse by any aesthetic experience in our conscience or the luminance, as Ali Canip
describes them, do not occur at the same level. That is why our aesthetic conscience
is not exposed to an effect when we subject the work of arts of average aesthetic
intelligences into our aesthetic experience after great aesthetic works produced by
great aesthetic geniuses.

One can observe that the position feeling of vitality occupies within the aesthetic life
is given place in the articles written by authors besides Ali Canip. Hüseyin Cahit
Yalçın, for example, emphasizes this point almost in all of his articles about
philosophy of aesthetics.490 Köprülüzade Mehmet Fuad also has a similar approach.
The following expressions of him, inspired from Auguste Rodin, are noteworthy in
this regard:

There can be no arts without life. When a sculptor wants to attribute

sublimity, grief or a passion on his work of art, first of all he must vitalize the
beings he produces. Otherwise, he may never create influence on us. What
does sublimity and grief of a motionless object, a marble block for example,
mean? The movement in arts is the transition from one state to another. A

488
Ali Canip, “Bedî’î Haz -3- Hayatiyet Hissi,” p. 406.
489
Ibid, p. 407.
490
See, for example, Hüseyin Cahit, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -15- Sanat ve Şiirin İstikbali-2,” pp. 74-
75.

237
 painter or a sculptor should mobilize the characters he creates and show them
in a living manner.491

The sense of vitality, beyond being an element of the aesthetic pleasure, creates a
fluctuation in the aesthetic conscience of human beings. In this regard, it represents a
luminous victory of aesthetic conscience and intelligence.492 In other words, it
enables the aesthetic subject to reach the aesthetic consciousness.

As a matter of fact, the feeling of vitality can even be said to form the main aesthetic
value in Young Turks’ understanding of aesthetic. For, as we mentioned in previous
chapters, the main goal of Young Turks is to build a new life. And the new life is
substantially possible with the creation of new values. Therefore, the feeling of
vitality, as an aesthetic value, will play a role that the new life they imagine is
possible.

According to Ali Canip, admiration, sympathy and vitality, which are the basic
elements of aesthetic pleasure, may appear in the fields like ethical or religious areas
having no aesthetic character.493 Therefore, these are not sufficient criteria of
aesthetical pleasure, although they are essential components of it. One of the
prominent signs proving this argument is that aesthetic pleasure does not arise only
from delighting stuff. To put it more clearly, the “zest”, in its familiar sense, is not
our unique expectation from an aesthetic object. All scenes of the “tragedies” inspire
us sense of remorse and mercy.494 Therefore, aesthetic cannot be defined as a
delighting element alone. When this point is taken into consideration, aesthetic
pleasure may be defined as the influence created in our conscience by the unraveling
of the essential nature. To be able to determine this influence with a sharp aesthetic
conscience, one must be both producing and consuming aesthetic subject in the sense
of being an art critic. Ali Canip seems to be the opinion that if one wants to grasp the
true meaning of aesthetic pleasure he must examine the three elements of pleasure
491
Köprülüzade Mehmet Fuat, “Rodin ve Sanat,” p. 465.
492
Anonymous, “Sanat Âlemi: Auguste Rodin,” Yeni Mecmua 1, no. 23 (13 December 1917), p. 445.
493
Ali Canip, “Bedî’iyyât Bahisleri: Hazzın Bedî’î Hayatta Mevkii,” p. 505.
494
Ibid, p. 506.

238
(which are admiration, sympathy, and vitality) as well as the conditions required for
being art critic. In this regard, the studies about art criticism are mandatory in terms
of putting the sufficient criteria of aesthetic pleasure.

Ali Canip makes two things obligatory for a person who wants to attempt to an
activity of aesthetic or artistic critic. The first one is that he needs to be captive of a
sensation.495 He cannot be characterized as a critic of art if the contact with
aesthetical object, which constitutes the aesthetical experience in this case, does not
create a fluctuation within his aesthetical conscience. The second is that he must
“have a grasp of the conditions that art has in itself.” 496 As we understand from an
article of Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, the requirements that Ali Canip asserted were in fact
brought up by Eugene Veron (182-1889).497 Essentially, these requirements give
some tips about the qualification of aesthetic object. An experience gained by anyone
in the face of any aesthetic object cannot be said to acquire aesthetic qualification
just because of being an experience. There are certain circumstances necessary for an
aesthetic experience. Either you brought that aesthetic object into life because you
are an artist; or, you should carry out specific conditions even if you are an audience.
This means that art cannot be comprehended by everyone and, therefore, that the
ability of making aesthetic judgments about work of arts does not fall within the
limits of everybody’s power. To put it more clearly, aesthetic experience is an
aristocratic experience. Thus, according to Ali Canip, “the art lived aristocrat and
noble up to now and it will live in that way from now on.”498 This aristocratic
understanding of arts is also compatible with general Jacobean approaches of Young
Turks.

Issues pointed out so far reveal that not all pleasures are aesthetic. We are attacked
by various feelings when we get in touch with an aesthetic object, whether it is a

495
Ibid.
496
Ibid.
497
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -1- Şive, Zevk,” Servet-i Fünun 15, no. 370 (2
April 1314/14 April 1898), p. 88.
498
Ali Canip, “Sanat ve Edebiyat: Millî Lisan ve Millî Edebiyat,” Genç Kalemler 2, no. 3 (6 May
1327/19 May 1911), p. 52.

239
painting, sculpture, poem, or novel. Having these feelings do not require that we are
in an aesthetic experience. We are experiencing something, of course. But, it is a bit
difficult to understand if it is an aesthetic experience or not. For, it is always possible
for some external elements to intervene. However, it is not impossible to distinguish
between real aesthetic pleasures and these foreign elements named “accessory
feelings”499 by Ali Canip. We may possibly attacked by the feelings like remorse,
sorrow, grief, and happiness etc., which may be felt in front of a dramatic view
appearing in any novel, and we would feel against the same view when it appears on
a television program. However, aesthetic experiment can be experienced only within
the scope of an aesthetic object. It is “unique” in this regard. Being unique does not
mean that it may not be experienced in another place or time and by another person.
But it has a special status which distinguishes it from ordinary experiences. For this
reason, the first condition that must be fulfilled is the separation of these two things
from one another. And Ali Canip carries out a conceptual analysis to which one can
apply for realizing that separation.

The definition Ali Canip made for aesthetic and non-aesthetic objects and incidents
is very convenient in terms of our topic. He says, that:

Just as we name the things that appreciated by aesthetic conscience as

“aesthetic” (“bedî’î”), we may call things that it rejects as “inaesthetic”
(“gayrı bedî’î”), and the common feelings to which we can give none of these
qualities as “anaesthetic” (“lâ-bedî’î”). Those who are not informed of the
nature of aesthetic feelings admire work of arts only due to anaesthetic
feelings. Take theatres, for instance, the people only cheer a “generosity” or
“heroism.”500

On the other hand, there are three reasons which cause us to experience a state of
sensation in the face of an aesthetic object. These are “personal attitude” (şahsî
vaziyet), “affective contagion” (derûnî sirâyet), and “conception of life” (hayatın
telakkîsi) respectively. These are the “anaesthetic” reactions against the aesthetic
object. They are confused with aesthetic feelings for the most of the time.

499
Ali Canip, “Bedî’iyyât Bahisleri: Lâ-Bedî’î Hisler,” p. 467.
500
Ibid.

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Moral entity, which we call personality, is not a simple entity. Our character,
habituations, moral ideals, religious thoughts, and scientific knowledge etc.
constitute our complex presence. When we come face to face with an aesthetical
object our personality, which is the sum total of all these, reacts. We maintain an
attitude unique to us. Personal attitude is such a feeling that constitutes the result of
the correlation between our character, habituations, ethical ideals, religious thoughts
and scientific knowledge. The reasons for these feelings which go with aesthetic
activity are so complicated that even the art critics have difficulties while separating
them from real aesthetic feelings.501 Affective contagion is states of mind transmitting
to us from aesthetic objects. They are objective feelings. They are feelings spreading
to us, although they belong to others. We maintain a personal attitude against a piece
of art, like a poem, in accordance with our age and religious beliefs for example.
That means that these kinds of feelings are really subjective. Whereas the feelings
mentioned in the affective contagion are the others’ belongings. They become ours
only through spread.502 As to conception of life, in fact it has a tight relationship with
personal attitude and affective contagion. Moreover, it can be said that this is a
reflection of them.503 According to our philosophy of life, we like or hate a work of
art. There is not a mandatory correlation between this philosophy and the work of art
we read. Finally, since our philosophy influences our view, it is necessary to say that
the feelings, which we are attacked, rise from it.

We would like to pass on to the next title by completing this section with a
remarkable claim about aesthetic pleasure by Mehmet Vahid Bey. According to him,
aesthetic pleasure does not only give gratification to aesthetic subject. It helps him to
develop intellectually and mentally either.504 This means that the pleasure is not only
an element of consumption but it has a vital importance also in terms of construction
of aesthetic conscience.

501
Ibid.
502
Ali Canip, ibid, p. 468.
503
Ibid.
504
Vahid, “Sınâ’at-i Nakş ve Te’bîd-i Mefâhir,” p. 45.

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6.3.4 Aesthetic Value

Aesthetic value is the judgment about any object which is subjected to an aesthetic
experience. This judgment defines whether the object in question is beautiful or ugly.
But there is an important point that needs to be noted. In everyday life there are
things that we call beautiful or ugly and these may not preserve the same quality in
terms of aesthetic. If we need to express in a clearer way, the fact that we name an
object as ‘beautiful’ does not entail that it is a given beauty. If it was so, there would
be no difference between aesthetic experience of the creative aesthetic subject and
ordinary experiences. The pointed situation is that experience of aesthetic situation is
related with the deepness of the aesthetic experience. Aesthetic subject can entitle the
object as beautiful or ugly as soon as he grasps its truth. For this reason, any incident
or object we can define as ugly under normal circumstances may be portrayed
through a work of art in an extraordinary aesthetic manner.

The meaning that Young Turks attached to aesthetic value should be addressed in
connection with the function of aesthetics. They make an effort for generating a
national quality in aesthetical field as just as they tried to do in the ethical field. A
national aesthetic is one of the founding elements of the new life. National aesthetic
should arise from the values which supports this nationality before anything else.
And the most important characteristic of aesthetic value is the vitality. National
aesthetic is composed of a chain of values which is compatible with the new life and
placing the idea of life to the conscience of people. It means that national aesthetic
values the things fertilizing the life. This is the first thing we can say about the issue
of aesthetic value. The thing that conveys us to this idea is the article titled “Millî ve
Siyasî Şarkılar”505 Is the thing giving us pleasure which is aesthetically valuable? Is
the pleasure enough to define aesthetic value? Ali Canip’s criticism shows that this is
not so. Some things, which have aesthetic value, may arouse sadness and grief in us.
The concept of pleasure alone cannot cover the aesthetic value we meet in tragedies,

505
Anonymous, “Makâlât-ı Mahsûsa: Millî ve Siyasî Şarkılar,” Şura-yı Ümmet 1, no. 18 (15
December 1902), p. 3.

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for example. Ali Canip’s comments in this direction may possibly be examined under
the heading aesthetic value.

Aesthetic value is created by aesthetic subject, which means that it is subjective.

Therefore, there is no aesthetic value in the things but it subsequently is installed by
the evaluating subject. Again, because of this subjectivity there is no absolute beauty
and an absolute aesthetic value.

6.3.5 Aesthetic Judgment

Aesthetic judgment, in addition to its other characteristics, has a quality which plants
in the subject a consciousness about being aesthetic conscience, and arouses this
feeling in it. Therefore, the pleasure from any work of art of the author, for instane,
and the judgment of “… is beautiful” based upon this, upskills the person to interpret
his relationship with the aesthetical object substantially. The artist has this ability by
nature and, therefore, his relationship with aesthetic object has a more “intuitional”
quality. But the art critic, for example, will gain this ability in time as a consuming
subject. Therefore, any circumstance presenting him the opportunity of explaining
reasonably and legitimately the situations in which he gets in touch with the aesthetic
object helps him to deepen his aesthetical experience. Thus, Ali Canip’s following
expressions, for example, seem discussible in this direction:

Almost all of our aesthetic judgments are criterions, whether positive or

negative, belongs to our personality’s victory: we are putting forward our
authority by saying that “I liked this and did not like that.” Is not that an
enough pleasure in-itself?506

One of the questions that came up most often in discussions of aesthetics is related
with the possibility of common aesthetic judgments. We can say, depending on the
discussions continued up to now, that the Young Turk figures are in a general
agreement with regard to the impossibility of the creation of mutual aesthetical
judgments. It is hard to say this, at least, in terms of the artist who generates the
aesthetic object. Ali Canip and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın imply that art critics may
506
Ali Canip, “Bedî’î Haz -2- Tecâzüb,” p. 367.

243
produce objective aesthetic judgments in case that the conditions laid down by them
are fulfilled. But it is difficult to take it as truth. It must be accepted that criticism is
largely subjective. But, this subjective quality does not entail the critic to attribute an
arbitrary value to aesthetic object or to expel it from aesthetical realm by trivializing
it. The critic should follow an objective method. He should have long observations
and experiences in order to reach to aesthetic judgments by means of the objective
method. Additionally, the critic should follow a path from hearth to brain, from
sensitivity to mind. The aesthetic judgment is the final point to which the route
arrives. We observe, in front of an aesthetic object, that our sensitivities are
mobilized. But, our aesthetic judgments cannot be based on these sensitivities alone.
The mind also needs to step in. Observation and experiment, the essential elements
of positivist method, should play a very important role at this point. Considered from
this perspective, Ali Canip’s reference to Auguste Comte is not irrelevant.507 One
must give a scientific quality to his aesthetic judgments. Any judgment deporting
scientific qualities does not have a place in positivist understanding.

On the other hand, there is one more point in the common (or objective) context of
aesthetic judgments that needs to be pointed out. Principally speaking, the critic
should review a work of art objectively. But, to what extent is easy or possible it to
review a product of a subjective point of view. Because, the things we may define as
objective will most probably be defined as “subjective” by the producing aesthetic
subject. In this regard, the critic will also be influenced by subjectivity and examine
the work of art and criticize accordingly. Also, we should ask if the art can be
objective in a perfect manner. If the art is seen as a reflection or a result of nature, of
course it cannot be objective. For, to be objective would imply the creation of the
same nature for the second time. However, position of the artist against the nature,
Young Turks seem to assume, consists of being subjected to it. The artist becomes
liable to nature and reflects it in the way he sees, feels, and comprehends. He repeats
it. In this regard, the art is a repetition. Still, in this regard, if the art is objective, not
his feelings and thoughts but the original situation of the natural element which he
tries to reflect shall be at the forefront. The more he depicts it closely the more he

507
Ali Canip, “Bedî’iyyât Bahisleri: Hazzın Bedî’î Hayatta Mevkii,” p. 506.

244
becomes objective and realist. This is a possible consideration for the plastic arts. But
is it possible for literature? How objective can poetry be? The creativity in the
plastic arts is directly proportional to the ability of reflecting the nature. The more
you re-create the nature the more you create a realist work of art. But, it seems that
the same condition cannot be valid for literature. Realism in poetry will probably
play a role to kill the creative essence of it. The poetry is a shining point among
written branches of arts to display the most profound understanding about the being.
Anyhow, imprisoning it to the constricted provisions of factual reality and
realistifying it for the sake of objectivity would mean to strangulate it. Therefore, the
more subjective the poetry is the more it becomes deep and extensive.

6.4 Arts as Imitation

In the Young Turk periodicals we examined the most remarkable comments in terms
of the character of the art are met in the articles about the relationship between arts
and nature. In almost all articles, taking part in the periodicals, about the philosophy
of arts and aesthetics the relationship between art and nature is mentioned in various
forms. These approaches basically qualify the art as an imitation of the nature. 508 But
yet, we should point out that this claim is restrictedly accepted by them. In Young
Turks’ consideration, nature is a point of origin in terms of the art. But, the thing the
art tries to fulfill is not depicting the nature as it is. On the contrary, the imitation
should be performed on what the artist as a creative subject likes to feature.

There is no doubt that the aforementioned restriction has some rationales. First of all,
a perfect imitation is impossible. Even the photography, which looks like a perfect
imitation, may be said to have some defects and deficiencies in itself. For example,
as it has been pointed out before, the photograph stills both time and place. In other

508
See, for example; Ali Canip, “Sanat ve Mahiyeti”; Nazmi Ziya, “ “Sanâyi’-i Nefîse: Resim,” Yeni
Mecmua 1, no. 8 (30 August 1917), pp. 149-152; Anonymous, “Sanat Âlemi: Auguste Rodin”;
K.öprülüzade Mehmet Fuat, “Rodin ve Sanat”; Vahid, “Sınâ’at”; Vahid, “Nefis Sanatlar: Sınâ’atte
Hakikatperestlik (Rodin)”; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -8- Sanat: Menşei,
Mevzuu, Gayesi, Aksamı”; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -9- Gaye-i Hayal = Idéal”;
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -9 [2]- Gaye-i Hayalî = İdéal”; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın,
“Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -10- Gaye-i Hayalî 2: Sanatın Ahlak ile Münasebeti”; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın,
“Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -10 [2]- Gaye-i Hayalî [2]: Sanatın Ahlak İle Münasebeti”, Hüseyin Cahit
Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -12- Deha”,Hüseyin Cahit, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -12 [2] – Deha.”

245
words, it freezes a living fact. However, while the art imitates the nature, it should
bring certain vitality into aesthetic objects which it produces as well. Work of art as
real aesthetic object does not still the time; it reflects and probably recreates the time
on its own part. One can even say that “the artist can imitate the nature in a more
accurate and a genius way than photography. Therefore, he is more loyal to the
nature than a photograph.”509 Otherwise, he will not be able to cause any impact on
consuming aesthetic objects.

We may say that these impressions which mentioned in various articles about the
photography give a reflection of the subjective interpretations taking part in Young
Turks’ understanding of aesthetics. For, it seems that an objective reality can solely
be expressed in a subjective way, in their conception. The subjective becomes a
reality as it gets closer to the objective. It is not an art to depict the objective in yet an
objective way. One needs to concentrate on what is seen rather than what is
appearing. To tell the truth, the traces of an extreme subjectivity are also seen in
some articles. While Köprülüzade Mehmet Fuat defines the art, for example, says
that the artist represents the universe in terms of his own imagination and, thusly,
puts his own dreams forward. According to him, this means that not the nature is
displayed but the artist’s own soul.510 But despite all this, it is helpful to remind that
one does not fully move away from the factual reality. The artist tries to establish a
balance between the objective and the subjective. In this way, the factual reality can
be interpreted. Interpretation is even sometimes mandatory, but this should not be
regarded as distortion.

The other reason for the aforementioned impossibility is that the aesthetic object
itself excludes a perfect imitation –in terms of its distinguishing quality. Because the
aesthetic object tries to reflect a condition which is currently or corporeally non-
existent. The reason for this is that the nature which the artist sees and the nature
which an ordinary person sees are totally different from one another. For, the nature
has an interior sight besides its external sight. It is however can be seen just by an

509
Köprülüzade Mehmet Fuat, “Rodin ve Sanat,” p. 466.
510
Ibid, p. 468.

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aesthetic subject. The artist’s look distinguishes the internal realities lying under the
external sight. An ordinary man cannot create a work of art with the imitation of the
511
nature. Since, “he looks without seeing”. Also this should be added that if the
nature as a rough factual reality had actually represented the feelings from the artist’s
aesthetic conscience, the occupation which is called art would not have been a
current issue in the human history.

Another example, supporting the conviction that the art is not a complete imitation,
can be found in an article by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın. According to him, it is possible
to find a lot of strong evidences on that the aim of art is not composed of a complete
imitation. For instance, some arts e.g. sculpture does not completely and accurately
reflect the nature. Ordinary statues are colorless; and they do not have pupils
either.512 That means some of the points of a thing are required to be carefully and
completely imitated, not all the parts of it.

The restriction taken into consideration about the relationship between art and nature
brought some changes in the descriptions of the art as well. For example, Ali Canip
describes the art as follows: “The art is to imitate the nature by pointing out an
essential character and fusioning this together with a distinguished personality.”513
Similarly, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, (inspired by Hippolyte Taine) defines the art as “the
imitation of the relationship between the parts of an object and their
interrelations.”514 It is also beneficial to say that this imitation does not present a
complete quality here. Because, as will be pointed out below, Hüseyin Cahit Yaçın
tells that these proportions may be changed in case of need.

Essentially, both Ali Canip’s and Huseyin Cahit Yalçın’s definitions of art remind a
very important matter which is frequently mentioned in terms of the philosophy of

511
Anonymous, “Sanat Âlemi: Auguste Rodin,” p. 445.
512
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -8- Sanat: Menşei, Mevzuu, Gayesi, Aksamı,” p.
250.
513
Ali Canip, “Sanat ve Mahiyeti,” p. 145.
514
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, ibid, p. 251.

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arts and aesthetics in Young Turk periodicals. All Young Turk figures who published
articles on aesthetical issues are of opinion that the thing may be expected from an
object is to bring “essential nature” (tabat-ı esasiye) out. This means that while the
nature is being imitated, not the whole but the character, which attracts aesthetic eye
of the artist to itself, should be regenerated in a more visible way. This is the reason
why we pointed above that Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın did not mean a complete imitation.

Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın describes “essential nature” in the following way: “essential
nature is such a quality that all other, or a large part of, qualities are generated from it
in the terms of constant connections.”515 The emphasis by another writer on the
“essential nature” that describes it as a “cordial and internal reality of the things”516
can also be seen as the sign of a realistic approach. For, if the definition Hüseyin
Cahit Yalçın makes is considered, the essential nature which all qualities emerge
from it, because of some immobile connections, composes a connection point that
plays a touchstone role in terms of every secondary qualities. Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’s
following example describing his intention about essential nature is noteworthy:

Being a big carnivore is the essential nature of a lion. All material and
spiritual qualities of the lion derive from this essential nature as if from a
single source. … First of all in terms of the body: teeth are like scissors, jaws
are built to crush and smash. It needs big muscles to control two awesome
grippers, and suitable holes on the temples for these muscles to be settled.
The lion’s claws are amazing. It is very swift, it walks on the tips of his feet,
and it violently jumps as if triggered by a winding spring. Since nights are so
good to hunt, it can see through the darkness. The spiritual features of the lion
are compatible with all these: it has a natural tendency to cruelty, it needs
fresh meat and it hates the other foods. Besides, it has a strong nervous
system and because of this during attack or defense it musters its forces and
shows in that short time. Despite all these, it is lazy in the leisure time. All
these qualities arise from its being a carnivore. Consequently,
carnivorousness is the lion’s essential nature.517

It is this attempt to reveal the essential nature that motivated Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın to
change his definition of art. Accordingly, masters of art like Michaelangelo and

515
Ibid, p. 250.
516
Anonymous, “Sanat Âlemi: Auguste Rodin,” p. 446.
517
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, ibid, pp. 250-51.

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Rubenis had mostly changed the ratio between parts. If one examines their paintings,
he may see the essential nature (therefore en essential thought that they produced
about the object) and real ratio between the parts is changed in order to make them
rather visible.518 So, how do we know what composes the essential nature? Indeed
there are some parts related to one another, having different proportional
connections, in things. Which one of the parts or proportions does represent
“essential nature”? In this context, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın seems to supervise two
things. The first one is that the shown nature is important and essential. Secondly, to
present that this essential nature is more dominant than the others.519 As long as it
provides two conditions, the work of art gains a right to use the quality of aesthetic
object.

An extraordinary aesthetic ability is needed to bring an essential nature out. Such

ability can only be a production of a genius. It is because of the central role it has in
the creation of the aesthetic object that Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın devoted his two articles
particularly for an analysis of the concept of genius.520 According to him, genius of
the artist functions as the bridge between work of art and nature.521 The most
important function of genius is the ability to fill a gap in the nature.522 This ability is
noteworthy in terms of showing the amplitude of creativity of genius. The authority
of defining essential nature is assigned to the artist because the nature has no power
to do this. Although this essential character exists in it, the nature cannot properly
display its effect as a result of some obstacles. The artist eliminates the factors which
hide essential character, selects the things which make it visible, and corrects the
things which change it. Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın interprets this circumstance in such a

518
Ibid.
519
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -9- Gaye-i Hayal = Idéal,” p. 283.
520
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -12- Dehâ,” Servet-i Fünun 15, no. 387 (30 July
1314/11 August 1898), p. 365 and “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -12- Dehâ [2],” Servet-i Fünun 15, no.
388 (6 August 1314/18 August 1898), pp. 379-381.
521
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -2- Hikmet-i Bedâyi’, His,” p. 105 and “Hikmet-i
Bedâyi’e Dair -12 [2] – Deha,” p. 365.
522
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -8- Sanat: Menşei, Mevzuu, Gayesi, Aksamı,” p.
251.

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way that an artist is able to display the things more accurately than the nature
itself.523

This ability of the artist has an influence on factual reality. As a producing aesthetic
subject, the genius changes its reflection while bringing essential nature out. But, this
is not a distortion. For, the changed reality does not lose anything from its reality. On
the contrary, it is placed on a more solid ground. Because, one foot is on the factual
reality while the other is on ideal. As Köprülüzade Mehmet Fuat states, “the artist,
even if he changes the nature, meanwhile he is not aware of what he does. At that
time, the feeling, which influences his seeing ability, displays the nature in the way
he imitates.”524 Considered from this perspective, change of the factual reality may
even be defined as that the things are forced to go back to their own identity.
Because, secondary qualities, which were changed to define the essential nature, are
being changed for the sake of essential qualities to which they are bounded. In other
words, essential nature is not being loaded onto things externally, but is derived from
the things themselves.

This last point is important, because, it is actually a reflection of a general approach

which we have seen in Young Turks’ periodicals. The general approach that we are
talking about is a conciliatory perspective. When it comes to the art, conciliation
between factual reality and ideal may be seen as the conciliation between reason and
heart. Abdullah Cevdet’s expressions in this context are important. He says that
“philosophy is the heart of human beings while the art is their heart. Brain in a body
without a heart, and the heart in a body without a brain can only exist in the state of
death.”525 Similarly, Ali Canip compares reason and sense in his article “Feylesof ile
Şair”526 and emphasizes that both of them are important means to reach to the reality.
A comparison between mind’s ability of understanding and heart’s ability of sense is

523
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -9- Gaye-i Hayal = Idéal,” p. 283.
524
Köprülüzade Mehmet Fuat, ibid.
525
Abdullah Cevdet, “Felsefe-Edebiyat,” p. 1579.
526
Ali Canip, “Feylesof ile Şair,” Genç Kalemler 3, no. 16 (16 February 1327/29 February 1912), pp.
93-94.

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so striking in terms of bringing out the extent of mind’s philosophical power.
Additionally, there is an interpretation made by Rıza Tevfik, in reference to Francis
Bacon, which is exceptionally important in terms of pointing out the connection
between reason and art. According to Rıza Tevfik, human knowledge is divided into
three big bodies. Each of the three big bodies refers to three big forces of reason.
These are “memory”, “consideration” (understanding) and “imagination”
respectively. History is a product of memory. Philosophy is born from the powers of
judgment and comprehension of reason. And the poetry corresponds to imagination.
The events are handled in history and philosophy as they are. There is a complete
reflection in poetry. Things and events are always handled in an imaginary way.527
The connection constructed between imagination, which is also a faculty of reason,
and poetry can be read as the connection between arts (therefore, poetry) and reason.
This can also be qualified as an emphasis on a strong connection between objective
and subjective realities. In this regard, we may say that Young Turks had one’s cake
and ate it. On one hand, they tried not to put factual reality away from sight because
of their strong positivist tendencies; on the other hand, they made an intellectual
change, more precisely, an interpretation on the factual reality to fulfill their ideal
thoughts. They saw that the factual reality does not present an adequate place to
fulfill the thing which they want to reach and consequentially they attempted to this
act of transformation.

6.5 Arts and Ethics

One of the issues held in the context of the philosophy of arts and aesthetics quests if
there is a connection between art and ethics. The fact that human being is a value
producing entity brings about the idea that there is a connection between arts and
ethics. In this regard, expecting that the produced values support each other can be
regarded as a legitimate attitude. Thus, although the things which people call good or
beautiful belong to different fields, to ethics and aesthetic respectively, they seem to
be pointing to the same theme.

527
Rıza Tevfik, “Tasnif-i Ulûm: Bazı Mukaddemât-ı Felsefiye,” p. 503.
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Of course, to understand if such a connection can be constructed or not, one needs
first to put forward their similarities and dissimilarities in terms of their structures. In
this context, there are a number of points to which we can refer by reminding some
of the discussions we have made so far.

We have pointed on several occasions that the human being is a value producing
entity. The Young Turks used philosophy as a mechanism to reinforce this value
generation quality. The production of ethical and aesthetical values, in particular,
sums up their expectation from philosophy. Now one needs to remind that ethical
and aesthetical value judgments are the products of the same subject. The mechanism
which produces them is one and same despite their appearance on different areas. In
this regard, it seems possible to define ethical and aesthetical values as two
reflections of the same conscience. Ethical values are born from ethical dimension of
the conscience while the aesthetical ones are born from aesthetical faculty of it. We
want to note this reality that they arose from a mutual source, as the first similarity
between the two types of value.

Another proof that ethical and aesthetical values resemble each other in terms of
structure can be deduced from ideal meaning which is based on their real resource. In
other words, the question asking if ethical and aesthetical values are objective or
subjective has a guiding function. One should give an answer to this question that
Young Turks evaluated these values as subjective in the last instance. However, it is
mandatory to take into account the reasoning maintained by them during the way to
subjectivity.

In Young Turk’s understanding, ethical values arise from an objective resource. This
resource is national conscience. While we are making a judgment on which actions
are good the objective basis that we will consider are the exceptions emanating from
national conscience. Moreover, the social conscience, as the upper ethical
consciousness, is an objective resource for the people liable to it. This is the
objective side of the matter related to ethical values. But we know that the value is
not an issue related to the factual reality. Goodness or righteousness are not qualities
in things themselves. These qualities are loaded by us, as a result of an inspiration

252
from national conscience, afterwards. Therefore we make subjective judgments when
it comes to things.

On the other hand, we may say about aesthetic values that the nature exists as an
objective reality. But we try to idealize this reality. Idealization means to produce
values corresponding to expectations of the upper aesthetic conscience. Attempts to
explore the essential nature, for example, are expressions of this circumstance. To do
this, producing aesthetic subject should change the nature as an objective resource.
But this is not defacement. For, production of aesthetic value is not entirely a fictive
process. One of the feet of the producing subject is on reality while the other is on
ideal. Therefore, one can say that ethical and aesthetical values are arising from a
mutual ground with respect to fusioning the objective and subjective truths.

It is difficult to say that the relationship between ethics and aesthetics is examined in
a widespread manner. However, it is possible to talk about two articles at least that
can be said to support the aforementioned arguments. These are written by Hüseyin
Cahit and Mehmet Vahid Bey. Both writers clearly suggest that beyond the structural
similarities of ethical and aesthetical values, there are functional similarities as well.

Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, starting from the idea that beautiful is also beneficial, claims
that the essential nature of human being is to be beneficial for the society in which he
lives.528 There is only one force ensuring human being to be beneficial to the society:
“love”. Because, he seems to think, “loving means caring about somebody else’s
happiness, working and making sacrifices for somebody else’s benefits.”529 It is
obvious that the essential character of a human being is pointing out an ethical case.
Moreover, mentioned character should also be considered while designating the
values of the esthetic objects. To put it in Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’s own words:

There cannot be more beneficial nature than this. Thus, we happen to

determine a criterion of value for the works of arts, in accordance with the

528
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-İ Bedâyi’e Dair -10- Gâye-i Hayâlî: Sanatın Ahlâk İle
Münâsebeti,” Servet-i Fünun 15, no. 385 (16 July 1314/28 July 1898), p. 331.
529
Ibid.

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 values we find in natures, as well. If we are presented two works of arts that
include two different essential natures, produced within equal ability and
power, we look into these essential natures to understand which one is more
valuable. We say that the one closest to the benefaction is more valuable than
the other.530

If one pays attention, he can claim that aesthetic value plays the role of combining
aesthetic object and esthetic subject in Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’s approach. This is
because, “loving” is the character of the aesthetic subject while “being close to
benefit” is the character of the aesthetic object. As a result of the combination of
these elements, an aesthetic value at the highest level arises.

Mehmet Vahid Bey, just like Hüseyin Cahit, is of the opinion that ethics and
aesthetics require each other. According to him, art is beneficial for society. For, it
purifies ethics. It softens the hardness of the nature of human being by means of
getting him contemplate himself.”531 This is why a real artist’s ethical level is higher
than the public. It is possible to come across, in the jails or in the court rooms, with
people from any kind of profession except artists.532

The most remarkable expressions of Mehmet Vahid Bey’s opinion about the
relationship between ethics and aesthetics take place within following statements:

Enyo, one of the members of the old city of Troy’s monarchs, finds herself
wafted to the shores of Africa. She secretly reaches to Carthage and gets
inside a temple which is common to Junun. She sees there a number of
paintings describing the siege of Troy. When she sees these paintings, her
concerns become replaced by a relief. The light of hope reborns in her heart
and says to her companion: “We can be relieved! Of course one can come
across, in such a place, with compassionate hearths showing mercy to
survivors.533

When considered in terms of the relationship mentioned above, one can say that it is
elitism which constitutes one of the elements constructing the relationship between

530
Ibid.
531
Vahid, “Sınâ’at-i Nakş ve Te’bîd-i Mefâhir,” p. 46.
532
Ibid.
533
Ibid.
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aesthetics and society.

The relationship of art and morality is, at the same time, a projection of the
relationship of aesthetic and society. Uncovering the essential nature, which has an
important place in Young Turks’ understanding of aesthetics, is not something that
can be done by everyone. It requires a great accumulation of knowledge and, more
importantly, an innate talent which is “genius”. This point actually constitutes one of
the basic foundations of “elitism” which we observe that taking an important place
within Young Turks’ mentality. Young Turks have awareness about the values, on the
one hand. In other words, they conceived the values to be instruments of change and
transformation. They believe, on the other hand, that producing these values is a duty
attributed to them. This belief caused them to look down on society. In fact, it is
possible to say that aesthetics is the most reasonable and legitimate area which can
be expected to give birth to an elitist approach.

6.6 National Art

The relationship between aesthetics and ethics seems to prepare enough ground for a
theme which we tried to revive on several occasions since the beginning of this
chapter. According to this, Young Turks’ philosophy of arts and aesthetics is for a
nationalistic purpose. To put it more clearly, they see aesthetic and arts as elements
strengthening the national soul. It is this understanding that all of those discussions
about aesthetics lead us. Actually this conclusion is consistent with the idea that we
keep emphasizing since the very beginning of our study. Young Turks see scientific
and philosophical understandings as tools, not as intellectual activities in themselves.
This circumstance is valid for arts and aesthetics as well. As it will be mentioned
below, art is responsible to remove the dust all around the national soul which is
brought by the other cultures. Hence, the original national soul, which still survives
somewhere deep, will come to the light once again. It is just those subjects and
objects, serving this purpose, that entitle to use the quality of aesthetic.

In this section, articles presenting the national mission attributed to arts, within
Young Turks’ periodicals, in the most obvious way will be examined. But, before

255
doing this, one needs to touch upon a point that possibly clarifies why Young Turks
expressed the emphasize on “nationality” importunately. We are going to make a
quotation from Ali Canip, for this purpose:

Leon Cahun says that Turks have never been able to live an original
civilization. They moved Chinese culture to Iran and Iranian culture to China.
They have a role in the history of civilization in this respect; but they could
not create a civilization unique to themselves. They lived an economical life
by means of extorting others’ properties. And they took, in their intellectual
life, other nations’ philosophies, literatures, laws, ethics etc. After taking
these, they did not even represent them. They carried them like a fake
ornament; they neither adapted their minds to these institutions nor adapted
these institutions to their minds.534

Ali Canip’s reference to Léon Cahun [1841-1900] is not circumstantial. Young Turks
are of the opinion that this is a common belief about Turks in the West. They tried to
put forward the contra-arguments within Western intellectuals’ language. Henry
Glück’s article named “Türk Sanatı”,535 which is published in Yeni Mecmua, seems to
be an example of such an effort. But interestingly enough, it is also possible to say
that there is also an acceptance, in Young Turk periodicals, that this common belief
of the West is arising from a legitimate ground. The intense effects of Arabic and
Persian languages on Turkish constitute the clearest evidence in this respect for
Young Turks.536 To annihilate this common belief in the West, the language that is
one of the founding elements of Turkness (the other one is religion) should be
purified from foreign concepts and words. In this respect, the movement of “turning
to the essence” in language can be characterized as an interesting combination of
nationalist and aesthetic points of view. This mixture of language, Young Turks
assume, might be seen as thinking in Turkish but expressing in Persian or Arabic.
However, if one looks more closely, it will be seen that the mixture causes in both

534
Ali Canip [Yekta Bahir], “Sanat ve Edebiyat: İbtidâiyyet-Originalite,” Genç Kalemler 3, no. 14 (13
January 1327/26 January 1912), p. 36.
535
Hanry Glück, “Türk Sanatı,” translated by Ahmet Cemal, Yeni Mecmua 3, no. 59 (29 August
1918), pp. 134-136.
536
For criticisms against Arabic and Persian words or concepts in Turkish, see for example: Hüseyin
Cahit, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -1- Şive, Zevk,” p. 88; Ziya Gökalp, “Para ve Tesanüt,” Yeni Mecmua
2, no. 41 (25 April 1918), p. 282; Ziya Gökalp, “Hars ve Medeniyet,” Yeni Mecmua 3, no. 60 (5
September 1918), p. 142 and Ali Canip, “Sanat ve Mahiyeti: Millî Lisan, Millî Edebiyat,”, p. 52.

256
thinking and expressing like an Arab or Iranian. Art is eventually revelation of the
truth and the way of reveling dominates the truth itself. Turkness’s insight on truth
can only be expressed within a language of reflection unique to itself. Otherwise one
will have say that the truth has been distorted.

The most authentic explanation of turning back to essence can be found in Hüseyin
Cahit Yalçın’s analyses about essential nature. As one may remember, Hüseyin Cahit
Yalçın defines the purpose of art as exposing the “essential nature” which exists
yarely in objects. He makes interpretations leading readers to conclude that this
circumstance, designated by him as an aesthetical duty, is an attempt to discover the
national essence. According to him, every nation is influenced by various changes
and transformations as a result of long periods. However, it always keeps the original
yeast, which calls it into being, somewhere deep. In other words, with the
continuation of this nature it always preserves a spiritual feature and a visage unique
to itself. This sphere constitutes the most essential nature.537 The image of Turk that
is described by Western intellectuals, like Cahun, is inspired by surpluses massed on
this very essential sphere as a result of different historical and cultural conditions.
However, one must look deeper and see the essential nature of Turkness. Considered
from this perspective, seeing the essential nature that exists somewhere in deep
means living an aesthetic experiment.

Things we name as aesthetical are directly inspired from national soul and establish a
close intimacy with it. It is clear that this will require us to define almost all
aesthetical concepts, including esthetic object and subject, peculiarly in a more
nationalistic way. As a matter of fact, Ziya Gökalp presents a striking interpretation
within this context. He explains this circumstance as “patriotic aesthetics”. Patriotic
aesthetics could be realized in two ways: either in respect of the object or in respect
of the subject. To put it in his own word:

An art’s being patriotic in respect of subject means that it is in conformity

with national pleasure. If a poet, a painter, an architect, or a musician does not

537
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -9- Gaye-İ Hayalî = Idéal [2],” Servet-i Fünun 15,
no. 383 (2 July 1314/14 July 1898), p. 294.

257
 have an understanding of national pleasure, citizens will not rejoice in his
works. For, these works are not owned by the country with respect to
pleasure. An art’s being patriotic in respect of object means that it selects its
themes from beauties of the country. The greatest artists are the creators who
make, through their works of arts, citizens love the country more. However,
neither subject nor the object, in our literature and art, was national so far.
For, we were observing in our artists the pleasures either of Arabs or Iranians,
or of the French and Britons, instead of national pleasure. And the subjects
were mostly belonging to foreign milieus. Even the grammar of our language
and the meter of our poetry also were directly taken from Arabs and Iranians.
In this case, today’s movement of national literature will give birth to an
aesthetic patriotism as well!538

We should define aesthetic value also in accordance with this. Every work of art that
vitalizes the national soul has an aesthetical value. For, it is a sign of the devotion of
the person who discovers it. It is a reflection of not an arbitrary but a purposive
product. Similarly, aesthetic attitude also will receive its own share from it. There is
no doubt that the sense of patriotism comes with a sense of “vigilance”. Every
measure, taken as a precaution, acquires an aesthetical quality if the country and the
nation are in danger, just as every step taken to protect them is assumed to be ethical.
The subject who tries to take these precautions will always be vigilant. And it will be
possible, in our opinion, to characterize the attitude of the aesthetic subject who is in
alert as the “aesthetical vigilance”. On the other hand, it is also the reason why an
abstract beauty cannot exist. Beauty can only find its reflection on the national soul.
Therefore, the beauty will have to be emanated from such a source. Finally, it is
possible to say that, art is as necessary to explore and awake the national soul as it is
to glorify it.539 Non-national arts cannot meet this demand.

Another point to be noted with regard to art’s national character is the function it
realizes as a unifying element. When the role given by Young Turks to the concept of
union is taken into consideration its additional aesthetic sense becomes quite
remarkable. Art is the reflection of “collective feelings”. An art’s lacking contact

538
Ziya Gökalp, “İktisadi Vatanperverlik,” Yeni Mecmua 2, no. 43 (9 May 1918), p. 322 [emphasis
added].
539
Nazmi Ziya, “Medeni İhtiyaçlar: Sanatın Kıymeti,” Yeni Mecmua 1, no. 10 (1 September 1917),
pp. 194-195; [Anonymous], “Erbâb-ı Kalemin Vazifesi,” p. 4 and Rıza Tevfik, “Nüfus Meselesi ve
Ehemmiyet-i Siyasiye ve İçtimaiyesi,” p. 51.

258
with national soul results in forgetting the national feelings and, therefore, it loses its
unifying identity.540 It can be said, by expanding Nazmi Ziya’s argument to this
effect, that art is not only a reflection of collective feelings but it is the creator of
them as well. Hence, the aesthetical dimension of union, the ethical dimension of
which has been examined within the previous chapter, is also happened to come to
the light. For, being national means to be arising from collective conscience of the
individuals of a nation, or their participation in a mutual conscience. Considered
from the point of view of arts, this union can only be weaved around aesthetic
conscience.

6.7 Aesthetics, Arts and Milieu

Young Turks` understanding of aesthetics and arts is a reflection of the effects of the
scientific and philosophical understandings their time, that we examined within the
third chapter. Arguments stating that aesthetics is a science and that it needs to follow
a positivistic methodology show the clear impact of positivism on Young Turks’
mentality.541 Actually, it is consistent when looked from Young Turks systematics of
understanding, as they come up with the same ideas about philosophies of religion
and ethics. A similar situation is also valid for materialist approach. Although there is
no article directly emphasizing on materialist view of aesthetics, it still is possible to
reach to some data in this direction. Salih Fuat and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, for
example, are seeing material reality as a big coarse mass and think that the
aesthetical value it has can only be given by a subject having aesthetical attitude.
According to them, the universe is eternal. It has no purpose like manifesting a
beauty lying behind it. And the matter is indifferent to its own results.542 Such ideas
can be said to be reflecting the materialist understanding. One also needs to remind

540
Nazmi Ziya, ibid, p. 195. See also: Vahid, “Sınâ’at-i Nakş ve Te’bîd-i Mefâhir,” p. 45.
541
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -2- Hikmet-i Bedâyi’, His,” p. 105; “Hikmet-i
Bedâyi’e Dair -8- Sanat: Menşei, Mevzuu, Gayesi, Aksamı,” p. 249; “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -15-
Sanat ve Şiirin İstikbali-2,” p. 78 and “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -16- Sanatın ve Şiirin İstikbali-3,” p.
93.
542
See Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -13- Şiir,” Servet-i Fünun 15, no. 389 (13
August 1314/25 August 1898), p. 396. See also: Salih Fuat, “Temaşaya Dair,” İçtihat 5, no. 126 (15
January 1330/28 January 1915), p. 462.

259
that realism, which is one of the most common concepts of that time, makes this
connection stronger. Considered from this angle, many Young Turk figures, like Salih
Fuat and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, can be classified both as realists and materialists.
They are realist in the sense that they accept that the being exists independently from
human consciousness. And they are also materialist because they conceive the
matter, as a big coarse mass, to be the essence of the being of all things.

Evolutionism can be said to have a greater impact on Young Turks’ understanding of

philosophy of aesthetics compared to the effect of positivism and materialism in this
regard. This impact is observed in articles written by several Young Turk figures,
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın being in the first place. The impact of evolutionist
understanding arises from the fact that they regarded the art as the imitation of the
nature. Just as the aesthetic object can be taken back to the originals in nature, their
appearance also can be explained in a resembling way to the development of the
natural objects. To be able to do this, one shall need, before anything else, to clarify
the kind of relationship existing between the art and the milieu.

According to Ali Canip, for example, art is a product of a certain period and a
society. To understand how a work of art is formed, towards which ideals it moves,
and the kind of the ways it follows in this continuous movement one must carefully
examine the “milieu” that contains that work of art in itself.543 On the other hand, he
seems to be pointing to a similar circumstance while telling us that the language, as a
tool of reflection, is subjected to the process of natural selection.544 Ali Canip’s
arguments may be seen as if they are referring to the “social milieu” alone. But, as
we are going to mention below, within the discussions about Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’s
assumptions about the relation of arts and milieu, the material sense of the milieu
also must be taken into consideration for a complete analysis of the said relationship.

Salih Fuat also believes, just like Ali Canip, the connections between both the
aesthetic object and subject and the corporeal and incorporeal milieu must be taken
into consideration. According to him, aesthetic object cannot exist, like any other

543
Ali Canip, “Bedî’iyyât Bahisleri: Hazzın Bedî’î Hayatta Mevkii,” p. 507.
544
Ali Canip, “Sanat ve Edebiyat: Millî Lisan ve Millî Edebiyat,” p. 47.
260
existent, without the milieu surrounding it. Therefore, it is compulsory to examine
this milieu. For, the existence of arts is prepared in accordance with the needs of that
milieu. Art arises, from that milieu, as a result of some sequential developments
taking place within it. But it always carries the traces of its origin. Therefore, one
must search for the scientific laws for a branch of art or an aesthetic object not within
the idea of abstract beauty but within sensed material things themselves.545

Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın realizes the most interesting combination of Darwin’s theory of
evolution and the philosophy of aesthetics. Approximately 10 out of 18 articles
published by him in the journal of Servet-i Fünun include interpretations about this
relationship. It is worth to remind that he is under the effect of French philosopher
Hippolyte Taine in almost all of his ideas with regard to the philosophy of arts,
including the relationship between aesthetic and milieu. Taine’s work of The
Philosophy of Arts546 constitutes Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’s main source of inspiration.

First of all, it should be stated that Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın does not regard the works of
art as deriving only from the creative character of aesthetic subject. He refers that
this idea has been commonly accepted in previous times and criticizes this approach.
According to him, there are certain scientific laws prevailing in the appearance and
survival of the physical objects and one must accept that the same laws apply to the
case of aesthetic objects as well. Moreover, it is these laws that ensure the existence
of aesthetic and art which are the science of beauty and the philosophical knowledge
about aesthetical objects respectively.547 Then, the specification of the nature of these
rules or laws is compulsory before anything else.

As far as we could observe, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın collects these laws under three
titles. Firstly, the works of arts, like physical objects, are products of a certain milieu.
As he puts it;

545
Salih Fuat, ibid, p. 461.
546
Hippolyte Taine, The Philosophy of Arts, Translated by John Durand (New York: Holt and
Williams, 1873).
547
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -2- Hikmet-i Bedâyi’, His,” p. 106. See also:
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -5- Edebiyat-ı Cedide, Menşe’ ve Esasları,” p. 183.
261
 Just as there is a temperature level causing the appearance of this or that
species of plant; there is also a spiritual temperature level. And the latter
results in the appearance of this or that work of art. For example, to
understand the appearance of corn, gruel and the orange or pine trees, one
must examine the material temperature level. Similarly, if one wants to
understand the appearance of realistic painting or classical literature, he must
examine the spiritual temperature level, that is to say the general condition of
ideas and ethics.548

This means that the products of human thoughts must be examined like natural
products.549 However, it is important to see that a reference has been given to the fact
that the spiritual temperature level, just like physical conditions, is also open to
change. For, any argument stating that it is an invariable factor would bring certain
difficulties within itself. For example, if the social conscience, which is described as
the spiritual milieu, does not change, then the artist would have to adapt himself in
accordance with this unchangeable source of reality and, consequentially, restrict
himself into a circle of pure imitation. But, as we learned from the discussions we
referred to in previous sections, the artist is responsible not only for imitation but
also for conversion. He is not the unique agent of change within social conscience.
But he still has the power of ensuring this change together with other factors.

Secondly, although the information about the spiritual temperature level is a

necessary condition for acquiring deepness within aesthetical issues, it is not the
sufficient condition per se. Just as, seems to think Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, increase of
foreign plants in a physical environment inhibits the growth of plants which are
native to that area; foreign works of arts also inhibit the development of national
ones. To put it in a clearer way, Darwin’s rules of “natural selection” and “struggle
for life” are valid also for the aesthetical objects.550 Growth of some anomalous

548
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -2- Hikmet-i Bedâyi’, His,” p. 106.
549
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -3- Mahsûlât-ı Fikriyye-i Beşeriyye, Mahsûlât-ı
Tabiiyye,” p. 117; “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -2- Hikmet-i Bedâyi’, His,” p. 107; “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e
Dair -7- Bir Eser-i Edebînin Kıymeti Havi Olduğu Vesâik-i Beşeriyyenin Mikdârı İle Mukâyese
Olunur”, p. 214; “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -12- Dehâ [2],” Servet-i Fünun 15, no. 388 (6 August
1314/18 August 1898), p. 380.
550
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -3- Mahsûlât-ı Fikriyye-i Beşeriyye, Mahsûlât-ı
Tabiiyye,” p. 118. See also. Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -14- Sanatın ve Şiirin
İstikbâli-1,” Servet-i Fünun 16, no. 394 (17 September 1314/29 September 1898), p. 55.
262
species of plants can be observed in some places from time to time. This occupier
plants spread quickly and prohibit the growth of native species of plants. Similarly,
thinks Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, a given spiritual milieu can be attacked by foreign
elements. What should be done in this case is to comb out these foreign factors of
invasion. This approach is consistent with the idea which we characterized earlier as
return to the essence. The fact that Turkish is attacked by foreign language, for
example, is an obstacle for the development of Turkish language as an artistic
language. One must, then, remove the foreign factors, which are Arabic and Persian
words in this case, from the native language.

Thirdly, and lastly, the circumstance that one might possibly come across in the case
of shrinking of the unused organs is valid for the works of arts as well.551 If a
spiritual temperature level cannot produce aesthetic works through its own creative
power, this creativity will have to be die after a while. And then, next generations
living in that spiritual milieu start to adopt the products of other milieus as if they are
their own products. This is why the arts and aesthetics are factors absence of which
cannot even be conceived for the existence and survival of a nation.

551
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Hikmet-i Bedâyi’e Dair -3- Mahsûlât-ı Fikriyye-i Beşeriyye, Mahsûlât-ı
Tabiiyye,” p. 119.

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 CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

We followed, within this study, the hints regarding the kind of meaning and role
attributed to philosophy by Young Turks in the periodicals they published
individually or institutionally. The Committee of Union and Progress, as a political
organization established by Young Turks, is constructed rather by pragmatic motives
and appears as an important historical example within the development of modern
philosophical understanding among Turkish intelligentsia. As the examinations about
their discussions on scientific, religious, ethical and aesthetical issues progressed, we
saw that Young Turks conceived philosophy as an instrument. And the
instrumentalization to which philosophy is subjected can clearly be observed
beginning from the foundation of the CUP until 1918 when it is abdicated.

That Young Turks’ attitude towards philosophy limited to instrumentalization on a

great part has different reasons. First of all, none of the Young Turk figures chewed
over philosophical issues as a philosopher by profession. The first motives that led
Young Turks to establish the Ottoman CUP are not resulted from purely
philosophical questions or concerns. They were practical issues, although in the
course of the time they took a scientific and philosophical form. Moreover, they had
no educational backgrounds in philosophy. They rather studied within the area of
natural science. Therefore, the interest they showed in philosophical matters
remained in a connection with daily and practical discussions. They developed an
eclectic thought as a result of the state of anxiety pertaining to a mind in crisis. As a
matter of fact, this circumstance is not exclusive to Young Turks’ mentality. It must
be seen also as a result of the unfamiliarity traditional Ottoman thought felt in the
face of modern philosophical way of thinking. Since Young Turks are the products
of a climate of thinking, they constitute a sign of the conditions putting them
forward.

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Except this ostensible circumstance, one can revive some other interrelated reasons
also causing Young Turks to instrumentalize philosophy. The type of Young Turks’
coming across with modern philosophical and scientific understanding affected their
attitude towards these two factors. In other words, Young Turk figures, who headed
for philosophy starting from certain practical needs, instrumentalized philosophy in
accordance with their own needs and followed a pragmatic method. It can be noted
as one of the reasons that critical point of view of philosophy and science could not
be traced within Young Turks’ periodicals. Since they defined the problem by
looking into the results, they preferred to deduce the solution directly from that result
either.

Of course, this is not an arbitrary circumstance. An instrumentalized philosophy has

an important role at the plane contemplated by Young Turks. Two points, at least,
can be touched upon within this regard. First, Young Turks are results of a period of
crisis. Political, economic, social and cultural crises experienced by Ottoman society
found their reflections within the world of thought of the Empire’s intelligentsia.
Young Turks depended, in terms of their search for solution, on historical and current
experiences of the West. Solution of Empire’s problems is stipulated to an exact
imitation of the historical process witnessed by the West. The role attributed to
science and philosophy is to make guidance in the pursuit of this process.

One must, in fact, remark that this attests to a problematic situation regarding the
process of development of the philosophical thinking. It is problematic because it
overlooks the temporal dimension of the process in particular. Considered from this
perspective, the most conspicuous reflection of the crisis can be said to appear in the
form of deterioration within Young Turks’ perception of time. Philosophical and
scientific thinking are not something that can be developed without any dedicated
struggles or just by an insight into certain theories. They are also in need of time, in
the sense that they require an important cultural accumulation. There is a historical
and cultural ground behind them. An attempt to explain science and philosophy in
terms of productions, without giving any reference to this ground, revives a
methodological skew.

265
The essential reason of instrumentalizing philosophy, to which we particularly need
to attract the attentions for the purposes of this study, can be determined as
nationalist attitude lying somewhere deep in Young Turks’ mentality. Philosophy
and science, which are regarded as instruments of rescuing Empire and keeping
elements from different ethnic and religious backgrounds together at the start, took
upon themselves the role of creating a new nationality. As a matter of fact, the
overlapping, in terms of time, that takes place between adoption of modern scientific
and philosophical understandings and emergence of Turkish nationalism is
remarkable. Although Turkist approach can be taken back to the dates in which the
newspaper of Meşveret is published, it is defended much more systematically in
articles written after 1911. What is remarkable for the purposes of our study is that
the role of strengthening nationalist approach is attributed to philosophy. Philosophy
shall revive national consciousness by means of new values it is expected to create
within the areas of science, religion, ethics, and aesthetics etc. This makes Young
Turks’ instrumentalization of philosophy more meaningful.

When considered from this perspective, the most suitable characterization that can be
used about Young Turks’ philosophical understanding is “social philosophy”. It is
both critical and constructivist. They attempted to create a new social consciousness,
in the areas directly interlinked with social life, through modern philosophical and
scientific understandings and concepts. Young Turks’ scientific, religious, ethical
and aesthetical discussions that we examined within his study are largely putting
forward such a result. Almost all of the concepts derived from these areas are
reconstructed in a way to refer to nation as an upper-consciousness.

The concept of “conscience” seems to constitute the backbone of the social

philosophy established by Young Turks. As a matter of fact consciousness is a sign
of one of the typical Young Turk approach, which is reconciliation. Areas that seem
irreconcilable at the start become reconciled interestingly by Young Turks. One
needs to say that these attempts of reconciliation create an image that they are
realized compulsorily. Abdullah Cevdet’s efforts to reconcile religious belief and
scientific understanding, for example, do not seem to be reasonable endeavors when

266
the general framework of his philosophical attitude taken into consideration. For,
reconciliation of a materialistic understanding of science with religious belief can
only be regarded as a perverse approach.

The meaning attributed by Young Turks to the concept of conscience is highly

remarkable. It is even possible to argue that their social philosophy is strengthened
by a philosophy about conscience. As far as we observed through the examinations
on periodicals, Young Turks can be said to conceive “conscience” as the final
judgmental authority or the upper ability of evaluation which includes both rational
and emotional dimensions. And this seems to be an extension of their struggle of
reconciling. Since positivistic, materialistic, and evolutionistic approaches created an
enormous impact on their mentality, they could not turn their back to factual reality.
Mind, they seem to think, can make a reasoning just on factual realities. The result to
which their anti-metaphysical attitude leads us is referring to such a rational
limitedness. However, their efforts of modernization can also be said to ground on an
emotional basis in addition to rationality. Multi-dimensional crisis experienced by
them deepened this emotional dimension. Therefore, they included emotion into their
philosophical analyses about crisis. In other words, since they could not explain the
crisis by reason alone they had to open a place for emotion as well. And this exactly
is where the conscience appears. Young Turks seem to attribute conscience a role
which removes the contradiction between bare facts and emotions.

There are some other examples showing the reconciliatory character of Young
Turks’ philosophical understanding. One can observe, for example, that their
acceptances about the source of knowledge are partly strengthened by idealist
approaches. It is also possible to come across with the traces of two different
conceptions of truth which are realistic and idealistic. Moreover, they take part not in
different writers’ articles but in the different articles of the same writer. Ziya Gökalp,
for example, gives such an impression. He is a loyal follower of the positivistic
understanding which is widely accepted among Young Turks. Within this regard, he
frequently mentions that philosophy must not remain uninterested in scientific data
about factual reality. It can reasonably be characterized as a realistic approach to the
source of knowledge. However, when the establishing role he attributes to

267
consciousness taken into consideration he is a typical idealist. Nonetheless, he
revives both of his realistic and idealistic attitudes remarkably. As a matter of fact
this circumstance can also be seen as an attempt of reconciliation similar to the one
they tried around the concept of conscience. They seem to think that the removal of
the gap between current factual reality, that west is developed while the Ottoman
Empire is remained backward, for example, and the reality which is idealized by
them is only possible after a reconciliation of this kind. One can deduce its hints
particularly from their arguments about philosophy of aesthetics.

What makes the circumstance interesting here is that Young Turks never considered
speculative thinking as an option in their struggle to overcome the crisis. Speculative
dimension seems to be one of the most conspicuous aspects of philosophy, within the
teachings of system owner philosophers at least. However, Young Turks have quite
consciously stayed away from speculative interpretations and restrained themselves
within the framework of factual reality which can be called as phenomenism. Just as
they did not make publications including speculative thoughts as a result of their
anti-metaphysical attitude; it is difficult also to trace such an approach within
translated articles that one comes across frequently in periodicals.

If we turn back to the argument that philosophy strengthened Young Turks’

nationalist approach by means of the concept of conscience, we can see that
conscience refers to an upper judgmental mechanism besides being an individual
mechanism of evaluation. Assessing this within the context of different meanings
Young Turks attributed to subject would, in fact, be more suitable for the purposes of
our study. When all of the examined periodicals are taken into consideration, one can
say that Young Turks seem to distinguish three types of subject. These are
establishing, producing, and consuming subjects.

Establishing subject is “national conscience” to which a constant reference has been

given within ethical and aesthetical contexts. All of the values that can be said to
exist within those areas need to be taken back to the national conscience. Therefore,
the establishing subject at the same time becomes a function determining the source
and limits of thinking. Producing subject is a subject which has a grasp of the

268
general framework set by establishing subject. This second kind of subject adopts a
critical point of view and tries to transform the consuming subject, staying one level
below, accordingly. To put it more clearly, the producing subject is Young Turks
themselves. And the consuming subject is the individual who is expected to be liable
to the conception of truth that is systematized by producing subject within a certain
conceptional framework emanated from the establishing subject. It is obvious that
the individual is obliged to maintain a life which is in accordance with the content
created by upper mechanisms of evaluation. The idealized concept of union makes
this kind of unconditional subordination necessary.

Of course, these definitions imply that the establishing subject is different from the
producing and consuming subjects and that it exists on its own by staying as an
external source of objectivity, as Ziya Gökalp puts it. Thus, their demands for
“turning to essence” also, which is touched upon in the fifth chapter, brings it to the
mind. However, this circumstance does not have a character away from suspicion.
For, despite that fact that Young Turks talk about national conscience as a self-
subsisting subject, the language they used reminds that it is also an “ideal” which is
open to production. It is possible to attribute the language they used to dynamism of
the conscience, or its openness to development, as the upper judgmental mechanism
just as it can be seen as a circumstance referring to an idealized peculiarity. The
examinations we carried out on Young Turks’ periodicals lead us to the conclusion
that the latter preponderates more. One can talk about a national consciousness, at
best, which is not completed its evolution yet. And that connotes a predicament in
terms of Young Turks’ understanding of national conscience. For, it can be made a
matter of discussion to what extent can a mechanism, the formation of which is not
completed yet, be determinative with regards to subjects staying at lower levels.
Moreover, this mechanism, which can also be characterized as “conscience in the
making”, seems to be constructed by producing subject himself. And the producing
subject, in this case, is the political mind that acts as the source of unionist idea(l)s.
In fact, the most important foundation showing that this is a reasonable and
legitimate interpretation can be deduced from Jacobean attitude of Young Turks. It is
because of the central role they undertook themselves within this construction
activities that Young Turks are of the opinion that the truth can only be searched

269
within the framework idealized by them. In other words, they are elitists. Thus, the
methodology they followed during the period starting from the foundation of the
Ottoman CUP till 1918 wherein Young Turks’ power came to an end represents an
elitist character thoroughly. This can ultimately be regarded as the result of the
contemplation of philosophy within an institutional dimension.

What makes this circumstance important in terms of our study is the way it is
connected with philosophy. Philosophy is in the position of supporting this activity
of construction by means of “new values” it will produce within scientific, ethical,
religious and aesthetical areas. Of course, one needs to question the truth of the
understanding adopting the value as something producible within a certain program.
However, it would be useful to record that the meaning attributed to “newness” by
Young Turks can only be possible together with the production of new philosophical
values. This constitutes also an explanation of why Young Turks’ mentality stayed
away from traditional way of thinking.

Another reason of their detachment from tradition is that traditional language and
belief do not present a ground supporting nationalist discourse construction of which
is tried by Young Turks. Hence, it can be observed that one of the most frequent
criticisms directed by some of the opposing factions that can be characterized as
Islamist against Young Turks’ mentality concentrates on the fact that it is nationalist.
To them, Islam cannot be reconciled with a nationalist understanding. On the other
hand, there are signs that Young Turks regarded the object of these criticisms a kind
of weakness on their part. As a matter of fact, publication of İslam Mecmuası seems
to be referring to rule out the criticisms to this effect.

Considered from this perspective, modernity represents a paradigm shift within

Young Turks’ mentality similar to the one experienced by the West. In fact, our
study presented the opportunity of touching on several remarkable cases concerning
the relation between embracement of modern scientific and philosophical concepts
and detachment from tradition. One of the most conspicuous examples of this
circumstance is observed during the discussions we made on fourth chapter. The
ideas Young Turks arrived in terms of the discussions about the existence and nature

270
of God, for example, by depending on modern scientific arguments are incompatible
with traditional understanding of God. As it is handled within the chapter on
philosophy of religion, three modern philosophical understandings, which are
positivism, evolutionism and materialism, caused Young Turks to adopt three
different positions with regard to mentioned issues. The first group led by positivistic
understanding to adopt agnosticism and deism. The second group preferred to
appropriate pantheism as a result of evolutionistic ideas. And the third group seems
to accept atheism as the only legitimate conclusion of materialistic approach. Hence,
one can observe that each of these approaches is expressed in different ways within
Young Turks’ periodicals. It is apparent that none of them is compatible with
traditional, that is to say theistic, understanding of God. For, theism is different from
pantheism because it talks about a “person”. Theism also argues that the creation of
the universe refers to the existence of God and that his attributes can be known by
depending on both the information received from him and the reasoning carried out
about universe. And it is a different result, in this respect, from the one at which
agnosticism and deism arrives. And, lastly, since theism depends on the idea that
there is a divine existence, it defers from materialism as well. Some other remarkable
examples of a similar detachment can be seen in discussions carried out on ethical
issues.

Young Turks’ attitude towards modern philosophical understanding is also affected

by their desire of imitation of the events occurred in the history of Western thought.
They targeted to actualize the developments that left deep traces on modern
philosophical movements, like Renaissance and French Revolution, in exactly the
same way in Ottoman society. However, one needs to point that this desire remained
just as an imitation. For, there is no convenient historical, social, cultural and
philosophical ground for Young Turks to create these events. Moreover, there are
some circumstances rendering this desire of imitation to banality and even
meaninglessness. For example, one can argue that the idea of Renaissance gives birth
to an idea attaching priority to individual. Young Turks, on the other hand, followed
an exactly opposite attitude because of their ideals emphasizing union. There is not
individual, in their understanding, but society. There are no individual rights and
freedoms, but the existence and survival of the total.

271
Young Turks pretended to select the modern reasoning as a new methodology for
their philosophical struggles. But this methodology, once again, seems to be away
from reflecting a modern reasoning, since it is used rather in a scholastic way. Just as
scholasticism used the reason in its endeavor of grounding what is given, that is to
say the divine orders, Young Turks also used another given thing, which is science in
their case, in the opposite way. And the most conspicuous proof of this argument can
be found in the lack of doubt with regard to scientific developments in their
understanding. An understanding of instrumentalization of philosophy preponderates
within both scholasticism and Young Turk mentality. Therefore, it may not be
difficult to suggest that the scientific and philosophical methodology followed by
Young Turks is a re-produced form of the old thinking style against which they used
a severe language.

272
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 APPENDIX A
TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

Enformatik Enstitüsü

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Taştan
Adı : Fatih
Bölümü : Felsefe

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Philosophical Movements İn Ottoman Intellectual

Life at the Beginning of the 20th Century and Their Impact on Young Turks’
Thought.

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir

bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ:

299
 APPENDIX B
CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Taştan, Fatih

Nationality: Turkish (TC)
Date and Place of Birth: 1 January 1976 , Ağrı
Marital Status: Single
Phone: +90 505 573 56 47
email: [email protected]

EDUCATION

Degree Institution Year of Graduation

MS Erciyes University Theology 2002
BS Erciyes University Theology 1999
High School Tutak İmam Hatip Lisesi, Ağrı 1994

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year Place Enrollment

2011-Present Ağrı İbrahim Çeçen University Lecturer
2011 Turkish National Agency Expert
2004-2011 Ministry of National Education Teacher

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Intermediate Arabic, Beginner in Persian

PUBLICATIONS

1. Davies, Brian, Din Felsefesine Giriş, Translated by Fatih Taştan, İstanbul:

Paradigma Yayınları, 2011.

2. Levinas, Emmanuel, “Yahudilik”, Translated by Fatih Taştan, Tezkire, No. 38-39,

Ankara: 2004.

3. Levinas, Emmanueal, “Kimliklenme Yolları”, Translated by Fatih Taştan, Tezkire,

no. 38-39, Ankara: 2004.

300
 APPENDIX C

TURKISH SUMMARY

İnsanlığın felsefe ile imtihanı üzerinde düşünülecek olursa birbiriyle bağlantılı birkaç
noktayı ayırt etmek mümkün gözükmektedir. Birincisi felsefe, klişe bir ifade olmakla
birlikte, genellikle bilgelik sevgisi olarak tanımlanır. İnsan düşünme yetisini
keşfettiği anda gerçek anlamıyla var olmaya başlar. Bu varlığın anlamı ise evrende
gözlemlediği mevcudat ile kendi arasındaki farkları kavramasına dayanmaktadır.
Dolayısıyla felsefe bireysel bilincin kendisini açma etkinliği olarak görülebilir. Hariç
ile olan temas insandaki merak güdüsünü harekete geçirir ve birbiri ardına çeşitli
muhakemeler üretilmesini sağlar. Bu düşünceler belirli bir sistematiğe doğru yol alır.
Bu felsefenin bir diğer özsel niteliğine işaret etmektedir. Başka bir deyişle, felsefe
(özellikle sistem sahibi düşünürler bir tarafa bırakılacak olursa) kümülatif bir nitelik
arz etmektedir. Öte yandan, felsefenin kesintisiz bir devrimci ruhu bünyesinde
taşıdığına işaret etmek gerekmektedir. Zira bilinç, düşünmenin özgün yapısı
itibariyle sürekli hareket halindedir. Bu nedenledir ki felsefe durmak bilmez bir süreç
olarak görülür. Karl Jaspers’in “felsefe yolda olmaktır” sözünü bu doğrultuda
yorumlamak mümkün gözükmektedir.

Felsefe bireysel bir temele dayanmakla birlikte, hiç şüphesiz, yarattığı etki itibariyle
bireysel alanı aşan bir mahiyet kesp etmeye başlar. Nitekim onun kümülatif niteliği
de bunu gerektirmektedir. Başka bilinçlerin aynı eşya hakkındaki farklı tasavvurları
felsefeye yaratıcı bir güç kazandırmaktadır. Farklı bilinç durumları daha önce
görülemeyen noktaları yakalamayı mümkün kılar. Böylece eşyanın bütün potansiyel
halleri içerisinde hakikate en uygun biçimin seçilmesi, insan açısından, imkân
dâhiline girer.

Şüphesiz felsefenin bireysel temele dayalı bir entelektüel faaliyet olması onun en can
alıcı niteliğini teşkil etmektedir. Bu nedenledir ki hakikate giden yol birden fazla;

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dolayısıyla hakikat hakkındaki konsepsiyonlar türlü türlüdür. Hakikatin tek bir
kavramsal çerçeveye hapsedilemiyor olması felsefenin üretkenliğini destekleyen bir
husustur. Ne zaman ki felsefî çerçeve sabit kılınır ve o çerçevede düşünme teşvik
edilirse felsefe oradan göçmüş demektir. İnsanlık tarihinde bunun çeşitli örneklerine
rastlamak mümkündür. Örneğin orta çağ dönemindeki hâkim düşünce anlayışını
temsil eden skolastisizm bunun en dikkat çekici örneğidir.

Skolastisizmin düşünce tarihindeki en önemli yansıması felsefenin sahip olduğu asî

ruhu boğmaya yeltenmesidir. Felsefe itaat etmeye uzak, sürekli hareket halinde ve
entelektüel yaratıcılığı had safhadaki bir ruhta ancak doyuma ulaşabilir. Sürekli
sorgulayan ve hiçbir şekilde tatmin olmayan mütereddit bir ruh haline dayanmadığı
sürece hiçbir düşüncenin gerçek anlamıyla felsefe olamayacağını söylemek mümkün
gözükmektedir. Hiç şüphesiz skolastik düşüncenin felsefeye yönelik bu dondurucu
ya da yok edici işlevi onun kurumsal çerçevesinden kaynaklanmaktadır.

Peki, her kurumsal bakış felsefî düşünenin özünü tahrip etme sonucunu zorunlu
olarak doğurur mu? Esasen bizi böyle bir çalışmayı gerçekleştirmeye iten temel
sorulardan birisi budur. Böyle bir soruyu sormamızın nedeni ise, yukarıda skolastik
düşünceye atfettiğimiz felsefeyi boğma cürmünün kurumsal bir zeminden doğduğu
varsayımıdır.

Kimi tarihi vakıalar bunun her zaman geçerli bir durum olmadığı fikrini akla
getirmektedir. Başka bir deyişle, felsefî düşüncenin kurumsallaşmanın veya belirli
kurumlar vasıtasıyla oluşturulmasının onu öldürmek bir tarafa, tam aksine, onu
bizzat canlı tuttuğunu ima eden durumlardan bahsedilmektedir. Çalışmamıza konu
edindiğimiz Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakkî Cemiyeti, aslına bakılırsa, tam da böyle bir
iddiayı desteklediği düşünülecek tarihsel bir örneğe referans vermektedir.

Bir varsayım olarak şu kadarını söyleyebiliriz ki, kurumsallaşma felsefî düşünceyi

zorunlu olarak ortadan kaldırmıyor ise de bu durumu en kuvvetli ihtimal olarak
gündemde tutmaktadır. Zira kurumsallaşan ve yerleşen her düşünce
muhafazakarlaşmaya, kendi içine kapanmaya ve yaratıcı enerjisini yitirmeye başlar.

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Bu açıdan bakıldığında, hangi türden olursa olsun kurumsal şemanın felsefeyi aslî
doğasından uzaklaştıracağını iddia etmek mümkündür.

Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakkî Cemiyetinin ve onu var eden Jön Türk zihniyetinin temel
iddiası, felsefî düşüncenin mevcut olabilmesi için onun belirli bir yapı tarafından
desteklenmesi ve güçlendirilmesi gerektiği yönündedir. Böylece felsefe bir dünya
görüşü olarak güçlenecek ve insanın karşılaştığı her türlü soruyu (başta siyasi ve
kültürel sorular olmak üzere) cevaplayacaktır. Fakat çalışmamız kapsamında çeşitli
vesilelerle gündeme getirildiği üzere, bu iddia felsefenin verili bir kavramsal çerçeve
dâhilinde yürüyen bir süreç olarak görüldüğünü akla getirmektedir. Bu durumun, en
azından başlangıç itibariyle, felsefenin doğası ile ilgili olarak problemli bir yaklaşıma
işaret ediyor gözüktüğünü belirtmekte fayda vardır. Acaba felsefeden beklenen kabul
görmüş kavramları kullanarak çözümlemeler yapmak mıdır örneğin? Buna olumsuz
bir cevap verilmesi muhtemeldir. En azından felsefenin yukarıda işaret ettiğimiz asi
ruhu açısından bunun gerçekleştirilmesi zor gözükmektedir. Yapılsa bile bunun
skolastik bir düşünceden öteye gidemeyeceği açıktır.

Felsefe öz itibariyle bireysel bir arayışın ürünüdür. Elbette her “ürün” gibi o da
kendisi ile temasta bulunan şeyler üzerinde şu veya bu etkide bulunacaktır. Bizi
böyle bir çalışmayı gerçekleştirmeye yönlendiren temel nedenlerden bir diğeri, Türk
düşünce ve siyaset tarihinde önemli bir yere sahip olan bir Jön Türk yapılanması
olarak Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakkî Cemiyetinin felsefeye yönelik bakışının
irdelenmesidir.

Çalışmamızın ana temasını makul bir şekilde ortaya koyabilmek bakımından

kurumsallık veya kurumsallaşma kastın ne olduğunu biraz daha açmak uygun
olacaktır. Kurumsallaşma veya kurumsallık ile kastedilen şey felsefenin kendine has
rotasında oluşturduğu birikimden ziyade, bu birikimin bir bütün olarak alınıp, politik
bir takım amaçlar doğrultusunda bir araç olarak kullanılabileceği varsayımına
gönderme yapılmaktadır.

Jön Türk zihniyeti ve onun doğal uzantısı konumunda bulunan Osmanlı İttihat ve
Terakkî Cemiyeti, siyasal iktidarı fiilen ele geçirmiş bir yapılanma olması hasebiyle,

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Türk düşünce tarihi açısından son derece ilginç bir örnek arz etmektedir. Söz konusu
zihniyete mensup ve büyük çoğunluğu kelimenin gerçek anlamıyla “ittihatçı” olan bu
figürler yoğun bilimsel ve felsefî kavramlarla örülü siyasi bir gündemi, yine bilimsel
ve felsefî söylemlerle süslenmiş bir yöntem dahilinde hayata geçirmeye
çalışmışlardır. Onların yaratmaya çalıştığı şeyi bilimin ve felsefenin kanlı canlı bir
abidesi olarak görmek mümkündür. Jön Türklerin kurumsal bir tutum halini alan
bireysel alt yapıları, onları yeni bir felsefî dil inşa etmenin zorunluluğuna ikna
etmiştir. Modernite, Jön Türkler nazarında felsefî paradigmalarla örülü bir kıyameti
andırmaktadır. Böyle bir kıyamet ortamından ancak onunla örtüşen ya da onunla aynı
felsefî ve bilimsel zemini paylaşan bir dille kurtulmak mümkündür.

Hiç şüphesiz buraya kadar söylenenler doğrudan tarihsel verilere temas etmediği için
retorik olarak görülme riskini barındırmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, Cemiyet’in kuruluş
ve iktidar dönemleri açısından bakıldığında yukarıda çizmeye çalıştığımız felsefî
çerçevenin doğrudan kurumlar vasıtasıyla gerçekleştirilmeye çalışıldığını görüyoruz.
Bu durumun en somut örneği, çalışmamıza konu teşkil eden süreli yayınlardır.
Modern felsefî ve bilimsel düşünce, Jön Türkler tarafından süreli yayınlar vasıtasıyla
alabildiğine propaganda konusu edilmiştir. Hiç şüphesiz bu, felsefî düşüncenin
özgünlüğüne ve ağırlığına karşı işlenmiş bir cürüm olarak da görülebilir. En nihayet
felsefe kabul görme ya da indoktrinasyon arzusu ile yola çıkmaz. Aksine, her türlü
yerleşik düşünceyi kendisine konu edinir ve herhangi bir sınıra tabi olmaksızın onlar
üzerinde dönüştürücü bir iz bırakır.

Tüm bu çekincelere rağmen, Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakkî Cemiyeti’nin Türk düşünce

tarihinde önemli bir merhale teşkil ettiğini söylemek mümkündür. Sürecin aslî
doğasına aykırı olmakla birlikte kalıcı izler bıraktığını kabul etmek gerekmektedir.
Çalışmamız, söz konusu izlerin bilim, din, ahlak ve estetik alanlarındaki
yansımalarını konu edinmektedir.

Felsefe ile kurumsallık arasındaki bağlantının ilginç bir durumu gündeme getirdiği
söylenebilir. Batının felsefî ve bilimsel serüveni göz önünde bulundurulduğunda,
iddia olunabilir ki, felsefî düşünce özgün bir kurumsallığı beraberinde getirmiştir.
Bunu düşünme ile sonuç arasındaki bir ilişki olarak okumak da mümkündür. Daha

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açık bir deyişle, batıda önce felsefî bir zemin oluşmuş sonrasında ise bu zemin doğal
bir şekilde kendine özgü bir takım kurumlar inşa etmiştir. Sanayi İnkılabı, Rönesans,
Reformasyon ya da Fransız İhtilali bu durumun en çarpıcı örnekleridir. Bu tarihsel
kırılmalar durduk yerde ortaya çıkmış değildir. Bunları doğuran çok ciddi bir felsefî
birikim vardır. Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakkî Cemiyeti yukarıda sayılan tarihi
tecrübeleri Osmanlı düşünce hayatında da gerçekleştirmeye yönelik çabanın
somutlaşmış hali olarak görülebilir. Süreli yayınlarda bunun çok bariz örnekleri ile
karşılaşmak mümkündür. Örneğin Şura-yı Ümmet gazetesinde yayınlanan “İki
İnkılâp” başlıklı bir makale Jön Türklerin iktidara gelmesini temsil eden II.
Meşrutiyet’i Fransız İhtilali ile kıyaslamakta ve her ikisini de insanlık tarihi
açısından önemli devrimler olarak değerlendirmektedir. Meşrutiyet aydınlanmacı bir
Türk devrimidir ve buna öncülük eden Jön Türkler ise Fransız devrimini yaratan
felsefî aklın Osmanlıdaki izdüşümleridir.

Benzer şekilde İslam Mecmuası’nda Musa Kazım Efendi tarafından yayınlanan

“İslam ve Terakkî” başlıklı makaleler zinciri de yine Fransız İhtilali ile Jön Türk
zihniyeti arasında kurulan ilişki bakımından dikkat çekicidir. Musa Kazım Efendi, bu
makalelerde Fransız ihtilalinin temel kavramları olan “özgürlük”, “kardeşlik” ve
“eşitlik”nin İslam tarafından da benimsenen kavramlar olduğunu dile getirmektedir.
Söz konusu makaleler tipik bir Jön Türk yaklaşımı olan uzlaştırmacı anlayışın
yansımaları olmaları bakımından dikkat çekicidirler. Hiç şüphesiz Musa Kazım
Efendi’nin bu uzlaştırma çabasının temelinde, Jön Türkler tarafından benimsenen
bilimsel ve felsefî anlayışların İslam’ın özüne aykırı olmadığının gösterilmesi kaygısı
yatmaktadır. Çalışmamız boyunca buna benzer çeşitli uzlaştırma girişimlerine de
temas etme fırsatı bulduk.

Tüm bunlara karşın, işaret etmek gerekir ki Jön Türkler bilimin ve felsefenin Batı
düşünce dünyasındaki serüvenini tersinden okumuş gözükmektedirler. Başka bir
deyişle, onlar, ilk önce belirli kurumlar ihdas etmişlerdir. Sonrasında ise bu kurumlar
maharetiyle bir felsefî dil ve düşünenin gelişmesini temin etmeye çalışmışlardır.
Çalışmamızda gözettiğimiz amaçlar bakımından bu durum dil ile düşünce arasındaki
ilişkiyi yeniden tanımlama/dizayn etme çabası olarak gördük. Esasen, işaret ettiğimiz
hususu şu şekilde problematize etmek mümkün gözükmektedir: Dil mi düşünceye

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önceldir yoksa bunun tam tersi mi geçerlidir? Eşyanın Tabiatı gereği düşüncenin dile
öncel olması beklenir. Zira önce düşünürüz. Belirli bir içerik inşa ederiz. Sonra bu
içeriği belirli kavramlarla eşleştiririz. Dil ancak bu eşleştirmeden sonra mümkün
olabilir. Fakat Jön Türk fikriyatı bu sürecin tam tersini takip etmiş gözükmektedir.
Daha açık bir ifadeyle, onlar ilk önce bir dilin inşa edilebileceğini, sonrasında bu
dille uyumlu bir düşünme biçiminin geliştirilebileceğini düşünüyor
gözükmektedirler. Bunun çok çeşitli örnekleri vardır ve bu örnekler yukarıda
kurumsallıkla felsefî düşünce arasında kurmaya çalıştığımız bağlantı açısından da
önemli ipuçları sağlamaktadır. Örneğin, İçtihat gazetesinin 54, 55 ve 57. sayılarında
“Istılah İstimzacı” başlıklı bir makale yayınlanmıştır. Söz konusu makalelerde on
tane Fransızca bilimsel ve felsefî kavram seçilmiş (Concret, Abstrait, Objectif,
Subjectif, Induction, Déduction, Type-Sous-Type, Conscient, Inconscient,
Constatation)ve bunlara Türkçe karşılıklar bulunması konusunda okuyuculara
çağrıda bulunulmuştur. Makaleyi yayınlayanların amacı hiç şüphesiz çeşitli
kavramlara Türkçe karşılık bulmakla sınırlı değildir. Yapılmaya çalışılan şey
kavramdan fikre gitmek olarak da görülebilir. Kavramdan fikre gitmek belki bir
öğrenme ya da düşünme biçimi olabilir; fakat düşüncenin spontanlığı açısından
bakıldığında bunun son derece zorlu bir süreç olacağı da ortadadır.

Felsefe ile kurumsallık arasında oluşturulmaya çalışılan bağlantının bir diğer

müşahhas göstergesi, Jön Türk iktidarı tarafından büyük bir özenle hayata geçirilen
Islahat-ı İlmiye Encümeninin çalışmalarıdır. 1913 yılında kurulan bu Encümenin
amacı yabancı bilimsel ve felsefî terimlere Türkçe karşılık bulmaktır. Encümenin
çalışmaları 3 eser ile neticelenmiştir. Söz konusu eserler sırasıyla bilimsel, felsefî ve
sanatsal kavramlar için öngörülen Türkçe karşılıklardan oluşan sözlüklerdir. Bununla
birlikte, öyle gözükmektedir ki söz konusu encümen kendisinden beklenen şeyleri
bütünüyle gerçekleştirme fırsatı bulamamıştır. Bunu kısmen savaş şartlarına ve
Encümeni kuran İttihatçı iradenin iktidardan uzaklaşmasına bağlamak mümkündür.
Batılı bilimsel ve felsefî kavramların kurumlar vasıtasıyla “ithal” edilmesi, gerek
üçüncü gerekse beşinci bölümlerde üzerinde durulduğu üzere, Jön Türklerin taklit
fikrini pekiştirmiştir. Onların bu ithalci eğilimlerini ne şekilde meşrulaştırdıklarının
ilginç örneklerini çalışmamız boyunca çeşitli vesilelerle ele alma imkânı bulduk.

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Bilim, felsefe ve sanat açısından yaratılmaya çalışılan dilin bir benzerinin de yine
kurumsal bir zemine dayalı olarak din alanında gerçekleştirilmeye çalışıldığına şahit
olmaktayız. İslam Mecmuası’nın 63. sayısında kuruluş beyannamesini okuduğumuz
Dâru’l-Hikmeti’l-İslâmiyye esasen modern felsefî dilin inşasının dini alandaki
izdüşümü olarak görülebilir. Jön Türk iktidarının sonlarında, 1918 yılında ihdas
edilen bu kurum da kendisinden beklenen faaliyetleri gerçekleştirecek yeterli zamanı
bulamamıştır.

Hemen işaret etmek gerekir ki çalışmamız yukarıda kısaca işaret edilen kurumların
faaliyetlerinin irdelenmesi amacıyla gerçekleştirilmiş değildir. Temel hedefimiz bu
kurumları hayata geçiren Jön Türk zihniyetinin şekillenmesinde rolü olan bilimsel ve
felsefî yaklaşımları ortaya koymaktır. Elinizdeki çalışma doğrudan Jön Türk süreli
yayınlarında yer alan düşünsel çerçeveyi bilim, din, ahlak ve sanat felsefeleri
açısından irdelemek amacındadır. Bununla birlikte, Jön Türklerin bu düşünsel
çerçeveye dayalı olarak inşa ettikleri siyasi iktidarın da göz önünde bulundurulması
kaçınılmazdır. Bu nedenle, çalışmamızın ikinci bölümü bir Jön Türk yapılanması
olarak Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakkî Cemiyeti’nin tarihi arka planı hakkında bir
incelemeye ayırılmıştır. Hiç şüphesiz bu çalışmayı okuması muhtemel olan herkesin
Jön Türkler ve Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakkî Cemiyeti hakkında ayrıntılı bir tarihsel
bilgiye sahip olduğu düşünülemez. Bu bakımdan, söz konusu zihniyet ve
yapılanmanın ortaya çıkış ve gelişimi hakkında, ayrıntılı olmamakla birlikte, tarihsel
bir çerçeve çizmek zorunlu olmuştur.

Kendi dönemlerinde hâkim olan felsefî yaklaşımların Jön Türk düşünce sistematiğini
derinden etkilediğine şahit olunmaktadır. Jön Türk süreli yayınları bu etkilerin gayet
açık ifadeleri ile doludur. Bu nedenle, çalışmamızın üçüncü bölümünü, o dönem için
yaygın bir şekilde kabul gören bilimsel ve felsefî yaklaşımların Jön Türk süreli
yayınlarındaki yansımalarına tahsis ettik. Bu kapsamda süreli yayınlarda üç farklı
bilimsel ve felsefî yaklaşımın kararlı bir şekilde savunulduğunu gözlemleme fırsatı
bulduk: pozitivizm, evrimcilik ve materyalizm.

Dördüncü bölümde, Jön Türklerin benimsediği felsefî ve bilimsel yaklaşımların din

felsefesi özelinde yarattığı sonuçları ele aldı. Bu bölüm Jön Türk fikriyatında

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gözlenen farklılığın en açık felsefî yansımalarını barındırmaktadır. Gerek Tanrı’nın
mevcudiyeti gerekse öldükten sonraki hayat, mucize, kader ve din-bilim ilişkisi gibi
klasik din felsefesi tartışmaları ile ilgili köklü paradigma değişikliğinin somut
yansımalarını bu bölümde gerçekleştirilen tartışmalar kapsamında açık bir şekilde
gözlemlemek mümkündür.

Beşinci bölüm Jön Türklerin bilimsel ve felsefî kanaatleri ile ahlak arasında
kurdukları bağlantıları ele almaktadır. Esas olarak Jön Türk fikriyatında bir ahlak
felsefesinin imkânını tartıştığımız bu bölüm de fikrî kırılmanın dikkat çekici
örneklerini sunmaktadır. Ahlakı sıradanlıktan kurtarma ve hatta onu “ilk felsefe”
konumuna yükseltme çabalarının gözlemlendiği tartışmalar çalışmamızın amaçları
bakımından da önemle üzerinde durulması gereken bir husustur. Ahlak alanı, yeni bir
dil inşa etme amacının yeni bir bilinç inşa etmeyi de kapsayacak şekilde
genişlediğinin işaretlerini vermektedir. Bu durum, felsefî dilin inşası neticesinde
varılmak istenen nokta arasındaki bağlantıyı göstermesi bakımından önem arz
etmektedir.

Son bölüm, Jön Türklerin estetik ve sanat felsefesi kapsamında yaptıkları tartışmaları
ele almaktadır. Bu bölümde Jön Türklerin kullandığı estetik terminoloji ile ele
aldıkları başlıca estetik problemler irdelenmektedir. Estetik tartışmalarını çalışmamız
açısından önemli kılan hususların başında Jön Türklerin “öze dönüş” ya da “aslî
doğanın keşfi” olarak gördükleri sanatın kendi düşünce sistematikleri açısından
yerine getirdiği kurucu işlev gelmektedir. Estetiğin problemleri doğrudan estetiğe ait
bir terminoloji dahilinde ele alınmakla birlikte, karşılamakla yükümlü kılındığı şey
çok daha geniş bir çerçeveye yayılmaktadır. Onların öze dönüş ile Rönesans fikrini
özdeşleştirdiklerini ve kurmaya çalıştıkları “yeni hayat”ın bir Türk Rönesans’ı
yaratmaya matuf çaba olarak görülebileceğine işaret etmek yerinde olur. Bu
bakımdan Jön Türk süreli yayınlarında yer alan ve büyük oranda birbiriyle tutarlılık
arz eden estetik felsefesine dair yazıların irdelenmesi amaçlarımız açısından faydalı
olmuştur.

Çalışmamız boyunca göz önünde bulundurduğumuz sorulardan bir kısmını şu şekilde

ifade etmek mümkündür: Felsefe sadece bir kavram analizi midir? Soyut bir

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düşünme olarak sadece düşünce alanında kalmaya mahkum bir disiplin midir? Yoksa
onun yeni bir hayat inşa etme noktasında herhangi bir etkisi var mıdır?
Görebildiğimiz kadarıyla Jön Türkler bunun böyle olmadığı kanaatindedirler.

Jön Türk süreli yayınları üzerinde yaptığımız inceleme neticesinde ulaştığımız

sonuçları özet olarak gündeme getirmeden önce incelediğimiz süreli yayınlar
hakkında kısaca bilgi vermek uygun olacaktır.

Çalışmamız kapsamında toplam 10 süreli yayının incelemesi gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Bunlar Meşveret, Şura-yı Ümmet, İçtihat, Ulûm-u İktisadiye ve İçtimaiye Mecmuası,
Muhit-i Mesai, Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası, Genç Kalemler, Yeni Mecmua, İslam
Mecmuası ve Tabiat’tır. Ayrıca bir Jön Türk yayını olmamakla birlikte pek çok Jön
Türk figürünün yazılarının yer aldığı Servet-i Fünûn adlı dergi de incelenmiştir.
Servet-i Fünûn’da özellikle Hüseyin Cahit tarafından estetik felsefesi kapsamında
kaleme alınan makaleler oldukça dikkat çekicidir.

Önemli bir husus olarak şuna işaret edilebilir ki, başta bilim olmak üzere, din, ahlak
ve sanat alanındaki tartışmalar Jön Türklerin bilimi ve felsefeyi birer araç olarak
tasavvur ettiğini ortaya koymuştur. Bu araçsallık Jön Türk mentalitesinin doğduğu
andan, iktidardan uzaklaştığı 1918 yılına kadar canlı bir şekilde gözlenebilmektedir.

Felsefeye yönelik tutumun araçsallaştırmayla sınırlı kalmasının çeşitli nedenleri

vardır şüphesiz. Öncelikle, felsefî meseleler üzerinde kafa yoran Jön Türk
figürlerinden hiç biri modern ya da klasik anlamıyla felsefe eğitimi almış değildir.
Onlar daha ziyade doğa bilimler alanında öğrenim görmüşlerdir. Bu nedenle, felsefî
konulara gösterdikleri ilgi yalnızca gündelik tartışmalarla bağlantılı kalmıştır. Öte
yandan, kriz içerisindeki bir zihne has kaygı durumuyla eklektik bir düşünme biçimi
geliştirmişlerdir. Esasen bu durum doğrudan Jön Türklerden değil, Osmanlı düşünce
ikliminin modern felsefi düşünceye yabancı olmasının bir sonucu olarak da
görülebilir. Netice itibariyle Jön Türkler bir düşünce ikliminin ürünüdürler ve ürün
kendisini ortaya koyan şartların bir nişanesidir.

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Jön Türklerin felsefeyi araçsallaştırmasının görünürdeki bu nedeninin dışında
birbiriyle bağlantılı farklı nedenlerden de bahsedilebilir. Öncelikle Jön Türklerin
modern felsefe ve bilim ile karşılaşma biçimleri onların bu iki hususa yönelik
tavırlarında da etkili olmuştur. Daha açık bir deyişle; pragmatik ihtiyaçlardan
hareketle bilime ve felsefeye yönelen Jön Türk figürleri, bilimi ve felsefeyi kendi
ihtiyaçları doğrultusunda araçsallaştırmış ve pragmatik bir yöntem takip etmişlerdir.
Esasen bilimin ve felsefenin eleştirel bakış açısının süreli yayınlarda gözlenemiyor
olmasının nedenlerinden birinin de bu olduğu söylenebilir. Zira sonuca bakarak
problemi tarif etmişler, dolayısıyla da problemin çözümünü doğrudan o sonuçtan
çıkarmayı tercih etmişlerdir.

Hiç şüphesiz bu arızi bir durum değildir. Jön Türklerin felsefeyi araçsallaştırmasının,
onların kurguladığı ideal düzlemde önemli bir rolü vardır. Bu rol bakımından en az
iki noktaya temas edilebilir.

Birincisi Jön Türkler bir kriz döneminin ürünüdürler. Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun

tecrübe ettiği siyasi, ekonomik, toplumsal ve kültürel kriz imparatorluk
entelektüellerinin fikir dünyasında, doğal olarak, bir yansıma bulmuştur. Jön Türkleri
krize karşı giriştikleri çözüm faaliyetlerinde Batının tarihsel ve mevcut tecrübelerine
dayanmışlardır. İmparatorluğun karşılaştığı sorunların çözümü Batının tecrübe ettiği
tarihsel sürecin aynen takip edilmesine bağlanmıştır. Bilim ve felsefeye atfedilen rol
bu sürecin takibinde rehberlik yapmaktır.

Esasen bunun felsefî düşüncenin gelişim süreci açısından problemli bir duruma
delalet ettiğini belirtmek gerekir. Problemlidir, zira sürecin bilhassa zamansal
boyutunu göz ardı etmektedir. Krizin en büyük yansıması, bu açıdan, Jön Türklerin
zaman algısındaki bir bozulma olarak tezahür etmiştir denilebilir. Bilimsel düşünce
durduk yerde, salt belirli teorilere vukufla geliştirilebilecek bir şey değildir. O aynı
zamanda önemli bir kültürel birikimi gerektirmesi anlamında zamana ihtiyaç
duymaktadır. Başka bir deyişle, bilimsel ve felsefi düşüncenin arkasında tarihsel ve
kültürel önemli bir dayanak bulunmaktadır. Bu olmaksızın bilimin sadece ürünler
üzerinden açıklanmaya çalışılması metodolojik bir çarpıklığı gündeme getirmektedir.

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Felsefenin araçsallaştırılmasının çalışmamız bakımından dikkat çekilmesi gereken
asıl amacı, Jön Türk zihniyetinin daha derinlerinde bir yerde bulunan milliyetçilik
olarak belirlenebilir. Başlangıçta İmparatorluğu kurtarmak ve farklı etnik ve dini
unsurları bir arada tutmanın araçları olarak görülen bilime ve felsefeye sonraki
dönemde yeni bir millet yaratma görevi yüklenmiştir. Esasen modern bilimsel ve
felsefî düşüncelerin benimsenmesi ile Türk milliyetçiliğinin ortaya çıkışı arasındaki
zamansal örtüşme dikkat çekicidir. Her ne kadar Jön Türk mentalitesine içkin olan
Türkçü anlayış Meşveret’in yayınlandığı döneme kadar geri götürülebilirse de,
1911’den sonra yayınlanmış olan yazılarda çok daha sistematik bir şekilde
savunulmaya başlanmıştır. Çalışmamız açısından dikkat çekici olan, felsefeye
milliyetçi anlayışı tahkim etme görevinin yüklenmiş olmasıdır. Felsefe bilim, ahlak,
din ve sanat alanında üreteceği yeni değerler vasıtasıyla millî bilinci canlandıracaktır.
Bu, onların felsefeyi araçsallaştırmalarını daha anlamlı hale getirmektedir.

Bu açıdan bakıldığında, Jön Türk felsefe anlayışına en uygun karşılık “eleştirel

sosyal felsefe” olmaktadır. Onlar toplumsal hayatı doğrudan ilgilendiren alanlarda,
modern bilimsel ve felsefî düşünce ve kavramlar vasıtasıyla yeni bir toplumsal bilinç
yaratmaya yeltenmişlerdir. Çalışmamız kapsamında ele aldığımız bilim, din, ahlak ve
estetik tartışmaları esasen büyük oranda böyle bir sonucu ortaya koymaktadır. Söz
konusu alanlara giren hemen bütün kavramlar, bir üst bilinç olarak millete işaret
edecek şekilde yeniden kurgulanmıştır.

Yerleştirmeye çalıştıkları sosyal felsefe büyük oranda vicdan kavramı etrafında

şekillenmektedir. Vicdan, tipik bir Jön Türk yaklaşımı olan uzlaştırıcı yaklaşımın da
bir göstergesidir aslında. Jön Türkler başlangıçta birbiriyle uzlaştırılamaz gibi
gözüken alanları ilginç bir şekilde uzlaştırılabilir bir hale sokmaktadırlar. Bununla
birlikte, itiraf etmek gerekir ki söz konusu uzlaştırma çalışmaları çoğu zaman zecrî
bir şekilde gerçekleştirildiği izlenimini uyandırmaktadır. Örneğin Abdullah
Cevdet’in din ile bilimi uzlaştırmaya matuf gözüken tutumu, onun genel felsefî
yaklaşımı göz önünde bulundurulduğunda çok da makul gözükmemektedir. Zira
materyalist bir anlayışla dini bir anlayışın uzlaştırılması, her ne kadar teorik düzeyde
mümkün gibi gözükse de, fiili olarak çarpık bir yaklaşım olarak nitelendirilmeyi hak
etmektedir.

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Esasen Jön Türklerin vicdan kavramına atfettikleri anlam fevkalade dikkat çekicidir.
O kadar ki bir eleştirel sosyal felsefe olarak nitelendirdiğimiz tutumlarının bir vicdan
felsefesi ile güçlendirildiği söylenebilir. Süreli yayınlar üzerinde yaptığımız
incelemelerde görebildiğimiz kadarıyla Jön Türkler “vicdan”ı hem aklı hem de
duyguyu kapsayan bir üst değerlendirme yetisi olarak tasavvur etmektedirler. Bu
esasen onların “uzlaştırma” çabalarının da bir sonucu gibi gözükmektedir. Zira
pozitivist, materyalist ve evrimci anlayış Jön Türk zihniyeti üzerinde çok ciddi bir
etki bıraktığı için olgusal gerçekliğe sırtlarını dönememişlerdir. Akıl, onlara göre,
yalnızca olgusal gerçeklik üzerinde bir muhakemede bulunabilir. Metafiziği dışlayan
yaklaşımlarının bizi ulaştıracağı sonuç böyle bir rasyonel sınırlılığa işaret etmektedir.
Fakat diğer yandan modernleşme çabalarının rasyonelliğin yanı sıra duygusal bir
zemine dayandığını söylemek de mümkün gözükmektedir. Tecrübe ettikleri çok
boyutlu kriz onlardaki bu duygusal yönü kamçılamıştır. Dolayısıyla, kriz hakkındaki
tahlillerine duygusallığı da dâhil etmişlerdir. Başka bir deyişle, krizi tek başına akılla
izah edemedikleri için duyguya da bir yer ayırmışlardır. İşte vicdan tam da böyle bir
noktada karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Önemle vurgulamak gerekir ki Jön Türkler vicdanı
olgu ile duygu arasında tecrübe edilen bu çelişkiyi giderme rolünü yüklemiş
gözükmektedirler.

Jön Türklerin felsefî anlayışlarını belirleyen bu uzlaştırıcı niteliğin tek örneği vicdan
kapsamında gündeme gelmiş değildir. Örneğin bilginin kaynağı ile ilgili kabullerinin
yer yer idealist yaklaşımlarla tahkim edildiğine şahit olunmaktadır. Süreli yayınlarda
hem reel hem de ideal olmak üzere iki türlü hakikat konsepsiyonunun izlerine
rastlamak mümkündür. Üstelik bu durum farklı yazarların makalelerinde değil aynı
yazarın farklı makalelerinde gündeme getirilebilmektedir. Örneğin Ziya Gökalp
böyle bir imaj çizmektedir. O Jön Türkler arasında yaygın bir kabul gören pozitivist
düşüncenin sadık bir takipçisidir. Bu bakımdan, felsefenin bilimin olgusal gerçeklik
hakkındaki verilerine bigâne kalmaması gerektiğini sık sık dile getirmektedir. Bunu
pekâlâ realist bir tutum olarak nitelendirmek mümkündür. Bununla birlikte, bilince
atfettiği kurucu rol göz önünde bulundurulduğunda o tipik bir idealisttir. Buna
rağmen, hem realist tutumunu hem de idealist tutumunu dikkat çekici bir şekilde
gündeme getirmektedir. Esasen bu da vicdan kavramı etrafında gerçekleştirdiklerine

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benzer bir uzlaştırma girişimi olarak görülebilir ve dolayısıyla anlaşılır bulunabilir.
Zira mevcut olgusal gerçeklik (örneğin Batının ilerlemişliği, Osmanlının geri
kalmışlığı vb.) ile idealleştirdikleri gerçeklik arasında gözlemledikleri uçurumu
ancak böyle bir uzlaştırma neticesinde giderebileceklerini düşünmüş
gözükmektedirler. Bunun ipuçlarını özellikle estetik felsefesi kapsamındaki
iddialarından çıkarsamak mümkündür.

İlginç olan, söz konusu krizi aşmak üzere spekülatif düşünceyi bir seçenek olarak
göz önünde bulundurmamış olmalarıdır. Spekülatif boyut felsefenin (en azından
sistem sahibi filozoflarda gördüğümüz kadarıyla) belirgin niteliklerinden biridir.
Buna karşın Jön Türkler, gayet bilinçli bir şekilde bu tür yorumlardan uzak
durmuşlar ve kendilerini “fenomenizm” olarak nitelendirilebilecek olgusal bir
çerçeveye hapsetmişlerdir. Muhtemelen metafiziğe yönelik katı tutumları dolayısıyla
spekülatif olarak nitelendirilebilecek eserleri bizzat kaleme almadıkları gibi; süreli
yayınlarda çokça karşılaştığımız çeviri makaleler arasında da buna benzer bir
yaklaşımın izlerini görmek hayli zordur.

Felsefenin vicdan kavramı vasıtasıyla milliyetçi yaklaşımı tahkim ettiği iddiamıza

geri dönecek olursak: Vicdan bireysel bir değerlendirme mekanizması olmanın
ötesinde, bireyin de dâhil olduğu bir üst değerlendirme mekanizmasına işaret
etmektedir. Esasen bunu Jön Türklerin özneye atfettikleri birbirinden farklı anlamlar
kapsamında değerlendirmek çalışmamızın amaçları bakımından daha uygun
bulunmuştur. Şu kadarı söylenebilir ki, Jön Türkler birbirinden farklı üç tür özne
ayırt etmiş gözükmektedirler. Bunları kurucu, üretici ve tüketici özneler olarak
isimlendirmeyi tercih ettik.

Kurucu özne gerek din gerek ahlak gerekse estetik açısından kendisine mütemadiyen
gönderme yapılan “millî vicdan”dır. Söz konusu alanlarda mevcudiyetinden
bahsedilebilecek bütün değerlerin millî vicdana geri götürülebilmesi gerekmektedir.
Dolayısıyla kurucu özne aynı zamanda düşünmenin kaynağı ve sınırlarını da
belirleyen bir işleve sahip gözükmektedir. Üretici özne, kurucu öznenin çizdiği genel
çerçeveye vakıf olan, ona dayanarak eleştirel bir bakış açısına ulaşan ve toplumu bu
bakış açısıyla dönüştürmeye çalışan öznedir. Daha açık bir deyişle, Jön Türklerin

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bizzat kendileridir. Tüketici özne ise kurucu özne tarafından genel çerçevesi
belirlenmiş ve üretici özne tarafından belirli bir kavramsal çerçeve dâhilinde
sistematize edilmiş hakikat konsepsiyonuna tabi olması gereken bireydir. Hemen
işaret etmek gerekir ki buradaki “birey” kavramı ideal bir tipe işaret etmektedir ve
otonom bir niteliğe sahip değildir. Üst değerlendirme yetisi olarak milli vicdana
mugayir düşünce ve eylemlere açık bir mahiyete sahip olan birey, kurucu ve üretici
özneler açısından patolojik bir vakıa halini almakta ve yok hükmünde sayılmaktadır.
Açıktır ki birey, yalnızca üst değerlendirme mekanizmaları tarafından oluşturulan
içeriğe uygun bir yaşam sürdürmekle mükelleftir. İdealleştirilen ittihat kavramı
böylesi bir koşulsuz itaati zorunlu kılmaktadır.

Hiç şüphesiz bu tanımlamalar, kurucu öznenin üretici ve tüketici özneden farklı,

kendi başına, Ziya Gökalp’in deyimiyle “harici bir objektivite kaynağı” olarak
mevcut olduğu anlamına gelmektedir. Nitekim Jön Türklerin beşinci bölümde “öze-
dönüş” olarak yorumladığımız talepleri de bunu akla getirmektedir. Fakat bu durum
şüpheden uzak bir mahiyete sahip değildir. Zira Jön Türklerin kendi başına mevcut
bir özne olarak millî vicdandan bahsetmelerine karşın, kullandıkları dil aslında onun
da üretilmeye açık bir “ideal” olduğu fikrini akla getirmektedir. Bunu üst
değerlendirme yeteneği olarak vicdanın devingenliğine, başka bir deyişle gelişime
açık oluşuna bağlamak mümkün olduğu gibi idealleştirilmiş bir hususiyete işaret
eden bir durum olarak görmek de mümkündür. Jön Türk süreli yayınları üzerinde
yaptığımız incelemeler bizleri bunlardan ikincisinin daha ağırlıklı olduğu kanaatine
ulaştırmaktadır. En iyi ihtimalle tekâmülünü henüz tamamlamamış bir millî
vicdandan bahsetmek gerekmektedir. Bu ise Jön Türk düşüncesi açısından bir
çıkmaza delalet etmektedir. Zira kendisi henüz oluşum aşamasındaki bir
mekanizmanın, daha alt düzeyde belirlenen özneler açısından ne derece belirleyici
olabileceği tartışma konusu edilebilir. Üstelik “inşa aşamasındaki vicdan” olarak
nitelendirebileceğimiz bu mekanizma bizzat üretici özne tarafından inşa ediliyor
gözükmektedir. Üretici özne ise İttihatçı fikirlere kaynak teşkil eden siyasal akıldır.
Esasen bunun makul ve meşru bir yorum olduğu yönündeki en önemli dayanağı Jön
Türklerin tepeden inmeci yaklaşımından çıkarsamak mümkündür. Jön Türkler, bizzat
kendi uhdelerine aldıkları bu inşa faaliyetindeki merkezi rolleri dolayısıyla hakikatin
ancak kendi idealleştirdikleri çerçeve dâhilinde aranabileceği kanaatindedirler. Başka

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bir deyişle onlar kelimenin gerçek anlamıyla elitisttirler. Nitekim Osmanlı İttihat ve
Terakkî Cemiyeti’nin kurulduğu tarihten, Jön Türk iktidarının sona erdiği 1918’e
kadarki dönem boyunca takip ettikleri yöntem bütünüyle elitist bir karaktere sahiptir.
En nihayet, bu, felsefenin kurumsal bir boyutta kurgulanmasının sonucu olarak
nitelendirilebilir.

Bu durumu çalışmamız açısından önemli kılan husus, felsefe ile bağlantılandırılma

biçimidir. Felsefe bilimsel, ahlaki, dini ve estetik alanlarda üreteceği “yeni değerler”
vasıtasıyla bu inşa faaliyetini desteklemek durumundadır. Değerin belirli bir program
dâhilinde üretilip üretilemeyeceği hiç şüphesiz sorgulanması gereken bir husustur.
Bununla birlikte, Jön Türklerin “yenilik” kavramına atfettikleri anlamın ancak yeni
felsefî değerlerin üretimiyle mümkün olacağını kayda geçirmekte fayda vardır.
Nitekim bu, Jön Türk zihniyetinin geleneksel düşünme biçimine niçin mesafeli
durduğunun da bir açıklamasını sunmaktadır.

Gelenekten kopmuş olmalarının bir diğer nedeni de geleneksel dilin/inancın Jön

Türklerce inşa edilmeye çalışılan milliyetçi söylemi destekleyen bir zemin
sunmamasıdır. Nitekim İslamcı olarak nitelendirilebilecek muhaliflerin Jön Türk
zihniyetini en fazla eleştirdiği noktalardan birinin de İttihatçı zihniyetin milliyetçi
anlayışa olan bağlılığıdır. Buna göre, İslam milliyetçi bir tutumla bağdaştırılamaz.
Öte yandan Jön Türklerin de bunu bir zaaf olarak gördüklerine şahit olunmaktadır.
Nitekim İslam Mecmuası’nın yayınlanmasının bir noktada bu eleştirileri bertaraf
etmeye matuf olduğu söylenebilir.

Bu bakımdan, modernleşme, tıpkı batıda olduğu gibi Jön Türk zihniyetinde de bir
paradigma değişimine işaret etmektedir. Esasen çalışmamız modern bilimsel ve
felsefî kavramların benimsenmesi ile gelenekten kopuş arasındaki bağlantıya dair
çok sayıda dikkat çekici duruma işaret etme fırsatı sunmuştur. Bunun en dikkat
çekici örneğini din felsefesi alanında gözlemlemek mümkündür. Özellikle Tanrı’nın
mevcudiyeti ve mahiyeti tartışmaları bakımından Jön Türklerin modern bilimsel
yaklaşımlardan hareketle ulaştığı sonuçlar geleneksel düşünme biçiminden oldukça
uzaktır. Dördüncü bölümde de ele alındığı üzere, Jön Türk figürlerinin bir kısmı
pozitivizmin etkisiyle agnostisizm ve deizmi; bir kısmı evrim fikrinin etkisiyle

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panteizmi; diğer bir kısmı ise materyalizmin ektisiyle ateizmi felsefî bir tutum olarak
benimsemiştir. Nitekim Jön Türk süreli yayınlarında bu üç yaklaşımın da farklı
şekillerde ifadelendirildiğini görüyoruz. Bunlardan hiçbirinin geleneksel Tanrı
anlayışıyla, yani teizm ile örtüşmediği ortadadır. Zira teizm bir zattan bahsetmesi
itibariyle panteizmden; evrenin yaratılışının Tanrı’nın mevcudiyetine işaret ettiğini
söylemesi ve onun sıfatlarının hem ondan alınan bilgiler hem de evren üzerinde
yürütülecek bir muhakeme neticesinde bilinebileceğini iddia etmesi itibariyle
agnostisizm ve deizmden; tek bir ilahın “mevcudiyeti” fikrine dayanıyor olması
hasebiyle de ateizmden farklıdır. Benzer bir kopuşun diğer ilgi çekici örneklerini
ahlak alanındaki tartışmalarda gözlemlemek de mümkündür.

Jön Türk süreli yayınlarının özellikle üzerinde durulması gereken yönlerinden biri de
Batı’da cereyan eden hadiselere yönelik öykünme tavırlarıdır. Onlar, başta Fransız
Devrimi ve Rönesans olmak üzere Batı düşünce tarihinde derin izler bırakmış
gelişmelerin birebir Osmanlı toplumunda da gerçekleştirilmesini hedeflemektedirler.
Bununla birlikte, bunun yalnızca bir öykünme olarak kaldığına işaret etmek
gerekmektedir. Zira söz konusu gelişmeleri yaratacak uygun bir tarihsel, sosyal,
kültürel ve felsefî zemin yoktur Jön Türkler açısından. Ayrıca bu öykünmeyi
sıradanlaştıran ve bir noktada anlamsızlaştıran kimi durumlar da söz konusudur.
Örneğin, Rönesans ile birlikte bireyi önceleyen bir yaklaşım ortaya çıkmıştır. Buna
karşın, Jön Türkler, ittihatçılığa vurgu yapan idealleri nedeniyle bunun tam tersi bir
tutuma sahiptirler. Birey yoktur, toplum vardır. Bireysel hak ve özgürlükler yoktur,
bütünün mevcudiyeti ve bekası vardır!

Jön Türkler modern bir akıl yürütme biçimini kendilerine metodoloji olarak seçtikleri
iddiasındadırlar. Fakat bu metodoloji de yine skolastik bir biçimde kullanıldığı için
modern bir düşünceyi yansıtmaktan uzak gözükmektedir. Nasıl ki skolastik düşünce
verili bir şeyi, yani Tanrısal buyrukları, temellendirmek bakımından aklı
kullanmışsa; Jön Türkler de verili bir şeyi, yani bilimi, bunun tam aksi bir yönde
kullanmışlardır. Her ikisinde de bir araçsallaştırma anlayışı hâkimdir. Bu bakımdan
Jön Türklerin metodolojisini eski düşünme biçiminin bir devamı olarak
nitelendirmek güç olmasa gerektir.

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