How Is Society Possible?

HOW IS SOCIETY POSSIBLE?
PHAENOMENOLOGICA
COLLECTION FONDEE PAR H.L. VAN BREDA ET PUBLIEE
SOUS LE PATRONAGE DES CENTRES D'ARCHIVES-HUSSERL
118
STEVEN VAITKUS
HOW IS SOCIETY POSSIBLE?
Comite de redaction de la collection:

President: S. Usseling (Leuven)
Membres: L. Landgrebe (KOln), W. Marx (Freiburg i. Br.),
J.N. Mohanty (Philadelphia), P. Ricreur (Paris), E. Stroker (KOln),
J. Taminiaux (Louvain-Ia-Neuve), Secretaire: J. Taminiaux
HOW IS SOCIETY
POSSIBLE?
Intersubjectivity and the Fiduciary Attitude as
Problems of the Social Group in
Mead, Gurwitsch, and Schutz
STEVEN VAITKUS
University of Bielefeld
KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS

DORDRECHT / BOSTON / LONDON
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publications Data
Vaitkus, Steven, 1955-

How is society possible? , lntersubjectivity and the fiduciary
attitude as problems of the social group in Mead, Gurwitsch, and
Schutz / Steven Valtkus.
p. cm. -- (Phaenomenologica ; 118)
8ased on the author's thesis (Ph. D, )--University of Toronto,
1986.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Phenomenological sociology. 2. Intersubjectivity. 3. Mead,

George Herbert. 1863-1931. 4. Gurwitsch. Aron. 5. Schutz. Alfred.
1899-1959. 1. Title. II. Series.
HM24.V23 1990
302' .2--dc20 90-5208
ISBN-13: 978-94-010-7432-2 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-2077-4
001: 10.1007/978-94-009-2077-4
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Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION
PART ONE: MEAD'S THEORY OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY
CHAPTER I. INTER SUBJECTIVITY AS A PROBLEM OF THE SO-

CIAL GROUP
Introduction 11
1. The Social Group of Determinate Interobjectivity: The Inverteb-
rates 12
2. The Social Group ofIndeterminate Interobjectivity: The Verteb-
rates 12
3. The Social Group of Creative Intersubjectivity and its Evolution:
The Human Beings 13
a. The Development of Non-Instinctual Gestures of Adjustment 14
b. The Constitution of the Other as a Social Object 14
c. The Constitution of Oneself as a Social Object: The Social
Self or "Me" 15
d. The Constitution of the "Organized Me" and "Generalized
Other" 16
e. The Creative Intersubjective Group 17
4. The Social Evolution of the Creative Intersubjective Group 20
a. The Development of the Primitive Group into Modem Socie-
ty 21
b. The Ideal Democratic Group of Creative Intersubjectivity 24
c. The Artistic and Scientific Groups 25
Notes 26
CHAPTER II. CRITICAL REMARKS TO MEAD'S THEORY OF IN-

TERSUBJECTIVITY
1. Practical Intersubjectivity and the Social Group of Creative

Intersubjectivity 31
v
vi
2. Mead's Conception of the Social Group and its Limitations 33

3. The Rational Character of Mead's Conception of the Social
Group, its Intersubjective Presuppositions, and Required Re-
visions 38
Conclusion 41
Notes 42
PART TWO: GURWITSCH'S THEORY OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY
CHAPTER III. INTER SUBJECTIVITY AS A PROBLEM OF CON-

TEXT AND THE MILIEU-WORLD
Introduction 45
1. The Reflective Context of a Phenomenology of Consciousness 46
2. The Reflective Context of Science 46
3. The Context of the Milieu-World 48
a. The Milieu 48
b. The Radically Implicit and Relatively Impertinent Knowledge
of an Intersubjective Milieu-World 49
c. The Three Fundamental Modes of Organization of Milieux
and their Intersubjective Relevancy 51
4. The World as a Development of Different Contexts: The Fun-
damental Question Concerning the Relationship between the
Reflective Context of Science and the Milieu-World 53
Notes 55
CHAPTER IV. CRITICAL REMARKS TO GURWITSCH'S THEORY

OF INTER SUBJECTIVITY
1. Intersubjectivity as a Transcendental Problem: The Relationship

between the Transcendental Order of Existence of Science and
the World of Everyday Life 57
2. The 'Intersubjectivity' Dialogue: The Correspondence between
Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch 60
a. The Critique of Objective Time and the Transcendental
Analysis of Intersubjectivity 60
b. Intersubjectivity as Ultimately a Mundane Problem and the
Constitutive Function of Consciousness 61
c. Scientific Intersubjectivity and the Life-World as Exclusively
a Foundation 63
d. The Transformation of Lived Experience in the Phenome-
nological Analysis of the Life-World 65
3. The Limitations of Gurwitsch's Theory of Intersubjectivity and
the Social World 67
Conclusion 70
Vll
Notes 71
PART THREE: SCHUTZ'S THEORY OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY
CHAPTER V. THE FUNDAMENTAL LEVELS TO THE PROBLEM

OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY
Introduction 75
1. The Three Fundamental Levels and the Phenomenology of the
Natural Attitude 76
2. Knowledge of the Dasein of the Other: The Fundamental Struc-
tures and Stratifications of the Life-World 78
3. Knowledge of the So-Sein of the Other: The Relative Natural
World View of a Group 82
4. Knowledge of the Concrete Motives of the Other's Action: A
Theory of Social Action 85
Notes 87
CHAPTER VI. TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF INTER-

SUBJECTIVITY: THE PERSON AND THE SOCIAL GROUP
Introduction 93
1. The Theory of Relevance 94
2. The Theory of Signs and Symbols 102
3. The Person in the Social Group 110
Notes 113
CHAPTER VII. CRITICAL REMARKS TO SCHUTZ'S THEORY OF

INTER SUBJECTIVITY
Introduction 117
1. The Luckmann Position: Intersubjectivity as a Problem of the
Division of Labor 117
2. The Practical Attitude as the Foundation ofIntersubjectivity and
Everyday Life 124
3. Intimacy and Anonymity 126
4. The Person 128
5. The Social Group and Taken for Granted Symbols 129
Conclusion 131
Notes 131
PART FOUR: INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND THE SOCIAL GROUP

CHAPTER VIII. A GENERAL PROGRAM FOR ANY FUTURE
ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY
Introduction 137
viii
1. The Phenomenological Reduction: Intersubjectivity as a Tran-

scendental or Mundane Problem 138
2. The Other as an 'Immanent Transcendence', or 'Transcendent
Immanence' and Responsible Social Actor 143
3. Intersubjectivity as an Egological or Group Problem 149
4. Intersubjectivity as a Constitutive Product, or as Taken for
Granted and Accomplished 154
Conclusion 158
Notes 158
CHAPTER IX. REFLECTIONS ON THE PROBLEM OF INTERSUB-

JECTIVITY AND THE SOCIAL GROUP
Introduction 161
1. The Social Group and the Fiduciary Attitude 162
a. The Adduction of Social Meaning to the Practical Attitude 162
b. The Fiduciary Attitude and the Practical Attitude 163
c. The Fiduciary Attitude 164
d. The Clarificatory Potential of the Fiduciary Attitude 166
e. The Fiduciary Attitude and Relativism 167
2. The Everyday Life-World 169
3. The Milieu 170
4. The Affiliatory Group 173
5. The Institution 176
6. The Symbolic Cosmos 183
Conclusion: The Person and the Social Group 186
No~s 190
Bibliography 193
Subject Index 199
Name Index 203

Einführung
How is society possible? In Die Krisis der europiiischen Wissenschaflen und die
transzendentale Phiinomenoiogie, I Edmund Husserl is found with a pathos send-
ing out pleas for belief ("Glauben") in his transcendental philosophy and tran-
scendental ego. The traditional idea of theoretical reflection instituted in ancient
Greece as the suspension of all taken for granted worldly interests has, through
a partial realization of itself, forsaken itself in the one-sided development of the
objective mathematical-natural sciences as they themselves have become so
taken for granted, with the method and validity of their results held as so
self-evident, that they appear as resting self-sufficiently on their own grounds,
while pursuing an increasingly abstract mathematization of nature. The sciences
are left without a foundation and their meaning within the world consequently
unintelligible, while their objective and valid abstract concepts continually tend
to supercede the everyday life-world and render it questionable. In the end, these
evolving and exchanging attitudes of belief in the everyday life-world or reflective
doubt (science) ultimately leads to a disbelief in both, and a search in one
direction for idol leaders and in the other for the cult of experience. This collapse
of Western belief systems becomes particularly threatening as it turns into
nihilism which is the development of beliefs in societal forms which employ
natural and social science for the liquidation of humanity and nature. 2 Society
starts becoming impossible.
The problem of intersubjectivity arose in this general context and, more
particularly, probably in some occasional, but still obscure conversations
between Wilhelm Dilthey and Edmund Husserl around the turn of the century
concerning the establishment of a universal theory of knowledge (allgemeingiiltige
Theorie des Wissens) or a phenomenological philosophy of culture grounded
respectively in the founding of the relativity of the Weltanschauungen in a higher
point of view, or in a priori and invariant relations. 3 The problem's general
contours then can be stated as follows: Objectivated and objectivating thought
patterns (e.g. the concepts of micro-physis or interactional typologies) ought to
be grounded 'intersubjectively' which is to say neither in the subject (the
Cartesian answer) nor outside (in some natural-empiricist tradition). Inter-
subjectivity is a category of intermediacy, and this very location "in-between" has
2 Introduction
rendered an adequate solution, respectively even a precise definition of the

problem very difficult.
Intersubjectivity in this sense is a modern problem not to be confused with
some of its vague predecessors to be found for example in the works of Descartes,
Leibniz, John Stuart Mill, Hegel, and Fichte.4 All these authors still stand under
the influence of Galileo's inauguration of the "new science" and the resulting
division of the world into mind and matter, carrying the assumption of a "being
as it really is in itself'. Their attempts in this regard could only result in construc-
tive, at times almost mystical, concepts beset by obscurities, due to the fact that
a transcendental SUbjectivism was not yet driven back deep enough to allow for
the problem of intersubjectivity to properly come into view. Taking up the last
example, Fichte tells us the ego, unaware of itself, posits a non-ego, and then by
reflection posits itself as the agent in that positing, or as the patient which the
activity posited in the non-ego posits in its turn. But all this fantasy of positing
would be surely all mere folly unless it was based upon some prior subjective
experience of the antecedent phenomena of the other.
Interestingly enough, the problem of intersubjectivity, soon after phenomenol-
ogy's discovery of it, begins to arise unexpectedly as a central theme in another
contemporary line of philosophy represented by Bertrand Russell and Rudolf
Carnap.5 Apparently they have some idea of the crisis of the sciences, but from
their own supercilious standpoint can only wrongly view the very idea of inter-
subjectivity as placing science further in question. Thus, conceding the actual
experience and belief in intersubjectivity in the common sense world, they vary
this experience to abstract out assemblages of sense data, upon which compati-
ble logical constructions are built (Russell) or from which logical constructions
are abstracted (Carnap) leading over to natural science and finding a final unity
in the modern logical theory of relations and derivation systems. Intersubjectivity
as it is lived is then said unfortunately not to be knowledge in any proper sense,
and an ideallogified intersubjectivity is offered in its place for the future. While
Galilean science had not yet reached into a mathematization of social relations,
this modern logic, just as it dissolved Zeno's paradoxes for science, which for
2,000 years stood as buffers between science and the everyday world, would now
logify intersubjectivity and the social for science absorbing it into nothingness,
so as to maintain there was never really a scientific crisis of the sciences and
certainly no need for such a solution. This outcome which vanishes the problem
of intersubjectivity into logical forms, so as to continue to look upwards with
closed eyes towards the clean paradise of the logical "positive theory of infinity"
could only intensify matters, and further lead to the irrelevance of science for life
and disbelief in the everyday life-world.
Husserl did not conceive of phenomenology as antagonistic to science and he
insists upon the legitimacy and even necessity of the formalization and techni-
zation of mathematics and natural science provided only that we do not lose sight
of the source from which their methods derive their sense, and cognitive and
human significance. In this regard, he speaks of a first epoche of objective science
which does not mean denying the validity of or taking any specifically critical
Introduction 3
position towards science, but rather suspending and abstaining from pursuing
the interests of objective science, so as not to proceed upon or use any part of
this science in our reasoning about and description of the life-world. 6 At this
point, a large number of later phenomenologists, broadly speaking, take their
departure and pursue the problem of intersubjectivity in different and interesting
directions such as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Ortega y
Gasset? However, in connection with this first epoch€:, Husserl also speaks
about a "science of the life-world" ("Wissenschaft der Lebenswelt") and in this
strict sense it would be two other phenomenologists Alfred Schutz and Aron
Gurwitsch who would carry out this program the furthest. In fact, it was Husserl
himself who brought the two into contact with one another, precisely due to their
common interest in a scientific analysis of intersubjectivity and the social life-
world. Husserl's insightful counsel in this regard would prove to be historically
significant as the two "philosopher-social scientists" immediately became intel-
lectual collaborators and then life-long friends, carrying out an academic corre-
spondence for over 20 years. 8 While Husserl's early attempts to carry out a
transcendental analysis of intersubjectivity will be seen to be clearly untenable
in the following, his later attempts in his posthumously published papers Zur
Phiinomenologie der Intersubjektivitiit (3. Vols.) still await a proper analysis. 9 It is
the standpoint of the present work that such an analysis is only obtainable, if at
all, through a first analysis of the mundane level of sociality considered in the
following. Husserl was certainly well aware of this "long path" to the social in
bringing Schutz and Gurwitsch together, but could himself have little time for
it in a crisis situation which he believed could only find a solution in an ego logical
transcendental phenomenological philosophy.
In the following, G. H. Mead, Aron Gurwitsch, and Alfred Schutz have been
chosen as the primary authors for an analysis of the problem of intersUbjectivity.
The theoretical and historical reasons for the further selection of Mead become
clear when Mead's earlier studies under Dilthey in Berlin are remembered, along
with the fact that upon their independent arrivals in America as "emigrant
refugee scholars" both Schutz and Gurwitsch turned to American pragmatism,
the tradition within which of course Mead stands as a central figure, believing
it to be the closest to their own work and as the best means to introduce
phenomenology to North America. In general, it will be seen that Mead,
Gurwitsch, and Schutz all treat intersubjectivity as a problem ofthe social group
and this is indeed a quite independent and new approach in comparison with the
traditional approaches of treating intersubjectivity in terms of how a, to some
extent, isolated ego comes to know of another ego, in terms of how both egos
partake in a superpersonal consciousness, or, finally, in terms of how both egos
are rooted in Being. In this social group approach, any knowledge of an other
always presupposes a knowledge of the fundamental categories of the world
constituted through the social organization of the body and nature such that the
other is always experienced as situated in the context of a group offering an
'inner-subjective meaning' while defining its boundaries through its symbolic
organization; and, while the group is consequently always experienced as strati-
4 Introduction
fied through imposing societal structures, the latter attain their implicit character
precisely through the process of distancing which the other performs as a respon-
sive or responsible actor. It is this fundamental state of affairs constituting
intersubjectivity which Mead, Gurwitsch, and Schutz attempt to describe in all
its various developments, ramifications, and Mannigfaltigkeiten.
Arising out of the crisis of the sciences, the problem of intersubjectivity here
finds its foundation in the social group and, in so doing, renders clear the various
invariant structures and relations which first allow for the very possibility of
society in general. In this sense, the problem of intersubjectivity attains a rele-
vance not only to philosophy, but also for the social sciences in establishing the
fundamental categories upon which new and more adequate methods for routine
empirical research may then proceed. It is of interest to note that while Mead,
Gurwitsch, and Schutz were all peculiar hybrids of philosophy and the social
sciences, they payed little attention to systematically developing methodological
rules for routine empirical research, preferring instead to carry out the prior
necessary theoretical research on "what the empirical in general is" first - that
is, developing a new conception of the empirical for the social sciences. The task
of developing such methodological rules from their work remains a difficult one
which has been attempted, but never fully carried out.
Having developed Mead, Gurwitsch, and Schutz's often quite implicit
theories of inter subjectivity, each followed by a separate critical chapter analyz-
ing the respective theory, all three authors are then uniformly treated as a tryad
in Chapter 8, against the background of Husserl's first insightful groundbreaking
analysis, so as to develop a general program for any future analysis of the
problem. In the final Chapter 9, a first attempt is made to execute this program
in a few initial analyses in which the notion of a fiduciary attitude is developed
in contrast to the natural practical attitude of the everyday life-world. The main
correlates of this attitude are further outlined: the everyday life-world, the milieu,
the affiliatory group, the institution, the process of textualization, and the
symbolic cosmos. In the conclusion, a number of speCUlative remarks about the
fiduciary attitude and a human Nature are put forth bringing the discussion to
a close.
It should be stated here at the outset to avoid any simple terminological
confusion that this notion of a fiduciary attitude was immanently developed within
the context of phenomenological analyses of subjective phenomena and human
action, and therefore has absolutely nothing to do with Niklas Luhmann's con-
ception of trust (Vertrauen) developed within his systems theory. 10 Here, nothing
more need be said than that Russell and Carnap's more difficult and refined
attempts to logistify the problem of intersubjectivity is more nihilistically and,
thus, more unwittingly pursued now at the level of social theory and societal
reality by Luhmann, when in finding deficiencies within his systems theory, he
incorporates alien and contradictory concepts into his theory by cynically strip-
ping them of all subjective reference and content. However, if the reader is intent
upon tracing out the subtleties of this line of argumentation, one consequence
of the present work drawn by Richard Grathoffis that Luhmann's "Verlegenheits-
Introduction 5
formel" becomes a major calamity for systems theory itself when intersubjectivity
involves human trust and a constitutive trust positing fiduciary attitude as is
argued in the following. 11 Finally, in taking Luhmann's opponent Habermas into
account to avoid any contrary misunderstandings, there should be even less
difficulty in seeing that the notions of a fiduciary attitude, the social Person, and
a personal life-world developed in the following, in one sense as the complex
foundation for any communication, have nothing to do with Habermas's incorpo-
ration of the life-world into his communicative theory which to use Ulf
Matthiesen's language involves a very watering down of communication itself
(Verfiiissigung der Kommunikation)Y If an analogical context of sociologists is
requested at the start for helping to frame this work, it is to be found most
obviously in the persons of Georg Simmel and Max Weber, and most surprisingly
in Florian Znaniecki and Robert Bierstedt. 13
The deepest perspective on the problem of intersubjectivity leads to the
guarantee that an essential aspect in living in the life-world is that it can never
in its entirety be completely objectively known. No matter how many great
strides and advances mathematical natural science makes in progressing to-
wards its posited ideal limit pole, it shall never tire of itself, explain the complete
future, or ever really explain the beauty of the blossoming cherry tree or the
wonder of the birth of understanding and life in nature. No matter how much
knowledge we should attain in however many read and printed books, so long
as I am situated as my body in a social nature in which I am born, through which
I move, and by which I will die, no kind of knowledge shall be able to eradicate
the experience of transcendence of the other or nature which intersubjectivity
teaches is immanent to our lives calling forth beliefs, carrying hopes and fears,
in general that the former will at least remain constant, so that what has typically
held good in the past will do so in the future. The fundamental question in the
crisis of the sciences is indeed how science and everyday life historically came
to be brought into question, but there is also the underlying question concerning
how "the true genuine wonders of the world can become so everyday like and
should become SO!,,14
It is good and worthy knowledge we obtain in following the philosopher, the
scientist, the poet and even Don Quixote into various phantastic worlds, but it
should not be forgotten that in each a principle distinction between reality and
dream-like fantasy is made. 15 If we everyday persons begin to fundamentally
believe in, live by, and build our own new thought constructions upon the
phantastic 'reality' of science in our everyday life, these constructions will of
necessity appear unscientifically dream-like to the scientist mirroring back his
own primary constructions as possibly dream-like, thereby giving rise to a crisis
situation which can then only be overcome through an analysis of the original
engagement of intersubjective belief in the existence of the everyday life-world
itself. Russell's complete logistified intersubjectivity16 based upon a complete
knowledge of all causal relationships and, thus, of all future events would lead
to no moral motivation for acting in everyday life, no moral stance of the dead
before angels, and even to eliminating the very existence of death itself in leaving
6 Introduction
over no moral substance whatsoever. In this light, the possibility of any Act
essentially involves some non-knowledge as its moral aspect which may be
developed into a certain profound trust of the unknown and most supremely a
respect for the unknown in the other and social nature. Only here can the belief
in the value and worthiness of everyday life be once more attained and asserted
by 'well-informed actors', so as to secure science's position as a grounded and
ethical science.
Objective knowledge is golden and can do much good, but in this world as
it is and for the future let us not forget Socrates' word of wisdom as our prayer
by an old Pythagorean poet: "King Zeus, grant us good whether prayed for or
unsought by us. But that which we ask amiss, do thou advert".17
I would like to thank and acknowledge my indebtedness to myoId friend and
teacher Richard Grathoff, and to Maurice Natanson and John O'Neill for a first
reading of the manuscript and offering critical suggestions. 18
NOTES
I. Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der europiiischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phiino-
menologie, Husserliana, Vol. 6, ed. Walter Biemel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950).
2. See, for example: Aron Gurwitsch, "On Contemporary Nihilism", Review of Politics, 7 (1945),
170-198; Eric Voegelin, "On the Origins of Scientism'", Social Research, 15 (1948),462-494; and
Ludwig Landgrebe, "Einleitung" Alfred Schutz - Aron Gurwitsch: Brie/wechsel 1939-1959, ed.
Richard Grathoff(Miinchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1985), also see the Sartre discussion between
Schutz and Gurwitsch therein.
3. Edmund Husserl, Die Husserl Korrespondenz (Husserl-Archiefte Leuven), R II, Dilthey: Husserl,
June 29, 1911; R I, Husserl: Dilthey, June 29, 1911; and R II, Dilthey: Husserl, July 10, 1911.
I would like to thank Professor Samuel IJsseling, Director of the Husserl- Archives, Louvain,
for his generous and kind permission to use and cite these documents.
It is true that Husserl's Krisis was written in the 1930's, however, the above general statement
can be taken as a clear formulation of what were still rough and incipient ideas around the turn
of the century. Cf. Edmund Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, Husserliana, Vol. 12, ed. Lothar
Eley (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970) and Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen,
Husserliana, Vol. 18-19/2, resp. ed. Elmar Holenstein and Ursula Panzer (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1975 and 1984).
4. Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 2 Vols., trans. John Cottingham, Robert
Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge Universtiy Press, 1984); Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, trans. Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrecht: D. Reidel
Publishing Company, 1969); John Stuart Mill, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philoso-
phy, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. 9, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University Press,
1979); Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phiinomenologie des Geistes, Slimtliche Werke, Vol. 5, ed.
Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1952); and Johann Gottlieb Fichte,
Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. I, 3, ed, Reinhard Lauth and
Hans Jacob (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1965), pp. 173-451.
5. Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.,
1969) and Rudolf Carnap, Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp
Verlag, 1966).
6. Husserl, Krisis, pp. 123 ff.
7. See, for example: Max Scheler, Wesen und Forrnen der Sympathie, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 7,
ed. Manfred S. Frings (Miinchen: Francke Verlag, 1973); Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit
Introduction 7
(Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1976); Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel
E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1973); Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology
ofPerception, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Humanities Press, 1974); and Jose Ortega y Gasset,
Man and People (New York: Norton, 1957).
8. Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel.
9. Edmund Husserl, Zur Phiinomenologie der Intersubjektivitiit, Husserliana, Vols. 13-15, ed. Iso
Kern (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973).
10. See, for example: Niklas Luhmann, Vertrauen (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1968); Niklas
Luhmann, Soziale Systeme (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984); and Niklas Luhmann,
"Die Lebenswelt - nach Riicksprache mit Ph1inomenologen", Archiv jUr Rechts- und Sozialphilo-
sophie, 72 (1986), 176-194.
I would like to thank Martin Albrow for pointing out to me just before the publication of this
study that a notion of ,fiduciary' can be found in Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962). However, given the immanent development of the notion of
the 'fiduciary attitude' in the following out of a very different and phenomenological tradition,
specifically Husserl, Mead, Gurwitsch, and Schutz, its theoretical origins are most likely to be
found in the doctrines of the Greek skeptical philosopher Carneades. See, for example: Cicero,
De Natura Deorum; Academica, The Loeb Classical Library, Vol. 19, trans. H. Rackam (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Py"honism; Against the
Logicians, The Loeb Classical Library, Vols. 1-2, trans. R. G. Bury (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1967); Alfred Schutz, Reflections on the Problem of Relevance, ed. Richard M. Zaner
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970); and Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann, The
Structures of the Life-World, trans. Richard M. Zaner and H. Tristam Engelhart, Jr. (London:
Heinemann, 1974). It should be mentioned that the notion of a 'fiduciary attitude' also arose at
the time of carrying out 5 years of empirical field research into 'processes of friendship con-
struction' under Professor Norman Bell of the University of Toronto.
11. Richard Grathoff, "Ober die Einfalt der Systeme in der Vielfalt der Lebenswelt", Archivfiir Rechts-
und Sozialphilosophie, 73 (1987), 251-263.
12. Ulf Matthiesen, Das Dickicht der Lebenswelt und die Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Miin-
chen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1985). With respect to Habermas, see, for example, Jiirgen Haber-
mas, Erkenntnis und Interesse (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973) and Jiirgen Haber-
mas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, 2 Vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1981).
13. See, for example, Florian Znaniecki, Cultural Reality (1919) (Houston: Cap and Gown Press,
1983), and Robert Bierstedt, Power and Progress (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1974).
14. Fully cited as "Der Wunder hochstes ist, da13 uns die wahren, echten Wunder so alltaglich werden
kiinnen, werden sollen" as the motto for Schutz's future book in "Erstes Notizbuch aus Seelisberg"
in the posthumously published Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann, Strukturen der Lebenswelt,
Vol. 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984), p. 246, my emphasis, exclamation, and
translation; originally taken from Gotthold Lessing, Nathan der Weise, act I, sc. 2, lines 217-219.
15. See Alfred Schutz, "Don Quixote and the Problem of Reality", in Collected Papers, Vol. 2, ed.
Arvid Brodersen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), pp. 135-158.
16. Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, especially Lecture 8 and pp. 236-240
therein.
17. Cited in Alfred Schutz, "Tiresias, or our Knowledge of Future Events", in Collected Papers, Vol.
2, p. 293.
18. The ideas in this work originally arose as part of my doctoral dissertation at the University of
Toronto, 1986.
PART ONE
Mead's Theory of Intersubjectivity

CHAPTER I
Intersubjectivity as a Problem of the Social Group
INTRODUCfION
The problem of intersubjectivity arises in Mead's work as early as in his 1903

article entitled "The Definition of the Psychical".! Pursuing his previous attempts
to delineate the nature of individual consciousness as the creative aspect of
problem-solving conduct in the social world, Mead recognized that this creative
individual consciousness stands in contrast to the empirical self and other selves
of the social world insofar as it reconstructs them in its reflective activity. Thus,
creative individual consciousness can be "neither me nor other".2 The problem
of intersubjectivity is viewed by Mead, then, as a question concerning the
relationship between the creative nature of individual consciousness and the
social world in which the empirical self is itself embedded.
In general, Mead attempts to demonstrate that intersubjectivity is a phenome-
non of the organization of a social group. The relationship between creative
individual consciousness and the social world is itself seen to be dependent upon
the very organization of a social group. Mead further differentiates all social
groups according to the extent to which intersubjectivity is obtained within them.
That is, beginning with social groups in which there are no intersubjective
relations, Mead differentiates all social groups according to the extent to which
individual creativity as a reconstructive activity is possible, encouraged, and
understood by others within them. Moreover, Mead attempts to show that there
has been an evolution of the organization of the social group in which the
relationships within a social group have come to be so organized that one can
conceive of the actual possibility of a social group in which the fullest extent of
intersubjectivity, that is the fullest expression of creative individuality and its
fullest understanding by others, is realized. He proposes that at the present time
the aesthetic and scientific groups most adequately represent this complete
attainment of intersubjectivity. In the following, we will be concerned with
Mead's account ofintersubjectivity in terms of the organization ofa social group
and his presentation of the evolution of intersubjectivity in terms of the evolution
of the organization of the social group.
11
12 Chapter I
1. THE SOCIAL GROUP OF DETERMINATE INTEROBJECTIVITY:

THE INVERTEBRATES
The first type of fundamental social group to which Mead refers is represented
by the invertebrates, for example, the Hymenoptera and termites. 3 The principle
of organization of this group is "physiological dijferentiation"4 which results in the
development of members into various types of physiological forms adjusted to
particular functions required for the further maintenance of the social group.
Thus, the individual members of this group are no more than particular physio-
logical forms suited for particular functions required by the group. As such, they
are completely determined by the group. The queen bee, with her enormous
reproductive organs, whose sole function is to carry out the process of repro-
duction for the entire group, and the fighters who are so physiologically special-
ized in their function that they cannot even feed themselves, are examples offered
by Mead. 5 The interaction between the members of this group is a "conversation
of gestures" in the sense that the action of anyone member leads to an appro-
priate response by another member which, in turn, leads to an appropriate
response by the first member or other members, and so on in a like fashion. 6 The
action of anyone member in carrying out its function is completed only by
another member carrying out its corresponding function. However, in that this
conversation of gestures is based upon a physiological differentiation between
the members, it is impossible for the members of this group to ever grasp the
meaning which their action has on another member ofthe group. Because of their
different physiological forms, the effect of a member's action on another member
would have a different effect upon it than upon the other member. 7
It can be said that the organization of this fundamental social group is one
of determinate interobjectivity in the sense that (1) the member and, consequently,
its action and interaction is absolutely determined by the social group; (2) the
effect of the action of anyone member of the group on another member in no
way enters into the experience of any member of the group; (3) and the structure
of the composite ongoing effects of the actions of members upon one another,
resulting in the maintenance of the group, in no way enters into the experience
of any member of the group. The community of perspectives, which is the
organization of all the members' perspectives in a social group, is, in this case,
a tight complex organization which lies outside of and totally determines the
member's particular perspective. s
2. THE SOCIAL GROUP OF INDETERMINATE INTEROBJECTIVITY:

THE VERTEBRATES
The second type offundamental social group to which Mead refers is that of the
vertebrates. 9 The principle of organization of this group is claimed to be instinctu-
al. 10 Although there is some physiological differentiation in this group with
regard, for example, to sex, and the nurture and care of infant forms, this
Intersubjectivity as a Problem of the Social Group 13
differentiation does not playa major part in the interaction between the members
of the group. The individual members are for the most part physiologically
identical and are often found interacting in an instinctually similar fashion in
drifting, attacking, and defending in the herd, school, flock, or pack. Thus, the
individual members are relatively undetermined by this social group. Unlike the
members of the first social group, they can, for example, reproduce and eat
outside of the group. The interaction between the members of this group is also
a conversation of gestures in the sense previously mentioned. The action of any
one member calls out an appropriate response by another in a functional circuit
of reciprocal actions and responses between the members. However, since this
conversation of gestures is not based upon physiological differentiation, but upon
the instincts of members who are for the most part physiologically identical, it
is not impossible for a member to grasp the meaning which its action has for
another member. II Since their physiological forms are primarily identical, there
is an open possibility that the effect of a member's action on another member
could have the same effect on it. As we shall see, the members of this group
merely lack the mechanism of manipulation and the development oflanguage by
means of which this could take place. Thus, the interaction between the individu-
al members of this group remains a conversation of gestures in which neither the
effect of the action of any member on another member, nor the structure of the
composite ongoing effects of actions of members upon one another, enters into
the experience of any member of the social group. The organization of this
fundamental social group can be said to be one of indeterminate interobjectivity.
The community of perspectives is a loose simple organization which lies outside
of, but does not determine to any great degree, the member's particular per spec-
tive. 12
3. THE SOCIAL GROUP OF CREATIVE INTER SUBJECTIVITY AND ITS EVOLUTION:

THE HUMAN BEINGS
The third type of fundamental social group which Mead considers is that of
human beings. The principle of organization of this group is language. 13 It has
evolved out of the second type of fundamental group organized by instincts.
Mead devotes a considerable amount of his work to tracing out this evolution
for it represents the evolution of an interobjective social group into an intersub-
jective social group.
Mead begins his examination of this evolution of the human group with the
statement that originally human beings, as simple vertebrate forms, were mem-
bers of the second fundamental social group organized by social instincts. 14 A
social instinct, which Mead defines as a "well defined tendency to act under the
stimulation of another individual of the same species,"15 renders the members
of the group sensitive to certain types of stimuli from other members of the group
and leads to the appropriate responses by those members. As has already been
14 Chapter I
indicated above, such an instinctual matrix is the basis of the conversation of

gestures of this second social group.
a. The Development of Non-Instinctual Gestures of Adjustments
The first phase of the evolution of the human group is the development of
non-instinctual gestures of adjustments. Mead refers to the development of these
non-instinctual gestures of adjustments in the following way. "Human conduct
is distinguished primarily from animal conduct by that increase in inhibition
which is an essential phase of voluntary attention, and increased inhibition
means an increase in gesture".16 This increase of inhibition in human conduct
is primarily the result of the development of the "manipulating hand" which
breaks up the instinctual activities.
Contact experiences of lower animals are, to a large extent, determined, not

by the process of manipulation, but are so immediately a part of eating,
fighting ... etc., that it is hard to believe that a consciousness of a "thing" can
be segregated from these instinctive activites. 17
We shall not here pursue Mead's argument that manipulation is an essential

aspect in the development of a "thing". In this regard, it should only be noted
that the actual development of the physical thing arises only after, and upon the
basis of, the development of the social group which we are presently considering.
"Social consciousness must antedate physical consciousness". 18 "Experience in its
original form became reflective in the recognition of selves, and only gradually was
there differentiated a reflective experience of things which were purely physi-
cal".19 The importance of the passage for us is that it suggests that human
inhibition arises through the process of manipulation breaking up instinctual
conversations of gestures such as fighting. The gestures, then, to which Mead
refers in the first passage as resulting from human inhibition are not properly
instinctual. They arise through the breaking up of the instinctual conversation
of gestures and, developing into vocal gestures, come to "elaborate and
immensely complicate this conversation of attitudes".20
b. The Constitution of the Other as a Social Object
The second phase of the evolution of the human group is the constitution of the
other as a social object. In the conversation of gestures, there is, to be sure, an
other involved. However, this other is only implicitly present. 21 The members in
the conversation of gestures are not aware of the other as an independent identity
for itself. The constitution of the other as a self, a social object, depends upon
rendering explicit in consciousness this implicit presence of the other in the
conversation of gestures.
If it is not already clear from our examination of the first two fundamental
groups, Mead subscribes to a behavioralist theory of meaning following Dewey,
Royce, and Angell. "Consciousness of meaning consists mainly in a conscious-
ness of attitude, on the part of the individual, over against the object to which
he is about to react",22 More particularly, consciousness of meaning consists in
a "statement of the relation between the characteristics in the sensuous stimu-
lation and the responses which they call out".23 According to this theory of
meaning, the implicit presence or implicit meaning of the other in the conver-
sation of gestures is the response gestures of a member to the other's stimulus
gestures. In order to become explicitly conscious of the implicit meaning of the
other, the member must separate his response gestures from the stimulus ges-
tures of the other which calls them forth and grasp the relationship between
them.
Unlike lower animals, it is possible for the human to separate and grasp the
stimulus and response gestures on account of the unique non-instinctual conver-
sation of gestures developed in the first phase ofthe evolution of the social group.
In the unique non-instinctual conversation of gestures of humans, instead of
being instinctually forced simply and immediately to respond to the stimulus
gesture of the other, "the very attention given to the stimulation may throw one's
attention back upon the attitude he will assume toward the challenging attitude
in another, since this attitude will change the stimulation".24 In other words, the
unique non-instinctual conversation of gestures between humans renders it
possible for the human, in attending to the stimulus gestures, to come to attend
to his own response. In this way, it is possible for the human to grasp the
relationship between the other's stimulus gestures and his own response, and,
in so doing, to become explicitly conscious of the meaning of the other.
Mead turns to the ontogenetic development of the child to further illustrate
this process. 25 At first, like the simple human vertebrate, the child instinctually
responds to the stimulus gestures of those about him. Through the development
of the unique non-instinctual conversation of gestures, the child's attending to
the stimulus gestures of others gradually leads to an attending to his own
responses and past responses to the stimulus gestures, and then to a merging of
his past responses with the stimulus gestures of others. The child now begins to
act with confidence toward the other for the other's gestures have come to have
meaning for him. He is conscious of the meaning, the presence, of an other.
Through the merging of his own past responses to the stimulus gestures of the
other, he constitutes the other as a social object. "The social object will then be
the gestures, i.e. the early indications of an ongoing social act in another plus the
imagery of our response to that stimulation".26
c. The Constitution of Oneself as a Social Object: The Social Self or "Me"
The third phase of the evolution of the human group is the constitution of oneself
as a social object - a "Self'; a "Me". Just as the other is implicitly present in the
conversation of gestures, so too I am implicitly present, and the constitution of
16 Chapter I
oneself as a social object depends upon rendering explicit in consciousness this

implicit presence. Similarly, according to the behaviorist theory of meaning, my
implicit presence or meaning consists of the response gestures ofthe other to my
stimulus gestures and to become explicitly conscious of this implicit meaning of
oneself and to constitute oneself as a social object, one must isolate the other's
response gestures from one's stimulus gestures, grasp the relationship between
them, and merge the other's response gestures with one's stimulus gestures.
It is possible for the human being to separate, grasp, and merge the other's
response gestures with one's own stimulus gestures on account of the fact that
the human, at this stage in the evolution of the human group, has attained the
standpoint of the other as a social object and has attained the capacity for a
non-instinctual elaborate vocal gesturing. Referring to the human vocal gesture,
Mead writes:
Certainly the fact that the human animal can stimulate himself as he stimu-
lates others and can respond to his stimulations as he responds to the stimu-
lations of others, places in his conduct the form of a social object out of which
may arise a "me".27
From the standpoint of the other as a social object, attained through the
merging of one's own past responses to his stimulus gestures, one turns back
upon oneself and attends to one's own stimulus gestures and the other's re-
sponses to them. Insofar as through the vocal gesture, one stimulates himself in
stimulating the other and responds to this stimulation, one can and gradually
does appropriate the memory images of the responses of the other as one's own
and merges them with one's own stimulus gestures thereby constituting oneself
as a social object. "In responding to ourselves we are in the nature of the case
taking the attitude of another... and into this reaction there naturally flows the
memory images of the responses of those about us".2 8 Thus, "the objective self
of human consciousness is the merging of one's responses with the social stimu-
lation by which he affects himseIr'.29
d. The Constitution a/the "Organized Me" and "Generalized Other"
The fourth phase of the evolution of the human group is the constitution of the
"organized me" and the "generalized other". The third phase of the evolution of
the human group, the constitution of oneself as as social object, results in as
many "me's", objective selves, as there are others with whom one comes in
contact. The fourth phase of the evolution of the human group is the appro-
priation of the composite organized response of all the others in the group,
thereby resulting in the constitution of a generalized other and an organized me.
Mead examines this evolution by turning once more to the ontogenetic devel-
opment of the child. He considers the development of the child from the "play"
to the "game" stage. However interesting these conceptions may be in terms of
the process of socialization, they primarily occur in the context of Mead's

discussion of the evolution of the human group and, consequently, must be
understood in those terms. In this sense, play is to be viewed as the incorporation
of the responses of individual members of the group apart from one another,
thereby constituting various independent 'me's', while the game is to be viewed
as the incorporation of the composite organized responses of all the other
members of the group, thereby resulting in the constitution of a generalized other
and an organized me. In playing a parent, teacher, or mailman, for example, the
child says something in one character and replies in another, and then replies
in the first character in a continual conversation such that "a certain organized
structure arises in him and in his other which replies to it, and these carryon
the conversation of gestures between themselves".J° In playing a game, the child
takes the positions of all the characters in the game in their relationships to one
another such that a unified organization arises between the others and his
position. "We get then an 'other' which is an organization of the attitudes ofthose
involved in the same process".3! That is, we get a generalized other and this
generalized other "gives to the individual his unity of self'.32
The development from the play to the game stage occurs through the child
simultaneously taking the attitudes of all the particular individuals acquired in
the play stage, and then organizing and generalizing them into group attitudes.
These social or group attitudes are brought within the individual's field of
direct experience ... and the individual arrives at them ... by means of further
organizing, and then generalizing, the attitudes of particular other individuals
in terms of their organized social bearings and implications. So the self
reaches its full development by organizing these individual attitudes of others
into the organized or group attitudes. 33
With respect to the evolution of the human group then, the constitution of the
organized me and the generalized other arises through a member taking the
attitudes of all the particular members of the group acquired in the third phase
of the evolution of the human group and then organizing and generalizing them
until the common unified organization of the entire group is reached.
e. The Creative Intersubjective Group
Now this evolution of the human group which has been outlined in four phases
Mead refers to in general as "the internalization in our experience of the external
conversation of gestures".34 Having developed a conversation of gestures which
is not totally determined by instincts, the constitution of the other as a social
object does consist of an internalization of one's response gestures and the
other's stimulus gestures involved in the external conversation of gestures, and
the constitution of oneself as a social object does consist of an internalization
of the other aspect of the external conversation of gestures, that is, one's stimulus
18 Chapter I
gestures and the other's response gestures. Furthermore, the constitution of the
organized me and the generalized other does consist of an internalization of the
organized external conversation of gestures of the entire group. However, insofar
as this internalization gives rise to new social objects, it is at the same time a
process of production and construction. In general, the evolution of the human
group could be said, then, to be a process which, in taking up an external
conversation of gestures in which they are embedded, humans produce an
internal conversation of gestures.
In this process of producing an internal conversation of gestures in which one
is conscious of others, the group, and oneself as social objects, there is an
internalization of the responses of others and the organized social group such
that through the vocal gesture, the individual can call out in himself the same
response which he calls out in others. For this reason, Mead refers to this internal
conversation of gestures as "significant". It is language proper.
The interaction between the members ofthe human group is then a significant
internal conversation of gestures. The actions of anyone member calls out the
same meaning in himself as in others. The effects of the action of a member of
the group on another member and the organization of the composite effects of
the actions of members upon one another enter into the experience of the
individual members. The perspectives of other members and the community of
perspectives lie within the particular perspectives of the members. In that the
community of perspectives lies within the perspectives of the members of the
human group and not outside of them, there is implied the existence of creative
individuals who can take up the common perspective of the group lying within
their perspectives and attempt to change it. "It is just the character of human
reflective experience... that the individual regards his own perspective from the
standpoint of others".35 "And mind or thinking is also - as possessed by the
individual members of human society - the means or mechanism or apparatus
whereby social reconstruction is effected or accomplished by these individu-
als".36 Let us examine this matter more closely.
The community of perspectives of the invertebrate and vertebrate groups lies
outside ofthe members' individual perspectives organizing them into a functional
unity. The members of these groups can only carry out the actions of their
particular perspective which is predetermined by a given organization of per-
spectives lying outside of their experience. In terms of their interaction, the
members are inextricably embedded in an external conversation of gestures
which is essentially automatic and played out in a more or less pregiven fashion.
The members of these groups are locked and irremediably bound to their
perspective insofar as they cannot grasp the community of perspectives.
In the human group, the community of perspectives lies within the perspective
of the member. The member's perspective is 'opened-out' to the perspectives of
others and the group from whose standpoint the member can reflexively turn
back, change the course of his action, and possibly bring about changes in the
group. In terms of their interaction, the members are involved in a significant
internal conversation of gestures in which the responses of others and the
Intersubjectivityas a Problem of the Social Group 19
organized group can be anticipated and, thus, one's own action can be reflexively
controlled and changed so as to possibly bring about a change in the group.37
Thus, the members of the human group attain a certain sort of independence
from the group. They are creative individuals.
In that the significant internal conversation of gestures of the human group
consists of a social aspect (i.e. the meaning or common responses to one's
actions) and a unique aspect (i.e. the action of an individual which can possibly
bring about a new situation), Mead refers to it as the "conversation of the I and
Me".38 The 'me' represents the objective self and the organization of the whole
group, while the 'I' represents the unique, creative, spontaneous aspect of the self.
In contrast with Mead's earlier work, such as "The Definition of the Psychical"
in which the question of intersubjectivity arose and in which he claimed that the
'I' is the immediate presence of oneself to oneself in the reconstructive activity
of a problem situation,39 Mead now claims, in his later work, which we have been
considering, that "the 'I' lies beyond the range of immediate experience"4o and
"comes in as a historical figure,,41 in memory as an objective 'me'. Having
examined the evolution of the human group out of the vertebrate group, Mead
realized that the claim that the 'I' is a pure presence of itself to itself is untenable
for it implies that the 'I' totally transcends the group and its evolution. Mead now
argues that the 'I' is an aspect of the evolution of the particular organization of
the human group depending upon that group not only for the possibility of its
appearance, but for its continual creative activity. "The individual, however
original and creative he may be in his thinking or behavior, always and necessari-
ly assumes a definite relation to, and reflects in the structure of his self or
personality, the general organized pattern of experience and activity exhibited in
or characterizing the social life process in which he is involved".42
It is now possible to provide a concise statement of the fundamental organi-
zation of the human social group. It will be recalled that the fundamental
organization of the social group of invertebrates was referred to as determinate
interobjectivity in the sense that the members' perspectives were absolutely deter-
mined by a tight complex community of perspectives lying outside ofthem.1t will
also be recalled that the fundamental organization of the social group ofverteb-
rates was referred to as indeterminate interobjectivity in the sense that the mem-
bers' perspectives were relatively undetermined by a loose simple community of
perspectives lying outside of them. The fundamental organization of the human
social group can now be said to be one of creative intersubjectivity in the sense that
the members' perspectives are occupied by creative individuals who can take up
the community of perspectives lying within their perspectives, possibly change
it so as to bring about new relations in the group, and yet continue to understand
one another. The crucial point which must be understood with regard to Mead's
analysis of intersubjectivity is that the intersubjectivity which obtains in the
unique organization of the human social group does not merely imply a common
set of taken for granted meanings, but also implies creative individuals who can
change those common meanings, bring about new relations between themselves,
and yet continue to understand one another. There can be no taken for granted
20 Chapter I
intersubjective social world without corresponding creative individuals who can

grasp it as intersubjective, change it, and continue to understand one another.
4. THE SOCIAL EVOLUTION OF THE CREATIVE INTERSUBJECTIVE GROUP
Thus far, the fundamental organization of the social group of invertebrates,

vertebrates, and, to the extent that is has evolved from the former, humans have
been considered with respect to the problem of intersubjectivity. Now Mead
claims that the intersubjective organization of the human group is first expressed
in a quite limited way in the first primitive human groups and he goes on to speak
of a further evolution of the human group in which it reaches a fuller expression.
One difference between primitive human society and civilized human society
is that in primitive human society the individual self is much more completely
determined, with regard to his thinking and his behavior .... In other words,
primitive human society offers much less scope for individuality - for original,
unique, or creative thinking... and indeed the evolution of civilized human
society from primitive human society has largely depended upon or resulted
from a progressive liberation of the individual self and his conduct. 43
Up until this point of his investigations, Mead has only considered the evo-
lution* of the intersubjective human group from the interobjective vertebrate
group. He now turns to a consideration of the social evolution of the intersubjec-
tive human group which depends upon the existence of creative individual selves.
There is nothing odd about a product of a given process contributing to, or

becoming an essential factor in, the further development of that process. The
social process, then, does not depend for its origin or initial existence upon
the existence and interaction of selves; though it depends upon the latter for
the higher stages of complexity and organization which it reaches after selves
have arisen within it.44
This social evolution of the human group is essentially the evolution of social
groups in which creative individuality, as an activity of reconstructing the social
group, becomes increasingly possible, encouraged, and understood by others
within the group. In short, it is the evolution of the human group in which
intersubjectivity progressively increases. While the evolution of the human group
is to be understood as the process by which the community of perspectives lying
* Mead's conception of evolution should in no way be confused with the Darwinian conception.
While Darwin emphasizes the environment as selecting the variants that survive under its changing
conditions, Mead emphasizes the form as selecting the environment, that is, the dependence of the
environment upon the form. More specifically, Mead stresses the social group's formation of its own
special environment and the organisms' developing capacities to consciously and reftectively create
their own environment in the social group.
outside of and determining the perspectives of the members is incorporated

within their perspectives thereby giving rise to creative individuals who can
change it, this social evolution of the human group is to be understood as the
process by which creative individuals change a restrictive community of perspec-
tives lying within their perspectives into a less restrictive community of perspec-
tives so as to allow for a fuller expression and understanding of creative individ-
uality in its activity of reconstructing the community of perspectives. Mead's
characterization ofthe significant internal conversation of gestures as having two
limit ends nicely portrays this social evolution. At one limit end of the conver-
sation of the 'I' and 'me', the 'me' presents the situation to which the 'I' responds
for the most part in a typical fashion bringing about little adjustment and
readjustment in the situation. "He is hardly more than a 'me' under such circum-
stances; his adjustments are only the slight adjustments that take place, as we
say, unconsciously".45 At the other limit end, the conversation is carried out in
full dialogical fashion. The 'me' presents the situation and the 'I' responds to that
'me' bringing about a change in that situation in thought to which the 'I' responds
again and so on leading to a provisional reconstruction of the 'me' or situation
in thought which can then be brought into the existing social situation as a
proposal for social change. 46
Unfortunately, Mead does not provide any extended descriptions of the
specific organizations of the various social groups involved in this social
evolution. 47 He essentially presents a somewhat vague overarching description
of the evolution of the primitive group up to modern society in which the
relationships within the human social group come to be so organized that one
can conceive of the actual possibility of a social group in which the fullest extent
of intersubjectivity, that is the fullest expression of creative individuality and its
fullest understanding by others, is realized.
a. The Development of the Primitive Group into Modern Society
Mead begins his analysis of the social evolution of the human group with a state
of affairs in which a primitive social group is situated in a social world composed
of other groups. Although Mead suggests that this original social group was the
family and speaks of its development into larger groups such as the clan and
tribal organizations,48 it is of primary importance to realize that the perspectives
of the members of this primitive social group contain a community of perspec-
tives only of their own group and this community of perspectives restricts the
expression of creative individuality. The generalized other extends only as far as
their own group and consists only of sedimented traditional types of characters
through which the individual can realize himself. "In primitive society... individ-
uality is constituted by the more or less perfect achievement of a given social
type".49 The significant internal conversation of gestures then is that of an 'I'
responding in a quite typical way to the 'me' bringing about little change in the
group.
22 Chapter I
Although the various social groups do not enter into the perspectives of the
other groups, they do interact with one another on the basis of an impulsive
relationship of hostility. 50 They have competing interests expressing themselves
in implusive, hostile attitudes toward one another. This impulsive relationship
of hostility leads the groups to emotionally organize themselves into a difference
of opposition and separation from one another. In times of actual threat and war,
the impulsive relationship of hostility leads even so far as to provide "principles
of increased social unity" emotionally intensifying and strengthening the sense
of organized social union in the group. The traditional character types, which
were the only means by which the individual could realize himself, are now
"broken down" as the individuals enter into an emotional sympathetic accord
with one another in fighting for the same cause. The 'I' is given the opportunity
for a self-expression previously not permitted by the traditional character types
and there is a feeling of 'at-oneness' with others in the group as the members all
partake in the same violence together against the other group. However, in this
very process through which the traditional character types are broken down,
thereby allowing for a fuller expression of the individual'!', that individuality is
lost in the emotional exhilaration of the feeling of oneness with others in the
group fighting against the other groUp.51 To develop a fuller expression of
intersubjectivity, it is not enough that the traditional types are broken down,
thereby leaving individual expression at the mercy of common emotional im-
pulses. The traditional character types must themselves be changed into new
character types in a new organization of the social group.
Now, insofar as the members of the primitive social group are creative
individuals, that is, insofar as the members of the group possess the capacity of
putting oneself in the place of others within their group through a significant
internal conversation of gestures which constitutes the language of that group,
there exists the possibility of their entering into the perspectives of other social
groups. 52 What is lacking is a set of common interests between the groups on
the basis of which co-operative activity can be carried out.
Mead searches through the history of the social evolution of modern society
for the most universal organizing forms of societies and finds them in the
fundamental attitudes of "kindliness" and "exchange" which respectively come
to be expressed in universal religious and universal economic processes. 53 These
fundamental attitudes occur even in hostile relationships providing the means by
which the groups can come together into relationships of co-operative activity.
They are attitudes which require one, in a very superficial way at first, to take
the attitude of the other, and are most likely to lead to a further, more involved,
taking the attitude of the other thereby possibly giving rise to a new, higher social
organization in which both groups are unified. "They are attitudes which can
transcend the limits of the different social groups organized about their own life
processes"54 and "may lead to a social organization which goes beyond the actual
structure in which individuals find themselves involved".55 Given the capacity of
putting oneself in the place of the other within one's own group, the simple act
of exchanging that which is oflittle value for that which is of more value to oneself
with another from another group may lead one to begin looking ahead and not
only to start producing what is of value to the other, but to setting up means of
transportation, elaborate media of exchange, banking systems, and so forth with
the other and his group. The simple kindly act of giving water to the thirsty or
helping the wounded from another group may lead to the missionary movements
of the great religions helping and assisting others over the world not only through
the faith, but through medical and technological knowledge, all of which leads
to a unifying of the groups into a larger social organization.
Individuals, in countless minor interactions, bring about and develop these
universal processes of economics and religion, usually without any awareness of
constructing new social organizations. 56 In their everyday activities, individuals
are not focused upon constructing new social organizations, but upon solving
various particular problems of conflict with others arising in their own ex-
perience. 57 As creative individuals, they solve these specific problems by a taking
of the attitude of the other, and by "turning back critically, as it were, upon the
organized social structure of society to which they belong and by modifying it
by that amount which is necessary for an integration of the conflicting attitudes
and the furtherance of their interaction with the other".58 However, in solving
countless specific problems of conflict with others from other social groups in and
through the universal processes of economics and religion, individuals do further
those processes and, at a general level of which they are unaware, do gradually
come to construct new social organizations. It is in this general process of
constructing new social organizations on the basis of the further development of
the universal economic and religious processes that the traditional character
types are broken down and new character types are formulated in which the 'I'
can further express itself and be understood by others. In exchanging goods and
then producing what is of value for the other, various conflicting perspectives are
integrated into a new functional organization in which the individual expresses
himself by fulfilling a new unique function-type in the group. 59 In helping and
assisting others in a religious movement, conflicting perspectives are superseded
in a new organization of equality in which the individual expresses himself by
fulfilling the new common character type of helping others and, thus, by becom-
ing one in the many in the society of the brotherhood of mankind. 60
Remembering that both the economic and religious processes further the
taking of the attitude of the other, it appears that the economic process, in leading
to the formation of social groups composed of unique function types, is more
self-centered, i.e. stresses the particularity of individual expression, while the reli-
gious process, in leading to the formation of common types, is more other-center-
ed, i.e. stresses the universality of individual expression. In any case, Mead
maintains that these two processes are themselves slowly being integrated into
a still incomplete democratic process whose first social organizations indicate
the actual possibility of a social organization which would provide "a higher
spiritual expression in which the individual realizes himself in others through that
which he does as peculiar to himself'.61
24 Chapter I
b. The Ideal Democratic Group of Creative Intersubjectivity
The ideal democratic group, which Mead is referring to above, would be compos-
ed of character types in which the individual could express himself in a unique
fashion bringing about change in the group which would be understood in
common by all other members. The creative individual would have been "carried
over into the social self"62 in the sense that the character type which it fulfills
would allow for the fullest freedom of individual expression which, in its very
particularity, would be universally understood by others. The internal significant
conversation of gestures would have evolved, then, from that of a creative
individual responding in a typical way to the 'me', bringing about little change
in the group, to that of a creative individual responding in a unique way to the
'me', bringing about unique changes in the group, which are understood and
appreciated in common by all other members. For Mead, "universal discourse
is ... the formal ideal of communication"63 and, insofar as the discourse of this
group consisted of creative individuals bringing about unique changes in the
group which are universally understood by the members, this discourse would
be the concrete ideal of communication.
The fundamental organization of this group could be said to be one of ideal
creative intersubjectivity in the sense that the members' perspectives are occupied
by creative individuals who can take up, and fully express themselves in, an open
community of perspectives which lies within their own perspectives, and encou-
rages that expression as well as the creative change in itself which that expression
brings about, and yet provides the means by which others can understand that
creative individual expression and change. In this organization the highest degree
of intersubjectivity would have been obtained in that the fullest expression of
creative individuality and its being understood by others would have been real-
ized.
Although, for Mead, modern civilized society seems to be approaching such
an ideal creative intersubjective organization, it has not yet attained it. To be
sure, he argues, there is a greater expression of creative individuality. "In civilized
society individuality ... tends to be something much more distinctive and singular
and peculiar than it is in primitive society".64 However, there is still lacking the
understanding and appreciation of this individuality by others. "We perhaps fail
to realize the unrecognized, unconscious pressure of the isolated individual in
modern society .... We have become bound up in a vast society, all of which is
essential to the existence of each one, but we are without the shared experience
which this should entail".65 "One has to find one's self in his own individual
creation as appreciated by others".66 The economic processes have grown to an
enormous extent providing a multitude of functions interrelated in a most intri-
cate fashion in terms of which creative individuality can express itself. However,
the religious processes, or more generally said, the processes of realizing oneself
in the many, wherein the commonality of all individuals is attained, have lagged
behind. One's creative individual expression is not understood in common by
others in modern society.
c. The Artistic and Scientific Groups
Mead primarily argues that the ideal of creative intersubjectivity is most ade-
quately attained in modern society in the realms of science and aesthetics. The
very nature of the member's activity in these realms consists of a continual
transformation of unique creative experiences into common experiences.
It is the work of the discoverer through his observations and through his
hypotheses and experiences to be continually transforming what is his own
private experience into a universal form. The same may be said of other fields,
as in the work of the great artist who takes his own emotions and gives them
a universal form so that others may enter into them. 67
Mead never examines in detail the activity of the artist nor does he ever
mention, except for the artistic field, what the "other fields", which are similar
to the scientific, may be. However, he devotes a considerable amount of his work
to the examination of the scientific field which shall be briefly considered.
The scientific group participates in and takes for granted the "common world"
of everyday experience and perception. However, interwoven in this unquestion-
ably valid "world that is there" of everyday experience are the presently accepted
doctrines of the scientific community. "The world that is there has taken up into
itself all the order, definition, and necessity of earlier scientific advance".68 The
justified "hypotheses", "analyzed relations, events and particles" of previous
scientific research "have passed into things, and for the time being at any rate,
they are there unanalyzed, with the same authority as that of so-called sensible
experience".69 Although Mead often emphasizes science's ultimate foundation in
the "common world" of everyday experience and its effect upon this world, it is
clear that insofar as this "common world" embodies the prevailing scientific
doctrines, there exists a unique scientific world for the scientific group.70 It could
be said that the immediate environment surrounding the scientists is a unique
scientific world and outside of that as a mediated environment surrounding the
scientists is the world of everyday life. Thus, Mead speaks of entering "the world
of the scientist by the process oflearning"71 and with respect to the freedom of
science claims that "it is, in a way, independent of the community, of the
community oflife".72 However, this scientific world,just as the world of everyday
life, is taken for granted as neither true nor false, but simply there. It is not
"known" by the scientists, which would require their having deliberately carried
out scientific research, but is accepted, unanalyzed, through the assimilation of
information from other scientists. 73
The scientific world which is commonly accepted by the scientists is never
called into question as a whole in scientific research for that would be to question
science in general and not to do scientific work. However, any aspect of this
scientific world is open to being called into question. It is expected that it will
be continuously interrogated and revised, and the individual scientist constantly
searches for problems in this commonly accepted world. "The research scientist
26 Chapter I
is looking for problems, and he feels happiest when he finds new ones".74 More
specifically, he continuously searches for an exception to the commonly held
views of the scientific group. When, through the scientist's own individual in-
genuity, an observed exception is found, the exception, as a contradiction of the
universally accepted scientific world, has no place in that world. It exists only
in the particular experience of the scientific investigator.75 The individual
scientist then attempts to develop a novel universal hypothetical solution to the
contradiction which reconstructs the scientific world to the extent that the
exception becomes an instance of that world. This universal hypothesis is then
tested in the immediate experience of the individual scientist by data abstracted
from the unproblematic scientific world, which,like all data, is shot through with
previously accepted scientific interpretations. If the hypothesis allows for the
scientific world view, as it has been reconstructed, to continue in this test
situation, the scientist proposes his universal hypothesis and the "process of
mind" by which it was reached to the scientific community.76 "He asks that his
view of the world be cogent and convincing to all those who have made his
thinking possible, and be an acceptable premise for the conduct of that society
to which he belongs"?7 If his thinking has adequately gone through the process
indicated above, his hypothesis is accepted by the community of scientists,
thereby becoming a part of a new taken for granted scientific world.
In finding an exception to the common scientific world, in formulating a
universal hypothesis that accounts for this particular exception, in testing the
universal hypothesis by theory-laden data in his particular immediate experience,
in presenting his unique research to the scientific community, and in having his
unique research accepted by the scientific community as a part of the common
taken for granted scientific world, the individual scientist realizes himself in full
particularity and in so doing realizes himself in the whole of the scientific group.
The individual scientist attains a freedom of creative individual expression
which, in its very uniqueness, is understood in common by other members of the
scientific group. In that the organization of the scientific group consists of
members who, as creative individuals, fully express themselves by taking up and
changing the common world view of the scientific group, and in so doing are
understood by other members of the group, the organization could be said to be
one that approaches the ideal of creative intersubjectivity.
NOTES
I. George Herbert Mead, "The Definition of the Psychical" (1903), in Selected Writings, ed. Andrew
J. Reck (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 25-51. Further references to this
volume will be hereafter cited as SW.
2. Ibid., pp. 45-59. There Mead claims, for example: "What I wish to insist upon is ... that the
statement of the rest of experience in terms of the conditions of the solution of the problem, the
gathering of data, does not give the positive touch of reconstruction which is involved in the
presentation of a hypothesis, however slight and vague it may be; that this step takes place within
the field of subjectivity, which insofar is neither me nor other, neither mind nor body" (Ibid., p.
52). He further states that: "But it is evident that, as the function of the world is to provide the
data for the solution, so it is the function of the individual to provide the hypothesis for the
solution. It is equally evident that it is not the individual as a 'me' that can perform this function.
Such an empirical self belongs to the world which it is the function ofthis phase of consciousness
to reconstruct" (Ibid., p. 53).
3. For example, see: George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, ed. Charles W. Morris (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1974), pp. 227-237; "The Genesis of the Self and Social Control"
(1924), SW, pp. 278-289; and "The Objective Reality of Perspectives" (1927), SW, pp. 312-315.
Further references to the above volume will be hereafter cited as MSS.
4. MSS, pp. 230-232; SW, p. 278; and SW, p. 313.
5. MSS, pp. 230-231.
6. MSS, pp. 55-56. For Mead's concept of a "conversation of gestures", see, for example, MSS, p.
14 and p. 63; "Social Psychology as Counterpart to Physiological Psychology" (1909), SW, p. 102
and pp. 109-111; and "Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning" (1910), SW, pp.
123-125.
7. "Especially in the complex social reactions of the ants or termites or the bees, the part of the act
of one form which does call out the appropriate reaction of another can hardly be conceived of
as arousing a like reaction in the form in question, for here the complex social act is dependent
upon physiological differentiation, such an unlikeness in structure exists that the same stimulus
could not call out like responses" ("The Genesis of the Self and Social Control", SW, p. 286).
Also see MSS, pp. 234-235.
8. The philosophical underpinnings of Mead's undeveloped theory of perspectives will not be
pursued here. That study would require an indepth analysis of the philosophies of Whitehead,
Leibniz, and Hegel, which would take us too far afield from our present theme. For a careful
examination of the relationship between Whitehead's and Mead's theory of perspectives, see
Gary A. Cook, "Whitehead's Influence on the Thought ofG. H. Mead", Charles S. Peirce Society
Transactions, 15, No.2 (Spring 1979), 107-131. Mead's attempt to develop his incomplete theory
of perspectives into a theory of the constitution of the concepts of 'time', 'space' and 'thing', in
order to clarifY the relationship between natural science and unreflective perceptual experience,
will also not be considered here due to the lack of references in that discussion to his theory of
the social group and the social realm in general which is our present concern. Mead did not extend
this particular analysis of perspectives to his previous theory of society, although he no doubt
intended to do so at some future point. See George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, ed.
Charles W. Morris (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972). Further references to this
volume will be hereafter cited as PA. For an interesting attempt to work out this discussion by
Mead along social lines, see Hans Joas, Praktische Intersubjektivitat: Die Entwicklung des Werkes
von G. H. Mead (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980), pp. 143-193. Also, in this regard,
see Natanson's careful and insightful study on Mead, Maurice Natanson, The Social Dynamics
of George H. Mead (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973). In the following, Mead's theory of
perspectives will be considered solely in relation to his theory of the social group and social
relationships as developed primarily in his only self-published works on the theory of perspec-
tives: "The Genesis of the Self and Social Control", SW, pp. 267-293 and "The Objective Reality
of Perspectives", SW, pp. 306-319. Referring to the relationship between the theory of per spec-
tives and the social group, Mead states in "The Objective Reality of Perspectives" that "it is the
relation of the individual perspective to the common perspective that is of importance. To the biologist
there is a common environment of an anthill or beehive, which is rendered possible by the
intricate social relationships of the ants and bees. It is entirely improbable that this perspective exists
in the perspectives of individual ants or bees for there is no evidence of communication" (SW, p.
312, my emphasis). It is clear from this passage that, with respect to social groups, it is the
relationship between the individual perspective and the common perspective which is of impor-
tance, that is whether or not the common perspective of the group lies within the individuals'
perspectives. In the case of ants and bees, the common perspective does not lie within their
individual perspectives for there is no evidence of communication. More specifically, they lack
the second requirement for such a relationship. "The community of different perspectives does
28 Chapter I
not immediately enter into the separate perspectives. This entrance implies, first, that the
fulfIllment of the process of one perspective is dependent upon the community of action within
the common field and, second, that the individual organism involved in one activity tends to carry
out the other activities belonging to the common action and so enters into their perspectives"
(PA, pp. 607-608). Once this second requirement has been fulfilled implying the entering of the
community of perspectives into the individual perspectives and the development of communi-
cation, which, as we shall see, occurs only in the case of human beings, the important question,
with respect to the theory of perspectives and the social group, will then concern the extent to
which individuals can reconstruct the community of perspectives lying within their own perspec-
tives. Mead also interprets this later development of the social group as an aspect of the creative
advance of nature. "What I am suggesting is that this process, in which a perspective ceases to
be objective, becomes if you like subjective, and in which new common minds and new common
perspectives arise, is an instance of the organization of perspectives in nature, of the creative
advance of nature" ("The Objective Reality of Perspectives", SW, p. 316). In the following, Mead's
term "community of perspectives" has been chosen over his more frequently used term "common
perspective" since it appears to be more extensive, covering not only an organization of perspectives
lying within the individual perspectives, as the term "common perspective" suggests, but an organi-
zation of perspectives lying outside ofthe individual perspectives. That the community of perspectives
of the insects is a tight complex organization, see, for example: MSS, pp. 239-240.
9. For example, see MSS, pp. 238-244 and "The Genesis of the Self and Social Control", SW, pp.
278-289.
10. MSS, p. 238 and "The Genesis of the Self and Social Control", SW, p. 279.
11. For example, see MSS, pp. 234-235 and pp. 238-239, and 'The Mechanism of Social Conscious-
ness" (1912), SW, pp. 139-140.
12. That the community of perspectives of the invertebrates is a loose simple organization, see, for
example: MSS, pp. 239-240.
13. For example, see MSS, p. 244 and p. 235.
14. For example, see 'The Psychology of Punitive Justice" (1917-18), SW, pp. 212-215; "Social
Psychology as Counterpart to Physiological Psychology", SW, pp. 94-98; and "What Social
Objects Must Psychology Presuppose" (1909), SW, p. 108.
15. "Social Psychology as Counterpart to Physiological Psychology", SW, p. 98.
16. "What Social Objects Must Psychology Presuppose", SW, p. 110.
17. "Concerning Animal Perception" (1907), SW, p. 79.
18. "What Social Objects Must Psychology Presuppose", SW, pp. 112-113.
19. Ibid., p. 113, my emphasis. Also see, for example, PA, pp. 311, 328, 385, and 428-429.
20. "The Mechanism of Social Consciousness", SW, p. 136.
21. "The implication of an organized group of social instincts is the implicit presence in undeveloped
human consciousness of both the matter and the form of a social object" ("Social Psychology as
Counterpart to Physiological Psychology", SW, p. 94).
22. "Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning", SW, p. 125.
23. Ibid., p. 129.
24. Ibid., p. 131.
25. 'The Mechanism of Social Consciousness", SW, pp. 137-141.
26. Ibid., p. 137.
27. Ibid., p. 139.
28. 'The Social Self' (1913), SW, p. 146.
30. MSS, p. 151.
31. MSS, p. 154.
32. Ibid.
33. MSS, p. 158.
34. MSS, p. 47. Also see, for example, MSS, pp. 92, 178, and 186.
35. PA, p. 202.
36. MSS, p. 308.
37. MSS, p. 187.

38. MSS, p. 179.
39. For example, Mead writes there: "If the psychical in this sense exist at all, there must be states
of consciousness in which what is peculiar to the individual and a moment of his existence finds
its meaning in these very peculiarities .... They must be deprived of their reference to anything
beyond, else they would not be peculiar to the individual and the moment; for if the momentary
refer to that which transcends it, its presence is no longer coincident with its meaning" (SW, p.
36). "The discussion so far has considered the immediate characteristic of the psychical. The
other element in the definition is its identification with the experience of the individual qua
individual" (SW, p. 46).
41. MSS, p. 174.
42. MSS, p. 222.
43. MSS, p. 221.
44. MSS, p. 226.
45. MSS, p. 200.
46. MSS, pp. 197·200.
47. For an account of this evolution in terms of the development of science in which Mead briefly
refers to the organization of thought in ancient, medieval and modem societies, see, for example,
"Scientific Method and Individual Thinker" (1927), SW, pp. 171·211. For an account of this
evolution in terms of the development of philosophy from the Renaissance period in which Mead
broadly refers to the organizations of various nineteenth century societies, see George Herbert
Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, ed. Merritt H. Moore (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1972). Further references to this volume will be hereafter cited as
MT. Mead's account of this evolution in terms of the development of society with which we are
concerned is to be found primarily in MSS, pp. 245·328.
48. MSS, p. 229.
49. MSS, p. 221.
50. The claim that the original social groups stood in a relationship of hostility, along with the
following account of the breakdown of traditional organizations and the increased sense of social
unity arising on the basis of hostility in times of threat and war are abstracted from various
passages in Mead's work. See, for example: MSS, pp. 207·209, 218·222, 257·258, 273, 275,
284·286, and 303·307; "The Psychology of Punitive Justice", SW, pp. 212·239; and "National·
Mindedness and International Mindedness" (1929), SW, pp. 355·370.
51. For example, in "National·Mindedness and International Mindedness", Mead writes: "The
hostile impulse unites us against the common enemy, because it has force enough to break down
customary social textures. But it was this social structure by which we realized ourselves. Our
rights and our privileges, our distinctions of capacity and skill, our superiorities and our inferiori·
ties, our social positions and prestige, our manners and our foibles not only distinguish and
separate us from others, but they constitute us what we are to ourselves. They constitute our
individualities ... when we thank God that we are not as other men are .... If these are in any degree
broken down we are no longer the same individuals that we were. To join ourselves with others
in the common assault upon the common foe we have become more than allies, we have joined
a clan... and have the exuberantfeeling of being at one with this community" (SW, pp. 356·357, my
emphasis). For Mead, this is a unity arising from the "identity of common impulses" in which
individual expression is lost.
52. Mead maintains that this is a condition for the development of the universal processes of
economics and religion mentioned below. For example, see MSS, pp. 297 and 259·260.
53. MSS, pp. 257·260.
54. MSS, p. 259.
55. MSS, p. 290.
56. MSS, p. 297.
30 Chapter I
57. It should be mentioned here that in more highly developed and organized societies Mead
maintains that conflicts arise not only with others but between different aspects of one's Self, each
belonging to conflicting groups. MSS, pp. 306-308.
58. MSS, p. 308.
59. See, for example, MSS, pp. 281-289.
60. Ibid.
61. MSS, p. 289, my emphasis. Also see MSS, pp. 317-328.
62. MSS, p. 324.
63. MSS, p. 327.
64. MSS, pp. 221-222.
65. "The Nature of Aesthetic Experience" (1925-26), SW, p. 301.
66. MSS, p. 324. Also see p. 325.
67. MSS, p. 41, n. 21.
68. PA, p. 49.
69. Ibid., my emphasis.
70. Thus, Mead speaks of various historical scientific worlds such as "the world of Daltonian atoms
and electricity", "Aristotelian science", the "Mesopotamian soothsayer", the "Greek astronom-
er", and the "modern Copernican astronomer". See PA, pp. 60-61.
71. PA, p. 50.
n. MT, p. 360.
73. PA, pp. 50-62.
74. MT, p. 265.
75. For Mead's account of the location of the observed exception in individual experience and for
his account of the conduct of the scientist of which an extremely concise presentation is given
in the following, see "Scientific Method and Individual Thinker", SW, pp. 171-211; PA, pp.
26-264; MT, pp. 264-291 and 360-385; and George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of the Present,
ed. Arthur E. Murphy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980). All further references
to this volume will be hereafter cited as PP.
76. PA, pp. 82-84, especially p. 84.
77. "Scientific Method and Individual Thinker", SW, p. 201.
CHAPTER II
Critical Remarks to Mead's Theory of Intersubjectivity
1. PRACTICAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND THE SOCIAL GROUP OF

CREATIVE INTER SUBJECTIVITY
No doubt, in the presentation of Mead's conception of intersubjectivity which

has been given above, it is obvious that many of the themes connected with the
pragmatic strain of his work have not been explicitly taken up for analysis and
belabored. Among other viewpoints, Mead did appropriate the pragmatic and
it is one which does stretch throughout much of his life work. Hans Joas has
devoted an excellent study to this particular aspect of Mead's work, in relation-
ship to the problem of intersubjectivity, and has made the first attempts to work
out a notion of what he has aptly termed ''praktische Intersubjektivitiit".! However,
Mead's work went well beyond the pragmatic viewpoint as is evident in the
following passages.
The world that rewards or defeats us, that entices or repels us, our remuner-
ations and frustrations, our delights and distresses, what is significant and
worthy of our effort, the beauty, the glory, and the dream, cannot be formulat-
ed in the language of exact science?
This break between the definition of the things that constitute the means and
the ends and values which they embody is not confined to the description of
physical instruments and their uses, for it bisects the field of the social sciences
as well. It has made economics the dismal science. It has mechanized and
anatomized psychology. It has made ethics utilitarian, and aesthetics an affair
of esoteric formulae. 3
It becomes ... the office of philosophy to present an unfractured universe,

qualified as well as quantified, together with all its meanings, and overcome
the bifurcation of nature that arose from the methods of scientific measure-
ment and philosophic dogma. 4
31
32 Chapter II
Contrary to the fundamental tenets of the pragmatic viewpoint, Mead argues

here against the break between means and ends, and points out the inadequacy
of the language of exact science, which presupposes such a separation, for
expressing that which is most significant and worthy in life: beauty, glory, and
the dream. He claims that it is the very task of philosophy to overcome this break,
this "metaphysical opposition", and to present an unfractured world. Mead's own
work was in the end an attempt to carry out this most difficult task.
It is precisely such aspects of Mead's work which go well beyond the pragmat-
ic viewpoint that have been pursued in the previous chapter with respect to the
problem of intersubjectivity. It is maintained, then, here and in the above, that
Mead's essential contribution to the problem of intersubjectivity to an extent
transcends, and lies much deeper than, the pragmatic aspects of his work. In his
insightful discussion of the most fundamental question to be found in Mead's
work, John Dewey unwittingly points the way to this deeper problem of intersub-
jectivity.
When I first came to know Mr. Mead, well over forty years ago, the dominant
problem in his mind concerned the nature of consciousness as personal and
private. In the 'eighties and nineties', idealism prevailed in Anglo-American
thought.. .. Mind as consciousness was at once the very stuff of the universe
and the structural forms ofthis stuff; human consciousness in its intimate and
seemingly exclusively personal aspect was at most but a variant, faithful or
errant, of the universal mind .... Even ifit were true and were accepted as such,
it did not explain how states of mind peculiar to an individual... which deny
objectivity to things that have been universally accepted as real objects, can
function as sources of objects which instead of being merely "subjective",
belong to the common and objective universe .... I fancy that if one had a
sufficiently consecutive knowledge of Mr. Mead's intellectual biography dur-
ing the intervening years, one could discover how practically all of his inquiries
and problems developed out of his original haunting question. 5
Mead's "original haunting question" was concerned with the creative nature
of individual consciousness: how individual consciousness uniquely denies the
world universally accepted as objective and gives rise to a new world which is
then held in common as objectively valid. This most fundamental question in
Mead's work arises no less than out of the tradition of Absolute Idealism and
its failure to adequately account for the creative nature of individual conscious-
ness. "The grandiose undertaking of Absolute Idealism to bring the whole of
reality within experience failed. It failed because it left the perspective of the finite
ego hopelessly infected with subjectivity and consequently unreal.... It recognized
the two dominant forces of modern life, the creative individual and creative
science, only to abrogate them as falsifications of the experience of the absolute
ego".6
Mead's fundamental concern with how individual consciousness creatively
denies a universally accepted objective world and gives rise to a new universally
Critical Remarks to Mead's Theory of Intersubjectivity 33
accepted objective world is essentially a concern with the problem ofintersubjec-

tivity. It is a concern with the relationship between the commonly accepted
objective social world and the creative individual consciousness which stands
over and against it, and reconstructs it.
2. MEAD'S CONCEPTION OF THE SOCIAL GROUP AND ITS LIMITATIONS
It has been seen that Mead attempted to work out the problem ofintersubjectivi-
ty, the relationship between creative individual consciousness and the social
world, in terms of the organization of the social group. This was Mead's major
insight into the problem of intersubjectivity. He considered intersubjectivity as
a problem concerning the organization of the social group. Mead's other signifi-
cant insights into the problem of inter subjectivity such as the notion of creative
intersubjectivity, the self, and the distinction between interobjectivity and inter-
subjectivity were themselves arrived at only upon the basis of this first fundamen-
tal insight. It has been seen, for example, that Mead conceives of creative
intersubjectivity in terms of a particular organization of the social group, the self
as arising only in a particular organization of the social group, and the distinction
between interobjectivity and intersubjectivity in terms of two different organi-
zations of the social group.
It is important to realize that, as a manner of dealing with the complex
problem of inter subjectivity, Mead's notion of the social group is a foundational
conception which is not to be confused with the more superficial conceptions of
the social group which have been developed upon the basis of his work. Mead's
notion of the social group lies in that undeveloped and obscure realm between
philosophy and sociology in which the social limits of philosophy and the philoso-
phical foundations of sociology are adumbrated. With respect to philosophy,
Mead's notion of the group is meant to be an internal limit to the project of total
reflection in the sense of arising as a limit in the very act of reflection itselffrom
which reflection cannot extricate itself. "We may wipe the alteri out of existence
and reduce our social world to our individual selves, regarding the others as
constructions of our own, but we can only do it to some other audience".7 With
respect to sociology, the notion of the social group is meant to be a foundational
clarification of sociology itself. "Sociologists have no adequate social psychology
with which to interpret their own science. The modern sociologists neither abjure
psychology with Comte, nor determine what the value of the social character of
human consciousness is for the psychology which they attempt to use".8
Although Mead's major insight concerning the fact that the problem of inter-
sUbjectivity must be approached as a problem of the social group is significant
and should in no way be underestimated, the conception of the social group
which he develops is flawed in a number of respects. First, Mead construes a
number of social groups as interobjective which are in fact intersubjective. He
claims that playing a game of tennis, boxing, fencing, moving in a crowd, and the
taking of an advertising bill thrust into our hand are all interobjective situations,
34 Chapter II
more specifically, external non-significant conversations of gestures. 9 He writes

with respect to boxing and fencing, for example, that "this is the same situation
as in the dog-fight. If the individual is successful a great deal of his attack and
defense must not be considered, it must take place immediately. He must adjust
himself'instinctively'to the attitude of the other individual".l0 There is, as Mead
would claim, no explicit taking of the attitude of the other in these situations.
However, that does not imply that they are external non-significant conver-
sations of gestures of stimulus and response reactions carried out instinctively
without a common meaning as is the case with a dog fight. In playing tennis,
boxing, or fencing both members know whether they are playing a practice game,
a friendly game, or a professional tournament. They also know the score, the time
left in the game, and the intensity of the game. One even senses the weak point
in the other's game, and the other senses that one has sensed it and tries to
compensate, whereupon one sensitively searches for the new weakness opened
up. In moving in a crowd, the members know whether they are in a crowd on
a busy street, at a demonstration, at a sports event, at the opera, at a parade,
a religious ceremony, a national celebration, or a funeral. They interact different-
ly with each other in each case and that holds even in the mere passing and
side-stepping of each other. Finally, in the taking of an advertising bill thrust into
my hand, I know, as does the giver, that this is a situation of normal everyday
solicitation in which we need not greet each other, converse with each other, or
even exchange glances. We know that we must only carry out the routine
interaction of "a handing out of and accepting of' an advertising bill. Although
one does not explicitly take the attitude of the other in these situations and
determine what the other is thinking, they are all, nevertheless, highly meaningful
and intersubjective.
Second, Mead maintains that in the intersubjective group the members expli-
citly take the attitudes of all the others in the group in their relationship to one
another. It has been seen that Mead maintains that in the intersubjective group
the members' perspectives explicitly contain the perspectives of others and the
community of perspectives of the group. More specifically, it has been seen that
the constitution of the other is a rendering explicit of his implicit presence and
a taking of his attitude, that the constitution of the "generalized other" is a
process of organizing and generalizing the attitudes of all the particular individu-
als, and that one of the primary characteristics of the intersubjective group is that
the members obtain the standpoint of the other and the group from which they
reflexively turn back to control the course of their action and possibly bring about
social change.
Throughout this work, there has been a careful attempt to avoid Mead's often
cited phrase "taking the role of the other" for Mead himself claims that it is "a
little unfortunate because it suggests an actor's attitude which is actually more
sophisticated than that which is involved in our own experience. To this degree
it does not correctly describe that which I have in mind"Y Nevertheless, his
claim that we explicitly take the attitudes or point of view of others in their
relationship to one another in the intersubjective group still implies a more
sophisticated activity than that which often occurs in our experience in intersub-
jective groups. Mead often, and quite conveniently, chooses a highly ordered and
rationalized social group to illustrate his point in this regard - a team playing
baseball.
The child ... must assume the various roles ofall the participants in the game, and
govern his action accordingly. If he plays first base, it is as the one to whom
the ball will be thrown from the field or from the catcher. 12
Each one of his own acts is determined by his assumption ofthe action ofthe others
who are playing the game. What he does is controlled by his being everyone else
on that team, at least in so far as those attitudes affect his own particular
response. We get an "other" which is an organization of the attitudes of those
involved in the same process. 13
It is doubtful that in the actual playing of a baseball game one explicitly

assumes the different positions of everyone else on the team and thinks about
their relationships to one another as Mead claims. It is doubtful, for example,
that, in my actual playing of first base, I intentionally assume the positions of the
various infielders, outfielders and catcher, and think about the possibility of their
throwing the ball to me. Such an explicit taking of the attitudes of others, and
deliberation over positions and the logic of the game is confined to reflective
activities in which one is no longer playing, but thinking of new strategies, plays,
or giving an account of the game to others. In the actual playing, I must act
spontaneously and quickly without stopping to deliberate over what the other in
his position is likely to do. I must move quickly, with the "flow of the play",
implicitly sensing the whole intricate movement of the entire team. In the split-
second reactions of an infield play, any pause to take the attitude of the other
in order to consider the possibility or probability of his throwing the ball to me,
according to the logic of the game, would surely lead to my being caught off
balance and dropping the ball. In our actual experience in intersubjective groups,
as long as the interaction is running smoothly, there is often no explicit taking
of the attitudes of others and consideration of their relationship to one another.
Rather, there is an implicit taken for granted sensing of the texture of the entire
group interaction in which I myself am involved.
Third, Mead maintains that the intersubjective social group is essentially
non-emotional. Nowhere in our analysis of Mead's account have emotions been
seen to be a significant aspect of the intersubjective group. In fact, Mead claims
that emotions are essentially non-intersubjective. "In most of it [our speech] we
do not deliberately feel the emotions which we arouse .... The emotional part of
our act does not directly call out in us the response it calls out in the other" .14
Moreover, he claims that the very structure of the self and, thus, one can
conclude, the structure of the intersubjective group is cognitive and non-
emotional. "Self-consciousness, rather than affective experience ... provides the
36 Chapter II
core and primary structure of the self, which is thus essentially a cognitive rather
than an emotional phenomenon".15
Contrary to Mead's contention that emotions are essentially non-intersubjec-
tive, in our everyday experience, we do actually sense the emotions which we
arouse in others. In our anger, we do know if we are arousing fear, sorrow,
resentment, or anger on the part of the other, and that knowledge does have an
impact on our own anger leading to its escalation or subsidence. At the height
of our anger, it is often only the knowledge of the genuine remorse aroused in
the other which leads to a diminishing of our anger. Mead's further claim that
the structure of the self, and therefore of the intersubjective group, is essentially
cognitive and non-emotional also appears to be untenable. Take the example of
the family in which the self of a child arises. Is not the self of the child also
constituted through the emotions of the family? Freud and, more recently, Bosch
have sufficiently demonstrated that the constitution of the child's self does in fact
depend upon the emotions of the family members. 16 Furthermore, it is clear that
the intersubjective organization ofthe family group is essentially emotional. Take
Scheler's example of the mother and father standing over the dead body of the
beloved childP The tragedy concerns the family as a group itself. It is not the
case that one member first feels sorrow and then tries to communicate it to the
other, or even that one member somehow comes to feel sorrow with the other.
The mother and father feel the grief together as members of the family and the
griefis an essential aspect of their very relationship with each other in the family.
It suffices for now to have shown that we do intersubjectively communicate
our emotions and that at least in one intersubjective group, the family, emotions
are an essential aspect of the very organization of the group itself. The fact that
emotions are an essential aspect of the structure of all groups and of the social
group in general will be examined later.
Fourth, Mead construes the organization of the social group as essentially a
formal logical relationship between the particular and the universal. It has been
seen that Mead distinguishes the interobjective social group from the intersub-
jective social group in the sense that in the intersubjective social group the
members contain the community of perspectives within their own particular
perspective thereby implying creative individuals who can change that com-
munity of perspectives. In other words, unlike the interobjective social group in
which the universal whole of the social group lies outside of, and to an extent,
determines the particular perspective of the member, in the intersubjective social
group the universal whole of the group lies within the particular perspective of
the member and thereby implies particular individuals who can change that
universal whole. It has also been seen that the social evolution of the human
group consists of an increasing particularity of individual expression which in its
very particularity becomes ever more universally understood by others in the
group. Finally, it has been seen that the scientific group, which represents the
highest attainment of this social evolution, consists of individuals who first, find
particular exceptions to the universally accepted scientific world view of the
group; second, develop particular universal hypotheses which reconstruct the
universally accepted scientific world view of the group such that the particular
expression becomes an instance of the universally accepted world; third, test the
universal hypotheses in their immediate particular experience; and fourth,
present their particular research to the scientific community which, insofar as it
is accepted, then becomes a part of the universally accepted scientific world view
of the group.
This presentation of the organization of the social group in terms of a formal
logical relationship between the particular and the universal is a presentation of
a formalistic logic of the social group which abstracts from the concrete phe-
nomenal character of the group itself. The focus is upon the individual as a
particular and the group as a universal, and the relationship between them is
viewed, in general, as either positive in which case the particular is an instance
of the universal, negative in which case the particular is a contradiction of the
universal, or creative in which case the particular gives rise to a new universal.
There is no attempt to describe the group itself as a phenomenon, but rather to
argue demonstrably that the group and its members accord with a certain logical
pattern. The actual, specific, complex fabric of relationships in the group is
abstracted from, and subsumed under a rigid order of limited formal possible
relationships between a particular and the whole. The intricate coherency and
'hanging together' of the concrete living tissue of the social group is, without
examination, immediately forced into the formal rational structures of a particu-
lar standing apart from, or in union with a universal. Thus, for example, the
concrete processes by which an individual arrives at a new problem and a new
idea for its solution with others there in the social group, and the concrete
processes by which others accept the new idea with the individual there in the
social group is not considered. It is enough to have argued that the obtainment
of new problems and ideas approaches the limit of the particular over against
the universal, and the acceptance of new ideas approaches the limit of the
universal. In abstracting from the intricate configuration of relationships in the
social group and subsuming them under a rigid logic of possible relationships,
the construal of the organization of the social group as a formal relationship
between the particular and the universal is in essence a systemic interpretation
of the social group which, although other types of logic are employed, reaches
an extreme in systems theory, cybernetics, and exchange theory, all of which are
a type ofmathematization of the social group. Although he allows for the creative
emergent character of individual consciousness, Mead's critique of Hegel that "it
is the fathomless wealth ofthe perceptual present that was veiled to Hegel's eyes"
turns back upon himself insofar as he too, in the final analysis, ends up formalisti-
cally systematizing the phenomena of lived experience. IS
38 Chapter II
3. THE RATIONAL CHARACTER OF MEAD'S CONCEPTION OF THE SOCIAL

GROUP, ITS INTER SUBJECTIVE PRESUPPOSITIONS, AND REQUIRED RE-
VISIONS
Mead's construing a number of social groups as interobjective insofar as there

is no explicit taking of the attitude of the other, his maintaining that in the
intersubjective social group there is always an explicit taking the attitude of the
other, his maintaining that the intersubjective group is essentially non-emotional
and cognitive, and his construing of the organization of the social group as
essentially a formal logical relationship between the particular and the universal
all indicate his characterization of the intersubjective social group as highly
rational. However, as has been seen in the critique of Mead's conception of the
social group presented above, the intersubjective social group does not entirely
consist of such a rational character. In the intersubjective social group, there is
often no explicit taking of the attitude of the other in understanding this other,
there are emotions, and there is a texture of relationships which is destroyed
when they are subsumed under a logic of the particular and universal.
Mead's characterization of the intersubjective social group as highly rational
arises from the particular problem of intersubjectivity which he was attempting
to work out. Mead's problem of intersubjectivity concerns, as has been repeated-
ly emphasized, the relationship between creative individual consciousness and
the social world in which the empirical self is itself embedded such that intersub-
jectivity comes to be viewed as the extent to which creative individual conscious-
ness is possible, encouraged, and understood by others in that world. In attempt-
ing to characterize the intersubjective social group, Mead is concerned then with
showing how a particular organization of the group provides for the possibility
of creative individual consciousness, and its fuller expression and understanding
by others. In that the organization of this group is to provide for the possibility
of creative individual consciousness and creative understanding, it is not surpris-
ing that Mead is led to characterize it as essentially rational. However, this
problem of intersubjectivity which is concerned with creative individual con-
sciousness, its reconstructive activity, and its understanding by others presup-
poses a more primordial intersubjectivity obtaining in the social group. The
problem of intersubjectivity which throws into question this more primordial
intersubjectivity asks not about creative individuals and creative understanding,
but rather about the way that intersubjectivity is experienced as a primordial
lived conviction in everyday life. That is, it asks about our taken for granted
experiential knowledge of others as fellow human beings; about the foundational
experiential givenness of other living and conscious social beings. An attempt to
work out this deeper problem of intersubjectivity would lead to a very different
characterization of the intersubjective social group.
It could be said that in between the interobjective social group which Mead
characterizes as involving no taking of the attitude of the other and the intersub-
jective social group which he characterizes as involving an explicit taking of the
attitude of the other, there lies a primordial intersubjective realm which has not
been examined. This intersubjective realm has to do with a taken for granted
experiential 'knowledge' of others which does not involve an explicit taking ofthe
attitudes of others and certainly not of creative individuals. It is the realm of our
proto-awareness of others as such. 19
It is suggested that Mead's work on the problem of intersubjectivity and his
characterization of the social group can be fruitfully reinterpreted as an exami-
nation of a particular aspect of the intersubjective group, namely, the rational
and reflective aspect which has to do with formulating and carrying out projects
of action. However, before this interpretation can be properly executed and
developed, it is first necessary to examine this more primordial problem of
intersubjectivity just raised in terms of the organization of the social group. In
this regard, four fundamental changes in Mead's approach to and conception of
the social group must be made if the notion of the group is to continue to serve
as our clue for the working out of the problem of intersubjectivity.
First, the social group must be descriptively considered with respect to the
meaning which it has for the actors involved within it. That is, the social group
must be examined as it appears in the experience of the actors engaged within
the group. As has been seen, for Mead, 'meaning' is the response gesture to a
stimulus gesture which calls it out in a conversation of gestures, and conscious-
ness of meaning is an internalization of this conversation of gestures such that
through the vocal gesture the individual calls out in himself the same response
which he calls out in others. In other words, meaning is already pre-given in an
external unconscious conversation of gestures, and consciousness of meaning
arises through an internalization of that situation. New meanings are created
through the individuals' rendering problematic the universal commonly held
meanings of the social group and constructing new meanings which come to be
universally held in common by the group.
Mead's claim that meaning is pre-given in nature apart from the conscious
experience of social actors is highly dubious insofar as the claim can only be made
by a social actor always already conscious of that meaning such as the reflecting
theorist in this case. His claim that consciousness of meaning is an internali-
zation by individuals of this pre-given meaning of the external conversation of
gestures and that new meaning is created through individuals rendering proble-
matic universal meanings and constructing new meanings which come to be held
as universal by the group is a consideration of meaning in terms of a formalistic
logical relationship between the particular and universal. Unless the meaning of
the social group as it appears in the actor's experience is examined, the notion
of the social group will remain a conceptual abstraction detached from the group
as it is lived in everyday life. As such, it could not serve as an adequate guide
for the examination and clarification of the phenomenon of intersubjectivity
itself.
Second, and along these same lines, the very conception of an interobjective
social group must be relinquished. Insofar as the members in such a group neither
know nor consider themselves to be in a group, the interobjective social group
is a group only for the reflecting theorist. In reality, there is no group at all and
40 Chapter II
the reflecting theorist, relying upon natural scientific conceptions, is to be un-

derstood here as having simply developed and then posited an abstract con-
ception of the social group into nature, while, thereafter, assuming and acting as
if it were a given aspect of nature itself and not the product of his own scientific
imagination. Furthermore, the conceptions of interobjective and social group are
themselves in essence a contradiction of terms. Interobjective refers to an organi-
zation in which there is no experiencing subject, while social group, at least in
any common understanding and meaningful usage of the term, always presup-
poses and carries a reference to such experiencing subjects. Finally, the concept
of interobjectivity itself can, in any reasonable and proper sense, only be employ-
ed and understood as founded upon intersubjectivity and not the reverse. Only
through first intersubjectively understanding others do we produce and construct
what we then together consider to be the 'objective' meaningful world.
Third, reflexivity must be considered as located also within the taken for
granted configurations ofmeaning of the social group. Mead's claim that reflexiv-
ity is essentially located solely in the process by which a subject explicitly takes
the attitudes of other individuals and the social group in general has been seen
not to totally accord with our experience in the intersubjective group. We carry
out our routine everyday activities and interactions totally geared into the si-
tuation and with an implicit taken for granted understanding of their meaning
and of the situation itself such that, without any explicit taking of their attitudes,
I obtain a reflexive understanding of all others in the situation. Here, all others
obtain a meaning in simply being encountered in or being related to the taken
for granted already meaningful situation without any active reflective work or
reviewing of the situation on my part.
Fourth, the evolution of the social group must be considered as multi-
dimensional. Mead presents the evolution of the social group as unilinear. He
maintains that the human group evolves from an interobjective group in which
there are no creative individuals into an intersubjective group in which there are
creative individuals, and, from there, evolves into increasingly intersubjective
groups in which creative individuality reaches a fuller expression and under-
standing by others.
Of course, Mead does argue against both causal and teleological conceptions
of the evolution of the human group leaving the development unguaranteed and
contingent upon the activities of individuals. 20 Furthermore, he argues against
the formulation of all final specific social ideals claiming that they are dogmatic
and emphasizes the necessity of continually reconstructing all specific ideals. His
viewpoint is most succinctly stated in his often repeated phrase "we don't know
where we are going, but we know we are on the way".21 Mead is essentially
claiming here that we do not have any specific idea, and for the matter, ideal of
where the evolution of the social group is going, but we do have a vague idea or
ideal that we are on the way. Although Mead argues, then, against the formu-
lation of final specific ideals, he does admit the formulation of a vague final ideal.
This ideal would be such that all specific ideals could be regarded as temporary
and open to reconstruction from within it. Mead explicitly refers to this vague
final ideal in the following manner. "The human social ideal- the ideal or ultimate
goal of human social progress - is the attainment of a universal human society
in which all human individuals would possess a perfected social intelligence".22
This ideal is essentially the ideal of the creative intersubjective group in which
individuals, in attaining the fullest expression of creative individuality, would be
intelligently reconstructing the social group, and, in attaining the fullest under-
standing of the creative individual expression of others, would be intelligently
accepting social change.
Mead interprets all social groups form the standpoint of this conception of an
ideal creative intersubjective group and presents the evolution of the group as
an unilinear evolution towards this ideal. In so doing, he fails to provide a proper
description of the development of the social group itself. Instead of attempting
to describe the actual development of the social group as such, he simply
construes the development of the group from the standpoint of a presupposed
ideal category. If Mead had attempted to describe the actual development of the
social group, he would have seen that the group has developed in various
directions which cannot be accounted for along a single continuum of develop-
ment. The evolution ofthe social group essentially consists in the articulation of
the social group itself into a plurality of fundamental domains and symbolic
orders each with its own evolution and intersubjective organization, and the
intersubjectivity obtaining in the social group can be said, in the final analysis,
to have to do precisely with the relationships obtaining within and between these
various realms of the group.
CONCLUSION
Having pointed to a more primordial problem of intersubjectivity and having

briefly discussed the changes in the notion of the social group which it entails,
it is now possible to further pursue our investigation into the problem of intersub-
jectivity by turning to Gurwitsch and, then, Schutz both of whom it could be said
begin their work at this point. Given the shift in the problem of inter subjectivity,
it is not surprising that a shift in terminology will occur in referring to the social
group. Gurwitsch will speak of the social group in terms of a context, contexture,
milieu, or an order of existence depending upon the level of his analysis, while
Schutz will speak of the group in terms of the relative natural world view and
multiple symbolic finite provinces of meaning.
Perhaps, it should be mentioned that while the critique of Mead carried out
here has been far reaching and has even touched upon the foundations of his
work, it is meant to be, as all the fundamental analyses and critiques of the
primary figures in this work, a working through and critical extension of impor-
tant insights from a major author who has dealt with the problem of intersubjec-
tivity. Mead had a keen sensitivity to the phenomenon of intersubjectivity which
led to his drawing out many significant themes in regard to it and, as has already
been indicated above, a certain interpretation of his work, just as with our other
42 Chapter II
two authors, shall serve as a significant foundation in our own attempt to carry
out an analysis of intersubjectivity as a group problem.
NOTES
1. Hans Joas, Praktische intersubjektivitiit, especially see, pp. 143-209.

2. "The Nature of Aesthetic Experience", SW, p. 295.
3. Ibid.
4. PA, p. 516.
5. John Dewey, "Prefatory Remarks", in PP, pp. xxxvi-xxxvii.
6. "The Objective Reality of Perspectives", SW, p. 306.
7. "Social Psychology as Counterpart to Physiological Psychology", SW, p. 103.
8. Ibid., p. 96.
9. For example, see "Concerning Animal Perception", SW, pp. 73-74 and MSS, pp. 43, 55, and 195.
10. MSS, p. 43.
11. MSS, p. 161.
12. "The Genesis of the Self and Social Control", SW, p. 285, my emphasis.
13. MSS, p. 154.
14. MSS, pp. 148-149.
15. MSS, p. 173.
16. For example, see: Sigmund Freud, Vorlesungen zur Einfiihrung in die Psychoanalyse, Gesammelte
Werke, Vol. II (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1973); Sigmund Freud, Drei Abhandlungen
zur Sexualtheorie, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 5 (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1972), pp.
27-145; and Sigmund Freud, "Der Familienroman der Neurotiker", Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 7
(Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1972), pp. 225-231. Also see Gerhard Bosch, Infantile
Autism. A Clinical and Phenomenological-Anthropological Investigation Taking Language as a Guide,
trans. Derek and Inge Jordan (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1970).
17. Max Scheler, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 7, ed. Manfred S. Frings
(Moochen: Francke Verlag, 1973), p. 23 II.
18. "A Pragmatic Theory of Truth" (1929), SW, p. 335.
19. Natanson, a good and insightful phenomenologist, essentially arrives at this same conclusion in
his own way and language in speaking of a "proto-linguistic awareness of the other", '''being-with'
others", and "the generalized other". See Maurice Natanson, The Social Dynamics of George H.
Mead, pp. 62-68.
20. See,for example, PA, pp. 494-519 and "Scientific Method and the Moral Sciences" (1923), SW,
pp. 248-266.
21. For example, "Scientific Method and the Moral Sciences", SW, p. 266.
22. MSS, p. 310.
PART TWO
Gurwitsch's Theory of Intersubjectivity

CHAPTER III
Intersubjectivity as a Problem of Context

and the Milieu-World
INTRODUCTION
Although there are some hints of Gurwitsch's concern with the relationship
between intersubjectivity and contexts (Zusammenhiingen) in the closing re-
marks of the "Phenomenology of Thematics and of the Pure Ego"! and other
previous works,2 it is in Human Encounters in the Social World that it first comes
to the fore as a central theme. 3 There it is maintained that intersubjectivity, as
an issue and problem in itself, has resulted from the development of the reflective
context of a phenomenology of consciousness which originates in the philosophy
of Descartes and which is continued today by Husserlian philosophy. "That there
is any problem at all concerning knowledge about human beings as fellow human
beings... is implied by a certain phenomenological formulation of conscious-
ness".4 Previously, as in the everyday contexts in which we carry out our routine
activities of today, intersubjectivity was a lived conviction, unproblematic,
obvious and always there without being expressed. With the development of a
phenomenology of consciousness, the constitution of a reflective context arises
in which this conviction is thrown into question insofar as a contrast arises
between the knowledge involved in this reflective context and the 'knowledge'
involved in everyday contexts concerning this lived conviction.
In demonstrating that the problem of intersubjectivity arises in this way,
Gurwitsch attempts to show that intersubjectivity is itself bound-up with the
structure of a context and that, while always remaining a primordial conviction,
becomes less and less a factor in the very constitution of contexts to the extent
that, from the standpoint of reflective contexts, it cannot even be recovered as
a phenomenon or, at least, not in the sense in which it is involved in everyday
life. Gurwitsch differentiates all contexts according to the extent that intersubjec-
tivity is involved as a factor in their constitution and the specific way in which,
if it is involved, it is articulated. The world is then displayed as a development
of contexts along these lines. In this chapter, it is with the various contexts that
Gurwitsch distinguishes and their relationship to intersubjectivity that we shall
be concerned. Along with Gurwitsch, we shall begin with the reflective contexts.
45
46 Chapter III
1. THE REFLECTIVE CONTEXT OF A PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
The first context which Gurwitsch considers is the reflective context of a phe-
nomenology of consciousness. 5 It is the context that provides the foundations for
all epistemological and psychological theories, and serves as their starting point.
In this context, everything which we know is given to us in experiences (Erleb-
nisse) in which we are conscious of something. These experiences have an
ego-relatedness and are always my experiences. Among them, there are those
which are privileged in that an object is given not merely as presented, meant,
or symbolically represented, but as itself, "leibhaftii' and "originiir". With regard
to the spatio-temporal world of real physical things, perceptual experiences are
these privileged experiences. Everything that we know about this world must be
given in immediate perception. Our fellow human beings are considered as
belonging to this spatio-temporal world along with physical things, plants, and
animals. Thus, our knowledge of them must be given in original perception; a
perception in which "we never go beyond the realm of physical qualities and
changes".6 The mental life of others must be somehow imputed to them on the
basis of my own ego-related perceptual experiences.
With respect to the relationship between this reflective context and the prob-
lem of intersubjectivity, Gurwitsch writes: "that one is helpless with respect to
the problem in question is not because of the insufficiency of the theoretical
thought.... No improvement or refinement of method, nor any theoretical ex-
pedient will promise progress in this situation". 7 It is the very nature of this
context which does not allow it to account for intersubjectivity in any way, let
alone the way in which it is experienced as a lived conviction in the contexts of
our everyday life. The members of this context are more or less isolated elements
standing in relations of independence to one another. The'!' has experiences
belonging solely to it and is related to other elements only to the extent that they
are given as physical qualities and changes in a perception carrying the index
mine. The result of such a context in which all mental experiences are always only
my mental experiences is that '''mental processes appertinent to We' ('Wir-Erleb-
nisse') become unintelligible". 8 In a context in which the immediately given is only
physical qualities and changes, the possibility of ever arriving at the mental life
of others is excluded. Due to the very nature of this context, its members and
the relations between them, the possibility of accounting for intersubjectivity is,
from the very beginning, excluded.
2. THE REFLECTIVE CONTEXT OF SCIENCE
The second context which Gurwitsch considers is the reflective context of

science. 9 This context has not been typically interpreted as having to do with
science. It has been interpreted by the reflective context of the phenomenology
of consciousness as the original natural surrounding world in which we live,
unreflectively, outside of all philosophizing. Although Husserl also interprets this
I ntersubjectivity as a Problem of Context and the Milieu- World 47
context as that of the natural unreflective man, Gurwitsch claims that Husserl's
analyses of this world of the natural attitude (on the basis of which, through the
employment of the epoch£:, he was led to the phenomenological sphere) were the
first to explicitly and consistently present this reflective context of science.
In this context, as Husserl has described it, all of us live in the natural attitude
in which there is a naive taken for grantedness of the world and of myself as a
human being in this world. Living in my particular surroundings which are
encompassed by an increasingly vague horizon which I may always turn into my
new surroundings, I accept this world as factually given without question. This
world is a "set of objects" ("InbegrijJ von Gegenstiinden") in the sense of serving
as actual or potential themes of cognitive consciousness and my being-in-this-
world is the "performance ofintentive advertings". Objects remain unaffected and
identical regardless of whether or not my cogitationes are directed to them. In
turning toward a physical thing, the latter remains unaffected presenting itself
as a material objective identical unity. However, along with the material determi-
nations, 'functions' such as utility values, use values, aesthetic values and others,
which have accrued to and are founded upon the material determinations, can
also be presented. Corresponding to this independence of objects is the indepen-
dence of my ego. I am free to turn thematically towards or away from objects
of my choice.
Referring to this reflective context of science in terms of a "world-context" and
speaking about its relationship to the problem of intersubjectivity, Gurwitsch
concludes, on the basis of the work of Edith Stein, that "even in the light of just
the world-context... drawn into view, the access to other minds can be disclosed
in its various strata".l0 This context can provide an account of intersubjectivity
because, unlike the previous reflective context, its members do not stand in
relations of more or less isolation from each other such that an enclosed sealed
'I' is related to other members only insofar as physical qualities and changes are
given in this enclosed realm. The relations between the members are more
extended and, we shall say, stand only in relations of separateness from one
another.
In turning towards a physical thing from within this context, my relationship
to it is not limited to physical qualities and changes, but can also consist of
functions such as use-values and aesthetic values founded upon and given in the
physical 'thingness'. More importantly, I can be related to an organism, the
movement of an organism, and specific life phenomena such as the feeling states
seen by the physician all of which are given konoriginiir in the physical. I can also
be related to expressions through which the psychical is seized due to an inner
material connection between mental processes and expressions. In standing in
a potential relationship to such phenomena, the ego is, so to speak, to a certain
extent 'opened-out' into the world. In that this reflective context allows for such
relationships between its members, it is possible to give an account of intersub-
jectivity from within this context.
The intersubjectivity accounted for from within this reflective context, how-
ever, is not that which is lived in the contexts of our everyday lives. In this
48 Chapter III
reflective context, the other is given as an object which I have thematized. I focus
upon and perceive phenomena of'livingness', 'animation', or 'expression'. In
everyday life, I do not encounter others as objects observing them and taking
note of such phenomena. I do not even encounter the components of the world,
with which I busily deal and manipulate, as a set of objects which are themes
of my free cogitationes. This context is clearly then a scientific context in which
the scientist stands over and against the world surveying and cognizing it from
a distance. The intersubjectivity which is accounted for is a scientific intersubjec-
tivity, for example, between that of a physician and a patient, and the com-
ponents of the world are scientific objects. II It was precisely because of this
distance between the members of this reflective context of science that we said
that they stand in relations of separateness to one another.
3. THE CONTEXT OF THE MILIEU-WORLD
The third context analyzed by Gurwitsch is the context of the milieu-world. 12

This context is the world of everyday life and is to be understood first in terms
of the milieux of which it is composed. Standing and living in a milieu is our
original and primary comportment towards the world-context of everyday life.
We begin, then, with a description of the milieu and will, thereafter, take up the
world-context of everyday life, the milieu-world itself.
a. The Milieu
Gurwitsch describes the milieu by essentially drawing out three respects in

regard to which it differs from the reflective contexts. 13 First, what is encountered
in milieux are not physical qualities and changes, or objects independent from
me, but rather what Heidegger has designated as das Zeug,14 which is to roughly
say in English, 'equipment' understood in the restricted sense of'stuff', 'parapher-
nalia', and 'gear' with which we are concerned in our concernful dealings. 15 Now
a specific piece of equipment is to be understood as something 'in-order-to .. .' in
two senses. The first sense has to do with the use required by the specific
equipment. The pen is, as writing equipment, in-order-to write. However, so long
as it remains a good pen, my dealing is not directed to this pen as a specific piece
of equipment. Rather, I use the pen in-order-to-write-on-paper-at-a-desk-next-
to-a-Iamp-in-a-room. This is the second sense of the in-order-to of equipment.
Any specific equipment contains an in-order-to reference to an equipment totali-
ty (Zeugganzheit) which prescribes its role in that totality and constitutes its very
involvement as this precise equipment.
The second way in which a milieu differs from the reflective contexts is that
in the milieu I am not a self-enclosed ego or someone standing over against the
world, but rather I gear into and am absorbed (aufgehen) in the milieu in the sense
of giving myself over to being included, incorporated, and determinded by it. "I
Intersubjectivity as a Problem of Context and the Milieu- World 49
am ... in every case the one the situation makes me out to be".16 In this absorption,
I attain what Heidegger calls "circumspection" ("Umsicht") through which I
discover and 'see' the equipment totality and the structure of the milieu which
prescribes how I must manipulate equipment and comport myself so as to reach
my goal. My motives do not structure the milieu. Rather, it is the milieu which
provides the structure, sense, and possibility of my motives.
The third way in which the milieu differs from the reflective contexts is that
there are no identical physical qualities and changes, or objects which remain
unchanged regardless of the situation. Equipment is what it is only with respect
to the milieuP
It is clear that the milieu is to be strictly distinguished from the two reflective
contexts of a phenomenology of consciousness and science which we have
respectively designated as a context of independence and a context of separate-
ness. Given the intimacy of relations between the members of a milieu, that is,
my absorption into it and the equipment totality, one could designate it as a
'contexture' understood in the sense of a context within which there obtains such
an intimate tissue of relationships between the members that anyone member
obtains its meaning only in relation to all the other members, and, consequently,
the whole context. 18
One might expect that Gurwitsch would now attempt to demonstrate that
given the intimate relationships in the milieu this context easily allows for the
possibility of accounting for intersubjectivity. However, our everyday lived con-
viction is not that we live in an intersubjective milieu, but that we live in an
intersubjective world. Living always in a milieu, the question arises then as to
how we know that we live in an intersubjective world.
b. The Radically Implicit and Relatively Impertinent Knowledge of an Intersubjective

Milieu-World
Gurwitsch attempts to answer the above question in a somewhat vague and

complex argument only the essential features of which will be outlined here. 19
Gurwitsch concedes that in carrying reference to horizons, every milieu is
situated in the world. Horizons are ordered around the milieu in terms of their
pertinence to it and one another, thereby constituting a world-context or the
'worldliness' (Welthaftigkeit) of the milieu. However, as I am busily concerned in
my milieu, in no way do I have a knowledge of all the relationships which are
involved in and comprise this world-context. What I do know is that, when I am
alone in a milieu, the equipment with which I deal, as well as the milieu itself,
carries references to an immediate pertinent horizon of milieux in which others
are co-included, and that there are further references to other milieux and their
others, whose nature is totally unclear to me, extending finally to an absolutely
vague world of fellow human beings. I also know that, when I am together with
others in a milieu, this being-together carries a reference to an immediate
pertinent horizon of milieux and their respective equipment, and that there are
50 Chapter III
further unknown references extending finally to a surrounding world of equip-

ment. In knowing that the equipment with which I deal in my milieu carries
references to a quite undetermined world of fellow human beings and, con-
versely, that my being-together with others carries quite undetermined references
to a world of equipment, I know, in my milieu, of an undetermined underlying
system of references to a world-context which consists of an interwovenness of
the world of equipment and world of fellow human beings.20 I know from the very
equipment and others encountered in my milieu, and their increasingly undeter-
mined references to the horizon that I am continuously in a surrounding world
of equipment and fellow human beings both of which are always articulated in
the same way. In the end, what I know of this world as a whole, as I comport
myselfin the milieu, is that "any modes of ,living in .. .' whatever are equally modes
of being in relation to the 'things' as well as also modes of being with others".21
Gurwitsch claims that it is precisely this underlying system of references in
which the relations between others and 'things' are co-articulated in the same
way and our knowledge of this which accounts for the lived conviction of
intersubjectivity in the milieu-world. 22 In a world-context in which the relation-
ships between human beings and 'things' are simultaneously articulated in the
same way, there always obtains such an interwovenness between the members
of this context that neither a problem of intersubjectivity arises nor a problem
of standing over against objects which does not adequately account for our living
in the everyday life-context.
Gurwitsch refers to the knowledge which we have of this everyday life-context,
this 'intersubjective-equipment-world', from within our milieu, as a "universal
'world consciousness'" and claims that it is an "implicit knowledge".23 Implicit
knowledge is generally defined as immanent to our living in a milieu, non-in ten-
tive, and not limited to a knowledge of the self.24 Gurwitsch argues that circum-
spection and our knowledge of the easily discoverable references which our
milieu carries to the immediate horizon of neighboring milieux is implicit. How-
ever, Gurwitsch speaks of a more radically implicit knowledge to be distin-
guished, although not separated, from these types which it is suggested here is
the type of implicit knowledge which he essentially maintains that we have of the
intersubjective-equipment-world. Gurwitsch only points to this radically implicit
knowledge by way of indicating its similarity to knowledge of automatic activity.
Referring to the latter, Gurwitsch concludes: "We have, then, such 'knowledge'
about the automatic activity when we are not 'in it', not heeding it, not living in
it, but thoughtfully and entirely busied with something else".zs In a somewhat
analogical sense, one could say that we automatically always implicitly know of
the intersubjective-equipment-world to which our milieu carries a reference,
however, while being concerned with our comportment in a milieu, we do not
heed it or busy ourselves with it. It is relatively impertinent and has little
meaningful bearing on our activity in a milieu.
c. The Three Fundamental Modes of Organization of Milieux and their Intersubjec-

tive Relevancy
The above should not be understood as implying that intersubjectivity is not in

any way involved in our comporting ourselves in a milieu. Gurwitsch maintains
that this primordial intersubjective-equipment-world is itself articulated into
three dimensions 26 and that "the task... arises of elaborating the different dimen-
sions in which we are concerned with fellow human beings and know about
them",27 Gurwitsch's point here appears to be that, while the primordial inter-
subjective-equipment-world, as a world-context, is impertinent to our concrete
activity in a milieu, the dimensions arising out of it, in which it is articulated, have
a bearing on our activity. It is in terms of these dimensions that intersubjectivity
is relevant to our comportment in a milieu.
These dimensions, which are themselves contextures, appear to be fundamen-
tal modes of organization of milieux28 which, in arising out of the primordial
intersubjective-equipment-world, variously and uniquely articulate the structure
of that world which, it will be recalled, simply consists in the fact that the
relations between fellow human beings and the relations between equipment are
expressed in the same manner. The way in which these fundamental modes of
organization arise and, in so doing, specifically articulate the primordial mutual
relationship of fellow human beings and the equipment of the world indicates:
(1) how intersubjectivity is involved in them; (2) their independence from what
Gurwitsch calls the "life-context" ("Lebenszusammenhani'); (3) and the degree
of immergence required by or freedom permitted by them. Gurwitsch delineates
these fundamental organizations of milieux along the following three dimensions:
partnership, membership, and fusion.
The fundamental organization of milieux with respect to the dimension of
partnership (Partnerschafl) arises from individuals leaving the life-context and
coming together due to a common concern for bringing about a material affair. 29
They have no further concern in each other or the equipment itself other than
in their aiding to bring about a task and having accomplished it the individuals
return to the life-context. In that this fundamental organization of milieux arises
only from the interests of individuals in accomplishing a common task, the
relationships between these individuals is one of a texture of roles and the
relationships between equipment, similarly, consists in a texture of pragmatic use
functions. 3D As the understanding of the other consists solely in the suitability
of the way he carries out his role in the situation, so the understanding of the
equipment consists solely in the way that it serves its function in the situation.
Thus, the contexture of the fundamental organization of milieux along the di-
mension of partnership is constituted as 'loose' and 'cool' with an internal distance
between the constituents. This contexture represents a departure from the life-
context. However, the contexture does not demand a complete immergence in
it such that all horizons are nothing more than a confused haze. In being
immerged in this contexture, the horizon, life-context, as that from which we
came and to which we will return, is always present in clarity. Freedom in this
52 Chapter III
context consists in our ability to always turn to this horizon, life-context, and
leave the partnership contexture.
membership (ZugehOrigkeit) arises from the actualization of the life-context by
members of it, who are always already together within it. 31 The coming together,
or more precisely, being-together of members in this fundamental organization
is motivated by and founded in the life-context. The fundamental organization
itself remains a constituent of the life-context which it exhibits. In that this
fundamental organization of milieux arises from the actualization ofthe life-con-
text and is motivated by it, the relationships between individuals is that of
'kinship' in the sense of a rootedness in the shared life-context, and, in a deeper
sense, shared common history. The relationships between equipment is, similar-
ly, rooted in history such that the equipment are "communal possessions" and
the tradition itself in which the members collectively and mutually participate.
My understanding in this fundamental organization is "an understanding in
which one is born or into which one grows Up"32 where others and equipment
are, respectively, understood only as members of a communal past and tradition-
al possessions. Thus, the contexture of the fundamental organization of milieux
along the dimension of membership is constituted as 'close' and 'warm' with an
"inner inseparability" between the constituents. Clearly, this contexture does not
depart from the life-context. Moreover, it requires a thorough-going immergence
within it. However, in this immergence, the horizon of milieux, ungoverned and
impertinent to this contexture, is always possibly visible. Freedom in this contex-
ture consists in the possibility to always turn to this horizon of impertinent
milieux and to leave the membership contexture.
fusion (Verschmelzung) arises from individuals tearing themselves away from and
rejecting the life-context.3 3 Their coming together or, more precisely, their being
brought together occurs through a surrendering of themselves to and being
seized by the new, exceptional, powerful, and uncommon: charisma. In emotion-
al acts of feeling united-as-one with it and identification with it, the charisma
manifests itself to them and "enraptures and unites all of them,,34 into a group
which is, so to speak, 'separated-off' from the life-context. In that this funda-
mental organization of milieux arises as a break from and rejecting of the
life-context, through feelings and emotions of oneness with the charisma and with
others sharing in it, the relations between people is one of fusion where all
individual differences are cancelled out. The relationships between equipment is,
similarly, one of fusion such that the equipment is involved in the charisma and
the people are at one with it (e.g. the "feeling united-as-one with nature"35).
Others and equipment in this fundamental organization are understood only in
the sense of this charisma. The contexture of the fundamental organization of
milieux along this dimension of fusion is constituted as 'solid' and 'feverish' with
a binding inherency of the constituents. Clearly, this contexture totally departs
from the life-context. However, it requires an absolute and unyielding immer-
gence such that one loses oneself within it, along with all horizons. "The dis-
Intersubjectivity as a Problem of Context and the Milieu-World 53
appearing of the 'world' signifies ... that it sinks away into a dark, undetermined
distance .... The world is never visible at the horizon".36 Thus, the freedom of
turning to the horizon of other milieux and leaving this fusion contexture is sealed
off. Freedom, in this contexture, only arises as the group, always unable, by
"eidetic necessity", to prevent the extraordinary character of the charisma from
becoming in time familiar and common, falls into and re-enters the life-context
introducing new meaning and existence into it. Freedom consists then in the very
collapse and traditionalization of this group into the life-context in which it is a
"phenomenon of the beginning"?7
4. THE WORLD AS A DEVELOPMENT OF DIFFERENT CONTEXTS: THE FUNDA-

MENTAL QUESTION CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
REFLECTIVE CONTEXT OF SCIENCE AND THE MILIEU-WORLD
With the explication of these three fundamental organizations of milieux, Gur-

witsch ends his analysis of contexts and their relationship to intersubjectivity. We
have seen that the phenomenon of intersubjectivity is closely bound-up with the
structure of a context. The reflective context of a phenomenology of conscious-
ness, as a context of independence, is so structured that it is impossible for it to
account for intersubjectivity in any way. The reflective context of science, as a
context of separateness, is so structured that it can account for intersubjectivity,
however, only that which exists in the scientific world. The structure of the
context of the milieu-world, as a context of interwovenness, accounts for our
everyday lived conviction that we live in an intersubjective world. Finally, the
three contexts of the fundamental organizations of milieux, as contextures of
internal distance, inner inseparability, and binding inherency, represent funda-
mental structures ofcontexts arising out ofthe life-context in which intersubjectivi-
ty is expressed in various ways.
Now this analysis by Gurwitsch does not merely present the world as a
plurality of contexts in which intersubjectivity is variously involved. Rather, the
world is explicated here as a development of contexts in which intersubjectivity,
while always remaining an implicit primordial conviction, is at first variously ex-
pressed and, then, becomes less and less a factor in the constitution of contexts
to the point where it can no longer be recovered as a phenomenon. The primordi-
al intersubjectivity obtaining in the world of everyday life is, at first, variously
expressed in the constitution of the contexts of partnership, membership, and
fusion, and, then, plays a minor transformed role in the reflective context of
science with its limited scientific intersubjectivity, and finally appears to play no
role in the reflective context of a phenomenology of consciousness where it can
no longer even be recovered.
It is only through understanding Gurwitsch's presentation of the world as a
development of contexts in which intersubjectivity becomes less and less a factor
in their constitution that one can gain a glimpse of the fundamental question
arising from his analysis and to which future investigations will be devoted.
54 Chapter III
Generally stated, how do these contexts develop such that the world comes to
be articulated into a world of various different contexts? To be sure, Gurwitsch's
analysis of the fundamental organizations of partnership (as individuals leaving
the life-context), membership (as the actualization of the life-context by members
of it), and fusion (as individuals tearing themselves away from and rejecting the
life-context) already provides some insights into how these particular contexts
are constituted out of the primordial life-context. However, those insights only
lead one to the more specific fundamental question arising out of Gurwitsch's
analysis: how do the reflective contexts and the peculiar limited intersubjectivity
obtaining or not obtaining therein arise out of the life-context? This question is
even more significant and difficult for the reflective contexts essentially represent
a unique 'break:', so to speak:, from the life-context. Referring to cognition in the
reflective contexts, Gurwitsch writes that it "contains a totally different mode of
Being", that it has "its own and entirely positive structures" which "constitute
its self-sufficiency", and that "it is essentially and radically distinguished from
being in the world in the pregnant sense".38 Gurwitsch goes on to then formulate
the specific question raised above in the following way. "Just this withdrawing
and 'being placed at a distance', upon which cognizing is first of all grounded,
now becomes a problem".39
An understanding ofthis specific question concerning the development of the
reflective contexts out of the life-context throws some light on Gurwitsch's
relationship to Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger. So long as Husserl's analyses
are interpreted as analyses of the reflective contexts, Gurwitsch has no dispute
with him. The reflective contexts are reserved for his work.40 However, while
appropriating Scheler's terms "milieu" and "living in a milieu" as "titles of
problems"41 along with aspects of Heidegger's notion of an "equipment totality",
Gurwitsch criticizes the very foundations of their philosophy which is, in the end,
a critique of their accounts of the development of cognition and the reflective
contexts.
Having criticized Scheler's unexamined metaphysical anthropological presup-
positions of an objective world and drive patterns, Gurwitsch criticizes his
conception that feeling united as one is the primal ground of this world and the
"vehicle of cognition". In the end, he levels the argument against Scheler that "in
a strict and pregnant sense, cognition is to be acquired exclusively on the road
that leads to science".42 With respect to Heidegger, Gurwitsch first criticizes his
analysis of being-in-the-world which leads to the most distant horizons of milieux
being included as constituent moments of the milieu and which, thereby, mis-
construes the fundamentally implicit nature of our knowledge of the milieu and
surrounding horizons making up the everyday world as a more or less explicit
vague knowledge of Dasein. 43 In the end, Gurwitsch criticizes the supposed
potency of Dasein which is to even give rise to science itself. "We ... cannot
subscribe to Heidegger's belief that interprets the 'mode of cognition' ... as an
existential derivative of the primary 'understanding that co-constitutes the Being
of any There (Da) whatever' and which even regards the 'Being-question ... as the
radicalization of a Being-tendency essentially belonging to Dasein itself, the

pre-ontological awareness of Being"'.44
The development of the reflective contexts and the peculiar limited intersub-
jectivity obtaining and not obtaining therein out of the life-context is not to be
accounted for in terms of a magic power always already lying within that life-con-
text as Scheler and Heidegger believe. Development is to be understood in the
strictest sense as the constitution of totally new and unique contexts which are
in no way to be reduced to the life-context. The reflective contexts represent the
'evolution' of the possibility of reflection and new intersubjective relations in the
face of the weight of traditional understandings and traditional intersubjective
relations in the life-context.
Gurwitsch does not attempt to answer this question concerning the develop-
ment of reflective contexts out of the life-context in Human Encounters. It remains
a "theme of its own investigation,,45 which will be pursued in later works.
However, as will be seen, the problem of the relationship between intersubjectivi-
ty in the context of science and intersubjectivity in the context of everyday life
will then be considered, first, in terms of transcendental "orders of existence"
and, then, in terms of science's foundation in the life-world all of which brings
us to the critical chapter on Gurwitsch's theory of intersubjectivity.
NOTES
1. Aron Gurwitsch, "Phenomenology of Thematics and of the Pure Ego: Studies of the Relation
between Gestalt Theory and Phenomenology" (1929), in Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 175-300. This volume will be hereafter
cited as SPP. The relevant pages are intentionally left out by Gurwitsch in this English translation.
However, see the original German: Aron Gurwitsch, "Ph!l.nomenologie der Thematik und des
reinen Ich", Psychologische Forschung, 12 (1929), 380-381.
2. For example, see Aron Gurwitsch, "Zur Bedeutung der Pradestinationslehre fUr die Ausbildung
des 'kapitalistischen Geistes"',Archivfur Sozialwissenschaji und Sozialpolitik, 68 (1933), 616-622.
3. Aron Gurwitsch, Human Encounters in the Social World, ed. Alexandre Metraux, trans. Fred
Kersten (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1979). Translation of Aron Gurwitsch, Die
mitmenschlichen Begegnungen in der Milieuwelt (1931), ed. Alexandre Metraux (Berlin: De Gruyter,
1976). In the following, references will be given first to the English translation (p.) followed by
references to the original German text (S.).
4. Ibid., p. 1., S. 1.
5. Ibid., pp. 1-33, S. 3-47.
6. Ibid., p. 3., S. 6.
7. Ibid., p. 29., S. 42.
8. Ibid., p. 28., S. 40.
9. Ibid., pp. 33-57, S. 51-68.
10. Ibid., p. 56., S. 80.
11. Ibid., p. 57, S. 81-82.
12. Ibid., pp. 58-156, S. 83-223.
13. Ibid., pp. 66-84, S. 95-120.
14. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer, 1976), pp. 66-76.
15. Here the translation by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson of'das Zeui as 'equipment' is
followed. See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson
56 Chapter III
(New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 97, n., I. The translation by Fred Kersten in Human
Encounters as 'utensil' overstresses the pragmatic use-value sense of'das Zeug. That translation
will particularly lead to difficulities when das Zeug is articulated as traditional possessions and
charismatic objects in the fundamental organizations of milieux, membership and fusion.
16. Gurwitsch, Human Encounters, p. 77., S. 110.
17. There remains for Gurwitsch the problem of the identity of the person in different milieux which
he mentions here, but does not solve. Ibid., p. 84, S. 120. For his later treatment of this problem,
see Aron Gurwitsch, "A Non-egological Conception of Consciousness" (1941), SPP, pp. 287-300.
18. The interpretation of the milieu as a contexture in this sense is not only based on what has been
presented above, but also upon Gurwitsch's many references and footnotes to Gestalt theory
when analyzing the milieu.
19. Gurwitsch, Human Encounters, pp. 95-103, S. 137-147.
20. Ibid., pp. 98-99, S. 141-142.
21. Ibid., p. 156, S. 223.
22. Ibid., p. 99, S. 142.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., pp. 84-94, S. 120-133.
25. Ibid., p. 86., S. 123. Also see pp. 85-86 and 92-94, S. 122-123 and 131-133.
26. Ibid., p. 156, S. 223.
27. Ibid., p. 33, my emphasis, S. 47.
28. Ibid., pp. 151-156, S. 216-223.
29. Ibid., pp. 104-119, S. 148-171.
30. Here again Gurwitsch mentions the problem concerning the identity of the person and points out
the difference between persons and equipment in this respect. Ibid., p. 117, S. 168-169. Also see
note 17 above.
31. Ibid., pp. 120-136, S. 172-196.
32. Ibid., p. 134., S. 194.
33. Ibid., pp. 137-151, S. 197-216.
34. Ibid., p. 141, S. 203.
35. Ibid., p. 145, S. 208.
36. Ibid., p. 147., S. 211. Gurwitsch also mentions on this page that the tearing away from and
rejecting of the life-context need not be so complete as he has presented it, "but often enough
occurs",
37. Gurwitsch's analysis of this contexture offusion, especially concerning its status as a "phenome-
non of the beginning", is dubitable. In later chapters, we will treat the phenomenon of the
beginning in terms of a theory of transcendence and symbols.
38. Ibid., p. 81, S. 115.
39. Ibid., p. 80., S. 114.
40. Ibid., p. 81, S. 115-116.
41. Ibid., p. 65, S. 93.
42. Ibid., p. 146, S. 210.
43. Ibid., pp. 72-73, 73-77, and 93-94, S. 103-104, 104-109, and 131-133.
44. Ibid., p. 94., S. 133.
45. Ibid., p. 81, S. 116.
CHAPTER IV
Critical Remarks to Gurwitsch's Theory of

Intersubjectivity
l.INTERSUBJECfIVITY AS A TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEM: THE RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN THE TRANSCENDENTAL ORDER OF EXISTENCE OF SCIENCE AND
THE WORLD OF EVERYDAY LIFE
In his next major work, The Field of Consciousness, 1 Gurwitsch attempts to shed
some light on the relationship between intersubjectivity in the context of science
and intersubjectivity in the context of everyday life by pursuing the entire prob-
lem at the level of transcendental phenomenology. He had already indicated in
Human Encounters that a consideration of intersUbjectivity at the transcendental
level is to follow the analysis of natural existence (natiirlichen Daseins) which he
carries out there.
What we are in the process of working out undergoes a radical modification

on the foundation of Husserl's "constitutive phenomenology" disclosed by the
epoche. But neither here, nor elsewhere in this essay, do we stand on this
foundation. We are primarily concerned with the description of our knowledge
about other people and our lives with others within the horizon of "natural
existence". These descriptions ... must precede the problem of constitution for
which they provide the ontological clues. 2
Although here and in the following the Field is interpreted as an attempt to

account for the relationship between intersubjectivity as it is involved in the
context of science and the context of everyday life through a transcendental
analysis, this is not meant to imply that an elaborate or completed analysis of
intersubjectivity is executed there. Rather, it is proposed that this problem serves
as the fundamental background for the analyses which Gurwitsch carries out in
the Field. It is noteworthy that in the concluding sections of the Field the problem
of intersubjectivity does in fact explicitly arise and it is one of the most central
points of discussion ofthis text in the Alfred Schutz - Aron Gurwitsch: Briefwechsel
1939-1959. 3
Gurwitsch's notion of transcendental consciousness, as found in the Field and
previous works,4 is to be distinguished from Husserl's conception of transcen-
57
58 Chapter IV
dental consciousness and the conceptions of consciousness in the reflective

contexts mentioned in the previous chapter. For Gurwitsch, there is no transcen-
dental ego or any other kind of ego in lived experience (Erlebnis). There is only
an empirical ego which arises in reflection on the lived Act and which is nothing
more than a constituted unity of the totality of such Acts. There is also no hyletic
data, sense data, or raw materials of sensation upon which meaning is bestowed.
The immediately given is always already meaningful having been articulated and
structured by various organizations. Transcendental consciousness is for Gur-
witsch the unity of various inherent organizations of consciousness, which is not
an egological consciousness of this unity. The field of consciousness is differen-
tiated into three organizational domains with their own respective inherent
principle of organization. The first domain is the theme which "engrosses the
mind of the experiencing subject" and occupies the "focus of his attention". Its
constituents are organized according to Gestalt-coherence. The second domain
is the thematic field defined as everything that is "co-present" with the theme and
experienced as materially relevant to the theme. The thematic field forms the
background out of which the theme emerges as the center. The relationships
between the theme and thematic field, and between the items of the thematic field
are organized according to "unity of context" or "unity by relevancy". The last
domain is the margin which encompasses the data which is co-present with the
theme without having any material relevancy to it. The relationships between
both the theme and thematic field to the margin are organized according to
phenomenal time. Gurwitsch claims that this "theme-thematic-field-structure is
a formal invariant of organization having universal significance. The structure is
realized at every moment of conscious life".5
Of interest to us here is Gurwitsch's analysis of "orders of existence" which
follows his intricate examination of the articulation of consciousness into theme,
thematic field, and margin. The thematic field, having been considered in the
narrow sense with regard to its direct concern and immediacy to the theme, is
now seen to continue indefinitely into a horizon of increasingly indeterminate
relevancy to the theme. Gurwitsch defines this horizon as an "order of existence"
and accounts for the unity of an order of existence in terms of specific relevancy
principles. 6
Orders of existence, as indefinitely extended thematic fields of consciousness,
are transcendental organizations. 7 As such, they should found the contexts,
contextures, and milieux of natural existence considered in the previous chapter.
Indeed, Gurwitsch does appear to argue along these lines in the Field. Gurwitsch
now considers the explanatory systems of science and the world of everyday life
as orders of existence. s He even maintains that the world of everyday life is
delimited into three orders of existence which essentially parallel the three
fundamental organizations of milieux, partnership, membership, and fusion into
which the world of natural existence is articulated. "Within the paramount
reality... several spheres of life and activity have come to be delimited from one
another. Among such spheres, we mention those of our professional activity, our
Critical Remarks to Gurwitsch's Theory 59
family life, the political sphere in which we act as citizens .... Everyone of these
spheres ... is to be regarded as an order of existence".9
In considering the contexts, contextures, and milieux of natural existence now
as orders of existence, as indefinitely extended thematic fields of consciousness
or transcendental organizations, Gurwitsch shifts the problem of the relationship
between intersubjectivity in the context of science and everyday life to the
transcendental level. The problem now concerns the relationship between the
order of existence or transcendental organization of science and that of the world
of everyday life. Gurwitsch states quite clearly that he is not interested in the
relationships between just any orders of existence, but rather between that of
science and the world of everyday life.
In regard to differences between orders of existence, we do not consider

differences as those between the life-histories of several persons, various
historical periods in separate civilizations,... diverse "worlds of imagination".
We rather mean differences of a farther and deeper reaching nature, differ-
ences concerning the very style and type of orders of existence. Such differ-
ences are those between the world of reality, on the one hand and, on the
other, any "world of imagination", any geometrical system, or any system of
propositions. lo
The order of existence of science is not analyzed in any explicit detail in the
Field. Referring primarily to logic, mathematics, and eidetic domains, Gurwitsch
hints that it is autonomous from the order of existence of everyday life, tends to
be atemporal, II and that validity is a factor in its unity.12 However, the order of
existence of everyday life and the intersubjectivity obtaining in that order is given
explicit attention.
The order of existence of the world of everyday life is fundamentally, for
Gurwitsch, the perceptual world. "By the perceptual world we mean that order
of existence which, in the pre-theoretical or a-theoretical attitude of everyday
experience, unquestionably counts for every one of us as external reality". 13 "The
paramount reality... is the perceptual world as a whole".14 The relevancy prin-
ciple of this fundamental order of existence of everyday life which provides for
its unity and continuity is objective time. 15 Objective time is the relevancy
principle of the fundamental order of existence of everyday life underlying and
unifying all sub-orders of existence such as the life-histories of all persons and
all milieux. Moreover, objective time is the fundamental constitutive principle for
intersubjectivity in this life-world.
On the basis of the one, unique objective time, in which the life-histories of all
persons take place, all the spatial surroundings of those life-histories are unified
into one all-encompassing order of existence, namely, the one real, objective,
spatio-temporal world, the life-world of all human beings communicating with
one another either directly or indirectly.16
60 Chapter IV
By virtue of the insertion of the segments of the past of any other person into
the same objective standard time into which the segments of our past are also
inserted, the system of spatial relationships between the scenes of the seg-
ments of our past now so expands as to comprise also the scenes of the life
history of every other person.... This system of spatial relationships expands
still further, when we allow for indirect intersubjective communication by
means of books and tradition. 17
Due to the fundamental relevancy principle of objective time into which the
life-histories of all persons are inserted and unified, intersubjectivity is rendered
possible in the life-world. Insofar as my past experiences and life-history are
organized and have occurred in the same objective time as others, I may enter
into intersubjective relations with others and communicate with them.
2. THE 'INTERSUBJECfIVITY' DIALOGUE: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN

ALFRED SCHUTZ AND ARON GURWITSCH
In order to obtain a critical perspective on this quite unique and difficult tran-
scendental account of inter sUbjectivity and to reflectively follow out Gurwitsch's
later, somewhat variant, approach to the problem which is by no means obvious
simply from his published works, we will now turn, and have the opportunity,
to examine Schutz and Gurwitsch's highly enlightening discussion of the problem
of intersubjectivity carried out in the personal Briefwechsel between them. 18 Of
course, the hope is that by following out this private critical discussion between
our two authors, a critical standpoint of a higher level can be obtained for then
properly evaluating Gurwitsch's own work and for later approaching the work
of Schutz himself. The following is then in no sense intended as a comprehensive
examination or summary of the discussion of inter subjectivity in the Briefwechsel,
but rather as an examination of a number of the most fundamental points, with
a special emphasis upon Gurwitsch's work leading over to Schutz. Throughout
this entire work, references to the discussion of inter subjectivity in the Briefwech-
sel will be made when needed.
a. The Critique of Objective Time and the Transcendental Analysis of

Intersubjectivity
In the Briefwechsel, Schutz questions Gurwitsch's above conception of objective

time in the Field which is put forth as the fundamental constitutive principle for
the intersubjectivity obtaining in the life-world. He finally asks: "What should
'objective' or 'quasi-objective' mean here other than 'intersubjective'?"19 Schutz's
point here is that implicitly presupposed within this very conception of objective
time is the entire problem of intersubjectivity in the world of everyday life. It is
not objective time which is primordial and serves as a founding principle for
inter subjectivity, but rather intersubjectivity which is primordial and founds

objective time.
Schutz argues that it is not objective time which unifies my life-history, but
rather my inner duration. "Only for biographers is my life-history played out in
objective time, not for my autobiography .... My past life is played out for me in
my inner duration, not in objective time".2° "All of these various times arise out
of and fuse together in inner duration which is to say in phenomenal time and
out of its irreversability".2 1 Intersubjectivity is not to be analyzed at the level of
objective time for Schutz, but at the level of inner durations to which objective
time is to be led back. More specifically, intersubjectivity at the most fundamen-
tal level is to be analyzed at the level of the 'intersection' of inner durations in
the primordial face-to-face we-relationship. Moreover, this level is not transcen-
dental, but mundane. Thus, Schutz goes on to criticize Gurwitsch's transcenden-
tal treatment of the fundamental organizations of milieux and calls for a con-
tinued analysis of intersubjectivity at the mundane level. Referring to problems
concerning the spheres of professional activity, family life, and politics, Schutz
writes:
Furthermore, it is confusing to find these problems treated under the category

of ontological problems, "orders of existence", and "orders of reality" in a
study which programmatically limits itself to the study of topical relevance
contextures in the noematic structure. They all belong to the realm of inter-
pretational relevances in the mundane sphere, like most social problems. 22
Spheres oflife in modern civilization, i.e. sphere of professional activity, etc.

Are these investigations in fact of an ontological nature? Can they be under-
taken immediately by a phenomenological theme-field analysis without first
a clarification of phenomenological and mundane intersubjectivity?23
b. Intersubjectivityas Ultimately a Mundane Problem and the Constitutive Function

of Consciousness
Although already hinting at it during his writing of the Field in a letter to Schutz,24
two years after this critique by Schutz, and while totally immersed in a first
reading of Husserl's Krisis, Gurwitsch comes to the conclusion that intersubjec-
tivity is indeed a mundane problem and, furthermore, claims that it does not even
exist at the transcendental level, since there is only a constitutive function of
consciousness and no transcendental consciousness proper. "I believe to have
discovered that there is no transcendental consciousness, but rather only a
constitutive function of consciousness. Thus, the problematic of transcendental
intersubjectivity collapses. You and I are mundane phenomena and put forth
mundane problems".25
Although Gurwitsch's reasoning here is nowhere explicitly worked out and
although he admits that it remains still quite vague even to himself,26 upon the
62 Chapter IV
basis of the few later indications which he provides us in the Briefwechsel, when
he becomes interested in the underlying essential historical relationships
between Hume, Leibniz, and Kant, it would appear to generally run along the
following lines. In learning to read Kant from the perspective of Leibniz's work,
Gurwitsch discovers the essential meaning of Kant's "unity of transcendental
apperception" by interpreting it "as a descendant of the Leibnizian monad whose
being consists in its doing".27 It is this active synthetic functional conception of
Kant's theory of consciousness which appeals to Gurwitsch and which he will
now appropriate into his own work, and, more specifically, into his non-egologi-
cal theory of consciousness. However, Kant failed to re-establish the notion of
context, which Hume had essentially destroyed, and, with respect to this issue,
Gurwitsch turns to Leibnizian conceptions having to do with a universal logic
ofrelations and perspectives.28 As a result of these reflections, Gurwitsch is led
to conceive of consciousness completely in terms of active functions and re-
lations, and, in so doing, hopes to have finally eradicated all implicit remnants
of substance implicitly presupposed within the notion. In conceiving of con-
sciousness essentially as a pre-personal spontaneous synthetic functional ruling
of various relational structures and organized contexts, Gurwitsch now claims
that there is no transcendental consciousness, but rather only a transcendental
constitutive function of consciousness, and with this essential insight the prob-
lem of transcendental intersubjectivity collapses for apparently the following two
reasons. First, it now becomes absolutely clear that the essential and ultimate
problem with Husserl's transcendental ego, against which Gurwitsch had argued
even in his earliest works, is that it merely exists and has no active function.
"With Husserl, it [the pure phenomenological ego] has simply no longer a
function and merely exists".29 Thus, this ego, as an existent, belongs, like all other
empirical egos, to the world of the natural attitude where its existence can be
legitimately assumed, along with the existence of the world. The problem then
of how this ego knows of the existence of another ego, the problem ofintersubjec-
tivity, is, consequently, not a transcendental, but a mundane problem belonging
to the sphere of the natural attitude. Second, this non-egological transcendental
constitutive function of consciousness results only in a pre-personal rational
structuralization of the world into various primordial organizational domains
and, thus, cannot in itself account for the quite specific phenomenon of intersub-
jectivity which concerns how one personal ego knows of another. Thus, the
problem of intersubjectivity has essentially nothing to do with this transcenden-
tal sphere and must be itself, in the end, then a mundane problem. Schutz himself
appeared to sense this second point in regard to Gurwitsch's theory oftranscen-
dental consciousness when he wrote to Gurwitsch that, in comparison with
Husserl, he has less problems with his theory of transcendental consciousness
for "since there is no transcendental ego, but rather only a thematic field, which
is not egological, you cannot constitute me at all!,,30 Interestingly enough,
Gurwitsch perceptively picks up on Schutz's apparent and, no doubt, uninten-
tional identification of a transcendental thematic field with a concrete personal
'you' in this statement, that is, with Gurwitsch himself, and he goes on to even
further clarify Schutz's insight by claiming that neither of them are thematic fields
and that their personal intersubjective relationship is thoroughly a mundane one.
"By the way, you are mistaken. We are not fields of consciousness, but rather
extremely complicated beings, however, thoroughly mundane. I deny that you
have a transcendental ego; as a mundane ego you are beloved and cherished".3!
c. Scientific Intersubjectivity and the Life- World as Exclusively a Foundation
Gurwitsch's interest in intersubjectivity, and the relationship between science

and the life-world will continue. However, he will now primarily concern himself
with intersubjectivity in the context of science and will no longer directly pursue
an analysis of intersubjectivity in the life-world. His starting point is now the
context of science and the task is to free the life-world from the formal and
conceptual abstractions of science in which it has been lost by demonstrating
science's foundation in the life-world. In an earlier letter written approximately
one month before the one concerning the discovery of the constitutive function
of consciousness quoted above, Gurwitsch had already made it quite clear that
the life-world, and, thus, the intersubjectivity obtaining therein, is not directly
accessible to analysis, but only indirectly accessible from the realm of science.
Here he argues that the life-world is an abstract and polemical concept whose
meaning depends upon its opposition to the scientific world: "The concept
life-world, world of everyday Dasein, etc. is indeed a polemical concept. It stands
for the world in which we live and which for us - or another group - constitues
the real in opposition to the 'world' which science constructs. Ifwe did not have
science, then this concept would not be necessary".32
This conception of the life-world as a polemical concept is more abstract and
narrower than Schutz's where the mundane intersubjective life-world can be
directly described along with the experiences of transcendence whose description
leads to an analysis of different levels and structures of the life-world such as the
scientific finite province of meaning itself. 33 The life-world is essentially treated
by Gurwitsch now solely as a foundation for science.
Gurwitsch's conception of the life-world rests upon his notion of an historical
evolution of science understood as a development of the cognitive motive (Er-
kenntnis-Motiv) through a continual historical tension between "Episteme" and
"Doxa" leading back to the differentiation of the sacred from the profane, and
the work of Plato and Pythagoras. 34 This historical 'evolution' of science, this
development of the cognitive motive of science, is the genesis of the social
transcendence ofscience in which the life-world is continually overcome, suppress-
ed, and then finally subsumed by the conceptual apparatus of science. Gurwitsch
begins his analysis at the end point of this development - modern science - and
attempts to demonstrate its grounding in the opposing concept of the life-world.
In so doing, he intends to free the life-world from the formal and conceptual
abstractions of science, and to explicate the universal reason of the world leading
to the development of science. He attempts to describe the rational structural
64 Chapter IV
laws according to which the world arises as finally an all encompassing scientific
world. This is an attempt to provide a genealogy of the scientific world. He does
not begin with consciousness and a givenness-x (Gegebenheit-x) analyzing the
constitutive accomplishments of consciousness upon this x through which the
world arises as a scientific world. Rather, he begins with the unitary meaningful
intersubjective organization of the scientific world and attemps to explicate the
rational process of its structural development by tracing science back to the
originary primordial structures contained in pre-predicative perceptual ex-
perience in the life-world. In his own words, he attempts "to show in which sense
the structures of these operations of reason lie implicitly in perceptual ex-
perience".35 Starting from the context of science, then, Gurwitsch will attempt
to explicate the universal rational implicit structures or Urlogik in our perceptual
experience in the life-world which provides the ultimate foundation for science
and its intersubjective organization.
So long as Schutz analyzes the way that social science and the intersubjectivi-
ty obtaining therein is founded in the life-world, Gurwitsch stands in the highest
agreement with him extending Schutz's analyses to the natural sciences, so as
to make advances in his own work.
Drawing out the problem of rationality ... and the insistence on a certain
continuity between common-sense thinking and science, I hold to be a
theoretical scientific accomplishment of the first order, because it opens up
a problem dimension whose significance extends well beyond social science.
(The life-world and physics!).36
That is really exciting: the process of verification in internal scientific work

is recognized by you as social action. This process has structures of social
action. I thought about this matter along all lines and must say that this also
holds for natural scientific verification and even for thinking through mathe-
matical proofs. In the latter, it is a question of nothing else than the discovery
of calculation errors. We always have: the science of a particular time, a
particular problem area in it, a theory or rivaling theories, findings, which
support a theory, the question, what these findings mean, i.e. A, who verifies,
asks himself, what B meant with his findings for his (B's) theory, whether he
is allowed to mean them in relationship to the procedural code; what, when
another theory is attempted, the attempt to verify means in regard to the
entirety of disposable knowledge of a particular time period, and the like ....
Thus, from the very beginning, we have social processes in science which, at
least in gross clarity, we must assume, before we can elucidate the in fact
central concept of verification. When we inquire into the conditions of the
possibility of science, and this question we cannot but help concretely under-
stand, then we run into certain structures of human working-together. Ofthis
discovery you can be quite proud .... As a result: the natural world thus plays
a double role. It provides the starting point for all science and all scientific
work, which is itself further carried out within structures of this world; in a
sector of this world. 37
Here the context of science is recognized as an historical process of social

action. The inter subjectivity obtaining within this context is a human working-
together centered around concrete mutual verification. Later, Schutz and
Gurwitsch will also agree that "teachability" ("Lehrbarkeif') and, thus, we may
add 'learn ability' , are further characterizations of this scientific intersubjec-
tivity?8 It appears that Schutz and Gurwitsch interpret the human working
together centered around verification in the context of science as basically a
process of ,teach ability' and 'learn ability' which is, in a yet to be analyzed sense,
a development of the 'teach ability' and 'learnability' which is characteristic of
intersubjectivity in the life-world. In any case, the context of science with the
specified intersubjective relations is founded in the life-world which is not only
its starting point, but also the world within whose structures it operates as a more
or less enclosed sector of this world.
This description of science marks a tremendous advance over the philosophy
of science prevailing at that time which was heavily under the influence of the
non-social reconstructionistic logical models of Hempel, Oppenheimer, Popper,
and Nagel, and it anticipates many of the critiques and issues later pursued by
Hanson, Kaplan, Kuhn, and Toulmin, and, more recently, Latour, Woolgar, and
Knorr-Cetina. 39 In regard to Gurwitsch's work, it marks a certain progress for,
in lessening the, at first, necessary and radically held opposition between the
context of science and the life-world, this analysis opens up and provides the
direction for further explications of the positive relationships between the context
of science and the intersubjectivity obtaining therein, and the life-world.
d. The Transformation of Lived Experience in the Phenomenological Analysis of the

Life-World
While agreeing with Schutz with respect to the intersubjectivity obtaining in the
context of science and the way that context is founded in the life-world,
Gurwitsch questions Schutz's direct analyses of the mundane life-world arguing
that the man in the natural attitude neither has nor lives the knowledge which
Schutz appears to attribute to him.
You maintain that knowledge of "origin and import of the socially approved
standard" has to do with rationality, and... correctly claim that the more a
pattern is standardized, the less "the underlying elements become analyzable ...
in terms of rational insight". My question is this: does the homunculus have
this knowledge? If it were attributed to him, it appears that the misunder-
standing pointed out by you on page 51 then occurs. This knowledge, only the
scientist has .... It appears to me that one must differentiate between two
rationalities. The one, let us call, the rationality of action, is excellently...
66 Chapter IV
defined by you; the other, let us say, cognitive rationality, has to do with the
procedures of the scientist in constructing the homunculi, with the knowledge
of origin and import of standards, etc. One cannot impute the second to the
homunculus. 4o
Do you not believe that one can first speak of symbols only after the differen-
tiation between the sacred and the profane has occured, or is starting to
occur? Before this differentiation, the sacred is not symbolized, but rather
manifests itself in that, what from the perspective of our standpoint is a
symbol- from ours and not from that of the participants .... Certain facts and
events are involved in the sacred, however, that determines their being and,
thus, they are precisely not facts and events. We, however, make them into
that for it is "self-evident" to us that they are facts and events, and so we
interpret them as symbols. 41
In specifically arguing that the man in the natural attitude does not have the
knowledge which Schutz appears to ascribe to the homunculi and does not have
a knowledge of symbols before the differentiation of the sacred and the profane,
Gurwitsch is employing a more general argument which he elaborates after the
first citation above.
The given is what it is thanks to its sense structures which permeates and
qualifies it. They are in the data itself implicit and "silent". One can naturally
explicate them. Then your description arises. But, then ask yourself: What
have you described? The experience of the common man or the phenomeno-
logical analysis of this description? Methodologically, there is a difficulty here.
We can only explicate all that insofar as we explicate it. We must, however,
remain clear that with this de engagement a transformation takes place. We
describe, therefore, transformed what is lived untransformed. 42
Gurwitsch's essential argument, underlying his specific arguments that man

in the natural attitude does not possess the knowledge which Schutz appears to
ascribe to him, is that a phenomenological analysis explicates sense structures
which are "implicit" and "silent" in lived experience and, in so doing, transforms
this lived experience to the extent that the description cannot be said to be a
description of the experience or knowledge of the common man. It is strictly a
phenomenological analysis of this experience. Thus, the structures explicated by
such analyses cannot in any way be said to appear as phenomena obtaining at
the level of the experience of the common man such that they are understood
as explicit and it appears as if the common man has a knowledge of them.
Schutz responds to this general argument by claiming that the problem
concerning the transformation of the lived experience of the common man simply
does not arise in his analyses since they are limited to a phenomenological
description of the natural attitude and, in a further later letter, he goes on
essentially to claim that such a problem arises only when the phenomenological
reduction is employed.
Now, you ask is this explication an explication of the natural relative world
view or is it an explication of phenomenological analysis. You know very well
that, in all of my work and also in the present one under consideration, I have
a phenomenological analysis of the relative natural world view as a goal. If
such a phenomenological analysis should succeed, then it has that, what it
finds, as it finds it, to present and to describe, and, in so doing, will naturally
clarify the analysis of the Common-sense-world. 43
The world remains preserved as "sense" also in the reduction, but, does that
mean as phenomenon, as the world as it appears to me and exactly as it
appears to me. Is not perhaps the modification to the "sense" of the world,
which results from the transition to the phenomenological attitude, to be led
back to the fact that in place of the self-immediacy of "being by the things
themselves" (which presupposes -life-worldly - "natural" - modes of given-
ness of inter subjective, temporal, and spatial transcendences, and, to be sure,
as a founding context) "intentionality" steps in, which places those founding
contexts out of play?44
3. THE LIMITATIONS OF GURWITSCH'S THEORY OF INTER SUBJECTIVITY AND

THE SOCIAL WORLD
The above mentioned problem concerning the transformation oflived experience

in the phenomenological analysis of the life-world is essentially not Schutz's
problem insofar as he strictly limits his analyses to a phenomenological
description of the natural attitude. It is rather Gurwitsch's own problem arising
from his particular form of phenomenological analysis. Gurwitsch begins his
analysis by standing at the heights of the context of science looking down into
the life-world searching for those implicit rational structures which could possi-
bly found science. Now, insofar as these structures can only be disclosed by
starting from the highly reflective context of science which itself consists of a
quite limited perspective, insofar as these structures are universal structures of
pre-predicative perceptual experience, and insofar as they are admittedly quite
implicit, their discovery and analysis involves a process of tearing them out of
the lived contexture of experience in which they are unwittingly and implicitly
lived in the natural attitude. In other words, their analysis involves a transfor-
mation of them from the way they are concretely experienced and lived within
the world of the natural attitude. Thus, they are not structures founding science
in the sense of concrete lived structures, but in the sense of structures abstracted
and transformed from lived experience. In short, they are explicated highly
formal structures founding science.
68 Chapter IV
Of course, it may be argued that, so long as one does not confuse these
explicated highly formal structures with the way that they are implicitly and
concretely lived in the natural attitude, there is no essential problem in carrying
out such an analysis. In fact, such a transformation of lived experience would
even appear to be a necessity for surely one could not expect to find the universal
rational structures of the life-world founding science by simply carrying out a
description of man in the natural attitude, as if such structures were somehow
lying on the surface of everyday life. However, if one focuses and reflects upon
the essentially social and intersubjective character of the life-world, three very
essential limitations of such an analysis immediately come to the fore.
The first limitation arises from simply questioning the direction of this ab-
straction from lived experience. In abstracting from the world of the natural
attitude, does Gurwitsch go 'below' that world and explicate structures which
underlie and found it, or does he go 'above' it and explicate structures which are,
in essence, ideal formal constructions of our concrete lived experience in the
natural attitude? Does Gurwitsch, in explicating structures which found science,
also explicate structures which found the natural attitude or are these structures
themselves founded in the natural attitude? Are the structures which he expli-
cates transcendental structures of the life-world or structures which transcend
the life-world? In short, our question simply concerns the direction of
Gurwitsch's abstraction from the concrete lived experience of the common man
in the world of the natural attitude and the status of the structures resulting from
it.
Of interest here is one of Schutz's last letters to Gurwitsch in which he
describes his questions and comments, in regard to Gurwitsch's work, as having
to do with the very depths of the presuppositions of the presuppositionless and
further mentions the confusion which then arises. "Perhaps, this is the slave
rebellion of consciousness, bewitched through the Cartesian experience of the
devil in the prison cell of solipsism .... So confused does one become, when one
looks at the unfathomable presuppositions ofpresuppositionlessness".45 Now, it
is precisely in this letter, in which Schutz deals with the most fundamental
questions of phenomenology, that he appeared to sense, at least at some level,
the question which we have just raised going so far as to even point the way
towards a solution. More specifically, Schutz maintains that the very pre-predi-
cative life-world from which Gurwitsch abstracts is itselfbased upon and presup-
poses a process of the construction of types in the natural attitude at which level
mundane problems concerning teachability, socialization, and intersubjectivity
arise.
Fourth problem group - or the Gurwitsch problem. You begin your investigation
with the prepredicative life-world which is already ordered under types - thus,
on the second level.... However, ifI am right with my "first level" - concerning
the construction of types - then we have indeed with the construction of types
as such a pre-Ieve1. 46
Fifth problem group - or the Schutz problem. Where does socialization and
intersubjectivity begin? ... Is thematization and relevance formation teach-
able? What are the conditions of such teachability? And what would be the
intersubjective presuppositions of teach ability in general?47
In that the pre-predicative life-world from which Gurwitsch abstracts is itself

founded upon a process of the construction of types in the natural attitude, the
structures which he explicates cannot be said to underlie and found the world
of the natural attitude. Since they are 'read-off of a secondary stratum of the
world of the natural attitude, they cannot be said to found the primary stratum
which is the world of the natural attitude itself. The direction of Gurwitsch's
abstraction, then, cannot be 'below' the world of the natural attitude explicating
structures which underlie and found it, but must be 'above' the world of the
natural attitude explicating structures which are founded within it.
Now, it is precisely in this abstracting 'above' the world ofthe natural attitude
that the first limitation with Gurwitsch's phenomenological analysis arises for the
structures which he abstracts are clearly seen, then, not only to be highly formal
structures torn out and transformed from our concrete lived experience in the
natural attitude, but, furthermore, to leave behind the entire founding experien-
tial wealth and richness of the more primordial world of the natural attitude itself,
at which level the very mundane problems concerning teach ability, socialization,
and intersubjectivity arise. These structures are, then, highly formalistic struc-
tures in which our meaningful lived experience in the world of the natural attitude
is essentially relinquished and forlorn, and, insofar as these structures are more
implicit than the very world of the natural attitude, upon which they are founded,
it appears that they may even very well be analytical 'constructions' produced
by the reflecting philosopher himself. The formalistic and possibly 'constructivis-
tic' character of this form of phenomenological analysis renders it simply incap-
able of providing much help in attempting to exactly describe something so fertile
and alive as intersubjectivity and the social world in general. In any case, as has
been seen, this phenomenological analysis essentially presupposes both of the
latter in carrying out its own investigations.
The second limitation of Gurwitsch's phenomenological analysis is that it
attempts to provide an account of the intersubjectivity obtaining in science by
merely focusing upon and attempting to demonstrate the latters foundation in
universal rational structures of pre-predicative perceptual experience in the
life-world. If it is true that intersubjectivity in science is, in the final analysis,
founded upon such structures, it is equally as true that so is the intersubjectivity
occurring in everyday conceptual thinking, and in other higher forms of symbolic
thinking such as art, music, and poetry. Thus, these universal rational structures
of pre-predicative perceptual experience cannot in themselves account for the
particular and unique character of the intersubjectivity obtaining in science. In
order to clarify the particular form of intersubjectivity in science, it is necessary,
first, to focus upon the specific experiences, activities, actions, interactions, and
creative thought processes of the scientists themselves. Second, it is necessary
70 Chapter IV
to possess a prior knowledge of at least the intersubjectivity obtaining in the

natural everyday life-world in order to be able to then distinguish the unique from
the common aspects of this scientific intersubjectivity itself.
Finally, Gurwitsch's phenomenological analysis concerns itself with and is
open to providing an examination of only one quite limited realm of the general
complex phenomenon of intersubjectivity itself, namely, with that intersubjectivi-
ty occurring within science. There is no questioning here of the right to delimit
the boundaries of one's own analyses, however, Gurwitsch's delimitation is, as
has been seen, essentially a 'pronunciation' that only this scientific intersubjectiv-
ity can be examined for the life-world itself has been subsumed by the conceptual
apparatus of science and is, consequently, essentially a mere polemical concept.
In the present study, no reason can be found to assume that the conceptual
subsumption of the life-world from within the context of science necessarily
implies that there is no longer an independently experienced natural everyday
life-world in which we live now as before and to which the scientist himself must
always return. In Gurwitsch's phenomenological analysis, there is, then, a certain
overconcern and overestimation of science resulting in an exclusion of an exami-
nation of the very intersubjectivity obtaining in the everyday life-world. One must
here seriously ask whether it is not this phenomenological analysis's understand-
ing of science and interest in founding universal structures of perceptual ex-
perience, rather than natural science itself, which leads to the losing of the very
life from the life-world.
CONCLUSION
It should be immediately pointed out that the above critique of Gurwitsch's later
work has been carried out only in regard to its relationship to and significance
for the problem of intersUbjectivity. The importance of this later work for other
philosophical problems and issues has not been taken up for analysis and no
criticism of it is intended in that more general sense.
Now, it is no doubt fairly obvious that in this chapter no critical analysis of
Gurwitsch's consideration of intersubjectivity as a problem of context and the
milieu-world, which was executed at the level of natural existence, has been
carried out, and the very good reason for this is that it is precisely those analyses
which constitute Gurwitsch's primary and essential contribution to the problem
ofintersubjectivity itself. More specifically, Gurwitsch's main contribution to the
problem of intersubjectivity was to consider it as a problem of various contexts,
milieux, and the milieu-world all of which pointed to and drew out the primordial
implicit and taken for granted character of our knowledge of others in the social
world. It is precisely this aspect of his work which shall be, more or less, taken
over as a whole and shall serve as a significant foundational element in the
attempt to carry out our own later analysis of intersubjectivity as a group
problem.
NOTES
1. Aron Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1976).
2. Gurwitsch, Human Encounters, p. 165, n. 82, S. 41, n. 81. To be sure, the status of Gurwitsch's
"Phenomenology of Thematics and of the Pure Ego" is questioned in Human Encounters, see
p. 168,n. 17 andp. 173,n. 97, S. 60-61,n. 17 and S. 87, n. 97. However, it is clear that the extension
of that work in the Field is now to provide that transcendental foundation about which he speaks
in the quotation given here.
3. Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch, Alfred Schutz - A ron Gurwitsch: BriefwechseI1939-1959, ed.
Richard Grathoff (Miinchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1985).
4. Gurwitsch, Field, pp. 157-375. With respect to previous works, see, for example: "Phenomenology
of Thematics and of the Pure Ego", SPP, pp. 175-300; Aron Gurwitsch, "Some Fundamental
Principles of Constitutive Phenomenology" (1937), in Phenomenology and the Theory of Science,
ed. Lester Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974) pp. 190-209; "On the
Intentionality of Consciousness" (1940), SPP, pp. 124-140; "A Non-egological Conception of
Consciousness", SPP, pp. 287-300; and "On the Object of Thought" (1947), SPP, pp. 141-147.
The above volume will be hereafter cited as PTS.
5. Gurwitsch, Field, p. 379.
6. Ibid., pp. 381-382.
7. See Gurwitsch's argument that the difference between his "orders of existence" and Schutz's
"finite provinces of meaning" consists in the fact that the former are explicated through the
phenomenological reduction and, thus, have to do with transcendental and not psychological
subjectivity. Ibid., pp. 399-404.
8. Ibid., p.382.
9. Ibid., p. 383.
10. Ibid., pp. 409-410.
II. Ibid., p. 390.
12. Ibid., pp.406-409.
13. Ibid., p. 382.
14. Ibid., p. 383.
15. Ibid., p. 387.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., pp. 386-387.
18. See n. 3 above.
19. Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, p. 253 (Jan. 25, 1952 S: G). In citing the Briefwechsel, the
page numbers are followed in parentheses by the date of the letter and the initials of who sent
the letter to whom. The English translations of this correspondence are my own and are based
upon the original archive typescript of this correspondence at the Sozialwissenschajiliches Archiv
Konstanz und in Bielefeld.
20. Ibid., p.249 (Jan. 25, 1952 S : G).
21. Ibid., p.253 (Jan. 25, 1952 S : G).
22. Ibid., p. 248 (Jan. 25, 1952S : G).
23. Ibid., p. 247 (Jan. 25, 1952S : G).
24. "In regard to this matter, I still do not want to commit myself. However, I can already say today
that the constitution of a transcendental Alter Ego appears to me to become invalid" (Ibid., p. 236
(Nov. 6, 1951 G: S ».
25. Ibid., p. 369 (Nov. 30, 1954 G: S).
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p.377 (Nov. 7, 1955 G: S), my emphasis.
28. Ibid., pp.423-424 (Jan. 15, 1958 G: S). Also see Aron Gurwitsch, Leibniz: Philosophie des
Panlogismus (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1974) and "The Kantian and Husserlian Conceptions of
Consciousness" (1960), SPP, pp. 148-160.
29. Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, p. 377 (Nov. 7, 1955 G: S).
72 Chapter IV
30. Ibid., p. 402 (March 22, 1957 S: G).

31. Ibid., pp. 402-403 (March 28, 1957 G: S).
32. Ibid., p. 361 (Sept. 10, 1954 G: S). Also see "Introduction", SPP, p. xxiv.
33. See, for example: Ibid., pp. 363-368 (Oct. 13, 1954 S : G); Alfred Schutz, "On Multiple Realities"
(1945), in Collected Papers, Vol. 1, ed. Maurice Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973),
pp.207-259. This volume is hereafter cited as CP 1. Also see "Symbol, Reality and Society"
(1955), CP 1, pp. 287-356.
34. Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, pp.360-361 (Sept. 10, 1954 G: S). The following inter-
pretation ofGurwitsch's work is also based upon his articles "Problems of the Life-World" (1970),
PTS, pp. 3-32; "On the Systematic Unity of the Sciences" (1972), PTS, pp. 131-149, especially
pp. 144-149; "Perceptual Coherence as the Foundation of the Judgment of Predication" (1973),
PTS, pp.241-267; and Aron Gurwitsch, "On Thematization", Research in Phenomenology, 4
(1974),35-49.
35. Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, p. 136 (Sept. 3, 1945 G: S). Although this quotation is taken
from a fairly early letter dating before the discussion of Schutz and Gurwitsch over the Field, it
is a programmatic statement to which Gurwitsch adds: "those are all themes which I wish I would
still come to in this life; to open up as themes". In the context in which we have used this quote,
this program has taken on a more clear and concrete form.
36. Ibid., p. 273 (April 4, 1952 G: S).
37. Ibid., pp. 328-329 (May 15, 1953 G: S).
38. Ibid., pp.415-421 (Dec. 7, 1957 S : G) and pp. 421-422 (Dec. 12, 1957 G: S).
39. See, for example Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life (Beverly Hills: Sage Publ.,
1979) and Karin D. Knorr-Cetina, The Manufacture of Knowledge (Oxford: Pergamon Press,
1981).
40. Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, pp. 274-275 (April 4, 1952 G: S).
41. Ibid., pp. 360-361 (Sept. 10, 1954 G: S).
42. Ibid., p. 275 (April 4, 1952 G: S).
43. Ibid., p. 279 (April 20, 1952 S: G).
44. Ibid., pp.364-365 (Oct. 13, 1954 S : G).
45. Ibid., p.420 (Dec. 7, 1957 S: G).
46. Ibid., p. 419 (Dec. 7, 1957 S: G).
47. Ibid., p. 420 (Dec. 7, 1957 S: G).
PART THREE
Schutz's Theory of Intersubjectivity

CHAPTER V
The Fundamental Levels to the Problem of

Inter subj ectivity
INTRODUCTION
Schutz's interest in the problem of inter subjectivity, which can be traced as far
back as to his first work not intended for publication, Theone der Lebensformen,
stretches throughout the whole of his life-work. 1 It is clear that unlike in his early
work The Phenomenology of the Social World where he left open the possibility
of considering intersubjectivity as a transcendental problem in the Husserlian
sense, Schutz, in the major portion of his life-work, viewed intersubjectivity
exclusively as a mundane problem belonging to the sphere of the natural attitude
in which man lives in a world whose existence he simply takes for granted?
Schutz considers the problem of intersubjectivity as a question concerning the
relationship between mundane consciousness and the social world. In the last
analysis, he attempts to demonstrate that intersubjectivity is a phenomenon of
the social Person who participates with different levels of his personality in
various dimensions of the social group.
It should already be clear from the above that Schutz's theory of intersubjec-
tivity does not involve the assumption of a solipsistic ego. The very notion of the
social Person points to the intrinsically social character of consciousness. Admit-
tedly, at times, Schutz goes so far as to analyze individual consciousness as if
it were solitary, without any reference to the social world. 3 However, this is an
intentional abstractive procedure employed in order to clearly gain access to
subjective experience before exhibiting the inherent social aspects of that ex-
perience. This very procedure illustrates the originary social character of con-
sciousness and demonstrates that the social is not a secondary substratum
attained by, or superimposed on, consciousness. Although the discussion is
carried out in regard to the transcendental sphere, Schutz's critique of Husserl's
attempt to abstract from the social world so as to attain the sphere of what is
"properly of the ego" and, then, to constitute intersubjectivity from within this
primordial sphere of ownness can be viewed as a further employment of this
procedure. 4 At each step of Husserl's analysis, Schutz shows that either the step
is impossible or else the intersubjective social world has been implicitly presup-
75
76 Chapter V
posed. In this way, Schutz draws out the intrinsic social character of Husserl's
supposedly isolated ego.
Schutz does not, in any of his published works, attempt to develop an explicit
theory of the social Person. Although the importance of such a theory was
mentioned as early as in The Phenomenology, Schutz only occasionally and, then,
very briefly refers to the Person throughout his work. 5 The notion of the Person
remains implicit and in the background. However, it is a crucial background idea
towards which, as the following will attempt to show, much of his work, especial-
ly in regard to intersubjectivity, is oriented.
Before we can directly deal with Schutz's implicit theory of the social Person
and its implications for the problem of intersubjectivity, it is necessary to, first,
become thoroughly acquainted with his more explicit theory of intersubjectivity
which is itself by no means obvious. In this Chapter 5, we shall first consider the
way in which Schutz deals with the problem of intersubjectivity on three levels.
In the following Chapter 6, we shall then consider the way in which, Schutz, on
the basis of a theory of relevance, attempts to develop an integrated theory of
intersubjectivity which simultaneously deals with the phenomenon of intersub-
jectivity which occurs on each of the three levels. Here a first attempt will be
made to sketch out Schutz's implicit theory of the social Person. However, it is
only after our further analysis of Schutz's theory of signs and symbols, a theory
which is concerned with the relationship between experience, transcendence,
and higher forms of knowledge, that we shall be able to make a complete attempt
at sketching out his notion of the social Person.
1. THE THREE FUNDAMENTAL LEVELS AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE

NATURAL ATTITUDE
In his critiques of Scheler and Sartre, Schutz commends both authors for
distinguishing between different levels on which one can deal with the problem
of the alter ego. 6 The failure of most philosophers and psychologists to satisfac-
torily come to terms with the topic of intersubjectivity has been due to their lack
of providing clear distinctions between the various problems involved. In Die
Schutz- Voegelin Korrespondenz, Schutz distinguishes three levels involved in his
own theory of intersubjectivity and raises a question concerning the relationship
between them. Voegelin writes:
You say in your letter very precisely and, I believe, correctly: "However, how
it comes about that reciprocal understanding and agreement can be obtained
in a concrete social relationship between humans, how one, from a knowledge
of the Dasein of the other, can come to a knowledge of the So-sein of the other,
and from here to an understanding of the concrete motive of his action; that
we also do not find in Plato and Aristotle, who, apart perhaps from the
doctrine of types in the Rhetoric of the latter, have seen no problem here
whatsoever". 7
The Fundamental Levels to the Problem of Intersubjectivity 77
Here Schutz distinguishes between the following three levels in his theory of
intersubjectivity: (1) Knowledge of the Dasein of the Other; (2) Knowledge of the
So-sein of the Other; (3) and Knowledge of the Concrete Motives of the Other's
Action.
In order to properly interpret each of these levels which Schutz differentiates,
it is important to remember, as has already been mentioned, that Schutz's
phenomenological analyses are carried out within the natural attitude. The
natural attitude is to be first understood in contradistinction to the strict phe-
nomenological attitude proper, attained through the phenomenological re-
duction, in which the belief in existence is suspended so as to disclose the pure
field of consciousness. In the natural attitude, the human being is considered in
the fullness of his humanity as a mundane existent among other mundane
existents. The human being is considered as a psycho-somatic unity existing in,
living in, and concerned with the world whose existence he implicitly takes for
granted along with that of his self. The natural attitude is also to be understood
in contradistinction to the attitude of traditional empirical sociology which is
concerned with particular empirical facts. The phenomenology of the natural
attitude is concerned with the disclosure and analysis of fundamental categories
of the natural attitude such as 'intersubjectivity', 'interaction', 'communication',
'groups', 'institutions', and 'language' all of which are presupposed in the research
of traditional empirical sociology. The task of such a phenomenology is then to
determine what the phenomena suggested by such terms actually are in our
mundane world and to determine how the meaning of each can be made intelligi-
ble within the sphere of that world. In sum, the phenomenology of the natural
attitude can be characterized as an analysis of an intermediate realm lying
between the concerns and capacities of philosophy and traditional empirical
sociology. In Schutz's words, "there is an intermediate realm - that of the relative
natural world view - towards whose description and analysis philosophical
categories are just as insufficient as the sociological for a clarification of the most
modest philosophical problems".8
Thus, as a level within the relative natural attitude, "Knowledge of the Dasein
ofthe Other" is not to be misconstrued as having to do with the questions posed
by a philosophical ontology which, in the end, are concerned with the primordial
question of Sein. Likewise, "Knowledge of the Concrete Motives of the Other's
Action" is not to be misconstrued as having to do with the questions posed by
traditional empirical sociology. It is more in line with Schutz's life-long investi-
gations of the relative natural attitude to construe "Knowledge of the Dasein of
the Other" as having to do with the fundamental structures and stratifications
of the life-world, and to construe "Knowledge of the Concrete Motives of the
Other's Action" as having to do with a theory of social action. "Knowledge of
the So-sein of the Other" is to be understood as having to do with the relative
natural world view, the latter now being understood in the narrow sense of the
taken for granted historically sedimented group experience. Having dispelled the
danger of misinterpreting the three levels on which the problem ofintersubjectivi-
78 Chapter V
ty is to be treated, it is now possible to briefly examine Schutz's analyses of

intersubjectivity with respect to each of them.
2. KNOWLEDGE OF THE DASEIN OF THE OTHER: THE FUNDAMENTAL STRUC-

TURES AND STRATIFICATIONS OF THE LIFE-WORLD
The fundamental structures and stratifications of the life-world are the

foundational elements of all experience. They are the basis upon which any
individual or social group organizes its experiences. Moreover, they provide the
founding stratum on the basis of which all our knowledge of others originate.
However, on the basis of them alone, only a very limited knowledge of the other
is attained: a knowledge of the mere existence of the other.
The fundamental structures and stratifications of the life-world first consist
of the interrelated basic spatial, temporal, and social structures of our everyday
experience in terms of which the world attains its first organization.9 Spatially,
I experience the world as organized around myself as a center. The place
occupied by my body is my actual here from which everything else is seen as
there. It is the starting point from which objects appear to me in certain distances
and perspectives, and from which I take my bearing in space. In Schutz's words,
the place in which I find myself as my body "is, so to speak, the center '0' of a
system of co-ordinates which determines certain dimensions of orientation in the
surrounding field and the distances and perspectives of the objects therein: they
are above or underneath, before or behind, right or left, nearer or farther". to
Furthermore, through this experiencing of my body as a 'here', the world be-
comes organized into a sector within "actual reach" and "potential reach." The
world within actual reach is that sector of the world which is accessible to
immediate experience through manipulation, seeing, and hearing. The world
within potential reach consists of a world within restorable reach which can be
brought back within actual reach, and a world within attainable reach which is
not nor ever was in my actual reach, but which can be brought within it. In sum,
the space experienced through my body is not an objective space, but a lived
space of orientation.
In explicating the spatial structures of the world, an implicit reference was
made to the temporal structure of the experienced world which is essentially
related to the former. We referred to a world which is in reach, a world which
was in reach, and a world which never was, but which can in the future be brought
within reach. Thus, the spatial structures of the world can be said to have the
following temporal correlates of consciousness: "the actual reach - the present
phase of the stream of consciousness ... ; the restorable reach - the memory; the
attainable reach - expectation". 11 Although the stream of consciousness 'inter-
sects' the spatial structures of the world by means of this correlation, the unity
of the stream of consciousness is in itself, for Schutz, essentially temporal. The
present phase of the stream of consciousness is a limiting phase of recollections
and retentions, and protentions and expectations. The horizon of the future is
composed of typified anticipations which, in becoming present, are confirmed or

disappointed, thereby, simultaneously giving rise to new anticipations, while
forthwith becoming retentions on account of the new succeeding present phase.
Interrelated with these spatio-temporal structures of the life-world are the
fundamental social structures and stratifications. Corresponding to the world of
present actual reach is the "pure we-relation" in which we share with our fellow
men a common span of time and a sector of the world in common reach. Thus,
the pure we-relation is a vivid face-to-face presence. Corresponding to the world
of potential reach is the potential "world of contemporaries" whose subjects
co-exist with me in time without being in actual reach. The world of contempo-
raries consists ofa world of "restorable we-relations" and a world of "attainable
we-relations" which correspond, respectively, to the worlds of restorable reach
and attainable reach. The restorable we-relations are relations with others who
were, at least once, in a we-relation with me and who are remembered in terms
of that past we-relation with varying degrees of probability for restoring it. The
attainable we-relations are relations with others of whom I know, but who never
were in a we-relation with me. These relations are also stratified according to the
different probabilities for attaining such a we-relation. Lying outside the world
of contemporaries, which, so to speak, surrounds the central domain of the
we-relation, are the worlds of predecessors and successors whose subjects
neither share a sector of the spatial world nor co-exist in time with me.
Now it is precisely in terms of these fundamental structures of the life-world
that Schutz goes on to explicate the fundamental structures of intersubjectivity.
Just as the sphere in actual reach was taken to be the founding stratum of all
reality, so the "pure we-relationship" is taken to be the founding stratum of all
social reality.12 In sharing a sector of the spatial world and common span of
world time in the we-relationship, not only is a certain sector of the outer-world
equally accessible to both partners (the same things can be seen, heard, and
manipulated), but, more importantly, the other's body (facial expressions, ges-
tures, etc.) is immediately observable as symptoms of the other's thought. In this
common spatial and temporal situation, in which the other's body is a perceiv-
able and explicable field of expression, his conscious life is open to me, and my
stream of consciousness and his flow together in true simultaneity. In Schutz's
words, "we grow older together". Thus, in the "pure we-relationship", the other,
unlike even my own self which can only be grasped by way of reflection on the
past, is seized in the immediacy of the present, as a stream of consciousness, by
my own stream of consciousness. However, the other, and this is decisive, is
grasped here only as a stream of consciousness without regard to any other
characteristics. That is to say, the other is grasped here only in terms of his mere
factual existence. "The 'pure' we-relation ... consists of the mere consciousness of
the Dasein of an other". 13 Schutz's account of intersubjectivity with respect to
the worlds of contemporaries, predecessors, and successors cannot be consider-
ed in detail here. Suffice it to say that, due to the lack of a commonly shared
sector of the spatial world or span of time with subjects of these worlds, their
80 Chapter V
factual existence can only be indirectly apprehended by increasing anonymous

types. 14
What is crucial to realize here is that this account of intersubjectivity is strictly
formal. The use of the adjective 'pure' to describe the we-relationship does not
only indicate that this relationship can be filled with a great variety of contents
showing manifold degrees of intimacy and anonymity. IS It further indicates that,
factually, there is no such relationship. I never encounter another in a "pure
we-relationship" in which I grasp only the other's mere existence. I always
encounter a particular type of Person with particular characteristics, if not a
particular Person with particular projects of action. Furthermore, the claim that,
insofar as they do not partake in the vivid presence of the pure we-relationship,
the subjects of the worlds of contemporaries, predecessors, and successors can
only be grasped in increasingly anonymous types is also formal. Factually, there
is no relationship which adheres strictly to this structure.
In his criticism of Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity, Schutz himself points
to the problems involved in such a strictly formal analysis of intersubjectivity
which does not yet take into account the relative natural world view of a group
or social action. "It must also be asked whether in fact the bodily appearance
of the Other ... has the decisive significance which Husserl ascribes to it. I
empathize much more with a philosopher spatially and temporally distant than
with my neighbor in the subway who is given to me in person (leibhaftig) but as
a stranger (Fremder)".16
The problems involved with a strictly formal analysis of intersubjectivity,
which does not take into account the other two levels on which intersubjectivity
is to be considered, becomes even clearer when Schutz analyzes the, so to speak,
second set of fundamental structures and stratifications of the life-world. The
fundamental structures and stratifications considered so far concern only our
everyday experience, and Schutz, roughly speaking, refers to them as our "work
world" (Wirkwelt)Y In his essay "On Multiple Realities", Schutz goes to great
lengths to show that, while this work world is the paramount reality insofar as
it is the world of physical things, bodily operations, resistances, tasks, practical
interests, and communication, it is only one of the many "orders of reality" in
which we live. IS Schutz refers to other orders of reality such as the worlds of
theatre, art, and religion, and goes on to analyze not just the cognitive style of
the world of working, but the cognitive style of the worlds of phantasms, the
world of dreams, and the world of scientific theory.
The cognitive style of an order of reality or, as Schutz prefers to say, a "finite
province of meaning" is defined in terms of the following basic characteristics:
(1) a "specific tension of consciousness"; (2) a "specific epoche"; (3) a "prevalent
form of spontaneity"; (4) a "specific form of experiencing oneself'; (5) a "specific
form of sociality"; (6) and a "specific time perspective". 19 The analysis of the finite
provinces of meaning in terms of these fundamental structural features leads to
a strict formal separation between these provinces.
Let us take, for example, the relationship between the scientific finite province
of meaning and the work world with which Schutz was primarily concerned.
The Fundamental Levels to the Problem o/Intersubjectivity 81
Unlike the work world, the scientific province of meaning consists of the follow-
ing basic structural features: (1) a certain detachment from an interest in life, i.e.
a turning away from the state of wide-awake ness and practical concerns; (2) all
actions are theoretical cognitions which do not gear into the outer world and
change it in any way; (3) there is a bracketing of the body, and the systems of
orientation such as the worlds in actual, restorable, and attainable reach, i.e. the
sUbjective point of view is replaced by the role of the theoretician; (4) the vivid
present constituted in the work world through the intersection of space, world
time, and inner duree is replaced by a specious presence defined by the span of
the conceived problem; (5) and there is a language and communication problem
for "any language pertains as communication ... to the world of working".20
This strict formal separation of the world of scientific theory from the world
of work leads Schutz to an equally formal account of intersUbjectivity in regard
to both provinces: the work world is intersubjective and the world of scientific
theory is not. "The theorizing self is solitary; it has no social environment, it
stands outside social relationships"?! The matter, however, is not ended here.
From the very beginning of his work, Schutz was convinced that science is
an essentially social enterprise. However, his formal analysis had now led him
to the impossible conclusion that science is non-intersubjective. Thus, Schutz
goes on to pose a question concerning the "sociality o/theorizing itself": "How can
theoretical thought be communicated and theorizing itself be performed in intersub-
jectivity?"22 Referring to the fact that theorizing is possible only within a pre-given
universe of discourse resulting from others' theorizing acts, and that theorizing
is founded upon the assumption that others can make the subject matter of my
theoretical thought the topic oftheir own theoretical thought (e.g. my theoretical
conclusions will be corroborated or corrected by their conclusions as theirs by
mine), Schutz raises the problem of communication between the world of science
and the work world. The collective enterprise of science presupposes communi-
cation, yet the latter is possible only in the work world. Schutz attempts to deal
with this problem by briefly pointing to the one unitary character of conscious-
ness, even in its attending to various formally delimited provinces of meaning,
and by, then, focusing upon a number of particular social situations in which,
while "still in the world of working connected by communicative acts of working
with the Other .... both partners have leaped together" into another finite province
of meaning?3 Here, Schutz appears to be suggesting that the limitations of his
formal analysis can only be overcome by focusing upon those concrete social
situations in which, through "indirect communication", the actors are able to
communicate their ideas on the basis of the world of working, while, neverthe-
less, having transcended this world through a leap into another finite province
of meaning. It is only through an analysis of such concrete situations that science
will regain and be seen again in its full intersubjective character: "Science
becomes again included in the world of life. And, conversely, the miracle of
aVJUplAoaocpefv brings back the full humanity of the thinker into the theoretical
field".24 Having understood this point, it should come as no suprise to learn that,
although in his formal analysis Schutz claimed that the "theorizing self is solita-
82 Chapter V
ry", in a letter to Gurwitsch, he maintains that the we-relationship is essential

for symphilosophy. "For symphilosophy, the face-to-face relationship is indis-
pensable".25
In sum, Schutz was then well aware of the problems arising from the strict
formal analysis of these fundamental structures and stratifications of the life-
world. In later sections, we shall see that he comes to further question the
independent analysis of this entire level and attempts to solve the problems
arising from it. 26
3. KNOWLEDGE OF THE SO-SEIN OF THE OTHER: THE RELATIVE NATURAL

WORLD VIEW OF A GROUP
The relative natural world view of a group is the taken for granted and commonly
shared historically sedimented group experience. On the basis of the relative
natural world view all subjects organize their experiences as members of the
group. Furthermore, it is on the basis of the relative natural world view that I
understand the other as a member of our group. The analysis of the relative
natural world view does not concern my knowledge of the factual existence, the
'there', of an other in the social world as did the analysis of the fundamental
structures, but rather my knowledge of the 'how' of the other in the social group,
that is, the other's 'social situatedness'. In a series of articles written closely
together, "The Stranger", "The Homecomer", and "The Well-Informed Citizen",
Schutz carries out his most extensive examination of the problem of inter-
subjectivity at this level of the relative natural world view. 27
In "The Stranger", Schutz attempts to exhibit the most fundamentally shared,
taken for granted, knowledge upon the basis of and in terms of which we
understand others as members of our group. More specifically, he attempts to
delineate the most basic assumptions which must be shared in order for any
relative natural world view to remain operative. Methodologically, Schutz con-
siders the situation in which an adult of our present society approaches another
group, at a corresponding level of civilization, and attempts to become "perma-
nently accepted or at least tolerated". The paradigmatic example which he
chooses is that of the immigrant. This stranger, in the very process of attempting
to understand others, places in question virtually everything that is unquestion-
able to a member of a group.
Schutz's enlightening analyses of the processes by which the stranger painfully
comes to place in question the relative natural world view of his former group
and comes to share the relative natural world view of the approached group
cannot be examined here. Only the conclusions of his analyses can be considered.
Referring to Scheler's concept of the "relative natural world view", Schutz
defines this term here as "the cultural pattern of group life" which is meant to
designate "all the peculiar valuations, institutions, and systems of orientation and
guidance (such as the folkways, mores, laws, habits, customs, etiquette, fashions)
which... characterize - if not constitute - any social group at a given moment in
its history".2 8 It includes the "of course" assumptions of a particular group and
is taken to be a "thinking as usual" by the members. Schutz concludes that the
maintenance of this relative natural world view depends upon four mutually
shared basic assumptions: "(1) that life and especially social life will continue to
be the same as it has been so far; ... (2) that we may rely on the knowledge handed
down to us ... ; (3) that in the ordinary course of affairs it is sufficient to know
something about the general type or style of events ... in order to manage or control
them; and (4) that neither the systems of recipes ... nor the underlying basic
assumptions just mentioned are our private affair".29
Now, for Schutz, it is precisely on the basis of these four mutually shared
fundamental assumptions, which support the relative natural world view, that I
first understand the other as a member of my group. The sharing of these
assumptions, then, implies the following most important points with regard to
the problem of intersubjectivity at this level of analysis. 30 First, the other shares
with me the vivid historical tradition of the group in which he also took part. It
too has become an integral part of his biography. Second, the other, like myself,
has a definite status in the hierarchy of the group; a status which serves as a null
point from which to organize the social world around himself and from which
to use the cultural pattern as a scheme of orientation. Third, the total cultural
pattern is for both of us 'in hand'. Thus, in a single glance, we catch the recipe
appropriate for the present situation and act accordingly. Fourth, in sharing a
total cultural pattern, the other shares with me a system of more or less anon-
ymous types in terms of which social acts are understood at a presupposed level
of anonymity, and in terms of which individual traits are manifested.
In "The Homecomer", Schutz examines a secondary stratum of the relative
natural world view. It is not the entire cultural pattern of the group and its basic
presuppositions which are now examined, but rather those more specific patterns
which one considers to be one's home within a group. Here Schutz attempts to
delineate that knowledge in terms of which we understand another not merely
as a member of our social group, but as a member of our home group. Methodo-
logically, Schutz considers the situation of the 'homecomer' who comes back to
stay permanently. Unlike the 'stranger' who, in attempting to join another group,
must relinquish the most basic categories of the relative natural world view of
his former group, the 'homecomer', in simply rejoining his old group, has only
to give up or modify the relatively superficial categories of his home group which
have undergone some change during his absence. The fundamental categories of
the relative natural world view remain intact. Thus, the stratum of the relative
natural world view which becomes questionable to the 'homecomer' is not the
primary stratum which concerns the fundamental order of the entire society, but
a secondary stratum which concerns a specific sector of order in that society -
his home.
Schutz's analyses ofthe social relationship between those at home and the one
who dwells far away from it, and the relationship between those who remained
at home and the one who returns home to stay, draws out the character of life
at home as "actually or at least potentially life in so-called primary groups".3J
84 Chapter V
This means that the 'home group' consists of: (1) a common sector of space and
time, and therewith common surrounding social objects; (2) face-to-face re-
lationships; (3) and a reliable chance to re-establish interrupted we-relationships
as if no intermittence had occured.32 In short, the 'home group' could be said to
be a texture of stable recurrent we-relationships in which the members possess
a great degree of reliable knowledge for interpreting what the other means and
for forecasting his future actions. The common knowledge shared by the mem-
bers of the 'home group' arises through their living together, in the immediacy
of we-relationships, the subtle changes in the customary patterns of daily life and
adapting their interpretive systems accordingly. It is precisely on the basis of such
'finely-tuned' knowledge that I understand the other as a member of my home
group.
Schutz now claims that it is not the place in which I find myself as my body
or the status in the hierarchy of the group, but rather the 'home group' which is
to be understood as the "null point of the system of co-ordinates which we ascribe
to the world in order to find our bearings within it".33 This notion of a 'home
group' is one of Schutz's most valuable insights into the problem of intersubjec-
tivity. Unfortunately, it has been totally neglected in the literature. 34
In the "Well-Informed Citizen", Schutz examines a tertiary stratum of the
relative natural world view: the typical ideal construct of a member in the group.
Here Schutz attempts to explicate that knowledge in terms of which we under-
stand an other not merely as a member of our social group or home group, but
as a member 'for himself.
Schutz suggests that there is a commonly shared knowledge that each mem-
ber of the group accepts some parts of the cultural pattern without question,
while subjecting other parts to question. 35 In other words, there is a commonly
shared knowledge in terms of which we understand the other as a member who
takes certain aspects of the cultural pattern for granted and inquires into others.
Consequently, Schutz now claims that Scheler's conception of the relative natur-
al world view, which tends to refer exclusively to the basic, mutually-shared,
cultural patterns of the group, is limited insofar as it does not take into account
this fact that members, while indeed sharing basic aspects of the relative natural
world view in common, nevertheless, do not share other aspects of it, and,
moreover, know of this.
In terms of the social group we may say with Scheler that any in-group has
a relatively natural concept of the world which its members take for granted.
Useful as this concept is in many respects, it is clear that all the members
of an in-group do not accept the same sector of the world as granted beyond
question and that each of them selects different elements of it as an object of
further inquiry. 36
In examining the fact that we understand others as members of our group who
subject different aspects of the relative natural world view to question, Schutz
is led to the conclusion that we understand others not merely as members of our
group, but as members, who are, simultaneously, to various degrees, an "expert",

a "well-informed citizen", and a "man on the street".37 The "expert" is that aspect
of the other which concerns his clear and distinct knowledge of a limited field
in which he makes warranted assertions. The "well-informed citizen" is that
aspect of the other which concerns his "reasonably founded opinions" in fields
which, although not bearing upon his purpose at hand, he knows are of mediate
concern to him. Finally, the "man on the street" is that aspect of the other which
concerns his "working knowledge of many fields which are not necessarily
coherent with one another".38 This working knowledge is a knowledge of recipes
for bringing about typical results, by typical means, in typical situations.
This type ofintersubjective grasping of the other as simultaneously an expert,
a well-informed citizen, and a man on the street already points to the next section
which is concerned with the understanding of the concrete motives of the other's
action.
4. KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONCRETE MOTIVES OF THE OTHER'S ACTION: A

THEORY OF SOCIAL ACTION
The third level on which the problem of intersubjectivity is to be considered

concerns the understanding of the motives of the other's action. The analysis of
intersubjectivity on this level does not concern my knowledge of the factual
existence of the other in the social world or my knowledge of the other as
belonging to the social group, but rather my knowledge of the motives of the other
for acting as he does. It will be seen that, although this knowledge depends in
varying degrees on the established typifications of the relative natural world
view, it is not determined by the latter. Of course, one might go so far as to argue
that the relative natural world view is itself a product of previous actions and
interactions, and must be examined as such. However, this would be going too
far for, although the relative natural world view can be partially examined in
terms of its genesis and as the product ofthe reciprocal understanding of motives
by actors, any formulation of motives or understanding of motives always pre-
supposes a relative natural world view, however primitive. 39 While one can,
perhaps, fantasize an original situation in which actors encounter one another
and, through interpreting one another's motives, construct an originary social
world, one cannot practically conceive of such a situation. There is always
already a previously constituted relative natural world view, composed of com-
mon typifications, on the basis of which I formulate my motives and understand
those of others.
In his analyses of social action, Schutz finds that it is important to first
distinguish between action and conduct. 40 Conduct refers to subjectively mean-
ingful experience without intent. Thus, it includes "all kinds of so-called auto-
matic activities of inner or outer life - habitual, traditional, affectual ones".41
Action, on the other hand, refers to "conduct which has been devised by the actor
in advance, that is, which is based upon a preconceived project".42 The precon-
86 Chapter V
ceived project of any action begins with the completed future act from which the
steps bringing about this act can be reconstructed. Thus, it is not the future
course of action which is anticipated in the preconceived project of action, but
the future act (modo futuri exacti). Schutz refers to this future projected act as
the "in-order-to motive" for carrying out the action. 43 Living in his ongoing
process of acting, the actor has only this in-order-to motive in view which is the
subjective meaning of his ongoing action. However, if he turns back to his past
action and becomes an observer of his own acts, the (genuine) "because motive"
can come into view. 44 The latter refers to those circumstances which appear to
have determined the actor to act as he did; circumstances which are understood
as that which motivated the project of action itself.
Now, the actor is eminently interested in grasping the in-order-to motive of
the other's action in the social world. In coming to terms with the social world
as an actor living within it and not merely observing it, I have to understand the
subjective meaning of the other's action. In order to successfully carry out my
own action and attain my own goals, I have to take into account the meaning
which the other's action has to him. However, it is of the utmost importance to
realize here that this understanding is not the understanding which is engaged
in grasping the other's automatic activities such as his habits or traditional acts.
This latter type of understanding is itself habitual or traditional and, if it were
applied to action, the very subjective meaning of the action would be forsaken.
As has been seen, action is distinguished from habitual and traditional activities
(i.e. conduct) by the fact that it is based upon a preconceived intended project.
If action is understood automatically in a habitual or traditional way, this
preconceived project, the very subjective meaning of the action, would be reduc-
ed to the standard gross typifications having to do with conduct and would,
consequently, be lost to interpretation.
The understanding to which Schutz refers in speaking of the understanding
of the subjective meaning of the other's action is best understood as a 'sponta-
neous understanding'.45 It is a spontaneous act of interpretation which grasps a
correspondingly spontaneously projected motive of action. To be sure, this
spontaneous understanding, just as the spontaneously projected future act, is
based upon a prior knowledge of a common set of typifications. However, this
understanding employs specific typifications, relatively private typifications, or
even constructs new typifications, all within the standard approved typifications
of the social group, in order to grasp the subjective meaning of the action.
Paradoxically, it could be said, then, that the subjective meaning of action is
grasped here in its 'specific typicality'. Of course, the more standardized the
in-order-to motive, that is, the more it is projected in line with the standard
socially approved typifications, the greater is my chance of understanding it. At
the same time, however, the more standardized the in-order-to motive, the more
it loses its character as the subjective meaning of action and boarders on
non-intentional conduct. The implications of this fact for the problem of rational-
ity, or what Schutz refers to as the "paradox of rationality", cannot be considered
here. 46
The processes by which this spontaneous understanding is deemed insuf-

ficient (e.g. a misunderstanding becomes thematic and must be 'cleared-up') and
by which a need arises for a further search for the sUbjective meaning of the
action concern an extremely interesting set of problems of which Schutz seemed
to be aware, but which he did not himselfinvestigate. 47 In any case, Schutz was
firmly convinced that the absolutely unique subjective meaning which the action
has for the actor is never grasped. Here Schutz takes over a thesis from Bergson
and claims that the apprehension of the unique subjective meaning which an
action has for the other presupposes that I have lived through all the other's past
experiences in their peculiar intensity and sequence, and that, consequently, I am
identical with the other.48 Nevertheless, it can be said that through a 'sponta-
neous understanding', which employs 'specific typifications', a glimpse of this
peculiar sUbjective meaning is indeed attained and this is sufficient for all practi-
cal purposes.
With respect to the understanding of the subjective motives of action, Zaner
and N atanson can now be read as drawing out two different aspects of this
problem in Schutz's work. Zaner emphasizes, in our words, the 'spontaneous'
aspect of understanding the other's action going so far as to claim that a
refraining from typitying and "being open to" the other is required in order to
grasp the other's SUbjective meaning. 49 N atanson, on the other hand, emphasizes
the need for typifications, anonymization, and abstraction, going so far as to
claim that the implicit suppression and disregarding of that which has to do with
the particularity of this concrete person is necessary for all understanding. 50 In
Schutz's work, both of these aspects of understanding the other are present,
although not to the extremes which Zaner and Natanson take them. There is
neither a relinquishing of the social world so as to attain a non-typified under-
standing of the other nor an objectitying of the other in which the particular
subjective meaning of his action is forlorn. Instead, there is a spontaneous
understanding of the other in which the SUbjective meaning of his action is
grasped in its 'specific typicality'. While the understanding which is determined
by the socially approved typifications is, for the most part, guaranteed, this
spontaneous understanding shows a chance character upon which our hopes and
fears of acting in the social world are based. In this spontaneous understanding,
"our experience of other peoples' thoughts is a transcendent one, and our belief
in the existence of those thoughts, therefore, a principally dubitable belief'.51
NOTES
I. Alfred Schutz, Theorie der Lebensformen, ed. Ilja Srubar (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag,
1981 ).
2. Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, trans. George Walsh and Frederick
Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967). Translation of Alfred Schutz, Der
sinnhafte Aujbau der sozialen Welt (1932), (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1981). We shall
follow our practice of providing references first to the English translation (p.) followed by
references to the original German text (5.). In regard to the fact that Schutz left open the
88 Chapter V
possibility of considering intersubjectivity as a transcendental problem in this text, see, for

example: pp. 43-44,45-96, and 97-102, S. 55-56,62-130, and 137-143. In a crucial footnote, Schutz
clearly states with respect to the problem of intersubjectivity that "in the Cartesian Meditations,
especially in Meditation V, Husserl has given us a profound analysis ofthe general significance
of these questions and has also given us the essential starting point from which they must be
solved" (p. 97, n. 2, S. 193, Anm. 2). For an early criticism ofHusserl's treatment ofintersubjectiv-
ity as a transcendental problem, see Alfred Schutz, "Scheler's Theory of Intersubjectivity and
the General Thesis of the Alter Ego" (1942), CP 1, pp. 165-167 and p. 175. Here Schutz questions
whether intersubjectivity is a transcendental problem and points to the fact that it is possibly a
mundane problem belonging exclusively to the sphere of the natural attitude. "It is in no way
established whether the existence of Others is a problem of the transcendental sphere at all, i.e.,
whether the problem of intersubjectivity does exist between transcendental egos ... or whether
intersubjectivity and therefore sociality does not rather belong exclusively to the mundane sphere
of our life-world" (p. 167). Schutz's later extended criticism ofHusserl's account ofintersubjectiv-
ity and his systematic argument that intersubjectivity is exclusively a mundane problem can be
found in Alfred Schutz, "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl" (1957), in
Collected Papers, Vol. 3, ed. I. Schutz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 51-84. This volume
is hereafter cited as CP 3.
3. For example, see: "On Multiple Realities", CP 1, p. 218; Alfred Schutz, Reflections on the Problem
of Relevance (1947-51), ed. Richard M. Zaner (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970),
pp.73-74 and p. 134; "Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation" (1953), CP 1, p. 10; and
"Symbol, Reality and Society", CP 1, p. 306 and p. 312. It is important to note that in response
to a question by Gurwitsch concerning this apparent positing of an isolated ego in the article
"Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation", Schutz writes: "Obviously, only for pedagogical
reasons, I have taken as a starting point a theoretical solipsistic ego and only afterwards
introduced the structures which bring in the social world. That, however, naturally does not mean
that I believe that a private experience could be possible which would not be from the outset
socialized. Here I have it much easier than Husserl because I am content with remaining at the
level of the relative natural world view.... The natural world is thoroughly social and our
knowledge of this world is also social, precisely in the natural attitude." (Schutz and Gurwitsch,
Briefwechsel, pp. 279-280 (April 20, 1952 S : G».
4. "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl", CP 1, pp. 51-84.
5. Schutz, The Phenomenology, p. 249, S. 349. Although Schutz, in places too numerous to cite, only
very briefly refers to the notion of the Person throughout his work, it should be mentioned that
he did write a lengthy manuscript on the Person which remains unpublished (Sozialwissenschaji-
liches Archiv Konstanz). This manuscript, which appears to be a predecessor to his article "On
Multiple Realities" (CP 1, pp. 207-259) arises out of the early period of Schutz's work. Conse-
quently, little from this manuscript will be used in the following as an attempt will be made to
develop the notion of the Person especially in respect to Schutz's later writings. In any case, I
wish to express my thanks to Richard Grathoff for calling my attention to this manuscript. It
should also be mentioned that Schutz carefully analyzes Scheler's notion of the Person in the
following articles: "Scheler's Theory ofintersubjectivity and the General Thesis ofthe Alter Ego",
CP 1, pp.150-179; "Max Scheler's Philosophy" (1956), CP 3, pp.133-144; and "Max Scheler's
Epistemology and Ethics" (1957), CP 3, pp. 145-178. This footnote was written before the
appearance of I\ja Srubar, Kosmion (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988).
6. "Scheler's Theory of Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego", CP 1, p. 164 and
"Sartre's Theory of the Alter Ego" (1948), CP 1, p.199.
7. Alfred Schutz and Eric Voegelin, Die Schutz-Voegelin Korrespondenz (Sozialwissenschajiliches
Archiv Konstanz und in Bielefeld), p. 585 (Oct. 19,1952 V: S) as part of the original typescript of
Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, which was distributed and used as the basis
for the colloquium "Phlinomenologie und Sozialwissenschaft: Alfred Schutz und Aron Gur-
witsch" at the Zentrum fiir Interdisziplinare Forschung at the University of Bielefeld, 1981. (See:
Sozialwissenschaji und Intersubjektivitiit: Phiinomenologische Perspektiven der Sozialwissenschajien
im Umkreis von Aron Gurwitsch und Alfred Schutz, ed. Richard Gratholf and Bernhard Waldenfels
(Miinchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1981)). In citing Die Schutz-Voegelin Korrespondenz, the page
numbers refer to this original archive typescript. They are followed in parentheses by the date
of the letter and initials of who sent the letter to whom.
8. Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, p. 134 (June ll, 1945 S: G).
9. For Schutz's account of these basic spatial, temporal, and social structures of everyday ex-
perience, see, for example: Schutz, The Phenomenology, pp. 45-214, S. 62-290; "Scheler's Theory
ofIntersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego", CP 1, pp. 167-179; "On Multiple
Realities", CP 1, pp. 209-226; "Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action",
CP 1, pp. 10-19; and Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann, The Structures of the Life-World,
trans. Richard M. Zaner and H. Tristam Engelhardt, Jr. (London: Heinemann, 1974), pp. 35-92.
The latter is a translation of Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann, Strukturen der Lebenswelt,
VoU (Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand, 1975). We shall follow our practice of providing refer-
ences first to the English translation followed by references to the original German text. See S.
53-107. In referring to the shortened-title form "Structures" in the following, it is always this first
volume which is intended.
10. "Symbol, Reality and Society", CP 1, p. 306.
11. Schutz and Luckmann, Structures, pp. 51-52, S. 67.
12. For Schutz's notion of a "pure we-relation", see, for example: Schutz, The Phenomenology,
pp. 163-172, S. 227-240; "Scheler's Theory ofIntersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter
Ego", CP 1, pp.I72-177; "On MUltiple Realities", CP 1, pp.212-222; "Common Sense and
Scientific Interpretation of Human Action", CP 1, pp. 15-19; Alfred Schutz, "Making Music
Together" (1951), in Collected Papers, Vol. 2, ed. Arvid Broderson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1976), pp. 159-178; and Schutz and Luckmann, Structures, pp. 75-81. Collected Papers, Vol. 2 is
hereafter cited as CP 2.
13. Schutz and Luckmann, Strukturen, S. 77, my translation; p. 64. Of course, Schutz makes many
similar statements in Der sinnhafte Aujbau. For example, there he writes: "Wir kiinnen also die
umweltliche Dueinstellung definieren als die besondere Intentionalitiit der Akte, in denen das Ich,
solange es in ihnen lebt, von dem Dasein eines Du im Modus des originalen Selbst Eifahrung hat. Jede
auBere Erfahrung im Modus des originalen Selbst setzt aber die leibhaftige Vorgegenheit des
Eifahrenen in zeitlicher und riiumlicher Unmittelbarkeit voraus. Wir sagen ausdriicklich, daB die
umweltliche Dueinstellung auf das Dasein eines alter ego, aber nicht notwendig auf sein Sosein
bezogen ist. Denn der Begriff der Dueinstellung impliziert an sich noch nicht ein In-den-Blick-fas-
sen der besonderen Bewuj3tseinserlebnisse dieses alter ego. Als 'reine' Dueinstellung konstituiert sie
sich schon in der intentionalen Beziehung auf das reine Dasein des belebten und beseelten Du,
indessen sein Sosein dahingestellt bleibt, oder zumindest dahingestellt bleiben kann" (S. 228-
229). With respect to the pure we-relation, Schutz goes on to write that "Was die reine Wirbezie-
hung konstituiert ist nichts anderes als die wechselseitige reine Dueinstellung, in der das umwelt-
liche alter ego intentional als ein Selbst erfasst wird. Aber diese reine Dueinstellung geht ihrem
Wesen nach nur auf das Dasein des Du iiberhaupt, nicht auf sein spezifisches Sosein. Schon daB
wir uns als daseiend, und zwar also einander zugekehrt, originar erfahren, konstituiert die reine
Wirbeziehung" (S. 233). The fairly loose English translations read: "The Thou-orientation can
thus be defined as the intentionality of those Acts whereby the Ego grasps the existence of the
other person in the mode of the original self. Every such external experience in the mode of the
original self presupposes the actual presence of the other person and my perception of him as
there. Now, we wish to emphasize that it is precisely the being there (Dasein) of the Other toward
which the Thou-orientation is directed, not necessarily the Other's specific characteristics. The
concept ofthe Thou-orientation does not imply awareness of what is going on in the Other's mind.
In its 'pure' form the Thou-orientation consists merely of being intentionally directed toward the
pure being-there of another alive and conscious human being" (p. 164). "The pure We-relationship
is merely the reciprocal form of the pure Thou-orientiation, that is, the pure awareness of the
presence of another person. His presence, it should be emphasized, not his specific traits. The pure
We-relationship involves our awareness of each other's presence and also the knowledge of each
that the other is aware of him" (p. 168).
90 Chapter V
14. See, for example: Schutz, The Phenomenology, pp. 176-214, S. 245-302; "Common Sense and
Scientific Interpretation of Human Action", CP 1, pp.15-26; and Schutz and Luckmann,
Structures, pp.68-92, S. 81-102.
15. Schutz makes this point numerous times when speaking of the "pure we-relationship". See n. 12
above.
16. "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl", CP 3, p. 81.
17. For Schutz's concept of the "work world", see, for example "On Multiple Realities", CP 1,
pp.218-234.
18. Ibid., pp.207-259.
19. Ibid., pp. 229-234.
20. See Ibid., pp. 245-253.
21. Ibid., p. 253.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., pp. 257-258.
24. Ibid., p. 259.
25. Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, p. 241 (Jan. 19, 1952 S: G).
26. See Chapter 6, especially Sec. 2.
27. "The Stranger" (1944), CP 2, pp. 91-105; "The Homecomer" (1945), CP 2, pp. 106-119; and "The
Well-Informed Citizen: An Essay on the Social Distribution of Knowledge" (1946), CP 2,
pp.120-134.
28. "The Stranger", CP 2, p. 92.
29. Ibid., 96.
30. See, for example, ibid., pp.96-105.
31. ''The Homecomer", CP 2, p. 109.
32. For this and the following definition of the home group, see ibid., pp. 107-113.
33. Ibid., p. 107.
34. In Part 4, the 'home group' will be further considered and will playa major role in our drawing
Schutz and Gurwitsch's work together. The fact that the Luckmann position, as presented in The
Structures of the Life- World, did not follow through with this insight will become clear in Chapter
7.
35. ''The Well-Informed Citizen: An Essay on the Social Distribution of Knowledge", CP 2,
pp. 120-122.
36. Ibid., p. 121.
37. Ibid., pp. 122-131.
38. Ibid., p. 122.
39. For example, in "Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action", Schutz writes:
"All projects of my forthcoming acts are based upon my knowledge at hand at the time of
projecting" (CP 2, p. 20). "Even the simplest interaction in common life presupposes a series of
common sense constructs" (CP 2, p. 23).
40. For the following account of Schutz's theory of social action, see, for example: "The Social World
and the Theory of Social Action" (1940), CP 2, pp. 1-19; Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons, The
Theory of Social Action: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons, ed. Richard
Grathofi' (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978); "The Problem of Rationality in the
Social World" (1943), CP 2, pp. 64-88; "On Multiple Realities", CP 1,pp. 208-218; and "Common
Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action", CP 1, pp. 3-47.
41. "On Multiple Realities", CP 1, p. 211.
42. Ibid.
43. See n. 40 above.
44. Ibid.
45. Although Schutz nowhere explicitly speaks of a 'spontaneous understanding' as defined below,
his distinction between automatic habitual conduct and social action, along with his theories of
typification, rationality, personal types, and the subjective interpretation of meaning, all point
towards such an active understanding of action which employs 'specific typifications'. It is also
noteworthy that Schutz speaks of the socially approved typifications as merely the common field
within which members construct specific or private typifications. "The socially approved system
of typifications ... is the common field within which the private typifications ... of the individual
members of the group originate" ("Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World"
(1957), CP 2, p. 238).
46. See, for example: Schutz and Parsons, The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons;
"The Problem of Rationality in the Social World", CP 2, pp. 64-88; and "Common Sense and
Scientific Interpretation of Human Action", CP 1, pp. 27-47.
47. "Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action", CP 1, p. 24. Also see Richard
Grathoff's excellent study devoted precisely to this problem. Richard Grathoff, The Structure of
Social Inconsistencies (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970).
48. While Schutz makes this claim in numerous places, see the following where it carries a Bergson-
ian reference. "Choosing Among Projects of Action" (1951), CP 1, p. 92 and Schutz, Relevance,
p.98.
49. Richard Zaner, ''Theory oflntersubjectivity: Alfred Schutz", Social Research, 28, No. I (Spring
1961),71-93, especially, 87-93.
50. Maurice Natanson, "Das Problem der Anonymitat im Denken von Alfred Schutz", in Alfred
Schutz und die Idee des AI/tags in den SozialwissenschaJten, ed. Walter M. Sprondel and Richard
Grathoff (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1979), pp. 79-88, especially pp. 83-85.
51. "Scheler's Theory ofIntersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego", CP 1, p. 176.
CHAPTER VI
Towards an Integrated Theory of Intersubjectivity:

The Person and the Social Group
INTRODUCTION
Thus far, we have considered the three levels on which Schutz treats the problem
of intersubjectivity. It should now come as no surprise to hear Schutz claim that
"my experience of my fellow-man in the we-relation... is the experience of a man,
it is the experience of a typical actor on the stage of the social world, it is the
experience of this completely determined, unique fellow-man in this completely
determined situation"! Moreover, it should now be clear why Schutz,
throughout his work, continuously refers to the "general thesis of reciprocal
perspectives" which consists of the "idealization of the interchangeability of the
standpoints", the "idealization of the system of relevances", and the "idealization
of the reciprocity of motives".2 The "general thesis of reciprocal perspectives"
refers to the problem of inter sUbjectivity in general, and each of the idealizations
respectively concern each of the levels at which the problem of intersubjectivity
has been dealt with above.
It should also be clear that the idealizations of the reciprocity of perspectives
are not formal, abstract, universal norms or principles which, in themselves,
account for the phenomenon of intersubjectivity as de Folter suggests. 3 As can
be seen from the above, the idealizations refer to three broad, rich fields in which
the phenomenon of intersubjectivity is to be investigated. Only the highlights of
Schutz's work in these fields have been presented in the above and Schutz
certainly did not consider any of this work complete. De Folter's further sug-
gestion that the "mutual tuning-in relationship" be understood as a concrete
production of a reciprocity of perspectives illustrates a confusion with respect
to distinguishing between the various levels on which intersubjectivity is to be
considered. 4 The "mutual tuning-in relationship" refers to the "sharing of the
other's flux of experience in inner time", "a growing older together", and, in the
end, the "pure we-relationship". 5 Thus, it refers to the first level of the problem
of intersubjectivity where Schutz carries out his most abstract analyses. Conse-
quently, the "mutual tuning-in relationship" is in no way meant to be, and can
in no way be considered to be, a concrete reciprocity of perspectives.
93
94 Chapter VI
Brodersen with his distinction between "pure theory" and "applied theory"6,
and Luckmann with his distinction between 'phenomenology' and 'sociology'7 do
attempt to clearly distinguish between various levels of analysis in Schutz's work.
However, their distinctions arise from general theoretical reflections on method-
ological issues and procedures, and are not based upon Schutz's concrete work
on the various differences given in the Sachverhalt of intersubjectivity itself. In
any case, it does seem clear that much of the debate centering around Schutz's
conception of intersUbjectivity is due to a lack of clarifying at exactly what level
one is speaking about the problem of intersubjectivity.
Throughout much of his work, Schutz examines the phenomenon of intersub-
jectivity by moving back and forth between the various levels of the problem
using insights gained at one level to throw light on the other levels. In this way,
Schutz hoped, in the end, to be able to go on and provide an inclusive analysis
of intersubjectivity which would be consistent with the findings at all of the
various levels. This deeper and broader problem of intersubjectivity, which
concerns the integration of the various levels at which the problem ofintersubjec-
tivity has been raised and treated, Schutz refers to when he asks how, from the
knowledge of the Dasein of the other, one arrives at a knowledge of his So-sein,
and how, from here, one arrives at an understanding of the concrete motives of
his action. 8
In general, Schutz asks: What is the relationship between the various levels
of intersubjectivity? He attempts to answer this question through a theory of
relevance. The relationship between the various levels can be understood only
in terms of their relevance to the social actor. With this insight, the ground is laid
for a theory of the social Person.
1. THE THEORY OF RELEVANCE
The theory of relevance is essentially an attempt to provide an integrated theory

ofintersubjectivity. The theory would ideally embrace each of the levels on which
the problem of intersubjectivity has been treated and would ideally unify these
levels by considering them in terms of their relevance to the social actor. Insofar
as the theory of relevance considers these various levels of intersubjectivity in
terms of their importance to the actor, it can be said to be a phenomenology of
motivation. It considers the various realms of intersubjectivity in terms of the
immediate interests and motives of an actor carrying out his action in the social
world.
Let us begin our discussion of the theory of relevance by first considering
Schutz's general line of argumentation. In his theory of relevance, Schutz consid-
ers the fundamental structures and stratifications of the life-world as the funda-
mental imposed relevances on the basis of which all other relevances originate.9
These fundamental structures are now understood as an aspect of the human
condition, that is, as an essential feature of the place of man within the cosmos.
Since they are not of our own making and have to be taken without question as
The Person and the Social Group 95
they are, they are experienced as imposed relevances. Founded upon these
fundamental imposed relevances is another set of imposed relevances which
shall be here referred to as the 'basic imposed relevances'. Schutz claims that
they too are "common to all social worlds because they are rooted in the human
condition".10 Everywhere we find that there are (1) "sex and age groups, and
some division oflabor conditioned by them"; (2) kinship organizations through
which the social world is arranged into zones of social distance; (3) and
hierarchies of superordination and subordination. Upon these basic imposed
relevances are founded the relevances of the relative natural world view. Schutz
now considers the relative natural world view as an organization of domains of
relevances which, as shall become clear later, are to varying degrees imposed. I I
Since numerous types of the relative natural world view carry a sUbscript to the
same problem for the sake of which they have been formed, they can be said to
refer to the same domain of relevance, and, insofar as this problem carries a
reference to a horizon of other interrelated problems, the types can be said to
refer to the same domains of relevances. These domains of relevances are
essentially heterogeneous and, consequently, "the application of yardsticks not
pertaining to the same domain of relevance leads to logical or axiological (moral)
inconsistencies".12 Furthermore, the domains of relevances are themselves
arranged in a certain order of superiority and inferiority. 13
It is suggested that this Schutzian notion of an order of domains of relevances
be understood, to use a term of Scheler, as a "rank order of values". 14 However,
this "rank order of values" is not to be understood in the Schelerian sense as an
a priori order, but rather as a concrete order which is constituted by a social
group and which varies from group to group. The rank order of values indicates
what is considered to be valuable to a particular group and provides the taken
for granted commonly-shared order of motivations for achievement in that
society denoting what is worthy to do from that which is not. It delimits what
can be obtained and changed from what cannot be obtained and is simply given
in the society. In general, it is being suggested, then, that Schutz's analyses of
the relative natural world view, from the perspective of a theory of relevance, can
be understood as an attempt to work out the concrete ethics of a group. To be
distinguished from this taken for granted ethics is the symbolic ethics of a group
which will be briefly touched upon in Section 2. In any case, the final point which
still needs to be made is that for Schutz it is precisely on the bases of these, to
varying degrees, imposed relevances of the relative natural world view that the
relevances of social action, which are voluntary and intrinsic, occur.
Having considered Schutz's general line of argumentation and some of his
more general reflections on relevance, let us now turn to his more specific
analyses. The fundamental structures and stratifications of the life-world, which
have already been seen to be imposed relevances, show a paradoxical relevance
structure. 15 Although they never enter into the core of consciousness and become
a theme, they are permanently present in the margin. They are, in the strict sense,
the least relevant elements of our knowledge insofar as they never become
problematic and enter into the core of consciousness. Yet, in the broader sense
96 Chapter VI
of the term, these fundamental structures are the most relevant elements of our
knowledge insofar as they are continually present, however, only in the margin.
They are not simply latent specific components of our knowledge which are
acquired in experience, which are applied from case to case, and which can be
exploded and further revised. The fundamental structures of the life-world are
the omnipresent condition of every experience. Our knowledge of these struc-
tures is, thus, 'on hand' in a peculiar way. Knowledge of the fundamental
structures is not 'at hand' ready to be employed in any situation, but rather 'in
hand' having always already been taken into consideration. Thus, referring to our
knowledge of these fundamental structures of the life-world, Schutz writes: "All
this is known to us ... as a permanent content, if not a prerequisite, of our
conscious life. This knowledge is not 'at' hand; it is 'in' hand, because no state of
mind could be imagined in which these experiences were not present - although
only in the margin as integral elements".16
The relative natural world view, which was said to involve various degrees of
imposed relevances, is primarily composed of routine knowledgeP Only in
relatively extreme cases, if ever, does this knowledge become thematically rele-
vant and enter into the core of consciousness. However, it is often included in
the margin. Without it coming to one's attention, routine knowledge is often,
simply, automatically included in situations and the activities, based upon this
knowledge, are simply carried out as usual. Although routine knowledge is not
an integral element of every experience, as is the case with fundamental knowl-
edge, it is still never let entirely out of our grip. It is "continually ready to grasp".
In this sense, routine knowledge can also be said to be 'in hand'. Furthermore,
although routine knowledge is acquired in experience, the original relevances
pertaining to the situation in which this knowledge was acquired have been lost.
The original thematically relevant problem is considered to have been definitely
'''once and for all' solved and stored away". As an absolutely trustworthy realiz-
able knowledge, this routine knowledge serves as a means to bring about ends
of a higher order. The original relevance of this knowledge, which pertains to the
solution of the original problem, is "truncated", replaced, or "buried" under
layers of new superimposed relevances. Thus, routine knowledge is "knowledge
for the sake of other knowledge". As a result, the elements of routine knowledge
appear to be objects belonging to the life-world. "The elements of routine knowl-
edge are no longer experienced as topics in themselves; they seem to be objects
pertaining to the life-world as such, within which they have their well-defined
place and function".18
Routine knowledge is itself stratified into various provinces of imposed rele-
vances. 19 The further a province of routine knowledge is from the knowledge of
the fundamental imposed relevances, the less imposed is this routine knowledge.
First, there is the province of "skills" ("Fertigkeiten") which are "such habitual,
functional unities of bodily movement (in the broadest sense) as have been built
upon the fundamental elements of the usual functioning of the body".20 To this
province of knowledge belongs our awareness of the "body image" which is
illustrated in the ethnological literature, in the experiments with those who have
suffered a traumatic loss of the limbs, and in the experience of becoming used
to the 'hole in our mouth' after a tooth has been pulled. The knowledge involved
in such bodily movement as walking, swimming, and eating with cutlery also
belongs to this domain.
Second, there is the province of "useful knowledge" ("Gebrauchswissen") which

is related to the knowledge of skills, but is distinguished from it insofar as there
is no direct reference to the fundamental structures concerning the usual
functioning of the body. Thus, the province of useful knowledge is experienced
as less imposed. Still, this province of useful knowledge is not attended to and
the activities based upon it are carried out automatically in a standardized way.
The ends of these activities are not motivated and there is no known alternative
to the means. Useful knowledge ranges from a knowledge of activities which are
closely related to skills such as smoking, chopping wood, and shaving to a
knowledge of such activities as talking, heating the oven, and frying eggs.
Finally, there is a "knowledge of recipes" ("Rezeptwissen") which is related to
useful knowledge, but is not related to skills and is certainly not related to the
fundamental structures concerning the usual functioning of the body. Thus, the
knowledge of recipes is experienced as least imposed. Nevertheless, it is still
automated and standardized. Without becoming thematized, it is often automati-
cally included in the horizon as a self-evident implication of the situation. A
knowledge of recipes is involved in such activities as a hunter reading tracks, a
sailor orienting himself to changes in the weather, and an interpreter 'automati-
cally' translating phrases.
The "specific knowledge at hand" is a third type of knowledge which, in
comparison with the knowledge of the fundamental structures and routine
knowledge, is relatively non-imposed. 21 The elements of this specific knowledge
are thematized as cores of experience or, at the very least, playa major part in
thematization. This knowledge is 'at hand' which is to say that it is neutralized
and dormant, and is activated only when it is intentionally adverted to and
purposely employed for the solution of problems. Thus, the specific knowledge
at hand is not automatically carried out, but is intentionally employed from case
to case. The elements of this specific knowledge are not considered to be final
'once and for all' solutions to problems, but rather provisional solutions which
were acquired in experience and which were found to be, for all practical
purposes, sufficient for a particular type of problem at a certain point in time.
Thus, the original relevance is maintained and the specific knowledge lies close
to the surface ready to be intentionally employed for future projects of action.
In his theory of relevance, Schutz also distinguishes between three types of
relevances - thematic, interpretational, and motivational. Briefly, thematic rele-
vance refers to the relevancy which something acquires by becoming question-
able and worth questioning against the background of an unproblematic familiar-
ity. Interpretational relevance refers to the coincidence between the thematically
relevant problem and the relevant elements of knowledge. The function of this
relevance becomes especially clear when one considers that the majority of our
98 Chapter VI
foreknowledge is immaterial for grasping and elaborating the theme. Finally,

motivational relevance concerns the importance of the interpretational decision
for future action.
Now, these three relevancy structures appear to be fully operative only at the
level of the relatively non-imposed specific knowledge at hand. 22 Schutz speaks
about these three relevances only in relationship to a theme and, as has been seen
above, it is only the specific knowledge at hand which is typically made a theme
of consciousness. Thus, when Schutz speaks of the 'impositional aspect' of these
relevancy structures, in contradistinction to their voluntary aspect,23 he is merely
pointing to the fact that there can be a slight impositional character to specific
knowledge and that, in the end, these relevancy structures 'go over' into the levels
of imposed routine and fundamental knowledge where they lose their proper
character. Of course, in those infrequent extreme situations in which routine
knowledge is exploded, the three relevancy structures would come into operation
insofar as the routine knowledge can no longer be automatically employed, now
requiring a voluntary revision.
In sum, it can be said, then, that the thematic, interpretational, and moti-
vational relevance structures tend towards the voluntary sphere. 24 Having exam-
ined them, it is now possible to consider social action proper which primarily
involves voluntary intrinsic relevances. 25
The projecting which occurs in social action is distinguished from pure fanta-
sizing by its "practicality". The latter implies that the projecting is a "phantasying
within a given or better within an imposed frame, imposed by the reality within
which the projected action will have to be carried out".26 Here Schutz is basically
pointing to the fact that the situation in which I formulate my projects is always
already predetermined, and limited by the imposed fundamental and basic
relevances, along with aspects of our routine knowledge. Schutz refers to this
predetermined imposed frame as "the world taken for granted".27 The fundamen-
tal, basic, and routine knowledge which is involved in this predetermination is,
for the most part, socially derived and approved, and Schutz goes on to claim
that "this socialized structure gives this kind of knowledge an objective and
anonymous character: it is conceived as being independent of my personal
biographical circumstance".28 It is important to realize, however, that the prede-
termined imposed taken for granted world, composed of our common ano-
nymous knowledge, is a world of predetermined indeterminateness consisting of
"open possibilities", which is to say, that none of the possibilities has any weight,
none of them contest the other, and, thus, all of them are equally open.
Now the situation in which I formulate my projects is further 'imprinted' by
higher elements of knowledge such as the more distant elements of routine
knowledge and aspects of the specific knowledge at hand. Roughly speaking,
Schutz refers to this determination as the "biographical determination of the
situation".29 For example, I come to the situation with a specific biographically
articulated stock of knowledge and with a knowledge of the specific prior history
of the situation. All this enters into the situation. Moreover, to this biographical
determination of the situation, belongs my knowledge that some of the elements
of the world taken for granted are imposed, while others are within my control
or capable of being brought within my control. However, at any given moment,
I am only concerned with some aspects of this world within and outside of my
control. It is the motivational relevance system, with a prevailing in-order-to
motive, which determines which aspects of these two domains are relevant, and
which are of no concern and left out of view. In contrast to the 'objective'
anonymous knowledge which is involved in the determination of the world as
taken for granted, Schutz tends to refer to the knowledge which is involved in
this biographical determination ofthe situation, along with the formulation of the
project of action, as sUbjective?O
In the process of subjectively determining which elements of the objectively
given, taken for granted, world are relevant to the project, a more or less explicit
situation of 'doubt' arises in which the full character of social action, involving
voluntary intrinsic relevances, comes into view. In spontaneously projecting a
motive of action, there arises a problematic alternative standing to choice. In
Schutz's words, "any project leads to a true problematic alternative. Each project
to do something carries with it the problematic counterpossibility of not doing
it".31 In more theoretical language, through the establishment of a project, the
open possibilities of the taken for granted world are transformed into a unified
field of problematic possibilities contesting one another. The problematic
alternative, then, understood as the anticipated acts standing to choice in an
imagined coexistence, is voluntarily produced by me through my voluntary
spontaneous projecting. In the course of producing this problematic alternative,
I may even modify it, as I deem fit, phantasying one project after the other in
a series of dynamic states. The final decision, the "voluntative fiat", to carry out
one of the projects occurs through the "freedom of reasonable deliberation"
which is our guide in ascertaining, or weighing, the pros and cons of each
project. 32 The standards of weights employed by reason in evaluating the pro-
jects are not bound to the concrete situation, but rather "transcend the actual
situation of concrete choice and decision".33 The projects are evaluated accord-
ing to a previously chosen system of interconnected projects of a higher order
in which the projects themselves were projected. Any project is itself projected
as a partial goal in an in-order-to context of superimposed goals which are, in
the end, integrated into one supreme life plan. It is in reference to this previously
chosen frame of a higher organization of projects that reason determines the
positive and negative weights of each project, and it is on the basis ofthis freedom
of reasonable deliberation that the 'voluntative fiat', to carry out one of the
projects,occurs. 34
From this still quite sketchy theory of relevance, two general conclusions can
be drawn which are of importance for an integrated theory of intersubjectivity.
First, it is clear that as one proceeds from the fundamental relevances, to the
basic relevances, to the relative natural world view and various forms of routine
knowledge, to the specific knowledge at hand and the three relevance structures,
to, finally, the choosing among projects of action, one proceeds from the imposed
to the intrinsic relevances of an actor. More specifically, the passage from the
100 Chapter VI
'objectively' given imposed framework of 'open possibilities' constituted by the

fundamental and basic elements of knowledge, along with the lower elements of
routine knowledge; to the subjectively given imposed and controllable elements of
the situation constituted by the biographical determination of the situation which
includes higher elements of routine knowledge and the specific knowledge at
hand; to the intrinsically chosen imposed and controllable elements relevant to the
project; to the intrinsic freedom ofreasonable choice among projects of action which
occurs in reference to a pre-existent system of motivational relevances which
transcends the situation, illustrates an advance from the imposed to the intrinsic
relevances of an actor. In general, it can be said that the above presentation of
the theory of relevance proceeded from an analysis of the given imposed horizons
of relevances which cannot be changed to the intrinsic thematic core of relevances
which concern the actors free choice of projects and which can indeed be
changed.
Second, the advance from the imposed to the intrinsic relevances indicates
an advance from taken for granted shared relevances to, so to speak, relatively
'unshared relevances'. It has already been seen that the imposed, fundamental
and basic relevances are shared regardless of the relative natural world view in
which one was socialized. 35 Schutz goes on to claim that routine knowledge,
stratified into skills, useful knowledge, and recipes, shows an increasingly inter-
cultural and intrasocial distribution. 36 The specific stock of knowledge at hand
is even less shared as it differs from one relative natural world view to the next
and shows a more or less complex distribution within the group. It would appear,
that, for Schutz, the choosing among projects of action varies most of all, since
it is bound up with the freedom of reasonable deliberation and the spontaneous
choosing of one's own goals. However, this does not imply that the choosing
among projects of action and the project of action itselflie outside ofintersubjec-
tivity. The important point to be understood here concerns not the relationship
between the intersubjective and non-intersubjective, but rather the relationship
between taken for granted and accomplished intersubjectivity. The imposed
fundamental relevances are shared in a taken for granted way, while the intrinsic
relevances are shared through the active and continual accomplishments of the
actors.
On the basis of these two general conclusions drawn from the theory of
relevance, it can now be said that, as seen from the perspective of their relevance
to the social actor, the relationship between the various levels of intersubjectivity
- knowledge of the Dasein, the So-sein, and the concrete motives of the other -
is essentially a relationship between imposed taken for granted intersubjectivity and
intrinsic accomplished intersubjectivity. Let us attempt to illustrate this whole state
of affairs.
Take, for example, the situation where one is leisurely walking down the street
with a friend who is explaining why he wishes to break up with his lover. There
is an automatic, imposed, intersubjective understanding regarding the fact that
the other exists, and that we walk down the street at a certain pace and in a
particular way without tripping over one another. I do not voluntarily attempt
The Person and the Social Group 10 1
to understand the factual existence of the other or his walking. I cannot but help
understand the other in this way, and a conscious effort would be required to
question his existence or to run into him. Furthermore, in a relatively less, but
still automatic way, we wait for the traffic to stop before crossing streets, avoid
approaching persons, notice the other's glance at something in a store window
or on the street, and understand the meaning of one another's words. In an even
less automatic, but still routine way, I understand the other as he stops to buy
a newspaper or to tie his shoelace. What I do not understand is why the other
intends to leave his lover and it is only through our conscious effort in the
conversation that such an understanding is attained.
Now, if we take into account the fact, as has already been indicated, that it
is only the imposed relevances established in relationship to a project which are,
in the strict sense, experienced as relevant,37 then it can be said that the under-
standing of the Dasein of the other and other such basic understandings are, in
the strict sense, irrelevant to the actor. Just as it appears to be senseless to speak
of imposed relevance in my routine experience of a tree - the tree is simply
experienced as a tree and not as an imposed tree - so too, it appears to be
senseless to speak of imposed relevances in my routine experience of the exis-
tence of the other. In the strict sense, I do not experience the other's existence
as imposed, but rather, for example, his insistence upon staying overnight at my
place after having broken up with his friend; an insistence which directly inter-
feres with my own projects.
It is now possible to make a first attempt at sketching out Schutz's implicit
theory of the social Person in the group. If the actor is now considered as
involved, with different degrees of his self, in these various relevant provinces of
intersubjectivity, then the full character of the actor as a social Person can be
drawn out.
The Person, situated within the social world, participates, or simultaneously
lives, in various dimensions of that world. The Person has in play, and puts in
play, various levels of his personality stretching from his involvement in the
imposed taken for granted fundamental and basic intersubjective relevances to
the intrinsic relevances of projects of action. In Schutz's words, "we are involved
in the one actual and many marginal... relevances with layers of our personality
on different levels of depth".38
The Person's involvement in the imposed intersubjective domain of funda-
mental and basic relevances tends towards the 'vital sphere', and concerns only
very superficial layers of the personality. The other is automatically understood
here in his factual existence and as a lived body, and as has just been seen, this
understanding of the other has little relevance, in the strict sense, to the actor.
The Person's involvement in the relatively less imposed intersubjective domains
of routine knowledge, which to a large extent 'make-up' the relative natural world
view, also concerns relatively superficial layers of the personality. Schutz writes
that "only very superficial levels of our personality are involved in such perfor-
mances as our habitual and even quasi-automatic 'household chores', or eating
102 Chapter VI
and dressing"?9 The other is understood here in terms of his social habits which
are usually of little direct interest to me.
"Syndromes" and "because motives" are also operative in the Person's partici-
pation in the various dimensions of the social world. 40 Syndromes and because
motives no doubt involve more intimate layers of the Person's self insofar as they,
to an extent, result from his particular biographical development. Nevertheless,
the Person's involvement in these spheres still remains somewhat superficial.
Syndromes and because motives are not ordinarily in the main focus of my
interests. If, for example, a syndrome, say my fear of snakes, were to become a
constant center of my attention as a result of the fact that I now see snakes
everywhere, I would have to see a psychiatrist to overcome it.41 Moreover,
understanding that the other fears snakes does not yet render intelligible his
action which is at the center of his and my interests. I know he is afraid of snakes,
but why, then, is he touching the snake with a stick and not running away?
In everyday life, the most intimate layer of the Person is involved in the
intrinsic accomplished intersubjectivity of projects of action. Although projects
are formulated within an imposed social world and are to an extent conditioned
by it, and, although projects are merely a part of an interconnected system of
plans which itself tends towards taken for grantedness, they are, nevertheless,
as has been seen, 'freely' chosen by the actor. They continuously stand at the
center of his interests and are most relevant to him. It could be said that even
the system of plans, although they are to an extent socially conditioned and tend
to become taken for granted, involve intimate layers of the personality. These
plans arose through numerous choices of the individual, remain open unfulfilled
expectations subject to recall, continually undergo change, and if, for some
reason, they become questioned in their entirety, a severe personal life crisis
results. In any case, it is clear that the most intimate layer of the Person is
involved in his projects of action with which his immediate hopes and fears are
bound up. In understanding one another's projects which is most relevant in
carrying out their own projects, the actors come to understand the most intimate
layer of one another's personality. As has been seen, this intersubjective under-
standing is continually achieved by the actors themselves. At this level of the
Person, the thematic, interpretational, and motivational relevance structures are
all fully operative and indicate, respectively, the 'value', 'methodological', and
'voluntative' aspects ofthe Person. Here the Person is seen to be the original unity
of various types of interested knowledge which different philosophical schools
represent and promote. This intimate level of the Person, which participates in
the world of the intrinsic accomplished intersubjectivity of projects of action,
tends towards the 'spiritual sphere'.
2. THE THEORY OF SIGNS AND SYMBOLS
In his theory of signs and symbols,42 Schutz attempts to explicate the highest
intersubjective spiritual world in which the Person participates and, correspond-
ingly, the highest spiritual level of the Person. To be contrasted with the world
of intrinsic accomplished intersubjectivity of everyday life, this higher spiritual
world is the world of symbolic intersubjectivity. Although Schutz's analysis of
signs and symbols can be understood as a development of his analyses in
"Multiple Realities", it is important to realize that the formal character of that
previous analysis has been discontinued. In "Symbol, Reality and Society",43
Schutz no longer considers the work world and, therewith, the fundamental
structures and stratifications of the life-world as the paramount reality of every-
day life. Rather, he asks how this work world enters into the immediate ex-
perience of everyday life. Furthermore, instead of focusing upon the formal
delimitations of the various finite provinces of meaning, he focuses upon how,
in the immediate experience of the world of everyday life, transcendent ex-
periences of other finite provinces of meaning come to be communicated.
Schutz's attempt to layout the highest spiritual world in which the Person is
involved, through a theory of signs and symbols, conceptually begins with a
consideration of the relationship between experience and transcendence. Any
experience, by virtue of its reference to an inner horizon, an outer horizon, and
the life-world, transcends itself. Thus, experience as such is, from the start,
intrinsically connected with transcendence. It is suggested that, for Schutz, it is
the passage between experience, the experience of transcendence, and the tran-
scendence of experience which leads to knowledge. Man finds himself at the
outset in a world which transcends his immediate experience and he has to obtain
a knowledge of this world, including a knowledge of his fellowmen and himself,
in order to find his bearings within it. How is it that man 'comes to terms' with
his experience of the transcendences of the world?
Schutz argues that one of the ways in which the transcendences of the world
are included in immediate experience is through the appresentational relation-
ships of marks , indications, signs, and symbols. "I believe in reality that appresen-
tation is one - however only one - of the many means to incorporate the
transcendent experience (on each of the levels of manifold transcendences) in the
situation of the Here and NOW".44 Through appresentational relations, man
attains a certain knowledge of the transcendences of the world; a knowledge in
which the transcendences are included in the immediate situation. It can be said,
then, that Schutz's analysis of the appresentational relations is an attempt to
develop a concrete theory of knowledge. It is a theory of how man, limited by
the here and now of his immediate situation in the world, comes to know of the
life-world and how this knowledge leads to higher forms of ideal knowledge,
ending in the highest spiritual world in which the Person is involved.
Although, in this analysis, Schutz does not explicitly refer to his theory of
relevance, the implications for that theory appear to be the following. The theory
of signs and symbols considers how a knowledge of the world which, at first,
appears to be irrelevant to the actor in his present immediate situation becomes
relevant, and how the taken for granted imposed relevances, which, in the strict
sense, are irrelevant to the actor's immediate interests in a situation, become
relevant and are reflected upon in that situation.
104 Chapter VI
Let us begin our examination of Schutz's theory of signs and symbols by

briefly considering his rejection of the work world as the paramount reality of
everyday life. * In a letter to Gurwitsch, Schutz states that, in the course of writing
a new work (i.e. "Symbol, Reality and Society"), it has become clear to him that
the concept of the 'work world' and the 'world of everyday life' do not coincide.
"Just in the process of writing a new work. .. it has become important for me to
contrast 'the world of working' and the 'world of everyday life' for I have
discovered that the meaning of both concepts do not coincide with one an-
other".45 Here Schutz realizes that the concept of the 'world of working' does
not exhaust the meaning of the 'world of everyday life'. Having criticized
Santayana just two years before for construing the "generative order of society"
as the paramount world of everyday life, and for, consequently, founding life,
psyche, and spirit upon the physical order of nature,46 Schutz now senses that
the world of everyday life consists of even more spiritual experience than his own
conception of the 'work world' permits. Schutz continues to agree with
Santayana that "the spirit can never possess, much less communicate, ideas
without a material endowment and a material occasion".47 However, the objects,
facts, and events within my actual and potential reach, all of which involve such
a material moment, are now viewed as thoroughly permeated by appresenta-
tional references of a "lower order" by means of which they are given in ex-
perience solely as historical socio-cultural objects of the relative natural world
view of a society.48 Schutz clearly realized here that the entire analysis of the first
level of the problem of intersubjectivity involves an illegitimate formal
abstraction from the social character of our experience in the world of everyday
life. Roughly speaking, one could say that he now collapses the fundamental
structures and stratifications ofthe life-world, and the relative natural world view
into one domain, and refers to the latter as the paramount reality of everyday
life. The new question which now arises is how the work world enters into our
experience in everyday life, and this question brings us to Schutz's analyses of
such appresentational relations as marks, indications, signs, and symbols.
For Schutz, "marks" are appresentational relations for coming to terms with
the experience of the transcendence of one's here and now by the world of
restorable reach.49 Marks are devices established in the sphere of actual reach
so as to help one again find one's bearing within this sphere, when, after having
become a sphere of restorable reach, it is brought back into actual reach. Thus,
marks appresent that which is to be remembered when the world of restorable
reach is brought back into actual reach. "Indications" are means for coming to
terms with past, present, or future events which transcend the perceptible and
manipulatory sphere of actual reach. 50 An indication is an object, fact, or event
within the sphere of actual reach which appresents another fact or event outside
that sphere in such a way that it suggests that the latter fact or event exists, has
existed, or will exist.
* Of course, this in no way lessens the importance of Schutz's discovery of the "work-world" for
philosophy and social theory, and as will be seen in a unique way actually broadens it.
"Signs" are means for overcoming the transcendent experience of the other
and his world. 51 The other's world transcends mine in a double sense: (1) there
are zones within my actual reach which are not within his reach and vice versa;
(2) and his system of relevances, founded in his unique biographical situation,
are not congruent with mine. Signs are objects, facts, or events in the outer world
which appresent the cogitations of a fellowman. Although I am not able to bring
the transcendent cogitations of my fellowman within my reach, I can, through
the appresentational relation of signs, understand the cogitations of my fellow-
man from within the sphere of my actual reach and, in so doing, I can overcome
the transcendent experience of the other.
While the sign does not necessarily presuppose communicative intent by the
one who manifests it (e.g. blushing),52 communication as such is based foremost
on "purposive signs" insofar as the communicator, at the very least, intends to
make himself understandable to others. Moreover, the communicative process,
and we might add signs in general,53 are based on a set of common abstractions
and standardizations which are provided primarily, although not totally, by the
ordinary vernacular of the mother tongue. "The communicative process is based
on a set of typifications, abstractions, and standardizations, and we referred
briefly to the fundamental role of the vernacular of the mother tongue in estab-
lishing this basis".54 Thus, I can and do take it for granted that certain objects,
facts, and events within our common social environment have the same appres-
entational significance for us.
Schutz refers to all the experiences oftranscendences which we have consid-
ered, thus far, as experiences of "immanent transcendences".55 Although each
of the transcendences transcends my actual here and now, each remains a
moment of the surrounding world, co-constituting this place of mine in the world.
Insofar as these transcendences remain immanent to the surrounding everyday
life-world, they can be said to have arisen within, and to have been solved within,
the practical attitude of successfully coming to terms with and achieving one's
goals within this world.
Now, there are experiences oftranscendences which transcend the reality of
everyday life. 56 These transcendences transcend not only my actual here and
now, but also the surrounding world. The experience of such transcendences
primarily arise through the emergence of the 'essentially novel' which cannot be
mastered by our knowledge of the everyday life-world and which, consequently,
leads to a shock and a crisis. Our taken for granted knowledge of the everyday
life-world, incapable of dealing with this 'novel experience', is grasped as essen-
tially limited and is questioned in its entirety. The transcendent novel experience
is unalterably imposed as an "unknowable transcendence" and points to the
"fundamental intransparency of the life-world". In Schutz's words, "the lived
experience of radical surprises refers forcibly to the fundamental intransparency
of the life-world".57 Here the taken for granted everyday life-world becomes
questionable as a whole, and is viewed as essentially unknowable and intranspar-
ent. It becomes a mystery. Correspondingly, the practical attitude of everyday
life goes over into an attitude of doubt, wonder, and reflection. A need now arises
106 Chapter VI
to elucidate the formerly taken for granted social and natural world through
higher 'metaphysical' insights, that is, through a superordinate knowledge.* It is
by means of the appresentational relation of symbols, in which these "unknow-
able transcendences" are expressed in images, that such a higher knowledge of
truth is attained. "We ... know that Nature and Society represent some kind of
order; yet the essence of this order as such is unknowable to us. It reveals itself
merely in images by analogical apprehending".59
The symbol is an appresentational reference of a higher order based upon
previously established marks, indications, and signs where the appresenting
member is an element within the world of everyday life, whereas the appresented
member refers to a transcendent idea within one or more provinces of meaning
outside the world of everyday life. 60 It is important to realize that, although the
symbol is an element within the world of everyday life, the meaning of the symbol
- a transcendent idea in another finite province of meaning - cannot be grasped
by the familiar knowledge of everyday life. Understanding a symbol does not
consist in translating it into the more or less precise discursive terms of everyday
life, but in experiencing it in its essential ambiguity according to its unique
symbolic reference to a transcendent idea which "vanishes at the limiting point'.
Thus, the meaning of a symbol cannot be apprehended as an objectivity or in a
direct way which is the characteristic result of our understanding in everyday life.
The meaning of a symbol can be apprehended only in the vague way in which
it exists in the imagery of a symbol. In sum, a symbol can only be interpreted
by other symbols and, then, only vaguely, and "it is unnecessary and may even
be harmful"61 to attempt to interpret the symbol as an element within the world
of everyday life.
In the world of everyday life governed by the practical attitude, there is no
motive for attempting to grasp the huge ballast of the social world which we carry
along with us to solve our typical problems. We are focused only upon the typical
problem confronting us. However, through the experience of the irruption of the
radically transcendent, in which this taken for granted everyday life-world is
questioned as a whole and is seen as fundamentally opaque, a motive arises to
interpret this world. Symbolization is the process of interpreting this taken for
granted everyday life-world and, on the basis of this process, a higher knowledge
about this everyday world is indeed attained. As such, symbolization is un-
derstood by Schutz as essentially the self-interpretation of a society by its members.
Schutz, quoting Voegelin at this point, maintains that human society "is illumi-
nated through an elaborate symbolism ... and this symbolism illuminates it with
meaning insofar as the symbols make the internal structure of such a cosmion,
the relations between its members and groups of members , as well as its existence
as a whole, transparent for the mystery of human existence".62 Thus, symboli-
zation is the self-explication and self-understanding of a society. Furthermore,
* In a letter to Voegelin, Schutz writes: "It is my firm conviction... that the experience of transcen-
dence is the fundamental presupposition of all truth whether it be of a philosophical, metaphysical,
or societal nature".58
the symbolic representation of the society which results is considered to be the

'truth' about that society. Of course, the taken for granted social world cannot
in all its complexity and extensiveness be understood. Throughout his work,
Schutz continually stresses our "lack of technique for availing ourselves of what
we know".63 The symbol merely reveals the richness of the world in the vague
simplicity of a particular. Quoting Goethe, Schutz writes: "True symbolism is
where the particular represents the general... as a vivid instantaneous revelation
of that which cannot be explored".64
N ow Schutz goes on to consider the development of society in terms of this
theory of symbolization. 65 The development of society is viewed as a process of
symbolic articulation which evolves from a compact articulation to a differentiat-
ed articulation of society. This is certainly one of Schutz's least developed ideas.
We can do no more here than to trace it out on the basis of the few indications
with which he provides us and, at certain points, to extend his thought along the
lines which he has already laid out.
In the compact symbolic articulation of society, man experiences nature,
society, and himself "as equally participating in and determined by the order of
the cosmos".66 There is a full integration of the interrelationships between the
various symbolic orders in that any element in one of these orders may become
a symbol appresentationally referring to a corresponding element in the other
orders. Thus, man experiences himself as part of a charmed community in which
everything he meets partakes in the same "unbroken unity of life". In this
charmed community, everything has force and will, animals and stones can be
men and gods, men can be divine, while gods are kings, and things can change
into one another. On the basis of his description of the compact articulation of
society, Schutz goes on to analyze some sets of universal appresentational
references which are rooted in the human condition and which, consequently,
can be readily used for symbolization. 67 The important point to be gathered from
that analysis is that, in the compact articulation of society, society and its order
is symbolized in analogue to the order of the cosmos. The earth and sky,
experienced in their overwhelming power and visibility, suggest to man that their
order is the impressive and all embracing order. Thus, the celestial revolutions
and vegetative rhythms are taken as the models of all other order, including the
structural and procedural order of society.
In the differentiated symbolic articulation of society, there "has developed
several systems of symbols such as science, art, religion, politics, and philoso-
phy .... which are merely loosely, if at all, connected one with another".68 In
contrast to the compact articulation of society, here there is a disintegration of
the interrelationships between the various symbolic orders. Only a few elements,
if any, in one order may become a symbol appresentationally referring to a
corresponding element in another order. Each symbolic order tends to form an
isolated system, and tends to develop its own particular interpretation of society
and nature. This differentiation of the various symbolic orders stems from the
attempt to interpret the world in terms of the positive methods of the natural
sciences. It is the world defined by the mathematical natural sciences, the "ideally
108 Chapter VI
isolated system" established by Galileo's discoveries and Newton's laws of

motion, which is taken as the archetype of all symbolic orders. 69 The ideally
isolated system of the mathematical natural sciences is viewed as the ideal order
of symbolic references. All other symbolic systems are explained, if not as
derivations from this ideally isolated system then, at least, as subordinated to it.
Thus, in the differentiated symbolic articulation of society, society and its order
is no longer symbolized in analogue to the order of the cosmos as earth and sky.
The ultimate source of order in the world is now provided by that which is even
more lasting, and which is invisible, existing beyond everything in tangible
existence: the ratio.
The development of society can be viewed then as a process of the develop-
ment of reason. However, this process must be concretely examined in detail
drawing out the various symbolic representations of society from rite, through
myth, to religion and theory. In the following, a number of important points to
bear in mind in carrying out any such investigation are proposed. 70 If they are
not made by Schutz himself, they, at the very least, coincide with the spirit of
his work and can be considered as proper extensions of it.
1. The symbolic system of a society, as the self-representation of a society,
provides the common motive for the members to further the development of
that society. The extent of the development will vary according to this motive
(e.g. compare Christianity with Gnosticism and secularization).
2. The development of society, its articulation from compact to differentiated
symbolism, is primarily the result of a conflict between the prevailing symbolic
system and an always presupposed, to varying degrees of explicitness, nega-
tive symbol system.
3. The rank order of the various symbolic orders within the symbolic system of
a society is to be understood as the symbolic ethics of that group. The latter
is to be distinguished from and compared with the concrete taken for granted
ethics of the group which was referred to in Section 1.71
4. The extent to which any symbolic system obtains a set interpretation, is taken
as the only possible symbolic system, and tends towards the annihilation of
all other symbolic systems is to be considered. Here the symbolism becomes
an expression of societal power. Its limited grasp of one aspect of the 'truth'
about the society is conceived to be the absolute total truth. There is a 'closing
off' of the possibility of obtaining other further transcendent experiences, if
not a closing off of the spirit in general. The symbolic system is still in view
here, although it has lost much of its symbolic character.
5. The process by which symbols become taken for granted and sink, non-
understood, into the everyday life-world is to be considered. The symbols are
no longer in view here and have, in fact, lost their symbolic character.
6. Points 4 and 5 are to provide the starting point for an analysis of the ill-defined
concept of ideology.
7. The differentiation of such symbolic systems as religion, philosophy, and
science out of the preceeding more compact forms of symbolic articulation is
to be considered. Here there arises symbolic systems whose 'truth' stands over
and against the 'truth' of the self-interpretation of a society. The influences of

these types of symbolic systems upon one another is to be examined with a
specific focus upon the way in which theoretical insights, symbols in the
genuine sense, become 'quasi-symbols' of the self-interpretation of a society.
As 'quasi-symbols', their theoretical content has become non-understandable,
but they, nevertheless, continue to provide some insight into the structure of
society. Scheler has to some extent envisaged this problem in his theory of
ideal and real factors.72
8. The relationship between the symbolic self-interpretation of the in-group and
the interpretation of this symbolic system by an out-group or out-groups is to
be considered. 73 Included in group A's own symbolic system is an interpre-
tation of group B's symbolic system and the way in which group B supposedly
looks at A. This "looking-glass effect" between groups can lead to various
changes in the self-interpretation and structure of the two groups. In any case,
it is clear that the group is not a monadic cosmion illuminated only by its own
self-interpretation with its claim to 'truth', but stands in symbolic intersubjec-
tive relationships with other groups whose symbolic systems also pose a claim
to 'truth'. In general, this analysis would lead to a theory of the intersubjective
relationship between groups and their influence upon one another.
9. The interrelationship between society and symbols is to be broadly conceived
as a process in which symbols originate in reflective acts of understanding by
members within society and, once established, influence in turn the structure
of society until they sink into the taken for grantedness of everyday life and
lose their symbolic character.
In sum, it can be said that this program to analyze the development of society
as an evolution from a compact symbolic articulation in which intersubjective
relations are one-dimensional to a differentiated symbolic articulation of itself in
which intersubjective relations are multi-dimensional carries along with it at least
two basic changes in Schutz's work. First, while intersubjectivity is experienced
in everyday life insofar as I experience the fact that I understand other individu-
als, in general intersubjective relations between individuals, and social collectiv-
ities as a whole, can only be apprehended symbolically. The farthest reaching
implication of this insight is drawn out by Schutz when he forcibly claims that
the we-relationship itself transcends the realm of everyday life and can only be
grasped symbolically.74 Second, the problem of inter subjective symbolic commu-
nication is clearly directed to an investigation of particular groups in society
which are involved in symbolic communication, and Schutz now not only speaks
of 'poetic communication', but also of intersubjective participation and inter-
action in transcendent finite provinces of meaning. 75 The scientific group would,
of course, be the paradigmatic example here. The task of such groups is to deal
precisely with the tension between the taken for granted shared meanings of
ordinary language and the transcendent meaning of the symbol. The members
must find ways to use ordinary language to communicate non-ordinary transcen-
dent ideas. For example, ways must be found to detach signs from their taken
for granted linguistic context and to transform them into symbols. Correspond-
110 Chapter VI
ingly, as interpreters, the members must find ways to understand these signs now
turned symbols in terms other than by their taken for granted shared meaning.
The symbols are, to use a term of Jaspers, "ciphers" for transcendent experiences
which can only be understood by those who find the keys to them.
Having discussed Schutz's theory of signs and symbols, it is now possible to
further attempt to sketch out Schutz's implicit theory of the Person, now with
a special emphasis upon the higher spiritual level of the Person.
3. THE PERSON IN THE SOCIAL GROUP
It has already been seen that the Person, situated within the social world,
simultaneously lives in various dimensions of that world having in play or putting
in play various levels of the personality stretching from his involvement in the
imposed taken for granted intersubjective relevances to the intrinsic relevances
of projects of action. 76 The Person's involvement in the imposed world, which
is the world of his habitual activities and automatic understanding of others,
concerns only superficial layers of the personality, while the Person's involve-
ment in the intrinsic relevances, which have to do with the freedom of choosing
among projects of action and the spontaneous understanding of others, concerns
the inner core of his personality.
Now, the preceeding analysis of symbols clearly demonstrates that man does
not just live in this everyday life-world. He also lives in various other transcen-
dent worlds and their realities. In participating in these other finite provinces of
meaning through symbols, the Person is seen to be something more than the
pragmatic problem-solving creature of the everyday life-world. This level of the
Person is free from the dependence and bondage of everyday life, and stands over
and against everyday life and its manifestations. In everyday life, we carry along
the taken for granted world, to playoff a metaphor of Scheler, somewhat as a
snail in its shell. We carry along our habits, routines, skills, syndromes, and taken
for granted knowledge, and are focused only upon pragmatically achieving our
limited projected goals. However, through our participation in other provinces
of meaning, we are able to place ourselves above the everyday life-world and are
able to interpret it. To be sure, we always, to an extent, continue to participate
in the everyday world by means of our bodies.77 However, in the other finite
provinces of meaning, we have transcended this world in thought and our mere
awareness of it, which is sufficient for carrying out our projects, becomes an
explicit consciousness of it. The open possibilities of the life-world, which were
to various degrees closed off by our habits, routine knowledge, and typical
solutions for typical problems, are now re-opened and the ultimate questions can
be posed: What is the world? What is man? What is our purpose?
In participating in other transcendent provinces of meaning by means of
symbols, the Person is able to reflect upon the entire natural-social world. This
level of the Person can say Yes or No to the world and can attempt to guide it,
although such reflections will always be met by the 'real factors' of the society
and will possibly find a certain resistance from them. Schutz's statement to
Gurwitsch put forth in the context of the 'egological dispute'78 gains an added
significance in the present context. "We ... must attempt to create in our world the
order which we must live without in our world".79 It is precisely the attempt to
create the order which is lacking in everyday life which occurs in the Person's
participation in the symbolic worlds of various transcendent finite provinces of
meaning. Here man attempts to make the social world his own, and attempts to
become fully himself by partaking in the social whole which transcends his
particularity. Quoting Voegelin, Schutz writes: "Through such symbolization the
members of a society experience it [social reality] as more than an accident or
a convenience; they experience it as of their human essence. And, inversely, the
symbols express the experience that man is fully man by virtue of his partici-
pation in a whole which transcends his particular existence".8o In the various
symbolic worlds, the Person attempts, with the innermost core of his personality,
to participate in the supreme ground of the world, and to both determine and
fulfill the potentiality of man. This level of the Person, which participates in the
various symbolic worlds with the innermost depths of the personality, is the
highest spiritual level of the Person.
The understanding which occurs between Persons as they participate in the
symbolic world is also the highest spiritual form of intersubjectivity. In general,
it can be said that the transcendent ideas of the other, expressed in the imagery
of the symbol, are not open to perception and understanding in the same way
as the ideas of others in everyday life. The latter are for the most part typical and
can, if necessary, be checked in the immediacy of the we-relationship wherein
the intersubjectivity of the everyday world is primarily developed and continually
confirmed. Insofar as man, as animate existence, manifests himself in nature, he
is in principle understandable to others. However, "blinded or blindfolded as we
are when plunging into the realm of the transcendental, we cannot check the
testimony of our fellow-men by our own sense perceptions".81 Our common
knowledge of the everyday life-world and the immediacy of the we-relationship
cannot be relied upon for help in our attempt to understand the other's transcen-
dent idea expressed in the symbol. It is submitted that for Schutz the understand-
ing of the other's transcendent idea, that is, symbolic intersubjectivity, rests, in
the last analysis, on "animal faith" in the sense of Santayana. 82 In attempting to
understand the other's ideas vaguely expressed in the imagery of the symbol, I
must have "faith in the Other's truthfulness". I must trust that what the other has
said is truly significant and reasonable to him and that, in time, I will, to an
extent, understand what he means. Here Schutz puts forth his own theory of
creative intersubjectivity in which the 'non-understandable' and 'ambiguous' are
essential moments in the development and understanding of essentially novel
ideas.
However, if such an understanding, in all its tenuity, does occur, then the
highest spiritual form of intersubjectivity has been attained. The Person is
understood here in his attempt to participate in and make sense of the entire
social world. The highest spiritual level of the Person involving the innermost
112 Chapter VI
core of his self is understood as I grasp his particular transcendent experience

of the supreme ground of the world and his reflective attempt to interpret this
experience in symbols. Only by elevating ourselves above the world of everyday
life, in which, in the end, our bodies and their place in the world separate us, to
the world of symbols are we able to attain this richest understanding of and union
with the other Person. Moreover, in understanding the other Person at this level,
I understand not only his transcendent experience expressed in symbols, but, to
an extent, also those of others insofar as his experience is articulated within a
pre-given world of symbols constituted by others. Thus, in understanding the
other Person here, it can be said that I participate in the intersubjective spiritual
life of the community in its attempt to interpret and determine itself. The very
important questions which concern the way in which this understanding of the
other Person varies in different finite provinces of meaning and the way in which
symbols lose their symbolic character, thereby rendering the understanding of
the other Person at this level impossible, remain open for investigation.
Now, if one goes on to consider the Person in terms of the evolutionary
development of society, then one enters into an analysis of the genetic develop-
ment of the Person. Corresponding to the development of society from its
compact to differentiated symbolic articulation, which has been seen to be a
development from one-dimensional to multi-dimensional intersubjective re-
lations, is the development from the 'closed' to the 'open' Person. In the compact
symbolic articulation of society, all experiences oftranscendence are symbolized
solely in terms of the one principle, visible order of the cosmos. The experience
of transcendence is limited to this one restricted form of symbolization and the
spiritual life of the Person is relatively closed in. In the differentiated, symbolic
articulation of society, the experience of transcendence can be symbolized ac-
cording to various relatively isolated symbolic systems, none of which are bound
to the visibility of the cosmos. Here the experience of transcendence is encourag-
ed along various open lines and there is a continuous search for ever new
disclosable 'truths'. As a result, there is an opening of the spiritual life of the
Person as the Person evolves towards the ultimate status of the "sensorium of
transcendence".
In sum, the Person participates in a world of imposed intersubjectivity with
only very superficial layers of the self which results in an initial fundamental
organization of the world; in the world of intrinsic intersubjectivity with the inner
core ofthe self which involves an understanding ofthe other for the sake ofspecific
achievements (i.e. projects of actions); and, finally, in the world of reflective
symbolic intersubjectivity with the innermost core of the self, the 'naked soul',
which involves an intersubjective understanding for the sake of the social group,
the spiritual, and the 'truth'.
Insofar as the Person participates in all of these worlds, one could say, quite
metaphorically, that the Person is 'thrown both in and out of existence'. If it is
true, as Heidegger argued, that we are condemned to death 83 and if it is true,
as Merleau-Ponty claimed, that we are condemned to meaning,84 then it is at
least as equally true, as Schutz would claim, that we find salvation through
symbols.
NOTES
I. Schutz and Luckmann, Structures, p. 67, S.80.

2. For example, see "Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action", CP 1,
pp.l1-13 and p. 23, and "Symbol, Reality and Society", CP 1, pp. 315-316.
3. Rolf J. de Folter, "Reziprozitat der Perspektiven und Normalitat bei Husserl und Schutz", in
Sozialitat und Intersubjektivitat: Phanomenologische Perspektiven der Sozialwissenschajten im
Umkreis von Aron Gurwitsch und Alfred Schutz, ed. Richard Grathoff and Bernhard Waldenfels
(Munchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1981), pp. 157-180.
4. Ibid., pp. 179-180.
5. See "Making Music Together: A Study in Social Relationship", CP 2, pp. 159-178, especially,
p. 162 and pp. 170-178.
6. Arvid Brodersen, "Editor's Note", CP 2, pp. ix-x.
7. Thomas Luckmann, "Phanomenologie und Soziologie", Alfred Schutz und die Idee des Alltags in
den Sozialwissenschajten, pp. 196-206.
8. See p.76 above.
9. Schutz, Relevance, pp. 167-182. Examples of such fundamental imposed relevances, in terms of
which all other relevances originate, are the following: (l) the surface of the earth is the primal
arche (Urarche), the unmoved and unmovable ground, with respect to which not only our
locomotions and those of our fellow-men occur, but in reference to which the sun and stars move
around; (2) 'I as my body' is the form in which my self manifests itself in the outer world and,
through this intermediary of my body, space is experienced as a space of orientation and the world
is organized into various zones of reach; (3) there is an imposed rhythm of outer time experienced,
for example, as the changing of the seasons, the changes of day and night, and the changes of
the vegetative cycle; (4) there is an imposed rhythm of bodily time experienced, for example,
through breathing and the heart beat; (5) there is an imposed rhythm of inner time experienced
in its continuity and irreversibility as a "growing older": "I was born, grow older and have to die";
(6) and, finally, there is an imposed social world which is historically pre-given and within which
other fellow-men exist with a consciousness similar to mine. The experience of'waiting' is a prime
example of the expression of these imposed relevances in daily life. I have to wait for the cube
of sugar to dissolve, the wound to heal, the child to be born, the right time for harvesting, and
for the other to arrive or finish his sentence.
10. "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World", CP 2, p. 229. For the following three
basic imposed relevances, see, especially "Symbol, Reality and Society", CP 1, pp. 330-331.
11. See pp. 96-97 below. The following presentation of the relative natural world view in terms of
domains of relevances is taken primarily from "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social
World", CP 2, pp. 226-276.
12. Ibid., p. 240, my emphasis.
13. Ibid., p. 241. Taking an example from Aristotle, Schutz illustrates the previous point that the
application of standards not pertaining to the same domain of relevance leads to moral inconsis-
tencies, and further illustrates that the domains of relevances are arranged in a certain order of
superiority and inferiority. Schutz argues, along with Aristotle, that, with respect to fluteplayers,
it would be simply wrong to say that persons of superior excellence in whatever respect is a valid
qualification for having the better flute given to them. For Schutz, advantages of height, strength,
beauty, noble birth and wealth all pertain to other domains of relevance, and have nothing to
do with and cannot be measured against the domain of fluteplaying. Thus, it is the better artists
who should have the better flute given to them. This would hold true even ifbirth, beauty, health,
and wealth were considered to be higher goods than fluteplaying. This last point indicates that
114 Chapter VI
the domains of relevances are themselves arranged in a certain order of superiority. See ibid.,
pp. 239-243.
14. Max Scheler, Der Formalisrnus in der Ethik und die rnateriale Wertethik, Gesammelte Werke, Vol.
2, ed. Maria Scheler (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1954), especially, pp. 10 1-130. Also see "Max
Scheler's Philosophy", CP 3, pp. 133-144 and "Max Scheler's Epistemology and Ethics", CP 3,
pp. 145-178.
15. The following presentation of Schutz's specific analyses of the fundamental structures and
stratifications is based primarily on Schutz, Relevance, especially, Chaps. 6 and 7.
16. Ibid., p. 143.
17. The following presentation of Schutz's analysis of routine knowledge is based primarily on ibid.,
especially, Chaps. 6 and 7.
18. Ibid., p. 144.
19. The following presentation of the stratifications of routine knowledge is based primarily on
Schutz and Luckmann, Structures, pp. 105-111, S. 118-123. Taking our clue from Schutz's general
analysis of routine knowledge from the perspective of a theory of relevance, we have gone on to
analyze these specific stratifications in terms of their relevance to the actor.
20. Ibid., p. 107, S.119.
21. This presentation of the "specific knowledge at hand" is based primarily upon Schutz, Relevance,
especially, Chaps. 3,4, and 5.
22. Ibid., especially, Chaps. 2 and 3, and "Some Structures of the Life-World" (1966), CP 3,
pp. 121-132. Also see Schutz and Luckmann, Structures, pp. 182-228, S. 186-228.
23. Ibid.
24. Schutz, Relevance, especially, Chaps. 3, 4, and 5.
25. The following presentation of Schutz's analysis of social action in terms of the theory of relevance
is based primarily on "Choosing Among Projects of Action", CP I, pp.67-96, and Schutz,
Relevance.
26. "Choosing Among Projects of Action", CP I, p. 73.
27. Ibid., pp. 74-96, especially, pp. 74-76.
28. Ibid., p.75.
29. Ibid., pp. 74-96, especially, pp. 76-77.
30. Ibid., p. 77.
31. Ibid., p. 82.
32. Ibid., pp. 88-94.
33. Ibid., p. 93.
34. Ibid., pp. 93-94. Also see, for example "Some Structures of the Life-World", CP 3, pp. 121-132
and Schutz, Relevance, especially, pp. 45-52 and 64-66.
35. See pp.94-96 above.
36. Schutz and Luckmann, Structures, pp. 109-111, S. 121-123.
37. See pp.95-96 above.
38. Schutz, Relevance, p. 120.
39. Ibid., p. 11.
40. See p. 86 above. "Because motives" are not experienced as such, but are the objective term for
my subjectively experienced urge which impels me to project a certain goal. Thus, Schutz writes,
with respect to motivational relevancy, that "motivational relevancy may be experienced as
imposed from without or else as a manifestation of inner spontaneity of any form (from a dark
urge up to a rational project)". This subjective urge arises on the basis ofa residue of previously
operational thematic, interpretational, and motivational relevances. The residue could form a
"syndrome" which "contains typical expectations concerning hypothetical events which appear
more or less vital". The syndrome consists of expectations, hypothetical relevances, plans for
acts, skills, and other elements of knowledge all of which are accompanied by a certain degree
of intensity and urgency. See Schutz, Relevance, pp. 45-56, and Schutz and Luckmann, Structures,
pp. 208-223, S. 209-223.
41. See Schutz, Relevance, p. 54 and Schutz and Luckmann, Structures.
42. See "Symbol, Reality and Society", CP 1, pp. 287-356.
43. Ibid.
44. Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, p. 363 (Oct. 13, 1954 S: G).
45. Ibid., p. 352 (June 21, 1954 S: G).
46. "Santayana on Society and Government" (1952), CP 2, pp.201-225.
48. Ibid., p. 328 and 341.
49. Ibid., pp. 308-309.
50. Ibid., pp. 310-311.
51. Ibid., pp. 312-329.
52. Ibid., p. 320. Luckmann objects to this Schutzian claim that the sign does not necessarily
presuppose that the other meant it and meant it with communicative intent. See Luckmann's own
attempt to work out a theory oflanguage in, for example, "The Constitution of Language in the
World of Everyday Life", in Life-World and Consciousness: Essaysfor Aron Gurwitsch, ed. Lester
E. Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), pp. 469-488.
53. In a letter to Gurwitsch, Schutz actually goes so far as to claim that "prepredicative perceptual
consciousness is already typical and somewhat generic". However, the relationship between
typification and language remains open for investigation: "Where does socialization and intersub-
jectivity begin? .. Are they, prepredicatively, genera, and particularly as the same genera for
everyone? Or is the word required and, if so, has not the transition from typical average
genericness to general conceptuality already occurred with such 'naming'?" See Schutz and
Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, pp. 419-420 (Dec. 7, 1957 S: G).
55. See, for example ibid., p. 353 and 328.
56. The following presentation of the experience of these transcendences is based primarily on
Schutz, Relevance, pp. 103-166, especially see, pp. 122-127, 130-136, and 145-158.
57. Schutz and Luckmann, Structures, p. 169, S.173.
58. Schutz and Voegelin, Die Schutz- Voegelin Ko"espondenz, p. 608 (Nov. 1952 S : V).
60. Ibid., p. 331 and 343.
61. Ibid., p. 347.
62. Ibid., p. 336.
63. Schutz's most extended account of this originally Leibnizian thesis is given in "Choosing Among
Projects of Action", CP 1, pp. 90-91.
65. Ibid., pp. 332-337. Also see pp. 347-356.
66. Ibid., p. 333. In general, see pp. 334-337. The following interpretation of Schutz's account of the
development of society from a compact to a differentiated symbolic articulation is based and
relies fairly heavily upon Schutz and Voegelin, Die Schutz-Voegelin Ko"espondenz. It is further
based upon a reading ofVoegelin's insightful and far-reaching text Eric Voegelin, The New Science
of Politics: An Introduction (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952).
67. "Symbol, Reality and Society", CP I, pp. 334-336.
68. Ibid., p. 332.
69. Ibid., pp. 332-333.
70. The following points were inspired by a reading of Schutz and Voegelin, Die Schutz-Voegelin
Ko"espondenz and a reading of Voegelin's insightful text Voegelin, The New Science of Politics.
Of importance was also Schutz and Gurwitsch's discussion of The New Science of Politics and of
the Schutz-Voegelin correspondence in their own correspondence. See for example Schutz and
Gurwitsch,Briefwechsel,pp. 288-289 (Nov. 2, 1952G: S),p. 293 (Nov. 10, 1952 S: G),pp. 309-310
(Jan. 24, 1953 G:S), pp. 318-319 (Feb. 15, 1953 G:S), pp.330-331 (June 11, 1953 G:S), and
p. 332 (June 15, 1953 S: G).
71. See p 95 above.
72. See Max Scheler, Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 8, ed. Maria
Scheler (Miinchen: Francke Verlag, 1960), pp. 15-190.
116 Chapter VI
73. See ibid., pp.355-356 and "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World", CP 2,
pp.245-248.
74. Ibid., pp. 317-318 and 352-356. This claim is not as puzzling as it might first appear to be. Let
us take, for example, the we-relationship of friendship. My friend is an element of everyday life.
I understand him quite well and feel close to him. I can predict his action quite accurately, I know
what he thinks, and I feel comfortable with him. However, I do not directly experience our
relationship, the friendship, as such. This we-relationship surpasses the present time and place.
It is made up of numerous face-to-face situations with periods of separation in between. It
consists of a history of subtile numerous complex interactions which the most sophisticated social
scientist could not unravel. In order to grasp this transcendent we-relationship, I must give up
the practical attitude of everyday life in which it suffices to simply know the thoughts and feelings
of my friend. In a somewhat reflective attitude and through the use of symbols , one then expresses
such essentially unknowable friendships in images: "We are in love"; "We are buddies"; "That
is our song"; "This is our anniversary"; and "These are our rings". Of course, the symbolic
character of the we-relationship holds regardless of the degree of intimacy or anonymity.
75. "Symbol, Reality and Society", CP I, p. 347 and 342.
76. See pp. 101-102 above.
77. "The outer world of everyday life is a paramount reality ... because we always participate in it,
even during our dreams, by means of our bodies" ("Symbol, Reality and Society", CP I, p. 342).
78. See "A Non-egological Conception of Consciousness", SPP, pp. 287-300; "Scheler's Theory of
Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego", CP I, pp. 150-179, especially, n. 43,
pp. 169-170; and Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, pp. 73-74 (Dec. 19, 1940 G: S), pp. 81-82
(April 20, 1941 G: S), pp. 83-84 (April 26, 1941 S: G), p. 94 (Nov. 24, 1941 S: G), pp. 96-100
(Nov. 30, 1941 G: S), p. 100 (Jan. 28,1942 S: G), and pp. 101-102 (Feb. 1,1942 G: S). Also see
Waldenfels' careful analysis of this dispute: Bernhard Waldenfels, "Das umstrittene Ich. Ichloses
und ichhaftes Bewu/3tsein bei A. Gurwitsch und A. Schutz", Sozialitiit und Intersubjektivitiit,
pp. 15-30.
79. Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, p. 83 (April 26, 1941 S: G).
80. "Symbol, Reality and Society", CP I, pp. 336-337.
81. "Don Quixote and the Problem of Reality" (1954), CP 2, p.153.
82. See Schutz, Relevance, pp.77-78 and ibid., p. 155.
83. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit.
84. Maurice Merleau-Ponty ,Phenomenology ofPerception, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Humanities
Press, 1974), p. xix.
CHAPTER VII
Critical Remarks to Schutz's Theory of Intersubjectivity
INTRODUCTION
In The Structures of the Life- World, Thomas Luckmann carries out a careful
systematization and explication of Schutz's thought based upon notes for a
proposed book left behind by Schutz.! Moreover, he develops a brilliant ex-
tension of Schutz's work in Chapter 4 entitled "Knowledge and Society".*
Although Luckmann is not explicitly concerned with the problem of intersubjec-
tivity, his analyses do have a bearing upon this topic. In the following, we shall
first examine this extension of Schutz's work by Luckmann which will simply be
referred to as 'the Luckmann position'. The concern will not be with whether
Schutz really intended to say what Luckmann puts forth or whether Schutz
would agree with it. Rather, the concern will be with whether the Luckmann
position makes sense in itself, especially with respect to the question of intersub-
jectivity. This critical analysis will not only provide us with an evaluation of the
contribution made by Luckmann to Schutz's work in the Structures, but, more
importantly, it will provide us with a starting point for taking up, in a critical
manner, one of Schutz's essential theses regarding intersubjectivity; a thesis from
which Luckmann develops his own position. Schutz's conception of the practical
attitude, intimacy, the Person, and the social group will then be considered.
1. THE LUCKMANN POSITION: INTERSUBJECTIVITY AS A PROBLEM OF THE

DIVISION OF LABOR
On the basis of his analyses of Schutz's theory of relevance, typification, and

taken for granted types of the relative natural world view, Luckmann attempts
to develop a full-fledged theory of "objectivation" in which language plays the
central role? In general, he comes to view the relationship between man and
* The apparent gravity of the criticisms of the Luckmann position which follow do not alter the fact
that Luckmann's work is one of the most insightful and significant developments of the Schutzian
perspective which presently exists. It is essential reading for anyone pursuing Schutzian studies and,
for that matter, social phenomenological scholarship.
117
118 Chapter VII
society as a "dialectic" in which subjectively experiencing actors produce,

through various forms of objectivations (the most important of which is lan-
guage), a social stock of knowledge with a specific social structure, which, in turn,
conditions and, to various degrees, enters into the subjective experience of
actors. 3 On the basis of their subjective stocks of knowledge, actors produce a
social stock of knowledge bearing a certain social structure, in short, an objecti-
vated "social a priori", which conditions their very SUbjective stocks of knowl-
edge. We shall limit ourselves to drawing out one of the main limitations of this
theory: intersuojectivity comes to be exclusively viewed as a problem of the
division oflabor.
Let us begin with Luckmann's theory of objectivation in which the principle
of the division of labor most clearly comes to the fore. Objectivation is "the
embodiment of subjective processes in the objects and events of the everyday
life-world" and Luckmann is chiefly interested in "those [objectivations] which
can be interpreted by Others as 'objectivations' of subjective explications, or of
SUbjective results of explications of generally subjective knowledge".4 In general,
it can be said that Luckmann is interested in the intersubjective objectivation and
transmission of knowledge. The transference of knowledge by means of objecti-
vations presupposes, at the most fundamental level, a typical similarity ofprob-
lems. 5 At the pre symbolic level of objectivation where the objectivations are still
closely bound to the concrete situation, this similarity of problems is simply
presupposed and, in principle, only the acceptance of knowledge is motivated.
At the 'symbolic' level of objectivation where language is presupposed, the latter
being the most important means of objectivation due to its potential for abstract-
ing from the concrete situation, the similarity of problems is explicitly granted
and the transference of knowledge is reciprocally motivated.
Now, not every problem and the knowledge of its solution assumed to be
relevant for one person is assumed to be relevant for another. Knowledge will
typically not be intentionally objectivated and transferred to persons for whom
it is deemed irrelevant. Here a certain typification and anonymization of others
arises according to the types of problems and knowledge relevant to them. 6 In
Luckmann's words, there is "an initial differentiation of knowledge according to
which knowledge is (or is considered to be) relevant for certain typical problems
and for certain typical persons".? In historical societies, where there is an accu-
mulation of knowledge which is transferred over generations, this differentiation
in the transference of knowledge is anchored in the social structure. 8 The trans-
ference of knowledge is now institutionalized and knowledge tends to be trans-
mitted according to social roles. The objectivated social stock of knowledge,
accumulated over time, consists of a realm of general knowledge which is
relevant and transferred to everyone, and provinces of special knowledge which
are relevant and transferred only to those acting in certain more or less
anonymous social roles.
In the simple social distribution of knowledge, general knowledge is evenly
distributed to all the members of the society, while special knowledge, which is
Critical Remarks to Schutz's Theory 119
role specific, is unevenly distributed. 9 However, the distribution of special knowl-

edge is itself an element of general knowledge and is grasped by all the members
of the group. Everyone knows which social types are in possession of which forms
of special knowledge. The social stock of knowledge as a whole is in principle
grasped by everyone. "Thus, in simple social distributions, reality and above all
the social world still remain relatively surveyable by 'everyone"'.l0
In the complex social distribution of knowledge, there is a progressive par-
titioning and specialization of special knowledge into various more or less
autonomous provinces, and there is an uneven distribution not only of special
knowledge, but also of general knowledge. II The increasing uneven distribution
of specialized knowledge leads the members into occupying roles at a certain
"social level" , "strata", or "class" ("sozialen Schicht") where they begin to transmit
only certain specialized versions of general knowledge. 12 In this way, general
knowledge becomes differentiated according to various social strata or classes.
Although the extent will depend upon the social level to which one belongs, in
general, the distribution of special knowledge is grasped here only in broad
general outlines and general knowledge is specifically grasped in terms of a
group's specialized version. Following out the logic, specialized knowledge be-
comes increasingly general and generalized knowledge becomes increasingly
specialized as we all become isolated from one another in our groups of a certain
social strata. In general, the surveyability of the social stock of knowledge is
extremely limited for not only is the distribution of special knowledge not grasp-
ed, but, more importantly, the distribution of the now specialized versions of
general knowledge is not grasped. Thus, general knowledge, which constitutes
the core of everyday reality, can no longer be totally relied upon as a common
ground in our understanding of others. "Above all, it is important that the
individual can only assume the 'equivalency' of the relevance structures of his
fellow-men in a conditioned fashion, subject to recall".B In other words, the
intersubjective understanding of others, once so secure in the simple social
distribution of knowledge where both general knowledge and knowledge of the
distribution of specialized knowledge were shared, becomes increasing proble-
matic in the complex social distribution of knowledge as neither of these realms
of knowledge can be assumed to be held in common.
It should already be clear from the use of such terms as "roles", "social strata",
and "class" that Luckmann essentially conceives of this entire process of objecti-
vation culminating in a complex social distribution of knowledge as a progressive
division oflabor. Be that as it may, Luckmann clearly states that "the structural
basis of this development is the progressive division oflabor .... The more division
of labor in a society, the more everyone becomes a specialist in a certain area
of special knowledge relevant for complexes of acts in one of the various insti-
tutional provinces of the division of labor". 14 He further states that "the typical
contexts of experience and act would be the same ... only where there were no
divisions of labor, no differentiation of roles, and thus only in a society having
no social structure in the proper sense".15 In general, it can be concluded that
120 Chapter VII
Luckmann essentially treats intersubjectivity as a problem of the increasing

division of labor.
There are two important questions which should be raised at this point with
regard to Luckmann's treatment of inter sUbjectivity as a problem of the division
of labor. The first question concerns whether the type of labor one carries out
has, in fact, the all pervasive fundamental meaning, which Luckmann attributes
to it, in our understanding of others. It is true that we do understand others in
terms of their labor. However, this is only one aspect of our understanding of
others and it may not be the most important. Do I not understand my parents
first as a father and mother, and only, secondarily, in terms of their labor? Do
I not grasp my friend or lover first as a friend or lover, and continue to view them
as such even when they change jobs, are laid off, or quit working? Furthermore,
although I may in no way understand their work, I do not, as a result, necessarily
experience any great difficulty in understanding those I meet in such public places
as churches, cafes, parks, and so forth. Finally, although I may understand the
specialized labor of a new co-worker quite well (perhaps, before I even meet
him), I will, no doubt, at first feel that I still do not really understand him, and
this may become especially evident when he explains to me that he is a member
of a radical religious sect or is suicidal.*
In sum, the type of work which one performs is only one of the many
typifications in terms of which we understand others. It need not be very specific
or the most relevant typification in our understanding of others. In fact, it would
appear that precisely, in our more intimate understanding of others, knowledge
of the actual work one performs becomes increasingly irrelevant or, at the very
least, talk about one's work turns into 'stories' about the everyday happenings
in the work milieu which do not, in the strict sense, say anything about one's labor
production, but does say a lot about one's self.
The second question is concerned with whether the so-called groups of differ-
ent social strata are in fact groups. Are these groups for the members within them
or are they groups merely for the reflecting sociologist? To use Luckmann's
examples concerning groups in which general knowledge has become special-
ized, do those people who walk a certain style consider themselves, on this basis,
to be a groUp?16 Do those people, in the rural areas, who happen to share a
certain form of Catholicism consider themselves, on this basis, to be a group?
Luckmann's 'groups' of various social strata are said to be groups insofar as, on
account of the division of labor, the members tend to do similar types oflabor
and, therefore, share a common type of knowledge. Now it is no doubt true that
certain actors can be found who do similar types of labor and share a certain
common knowledge. However, this does not suffice to call these actors a group.
To use two other examples of groups proposed by Luckmann, actors can also
be found to share something in common with those of their own sex and of their
• To be sure, it is possible to argue that Luckmann's concept of 'labor' is broader than the concept
of ,work' encompassing, to use an early Marxian phrase, "all sensuous activity". However, this would
be to virtually identify all social action in everyday life as labor, which is a highly dubious claim.
own ageP Actors may even be found to share in common with others such
features as having blonde hair, brown eyes, and being overweight. However,
although actors can be found to share such attributes in common with others,
they need not, in any ofthese cases, including that of doing similar labor, consider
themselves a group.* This would only occur, for example, if the actors belonged
to a union, a women's organization, or weight watchers. In these cases, one could
speak of a group for the members bearing such attributes have interpreted
themselves, along the lines of these attributes, as a group and have gone on to
organize themselves for some purpose. Symbolization, not typification, is the
essential moment in the process of group formation. Insofar as Luckmann's
groups of various social strata are not founded upon this requirement, they are
not, in the strict sense, groups at all.
As will be seen, it is precisely the imposition of types and social categories on
sets of people who do not consider themselves to be a group which constitutes
one of the major features of social power.
Let us now turn to Luckmann's theory of internalization in which the principle
of the division of labor lies somewhat more in the background of his analyses. 18
Naturally, Luckmann, a careful and good phenomenologist, is well aware of the
fact that his theory of objectivation requires some sort of predominantly subjec-
tive social group. In his theory of internalization, Luckmann goes on to develop
the other half of the dialectic in which he considers the primarily subjective social
groups. In these groups, the objective institutionalized group forms, resulting
from the division of labor, are transmitted and internalized. Although it is
impossible to enter into a critique here, the talk of SUbjective and objective
groups, and of objectivation and internalization indicates that there is something
fundamentally wrong with this basic dialectical perspective put forth by
Luckmann. Classic dualistic distinctions once thought to have been permanently
overthrown by Husserl in his attempt to describe lived experience arise here once
again. Later an attempt will be made to develop Schutz's notions of imposed and
intrinsic relevances. It is suggested that these notions are much more fruitful in
attempting to describe an aspect oflived experience which Luckmann's subjec-
tive-objective distinction attempts, but fails, to capture.
In his theory ofintemalization, Luckmann primarily focuses upon the earliest
we-relations of the child which he understands as subjective groups which serve
as a "filter" for the objectivated social structure. 19 The child does not encounter
the objectivated social structure in one thrust, but rather slowly begins to
internalize it in its first appearance as an element interwoven with his concrete
subjective experience of others in the we-relationship. Although the social struc-
ture is said to "lie behind" these earliest we-relations, it does not exhaust them.20
• To be sure, and Luckmann no doubt had this fact in mind while developing his argument, Schutz
claims that sex, age, and the division of labor which is conditioned by them are basic imposed
relevances rooted in the human condition (See p. 9S above). However, the 'groupings' which result
from these relevances are for Schutz typificatory groups. He does not anywhere argue, to my
knowledge, that the members of such groups necessarily interpret themselves symbolically as a group.
122 Chapter VII
Through processes of "intersubjective mirroring" which are based upon the

fundamental reciprocity of the we-relation, the child internalizes the social struc-
ture. As he does so, the social structure becomes increasingly understood as
detached and independent from the immediacy of the subjective we-relation. In
other words, the social structure becomes increasingly viewed as an objectivated
social structure. Of course, due to the socially conditioned specificity of these
early we-relations, that is, due to their very location in the objectivated social
structure, what the child internalizes is not the objectivated social structure per
se, but rather a determinate version of it. 21
Although the subjective group is said not to be exhausted by the objectivated
social structure, which, it will be recalled, is essentially the prevailing institution-
alized division oflabor, it is, nevertheless, primarily interpreted only from this
perspective. First, the subjective group is primarily construed only as a means
for transferring and internalizing the objectivated social structure. Second, the
subjective group is viewed as strongly conditioned by the objectivated social
structure. Due to the location of the subjective group in the social stratification
system of the objectivated social structure, only an objectively determined
version of the social structure is internalized. Finally, what is presented to
subjective experience in the subjective group is only the subjective correlate of
the objectivated social structure oflabor. "The individual experiences the social
world which is already given to him and objectivated in the relative natural world
view, as a scale of subjective probabilities related to him .... In other words, the
social structure is open to him in the form of typical biographies".22 These typical
biographies are construed by Luckmann as "careers", that is, subjective possibil-
ities in the present division of labor which are ranked along a scale of prestige
established in the prevailing system of social stratification. 23 Thus, the social
world is experienced within the subjective group as a world of possible careers
and occupations with varying degrees of social prestige. In short, the social world
is subjectively experienced within the SUbjective group as a world of the division
oflabor.
Three questions should be raised in regard to this theory of internalization and
the subjective group. First, what does it mean to say that the objectivated social
structure stands behind the subjective group, that the subjective group acts as
a "filter", and that the social structure is internalized? The image appears to be
one in which something outside the group flows through the group, and then into
the individual with the help of intersubjective reciprocal mirroring. Now there
is no questioning the fact that the early we-relations are extremely significant
subjective groups. However, the above image places undue emphasis upon the
determining character of the objectivated social structure and tends to overlook
the active character of the child and the subjective group. The more appropriate
image of what happens in those early we-relations would be something like the
following. The SUbjective group acts as a 'cautionary gateway' through which the
child slowly learns of various transcendent realms, and from which he learns how
to actively interpret and map out the world of everyday life. For example, the
child learns of his family and other families, that families are different from
church and nursery groups. and that there is an institutionalized ideal of a family
from which. to some degree. his own family differs. To be sure. children do learn
various versions of the social world. However. this fact is to be dealt with by
carefully examining how. and to what extent. the child learns to see his group
from the perspective of other groups such that he learns that he possesses a
version of the social world to which a certain social value is attached.
The second question is concerned with whether the sole purpose of subjective
groups is the internalization of the objectivated social world as Luckmann would
seem to have it. What happens to these subjective groups after a good deal of
the objectivated social world is internalized? Having accomplished their pur-
pose. do the subjective groups then totally disappear or do we merely continue
to view them as SUbjective when. in fact. they are highly anonymous and objective
being bound by the objectivated social structure? Luckmann hints at the latter
possibility. "Seen from the outside. the result of the socialization... is the typical
similarity in the conduct of contemporaries who are understood as typical. Seen
from the inside. such similarities are accidental. The socialized man is 'unique..•. 24
It would appear that. after the internalization ofthe objectivated social structure.
the members in the subjective group basically understand one another in terms
of the objective anonymous roles established in the objectivated social structure.
Thus. it is only within this institutionalized role system that they may salvage
some sort of meager subjective existence.
There is simply no reason to believe that the institutionalized social world
comes to replace the SUbjective existence attained in the original subjective
groups. After we are adults and have learned much about the institutionalized
social world. we continue to relate to our families. and here. clearly. not so much
in terms of learning or in terms of institutionalized roles. but in terms of the
intimacy and high emotions which continue to be experienced there. and which
are so reminiscent of childhood. In general. all subjective groups are character-
ized by a certain degree of intimacy by means of which they are able to support
the huge anonymous institutional apparatus from which they always retain a
certain distance. Later. we shall examine in detail this pre-institutional sphere
of subjective groups in terms of a theory of the 'milieu'.
The final question is concerned with whether the social world is experienced
within the SUbjective group as a world of the division of labor. In a sense, this
question is a repetition of the earlier one. raised in regard to Luckmann's theory
of objectivation. where we asked whether 'labor' has the all pervasive fundamen-
tal meaning which Luckmann attributes to it. 25 We have now gone full circle. The
objectivated division of labor. which we have already critically considered. now
reappears within the theory of internalization and the subjective group. Suffice
it to say that not only are careers and occupations open to us as Luckmann
claims. but also the possibility of being , for example. husbands and wives. fathers
and mothers, church goers, gardeners. cardplayers. members of numerous inter-
est and community organizations. and so forth.
124 Chapter VII
2. THEPRACfICAL ATTITUDE AS THE FOUNDATION OF INTERSUBJECfIVITY

AND EVERYDAY LIFE
Apart from the fact that Luckmann's position is an interesting and significant
extension of Schutz's arguments, which deserves an even more detailed critical
analysis than we have been able to provide here, it is also of considerable value
for pointing us towards the problems with one of Schutz's basic theses concern-
ing intersubjectivity. We shall now attempt to draw out the fundamental thesis
of Schutz from which Luckmann develops this highly questionable position.
Luckmann's treatment of inter subjectivity as a problem of the division oflabor
most clearly begins with his claim that, during the transference of knowledge, a
certain typification of others develops according to their types of problems and
according to the type of knowledge relevant for the solution of such problems. 26
Others are, thereafter, understood in terms of their typical labor on certain
problems and the typical knowledge which they employ to solve such problems.
It was seen that the above claim presupposes that knowledge is transferred by
means of objectivations when a typical similarity of problems is presupposed. 27
Now this assumption is itself derived from a particular interpretation of Schutz's
theory of relevance. Luckmann's claim that a typical similarity of problems is
fundamental for a transference of knowledge is based upon his interpretation of
the thematic relevance structure (which, it will be recalled, is concerned with the
problems which confront us) as the most fundamental relevance structure for
establishing intersubjective understanding.
Luckmann views the interpretational and motivational relevance structures
as, for the most part, highly socialized, while viewing the thematic relevance
structures, in the end, as closely dependent upon the formal arrangement of
subjective experience in the social world. 28 Thus, the thematic relevance struc-
tures are viewed as the structures which are most dependent upon the immediate
situation, most susceptible to direct perception, and, consequently, most open
to intersubjective agreement. In a face-to-face situation, having a sector of the
spatial world in common, certain objects and events of the situation are simulta-
neously imposed upon the actors as thematically relevant and this thematic
relevancy is said to be, relatively speaking, easily read off the body of the other
which is given as a field of expression. Regardless of their variously socialized
interpretational and motivational relevance structures, then, the actors can
readily find agreement with respect to the thematically relevant. It is for this very
reason that Luckmann claims that the thematic relevance structures are employ-
ed as the primary means for re-establishing intersubjective understanding. "N at-
urally intersubjective thematic relevances can be used again and again in the
verification of the congruence of the schemata of experience and explication
'brought into' a we-relation by the partners. This plays an important role, espe-
cially in situations where (for one reason or another) language 'breaks down"'.29
To be sure, Schutz continually emphasizes, at least in Reflections on the
Problem of Relevance, the mutual priority of the motivational, interpretational,
and thematic relevance structures. 30 However, Luckmann's assumption that the
thematic relevance structure is the most fundamental relevance structure for the
establishment ofintersubjective understanding appears to be directly based upon
Schutz's basic assumption that in everyday life we abide solely by the practical
attitude. 31 If Schutz characterizes our actions in everyday life as practical prob-
lem-solving activities, then it is surely consistent for Luckmann to choose the
thematically relevant problems, which arise and which we are focused upon
solving in everyday life, as the foundation for the intersubjective relations in the
everyday life-world.
Although Schutz's notion of the practical attitude is much broader than
Luckmann's notion oflabor and is, consequently, not open to all the criticisms
which we have leveled against Luckmann's conception, nevertheless, the ease
and consistency with which Luckmann is able to derive his concept oflabor from
the practical attitude, and the severe difficulties which then arise with respect to
this theory leads us to critically question this basic thesis of Schutz. Once Schutz
characterizes social action in everyday life as practical problem-solving activity,
Luckmann simply interprets this problem-solving action as labor, the solving of
different types of problems as different types of labor, and the transmission of
knowledge according to persons with certain types of problems as the beginning
of the division of labor.
In order to begin questioning Schutz's basic assumption concerning the prac-
tical attitude, it is important to understand this assumption in terms of the
development of his work. Schutz's claim that we abide solely by the practical
attitude in everyday life is a remnant of his analyses in which the world of
everyday life was construed as the work world. 32 It will be recalled that the work
world is the world of physical things and bodily operations. It is the world which
offers resistances to me which require effort to overcome, and which places tasks
before me which I must solve to obtain my purposes. In correspondence to this
work world, Schutz develops the concept of the practical attitude which is the
state ofwide-awakeness in which I attempt to attain my purposes by gearing into,
overcoming, and changing this work world.
As was seen in the previous chapter, Schutz came to view this analysis of the
everyday life-world as essentially limited and went on to argue that the work
world is permeated by appresentational references of a lower order such that the
objects, facts, and events given in experience are given only as socio-cultural
objects of the relative natural world view. 33 Unfortunately, in revising what is
given to us in experience in everyday life, Schutz did not take the further
necessary step of revising our attitude towards it. If the object given in experience
carries an appresentational reference to an immanent transcendent meaning,
then the practical attitude toward that object must be revised so that this
appresented meaning can be properly grasped. Instead of pursuing such an
analysis, Schutz simply continued to employ his outmoded concept ofthe practi-
cal attitude.
It should be mentioned that Schutz did realize that there were problems with
his concept of the practical attitude. Through an analysis of the notion of 'taken
for grantedness', he hoped, in his future book (The Structures of the Life-World),
126 Chapter VII
to, at least, partially work them out. Responding to footnote 46 in The Field of
Consciousness34 where Gurwitsch critically asks, in regard to Schutz's essay "On
Multiple Realities", how the non-everyday systems of relevancy are to be derived
from the systems of relevancy prevailing in the work world, Schutz writes, in a
letter to Gurwitsch, that "that is a big problem, which I have not solved. For a
partial solution having to do with 'taken for grantedness', I am working on in my
book".35 Here Schutz indicates that he intends to rework his concept of the
practical attitude, which he had construed in terms of pragmatic instrumental
action within the work world, along the lines of a theory of taken for grantedness
so as to clarify how the non-everyday relevances can be derived from the
practical attitude.
Schutz's concept of the practical attitude just as that of the work world is then
a formal one which represents a perspective slice of the world of everyday life
which, while foundational, does not account for the rich immanent transcendent
meanings of this world. Given the pervasiveness of these transcendent meanings
in any practical situation, it can be said that, strictly speaking, no actor abides
solely by the practical attitude.
In order to revise Schutz's formal concept of the practical attitude, it is clear
that a more radical concretization is required than that of merely adding flesh
to it which is essentially what Luckmann attempted in his analyses. Sensing this
formal character, while wishing to remain as close as possible to Schutz's original
conception, Luckmann simply gives 'body' to the practical attitude, in both
senses of the word, and introduces the concept of labor. However, in merely
fleshing out this notion, Luckmann merely transforms the work world (Wirkwelt)
into a world oflabor (Arbeitswelt) at which point many of the difficulties with his
theory arise.
It is clear that the most difficult task which confronts us is to somehow revise
Schutz's conception of the practical attitude such that other attitudes are permit-
ted in everyday life, for example, sentimental, altruistic, antagonistic, and
grievance attitudes, all of which may have some very impractical consequences.
The intention here is not to suggest that there is a need to develop a list of the
various attitudes in everyday life, but rather to suggest that there is a need to
fundamentally account for such attitudes which are so evidently a part of this
everyday life. At the same time, extreme care must be taken so as not to lose the
foundational importance of the practical attitude for such a loss would result in
the inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and would lead into a
relativism of the most extreme kind. In Part Four, a first attempt will be made
to take up this difficult task.
3. INTIMACY AND ANONYMITY
Throughout his work, Schutz continually emphasizes the fact that intimacy and
anonymity are important features of the social world. 36 However, he repeatedly
avoids any analysis of this dimension. In his early work, Schutz focuses instead
upon the supposedly more fundamental dimension which concerns the formal
arrangement of the world into provinces of immediacy and mediacy.37 Rather
than examining the dimensions of intimacy and anonymity, he turns to an
examination of the fundamental structures of proximity and distance, with re-
spect to space and time, in the social world. In these analyses, Schutz demon-
strates the origin and necessity of an increasingly anonymous typification of
others insofar as they do not share in the immediacy of the we-relationship.
However, Schutz himself admits that this formal organization of the social world
allows for all degrees of intimacy and anonymity.38 Even his theory of "course-
of-action types" and "personal types" 39 essentially allows for the same. Thus, for
example, how an anonymous personal type comes to attain an intimate fullness
is left, in the end, unclarified. "In the we-relationship among consociates the
other's course of action, its motives (insofar as they become manifest) and his
person (insofar as it is involved in the manifest action) can be shared in immediacy
and the constructed types, just described, will show a very low degree of anony-
mity and a high degree of fullness".4o
Even in his later work, where Schutz turns to a concrete investigation of the
relative natural world view and its appresentational relations such as marks,
indications, signs and symbols,41 he still does not analyze the dimensions of
intimacy and anonymity in the social world. Thus, for example, while the we-
relationship is now understood in terms of symbolic appresentations and no
longer merely in terms of the spatio-temporal immediacy of a face-to-face
situation, the we-relationship continues to refer to "situations of all degrees of
intimacy and remoteness".42
In general, it seems clear that, while recognizing the importance of intimacy
and anonymity, Schutz intentionally limited his analyses to what he considered
to be more fundamental dimensions of the social world. However, we must here
seriously raise the question as to whether there is any more fundamental di-
mension to the social world than the dimension of intimacy and anonymity, and
further ask whether the problem of intersubjectivity can be properly treated at
all without an examination of this dimension.
First, each and every concrete experience of others is experienced with some
degree of intimacy and anonymity. Our understanding of others is always inex-
tricably bound up with some degree of intimacy and anonymity. Second, this
aspect of our experience of others is of the utmost concern to us in carrying out
our projects of action. It is only on the basis of whether the given others are
intimate friends or anonymous others that we formulate and carry out our
projects of action. This does not only refer to the fact that, since the action of
intimates can be more accurately predicted than the action of anonymous others,
they are included in our projects of action quite differently. More importantly,
it refers to the fact that the means for carrying out the projected goals, along with
the projected goals themselves, will be qualitatively different depending upon
whether I am dealing with intimates or anonymous others. Even in the relatively
anonymous practical situation of serving a customer, if that customer is also a
best friend, I must, at the very least, alter my typical way of serving customers,
128 Chapter VII
if not the goal of selling an item or service to him. I might give him the item, or
perform the service at a discount or for free. Simply put, I act differently towards
my friends than I do towards anonymous others and it is a fundamental concern
of mine to know with whom I am dealing in carrying out my projects of action.
Third, such essential structures of intersubjectivity as those having to do with
space and time must be considered simultaneously with the structures of intima-
cy and anonymity. For example, the claim that others are grasped in increasingly
anonymous typifications insofar as they do not share in the immediacy of the
we-relationship must be qualified by the dimensions of intimacy and anonymity
in the social world. In the world of everyday life, intimates, separated by distance,
employ the so-called anonymous typifications to communicate quite intimate
thoughts (e.g. through letters), while strangers, partaking in the immediacy of a
we-relationship, manage the suggested abundance of symptoms manifest there
so as only to communicate quite anonymous thoughts. Embedded within the
everyday life-world with its dimensions of intimacy and anonymity, the formal
relationship between immediacy, mediacy, and anonymity undergoes a complete
transformation.
In Part Four, intimacy will be examined in terms of its constitution out of
anonymous situations and in terms of the milieu, while anonymity will be examin-
ed in terms of a theory of institutions.
4. THE PERSON
The notion of intimacy can be found in Schutz's work in another sense which
is very subtle and highly theoretical. Here the notion of intimacy is centered
around the concept of the Person. It was seen that the Person's participation in
a world of imposed intersubjectivity, a world of intrinsic intersubjectivity, and
a world of symbolic intersubjectivity involves a participation ofincreasingly more
intimate aspects of the self. Generally speaking, anonymity is understood here
in terms of the Person's involvement in the automatic taken for granted world
of imposed intersubjectivity which tends towards the vital sphere and intimacy
is understood in terms of the Person's involvement in the non-taken for granted
world of symbolic intersubjectivity which tends towards the spiritual sphere.
There certainly is a sense in which this conception of intimacy, stemming from
the Person's involvement in various intersubjective worlds, is valid. I am surely
more intimate with one whose creative theoretical thoughts I share, than with
one whom I understand only in terms of the lived body as we avoid running into
one another on the street. However, and Schutz was clearly aware of this ,43 one
of our most intimate understandings of the other Person concerns precisely our
involvement with the other's lived body as, for example, in making love.
Schutz's notion of the Person needs first to be partially revised so as to allow
for the Person's intimate involvement in the vital sphere. Instead of viewing the
Person's involvement in the domains of imposed, intrinsic, and symbolic inter-
SUbjectivity as constant, it is suggested that this involvement be viewed as
variable and at the discretion of the Person. The Person, due to an inner freedom,
can, to various degrees, become involved in each of these realms. This implies
that the Person has at his disposal the possibility of managing the anonymous
and intimate character of these various worlds. Through a thorough involvement
in the automatic taken for granted world of imposed intersubjectivity, the Person
can render much of the anonymous character of this world quite intimate. In
other words, the Person can take up certain automatic taken for granted routines
and render them non-habitual so as to present certain intimate aspects of the self.
For example, in a sexualized situation, automatic routines having to do with the
lived body such as walking, smoking, drinking, and undressing can become quite
thematic and involve a most intimate display of the self. In the actual making
love with another, the usually horizonal, taken for granted, lived bodies are
brought into thematic focus and, through the most intricate subtle movements
of the lived body, one of the most intimate understandings of the other can be
attained.
It is also true that through a lack of involvement in the non-taken for granted
world of symbolic intersubjectivity, the Person can render much of the intimate
character of this world quite anonymous. Within this world, he can present a very
anonymous self. Rather than presenting his innermost creative thoughts, he can,
for example, recite others' arguments by memory, routinely give summaries of
others' ideas, strategically present certain positions, attempt to be simply en-
tertaining, and even plagiarize. Correspondingly, the listener can dose off, ask
rhetorical questions, and argue against a position merely because it is on the
other side.
The fact that the anonymous automatic taken for granted world can become
quite intimate and the intimate non-taken for granted world of symbolic intersub-
jectivity can become quite anonymous points to the further need of revising the
notion of a world of imposed, intrinsic, and symbolic intersubjectivity. In Part
Four, these various worlds will be reinterpreted from the perspective of a theory
of the milieu, the group, the institution, and the symbolic cosmos.
However, the important point to grasp for now is that the Person's partici-
pation in the worlds of imposed, intrinsic, and symbolic intersubjectivity is not
to be viewed as constant involving an increasingly more intimate aspect of the
selffor then the Person is merely viewed as a composite of various strata ranging
from the anonymous participation in the vital and physical sphere to the intimate
participation in the spiritual sphere. Thus, it has been suggested that the Person
be viewed in terms of a freedom of involvement and display of the self within
these worlds. This freedom is always assumed to be within the grasp of the typical
actor and will be carefully taken into consideration in the following.
5. THE SOCIAL GROUP AND TAKEN FOR GRANTED SYMBOLS
Schutz's analyses of intersubjectivity in terms of the symbolic self-interpretation

of a social group by its members are extremely useful and will be heavily relied
130 Chapter VII
upon in the following. Unfortunately, however, Schutz was primarily concerned

only with the transcendent character of symbolic knowledge. 44 He left unclarified
how symbols become taken for granted and how such higher order taken for
granted knowledge is presented in subjective experience. Thus, he left out of his
analysis a broad and important realm of the social world. This lack of analysis
actually constitutes a certain defect in Schutz's work insofar as it leaves open
the possibility of interpreting his theory of symbolism along the lines of those
interested in promoting hermeneutics, existentialism, an archaeology of knowl-
edge, or the more sophisticated forms of social determinism. Taken for granted
symbolism could be interpreted as 'unconscious, fully-operative, effective mean-
ing'. Of course, this interpretation would be quite at odds with the overall
orientation of Schutz's work which stems from Husserl's and Bergson's theories
of consciousness. Perhaps, it would not be improper here to say a few words
about taken for granted symbolism from a basically Schutzian perspective so as
to avoid possible early misinterpretations.
A large portion of the great symbolic systems are grasped by the actor in
subjective experience in a specific taken for granted way. The full transcendent
meaning of the symbols, the 'truth' about the world which the symbol discloses,
is neither understood by actors nor even attempted to be understood by them.
In this sense, the symbols are taken for granted. Nevertheless, the symbols are
understood as representing certain transcendent groups and, in this sense, they
are not fully taken for granted. For example, for the typical actor, the full
transcendent spiritual meaning of the 'Red Cross', the 'Staff of Aesculapius', and
the 'University Emblem' is not understood. Why these symbols were chosen and
what they essentially represent is unknown to the actor. However, these symbols
are understood as generally referring to certain transcendent groups. The 'Red
Cross' generally refers to an organization which provides emergency aid, the
'Staff of Aesculapius' refers to the medical profession, and the 'University
Emblem' refers to a particular university. These symbols, which were originally
created to express a knowledge about the transcendent spiritual experience of
a group and its higher purposes, have become taken for granted, and now serve
as a mere means for simply and generally referring to the group.
If the symbols were to become fully taken for granted in everyday life, they
would further lose this transcendent reference to the group and, consequently,
all of their transcendent sense. The symbols would then possess only a practical
meaning. This can be clearly seen in our present practical understanding of the
celestial revolutions and vegetative rhythms which were once understood as
powerful symbols representing all other order.
To be sure, the forlorn transcendent meaning of such symbols can be still
investigated and even to some extent recovered by scientific researchers. How-
ever, such meaning belongs to a past era and has no direct effect on the present
everyday life-world in which it has become irrelevant and replaced by a practical
meaning.
CONCLUSION
In general, this entire critical analysis of Schutz's conception of intersUbjectivity

has been directed against his lack of analyzing a very significant realm lying, so
to speak, between the practical, everyday life-world and the multiple transcen-
dent finite provinces of meaning. Thus, it was argued that the practical attitude
excludes other attitudes obtaining within the everyday life-world; intimacy and
anonymity are a fundamental dimension of the social world; the Person is to be
viewed in terms of a freedom of involvement and display of the self; and, finally,
that the taken for granted symbolism of a group must be considered. The analysis
of what might be called this 'realm of decorum' would constitute a fundamental
development of Schutz's work.
Among all three of the authors considered here, Schutz has, without a doubt,
devoted the most attention to the problem of intersubjectivity. His specific
analyses stretch over many years and demonstrate a scope, depth, and complexi-
ty which has required us to devote a great amount of time to them. While his
analyses proceed in many different and, sometimes, opposing directions, an
attempt has been made to draw out the, to be sure, largely implicit, fundamental
line of his argument.
Schutz's general contribution to the problem of intersubjectivity was his
development of the notion of the Person in the social group. It is no longer the
abstract 'individual', 'consciousness', 'actor', 'member', or 'other', but rather the
concrete Person which is to be considered with respect to the problem of
intersubjectivity. The Person is the unity of the lived body, the actor, and spiritual
self, and, as the locus of these various aspects of the self, which participate in
divergent intersubjective worlds, the Person in the social group provides the ideal
vantage point from which to consider the problem of intersubjectivity.
NOTES
1. With respect to questions concerning the written material left behind by Schutz for this book,
and Luckmann's editing and contributing to it, see Schutz and Luckmann, Structures, pp. xi-xx,
S. 11-20.
2. See, for example: ibid., pp. xvi-xvii, 229-241, 247-248, 261-304, and, especially, p. 291 and p. 291,
n. 19, S. 16,229-240,248-249,262-301, and, especially, S. 289 and S. 326, Anm. 15.
3. For example, in summarizing his argument, Luckmann writes: "We have discussed various
aspects of the relation between the social and the sUbjective stock of knowledge, as a basic
dimension of the dialectic between man and society. After an analysis of the presuppositions and
basic structures of the subjective, the origin of the social stock of knowledge in subjective
knowledge was described. Then it was shown how the elements of the social enter the subjective
stock of knowledge. But there is still one question to answer: how is the social stock of knowledge
presented in subjective experience?" (Ibid., p.319, S. 315). Also see, for example: ibid.,
pp. 243-251,261-264, and 304-306, S. 245-252, 262-264, and 302-303.
4. Ibid., p.264 and 265, S. 264.
5. Ibid., pp. 286-291, S. 285-289.
6. Ibid., p. 291, S.289.
132 Chapter VII
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., pp. 291-299, S. 289-296.
9. Ibid., pp. 308-312 and 317-318, S. 305-308 and 313-314.
10. Ibid., p. 312, S. 308.
II. Ibid., pp. 312-318, S. 309-314.
12. Ibid., pp. 312-313 and 317-318, S. 309-310 and 313-314.
13. Ibid., p. 327, S. 322. In general, with respect to this issue, see ibid., pp. 326-331, S. 321-326.
14. Ibid., pp. 327-328, S. 323.
15. Ibid., pp. 250-251, S. 251.
16. For this and the following example, see ibid., p. 314, S. 310.
17. Ibid., pp. 308-315, S. 305-311. Also see, for example, p. 307 and pp. 289-295, S. 304 and 287-293.
18. See ibid., pp.243-261, S. 245-261. Although Luckmann only very occasionally uses the word
'internalization' in these analyses, it is clear from his characterization of the socially conditioned
aspects of the subjective stock of knowledge that it is essentially what he has in mind. Of course,
'internalization' is to stand in contradistinction to 'objectivation'. Cf. Peter Berger and Thomas
Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1967),
especially, pp. 129-183.
19. Schutz and Luckmann, Structures, pp. 243-261, S. 245-261. However, also see the programmatic
and somewhat unclear section entitled "The SUbjective Correlates of the Social Stock of
Knowledge", pp. 319-331, S. 315-327.
20. Ibid., p.247, S. 248.
21. See, for example, ibid., pp. 250-251 and 259-260, S. 251-252 and 259-260.
22. Ibid., p. 95, S. 104.
23. See, for example, ibid., pp.95-98 and p. 329, S. 104-107 and 324.
24. Ibid., p. 261, my emphasis, S. 261.
25. See pp. 120-121 above.
26. See p. 118 above.
27. Ibid.
28. For example, Luckmann writes: "The 'socialized' interpretational and motivational relevances
again refer in turn to 'originary' situations of acquisition based on intersubjective thematic
relevances and formed by immediate social givens" (Ibid., p. 256, S. 257). He further writes that
"since the intersubjectivity of thematic relevances is dependent on the formal arrangement of
subjective experiences in the social world, it also has significant relevance for the 'socialization'
of the interpretational and motivational relevances" (Ibid., p.255, S. 256). In general, for
Luckmann's interpretation of Schutz's theory of relevance, see ibid., pp. 252-261, S. 252-261. Also
see pp. 229-241, S, 229-240.
29. Ibid., p. 255, S. 256.
30. Schutz, Relevance, especially, pp. 68-71 where he most clearly argues this point. However, also
see "Some Structures of the Life-World", CP 3, p. 132. There Schutz appears to argue that the
thematic relevance structures are indeed primordial.
31. For Schutz's assumption concerning the practical attitude, see, for example: "The Problem of
Rationality in the Social World", CP 2, pp. 64-88; "On Multiple Realities", CP 1, pp.207-259,
especially, pp. 208-229; Schutz, Relevance, especially, pp. 16-21 and 121-132; "Common Sense
and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action", CP 1, pp. 3-47; "Symbol, Reality and Society",
CP 1, pp. 287-356, especially, pp.306-329 and 340-343; and "Tiresias, or Our Knowledge of
Future Events" (1959), CP 2, pp. 277-293, especially, pp. 283-284.
32. For example, see "On Multiple Realities", CP 1, pp.208-229, especially note, pp.208-209,
212-213, and 226-229.
33. See, especially, p. 104 above.
34. Gurwitsch, Field, p. 398, n. 46. The footnote reads: "Schutz' theory, it seems, gives rise to two
questions. In the first place: from which experiences do systems of relevancy other than that
prevailing in the 'world of daily life' originate? The question refers to those experiences which
stand to the systems of relevancy under discussion in the same relation as that in which the 'basic
experience' of the 'fundamental anxiety' stands to the system of relevancy which prevails in the
'world of working'. Since, in conformity with the general trend of Schutz' theory, the experiences
under consideration are not to be presumed as basic, but rather as derived from that of the
'fundamental anxiety', the second question concerns their very derivation".
35. Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, p. 253 (Jan. 25, 1952 S: G).
36. For example, see: "The Social World and the Theory of Social Action", CP 2, pp.12-13;
"Phenomenology and the Social Sciences" (1940), CP 1, p. 134; "The Problem of Rationality in
the Social World", CP 2, pp. 70-72; and "Husserl's Importance for the Social Sciences" (1959),
CP 1, p.148.
37. See, for example, Schutz, The Phenomenology, pp. 139-214, S. 198-302 and "On Multiple
Realities", CP 1; pp.225-226.
38. See, for example: Schutz, The Phenomenology, pp. 163-172, S. 233-240; "Phenomenology and the
Social Sciences", CP 1, p.134; "The Homecomer", CP 2, p.1I0; and "On Multiple Realities",
CP 1, pp. 225-226.
39. See, for example, Schutz, The Phenomenology, pp. 181-207, S. 252-290 and "Common Sense and
Scientific Interpretation of Human Action", CP 1, pp. 19-27.
40. "Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action", CP 1, p. 25, my emphasis.
41. See above, pp. 78-80 and p. 104.
43. See,for example, Schutz, The Phenomenology,p. 168, S. 234 and "The Homecomer", CP 2, p. 110.
44. See pp. 102-110 above.
PART FOUR
Intersubjectivity and the Social Group

CHAPTER VIII
A General Program for any Future Analysis

of the Problem of Intersubjectivity
INTRODUCTION
In the previous three parts of our investigation into the problem of intersubjectiv-
ity, an attempt has been made to layout Mead, Gurwitsch, and Schutz's theory
of intersubj ectivity , and to draw out some of the limitations of each. Our analyses
of these theories were held, for the most part, somewhat separate from one
another in order to clearly present and criticize the relevant author's theory of
intersubjectivity which was usually quite implicit in his own work and quite
complex in itself. In general, the intention was not to make an already very
difficult subject matter even more difficult by entering into comparisons at such
an early stage of our analyses. In the present chapter, it is precisely such
comparisons which will be provided. However, the main goal of this chapter is
not merely to provide comparisons, although those which are presented are
hoped to be quite illuminating.
The fundamental aim of this entire work is to re-think the problem of inter sub-
jectivity so as to aid in the advancement of our conceptualizations and analyses
of it. As a furthering of this basic project, the present chapter essentially consists
of an attempt to carry out a general reflection over our authors' three theories
of intersubjectivity with the intention of establishing a clear direction for any
further analysis of the problem. In short, an attempt is made to set up a general
program for any future analysis of the problem of intersubjectivity.
Of course, Husserl was the founding father of the problem of inter subjectivity.
Unfortunately, due to our concentration upon more recent and more sociologi-
cally-oriented theories of intersubjectivity, which have never yet been closely
examined, we have had to forgo, in this work, a detailed critical examination of
his first insightful breakthroughs in the field. Nevertheless, in the present chapter,
his work is accorded its rightful privileged and distinguished position as that
against which all attempts to reformulate the problem must be made. More
precisely, in the following, four fundamental questions for any analysis of the
problem of intersubjectivity have been developed: (1) Intersubjectivity as a
Transcendental or Mundane Problem; (2) The Other as an 'Immanent Transcen-
dence', or 'Transcendent Immanence' and Responsible Social Actor; (3) Inter-
137
138 Chapter VIII
subjectivity as an Egological or Group Problem; (4) and Intersubjectivity as a

Constitutive Product, or as Taken for Granted and Accomplished. In general,
Husserl's standpoint on each question will first be presented followed by the
common new viewpoints of Mead, Gurwitsch, and Schutz.* The views of our
three authors will then be seen, upon a closer examination, to significantly
diverge from one another, thereby providing us with the fertile ground for a
renewed analysis of our problem and with the possibility of developing a definite
framework for a future analysis.
1. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION: INTERSUBJECfIVITY AS A TRAN-

SCENDENTAL OR MUNDANE PROBLEM
Husserl was the first thinker rigorously and systematically to attempt to solve
the problem of the alter ego. He rightly saw that this problem was the real crux
in any attempt to establish a transcendental philosophy for, in a program which
attempts to found all knowledge, in the final analysis, upon a transcendental ego,
there always exists an eminent danger of solipsism. In the fifth of his Cartesian
Meditations, Husserl clearly formulates and attempts to offer a solution to this
transcendental problem of intersubjectivity. Having already performed the tran-
scendental reduction whereby the existential belief in the world as a whole,
including myself as a psycho-somatic unity, is suspended so as to disclose a pure
transcendental field of consciousness, and having then shown that real existents
attain sense only through the operating intentionality of my conscious life and
its constitutive syntheses, in the Fifth Meditation, Husserl carries o~t a second
epoche, from within this egological sphere, through which all intentional activ-
ities and their results, referring immediately or mediately to other subjectivities,
are excluded. 2 That is to say, within the already attained transcendental field of
subjectivity, Husserl isolates what he calls a "sphere of peculiar ownness", a
sphere of what is "properly of the ego", by abstractmg from all meaning which
refers to others and, thus, by essentially withdrawing the intersubjective charac-
ter of the world.** Having carried out this reduction in WhiCh the transcendental
ego is isolated from all references to others, it now becomes possible to describe
the constitution of the sense of 'the other' from within this primordial sphere of
ownness and, in so doing, to demonstrate that the transcendental ego is indeed
the founding stratum upon which the constitution of intersubjectivity is based.
* Here, we shall refer solely to Husserl's analysis of the problem of intersubjectivity as developed
in the Cartesian Meditations as it represents his most thorough and systematic self-published work
on this problem.! However, see Introduction above .
•• To be sure, Husserl maintains that every consciousness of (my actual and possible experiences
oj) that which has been abstracted from in this second epochl: belongs in the sphere properly ofthe
ego. However, as Schutz points out, this claim is incompatible with the second epochl: itself which
was to exclude every reference of sense to a possible Us and We. 3 Such experiences of others would
already institute (stiften) a We or Us, and would, furthermore, appear to occur primarily in the natural
world itself as "products" of o.ther subjectivities or, at least, interpreted by us as such.
A General Program for any Future Analysis 139
Mead, Gurwitsch, and Schutz all reject such a transcendental interpretation

of the problem of intersubjectivity and maintain instead that it is essentially a
mundane problem. Although referring specifically to Absolute Idealism in its
dialectical formulation, Mead argued, in a manner which retains its relevance
here, that the "grandiose undertaking of Absolute Idealism" to bring the whole
of reality within experience failed, for precisely in such an undertaking, which is
totally preoccupied with the absolute ego, the finite ego or, as we shall say, the
concrete mundane ego, in its theoretical and practical life, is lost and abrogated. 4
In other words, Absolute Idealism cannot account for the creative nature of
mundane consciousness in the intersubjective construction of new worlds, and,
as such, cannot account for the phenomenon of intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivi-
ty is clearly understood here by Mead as a mundane problem which, moreover,
remains inaccessible to transcendental analyses.
Although having considered intersubjectivity as, in the final analysis, a tran-
scendental problem in both Human Encounters and the Field, Gurwitsch also
concluded, after many years of deliberation, that intersubjectivity is indeed, in
the end, a mundane problem. 5 From the standpoint of his non-egological tran-
scendental conception of consciousness, which he came to view as a pre-personal
constitutive function of consciousness, Gurwitsch concluded that the transcen-
dental ego which has no function is merely an existent empirical ego and the
specific problem of how one such personal ego comes to know of another is then
a mundane problem.
Finally, Schutz also essentially considered intersubjectivity as a mundane
problem. While it is true that in his early work, The Phenomenology, he left open
the possibility of considering intersubjectivity as a transcendental problem, it is
significant that even there he chose to carry out his own analyses of intersubjec-
tivity within the natural attitude. 6 It is suggested that this decision was based
upon his deep-seated view, which he disclosed many years later to Gurwitsch,
when he wrote, in regard to transcendental matters, that "I...,have always found
the phenomenology of the natural attitude more pressing and also more fruitful".1
In any case, having gone on to immediately question the "Doppelschichtigkeit des
Bewusstseins" (i.e. a consciousness which, as both transcendental and mundane,
is in principle schizophrenic), along with the possibility of a transcendental
constitution of an identical 'thing' (Ding), especially an intersubjective identical
'thing', and having further pointed to the need for transcendental phenomenology
to recognize "das simple Phiinomenon der actio",S Schutz concluded on these
grounds, right after the publication of his very next work, "Phenomenology and
the Social Sciences",9 that the transcendental problem of intersubjectivity is
unsolvable. "Factually for Husserl, the problem ofidentity remains just as unsolv-
able as that of the alter ego".l0 Hereafter, Schutz considered intersubjectivity
solely as a mundane problem. 11
Now the consideration of intersubjectivity as a mundane problem is a funda-
mental turning point for any attempt to develop a theory of intersubjectivity.
First, it is to have essentially realized that, once a reduction to a transcendental
or absolute ego is carried out and once the social world is bracketed, what
140 Chapter VIII
remains is a mere isolated transcendental field of consciousness whose universal

structures, essentially lacking all references to others, could never provide a basis
for arriving at a knowledge of the other. Second, it is to have essentially realized
that such an abstract formulation of the problem which is concerned solely with
how a transcendental consciousness knows of an other, in the end, transcenden-
tal consciousness cannot clarify how a finite social actor knows of another actor,
understands his action, and, together with him, produces a new intersubjective
understanding. Having understood these essential insights which are involved in
the decision to treat intersubjectivity as a mundane problem, it becomes clear
that such an interpretation of inter subjectivity as a mundane problem essentially
constitutes the transformation of the problem from the dry terrain of transcen-
dental monads into the rich pastures of the social world, thereby opening up an
entirely new and promising direction for any future analyses. As Schutz so aptly
put it, "now the way is open to work peacefully in the fruitful bathos of the
life-world". 12
Of course, the critical question may now be posed to us: Is not the con-
sideration of inter subjectivity as a mundane problem, that is, as a problem which
already presupposes the existence of others, and, consequently, precisely that
whose constitution Husserl attempted to explicate, a relinquishment of his
original goal to establish phenomenology as a rigorous a priori science and as
the perennial "first philosophy"? To the extent that it is maintained here and in
the following that intersubjectivity cannot be founded upon transcendental con-
sciousness and that it is, rather, a given 'datum' (Gegebenheit) of the life-world,
it is possible to argue such a point. However, it would appear to be more true
to the nature of the matter to argue that the consideration of inter subjectivity as
a mundane problem essentially represents an extension and furtherance of
Husserl's original program. The most fundamental methodological principle in
all of Husserl's work, which can be traced as far back as to the Logische
Untersuchungen,13 if not the Philosophie der Arithmetik, 14, and which constitutes
his most essential contribution to philosophy, consists of his unyielding explicit
proclamation to describe the 'object' precisely and exactly as it appears in the
immediacy of conscious experience, that is, as a 'phenomenon'.* This fundamen-
tal principle, which calls for the radical return to the immediate evidence of
consciousness and which is captured in the slogan "zu den Sachen selbst", pro-
vides the common point of agreement for phenomenologists of all persuasions,
regardless of their stance towards the transcendental ego. Moreover, it is only
by following this fundamental principle, which insists that all valid claims must
be grounded in proper descriptions, that phenomenology is able to face and light
up the dark corners of the world and, thus, attempt to fulfill its ultimate claim
to prim am philosophiam. Now, insofar as Gurwitsch and, especially, Schutz have
amply demonstrated, upon the basis of such rigorous descriptive reflections, that
• It is of importance to note that in the Logische Untersuchungen Husser! did not subscribe and was
even opposed to the doctrine of a pure ego, and later maintained that this standpoint on the question
of the pure ego is even irrelevant to those investigations. IS
A General Program/or any Future Analysis 141
the attempt to found intersubjectivity upon a transcendental ego is faulty in that

it essentially consists of an artificial abstraction from our concrete experience of
others, through putting out of play all the founding contexts upon which that
experience is based, the consequent turn towards considering intersubjectivity
as a mundane problem can be simply viewed as a proper revision of Husserl's
own analyses and descriptions carried out in the founding spirit of his own work
to establish a "first philosophy".
Now it is clear that our consideration of intersubjectivity as a mundane
problem in no way solves all our difficulties, but rather solves one set of very
important traditional problems and opens up a rich field of new problems. What
must now be approached and clarified is exactly the intersubjectivity obtaining
in the mundane world of everyday life, and it is precisely here that our authors
stand in disagreement, each offering a different account of this state of affairs.
Mead can said to have carried out a 'natural constitutive' analysis ofintersubjec-
tivity in the everyday life-world supplemented by an analysis of the actors'
creative production of intersubjectivity. He took his first task to be that of
restoring to nature the characteristics and qualities which an Absolute Idealism
had regulated to consciousness, so as to do away with what he perceived to be
the dualisms of this tradition. He, consequently, located consciousness inextric-
ably in nature and, then, turned his attention to how intersubjective relations
could arise out of this natural world. He concluded that human beings are already
essentially related to one another in the natural world and that intersubjectivity
arose through a 'natural evolution' in which humans internalized a given natural
community of perspectives. In sum, Mead viewed the intersubjective everyday
life-world as an aspect of the creative advance of nature in which the members,
in an increasingly purposive fashion, determine the development of their own
group.
In direct contrast to Mead, Gurwitsch relentlessly continued to abide by the
raison universelle of idealist philosophy and carried out, what shall be somewhat
hesitantly called here for lack of better words, an 'epistemic' analysis of inter sub-
jectivity in the world of everyday life. He considered his first task to be that of
suspending the very idea of 'objective science' so as to free the life-world and to
demonstrate science's sense foundation in an intersubjective everyday life-world
which was seen to be grasped by him in terms of the implicit universal rational
structures involved in our pre-predicative perceptual experience. In sum, it can
be said that Gurwitsch viewed the intersubjective everyday life-world as the
epistemic foundation for the development of science and universal reason.
Finally, Schutz carried out a 'relative natural' analysis of intersubjectivity in
the everyday life-world. He understood his task to be that of simply providing
an analysis of the relative natural conception of the world held by the actors in
everyday life, along with an analysis of their symbolic interpretations of them-
selves and the social-natural world. In short, his efforts were directed at the
disclosure and analysis of the fundamental structures by which actors take for
granted and further produce a particular social world for themselves.
142 Chapter VIII
The differences between these three theories clearly display the particular
methodological dilemma which arises for an analysis of mundane intersubjectivity.
The given framework for the analysis lacks a definite transcendental ego on the
basis of which it is possible to distinguish one's analysis easily from natural
science and its abstract constructions, and, yet, at the same time, it allows for
enough remnants of such an ego so as to allow for an easy formal abstraction
from the concrete lived experience of inter subjectivity in everyday life. Thus, on
the one hand, we find Mead, who, in turning totally away from the claims of
Absolute Idealism, falls back upon the abstract constructions of natural science.
On the other hand, we find Gurwitsch relentlessly abiding by the raison universelle
which, while allowing him easily to avoid the abstract constructions of natural
science, leads him to fall back upon explicating mere abstracted formal struc-
tures of everyday life.
Pursuing these two most obvious methodological routes, which essentially
represent the horns of the dilemma of an analysis of mundane intersubjectivity,
Mead and Gurwitsch both end up failing to describe the concrete intersubjective
life-world; the former by positing natural scientific abstractions into it, the latter
by reflectively abstracting from it. Interestingly enough, at the highest level of
their theoretical reflections, where Mead thinks beyond the constructions of
natural science, and attempts to develop a formal logic of the particular and
universal, along with a philosophical theory of perspectives, and where
Gurwitsch attempts to develop a philosophical conception of the Zusammen-
hang, the thoughts of both men converge in an interest in Leibnizian conceptions
having to do with a universal logic of relations and perspectives. 16 It would
appear, then, that if one takes either of these methodological routes outside of
our field of analysis and critically reflects upon it, then one's thinking will tend
towards the same conclusion.
Returning to the field of mundane intersubjectivity proper, it is Schutz, who,
in carrying out a 'relative natural' analysis, appears to have been most able to
formulate a methodological perspective from which to avoid both tendencies of
falling back upon the conceptual framework of modern science, and the opposing
tendency of merely explicating formal 'epistemic' structures of perceptual ex-
perience by firmly fixing his attention exclusively upon the actors' own experience
and understanding of the intersubjective everyday life-world. Nevertheless, as
has been previously argued, it too represents, to an extent, a formal abstraction
from everyday life, although in the quite different sense of merely failing to
analyze one particular significant realm of experience which was referred to as
the 'realm of decorum' lying, so to speak, between the practical everyday life-
world and the multiple transcendent finite provinces of meaning.
On the basis of this critical examination of our authors' different attempts to
carry out an analysis of intersubjectivity as a mundane problem, it can be
concluded that the essential methodological problem facing any future analysis
of intersubjectivity is obviously not solipsism, but formalism. In general, it
appears that, in attempting to provide an account of mundane intersubjectivity,
one is inevitably and continually faced with the danger of transforming the
concrete lived experience of intersUbjectivity in everyday life into formal analyti-

cal structures which do not properly account for it.
In our own following investigations, we hope to maintain contact with the
concreteness of SUbjective, lived experience and, thus, avoid the problem of
formalism by complying with the following methodological postulates. First,
taking our clue from Schutz, we intend to carry out a 'relative natural' analysis
of everyday life so as to generally avoid natural scientific constructions and
phenomenological formalisms. Second, we intend to carry out a controlled
process offormalization which is to say that it will be held in check by explicitly
noting the relevance structures of the actor and by explicitly stating them along-
side of all claims. Third, the first basic units to be identified in our analysis are
to stand at the intersection of the relevant and irrelevant meaning structures of
the actor so as to provide a firm starting point from which to further analyze the
fundamental taken for granted irrelevant assumptions and the thematically rele-
vant questionable assumptions. Fourth, we intend to follow a 'mosaic procedure
of theory construction' which is to say that we shall first attempt to draw out the
contours of a number of basic units and only later attempt to work out the
relationships between them. The intention here is to avoid system building which
typically arises from concluding, on the basis of a description of one basic unit,
what the characteristics of the other units must be, according to standards of
logical coherency, without ever carrying out a proper independent description of
those other units. Finally, the resulting 'formal accounts' of our analysis are
proffered as, and I use the word cautiously, 'theoretical hypotheses', which is only
intended to mean that, while they make a claim to universality, they remain open
to the critical reflective experience of others for revision, specification, and
accretive sedimentation. The intention here is to avoid the peculiar recalcitrant
stance which appears to arise in making claims of a universal nature, and to hold
open the theoretical research program of phenomenology which is to be carried
out by a community of investigators who do not fear the findings of the empirical-
ly oriented sciences and, may we add, of one another.
2. The Other as an 'Immanent Transcendence', or 'Transcendent Immanence'

and Responsible Social Actor
The second fundamental question for any analysis of the problem ofintersubjec-
tivity concerns the relationship between immanence and transcendence. In car-
rying out the second epoch€:, Husserl disclosed a purely immanent consciousness
which he understands as the sphere of the actualities and potentialities of the
stream of subjective experiences to the extent to which this stream in its imma-
nent temporality is accessible and pre-given to my explication. 17 Within this
purely immanent consciousness, a transcendent 'world' is said to appear and,
then, from within it, a transcendent 'body' (Korper), each of which, as determin-
ing parts of my own immanent being, Husserl refers to as an "immanent transcen-
dency".18 Referring to the phenomenon of appresentation which is a special case
144 Chapter VIII
of the universal problem of pairing, which, in turn, is a primal from of passive

synthesis, Husserl, then, attempts to show how the other as such an immanent
transcendence is constituted first as a 'living body' (Leib) and, finally, as an alter
ego in full concretization through an intentional analogical modification of my
own self, although with the sense 'other than me'; that is, "other self'. Proceeding
in a similar fashion, Husserl then goes on to demonstrate the constitution of a
common objective nature.
In this section, we are no longer specifically concerned with the fact that,
starting from the basis of such a transcendental ego, Husserl can never arrive
at the constitution of the alter ego. What is of importance in the present context
is that in conceiving of the other, at the most primordial level, as a mere
transcendence within the immanence of my conscious life, that is, as an imma-
nent transcendency, the very immanency of the other is eliminated. 19 In the final
analysis, the other can be no more than a mere total and thoroughly constituted
ego grounded upon the substratum of my immanent transcendental ego. The very
possibility ofthe other remaining even to the smallest extent non-understandable
and opaque is inconceivable. Furthermore, the very possibility of my depending
upon the other for the further existence of my own conscious life and self remains
even more inconceivable.
It can be said that Mead, Gurwitsch, and Schutz all reject considering the
other, at the most primordial level, as an immanent transcendency, and decide
instead to construe the other as a 'transcendent immanency'. Mead developed
the notion of taking the attitude of the other and the generalized other which is
clearly based upon the assumption that the other's inner mental life essentially
stands apart from and transcends my own, and is at most only partially grasped
in terms of the particular 'role' played in the situation. The unique spontaneous
Tis essentially never grasped. 20 Gurwitsch, in Human Encounters, argued that
it is not through a mere variation of my conscious life that I know of the other,
but rather only through living together with the other in a milieu wherein the
other's mental life, insofar as it concerns his participation in other milieux,
escapes me. 21 Finally, Schutz considers the other, at the most fundamental level,
as one of the various transcendences of the world of everyday life about which
I attempt to acquire knowledge through the appresentational relationship of
signs, but whose absolutely unique experience is never grasped for that would
require my actual becoming the other Person.22 Clearly, in all three cases, the
other is assumed both fundamentally to transcend the immanency of my own
conscious life and to consist of a certain 'inwardness' which is never fully grasped.
It should be clearly emphasized here that the consideration of the other as a
transcendent immanency does not in any way imply that we are totally isolated
from the other and, to use a metaphor of Scheler, confined to a kind of psychical
j ail in which we are left to wait for what the metaphysical nexus of causality might
magically project on its walls. In the natural attitude of everyday life, we have
the advantage of already knowing about the existence of others and, consequent-
ly, any reference to the other as a transcendent immanence from within this
context only points to the essential fact that, in the world of everyday life, I
experience the other as a mundane existent which transcends my own existence

and, furthermore, as consisting of a certain 'inwardness' and 'ownness', an
immanency, of which I cannot be apodictically certain.
The consideration of the other as a transcendent immanency is another
fundamental turning point for any analysis of intersubjectivity and, in its impor-
tance, almost equals that of the relinquishment of the transcendental reduction
with which it is closely connected. Questions no longer arise concerning how,
from within my own immanent egological sphere, the existence of the other is
constituted, but rather already knowing of the given transcendent existence of
the other, how do I further come to know of the other's immanent self which is
even less immediately presented in my experience. At this point in our discussion,
it can be said that the general question which an analysis of intersubjectivity
raises and attempts to answer, and, to be sure, this question will have to be
reformulated as later considerations are taken into account, is, knowing already
that others exist, how do I know of the immanent 'private' life of the other. More
specifically, how do I know that the other, who exists in the world in an
essentially similar manner as I do, further consists of an 'inwardly ownness'
which is, in essence, different from my conscious life, insofar as for me it must
always be his and only his 'inwardness'? To use very metaphorically transcenden-
tal terminology at the level of the natural attitude, the question concerns how,
already knowing of the other as a noema, I come to know of the other as a noesis.
It is not the belief in the existence of the other which requires proof here, but
rather the belief in the other's immanency through which we come to understand
the other's subjective motives of action and private thoughts.
In attempting to answer this question of how I come to know of the immanent
conscious life ofthe other, two pitfalls, which are clearly not to be confused with
those of the transcendental and ontological problems of inter subjectivity, are to
be avoided. 23 The first concerns the danger of a practical optimism which results
from tacitly assuming that my experiencing of the inwardness of the concrete
other and his experiencing of me are simply interchangeable. Although this might
be, to a certain extent, the final outcome of an analysis of mundane intersubjec-
tivty, it cannot be assumed as a starting point without committing a petitio
principii. The very task of the analysis is to show how such an interchangeability
is possible. The second pitfall concerns the danger of a practical solipsism which
results from construing the 'inwardness' (and we intentionally do not say 'exis-
tence') of the concrete other as merely a constitutive element or independent
representation of my own mundane conscious life, thereby rendering it impossi-
ble to ever even approach grasping the inner mental life of the other as he lives
it.
These two opposing dangers do not only further delimit the boundaries of our
field of inquiry, but, moreover, actually indicate the direction for the further
formulation of our problem. In order to avoid the practical optimism of simply
assuming from the outset that the experiencing of one another's 'inwardness' is
simply interchangeable, some sort of at first 'non-interchangeability' or 'distance'
must be disclosed which, however, is such that it is possible to overcome so as
146 Chapter VIII
to avoid the opposing danger of falling into a practical solipsism. It now finally
becomes clear why Schutz, although very critical of the Fifth Cartesian Medi-
tation, nevertheless, often spoke quite highly of Husserl's analysis of the hie and
illie carried out there, even going so far as to propose that it serve as a possible
starting point for an analysis of mundane intersubjectivity.24 While my 'here' and
your 'there' does indicate an essential initial difference between the existence of
two mundane egos, it is overcome able and, in fact, overcome so as to allow for
a further more concrete understanding of the immanency of the other.
It is fairly easy to go on now and conclude from the above that a complete
analysis of inter subjectivity would consist precisely in a demonstration not only
of how such an initial difference is overcome, such as between my 'here' and your
'there', but how further other differences are overcome leading to an ever more
complete understanding of the immanency of the other. In other words, it can
be said that the principle of reciprocal perspectives developed by Husserl for the
problem of space needs to be further developed for the entire complex field of
social experience.
Now, insofar as there are these various differences which must be overcome
in order to obtain a more complete understanding of the immanency of the other,
it can be concluded that there are multiple levels and types of intersubjective
understandings of the other and, with this essential insight, we arrive at another
key point for any future analysis of intersubjectivity. Any general claims concern-
ing intersubjectivity as a total phenomenon must clarify and adequately account
for the 'multiple sense' of intersubjectivity in everyday life. Avoiding running into
another on the street, making love, receiving a letter, praying together, and doing
science together are all intersubjective understandings, that is, a type of intersub-
jective understanding of the other, each in their own right, and must be account-
ed for as such in asserting any claims about intersubjectivity in general. Whereas
previous attempts to provide an analysis of intersubjectivity have construed the
latter in a totally singular fashion insofar as their sole concern was with the mere
demonstration of the existence of the other, we, who are examining intersubjec-
tivity as a mundane problem, recognize the various forms which our intersubjec-
tive understanding of the other can take within the social world, and insist that
they be properly analyzed.
Of course, all three of our authors recognized this multiple sense to the notion
of intersubjectivity which must be clarified in pursuing any analysis of the
problem in general. Briefly, Mead analyzed the different types of intersubjectivity
obtaining in various groups due to their particular organizational structure,
Gurwitsch examined the different types of intersubjectivity obtaining in various
contexts and fundamental organizations of milieux, and Schutz analyzed differ-
ent types of intersubjectivity in terms of the Person's many different types of
understandings of others both within everyday life and within the various mul-
tiple finite provinces of meaning.
Now, what none of our authors sense, except perhaps Schutz, who appears
at times to have caught dim glimpses of this state of affairs, 25 is that this multiple
sense of intersubjectivity, that is, our various multiple degrees and forms of
understanding the other in everyday life, arises from the following, perhaps most
essential, foundational feature of the social world: the primordial irreconcilable
tension between the immanency of the mundane ego and the transcendent social
world. Of course, with respect to our specific understanding of the alter ego, this
irreconcilable tension takes the form of a discordant irresolution between the
immanency of the mundane ego and the transcendent immanency of the other.
Stating the matter somewhat loosely, in general, in always already knowing of
the existence of others, I am to an extent always thrown outside the immanency
of my own conscious life and implicated in a process of obtaining a further
knowledge of the other, however, in never being able to obtain a complete
understanding of the immanency of the other, I am at some point always found
to be thrown back upon the immanency of my own conscious life and restrained
by it.
In order to demonstrate the factual necessity of this irreconcilable tension
between a finite immanent ego and a transcendent social world, which includes
of course other transcendently immanent egos and transcendent objects, let us
carry out two variations in phantasy. First, suppose that all transcendences were
included within the immanency of the mundane ego. We would then all know
everything about everything and everybody in the same way, and, consequently,
there would be a lack of differentiation between egos and a lack of motivation
to project goals in this clearly certain social world. Here the social world would
have surely 'folded in' upon itself and collapsed as something like Freud's
self-determined return to the original 'quiescence of the inorganic world' would
have been achieved; a tension free state which can be metaphorically interpreted
as a 'living death'. Now, suppose, on the other hand, that all transcendences were
excluded from the experience of the mundane ego. The mundane ego would then
remain unknowingly immersed in and bound to the here and now ofthe perceptu-
ally immediate situation, and would know little of almost nothing as the most
minimal knowledge of the transcendent experience of the past, required to
project a transcendent future from which to order the present, would be lacking.
This would result in a total differentiation between egos and an inability to
project goals in a totally uncertain social world. Here the social world would have
surely disintegrated and collapsed as we would have all fallen below the level of
Gelb and Goldstein's "concrete attitude",26 and would have approached some-
thing like the level of Mead's various individual perspectives given in nature
wherein organisms remain completely immersed; organisms whose future, by the
way, Mead can only guarantee by putting his faith in the scientific postulate of
evolution.
Although both of these worlds are, to an extent, theoretically conceivable in
phantasy, it is clear that they are both an empirical impossibility. In both cases,
it has been seen that the social world collapses and essentially ceases to exist
as such. Thus, the former should be taken as a warning sign for any critical
theorizing and positing of future utopian ideals, while the latter should be taken
as a warning sign for any behavioralistic interpretation of the social world.
148 Chapter VIII
Having now generally considered the other as a transcendent immanency and

having pointed to the underlying somewhat speculative thesis concerning the
primordial irreconcilable tension between the immanency of the mundane ego
and the transcendent social world, one final very important point remains to be
made before drawing this section to a close. To speak of the other as a transcen-
dent immanency at the level of the natural attitude is, in the final analysis, to
speak of a 'responsible social actor'. The transcendently immanent other, by first
simply existing in a world in which the existence of others is already given, cannot
but help influencing others in this world. The other's mere presence, along with
what he does and does not do, effects others as they effect him, and this
inextractable influence upon others provides the foundational basis for our
attributing to him a certain responsibility which is an intrinsic aspect of all
intersubjective understanding in everyday life.
While it is true that I never completely grasp the peculiar transcendent
immanency of the other, I always assume that the actions of the other are
attributable to an unknown, inwardly, ownness or what often goes by the name
of an 'inner spontaneity', and, I, consequently, hold the other morally account-
able for them, assuming thereby that he can provide a fairly acceptable reason
and, if need be, an apology for having carried them out. More specifically, I
assume that the other has the inner intention and trained capacity to abide by
the norms, standards, and customs of the social group, and will, to the best of
his ability, contribute to the typical functioning of standard communicative
processes not only by smoothly fitting into situations with little disruption, but
also by demonstrating the proper level of involvement while in them. If for any
reason an explanation of his action is required, it is believed that he can naturally
provide one in terms of these same social stipulations. In this quite general way,
I assume that the other is a qualified responsible social actor in the everyday
life-world.
Of course, this inner responsible self is assumed regardless of the extent to
which I understand the other. The responsible self is the assumed final locus
point of the transcendent immanency of the other which serves as a necessary
condition for attaining any intersubjective understanding of this other. Thus, the
psychologically insane, who attempt and appear to find quite ingenious ways to
continually invalidate our making such an assumption, are experienced as some
of the most difficult others with which to interact and simply subjectively under-
stand, not to mention with which to become intimate.
Considering the transcendent immanency of the other under the rubric of a
'responsible social actor' is obviously meant to draw out clearly and remind us
of the essential social aspects of this immanency, and in a very deep sense. It is
essential to the very genesis of the transcendent immanency of the other that an
inner responsible self develops which arises only through its being assumed by
others. Thus, the newborn infant, with all its inner temporality of consciousness,
is first experienced as lacking an inner immanent depth and responsibility of any
kind. The eyes are perhaps the emptiest to be seen, and the arms and limbs the
most directionless to be held. It is only through the experience of others who,
through a complex unity of actions, gestures, and language, begin to attribute the
child's movements, influences, and acts to him, and hold him responsible for
them that the child first begins to attain an immanent self which is detached
enough from the social world that he may gain control and direction over himself
so as to purposefully gear into his still 'small social world' and obtain social action
proper.
In sum, the ego, the spontaneous I, and all other sources of inner spontaneity,
which have hitherto remained somewhat mysteriously outside of the social
world, are here finally brought, to an extent, within its boundaries. The social
theoretician now need no longer be embarrassed by the well-established empiri-
cal facts that autistic children, who lacked such a social context, and captives,
who have been isolated from such a social context, both tend to lack such an
inner spontaneity. The transcendent immanent other is always essentially related
to a social context and with this explicit reference to the importance of the social
context in understanding the other we are brought before our next section.
3. INTERSUBJECTIVITY AS AN EGOLOGICAL OR GROUP PROBLEM
The third fundamental question for any analysis of the problem ofintersubjectivi-
ty is concerned with whether intersubjectivity is to be treated as essentially an
egological or group problem. Husserl, of course, considered it as primarily an
egological problem. It has already been pointed out that, in carrying out the
second epoche, Husserl discloses a purely immanent consciousness in which a
transcendent 'body' is said to appear which he refers to as an 'immanent tran-
scendency', and that, by referring to a process of appresentation, he attempts to
show how this other, as such an immanent transcendency, is constituted first as
a 'living body' and, finally, as an alter ego in full concretization. More specifically,
it can be said that Husserl argues that, among all the natural bodies appearing
within the original reduced sphere of my purely immanent consciousness, one
which I call "my living body" ("mein Leib") is distinguished from all the others
in that it is the carrier of my field of sensations and is that which I actively control.
In order to demonstrate the constitution of the other, Husserl then turns to the
process of appresentation which he understands as a primal form of passive
synthesis by which a genuine self-presentation effects a co-presentation of that
which itself never comes to immediate presentation, but which is continually
interwoven with it so that both are constituted as a pair in a unity of similarity. 27
He argues that, through such a process of appresentation, the other's body,
which appears within my perceptual field, is interpreted as analogous to this
distinguished living body of mine, which serves here as the primary instituting
phenomenon, and the sense 'living body' and, more particularly, 'living body'
other than mine is transferred to it from my living body. In the same appresenta-
tive manner which always involves such an intentional modification of myself and
transfer of sense, I interpret the other's bodily movements and permanently
congruent behavior (Gebaren) as a further expression of his psychical life in a
150 Chapter VIII
continuous progression leading to the emphatic apprehension of higher psychic

spheres and, finally, to the apprehension of everything belonging to the concreti-
zation of this other I which includes, first, his primordial world and, then, his
fully concrete ego. On the basis of these analyses, where it is added that I always
appresent the other as an ego co-existing with me 'there' (a fact which supposedly
guarantees the non-reduplication of myselt), Husserl then attempts to demon-
strate the constitution of the first level of community which consists of a common
objective nature and temporal form.2 8 It is only after that analysis that Husserl
finally turns his attention to social groups referring to a "human community", a
"social community", and a "cultural world" which he essentially claims are easily
derivable from this first level of community.29
Once again we are not specifically concerned with the fact that Husserl never
does arrive at the constitution of the alter ego. Furthermore, we are not directly
concerned with either the specifics of or the problems involved in his analyses
ofthe above named social groups. Rather, the concern is with the more general
issue that intersubjectivity is understood here primarily as an egological problem.
Only after having, supposedly, already gained access to the mental life of the alter
ego is intersubjectivity treated as a group problem.
There is no denying the fact that the problem of intersubjectivity originally
arose and attained its sense precisely as such an egological problem. Although
we cannot enter here into a detailed examination of the historical origins of the
problem, suffice it to say that it was Descartes who, while never specifically
examining the problem of our knowledge of others, prepared the universal basis
for it through his monadic isolation of consciousness, and his distinction between
'res cogitans' and 'res extensa'?O Upon the basis of this Cartesian theory of
consciousness, the problem of inter sUbjectivity then arose as a question concern-
ing how I, starting from the basis of my isolated ego, can gain access, through
a quite impoverished perception in which only purely physical events are given,
to a new realm of matters of fact and arrive at the mental life of the other. In
other words, how do I, in mental processes appertaining exclusively to my ego,
know, on the basis of physical qualities and changes which is all that is given in
originary immediate perception, of the mental life of the other. Of course, Husserl
stands within this philosophical tradition and, taking up this general formulation
of the problem, attempts, for the first time, to provide a rigorous and systematic
solution to it. Thus, we find him attempting, from within the reduced sphere of
the transcendental ego, to arrive at the mental life of the other, through a
perception of a body, its movements, and permanently congruent behavior,
before even thinking of turning his attention to the problem of the social group.
Although our own analyses are indebted to this philosophical tradition, the
tradition itself should not stand in the way as a limiting prejudice. While the
problem of inter subjectivity could have, perhaps, only have arisen as a result of
the philosophical concern with absolute knowledge and through the, consequent,
monadic isolation of consciousness, perhaps, the ability to provide a proper
account of it can only arise on the basis of the complementary social theoretical
concern with society in general. It is noteworthy, then, that all three of our
authors, who shared such a social theoretical concern, chose to reject the
formulation of intersubjectivity as an ego logical problem, deciding instead to
construe it as essentially a problem of the social group. Mead treats intersubjec-
tivity as a problem of the organization of the social group. Gurwitsch treats it,
in his early work, as a problem of the milieu and the milieu-world, and, in his
later work, as a problem of the scientific group. Finally, Schutz considers inter-
subjectivity as a problem of the Person's participation in various levels of the
social group, and in various types of social groups.
The decision to treat intersubjectivity as a problem of the social group is based
upon the following two essential insights. First, it is to have realized that any
possible knowledge which I might obtain of an alter ego already presupposes a
knowledge of the fundamental categories ofthe social world and is, consequently,
in some sense, already essentially social. In other words, there is no aspect of
the other given to me, materially or otherwise, which is not interpreted upon the
basis of a prior knowledge of the social world. It can even be argued that the mere
so-called 'body' (Korper) of the other, which in the egological formulation of the
problem is said simply to appear within the perceptual field of consciousness, is
socially interpreted, for it must be understood as some type of 'body', familiar
or unfamiliar, standing out from a background of other, similar or dissimilar,
bodies, objects, and events. However, granting for the sake of argument that
merely a 'perceived body' of the other is given to consciousness, clearly, all
further knowledge which is obtained of this other is social and is based upon a
prior knowledge of the social world. My understanding of this 'body' of the other
as a 'living body' (Leib), and my understanding of the other's bodily movements
as gestures, and, furthermore, as permanently congruent behavior, all of which
Husserl claims leads to the first verification (Bewiihrung) of the existence of a
psychic life of an other, presuppose such social knowledge. In interpreting the
other's body as a 'living body', I must be able to distinguish such a 'living body'
from a 'dying body', a 'dead body', and a mere 'sleeping body', all four of which
can at times appear quite similar, and this ability clearly points to a previous
knowledge of the social world. Likewise, in interpreting the other's bodily move-
ments as gestures, I must already have some sense of what the gestures are,
insofar as gestures vary over time and according to various groups, and I must,
furthermore, be able to distinguish between mere bodily movements, unintended
gestures, habitual gestures, and fully intended communicative gestures, all of
which once more points to a prior knowledge of the social world. Finally, as
Schutz pointed out, interpreting the other's bodily movements as permanently
congruent behavior presupposes a conception of normality, that is, a conception
of what is normatively congruent behavior, and this normality varies not only
according to the culture, but, furthermore, according to the established normal-
ities within that culture for those of a certain sex, age, health, and so forth? I In
general, it can be said that even the most primordial understanding consists of
an understanding of the other in the most anonymous fashion in terms of what
holds as typical for any human being in the social world, and, more particularly,
in my particular social world.
152 Chapter VIII
The second essential insight lying behind the decision to treat intersubjectivity
as a group problem consists of the realization that the egological formulation of
the problem is fundamentally at odds with our lived experience ofintersubjectivi-
ty in everyday life. My experience of the other is never a mere cogitative per-
ception of a 'body' and its non-mental activity as the egological formulation
would have it. In encountering the other in a face-to-face situation, I always
experience the other in terms of a situational context, whether it be a milieu or
public setting, in which the other appears in varying degrees to be in or out of
place, and this context is itself understood as situated within the social world.
Furthermore, my experience of others outside of such face-to-face situations
does not even involve a perception of the other's body (somatic or otherwise)
which is assumed to be so essential in the egological formulation ofthe problem.
The other is experienced through a frame of reference consisting of, for example,
signs and symbols whose employment naturally presupposes a knowledge of the
social world. Of course, one may argue that in particular, and we might add highly
atypical, everyday situations, where I am startled by the presence of some
unknown body imposed in my perceptual field or am fooled by a mannequin, I
do indeed confront the other as such a mere 'body', and the attempt to determine
whether this body is that of a human being illustrates the primordial process by
which we obtain a knowledge of others. However, the difficulties involved in this
mode of argumentation are quickly seen as soon as it is pointed out that such
experiences are but mere variants of my primordial experience of a fully intersub-
jective world which goes unquestioned as the fundamental ground for their
occurence. I never, even for a moment, doubt in these situations that I am living
in a social world in which there are others like me.
The consideration of intersubjectivity as a group problem constitutes the third
fundamental turning point for any future analysis of intersubjectivity and closely
follows from our two previous fundamental moves. Once the transcendental
reduction is relinquished such that the existence of others is accepted as a given
datum of the world of everyday life and once the other is considered not as an
immanent transcendency, but rather as a transcendent immanency such that it
is the other's immanent 'private' self which stands in question, the next obvious
step is to consider the social group which fills the gap, and provides the essential
connection between my knowledge of the existence of others and my possible
knowledge of this immanent self. In other words, what is called for is precisely
an analysis of the social group which provides the fundamental context on the
basis of which I am able to arrive at, at least, some knowledge of the inner self
of the other. Of course, as was already indicated in the previous section, our
analysis of the other as a transcendent immanency must undergo a certain
qualification. It must now be clearly stated that the other, as such a transcendent
immanency, is always given and understood only within the context of a social
group.
Now, while Mead, Gurwitsch, and Schutz all agree upon the fact that inter-
subjectivity is to be considered as such a group problem, it is clear that each went
on to develop a somewhat different conception of the social group. Mead essen-
tially understood the social group as an organization of perspectives which lies

within the individual perspectives of the members such that the members are
creative individuals, who can take up this community of perspectives and change
it, so as to bring about new relations within the group, while continuing to
understand one another. Thus, the social group is essentially characterized as
a reflective group of creative intersubjectivity. Mead's conception of an objective
social group given in nature which is based upon an untenable behavioralist
theory of meaning and his conception of the evolution of the creative intersubjec-
tive group which is based upon an illegitimate positing of an abstract social ideal
have both been previously criticized and are of little concern to us here?2
Gurwitsch, in his early work, essentially understands the social group as a
context (Zusammenhang) wherein we encounter and live together with others in
face-to-face relations as we gear into and are absorbed in a certain given, taken
for granted equipment totality (Zeugganzheit) where only a form of circum-
spection is obtained. Thus, he essentially characterizes the social group as a
milieu. Gurwitsch's notion of a scientific group which is understood in terms of
its ultimate foundation in the implicit universal rational structures embedded in
our pre-predicative perceptual experience in the life-world, and his notion of an
intersubjective equipment world which reminds us, although at a different level
of analysis, of such similar structures will both, on account of their formalistic
character, also be oflittle concern to US. 33 Finally, Schutz understands the social
group, first, in terms of the relative natural world view which is the taken for
granted and commonly shared historically sedimented experiences of the mem-
bers on the basis of which they carry out their projects of action and, second,
in terms of the members own symbolic interpretations of themselves as a group.
In carrying out a future analysis of intersubjectivity and, more particularly, an
analysis of intersubjectivity as a group problem, one is faced with coming to
terms precisely with these three somewhat different conceptions of a group. It
is in regard to them that any fundamental decisions must be made regarding what
a social group is. Upon the basis of our prior extensive analyses of these three
conceptions in which it has been seen that, in spite of our various criticisms, each
is based upon a highly credible and well-formulated argument, it is proposed here
that each be regarded as an attempt to draw out and emphasize a different aspect
of the same group phenomenon.
In general, Mead, Gurwitsch, and Schutz can be understood as having analyz-
ed, thus far, the following aspects of the social group. Mead's conception of the
group, which we have characterized as the reflective group of creative intersub-
jectivity, draws out the members' creative, interactional, reflective, production
of the organization of the social group. In contrast, Gurwitsch's conception of
the group, which he refers to as the milieu, emphasizes the established taken for
granted routines of ongoing face-to-face relations which the members implicitly
carry out. Finally, Schutz's notion of the group gives due notice to both of these
aspects, the former through his theory of social action, and the latter through his
theories of the relative natural world view and the home group, while newly
154 Chapter VIII
drawing out and emphasizing the members' own symbolic interpretation of

themselves as a group.
It is clear that the fundamental task which now arises simply concerns the
development of a single universal theory of the social group. Ideally, such a
theory would incorporate all three of our authors' conceptions of a social group,
however, only in a more or less transformed sense, and would provide a more
general and intensive determination of the phenomenon of the group, and,
therewith, a more complete analysis of the phenomenon of intersubjectivity.
4. INTERSUBJECfIVITY AS A CONSTITUTIVE PRODUCf, OR AS TAKEN FOR

GRANTED AND ACCOMPLISHED
The fourth fundamental question for any analysis of the problem of intersubjec-
tivity is concerned with whether intersubjectivity is to be understood as a
constitutive product resulting from the operations of a transcendental ego or as
an essentially taken for granted shared understanding of various mundane egos
upon which an accomplished intersubjectivity is founded. It has already been
seen that in Husserl's classical formulation of the problem an attempt is made
to isolate a transcendental ego upon the basis of which an attempt is then made
to demonstrate the constitution of an intersubjective world. More specifically,
Husserl tries to show, in a step-like fashion, how, as a result of the intentional
activities of a transcendental ego, the sense of the other as a living body, as a
living body with higher psychic spheres, and, finally, as a fully concrete alter ego
is constituted, along with similarly demonstrating the constitution of a common
objective nature and social world. Of course, by establishing that intersubjectivi-
ty is such a constitutive product of a transcendental ego, Husserl intends to
provide the rational grounds and justification for our belief in the mental life of
others.
What is of concern to us here is that in conceiving of intersubjectivity as
essentially a totally accomplished product and, moreover, as a totally accom-
plished product of a single transcendental ego, the very possibility of describing
our everyday taken for granted lived conviction of others, exactly as it is taken
for granted, is ruled out, not to mention the description of our less fundamental
understandings of others such as the accomplished intersubjective understand-
ings which are founded upon the former. In everyday life, our primordial lived
conviction concerning others is lived as essentially taken for granted in the sense
that it provides the fundamental permanent framework for all the activities of
our conscious life, while never entering into the core of consciousness and
becoming thematically relevant. As such, this lived conviction does not refer
back to any rational processes or grounds on the basis of which we have, at some
point, committed ourselves to it. Consequently, any analysis which construes this
radically taken for granted conviction as the accomplishment of, for example, a
transcendental ego, regardless of how passive the accomplishment may be,
distorts the essentially taken for granted character ofthe conviction and, thereby,
renders itself incapable of ever properly describing it. Of course, it is even less
capable of describing our accomplished intersubjective understandings which
are founded upon the lived conviction and which are accomplished by concrete
persons within a social group.
There is no denying the fact that a phenomenological analysis essentially
consists of the attempt to render that which is taken for granted 'explicit' so as
to analyze it in regard to its 'sense'. However, it is important that the taken for
granted aspect of this 'sense' is not lost in the analysis through an implicit
transformation in which the 'sense' comes to be described as if it were explicitly
lived at the central thematic core of consciousness. Thus, while it is maintained
here that the task of a phenomenological analysis is to explicate the 'sense' of
that which is taken for granted, it is further maintained and asserted that this
task fundamentally involves a preservation and presentation of the taken for
granted aspect of this sense.
In considering intersubjectivity as a totally accomplished product of a tran-
scendental ego, our primordially taken for granted, lived, conviction of an inter-
subjective world, which provides the fundamental framework for all our con-
scious activities, and which, consequently, provides the fundamental ground for
our proto doxic belief in and different modalized manners of belief, including
doubt, of the mental life of the other, is presented as a mere dubitable belief in
need of active deliberation and proof by a transcendental ego. Clearly, it is the
reflecting philosopher's explicitly thematized and critically questioned belief in
an intersubjective world, and his own following reflective attempt to rationally
justify this belief which is described here, and not the essentially taken for
granted lived conviction of an intersubjective world which is experienced as lying
permanently in the farthest horizons of our experience.
In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, it should be clearly stated
that the above does not imply that our essentially taken for granted lived
conviction of an intersubjective world is understood here as an ontological fact
grounded in Being which is, as such, not open to exact phenomenological de-
scription. Unlike Merleau-Ponty who tends to hold such a view and who then
goes on to develop a theory of the essential ambiguity of the social world,34 it
is maintained here that this lived conviction is simply a given fact of the natural
attitude and is, as such, open to precise phenomenological description.
To varying degrees, all of our authors attempt to develop such a taken for
granted theory of inter subjectivity upon which an accomplished intersubjectivity
is based, and, in so doing, essentially reject considering intersubjectivity as a
totally accomplished product and, especially, as an accomplished product of a
singular transcendental ego. Mead, of course, focused upon the relationship
between the given, taken for granted, and commonly understood organization
of the group, and the creative spontaneous actions and understandings through
which new changes are brought about in the group. At the most general level,
this relationship was referred to as a 'conversation of the I and Me'. Gurwitsch
was interested in the development of the scientific group which, although ulti-
mately founded upon, nevertheless, significantly departs from the taken for
156 Chapter VIII
granted intersubjective relations of the milieu-world or, if one considers his later
works, the life-world. Finally, Schutz held a fairly well-developed theory of what
has been referred to as 'imposed taken for granted intersubjectivity' and 'intrinsic
accomplished intersubjectivity'. In the final analysis, he was interested in the
genesis of higher forms of spiritual understanding, found in various symbolic
worlds, out of the primordial, taken for granted, intersubjective realms which
tend towards the vital sphere.
The consideration of intersubjectivity as an essentially taken for granted
shared understanding upon which an accomplished intersubjectivity is founded
represents the final fundamental turning point for any analysis of intersubjectivi-
ty. Now, not only is the existence of others accepted as a given datum of the world
of everyday life and the other considered as a transcendent immanency whose
inner 'private' life stands in question within the social group, but my understand-
ing of this other within the group is viewed as ranging from a taken for granted
to an accomplished intersubjective understanding. In other words, the social
group, which provides the fundamental context for my understanding of the
immanency of the other, is now itself viewed as articulated into various taken
for granted and accomplished understandings of the other. Thus, it is precisely
the analysis of taken for granted and accomplished intersubjectivity which shall
provide us with the first essential clues for the further explication and develop-
ment of the conception of the social group.
Now, while Mead, Gurwitsch, and Schutz all agree that intersubjectivity is
to be considered in terms of an essentially taken for granted shared understand-
ing of others upon which an accomplished understanding is based, each clearly
differed in regard to the significance and predominance of each of these types
of understandings of others within the social group. In general, Mead tends to
view all intersubjective relations within the group as preeminently accomplish-
ments, insofar as he claims that, with the mere establishment of the intersubjec-
tive group, there arise creative individuals who, regardless of the type of activity,
always purposely and explicitly take the perspective of others and the social
group. Of course, Mead could plausibly develop this view only by construing our
many implicit taken for granted intersubjective relations, in which we do not
explicitly take the perspective of others, as interobjective relations, thereby
simply excluding them from the realm of the intersubjective group. This highly
problematical procedure has already been previously criticized?5
In direct contrast to Mead, Gurwitsch, in his early work, where he carries out
his most extensive analysis of everyday life, tends to view all intersubjective
relations as essentially taken for granted. In living together with others in a
milieu, the actor is said to attain only a circumspection which involves a non-
intentive implicit knowledge of the contexture of the milieu in which others are
given as interwoven aspects, and this implicit knowledge is then said to be
founded upon an even more implicit knowledge which involves an understanding
of the intersubjective life-context of history and tradition, which, in turn, is
founded upon a radically implicit knowledge of an intersubjective equipment
world. The latter is so taken for granted that we are said to neither live in it nor
A General Program for any Future Analysis 157
heed it as we are busily engaged in the milieu. Of course, by arguing that our
intersubjective relations in the social group are foremost taken for granted
relations, Gurwitsch is led to advance only a theory of human comportment
(Verhalten) and forgoes any attempt to develop a theory of social action (Hand-
lung) which presupposes, to some extent, an explicit projection of goals. Thus,
he too de-emphasizes and overlooks a very significant aspect of any social group.
Finally, Schutz, once again, takes the more inclusive position and argues that
intersubjective relations within the social group consist of a very significant
essentially taken for granted aspect and an equally significant accomplished
aspect.36 These two equally prominent intersubjective realms are distinguished
in terms of the dividing line between traditional and habitual conduct, and social
action proper. However, in his theory of relevance, Schutz actually appears to
have been working towards establishing a continuum between taken for granted
and accomplished intersubjectivity as he specifically analyzes, essentially in
succession, the fundamental relevances, the basic relevances, the relative natural
world view and its various domains, the specific knowledge at hand, the three
relevance structures, and, then, social action.
No doubt, laying out a continuum of various types of intersubjective under-
standings, stretching from the most taken for granted to the most accomplished,
would provide a decisive illustrative account of the many levels of understanding
others within the social group and, in so doing, would render all disputes as to
whether mankind lives its life, unreflectively and implicitly, geared into the world
in a taken for granted fashion, or as reflectively standing over against the world
projecting future plans of action somewhat meaningless. However, such a project
is not to be further pursued in a future analysis of inter subjectivity for it does not
essentially correspond to how we experience taken for granted and accomplished
intersubjectivity in the social group. First, our actions within the group are not
articulated along a continuum in which all less accomplished forms of intersub-
jective understanding are consecutively presupposed as a foundation. Some of
our even most habitual and automatic understandings need not be presupposed
in order for certain actions to be carried out. For example, irrelevant forms of
taken for granted understandings such as seeing the same colors and riding
bicycles together need in no way be assumed in order for a successful business
transaction to be carried out. Second, such fundamental and commonly shared
taken for granted knowledge reaching well into the routine level is not taken for
granted by all actors in the social group. While it may be true that many know
as an unquestioned fact that a soft-boiled egg takes three to four minutes to cook
and, furthermore, know quite automatically how to fry eggs, people have been
known to overcook and burn eggs pleading ignorance in regard to this activity.
It is clear that the fundamental task which now confronts us involves a
determination of the basic units in terms of which our various taken for granted
to accomplished understandings of others are organized within the social group.
In other words, our task involves the identification and description of the various
fundamental "regions" or "domains" which serve as the principal spheres for
ordering our many taken for granted and accomplished understandings of others
158 Chapter VIII
within the social group. Drawing out these fundamental regions in relation to the
Person will essentially lead to a new conception of the social group.
CONCLUSION
In analyzing Mead, Gurwitsch, and Schutz's theories of intersubjectivity to-

gether, along the basic lines of Husserl's first insightful analyses, it has been seen
that they essentially constitute a triad all fundamentally agreeing on basic points,
while thereafter Mead and Gurwitsch go their independent ways with Schutz
providing the unifying and encompassing position for all of them. They all agree
that intersubjectivity is a mundane problem, that the other is to be considered
as a transcendent immanence, that intersubjectivity is primordially a problem of
the social group, and that intersubjectivity is to be understood in terms of a taken
for granted and accomplished aspect, and it was, furthermore, established what
it means phenomenologically to maintain each of these general claims and that
in a specifically progressive manner. However, through a critically comparative
analysis of the limitations of all their various different attempts to execute a
theoretical program upon the basis of these fundamental postulates (which also
appropriated our previous chapter critiques), essential points were developed
involving the methodological problem offormalism, the multiple sense structure
of intersubjectivity, the irreconcilable tension between the immanent mundane
ego and transcendent social world, and the essential aspects of the social group
with their unclear relations, including that between taken for granted and accom-
plished intersubjectivity.
Given these common and clarified fundamental postulates, and the critically
following and incurring essential insights all of which make up our general
program, it is clear that the program's evolving contextual outcome as the
essential first task for any future analysis of intersubjectivity concerns the analy-
sis of the fundamental organizational regions or domains of the social group in
their relationship to the social Person. In the last chapter, it is precisely with the
beginnings of this first task that we shall be concerned.
NOTES
l.Edmund Husser!, Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1973). This translation is based primarily upon Edmund Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen und
Pariser Vortrage, Husserliana, Vol. I, ed. S. Strasser (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950). We shalI
folIow our practice of providing references first to the English translation followed by quotations
and references to the original German text.
2. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 92-99, S. 124-130.
3. See "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl", CP 3, pp. 51-84.
4. See, for example, p. 32 above and "The Objective Reality of Perspectives", SW, p. 306.
5. See, for example, pp. 61-63 above.
6. See Chapter 5, n. 2 above and Schutz, The Phenomenology, pp. 97-102, S. 137-143.
7. Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, p. 391 (May I, 1956 S: G).

8. With respect to all of these points, see ibid., pp. 40-45 (August 19, 1939 S : G).
9. "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences", CP I, pp. 118-139. In this work, Schutz already
questions Husserl's transcendental treatment of the problem of intersubjectivity and indicates the
need for a critique of it. See p. 124, n. 5 therein.
10. Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsei, p. 69 (Nov. 16, 1940 S: G).
II. Of course, in his published works, while at times raising a number of critical questions (see, for
example: "Scheler's Theory of Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego", CP I,
pp. 165-167 and p.175; "Sartre's Theory of the Alter Ego", CP I, pp.194-197; and "Edmund
Husserl's Ideas, Volume II" (J 953), CP 3, pp. 36-39), Schutz did not directly rule out the possibility
of considering intersubjectivity as a transcendental problem until his very late articles "The
Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl" (CP 3, pp. 51-84) and "Type and Eidos
in Husserl's Late Philosophy" (1959), CP 3, pp. 92-115). During this interval, Schutz came firmly
to believe that the world of mundane intersubjectivity involves certain limitations for transcenden-
tal phenomenological analyses. Having come to the conclusion that the problem of intersubjective
noemata is a "hOlzernes Eisen" (Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, p.228 (August 29, 1951
S : G», that our knowledge of the existence of others is always in the margin of even transcendental
consciousness (ibid., pp.255-256 (Jan. 25, 1952 S: G», that the distinction between regional
ontologies and transcendental constitutional problems is questionable (ibid., pp. 285-286 (Oct. 12,
1952 S: G», and that the founding of intersubjectivity in communication and, ultimately, in
empathy is fruitless (ibid., pp. 281-282 (April 20, 1952 S: G) and "Edmund Husserl's Ideas,
Volume II", CP 3, p. 38», Schutz, for example, now claims that the doctrine of intentionality and
the eidetic reduction presuppose, as their unquestioned ground, the mundane intersubjective
life-world which is further said to be the foundation of all understanding (see ibid., p. 332 (June
15,1953 S: G); pp. 364-365 (Oct. 13, 1954 S: G); pp. 439-440 (July 21,1958 S: G); p. 444 (Nov.
7, 1958 S: G); and p.451 (Dec. 20, 1958 S: G); and "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late
Philosophy", CP 3, pp. 92-115». Of course, we cannot here enter into Schutz's specific extended
and subtle critique of Husserl's analysis of intersubjectivity (see "The Problem of Transcendental
Intersubjectivity in Husserl", CP 3, pp. 51-84). Suffice it to say that Schutz demonstrates, at each
step of Husserl's analysis, whether it involves the isolation of the transcendental ego or the
constitution of an intersubjective world, that either the step is impossible or else the mundane
intersubjective world has been presupposed. In this manner, he further establishes the primor-
diality of the mundane intersubjective life-world and clearly demonstrates that intersubjectivity
is a mundane problem. It should also be mentioned, by way of a conclusion, that, in the final
analysis, Schutz no longer even understands the transcendental problem of intersubjectivity as
an attempt to save phenomenology from the appearance of solipsism. Rather, it is understood as
an attempt to save an excessive use of the transcendental constitutive method which itself actually
institutes the appearance of solipsism (ibid., pp. 83-84). The transcendental constitutive method,
which is said to have undergone a transformation from a 'procedure of explication' to a 'process
of creation' (Kreation), can be preserved in this new sense, only if it is demonstrated that a
transcendental ego can be totally isolated from an intersubjective world and then shown to be able
to constitute it in the sense of creation.
12. Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, p.401 (March 22, 1957 S: G). "Bathos = depths (from
Kant's Prolegomena A 204; according to Bernhard Waldenfels)" (ibid., p. 401, editor's n.2).
13.Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, 2. Vols., 2d rev. ed. (Halle a.d.S.: Max Niemeyer
Verlag, 1913-1921).
14. Edmund Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik, Husserliana, Vol. 12, ed. Lothar Eley (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1970).
15. See Husserl, Log. Unt., Vol. 2, pp. 345-363, especially, Addendum, p. 363.
16. See, for example: "The Genesis ofthe Self and Social Control", SW, pp. 278-289; "The Objective
Reality of Perspectives", SW, pp.306-319; Aron Gurwitsch, "An Apparent Paradox in
Leibnizianism", Social Research, 33 (1963), 47-64; Aron Gurwitsch, "Zwei Begriffe von Kontingenz
bei Leibniz", in Weltaspekte der Phi!osophie, eds. Walter Beierwaltes and Wiebke Schrader
(Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 1972), pp. 107-118; and Gurwitsch, Leibniz.
160 Chapter VIII
17.Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 100-103, S. 131-133.

18.Ibid., pp. 103-106 and p. 110, S. 134-136 and 140.
19. Cf. Kersten's quite interesting and different position on this point. Fred Kersten, "Privatgesichter",
Sozialitiit und Intersubjektivitiit, pp. 121-133.
20. See above, especially, pp. 13-20 and 34-35.
21. See above, especially, pp. 46,48-50 and 54-55.
22. See above, especially, pp. 86-87 and p. lOS.
23. However, in this latter regard, see Schutz's enlightening critique of Sartre and Sartre's own
criticisms of various authors. "Sartre's Theory of the Alter Ego", CP 1, pp.180-203.
24. See "Scheler's Theory of Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego", CP 1,
pp. 177-179 and "Husserl's Importance for the Social Sciences", CP 1, p. 147. Also see Schutz's
interesting further insight that it is illie which is originally given and not hie, or at least hie is not
originally given in the same way as illic. Schutz and Gurwitsch, Briefweehsel, pp. 192-193 (July 27,
1950 G: S).
25. See, for example, Schutz, Relevance, pp. 125-126,148-149, p. 135, and pp. 130-131, and Schutz and
Gurwitsch, Briefweehsel, pp. 363-364 (Oct. 13, 1954 S: G).
26. See, for example: "Gelb-Goldstein's Concept of 'Concrete' and 'Categorial' Attitude and the
Phenomenology of Ideation" (1949), SPP, pp.359-384; "On the Conceptual Consciousness"
(1959), SPP, pp. 390-396; and "Language, Language Disturbances, and the Texture of Conscious-
ness" (1950), CP 1, pp. 260-286.
27. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 108-120, S. 138-149.
28.Ibid., pp. 120-128, S. 149-156.
29. Ibid., pp. 128-136, S. 156-163. In regard to the last point concerning the easy derivation of these
communities, see p. 129, S. 157.
30. See Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 2 Vols., trans. John Cottingham,
Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984-1985).
Also see Gurwitsch, Human Encounters and, then, compare Husserl, Cartesian Meditations.
31. "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl", CP 3, p. 66.
32. See pp. 39-40 and 40-41 above.
33. See pp.63-70 and 49-50 above.
34. See Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology ofPerception, especially, pp. 346-456. Also see Ferdinand
Alquie, "Une philosophie de l'ambigui'te: l'existentialisme de Maurice Merleau-Ponty", Fontaine,
11, No. 59 (April 1947),47-70 and A. De Waelhens, Une philosophie de i'ambiguite (Louvain:
Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1951).
35. See pp. 33-34 above.
36. It is of interest to note that this question concerning the predominance of taken for granted and
accomplished intersubjectivity has recently drifted down and become the major stumbling block
for modern empirical social research. In fact, it actually provides the fundamental framework for
understanding the differences between contemporary empirical interpretive sociologists whose
perspectives were, of course, in various ways, derived from the foundational work of our authors.
Briefly, Harold Garfinkel tends to view intersubjective relations as essentially taken for granted
situated reflexive practices, thereby requiring disruptive methodological procedures to describe
them, while, at the other end of the spectrum, Erving Goffman tends to view intersubjective
relations as primarily intentional accomplished performances, thereby requiring only a skilled
participant observer to describe them. Others, such as Aron Cicourel, fall somewhere in between
relying upon such documentary devices as tape recorders and video machines for their
descriptions (see, for example: Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice Hall,1967); Erving Goffman, The Presentation ofSeifin Everyday Life (Garden City:
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959); and Aron V. Cicourel, Method and Measurement (New York:
The Free Press, 1964) and Aron V. Cicourel, Cognitive Sociology (Harmondsworth, Middlesex:
Penguin Education, 1973».
CHAPTER IX
Reflections on the Problem of Intersubjectivity and the

Social Group
INTRODUCTION
Having now completed a general program for any future analysis of the problem
of intersubjectivity, in this chapter a number of initial reflections and analyses,
which are intended to serve as the first execution of such a program, are put forth.
As initial reflections, they, of course, obtain only a provisionary status and, in
this one chapter, can obviously only be stated in the briefest form. Clearly, these
reflections will take on, then, the mere form of a general sketch or outline of the
phenomenon of intersubjectivity. Nevertheless, it should be clearly understood
that they constitute the first proper concrete reflections of the renewed analysis
of the problem of inter subjectivity. Guided by our general program, these reflec-
tive analyses shall clearly designate the first fundamental concepts and units
required for any clarification of the phenomenon of intersubjectivity, and shall,
moreover, at least attempt to work towards indicating some possible relation-
ships between these units. Perhaps, it should be mentioned that it is, of course,
precisely at this point in our investigations, where we turn to begin an explicit
and direct analysis of the Sachverhalt of intersubjectivity itself, that our reliance
upon and use of the, at times mimetic, term 'intersubjectivity' shall recede into
the background of our discussions.
More specifically, in the following, an attempt is made to carry out a renewed
analysis of inter subjectivity as a problem of the social group. It has already been
established that the social group is not to be conceived in terms of a 'pyramid'
type structure in which ever more accomplished intersubjective understandings
are neatly founded upon ever more taken for granted intersubjective understand-
ings, not to mention as primarily consisting of merely one or the other of these
types of intersubjective understandings. In the present chapter, it is essentially
argued that, at the most general level, the social group is best conceived of as,
so to speak, a 'constellation' which is articulated into various 'regions' or
'domains', each of which organizes its own types and degrees of taken for granted
and accomplished understandings, and each of which, consequently, represents
its own specific form of sociality. Furthermore, it is argued that at least all ofthe
following represent such fundamental regions of any social group: (1) The Every-
161
162 Chapter IX
day Life-World; (2) The Milieu; (3) The Affiliatory Group (or, simply, 'Group',
understood in the narrow sense); (4) The Institution; (5) and The Symbolic
Cosmos. In general, it is in terms of at least these fundamental domains, which
constitute the principal spheres of order of the group, through providing the
foundational organizational structures for all the intersubjective understandings
occurring within it, that any social group articulates itself in order to develop,
maintain, and preserve itself as an intersubjective whole. Of course, before
beginning our analysis of these specific domains, it is first necessary to re-work
the notion of the practical attitude in terms of a personal fiduciary attitude so
as to 'open-up' the possibility of properly describing them, just as, after our
analysis of these domains, it shall be necessary to specifically analyze the Person
in the social group so as to properly 'close-off our descriptions.
1. THE SOCIAL GROUP AND THE FIDUCIARY A TIITUDE
a. The Adduction of Social Meaning to the Practical Attitude
In general, understanding 'taken for grantedness' and 'social action' solely from
the limited perspective of the practical attitude, that is, in terms of problem-solv-
ing activities, leads to construing the 'taken for granted' as simply all that which
is 'unproblematic', and 'social action' as simply having to do with the 'problemat-
ic' and with the obtaining of problematic goals. Admittedly, this practical inter-
pretation of the taken for granted and social action does allow for then differen-
tiating between various levels or 'degrees' of taken for grantedness, and various
levels of explicitness of social action, as this can then be simply determined
according to how 'problematic' the particular item under consideration is. How-
ever, in being essentially capable of only differentiating between various
'problematic degrees' of taken for grantedness and social action, this practical
interpretation can, at the very best, only lead to organizing our taken for granted
and accomplished understandings in terms of an abstract continuum ranging
from the most taken for granted to the most problematic. The everyday life-world
is, and can only be, then, presented as one single, essentially unarticulated,
domain stretching from a primarily unproblematic taken for granted aspect to
a limited problematic aspect having to do with the projected goal of one's action.
In order to determine the fundamental organizational domains of the social
group, it is first necessary to broaden the notions of ' taken for grantedness' and
'social action' which have, hitherto, been understood from this limited practical
perspective. Theoretically speaking, both concepts must be so broadened out as
to include that stratum of social meaning wherein our variously problematic
taken for granted and accomplished understandings become ordered, for the first
time, into those fundamental immediate contexts of relevancy for carrying out
our projects of action in the everyday life-world. More concretely expressed, it
appears to be necessary to re-admit the various 'moods' which are an essential
social feature of the unproblematic taken for granted aspects of any situation,
Reflections on the Problem of Intersubjectivity 163
along with the various social attitudes which are inextricably involved in the
achievement of any problematic goal of social action, both of which have been
reductively stripped from these concepts of taken for grantedness and social
action, through carrying out, what can be referred to as, a 'practical reduction'.
Consequently, we simply hereby re-admit this non-practical stratum concerning
'moods' and various types of attitudes into our present analyses.
Having executed this necessary adduction* of social meaning, it is now possi-
ble for us to search for a new foundational attitude for generally clarifying this
most fundamental and significant non-practical stratum of social life.
b. The Fiduciary Attitude and the Practical Attitude
The first crucial point to realize, in attempting to rework the practical attitude,
is that lying at the very foundation of this practical attitude is a fiduciary attitude.
The 'fiduciary attitude' can be generally understood as an attitude of credulity,
which is to say, as a certain 'predisposition' or 'readiness' to be open to believing
in the other, and it is precisely this attitude which can be seen to exist even in
our most practical intersubjective understandings of the other.
It will be recalled that the intersubjective understanding which is said to arise
in the practical attitude concerns the sharing of thematically relevant problems
and the knowledge of their solution. 1 At the most primordial level, it was said
that, having a sector of the spatial world in common, certain objects and events
of the situation are simultaneously imposed upon the actors as thematically
relevant, and this problematic relevancy can be then relatively easily read off the
lived body of the other as is the knowledge for the solution of the problem. Now,
even here, at this most primordial level of intersubjective understanding within
the practical attitude, a fiduciary attitude is involved for, in this very 'reading off'
of the other's lived body, I must to some extent be already predisposed, or ready,
to believe that what appears to be a problem to the other is in fact a problem,
and that the knowledge which the other transmits to me is in fact correct. The
other may, for whatever reason, be trying to fool me and lead me astray, and it
is only by being predisposed and ready to believe that this is not the case that
any intersubjective understanding in this practical attitude can occur.
Of course, it may be rightfully pointed out that the very capability of the other
to fool me and the very capability of me, in turn, fooling the other into thinking
that he has, in fact, fooled me depends upon an already fundamental intersubjec-
tive understanding between us of, at least, the feigned problem and its solution.
However, this insight only points to the basic fact that the very possibility of
deception, which in the end leads to a relinquishing of the fiduciary attitude, is
itself founded upon, first, a fiduciary attitude of believing in the other so as to
obtain, at least, a common, standard, and typical intersubjective understanding
of the problem and its solution (regardless of how feigned the latter may be), and,
* Intended in the original sense as 'the action of bringing forward for consideration'.
164 Chapter IX
second, upon an ability to then give the appearance of continuing to abide by this
fiduciary attitude in a fiduciary situation while, in fact, not doing so. If I am
unable, even to this smallest extent, to adopt a fiduciary attitude, then no
intersubjective understanding whatsoever, no matter how practical, can be
obtained for I am then incapable of even putting my trust in the other long enough
to grasp the typical standard meaning of the situation and am, consequently, led
into the worlds of complete individual phantasy in 'reading off' the other's lived
body. Of course, the adoption of this fiduciary attitude is to a large extent
automatic in everyday life as is cleary indicated by the ease with which we are
subject to the deceitfulness of others in our ordinary endeavors, and the shocked
indignation which then arises upon discovering that we have, in fact, been taken.
The distinguishing feature of these practical intersubjective understandings
concerns not their lack of a fiduciary attitude which they always essentially
presuppose, but rather the fact that whether or not an intersubjective under-
standing has indeed been obtained can be relatively easily determined. The very
character of the knowledge transmitted, upon the basis of trust, in these practical
intersubjective understandings, in having to do with a problem and its solution,
is such that it can be 'tested' and, thus, whether or not an intersubjective
understanding has in fact been obtained can be fairly easily ascertained. If the
others in the inn with Don Quixote and Sancho Panza claim that what looks like
a packsaddle to me is in fact a horse's harness, then it had better be at least
employable as a harness,2 and if others claim that I can forge a river at a certain
point, then I had better be able forge it there? Ifneither or these is possible and
the others maintain their claims, then I have either misunderstood these others,
they are lying, or are simply insane. In any case, I am absolutely certain that an
intersubjective understanding has not been obtained.
c. The Fiduciary Attitude
Let us now turn to an analysis of the fiduciary attitude itself and its own proper
intersubjective understandings which lack precisely this characteristic of being
capable of such confirmation. Insofar as this analysis will attempt to draw out
the essential characteristics of the fiduciary attitude and the intersubjective
understandings occurring within it somewhat independently from the practical
attitude, it shall, to an extent, take on an ideal character.
It has already been said that the fiduciary attitude can be generally understood
as an attitude of credulity in the sense of being a certain predisposition or
readiness to be open to believing in the other. It is now to be added that, in the
fiduciary attitude proper, I can never be completely assured that I have in fact
reached an intersubjective understanding with the other and, consequently, I
must for this reason always and primarily rely upon a fundamental trust in the
other. More specifically, unlike the intersubjectivity attained in the practical
attitude which fundamentally assumes the sharedness of a problem, the intersub-
jectivity attained in the fiduciary attitude assumes the sharedness of an 'offering.
At the most fundamental level, it can be said that the actor offers a 'gift' to the
other and the other accepts it.4 Of course, the primary meaning of this gift
consists not in its usefulness and practical implications, but in the intentional acts
of giving and receiving and it is precisely this meaning of which I cannot be sure.
In principle, no matter how much I observe the other and no matter how often
I use the gift successfully to solve practical problems, I cannot be sure that it was
in fact given as a gift. Likewise, no matter how often the other observes me using
or, for that matter, not using the gift, he cannot be sure that I have in fact received
it as a gift. In short, the actors cannot be assured that they have reached an
intersubjective understanding of one another, and, consequently, they are left to
rely upon a fundamental belief and trust in the other. They simply assume, upon
the basis of common standard typifications and the past history of their relation-
ship, that the gift was indeed given and received as a gift. Thus, for example,
while, after having transmitted to me the knowledge of using a hammer, the other
and I can be relatively assured of a mutual understanding as I employ the
hammer to build a shelter, if the other then turns to give me the hammer as a
gift, we must simply trust in our mutual understanding of this offering. Of course,
I can always choose not to trust the other and to rely primarily upon the practical
attitude to understand this gift giving. Perhaps, he wishes to mark me with this
hammer so that my enemies can find me or, perhaps, he merely wishes to obtain
something in return. This reliance upon the practical attitude in properly fiducial
situations gives rise to the special case of 'strategic interaction' which we cannot
further enter into here. 5 What is important to understand for our present pur-
poses is that if the intersubjective sharedness of an offering is to be achieved, both
actors must rely upon a fiduciary attitude in which they are primarily disposed
to believe in the other.
Now two important remarks are to be made with respect to this still somewhat
metaphorical concept of a 'gift', both of which are intended to render this concept
more sociologically applicable. First, although the primary significance ofthe gift
consists in the intentional acts of giving and receiving it, an understanding of the
practical meaning of the gift, to the extent that there is one, is always presuppos-
ed. If I am given the gift 'hammer' without knowing for what it is used, although
I may, to an extent, be able to grasp the intentional acts of giving and receiving,
I still do not yet completely understand the gift as is evident from my confusion
or embarrassment which is displayed, or attempted to be hidden, until the
practical meaning of the gift is clarified.
Second, this notion of the gift is not to be understood merely in the restricted
sense of a material gift. Although the ultimate foundation of the intersubjective
understanding attained in the fiduciary attitude is, as has been argued above, to
be found only in the offering of a material gift, a much broader notion of the 'gift'
is required in order to encompass all the various types of intersubjective under-
standings which are developed upon the basis of this foundation. Consequently,
we shall hereafter speak, more generally, of a 'social offerini, and mean by that
any object, action, event, or knowledge whose immediate and primary meaning
for the social actors resides in the acts of giving and receiving it, rather than in
166 Chapter IX
its practical implications. Clearly, a wide range of everyday phenomena can now
be understood in terms of this conception of ' social offerings' within the fiduciary
attitude. For example, offering the other a place to sit, and something to smoke,
drink, or eat; opening the door for the other; opening up a conversation with the
other; inviting the other to go out or to come home; praising or complaining
about anything to an other; telling stories about one's past and present life; and
telling secrets, all represent such a social offering. In all these cases, what is
transferred to the other is intended and understood not so much in terms of its
practical value for solving a problem, but rather in terms of its expressive value
for creating a communal situation.
d. The Clarificatory Potential of the Fiduciary Attitude
To be sure, it may at first appear quite difficult to construe social action in terms
of these social offerings of the fiduciary attitude, given the long tradition of
thinking merely about the practical aspects of social activity. Furthermore, it is
clear that much theoretical work still remains to be carried out before a full
clarification of this fiduciary attitude is obtained, and this remains especially true
in regard to claritying its analytical components and their relationships, which
for the practical attitude was nicely achieved by both pragmatism and phenome-
nology alike. Here it would appear that an analysis of the temporal structures
involved in the grasping of appresented meanings and in the formulation of
projects of action based upon these meanings is the proper line of investigation
to be pursued. Nevertheless, it is clear from the following points that it is only
upon the basis of this fiduciary attitude that the full social character of the
everyday life-world can be described.
First, it is clear that we never encounter others, in everyday life, simply in a
practical attitude in which we are merely concerned with the solution of a
practical problem. We always further encounter the other in a fiduciary attitude
in which we are concerned, at the very least, not merely with whether the other
technically helps or hinders in the solution of the problem, but with 'how', that
is, with what type of 'performance' and 'promenade', he attempts to solve the
problem. It is precisely such 'demonstrative action' which provides us with the
fundamental clues for further trusting the other.
Second, our practical activities obtain their everyday sense for us only within
an established fiduciary context. Thus, the identically same practical activity has
a very different meaning depending upon the fiduciary context in which it occurs.
For example, the identical practical activity of say 'fixing a tire' has a very
different meaning depending upon whether it is done in the garage where I work
(labor), on the family car (housework), on the car of a stranded motorist
(altruism), on the car of a new friend (intimacy), or on an old classic which I am
repairing as a hobby (leisure).
Third, the 'objects' or das Zeug, which we encounter in everyday life, consist
not only of a practical meaning, but, furthermore, of a fiduciary meaning by which
they obtain a sedimented social history and sentimental social value. One must
simply believe and trust in others that this meaning in fact exists, and it is for
this very reason that, with the disappearance of these others and myselffrom the
scene, it is precisely this meaning which is the least recoverable and the most
subject to replacement, while the practical meaning remains, more or less, the
same. In any case, it is clear that one practically functioning pen is simply not
always as good as another equally functional pen as Heidegger would appear to
have it in his theory of the Zeugganzheit. 6 The latter may have been a gift from
my parents, may have been left behind and belonged to someone of importance,
or simply my present favorite pen for composing.
Fourth, our activities in the everyday life-world obviously involve various
'moods', emotions, and attitudes such as depression, boredom, excitement, grief,
happiness, fear, anger, and hate, all of which can have some very impractical
consequences, and such a significant, potentially impractical stratum of life can
only be understood, in general, from the basis of a fiduciary attitude which has
to do precisely with our acts of belief in the other. In having to do with these acts
of belief, the fiduciary attitude is by implication concerned with the augmen-
tation, affirmation, doubt, loss, and betrayal of these beliefs, and, as such,
provides the fundamental structural grounds for the clarification of this impracti-
cal emotional stratum.
Finally, all the ceremonial etiquette, and accompanying flattery, wittiness,
sarcasm, teasing, and rivalry, which together constitute the essential 'socializing'
stratum of any practical situation, can once again only be understood, in general,
from the basis of a fiduciary attitude in which there is established a field of
contestation for the giving, receiving, requesting, rejecting, and withdrawing of
social offerings.
e. The Fiduciary Attitude and Relativism
It can, at this point in the discussion, be confidently concluded that the fiduciary
attitude is an essential feature of the social world which lies at the foundations
of and is inextricably bound up with the practical attitude of everyday life. Thus,
it shall henceforth be assumed, as a fundamental finding and established fact of
social life, that the practical attitude, while always providing the foundational
stratum of everyday life, is essentially and fundamentally related to a fiduciary
attitude such that all our practical problems and concerns are understood by us
only as mediated by or expressed within fiduciary contexts of trust.
In being variously involved in both a practical and fiduciary dimension to-
gether, of interest is the fact that our activity within each need not always
coincide giving rise to both 'practical crises' wherein practical problems erupt
into fiduciary settings as embarrassing, tragic, or frustrating events ("The dinner
is burned, what now?" "What to do with the guests ?"), and 'social crises' wherein
fiduciary troubles erupt into practical activities as incapacitating and worrisome
events ("He hasn't eaten, since she left him."). Of course, the primary character
168 Chapter IX
of the everyday life-world appears to consist precisely of a coincidence between

these two dimensions such that practical problems are typically and readily dealt
with in fiduciary contexts, if not simply automatically solved, so as to allow for
the possibility of devoting one's main involvement and attention to fiduciary
activities proper.
It should be made absolutely clear that we are not led into a relativistic
position by arguing for the fundamental importance of this fiduciary stratum, and
by admitting it into the world of everyday life as the stratum within which our
practical problems and concerns are expressed for, in so doing, we continue to
maintain that this practical stratum provides the foundational framework of
everyday life. Our basic point is only that this practical foundational stratum
itself inheres within a fiduciary stratum. Of course, understood as inextricably
bound up and essentially re-united with its fiduciary dimension, this practical
stratum does undergo a certain transformation as the intersubjective under-
standings of problems occurring within it are then understood as possessing
fiduciary features. Indeed, in a certain still to be determined sense, one can even
cautiously begin to speak of this practical attitude as essentially a fiduciary
attitude limited to the solving of practical problems. It is even submitted that the
development of this much broader notion of a fiduciary attitude constitutes one
of the fundamental tasks for any future social phenomenology and that our more
limited concept developed here be understood as the first crucial step in this
direction. Nevertheless, understood even in this transformed sense as fiduciary
problem-solving activity, the practical attitude must and does remain for us the
foundational stratum of the everyday life-world. Thus, for example, although we
wish to emphasize the fact that the practical goal of eating to subside one's
practical problem of 'hunger' is fairly irrelevant to the fiduciary context of dining,
where the main attention is focused upon the communal process of conversing
in the sharing of the wine and breaking of the bread to the extent to which obvious
practical suggestions to increase the efficiency of this process (e.g. being served
upon arrival, and eating before others, quickly, and without speaking) are highly
discouraged, it is, nevertheless, recognized that dining is ultimately founded upon
this practical goal of eating in the everyday life-world. A group dining without
eating is to be found only in the worlds of play, phantasy, the dream, theatre, and
art. Of course, the pressing future task of working out a broader notion of the
fiduciary attitude is concerned precisely with how, in the very solving of this
practical problem, I must trust that the others have not poisoned the wine or
food, and will not otherwise injure or rob me as I attend to the process of eating.
In the following, our own analyses will take then this fiduciary attitude as their
point of departure. In general, as we move through the various forms of fidu-
ciation involved in the fundamental organizational domains of the social group,
it will be seen that, while the latter always presuppose a practical stratum, there
is an increasing departure from it leading up to, finally, the symbolic cosmos.
2. THE EVERYDAY LIFE-WORLD
The first fundamental region of the social group can be said to be the everyday
life-world. In general, the everyday life-world constitutes the primordial stratum
of any social group and involves afiduciary 'consignment' to it, while essentially
consisting of those foundational and radically taken for granted anonymous
intersubjective understandings which are common knowledge for all the mem-
bers of the group, but which are, strictly speaking, typically irrelevant and
marginal to them such that the everyday life-world is itself established as an
ultimate foundational framework which is simply factually there.
To be sure, the everyday life-world and the taken for granted intersubjective
understandings of which it is composed are, in the end, inextricably bound up
with and founded upon a material world with all its spatio-temporal orientational
structures. However, the everyday life-world always further includes the group's
most primordial, common, historically sedimented experiences. Thus, the every-
day life-world always far surpasses the material world, the immediacy of the
present perceptual situation, and the practical attitude. It is always further bound
up with the relative natural world view of a group and its tradition, and it is
precisely for this reason that we have considered it here as an aspect of the social
group.
As the primordial taken for granted common knowledge of all the members
of the social group, the everyday life-world essentially consists of anonymous
typifications. In general, this entire everyday life-world is a world of primarily
'open social possibilities', which is to say that here all of our knowledge is only
of the most anonymous and gross character, and that none of the further possible
concrete social determinations of this world has any weight and contests the
others. Insofar as this everyday life-world provides the fundamental anonymous
taken for granted framework for all further specific social determinations, it
typically never enters into the thematic core of consciousness and becomes
relevant in the proper sense, but rather remains permanently present in the
margin. More specifically, insofar as the everyday life-world is composed of such
fundamental anonymous taken for granted typifications which serve as the
common taken for granted intersubjective framework for all further intersubjec-
tive determinations or understandings, it essentially involves a certain basic
'consignment' to it in the original sense of simply submitting and giving oneself
over to it as the ultimate common factual reality. If I do not, in this way, at first
commit myself to the everyday life-world, then no understanding of the other and
certainly no further intersubjective understandings of the other in the social
group are possible. I have then not even the slightest most anonymous
foundation upon the basis of which I can begin to at least try to understand the
other. Moreover, even the most irreal intersubjective understandings attained
within the symbolic cosmos, wherein such a consignment is suspended, as the
everyday life-world in general is brought into question, depend upon first having
fixedly consigned and having entrenched oneself in this world, so as to then be
able to withdraw this commitment and, after having reflected upon this world,
170 Chapter IX
to be able to further return to it and accept it again as the ultimate real world.
In general, it is only by first consigning oneself over to the everyday life-world,
and by neither questioning the other nor pondering over other mysterious tran-
scendences of this world that it is possible to obtain an intersubjective under-
standing of the other so as to get on with, and meet the everyday 'needs' and
intersubjective requirements of life.
3. THE MILIEU
The second fundamental region of the social group is the milieu. In general, the
milieu constitutes the confirmatory stratum of any social group and involves a
fiduciary 'credence' to it, while essentially consisting of an 'operative' spatio-tem-
poral field of recurring face-to-face relations in which certain relevant determi-
nate taken for granted intersubjective understandings and related specific forms
of accomplished intersubjective understandings have been established, given a
limited symbolic goal, within the everyday life-world.
More specifically, the milieu is the social determination and specification of
those relevant aspects of a situation in the taken for granted everyday life-world,
upon the basis of which certain types of projects of action are then to be carried
out. It arises, to various degrees, through situated recurring face-to-face encoun-
ters and through the establishment of a common limited symbolic goal, upon the
basis of both of which the actors then begin to determine and organizationally
relate that which for themselves is to be specifically taken for granted and that
which is to be interactionally negotiated, all within the broader context of the
taken for granted everyday life-world. In short, the milieu is then the specification
and particularization of the anonymous taken for granted foundational typifi-
cations of the everyday life-world through which a concrete taken for granted
context is established for particular types of projects of action.
More theoretically expressed, it can be said that the milieu is the social
determination and partial closure of the 'open social possibilities' of the given
taken for granted everyday life-world, and that it is, consequently, the fundamen-
tal immediate context for the constitution of those unified fields of problematic
possibilities or alternatives which are established through the formulation of
related projects of action. It represents, then, a situated context of relevancy
which is delimited from the horizonal or, more precisely, marginal world of
everyday life, and as such serves as the most immediate relevant context for the
formulation of all my projects of action in the everyday life-world.
As a situated concrete specification of the taken for granted everyday life-
world, which concerns both taken for granted and accomplished understandings,
the milieu essentially consists of relatively specific, if not intimate, taken for
granted and ongoingly produced, finely-tuned, revised typifications. Thus, it can
be said then that the milieu is the context in which actors relate to one another
in face-to-face relations in which 'personal types' and 'course-of-action types'
obtain a high degree of fullness, and are interwoven into an intricate gestalt of
meaning such that the actors are not only taken for grantedly familiar with the
other members, but also possess a contemporary finely-tuned knowledge of one
another. In living together in the milieu, the actors are immediately and contin-
uously involved in the understanding, and formulation of one another's projects
of action such that they experience the subtle changes in the customary patterns
of daily life together to which they, of course, accordingly adopt their interpretive
typificatory systems, so as to produce a highly sensitive and reliable knowledge
for understanding one another, and for forecasting each other's future actions.
Of course, it is precisely within this intricate contexture of meaning that all
'objects' of the situation also inextricably stand and by which they obtain a subtle
historically sedimented meaning so as to be understood solely as 'milieu objects'.
In sum, it can be simply said, then, that the milieu consists of relatively specific
taken for granted and contemporaneously produced typifications both of which
are highly reliable for understanding the other.
Insofar as the milieu consists of such specific, and highly reliable taken for
granted and contemporaneous typifications, it essentially involves a certain
active 'credence' in it in the sense of my simply confiding in it as the most highly
credible and solid social reality. If, for some reason, I do not possess such a
confidence in these determinate intersubjective understandings of others in the
milieu, then I have essentially lost my social situatedness and place in the world,
and am subject to all those processes of anomie so excellently described by
Durkheim. 7 Here I can no longer turn to, or find others of whom I possess such
a familiar and subtle intersubjective knowledge that we can quickly re-establish
interrupted we-relationships, as if no intermittence had occurred, and together
produce a solid stream of social reality so as to reassure us of our secure place
in the world and so as to mutually help one another produce typifications for
understanding the potentially fearful anomalies of the social world. Furthermore,
since the everyday life-world only attains its vivid and living character within the
immediacy of the milieu, in losing this confidence in the milieu, even my basic
consignment to the everyday life-world itself becomes slowly disengaged leading
to a fundamentally distorted sense of reality. At the extreme, one may only be
left to and capable of believing in the quixotic worlds of phantasy which gives
rise, at least on the part of modern society, to the attempt to totally institutional-
ize and resituate this Person in the special milieu of the mental asylum of which
it can only be said, with confidence, that it succeeds in situating the lived body
in a milieu. 8
In the typical case, where I do possess an active credence in the milieu, the
milieu, as the most immediate and familiar context for the formualtion of all my
projects in life, is essentially experienced as imposed. This impositional character
is evident, first, from the difficulties which due to other milieu members arise in
carrying out my projects of action; second, from the fact that these familiar others
readily, that is, frequently and with little question, call upon and place demands
upon me, as I upon them; and, finally, from the perhaps more seldom, yet highly
significant and overwhelming experience that my general situation in life is simply
hopelessly unchangeable and predetermined.
172 Chapter IX
The very situatedness, immediacy, and familiarity which characterizes the

milieu and which leads to the establishment of its reality as the most vivid and
solid of all the organizational domains in the social group, paradoxically enough,
also comes to constitute its fundamental 'reality problem'. The milieu, in being
essentially dependent upon the immediate presence of familiar others, undergoes
a radical weakening in its reality with the very absence of a member, and, even
moreso, with the long term or permanent departure of a member. The milieu then
lacks the unique presence and interactional contribution of a member who not
only aided in the confirmation of the reality ofthe milieu, but whose very presence
and social activity was itself an essential component of the reality of the milieu.
Furthermore, as a familiar, if not intimate, context, the milieu cannot readily
accept a new and, thus, anonymous member without forsaking its distinctive,
private, familiar character which gains its significance precisely in opposition to
such anonymous others. The quick and immediate acceptance of such an ano-
nymous outsider can only result in calling into question whether this private
familiar character of the milieu in fact exists or ever existed, and, thus, only
further weaken the milieu's already tenuous reality.
In order to overcome this fundamental reality problem, the milieu is left to
develop those complex 'initiation procedures' and 'procedures of passage' which
are intended not only as a means for the novice to demonstrate his credence in
the milieu, but as a means for the members to gain some 'reorganizational time'
before demonstrating their confidence in him. We shall not further enter into
these sociologically familiar processes except to say that, with the final accep-
tance of the new contributing member, the old social reality of the milieu is, to
an extent, necessarily transformed as one unique essential member of its contex-
ture is now replaced by an equally unique member, thereby effecting the entire
contexture of intricate relationships within the milieu. This transformation is
most clearly evident from the experience of the permanently departed member
who for one reason or another decides, soon afterwards, to permanently return
to the old milieu only to find, somewhat to his surprise, not only a substantial
change in the intersubjective relationships in the milieu, but that his old place
has vanished and cannot be recreated, at least, not in the old sense.
The interesting question for future analyses, of course, concerns how, and at
what specific point, a particular milieu is considered to be irreparable and is
closed off as a terminated non-existent past entity which cannot, consequently,
be said to represent the previous continual history of any actually present milieu.
At the limit point, where all the members permanently depart from one another,
this end to the milieu appears to occur by necessity as the members no longer
partake in face-to-face relations and, upon the basis of one member's experience
alone, it appears to be impossible to reproduce a similar continuous milieu with
different others. In any case, it should be mentioned, in light of our further
analyses, that the production of texts, generally understood as the production of
relatively permanent objectified meaning, cannot help the milieu in overcoming
its fundamental reality problem. Simply put, the loss of something so vivid and
vital as the lived bodily presence of a familiar member partaking in, and contri-
buting to the ongoing subtle and intricate intersubjective understandings of the

milieu cannot be remedied by the disembodied and fairly static meaning of the
written word of texts. As has been argued above, new, so to speak, 'flesh and
blood' is required. In fact, the milieu itself appears to provide the fundamental
context for the production and understanding of at least non-theoretical texts.
This is absolutely clear with respect to briefnotes which are produced within and
require an understanding of the milieu context in order to be deciphered (e.g. "go
ahead!"; "8.00 O.K."; and "call R"), and has been established by ethnomethodol-
ogists with respect to the recording and filing of documents. 9 However, it still
remains to be shown with respect to other more fully executed and symbolic
texts.
The further analysis of the milieu in terms of the notion of "familiarity"
("Bekanntheit"), "normality", and "typificatory schemata", all of which Grathoff
has pointed to in his own excellent investigations of the milieu, constitutes a
primary task for future investigations. to Likewise, the fundamental differen-
tiation of the milieu into the home, work, and leisure milieu constitutes a funda-
mental task for later investigations.
4. THE AFFILIATORY GROUP
The third fundamental region of the social group in general is the affiliatory
group, or, simply, 'group' in the narrow and more everyday sense ofthe term. In
general, the affiliatory group constitutes the creative productional stratum of any
social group and involves a fiduciary 'act of commitment' to it. It essentially
consists of non-taken for granted 'ordering' and 'goal oriented symbolism'
through which actors, who are situated in different milieux, come to interpret and
obtain a symbolic intersubjective understanding of themselves as a collectivity.
More specifically, the affiliatory group consists of an intersubjective symbolic
understanding by means of which actors, who only infrequently come into
contact with one another, due to their involvement in different milieux, come to
order and classify themselves, along some lines, as belonging together, and this
may further involve setting up some common goal for themselves. It essentially
arises through creative acts of everyday imagination by which one or more actors
are able to first symbolically identify themselves with primarily unknown and
unseen actors, and grasp their latent similar relevance structures so as to pro-
duce an initial symbolic framework for thinking about themselves as a collectivi-
ty, which is readily open to the intersubjective understanding of these unknown
actors. In short, the affiliatory group represents, then, are-ordering of the given
relationships in the milieu-world and the establishment of a fundamentally new
symbolic order of affairs. Of course, insofar as this affiliatory group is
autonomous from the various milieus in which the actors remain involved, it
provides the very basis, and possibility for carrying out 'situation free' individual
and collective projects of action.
174 Chapter IX
To speak more theoretically, with the affiliatory group, the 'open social possi-
bilities' of the everyday life-world, which were partially closed off by the estab-
lishment of the specific taken for granted context of the milieu for certain projects
of action, are, to some extent, re-opened as the actors creatively abstract and
produce, from all the specificity and situatedness of the milieu-world, a new
independent symbolic order and mode of collective organization for themselves.
The affiliatory group can be said to be then an unsituated and autonomous
context of symbolic relevancy which stands over and above the milieu-world and
the foundational world of everyday life, and, as such, serves as a mediated,
immanent transcendent*, symbolic context in reference to which unsituated
individual and collective projects of action can be formulated and then carried
out.
As a symbolic ordering, classification, and formulation of goals for various
individual actors involved in different milieux, the affiliatory group indeed con-
sists of relatively anonymous 'conceptualizations'. However, insofar as these
anonymous conceptualizations arise only through the actors creative production
of them, are in essence not taken for granted, but symbolic, and represent a
primarily invisible collectivity, they essentially allow for and involve 'acts of
commitment' to them, and, thus, to the collectivity which they together represent,
in the sense of simply trusting that this collectivity is real and, in fact, exists. More
concretely expressed, insofar the members only infrequently encounter one an-
other, and, thus, find little opportunity to demonstrate and confirm their partici-
pation in this group, it demands an act of commitment to it, on their part, in the
sense of simply trusting that these others continue to participate in it and that
this group does, consequently, in fact, exist.
Of course, the above does not mean to imply that the members of the
affiliatory group never encounter one another, but rather only that such encoun-
ters are of a limited nature. Not only are these encounters infrequent due to the
members' involvements in different milieux, but, when they do occur, they are,
for the most part, primarily limited to the unorganized interactions of a few
members. Furthermore, if they do happen to occur on any large scale, they are,
then, only of a limited duration. Here necessary group business is performed as
the group visibly displays itself as a whole so as to reconfirm group commitments
and solidarity, all of which itself often becomes quite a symbolic adventure
overladen with rituals and ceremonies.
Now, as a result of these common acts of commitment to the affiliatory group,
there then arises a peculiar assumed 'familiarity' which overlays the quite
anonymous conceptualizations of this group. It is assumed, for example, that
there exists a 'close familiarity' with other members of the group, although these
members are actually grasped only in the most anonymous fashion. This assumed
familiarity is not only clearly evident from the surprise and excited immediate
• In the sense that the foundational structures of everyday life and the practical attitude have not
been totally disengaged here. It is for this reason that, with respect to the affiliatory group, we speak
only of ordering, classification, and goal-oriented symbolism.
acceptance of the 'stranger' upon discovering that he too belongs to the same
group as oneself, but the phantastic character of this assumption is rendered
clear from the forms of anxiety arising around meeting other members of the
group for a non-business like social affair.
The affiliatory group is, of course, experienced as an intrinsic set of relevances.
First, I voluntarily choose to commit myself to, and to understand myself as a
member of, this group. Second, as a creatively produced collectivity, the affiliato-
ry group is not experienced as ready-made, but as has been built up by the
members and as in a process of dynamic evolution in which I am myself involved
in the bringing about of a common intersubjective definition and production of
this group.
Due to the infrequent and limited encounters of the members, its fundamental
character as a primarily invisible collectivity, and its founding upon acts of
commitment, the 'reality' of the affiliatory group is, by nature, highly tenuous and
readily subject to processes of waning. Its fundamental reality problem concerns,
then, the fading of its realness in the minds of its members, while they remain
primarily engaged in the continual attending to the immediate, that is, vivid and
pressing, everyday business and tasks of the milieu-world. In order to overcome
this reality problem, the affiliatory group may attempt to more firmly establish
itself by rendering the group more visible to itself which implies, of course, an
opening up of more stable lines of communication for themselves. Now, it is
precisely the production of texts which ideally serves this purpose for, with texts,
it is possible to obtain a visible communicative structure between the members
of the group without necessitating, for the most part, their encountering one
another in face-to-face relations and, thus, at least to some extent, giving up their
involvements in various milieux. In general these affiliatory texts, which take on
such forms as constitutions, charters, programs, reports, bulletins, newsletters,
and other types ofletters, display to various degrees the group's purposes, beliefs,
history, membership, and change to itself, while providing, again to various
degrees, a medium for further ongoing communication between the members.
Although this production of texts does result in a certain stabilization of the
reality of the affiliatory group, it is of the utmost importance to realize that it
remains, here, a process of symbolization. The produced texts consist primarily
of non-taken for granted symbolism, which is to say that they essentially consist
of reflective 'imagery' for analogically apprehending and reflecting upon the
group in general. Insofar as these texts consist of such a symbolic self-interpretive
and reflective understanding of the group by its members, the inner meaning
which they have for these members is, of course, inaccessible to non-group
members.
The obvious logical development of this production of texts by the affiliatory
group is the establishment of a milieu wherein certain members of the group
regularly meet in face-to-face encounters so as to periodically and organization-
ally produce such texts for the group in general. The fundamental task of this
milieu consists not only in the ascertainment, production, and expression of the
group's self-understanding of itself in the symbolic language of texts , but, further-
176 Chapter IX
more, in the discovery of ways to transform news events and everyday happen-
ings, occurring outside of the immediate relevance structures of the group, into
non-ordinary textual symbolic language which expresses the purposes and beliefs
of the group, so as to provide, for the group members, a definite interpretation
and statement about such everyday affairs from the group perspective.
Of course, this milieu may, so to speak, 'show itself and even open its doors
to the public', thereby providing the first permanently visible public display of
the group and the first regular public access point to it. In this case, the milieu
takes on the further task of representing the group, and attempting to render it
comprehensible to individual actors and the public at large, in order to promote
the group's own perspective and, ifneed be, to acquire new members for it. Here
the milieu is confronted with the problem of finding ways to connect the symbolic
language and perspective of the group with the common language and perspec-
tives of the everyday life-world.
5. THE INSTITUTION
The fourth fundamental region of the social group is the institution. In general,
the institution constitutes the securance stratum of any social group and involves
afiduciary 'act o/belief in it, while essentially consisting of that taken for granted
reflective symbolism which provides the common forms of understanding those
essential segments of human activity in the everyday life-world in regard to which
intersubjective agreement and interaction have been interpreted to be absolutely
necessary for the preservation of the overall sociability of the group.
More specifically, the institution is the taken for granted result of previous
reflective symbolic attempts, within the symbolic cosmos, to interpret and exhibit
the fundamental order of the everyday life-world. As such, it represents a taken
for granted reflective understanding of what appeared to be, at one time, a
significant and fundamental order of everyday life which required a higher
symbolic understanding and intersubjective agreement in order to promote the
purposes of the social group in general. Thus, we find institutions providing
common taken for granted symbolic understandings for such significant aspects
of everyday life as sexuality and procreation, work, our influences upon others,
the transference of knowledge, and the transcendent experiences of society and
nature. While it is true that sociologists and anthropologists alike have come to,
more or less, correctly identify these basic institutions as, in succession, the
'family', the 'economy', 'government', 'education', 'religion', and, may we add,
'science', they fail to recognize this subjective origin and meaning of the insti-
tution. Insofar as institutions arise only from such past reflective symbolic
endeavors of social actors and through processes of, then, taking these symbolic
reflections for granted, their so-called 'necessity' is dependent upon these initial
subjective reflections and, more immediately, upon their present taken for grant-
ed character for us, and have nothing to do with the objectively posited concepts
of "needs" (biological or otherwise), "functions", and "anthropological con-
stants", which are often employed by both of these sciences to explain the
institution.
Having understood this primarily subjective origin and character of the insti-
tution, it can now be further said, with little concern for misinterpretation, that
the institution represents a symbolic affirmation and regulation of our taken for
granted relationships in the everyday life-world, through serving as the funda-
mental given reflective framework for reflexively understanding, judging, and
managing essential segments of our taken for granted activities in the everyday
life-world. In other words, the institution essentially provides a given explanatory
symbolic framework in regard to which actors interpret,judge, and regulate their
action in certain key realms of the everyday life-world, thereby essentially
re-affirming the latter's already intersubjective character. Insofar as the insti-
tution carries a quasi-symbolic reference to essential features ofthe entire every-
day life-world, it is, of course, clear that it provides a common self-evident
understanding of these segments of life for all the actors in the social group,
regardless of their involvement in different milieux and membership in different
affiliatory groups. In sum, to state the matter as simply as possible, the institution
merely provides for everyone that given fundamental reflective symbolic context
of reasons and explanations for understanding why we do things the way we do
in the everyday life-world, regardless of whether or not these things stand in
question for us.
Considering the institution more theoretically, it can be said to provide a given
symbolic rationalization for the taken for granted 'open social possibilities' of the
everyday life-world which are, afterall, to a large extent merely dependent upon
the relative natural world view of a group and its tradition, and are, thus, not
only susceptible to question through the unique transcendent experiences of
society and nature, but through common contact with other social groups. More
specifically, the institution can be understood as a taken for granted context of
symbolic relevancy which stands over and above the affiliatory group, the milieu-
world, and world of everyday life, providing, so to speak, a fortified rational
canopy which not only encloses, but immures the everyday life-world from
fundamental doubt, through providing rationalizations for why it is as it is.
Of course, as a common, symbolic, self-evident understanding of certain
segments of everyday life for all the actors in the social group, the institution
consists of highly anonymous conceptualizations taking on, for example, not only
the regulatory form of people of type X are to do p, q, r, and s, and not to do
t, u, and v, but also, and, more fundamentally, identificatory forms such as IX is
'X' (e.g. a 'Father', 'Landlord', 'Senator', 'Professor', etc.). Now, insofar as these
anonymous conceptualizations are neither exactly taken for granted as the
typifications in the everyday life-world nor exactly not taken for granted as are
essentially the conceptualizations in the affiliatory group, but rather constitute
a peculiar species themselves - 'taken for granted symbolism' - which is to say,
'assumed reflections', they are essentially taken for granted concepts which, due
to their further reflective symbolic character, are intrinsically always subject to
doubt. In other words, they can always be readily brought into question without
178 Chapter IX
first necessitating the experience of a disruptive novel event which, in not fitting
into that which is taken for granted, renders the latter problematic. As such
intrinsically dubious conceptualizations, these taken for granted symbolic forms
of understanding essentially allow for and involve 'acts of belief' in them, and
consequently in the institution which they together compose, in the sense of
simply consenting that this reality of the institution is legitimate and properly
represents, that is, renders understandable our activities in the everyday life-
world. Of course, no matter how much we believe that the institution properly
represents the everyday life-world, there always remains an irremediable dis-
tance between it and the everyday life-world itself.
These structures of belief in the institution are clearly evident from the
differences between those who, in totally believing in the institution, act out the
given regulatory and identificatory anonymous forms of understanding with such
complete involvement, enthusiasm, and unyielding invariance that it appears as
if there is no other 'reality' for them, and those who, in lacking such a belief, act
out the anonymous forms of understanding to the minimum extent necessary to
successfully carry out the interaction, while constantly remaining open to em-
ploying them as a means not only to arrive at some knowledge of the private life
of the other, but also to disclose some private knowledge about oneself. Although
the latter 'private communication' need not in itself constitute a major threat to
the institution and, no doubt, typically does not, it appears clear that it is only
upon the basis of such incipient betrayals that full-fledged systems of disbelief
in the institution may arise. For example, one may then go on to privately
communicate to the 'institutional other' one's own disbelief in the institution and
attempt to convince him of one's own beliefs, perhaps, in another symbolic form
of the institution. Of course, the milieu-world and world of everyday life provide
the ultimate foundation for the very possibility of carrying out any such private
communication in general as they represent pre-institutional spheres proper.
As a given symbolic context of rationalizations for interpreting everyday life
which ultimately involves an act of belief in it, the institution may be experienced
as anywhere from an intrinsic to an imposed context of relevances. 11 If I totally
believe in the institution and fully consent to it as a legitimate social reality, then
I experience it, and all its anonymous forms of understanding and conceptuali-
zations as essentially my own and intrinsic. In other words, I am then prepared
to treat even the most anonymous institutional conceptualization of myself,
which identifies the broadest layers of my personality with the particular trait or
characteristic conceptualized, as essentially a self-conceptualization, and as a
self-identification in which I identify my personality with a trait which is of the
highest relevance to me, and which, thus, concerns one of the highest possible
forms of self-realization for me. If, on the other hand, I do not believe in the
institution and consider it as an illegitimate social reality, then I experience it,
and all its anonymous forms of understanding and conceptualizations as impos-
ed and extrinsic. More specifically, I then experience the institution as the sole
possession of alien others, and, if these others have the power to enforce, against
my own will, its anonymous conceptualizations upon me such that I am, for
example, compelled to identify myself as a whole with a particular trait or

characteristic of an institutional concept, which had never been and is not
relevant to me, then I further experience the institution as that which attempts
to annihilate my private order of domains of relevance and, consequently, the
integrity of my personality itself. I now feel that the institution does not treat me
as an individual human being with my own rights, but rather as a mere inter-
changeable specimen of a certain conceptual class, that is, as a mere representa-
tive of the conceptualized traits and characteristics of the class. Here arise all
those feelings of degradation, oppression, and anger which often lead to social
conflict and to a change in the institution itself. Of course, the general implication
of this analysis is that it is precisely the enforced imposition of social categories
on sets of people, who do not consider themselves to be a collectivity, which
constitutes one of the essential features of societal power.
Now, institutions, understood at the most primordial level as simply processes
of taking symbols for granted, essentially involve rendering the symbols and, by
implication, themselves highly conspicuous and familiar within the social group.
Thus, from the very beginning, institutions typically constitute themselves as
highly visible through the establishment of various milieux. In these milieux,
basic symbolism such as flags, coats of arms, colors, dress (e.g. gowns and
uniforms), anthems, hymns, seals, and so forth can be, more or less, permanently
displayed; buildings can be established with their symbolically furnished fronts
and heavily equipped interiors; institutional activity can be seen to be going on
as relevant people are seen entering and leaving the milieu; institutional business
can be performed which requires at least some members of the social group to
come into direct contact with the milieu and its institutional personnel; and,
finally, ceremonies and processions can find a place in which and from which to
occur. In short, these milieux present, and render more or less permanently
visible, certain symbols and their institution such that both become a familiar and
customary taken for granted fact adjoining the everyday lives of the members of
the social group.
The fundamental reality problem which confronts the institution has clearly,
then, not to do with its invisibility and the, consequent, processes of fading.
Rather, due to its fundamental character of being composed of taken for granted
symbolism and as being, thus, inherently susceptible to doubt, and due to its
founding upon mere acts to belief in it, its 'problem' concerns the development
of ' systems of disbelief in the very reality of the institution which the milieux were
established to so obviously represent. Here the adherents begin to consider the
institution as an illegitimate social reality which misrepresents, obscures, and
renders unintelligible their activities in the everyday life-world.
In order to prevent, or to at least suppress, such possible hereticism and to
more firmly secure itself, the institution may attempt to establish, using
Voegelin's term in a somewhat altered sense, a "Koran character" to its quasi-
symbolic forms of understanding. 12 In other words, an attempt may be made to
establish a simple mono-symbolic interpretation of the remaining poly-symbolic
meaning of these forms of understanding such that all of their variant reflective
180 Chapter IX
characters and the ambiguity arising therefrom are eliminated. The outcome
would, of course, be a single, uniform, interpretation of these forms of under-
standing which, in closing off all variant reflective symbolic meanings and modes
of thought, is hoped to give to these forms of understanding and, consequently,
the institution itself the appearance of an undisputable objective factual truth.
It is once more the production of texts which ideally serves the purpose of now
establishing such a mono-symbolic interpretation of the institution for, with
texts, it is not only possible to provide a clear and precise mono-symbolic
statement, but, furthermore, it is possible to provide a mono-symbolic statement
which is clearly officially sanctioned, non-situtated, and relatively permanently
objectified in the world, and which, as such, is readily open to exact reproduction,
dissemination, and immediate referral and employment throughout the entire
social group. Of course, it is of the utmost importance to realize here that this
production of texts, which serves to establish the institution as the single objec-
tive factual truth and which, in so doing, closes off variant potential forms of
reflective thought, is obviously not a process of symbolization for the further
understanding of the group. It is, rather, a process of'textualization' by which,
at least, certain significant areas of the everyday life-world are subsumed by and,
then, ordered according to the textual net of the institution. In issuing in the
establishment of a written single invariant interpretation of the order of the
group, this production of texts essentially constitutes a transformation of the
interest in an already limited symbolic understanding of the given order of the
group into a mere interest in an offically stipulated, written order of the group.
Of course, the latter now naturally involves, as its primary concern, ensuring that
this order is properly followed out. In other words, the new interest which arises
here concerns the systematic managing of the everyday life-world, according to
the invariant line of the official texts. It is now in reference to the official written
word that all institutional activity is carried out and in regard to it that the
behavior of actors in the everyday life-world is interpreted,judged, and regulated.
Of course, the natural development of this entire process is a proliferation oftexts
and an increasing textualization of the everyday life-world as the institution
attempts to ever further work out the details of its officially stipulated invariant
order, and begins not only to record cases of how this order was or was not
factually carried out in the everyday life-world, but begins to record its own
activity and judgments in regard to these cases, along with its recommendations
for the future existence of the institution. This is not even to mention the many
texts which are produced within the institution for ordinary communicative
purposes. In any case, all these texts take on, for example, such forms as decrees,
orders, laws, rules, regulations, ordinances, citations, verdicts, injunctions, sen-
tences, manuals, handbooks, files, case histories, letters, memos, and so forth.
Finally, it is precisely along this development of the institution, understood as
a process of the textualization of the everyday life-world, that, and we say quite
specifically, the institutional superstratum of the social group begins to take on
the bureaucratic character so carefully analyzed by Weber 13 and, furthermore,
begins to take on the appearance of a social system which, in this specific sense,
can be said to have been correctly analyzed by Parsons. 14
Now, unlike the texts of the affiliatory group which, due to their heavily laden
symbolic meaning, are always essentially non-understandable to a non-member,
institutional texts, while initially serving as an accessible official interpretation
of the institution for all the members of the social group, if only as documents
read to them, come to be divided into a public and hermetic class. Clearly, there
are official texts which are read before the public, reprinted for them, and even
some which they are asked to read, fill out, sign, and to return or keep with them.
However, it is just as clear that there are a significant number of texts which are
kept concealed within the recesses of the institution or, if they happen to be
materially available, are, due to their technical language, still essentially inacces-
sible to, at least, the layman.
This development of a sphere of hermetic texts basically represents the insti-
tution's attempt to regain and clearly re-establish its reflective symbolic charac-
ter most of which it essentially relinquished through textually establishing itself
as the single objective factual truth at the exclusion and prohibition of all others.
The hermetic texts not only lend to the institution an obviously reflective charac-
ter as they constitute the institution's own special knowledge about the group,
but, furthermore, insofar as they are inaccessible to lay actors, they render the
institution even further indisputable and correct. For example, institutional
personnel are now backed by an unknown sphere of official texts for which they
do not claim to be responsible, but which they certainly do apply in various,
sometimes even inconsistent, manners to different situations, with little ob-
jection, simply due to the lay actor's lack of knowledge of them. Thus, it is
precisely the lawyer, in possessing an inside expert knowledge of such texts and
the ultimate legal ones, who causes such definitional problems for institutional
personnel, whether they be immigration officials, arresting police officers, social
service workers, or, simply, the local landlord. In sum, it can be generally said
then that, through the development of a sphere of hermetic texts, the institution
not only regains a certain reflective character, but, furthermore, the lay actor then
comes to lack a sufficient knowledge of the institution to easily call it into
question and, consequently, the development of systems of disbelief in the
institution are even further closed off.
Now, while the development of this sphere of hermetic texts obviously lends
to the institution a reflective character and allows it to further secure itself, it is
suggested here that it furthermore, and more fundamentally, represents the
establishment of a transcendent character to the institution itself. Incapable of
obtaining or participating in the hermetic textual knowledge of the institution,
the actor now comes to experience the institution as basically intransparent and
overwhelmingly powerful. The institution is now experienced as an inner complex
maze of primarily unknown rules, regulations, and procedures whose immediate
purposes are themselves unknown, and, furthermore, as capable of imposing
primarily unknown and atypical sanctions upon the social actor. Here, the
common taken for granted symbolism, which served as a basis for an intersubjec-
182 Chapter IX
tive understanding of the order of the group, no longer provides an adequate

interpretive framework for understanding the institution for the latter now con-
sists of something essentially more, namely, a primarily unknown, and unshared
field of textual knowledge for understanding and managing the group in general.
Thus, the institution is experienced as a transcendent phenomenon which not
only transcends our taken for granted everyday knowledge, but also our taken
for granted symbolic knowledge.
To be sure, our common taken for granted institutional symbolism still
remains in use as is most evident from the simple maxims, aphorisms, and
dictums which continue to be typically employed in referring to the institution.
It is still said, for example, that "good boys and girls obey their parents".
However, the fundamental inadequacy of this taken for granted symbolism is
clearly realized in simply attempting to think about the institution in general.
Here one undergoes a primordial experience of the essential opacity of the
institution itself where, if anything at all occurs to one, then it is the vaguest thin
outlines of the essential immensity, vastness, and complexity of the institution
itself. For example, one may vaguely sense that the institution of the family
consists of a complex historical legal code and court system; a complex system
for recording changing family relations; and numerous types of family social
services; all of which, more or less, involve numerous departments with their
professional texts, handbooks of rules and regulations, computer systems, forms,
files, and case histories, and all of which occur in countless, primarily unknown,
milieux in possibly far-reaching and often unknown places. It is essentially only
the social types 'higher institutional officials', the 'lawyer', and the 'hardened
criminal', each of whom, it can be said, has been socialized into the institutional
realm in their own unique way, who now possess at least some sort of working
knowledge of an entire institution and, thus, stand in some degree of familiarity
with it. However, it remains an open question as to what extent even they lack
a knowledge of the accumulative texts of the institution and, consequently, also
come to experience it as, in some sense, transcendent.
In experiencing the institution as an essentially transcendent phenomenon,
the social actors, of course, attempt to symbolically comprehend it and, here, it
is of the utmost importance to realize that, insofar as these actors have little
proper experiential knowledge of the institution itself, they are only capable of
carrying out a quite limited symbolic understanding of it which has to do primari-
ly with how it effects, or how they believe it effects, their own milieu lives. ls
Consequently, the resulting symbolism is essentially produced only from within
the limited context of their own milieu and, thus, represents what can be referred
to as 'colloquial theory'.
In sum, it is clear that, with the establishment of a transcendent character,
the institution, which already secured its own reality through establishing a
mono-symbolic textual interpretation of its taken for granted symbolism and,
then, through further establishing, by means of the production of hermetic texts,
a reflective character for itself, now, even further affirms itself through establish-
ing itself as the new fundamental transcendent mystery in the social world to be
understood and 'feared' .16 The actors are now left, more or less, unquestionably
accepting the institution as a legitimate reality, while carrying out their limited
symbolic attempts to comprehend its transcendent character which naturally
leads to the production of some quite fictive, narrative, everyday theories. Of
course, even given all this protective reality work, insofar as, in the final analysis,
the institution is founded upon taken for granted symbolism and acts of belief
in it, it always remains, in essence, inherently susceptible to doubt.
6. THE SYMBOLIC COSMOS
We have now arrived at the final fundamental region of any social group which
is here referred to as the 'symbolic cosmos'. It is clearly the most difficult and
complex of any of the regions which have been analyzed thus far. First, it involves
a complex genealogical development from a compact symbolic articulation to a
differentiated symbolic articulation in which there are several fairly independent
symbolic orders such as music, art, poetry and literature, and the various
sciences. Second, each one of these relatively independent symbolic orders
possesses its own cognitive style and symbolic gestalt of meaning, and, thus,
essentially requires a full independent analysis of its own. Finally, insofar as each
of these symbolic orders remains a human world of reflective thought, each
comes to develop itself, along parallel lines to the social group, so as to, finally,
consist of an institutional, milieu, affiliatory, and proper reflective symbolic
aspect, although to be sure with essential differences, insofar as they now have
to do with the symbolic cosmos. Clearly, it is impossible to carry out an analysis
of the symbolic cosmos which adequately accounts for all these complex far-
reaching dimensions here in the closing section of this study. In the following,
we shall restrict ourselves, then, to making only a number of general statements
about the symbolic cosmos so as to block off this field of study and so as to
provide some limited sense of this final fundamental region of the social group.
At the most general level and as an initial working statement, it can be said
that the symbolic cosmos constitutes the contemplative stratum of any social
group and involves a fiduciary 'act offaith' in it, while essentially consisting of
taken for granted to creatively produced, highly reflective, symbolism which
serves, in the end, as the fundamental context for a controlled and systematically
refined experiencing, understanding, and expression of the fundamental tran-
scendences of society and nature.
In experiencing the fundamental transcendences of society and nature in
everyday life, the lay actor's knowledge of the everyday life-world is indeed
thrown into question, while an attitude of wonder and reflection is correspond-
ingly adopted. However, without any proper erudition in a symbolic order, the
lay actor is left to employ taken for granted institutional symbolism which quickly
explains away the experience as nothing too extraordinary, or the experience, in
any case, quickly fades away insofar as it cannot be meaningfully typified or
conceptualized. If it does not fade away and the institutional symbolism is
184 Chapter IX
inadequate, then the lay actor is left to produce his own reflective symbolism in
which case the transcendent phenomenon is often experienced as quite a fright-
ening event. Here, no doubt, belong all the everyday myths about the social-
natural world. In any case, no higher reflective symbolism is produced.
In order to produce such higher reflective symbolism, it is first necessary to
become thoroughly educated in the symbolic system of one of the symbolic orders
which implies acquiring enough of a proper knowledge of its taken for granted
and newly creative symbolism so as to attain a foundational sense of its gestalt
of meaning, and so as to be able to adopt its particular cognitive style of thinking.
This holds true with all the symbolic orders whether they be music, art, philoso-
phy or the sciences. With this symbolic knowledge at hand and capable of
thinking in a particular cognitive style, it is then possible, from within the context
of a symbolic order, to attain radically new transcendent experiences of society
and nature, and, while holding a transcendent experience constant, to, slowly
and systematically, question and vary different aspects, or realms, of the order's
symbolism, so as to then attempt to creatively produce new reflective symbolism,
which better clarifies and brings to expression this unique transcendent ex-
perience. Of interest is the fact that this contemplative process, unlike our
everyday transcendent reflections, can now go on for hours at a time. Of equal
interest is the fact that, even after having acquired such a facility in a symbolic
order, a certain amount oftime and effort is always required to re-enter the order,
before being capable of being fully and creatively active within it, as is a certain
amount of time required before having completely left it behind.
Of course, in focusing upon the production of new highly reflective symbolism,
we have, thus far, been concerned primarily only with the proper reflective aspect
of a symbolic order. Here, the actor, primarily left to himself and his own creative
capacities, insightfully and systematically produces that new highly reflective
symbolism which constitutes a significant advance for that entire symbolic order.
However, as has already been mentioned above, a symbolic order, furthermore,
comes to consist of an institutional, affiliatory, and milieu realm.17 Briefly, the
institutional realm consists of the taken for granted symbolism of the symbolic
order, and, while working at this level, the actor is essentially involved in carrying
out projects which merely repeat, extend, or elaborate this taken for granted
symbolism, and, in so doing, render it even further taken for granted. The
affiliatory realm consists of non-taken for granted symbolism by means of which
the actor brings to expression contemporary ideas which are, more or less,
vaguely lying on the surface of the consciousness of many in the symbolic order
or are, so to speak, 'in the air', but which have never been clearly, systematically,
and, ifneed be, evidentially brought to expression. Finally, the milieu constitutes
that working environment in which the actor continually re-encounters particular
members of the symbolic order so as to partake in all those social forms of
colleagueship, to carry out fairly practical work and the order's business together,
and to test out and exchange some symbolic ideas with one another. In what
appears to be extreme cases, which urgently demand empirical investigation, the
milieu may develop into a 'symphilosophic milieu', which is to say that the
Reflections on the Problem of lntersubjectivity 185
members, then, together, creatively partake in the intersubjective understanding

and production of that highest reflective symbolism which constitutes a signifi-
cant advance for the entire symbolic order.
Of course, all these realms are important features of a symbolic order. In
general, what they illustrate is that a symbolic order consists of various levels
stretching from its, institutional and milieu, own fairly habitual and routine
activity to the highly contemplative and creative activity of producing new highly
reflective symbolism. The general theoretical point to be understood here is that
a symbolic order, while ultimately founded upon the everyday life-world, is
neither completely embedded within it nor totally transcendends it, but rather
consists of various levels or dimensions of increasing distance from it by means
of which certain members are then enabled in a controlled and sytematic ally
refined manner to ever further transcend it. 18 In general, this entire chapter can
be understood as a first attempt to indicate the various levels and dimensions
of the life-world, and of a symbolic order itself so as to work towards explicating
the proper specific relationship between these two, at first, opposing fundamental
domains.
Now, given our own previous analyses of the other fundamental regions of the
social group, there is every reason to believe that the production of texts will
constitute one of the essential, if not the most essential, feature of a symbolic
order. However, extreme caution and care is required here for some symbolic
orders, such as art and music, work with other forms or mediums of "textual
symbolic gestalts" such as the socio-material world and the world of sound. 19
Furthermore, taking science as our example, one must become aware of and
remain sensitive to such crucial distinctions as: first, the creative symbolic act
of writing or, more succinctly, simply, "composing" in which symbolic ideas are
ordered and brought to written expression with the hand;20 second, the taken
for granted act of writing or, simply, "printing" in which informational reports,
findings, and events are merely brought into textual form; and, finally, those even
more taken for granted processes involved in "publication" which include not
only bringing an already written work to proper form (editing, proof-reading,
style changes, etc.), but the actual printing of the work and the distribution of
it.
Insofar as all the symbolic orders participate in one symbolic cosmos and
insofar as there is but one, single, universal reason, it is possible to conclude here
by generally stating that, in essentially consisting of the highest reflective
symbolism in whose vague imagery the deepest transcendent experiences of
others are expressed, a symbolic order essentially involves an 'act offaith' in it,
first, in the sense of hoping that one has indeed understood its foundational
symbolic gestalt of meaning and will continue to be able to further understand
it, so as to be able to possibly creatively contribute to the symbolic order's social
construction, and, second, in the sense of devoting oneselfto its 'reality' as that
which provides the ultimate clarification of the social-natural world. Thus, the
fundamental reality problem of a symbolic order would appear to consist, then,
precisely in the process by which its members come to think that they essentially
186 Chapter IX
have not, can no longer, or can no further understand its highest reflective
symbolism, and, consequently, that they cannot, in any way, possibly contribute
to the order's further construction. This loss of hope in the comprehensibility of
the symbolic order and in one's corresponding ability to be able to contribute to
it leads not only to a deengagement of one's devotion to it (to a 'reality' which
is, after all, essentially non-understandable), but, furthermore, to a certain
'cynicism' in regard to the order's higher purposes, and to a re-identification of
oneself with the more mundane realms and aspects of everyday life. How a
symbolic order overcomes this reality problem remains an open and pressing
question.
CONCLUSION: THE PERSON AND THE SOCIAL GROUP
Starting out from a general analysis of the fiduciary attitude, such fundamental
regions of the social group as the everyday life-world, the milieu, the affiliatory
group, the institution, and the symbolic cosmos have been briefly described each
respectively involving a fiduciary 'consignment', 'credence', 'act of commitment',
'act of belief, and 'act of faith' in it.
Now, the social Person is to be first understood as standing, so to speak, at
the intersection of all of these various fundamental regions of the social group
and as, essentially, investing various aspects of his self, or parts of his personality,
in each of these fundamental regions. To be sure, each region requires the
respective type of fiduciary trust in it and, as one proceeds from the fiduciary
consignment of the everyday life-world to the act of faith in the symbolic cosmos,
there is essentially an increasing amount of trust required for each fundamental
region. However, it was seen that, except for the everyday life-world, each region
also has a fundamental reality problem by means of which the required fiduciary
attitude of its members can become disengaged. Thus, it can essentially be said
in regard to the social Person that, while it is less true with, for example, the
milieu than the symbolic cosmos in that the milieu involves fewer fiduciary
elements, the social Person, in the end, essentially possesses a freedom of
involvement in each of these fundamental domains. In other words, the Person
is essentially free to choose with what part of his personality he wants to
participate in each region, and it is precisely through his ability of not engaging
the required type of fiduciary attitude in a fundamental region that the Person
obtains the possibility of a free display of the self. He is then able, ifhe so desires,
to act quite intimately within the context of the anonymous typifications of a
region or, vice versa, to act quite anonymously within the given context of the
specific typifications of a region. For example, in withdrawing his belief in the
institution, the Person is enabled, within the context of its anonymous concep-
tualizations, to then begin to act quite intimately with the institutional other so
as to even verbally disclose his disbelief in it; or, in losing credence in the milieu,
the Person may begin to act quite distant and treat the other members quite
anonymously within the context of the milieu's more specific typifications, so as
to even disclose to outsiders his lack of support in it. The specific particularities
concerning how the Person comes to lack such a fiduciary trust in a fundamental
region and comes to, furthermore, act quite untypically within it, whether this
be momentarily or at long length, along with how many members of a social
group lack such a trust in one or more particular regions all have to do with
mundane 'interactional processes' which, while grounded upon our more
foundational analyses, themselves require an independent empirical investi-
gation. All that can be said here with certainty is that as fewer and fewer persons
come to lack the required attitude of involvement in the fundamental regions of
the social group, which have been laid out here in their essential typicality, the
overall intersubjectivity of the social group begins to break asunder.
The Person is furthermore understood by others as possessing such an inner
responsible self in the sense of being essentially free to and, thus, responsible for
adopting a particular fiduciary attitude towards, and for his consequent acts
within, a fundamental region of the social group. Interestingly enough, insofar as
the Person does not possess the proper fiduciary attitude in a region, say the
institution of government, it is now possible for him to admit to being 'responsible
for' his acts in the region, while claiming only to be 'responsible to' and, thus,
accountable to another region, say the church and God, in which he possesses
the proper fiduciary attitude. 21 Finally, insofar as a Person is properly involved
in a fundamental region, say again government, where his acts and this entire
region attempt to promote, or radically deny or limit the Person's inalienable
freedom of involvement and display of the self, he is typically understood by
others as responsible for acts for or against humanity as a whole.
The question may now arise here at the end of this study whether, in giving
up the practical attitude and work world as independent foundational structures
considering them as always irretrievably bound up with a fiduciary attitude and
relative natural world view of a group, there are any other more foundational and
essential structures.z2 After all the preceding analyses, this question is now raised
in its proper place and upon a theoretical basis which can begin to provide
detailed answers, but unfortunately not in such a concluding section. It would
require a work of its own. However, given the importance of this final question
arising out of this work, it may not be out of place here to simply give up analytic
descriptions and to resort to metaphors so as to at least indicate the direction
of a future answer.
The "epoch€: of the natural attitude,,23 which suspends doubt in the existence
of the everyday life-world must be first interpreted as the engagement of a
profound and fundamental fiduciary attitude of belief in the world. This fiduciary
engagement is essentially an achievement based upon the suspension of doubt
that the world and its objects might be otherwise than as they appear, so that
there arises a basic trust in the world and its reality as there, and as having a
past and probable future which is ultimately and essentially common to all of us.
In order to even obtain a practical problem in the natural attitude, there must
first occur as its basis this fundamental fiduciary engagement in the world upon
which the problem can then arise as a questionable aspect of this world. In other
188 Chapter IX
words, within the very notion of intentionality both in its noetic and noematic
sides there is a co-operant and accompanying unity of basic trust integrating the
implications of the theme and inner and outer horizons, so as to give rise to the
identity of the intentional object which in everyday life is furthermore believed
to exist as that very same thing in the world. What might this original fiduciary
engagement and its possible deepest correlate a human nature look like?
The baby is first born in marvel of the world; in an open-eyed trance of rushing
booming and colorful images of the world. To be sure, the newly born first rejects
this naturalness in its first cries into the world and attempts to return from
whence it came in a closed-eyed trance of sleep. However, it becomes hungry.
In the open-eyed trance, there is nothing to hinder it from indefinitely following
out the original infinite plurality of perceptual horizons, except for the fact that
it must now carry out its first act: to move from an open-eyed trance to an
open-mouthed act. With the help of a mother, hearing and finally active touch,
the first intersubjective act occurs (intersubjectivity itself of course goes back to
before birth in the social group) and some existence is believably set into the
world. In this very process and thereafter, the child begins to fundamentally trust
nature and others ever more, and learns when to distrust them as nature herself
plays her primary pedagogical role in the social processes of falling asleep and
being wide-awake. Later, when the child becomes an adult in a full existent
everyday life-world, he or she may return back to something similar to this
original marvel in doing theoretical reflection wherein this trust in existence is
deengaged and placed rather in belief in doubt.
More theoretically, the world is originally infinite as a natural infinity and man
must first close in this world by fiducially trusting in and establishing existences
such that this world, in shortened form, is taken for granted. These existences
are essentially aspects of types and are established in the process of typification
under the idealization of "I can't any further" (Ich kann nicht mehr weiter) upon
which Husserl's principles of "and so forth" (und so weiter) and "I can do it again"
(Ich kann immer wieder) can then be practically unfolded, according to the
requirements and exigencies of the situation. The point here is not the following
out of concatenations of the perceptual sense of the house by walking around it,
which in their full particularity could themselves be infinite, but rather the
establishing of enough trust in the house so as to walk into it, sit down, and begin
to make plans for the future. The farthest reaching and most obvious adminis-
tration of this trust consists in the establishment of significative connections
between present phenomena in the situation of the Now and Here, and absent
phenomena which transcend it, which at its most primordial level involves the
appresentative inclusion of transcendent natural spatial-temporal structures into
the Now and Here of conscious life so as to essentially temporalize them, thereby
rendering the life-world at first possible.
In sum, the faithful establishment of existent types essentially allows for the
first possibility of acting in general. And the resulting relevances, as all rele-
vances, are not rooted in any fundamental anxiety of death. What does the baby
know about death? It is not death, but life itself as human nature which calls forth
the first principle of "I can't any further". We may sleep a little longer, but soon
"I can't any further" and 1 am called into movement and action, just as we may
stay awake a little later, but soon "I can't any further" and 1 fall asleep now
paradoxically really trusting in, while giving up existence.
Such a meaningful human nature in which we all take part is obviously
something very social as all nature is, and in her regularity and continuity
expresses something very beautiful and wonderful which science can never grasp
and which the mystics, poets, and religious men have always tried to express. The
movements of the sun and moon, the rhythms of the seasons, the flows of the
streams, the blooming and wilting of life all in which 1 originally partake in the
"touchless touch" of my lived body readily and with regularity allow for our social
typifications and usually without any objection; however varied and colorful they
may be as seen from so many relative natural world views. From this perspective,
science should readily and formally thank nature for being so amendable to its
formalisms, while in our human intersubjectivity we may smile and wink at her
in smiling and winking at one another. True, there are hurricanes, earthquakes,
draughts, and thunder, as there are wasps, snakes, bats, and lions. Here nature
announces her existence in a sense deeper than 1 can bring to expression or
contribute towards her in my social typifications. The cracking boom of thunder
does not always lead to symbolic reflection over the opacity ofthe life-world, but
often to a scary and nerving shock as nature comes out of her regularity to assert
herself forcefully and independently of my taken for granted social typifications.
Thus, I find that the principle of "I can't any further" has closed in a milieu of
social nature in which she smiles from that in which she frowns. Here, it appears
that the original life-worldly spatio-temporal relationship of hic and iI/ie, and the
distances of perspectives involved therein is very different depending upon
whether illie is a rock, tree, water, bird, elephant or lion, or from my pack or their
pack. Intentionality in the case of intersubjectivity becomes a most precarious
matter thoroughly permeated with elements of trust as is seen from the extreme
social difficulties arising in simply attempting to fulfill my anticipations of the
others back side by walking around to look at his behind. It is simply a prejudice
to suppose that experience has primordially only such types as color, sound,
touch, smell, and taste because the senses that present them can be separated
at will. Far more fundamental is their unity in the more primitive dichotomies
such as good and bad, near and far, coming and going, fast and slow, with eyes
and teeth or without, just now and very soon, dangerous and harmless. In this
sense, perception is in essence trust as the toys of perception turn into the gifts
of acting with the world. The practical attitude arises upon this original fiduciary
attitude in nature.
The final and most thought provoking fundamental point which arises here,
at the end of our investigations, and which provides the proper direction for all
further more general speculative thoughts on intersubjectivity and the social
group concerns the general relationship between the fundamental regions of the
group themselves and human nature, and precisely how, at the most fundamental
level, they serve to maintain and preserve the overall intersubjectivity of the
190 Chapter IX
group. More specifically, it would appear that, in essentially providing such

fundamentally different contexts in which to understand the other in essentially
very different ways, these fundamental regions into which the social group
articulates itself, upon the basis of human nature, essentially constitute, with
respect to one another, inner-worldly transcendent contexts such that in passing
between them, I can and always do attain a new transcendent experience of
others which gives rise to a renewed continual motivation for ever further
attempting to understand others. In other words, in serving as essentially given
contexts for understanding others in quite different ways, these fundamental
regions essentially allow for the possibility of my always attaining an, in essence,
different experience of others, as I pass from one region to the next, and, in so
doing, help keep up my interest in ever further attempting to understand others
and to construct an intersubjective world. Thus, the so often wonderful ex-
perience of coming home to the comforts of intimacy and sleep in home life is
seen here to depend upon having, in some sense, left them behind during the day
and having actively partaken, in a wide-awake fashion, in the more anonymous
realms of the social world.
NOTES
1. See pp. 124-125 above.

2. Cf. "Don Quixote and the Problem of Reality", CP 2, pp. 135-158.
3. Cf. Schutz and Luckmann, Structures, Chap. 5.
4. This conception of "gift" is not to be confused with that developed by Marcel Mauss or that which
is introduced by Erving Golfman (Marcel Mauss, The Gift, trans. Ian Cunnison (London: Cohen
and West Ltd., 1954) and Erving Golfman, Asylums (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books,
1961) pp. 274 If.). Both of these conceptions, although the former far more than the latter, are
founded upon a conception of exchange relations and roles, and to this extent are similar to
objective economic models of human behavior. Our conception of the "gift" is founded upon a
personal SUbjective fiduciary attitude to the everyday life-world involving subjective intentionality
and typification, and which does not imply objective calculable returns, evaluative exchanges,
or even role relations. Thus, this conception of "gift" could be even profitably employed for a first
phenomenological analysis of money (and stock market crashes) which otherwise is essentially
studied as an analysis of numbers and their commerce. What is the personal and symbolic
significance of money involving what types of structures of trust and faith?
It should be mentioned, however, that the works of Golfman have inspired much of my own
thinking and are essential reading for those of both philosophical and sociological persuasions.
The same is to be said of the insightful works of George Santayana. See, for example, George
Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955).
5. However, see Golfman's first analyses into precisely this problem. Erving Golfman, Strategic
Interaction (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1969).
6. See Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, pp. 63-84.
7. See, for example, Emile Durkheim, The Division ofLabor in Society, trans. George Simpson (New
York: The Free Press, 1964) and Emile Durkheim, SUiCide, ed. George Simpson, trans. John A.
Spaulding and George Simpson (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968).
8. In this regard, see Erving Golfman, Asylums.
9. For example, see Harold Garfinkel's now classic work, Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology.
10. For example, see Richard Grathoff, "Ober Typik und Normalitat im al1taglichen Milieu", Alfred
Schutz und die Idee des Alltags in den Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 89-107, and Richard Grathoff,
Milieu und Lebenswelt (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1989). In regard to empirical
literature on the milieu, see Christa Hoffman-Riem, Das adoptierte Kind (Miinchen: Wilhelm Fink
Verlag, 1985).
II. See, and compare, the following work of Schutz some of whose points we have appropriated here
and in the following for our own purposes. "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social
World", CP 2, pp. 226-276.
12. See Voegelin, The New Science of Politics.
13. See, for example, Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft and Max Weber, Gesammelte politische
Schriften (Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Verlag, 1958).
14. See, for example, Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York: The Free Press,
1967) and Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: The Free Press, 1968).
15. Unlike the everyday life-world of which the actors always possess an experiential taken for
granted knowledge such that, through the experience of a radical transcendence, it is given within
experience in its entirety as a questioned whole and is, consequently, open to the highest forms
of reflective symbolic interpretation, the essential character of the institution comes to consist
precisely in the fact that the actors lack such an experiential knowledge of it, let alone a taken
for granted one at that. Consequently, it is essentially impossible for them to carry out such highly
reflective symbolic interpretations about that - the institution - of which they have such little
experiential knowledge. Metaphorically speaking, unlike the everyday life-world which lies under
our feet and nose, the institution stands well over our heads.
16. The question concerning how the institution, after having undergone a substantial change in its
taken for granted symbolism, is able to easily take over and further employ the textual bureaucrat-
ic apparatus which was developed upon the basis of the old taken for granted symbolism remains
a topic for future investigations.
17. With respect to the sciences, it should be clear that, in resorting to this, essentially phenomenolog-
ical, general distinction between taken for granted and creative activity, we reject the employment
of the traditional distinction between theory and empirical analysis, along with all logical
combinations between them arising therefrom, for an empirical analysis can and does take on
the highest contemplative, and speculative character, in our sense, precisely when it is highly
impregnated with theory, while theory can and does take on a taken for granted, and routine
reportative and informational character, in our sense, precisely when it lacks an experiential
knowledge and a sensitivity to the phenomenal world.
18. It is now such a well-established and indisputable fact that science is ultimately grounded in the
everyday life-world that it is finally possible for phenomenology to consider that as a past issue,
and, without concern for misinterpretation, to finally turn its attention towards an investigation
of how, beginning from this world of everyday life, science comes to find ways to transcend it
and to provide us with reflective theoretical knowledge. The final end goal of an empirical
phenomenology of science can be said then to consist precisely in the exact description of that
miraculous process by which an 'essential insight' is attained; the latter understood here, in the
deepest sense, as the arrival at a fundamentally new seeing into a subject matter which issues
in a major change in the customary way of interpreting it.
19. Of course, they also employ printed texts (e.g. art history books and musical notation) whose
relationship to these "textual symbolic gestalts" must be worked out.
20. Of course, the most interesting and far-reaching question here concerns how the contemplative
scientist treats his so-called 'data' or 'facts' as the textual symbolic documents which they
essentially are, and ingeniously orders and re-orders them into various textual symbolic gestalts
of meaning so as to revise old ideas, to discover the need for a new different type of 'data', and
to arrive at new essential insights.
21. See "Some Equivocations in the Notion of Responsibility" (1958), CP 2, pp. 274-276.
22. For what I interpret to be a different, although highly interesting, first answer to this question,
see: Richard Grathoff, Milieu und Lebenswelt, especially Chap. 12, "Milieu und N atur als Lebens-
zusammenhiinge oder: Charles Darwin als Soziologe", pp. 369-413.
192 Chapter IX
23. See "Multiple Realities", CP 1, p.229 and p.233, and Maurice Natanson's excellent interpre-
tation of this Schutzian notion in "Introduction", CP 1, pp. XLIII-XLIV.
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Joas, Hans. Praktische Intersubjektivitiit: Die Entwicklung des Werkes von George Herbert Mead. Frank-
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Knorr-Cetina, Karin D. The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual
Nature of Science. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981.
Latour, Bruno and Woolgar, Steve. Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts. Beverly
Hills: Sage Publications, 1979.
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Philosophical Papers and Letters. Trans. by Leroy E. Loemken. Dordrecht:
D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1969.
Lessing, Gotthold. Nathan der Weise.
Lipps, Theodor. Zur Einfiihlung. Leipzig: W. Engelmann Verlag, 1913.
Luhmann, Niklas. Vertrauen: Ein Mechanismus der Reduktion sozialer Komplexitiit. Stuttgart: Ferdi-
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Luhmann, Niklas. Soziale Systeme: Grundrifi einer allgemeinen Theorie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhr-
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Luhmann, Niklas. "Die Lebenswelt - nach Rllcksprache mit den Phlinomenologen". Archiv fiir Rechts-
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Matthiesen, Ulf. Das Dickicht der Lebenswelt und die Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Mllnchen:
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Subject Index
Accomplished intersubjectivity 100 if., Communication 5, 24, 60, 77, 80-81,

128, 138, 154-158, 160 n.34, 161- 103, 105, 109, 115 n. 52, 128, 146,
162, 170. Cf. Taken for granted inter- 151, 159 n. 11, 175, 178, 180
sUbjectivity Comport (Comportment) 50-51, 157
Act 5,58 Concrete attitude 147
Actio 139 Conduct 85-86, 157
Actual reach 78, 81, 104-105 Context (Zusammenhang) 41, 45-55,
Adduction 163 57-59, 63, 70, 142, 155
Affiliatory Group 162, 173-177, 186 Contexture 41, 49-55, 59, 156
Altruism 166 Cosmion 88 n. 5, 106, 109
Animal faith III Creativity 11, 13-26, 32-33, 38, 111,
Anomaly 171 128,139,141,153,155-156,191 n. 15
Anomie 171 Crisis 1-6, 63-65
Anonymity 80, 87, 98-99, 110-113,
126-129,131,151,169-170,172,174, Dasein 54-55, 57, 63, 70, 76-82, 89
177, 186, 190. Cf. Intimacy n. 13, 94, 100-101
Anthropological constants 176-177 Death 5,112,147,151,188. Cf. Funda-
Appresentation 103 ff., 125, 142, 149, mental anxiety
166 Deception 164, 168
Autism 149 Dialectic 117-123, 131 n. 3
Distribution of knowledge 117-123
Bathos 140, 159 n. 12 Division oflabor (labor) 95, 117-126,
Being 3, 54-55, 77, 150 166
Because motive 76, 92, 114 n.40
Biography 83, 98, 101-102 Economy 176-183, 190 n. 2
Bureaucracy 180, 191 n. 14 Education 176-183
Ego (Egological) (selected passages) 3,
Cartesianism 1,45, 121, 141, 150 46-47,58,62-63,71 n. 24, 75, 88 n. 3,
Circumspection (Umsicht) 49, 153, 156 111, 135-155, 158, 159 n. 9
Class (Social strata) 117-123 Emotions 35-36, 123, 167
Cogitationes 47-48, 105, 152 Empathy 161 n. 11
Cognitive 35-36, 47-48, 54, 63, 66 Empirical 4
199
200 Subject Index
Empirical research 160 n. 34, 184-185, Ideology 108

191 n. 15, n. 16, n. 18 Immigrant 82
Epoche (Reduction) 2-3, 47, 57, 80, Inner duration 61, 78-79, 81, 93. Cf.
138-145,149-150, 152, 154, 159 n.9 Ego, Cogitationes, Time
Equipment (das Zeug) 48, 50, 55-56 Inner spontaneity 146, 149
n. 15, 168 In group - out group 109
Equipment totality (Zeugganzheit) 48- In-order-to motive 76, 99
50, 153, 167 Irreconcilable tension 145-148, 158
Ethics 95, 108, 119 n. 13, 146. Also see Insane 148, 171
Responsibility Institutions 77, 82, 128-129, 162, 171,
Everyday life-world (selected pas- 176-183, 186, 191 n. 13, n. 14; pre-
sages) 104 ff., 124-126, 131, 132 institutional 123
n.34, 141-146, 152, 156, 161-162, Intentional acts 165-166
166-170,174-180, 183,185-186,191 Internalization 117-123, 132 n. 18
n.16 Intersubjective equipment world 49-
55, 153, 156
face-to-face 61, 79, 81, 84, 124, 152, Intimacy 80, 102, 110-113, 117, 123,
153, 163, 170, 172, 175. Also see 126-129, 131, 148, 166, 170, 172,
We-relationship 178, 186, 190. Cf. Anonymity
Familiarity 173
Family 176-183 Kinship 95
Fantasy see Phantasy
Fiduciary attitude 4,5,7 n. 10,161-190 Language 13-26, 77, 81, 105-106,
Field of consciousness 57-60 109-110, 115n. 52, 117-124, 149. See
First Philosophy 140-141 also Communication and Texts
Functions 176-177 Legitimacy 178 ff.
Fundamental anxiety 132 n. 34. Cf. Leisure 166
Death. Life-context (Lebenszusammenhang)
51-55, 156
Gift 165, 167, 190 n. 2. Also see Social
Life-world (selected passages) 3, 5,
offering
59-60, 63-65, 68-70, 78-82, 94-96,
Government 176-183, 187
105, 140-141, 153, 156
Hand; on hand 83, 96-98; at hand Lived body 3, 5, 78, 81, 84, 96-97, 110,
96-98; in hand 83, 96 124, 126, 128, 131, 144, 149, 151,
Here and now 103, 147, 188 154, 163, 164, 172, 189
Here and there (Hic et illic) 78, 146, Lived conviction 38, 45, 53, 70
150, 160 n. 22, 189 Logic 2,5
Hierarchy 84,95 Looking glass effect 109
Homecomer 82-83
Home group 73-74, 153 Manipulating hand 13-14,78. Also see
Human community 150 hand
Margin 58, 96, 161 n. 11, 169-170
Ideal and real factors 109-11 0 Methodology 4, 66, 75-76, 82-83, 94,
Identical 47, 49,56 n. 17, n. 30,87,139, 130, 142-143, 155, 158, 159 n. 9, 160
188 n.34
Subject Index 201
Milieu 41, 48-55, 59, 61, 70, 123, Phantasy 5, 80, 98, 126, 164, 168, 171
128-129,144,146,151,153,156-157, Potential reach 78, 81, 104-105
162, 170-177, 179, 182, 186 Power 121, 178-179, 187
Milieu-world 48-55,70, 151-152, 156 Practical attitude 4, 80-81, 98, 105-106,
Misunderstanding 87 117,125-126,131,142,162-169,187,
Moods 162, 167. See also Emotions 189
Motives (Motivation) 49, 76, 85-87, Practical reduction 163
94-102, 145. See also Social action Pre-predicative perceptual experience
and Projects of action 64,67,70, 141, 153
Mundane 61, 63, 69, 75, 77, 87 n.2, Primary groups 83
137-143, 146, 154, 158, 159 n. 9. See Projects of action 39, 80, 85-87,99-102,
also Natural attitude and relative 127-128,153,157,162,166,170-171,
natural world view. 173. See also Social action and Mo-
Multiple finite provinces of meaning tives
41,71 n. 7, 80-81,102-113,131,142,
146 Rank order of values 95. See also
Mutual tuning-in relationship 93 Ethics
Natural attitude 65-70, 75, 77, 139, Rational (Rationality) 36-39, 64-69;
144, 146, 155, 187; epoche of the paradox of rationality 86
natural attitude 187. See also Mun- Reason 63-64, 108, 141-142
dane and Relative natural world Reciprocity (General thesis of recipro-
view cal perspectives) 93
Relative natural world view (Welt-
Needs 176-177 anschauung) (selected passages) 1,
Newborn infant 148-149, 188 41,47,80,82-85,88 n. 3, 95-96,104,
Nihilism 1, 4 117, 125, 141-143, 153, 157, 169,
Noesis/noema 61, 145, 187-189 187, 189. See also Mundane and
Non-egological consciousness 57-58, Natural attitude
62-63, 139 Relevance (selected passages) 69, 76,
Normality 84-85, 87, 91 n. 47,148,151, 94-103,110-113,113 n. 9, n.13, 114
171, 173 n.19, 117, 121, 124-126, 132 n.28,
Null point 78, 83-84 n.30, n.34, 143, 157, 162-163,
169-171, 173, 175-179
Objectivation 117-124, 132 n. 18 Religion 176-183, 187
Orders of existence 41,55,58,61, 71 Responsibility 4, 137, 141-149, 186-
n. 7 187. See also Ethics
Open possibilities 98-100, 110
Organizational regions or domains Science 1-2, 5-6, 25, 30 n.70, n.75,
157-158, 161-162 36-37, 39-40, 46-48, 53-55, 57-60,
63-65, 67-70, 80-81, 107, 109, 141-
Passive synthesis 144, 149, 153 142, 147, 151, 153, 155, 176, 183,
Permanently congruent behavior (Ge- 189, 191 n. 16
baren) 149, 151 Social action (selected passages) 64,
Perspectives 11-26,27 n. 8, 34-37, 78, 66,77,80,83-87,94-95,98,101-102,
142, 147, 153, 156 139-140, 145, 150, 153, 157, 162,
202 Subject Index
166, 170-171, 173, 188. Also see Thematic field 58-59, 62-63, 143
Motives and Projects of action Theme (Thematic) 48,58,69,95-102,
Social evolution 20-26, 29 n. 47, 40-41, 154, 163, 169, 188
53-55, 63, 107-110, 112 Texts 60, 172-173, 175-176, 180-183,
Sociality 161 185, 191 n. 14, n. 17, n. 18
Socializing 167 Taken for granted intersubjectivity
Social nature 5, 106, 111, 141, 150, 154, 100 ff., 128-129, 154-158, 160 n. 34,
169, 183-186, 188-189 161-162, 170. Cf. Accomplished in-
Social offering 164, 166-168 tersubjectivity
Social Person (selected passages) 75- Theory 81-82, 94, 143, 181-186, 191
76,80,88 n. 5, 94,101-103,110-113, n. 15, n. 16, n. 18
117,128-129,131,151,158,161-190 Time 59-61, 78-81, 84, 127-128, 150,
Social roles 117-123 166, 169-170
Social stock of knowledge 117-123, Transcendence 5, 56, 63, 76, 81, 87,
131 n.3 102-113,130-131,142,158,181-190,
Solipsism 33, 75-76, 81, 88 n.3, 138, 191 n. 16; immanent transcendences
142, 145-146, 159 n.9 105, 125-126, 137-138, 141-149, 152,
So-sein 76-77, 82-85, 94, 100 174; transcendent immanence 137,
Space 78-81, 84, 127-128, 169-170 141-149, 152, 156, 158
Spontaneous understanding 86-87, 90 Transcendental 1, 3, 57-70, 75, 87 n. 2,
n.45 137-145,149-150,152,154-155,159
Stranger 80, 82, 175 n. 7, n.9
Strategic interaction 165 Transference of knowledge 117-124
Subjective stock of knowledge 117- Truth 107-109, 112, 130
123, 131 n.3, 132 n. 18 Types (Typification) (selected pas-
Symbolic cosmos 162, 168-169, 183- sages) 21-24, 68, 79-80, 83-86, 95,
186. Also see symbols 105, 117, 121, 124, 127-128, 151,
Symbols (Symbolization) (selected 169-171,173, 182, 186-189
passages) 3, 41, 56, 66, 69, 76, 95,
102-112,121,128-131,141,152-154, Voluntative fiat 99
156, 170, 173-186, 191 n. 13, n. 14;
symbolic articulation of society We (We-relationship) 45,84,93, 109,
(compact/differentiated) 107-11 0, 111, 116 n.74, 122-124, 127-128,
112, 115 n. 66, n. 70. Also see Sym- 163,171; pure we-relation 79-80, 89
bolic cosmos n. 13, 93. See also face-to-face
Symphilosophy 81-82, 184-185 Well-informed citizen 82, 84
Syndromes 92, 114 n.40. Also see Work 120
Because motive Work world (Wirkwelt) 80-81, 103,
Systems 4, 37, 143, 181 125-126, 132 n. 34, 187
Name Index
Albrow, Martin, 7 n. 10 Gelb, A., 147

Alquie, Ferdinand, 160 n. 34 Goethe, J. W. von, 107
Angell, J. R., 15 Goffman, Erving, 160 n.34, 190 n.2,
Aristotle, 76, 113 n. 13 n. 3, n. 6
Goldstein, Kurt, 147
Bell, Norman, 7 n. 10 Grathoff, Richard, 4, 6, 88 n.5, 173,
Bergson, Henri, 87, 130 191 n.20
Bierstedt, Robert, 5
Bosch, Gerhard, 36 Habermas, Jiirgen, 5
Brodersen, Arvid, 94 Hanson, Norwood R., 65
Hegel, G. W. F., 2, 27 n. 8, 37
Carnap, Rudolf, 2, 4 Hempel, Carl G., 65
Carneades, 7 n. 10 Heidegger, Martin, 3, 48-49, 54-55,
Cicero, 7 n. 10 112, 167
Cicourel, Aron, 160 n. 34 Hoffmann-Riem, Christa, 191 n.8
Comte, Auguste, 33 Hume, David, 62
Cook, Gary A., 27 n. 8 Husserl, Edmund, 1-4, 45-47, 54, 57,
61,62,75-76,80,130, 137-140, 143-
Darwin, Charles, 20 n. 144, 146, 149-151, 154, 158
Descartes, Rene, 2, 45, 150
De Folter, Rolf J., 93 IJsseling, Samuel, 6 n. 3
De Waelhens, A., 160 n. 32
Dewey, John, 15, 32 Jaspers, Karl, 110
Dilthey, Wilhelm, 1, 3 Joas, Hans, 27 n. 8, 31
Empiricus, Sextus, 7 n. 10 Kant, Immanuel, 62

Kaplan, Abraham, 65
Fichte, Johann G., 2 Kersten, Fred, 56 n. 15, 160 n. 17
Freud, Sigmund, 36, 147 Knorr-Cetina, Karin D., 65
Kuhn, Thomas S., 65
Galileo, 2, 108
Garfinkel, Harold, 160 n. 34, 190 n. 7 Landgrebe, Ludwig, 6 n. 2
203
204 Name Index
Latour, Bruno, 65 Royce, Josiah, 15

Leibniz, G. W., 2, 27 n. 8, 62, 142 Russell, Bertrand, 2, 4, 5
Lessing, G., 7 n. 14
Luckmann, Thomas, 94, 115 n.52, Santayana, George, 104, 111, 190 n. 2
117-126 Sartre, Jean Paul, 3, 6 n. 2, 76
Luhmann, Niklas, 4-5 Scheler, Max, 3, 36, 54-55, 76, 82, 84,
95, 110, 144
Matthiesen, Vlf, 5 Simmel, Georg, 5
Marx, Karl, 120 Socrates, 5
Mauss, Marcel, 190 n.2 Srubar, Ilja, 88 n. 5
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 3, 112, 155 Stein, Edith, 47
Mill, John Stuart, 2
Toulmin, S. E., 65
Nagel, Ernest, 65
Natanson, Maurice, 6, 27 n. 8, 87,192 Voegelin, Eric, 76,106,111,115 n. 66,
n.23 179
Newton, Isaac, 108
Waldenfels, Bernhard, 116 n.78
O'Neill, John, 6 Weber, Max, 5, 180
Oppenheimer, Paul, 65 Whitehead, A. N., 27 n. 8
Ortega y Gasset, Jose, 3 Woolgar, Steve, 65
Parsons, Talcott, 181 Zaner, Richard, 87

Plato, 63, 76 Zeno, 2
Polanyi, Michael, 7 n. 10 Zeus, 5
Popper, Karl R, 65 Znaniecki, Florian, 5
Pythagoras, 63
Phaenomenologica
44. E. Holenstein: Phiinomenologie der Assoziation. Zu Struktur und Funktion eines
Grundprinzips der passiven Genesis bei E. Husser!. 1972 ISBN 90-247-1175-4
45. F. Hammer: Theonome Anthropologie? Max Schelers Menschenbild und seine
Grenzen.1972 ISBN90-247-1186-X
46. A. Paianin: Wissenschaft und Geschichte in der Phiinomenologie Edmund Husserls.
1972 ISBN 90-247-1194-0
47. G.A. de Almeida: Sinn und Inhalt in der genetischen Phiinomenologie E. Husserls.
1972 ISBN 90-247-1318-8
48. 1. Rolland de Reneville: Aventure de l' absolu. 1972 ISBN 90-247-1319-6
49. U. Claesges und K. Held (eds.): Perspektiven transzendental-phiinomenologischer
Forschung. Ftir Ludwig Landgrebe zum 70. Geburtstag von seiner K51ner Schtilem.
1972 ISBN 90-247-1313-7
50. F. Kersten and R. Zaner (eds.): Phenomenology: Continuation and Criticism. Essays
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51. W. Biemel (ed.): Phiinomenologie Heute. Festschrift fUr Ludwig Landgrebe. 1972
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52. D. Souche-Dagues: Le developpement de l'intentionnalite dans la phenomenologie
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53. B. Rang: Kausalitiit und Motivation. Untersuchungen zum Verhilltnis von Perspek-
tivitat und Objektivitat in der Phanomenologie Edmund Husserls. 1973
ISBN 90-247-1353-6
54. E. Levinas: Autrement qu' etre ou au-dela de l' essence. 2nd. ed.: 1978
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55. D. Cairns: Guidefor Translating Husserl. 1973 ISBN (Pb) 90-247-1452-4
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'Ideen 1'.1973 ISBN 90-247-1307-2
58. R. Williame: Les fondements phenomenologiques de la sociologie comprehensive:
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61. H.L. van Breda (ed.): Verite et verification / Wahrheit und Verifikation. Actes du
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nationalen Kolloquiums fUr Phanomenologie (Schwabisch Hall, Baden-Wtirttemberg,
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ISBN 90-247-1740-X
Phaenomenologica
66. D. Cairns: Conversations with Husserl and Fink. Edited by the Husserl-Archives in
Louvain. With a foreword by R.M. Zaner. 1975 ISBN 90-247-1793-0
67. G. Hoyos Vasquez: Intentionalitiit als Verantwortung. Geschichtsteleologie und
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68. J. Patocka: Le Monde naturel comme probleme philosophique. 1976
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71. G.C. Moneta: On Identity. A Study in Genetic Phenomenology. 1976
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73. M. Richir: Au-dela du renversement copernicien. La question de la phenomenologie
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78. S. Strasser: lenseits von Sein und Zeit. Eine EinfUhrung in Emmanuel Levinas'
Philosophie.1978 ISBN 90-247-2068-0
79. R.T. Murphy: Hume and Husserl. Towards Radical Subjectivism. 1980
ISBN 90-247-2172-5
80. H. Spiegelberg: The Context of the Phenomenological Movement. 1981
ISBN 90-247-2392-2
81. J.R. Mensch: The Question of Being in Husserl's Logical Investigations. 1981
ISBN 90-247-2413-9
82. J. Loscerbo: Being and Technology. A Study in the Phil sophy of Martin Heidegger.
1981 ISBN 90-247-2411-2
83. R. Boehm: Vom Gesichtspunkt der Phiinomenologie II. Studien zur Phanomenologie
derEpocM.1981 ISBN 90-247-2415-5
84. H. Spiegelberg and E. Ave-Lallemant (eds.): Pfiinder-Stlldien. 1982
ISBN 90-247-2490-2
85. S. Valdinoci: Les fondements de la phenonuffnologie husserlienne. 1982
ISBN 90-247-2504-6
86. I. Yamaguchi: Passive Synthesis und Intersubjektivitiit bei Edmund Husserl. 1982
ISBN 90-247-2505-4
87. J. Libertson: Proximity. Levinas, Blanchot, BataiIIe and Communication. 1982
ISBN 90-247-2506-2
Phaenomenologica
88. D. Welton: The Origins of Meaning. A Critical Study of the Thresholds of Husserlian
Phenomenology. 1983 ISBN 90-247-2618-2
89. W.R. McKenna: Husserl's 'Introductions to Phenomenology'. Interpretation and
Critique. 1982 ISBN 90-247-2665-4
90. J.P. Miller: Numbers in Presence and Absence. A Study of Husserl's Philosophy of
Mathematics. 1982 ISBN 90-247-2709-X
91. U. Melle: Das Wahrnehmungsproblem und seine Verwandlung in phiinomeno-
logischer Einstellung. Untersuchungen zu den phiinomenologischen Wahrneh-
mungstheorien von Husserl, Gurwitsch und Merleau-Ponty. 1983
ISBN 90-247-2761-8
92. W.S. Hamrick (ed.): Phenomenology in Practice and Theory. Essays for Herbert
Spiegelberg. 1984 ISBN 90-247-2926-2
93. H. Reiner: Duty and Inclination. The Fundamentals of Morality Discussed and
Redefined with Special Regard to Kant and Schiller. 1983 ISBN 90-247-2818-6
94. M. J. Harney: Intentionality, Sense and the Mind. 1984 ISBN 90-247-2891-6
95. Kah Kyung Cho (ed.): Philosophy and Science in Phenomenological Perspective.
1984 ISBN 90-247-2922-X
96. A. Lingis: Phenomenological Explanations. 1986
ISBN Hb: 90-247-3332-4; Pb: 90-247-3333-2
97. N. Rotenstreich: Reflection and Action. 1985
ISBN Hb: 90-247-2969-6; Pb: 90-247-3128-3
98. J.N. Mohanty: The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy. 1985
ISBN Hb: 90-247-2991-2; Pb: 90-247-3146-1
99. J.J. Kockelmans: Heidegger on Art and Art Works. 1985 ISBN 90-247-3102-X
100. E. Levinas: Collected Philosophical Papers. 1987
ISBN Hb: 90-247-3272-7; Pb: 90-247-3395-2
101. R. Regvald: Heidegger et Ie Probleme du Neant. 1986 ISBN 90-247-3388-X
102. J.A. Barash: Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Meaning. 1987
ISBN 90-247-3493-2
103 J.J. Kockelmans (ed.): Phenomenological Psychology. The Dutch School. 1987
ISBN 90-247-3501-7
104. W.S. Hamrick: An Existential Phenomenology of Law: Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 1987
ISBN 90-247-3520-3
105. J.C. Sallis, G. Moneta and J. Taminiaux (eds.): The Collegium Phaenomenologium.
The First Ten Years. 1988 ISBN 90-247-3709-5
106. D. Carr: Interpreting Husserl. Critical and Comparative Studies. 1987.
ISBN 90-247-3505-X
107. G. Heffernan: Isagoge in die phiinomenologische Apophantik. Eine Einfiihrung in die
phanomenologische Urteilslogik durch die Auslegung des Textes der Formalen und
transzendenten Logik von Edmund Husser!. 1989 ISBN 90-247-371 0-9
108. F. Volpi, J.-F. Mattei, Th. Sheenan, J.-F. Courtine, J. Taminiaux, J. Sallis, D.
Janicaud, A.L. Kelkel, R. Bernet, R. Brisart, K. Held, M. Haar et S. IJsseling:
Heidegger et I'ldee de la PMnomenologie. 1988 ISBN 90-247-3586-6
109. C. Singevin: Dramaturgie de l' Esprit. 1988 ISBN 90-247-3557-2
Phaenomenologica
110. J. Patocka: Le monde naturel et Ie mouvement de l' existence humaine. 1988
ISBN 90-247-3577-7
111. K.-H. Lembeck: Gegenstand Geschichte. Geschichtswissenschaft in Husserls
Phanomenologie.1988 ISBN 90-247-3635-8
112. J.K. Cooper-Wiele: The Totalizing Act. Key to Husserl's Early Philosophy. 1989
ISBN 0-7923-0077-7
113. S. Valdinoci: Le principe d' existence. Un devenir psychiatrique de la pheno-
menologie.1989 ISBN 0-7923-0125-0
114. D. Lohmar: Phiinomenologie der Mathematik. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0187-0
115. S.lJsseling (Hrsgb.): Husserl-Ausgabe und Husserl-Forschung. 1990
ISBN 0-7923-0372-5
116. R. Cobb-Stevens: Husserl and Analytic Philosophy. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0467-5
117. R. Klockenbusch: Husserl und Cohn. Widerspruch, Reflexion und Telos in
Phanomenologie und Dialektik. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0515-9
118. S. Vaitkus: How is Society Possible? Intersubjectivity and the Fiduciary Attitude as
Problems of the Social Group in Mead, Gurwitsch, and Schutz. 1991
ISBN 0-7923-0820-4
119. C. Macann: Presence and Coincidence. The Transformation of Transcendental into
Ontological Phenomenology. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-0923-5
Previous volumes are still available
Further information about Husserliana and Phenomenology publications are available on request.
Kluwer Academic Publishers - Dordrecht / Boston / London

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HOW IS SOCIETY POSSIBLE?

HOW IS SOCIETY POSSIBLE?

Comite de redaction de la collection:

KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS

Vaitkus, Steven, 1955-

1. Phenomenological sociology. 2. Intersubjectivity. 3. Mead,

Published by Kluwer Academic Publishers,

Kluwer Academic Publishers incorporates

Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada

In all other countries, sold and distributed

Printed on acid-free paper

All Rights Reserved

PART ONE: MEAD'S THEORY OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY

CHAPTER I. INTER SUBJECTIVITY AS A PROBLEM OF THE SO-

CHAPTER II. CRITICAL REMARKS TO MEAD'S THEORY OF IN-

1. Practical Intersubjectivity and the Social Group of Creative

2. Mead's Conception of the Social Group and its Limitations 33

PART TWO: GURWITSCH'S THEORY OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY

CHAPTER III. INTER SUBJECTIVITY AS A PROBLEM OF CON-

CHAPTER IV. CRITICAL REMARKS TO GURWITSCH'S THEORY

1. Intersubjectivity as a Transcendental Problem: The Relationship

PART THREE: SCHUTZ'S THEORY OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY

CHAPTER V. THE FUNDAMENTAL LEVELS TO THE PROBLEM

CHAPTER VI. TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF INTER-

CHAPTER VII. CRITICAL REMARKS TO SCHUTZ'S THEORY OF

PART FOUR: INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND THE SOCIAL GROUP

1. The Phenomenological Reduction: Intersubjectivity as a Tran-

CHAPTER IX. REFLECTIONS ON THE PROBLEM OF INTERSUB-

Subject Index 199

Name Index 203

rendered an adequate solution, respectively even a precise definition of the

Mead's Theory of Intersubjectivity

Intersubjectivity as a Problem of the Social Group

The problem of intersubjectivity arises in Mead's work as early as in his 1903

1. THE SOCIAL GROUP OF DETERMINATE INTEROBJECTIVITY:

2. THE SOCIAL GROUP OF INDETERMINATE INTEROBJECTIVITY:

3. THE SOCIAL GROUP OF CREATIVE INTER SUBJECTIVITY AND ITS EVOLUTION:

indicated above, such an instinctual matrix is the basis of the conversation of

a. The Development of Non-Instinctual Gestures of Adjustments

Contact experiences of lower animals are, to a large extent, determined, not

We shall not here pursue Mead's argument that manipulation is an essential

b. The Constitution of the Other as a Social Object

c. The Constitution of Oneself as a Social Object: The Social Self or "Me"

oneself as a social object depends upon rendering explicit in consciousness this

d. The Constitution a/the "Organized Me" and "Generalized Other"

the process of socialization, they primarily occur in the context of Mead's

e. The Creative Intersubjective Group

intersubjective social world without corresponding creative individuals who can

4. THE SOCIAL EVOLUTION OF THE CREATIVE INTERSUBJECTIVE GROUP

Thus far, the fundamental organization of the social group of invertebrates,

There is nothing odd about a product of a given process contributing to, or

outside of and determining the perspectives of the members is incorporated

a. The Development of the Primitive Group into Modern Society

b. The Ideal Democratic Group of Creative Intersubjectivity

c. The Artistic and Scientific Groups

37. MSS, p. 187.

Critical Remarks to Mead's Theory of Intersubjectivity

1. PRACTICAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND THE SOCIAL GROUP OF

No doubt, in the presentation of Mead's conception of intersubjectivity which

It becomes ... the office of philosophy to present an unfractured universe,

Contrary to the fundamental tenets of the pragmatic viewpoint, Mead argues

accepted objective world is essentially a concern with the problem ofintersubjec-

2. MEAD'S CONCEPTION OF THE SOCIAL GROUP AND ITS LIMITATIONS