SYMBOLIC

INTERACTIONISM
THE BASICS

Charles Quist-Adade
Kwantlean Polytechnic University
Surrey, BC, Canada

Vernon Series in Sociology

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 Table of Contents

Preface vii

Introduction ix

Chapter One: Society and the Social Animal 1

What is Society? 1
We are Social Animals 2
We Create that which Creates Us:
The Dialectic of the Individual and Society 5
The Individual and Society:
Two Perspectives and Two Levels of Analyses 6
The Two Levels of Analyses 7
From Macrosociology to Microsociology 9
From Decoupling to Coupling:
Micro-Macro Nexus 12
Chapter Summary 14

Chapter Two: Symbolic Interactionism: A Brief Introduction 17

What Symbolic Interactionism?
Many Definitions, One Concept 20
Ritzer’s Seven Principles of
Symbolic Interactionism 23
Symbols, Language, Thought, and Mind 23
Thought 24
The Mind 24
Synopsis 25
Symbolic Interactionism:
Images, Histories, and Themes 26
Symbolic Interactionism as aScion
of Sociological Social Psychology 29
 The Psychology in Sociology:
Tracing the Roots of
Sociological Social Psychology 31
The Sociological Perspective 41
The Spectrum of Social Psychology 42
Psychological Social Psychology 43
Chapter Summary 44
The Sociological Perspective 47

Chapter Three: Philosophical Sources and Intellectual

Roots of Symbolic Interactionism 49
Philosophical Sources 49
Pragmatism 50
John Dewey’s Pragmatism 50
William James’ Typology of Selves 51
Behaviorism 52
Darwinism 53
Intellectual Roots of SI 54
Max Weber: The Foremost Forerunners
of Interactionism 54
Simmel’s Methodological Relationism 56
Levels of Concerns 58
Primary Concerns, Interests, and Contributions 59
Group Size and Interaction 59
Objective Culture 60
The Philosophy of Money 61
Chapter Summary 61

Chapter Four: George Herbert Mead “The Father”

of Symbolic Interactionism 67
Mead as a Behaviorist 68
Mead as a Pragmatist 69
Mead as a Darwinist 71
Mead as a Social Behaviorist 73
Mead on Language 77
The Social Component of Gestures 81
 Mead’s Gesture Versus Wundt’s Gesture 82
Mead and Defining Meaning 83
Mead on the Mind and the Self 87
The Question of Self as an Object 89
The Self as a Social Self 90
Generalized Other 92
The Stages of the Development of the Self 93
The “I” and the “Me” Component of the Self 94
Chapter Summary 97

Chapter Five: Herbert Blumer and Symbolic Interactionism 101

Defining Symbolic Interactionism 101
Root Images 105
The Nature of Human Group Life 105
Nature of Social Interaction 106
Nature of Objects 107
Humans as Acting Organisms 109
Uniqueness of the Nature of Human Action 110
Interlinkage of Action 111
Conclusions 113
Chapter summary 113

Chapter Six: Charles Horton Cooley’s Looking Glass Self 115

The Looking Glass-Self 116
Chapter Summary 119

Chapter Seven: Erving Goffman and

Impression Management 121
Chapter Summary 124

Chapter Eight: Phenomenology 127

Alfred Schultz’s Social phenomenology 130
Chapter Summary 131

Chapter Nine: Ethnomethodology 133

Doing ethnomethodology 134
Chapter summary 137
Chapter Ten: Rational Choice Theory 139
Exchange Theory/Theories of
Rational Choice 139
Rational Choice and Individual
Behaviour: Homans's Elementary
Forms of Social Behaviour 142
The Meaning of Rational Choice 143
Selecting Action Alternatives 143
Chapter summary 144

Chapter Eleven: Tying the loose ends 147

Society, Self and Mind 149
Critique of Symbolic Interactionism:
The Good, the Not So Good
and the In-between 150
Neglect of Larger Structures 151
Extent of Structural Constraints 151
Theory of the Duality of Structure and Agency 152
Anthony Giddens’ Structuration 154
Refusing to Die 157
From Social Reality Construction
to Critical Constructionism 157
Corporate crime and street crime 163
The Postmodern Turn of
Symbolic Interactionism 165
Postmodernism emerged as an
antithesis to the Enlightenment project 166
Postmodernism 167
Postmodernity and Postmodernism 167
Critique of Postmodernism 176

Bibliography 179

Endnotes 189

Index 191
 Preface
Symbolic Interactionism is Dead, Long Live Symbolic Interactionism!

As Ken Plummer (2014) has noted, the symbolic interactionism paradigm

remains one of the most endurable social theories of the twentieth century.
He echoes the same optimism of Stryker (1987) who writes about the vitaliza-
tion of symbolic interactionism. But not long ago, other social scientists
sounded the death knell and mourned the “sad demise” and the “mysterious
disappearance” of the paradigm, with others describing it as moribund and
“graying” (Saxton, 1989). Yet, these declarations and acknowledgments, while
pointing to the usual drill most paradigms go through on their historical
paths, fail to capture in full the twists and turns, the ebbs and flows, the for-
tunes and misfortunes of a paradigm that has simply refused to die. In fact, in
recent times, some have begun to celebrate the “glorious triumph of symbolic
interactionism” (Fine, 1993). Some have described it as “the harbinger of
postmodern social theory.” (Plummer, 2014)
I agree with the optimists. Symbolic Interaction is a paradigm that has simp-
ly refused to give up the ghost. This fact is borne out of the growing corps of
social scientists who are actively and tirelessly championing the theory with
their own journals, conferences, websites and professional organization (The
Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction). Plummer
(2014) has observed that other promoters of the paradigm are moving
through much of the social theory in disguised “post Blumerian” forms (cf.
Denzin, 1992: xiv; Fine, 1990).
This book echoes the optimism of both Plummer and Stryker. It traces the
checkered history of Symbolic Interactionism from its social philosophical
beginnings to its meandering ways through psychology and sociology to its
postmodernist turn.
 Einführung

This book is a survey of Symbolic Interaction. In thirteen short chapters, it

traces the history, the social philosophical roots, the founders, “movers and
shakers” and evolution of the theory. Symbolic Interactionism: The Basics
takes the reader along the exciting, but a tortuous journey of the theory and
explores both the meta-theoretical and mini-theoretical roots and branches of
the theory. Symbolic interactionism or sociological social psychology traces
its roots to the works of United States sociologists George Hebert Mead,
Charles Horton Cooley, and Herbert Blumer, and a Canadian sociologist, Erv-
ing Goffman; Other influences are Harold Garfinkel’s Ethnomethodology and
Austrian-American Alfred Schultz’s study of Phenomenology.
Symbolic Interactionism: Basics explores the philosophical sources of sym-
bolic interactionism, including pragmatism, social behaviorism, and neo-
Hegelianism. The intellectual origins of symbolic interactions can be attribut-
ed to the works of William James, George Simmel, John Dewey, Max Weber,
and George Herbert Mead. Mead is believed to be the founder of the theory,
although he did not publish any academic work on the paradigm. The book
highlights the works of the intellectual heirs of symbolic interactionism—
Herbert Blumer, Mead’s former student, who was instrumental in publishing
the lectures his former professor posthumously with the title Symbolic Inter-
actionism, Erving Goffman and Robert Park.
Symbolic Interactionism (SI) places a premium on human agency and crea-
tivity. In doing so, it underscores how individuals create and recreate their
social worlds through the use and manipulation of symbols in a joint interac-
tion with co-social actors in a dynamic and infinite fashion. According to the
Oxford Dictionary, “Symbolic interactionism grew out of the American philo-
sophical tradition of pragmatism in the late 19th century, especially as elabo-
rated by William James, John Dewey, and Charles S. Peirce.” Famed founder of
SI, George Herbert Mead is credited with forging a bridge between the prag-
matic tradition and sociology. Other founders who cemented the SI tradition
into sociology were Charles Horton Cooley and William Isaac Thomas. How-
ever, most sociologists agree that the most important exponent of SI was Her-
bert Blumer, who coined the perspective’s label in 1937 in his book, Symbolic
Interactionism.
SI serves as a counterpoise to the “grand old theories” of functionalism and
conflict, proposing a balance in our understanding of social life. SI seeks to
x Introduction

counter the tendency of functionalist and conflict theorists that humans are
mere puppets of powerful social structures and institutions, such as norms,
ideologies, traditions, the economy, polity, family, media, etc. Instead, SI quite
cogently contends that humans are freely acting agents, who create that
which creates them. This dialectical approach provides a nuanced explana-
tion of social life, by juxtaposing human agency and social institutions.
In 1963 Peter Berger wrote in Invitation to Sociology, “It can be said that the
first wisdom of sociology is this - things are not what they seem.” Everyone
has a perspective, a worldview, a common sense notion of how human society
operates. Yet Berger goes on to say that, “Social reality turns out to have many
layers of meaning. The discovery of each new layer changes the perception of
the whole.” (23) The main objective of the book is to examine those various
layers of meaning and reality. While doing so, it examines the structural as-
pects of human society and the dynamic processes that construct and shape it
[society]that most often go unnoticed by the individual, yet have an enor-
mous influence on the life chances, lifestyle, and opportunities available to
people. People, in turn, make choices, take advantage of opportunities (or
make opportunities) and influence changes in society. This examination will,
hopefully, help you better understand the forces that shape your own life and
how you shape the lives of those around you and the society in which you live.
Thus, the book critically examines how people relate to, shape, and are
shaped by society. The primary purpose is to explore the relationships be-
tween individuals and the larger societal structures to which they belong.
These structures may be social subgroups such as family, or ethnic/ race, or
they may be larger institutions such as the government or markets.
Symbolic Interaction has been criticized from multiple angles for either be-
ing too microscopic or not microscopic enough. Other critics have faulted the
theory for ignoring the importance of social structures and social institutions
and hence the impact of these on how society produces and reinforces social
inequality and social injustice. (Stryker, 2002) Symbolic Interactionism: The
Basics seeks to address these criticisms by exploring ongoing efforts by a new
crop of adherents to give the paradigm the much-needed critical edge. In my
opinion, Critical Constructivism provides that critical edge. In Chapter 12, I
demonstrate how Critical Constructivism effectively plugs this major loop-
hole—the lack of emphasis on social inequality.
Critical constructivism (used interchangeably with critical constructionism)
combines conflict theory (which focuses on the struggle for power resources
between groups) and social constructionism (which treats reality as a human
creation, rather than natural or divinely inspired). Critical constructionism
differs from social constructionism only in that it emphasizes the role of elite
interests in the process of reality It is a theoretical framework based on the
Introduction xi

assumption that the way social reality is constructed, perceived and presented
usually reflects the interests of society’s elite more than those of the main-
stream, and often at the expense of those with the least power in society.
Any theory that lacks reflexivity and introspection and the urge to move with
the times, atrophies and dies. To this end, I devote considerable space to the
ongoing efforts by scholars in the Symbolic Interactionism field to take a so-
ber and impassioned look at its blind spots and loopholes, as they inject a
new “realism” into the discipline in order to make it increasingly holistic. I do
so by seeking to tie the loose ends of the paradigm by taking a look at its
strengths and validities alongside with some criticisms leveled against it. I
emphasize the staying power, vitality and the interesting ways the perspective
has adapted to the changing and meandering terrain of the field of sociology. I
discuss the postmodern turn of Symbolic Interactionism by scholars, particu-
larly Ken Plumer.
Scholars have debated and continue to debate what I call the enigma of so-
ciety—its origin, evolution and its laws. Is society a sui generis, a self-
regulating entity as Durkheim asserts or a socially constructed phenomenon?
A Symbolic Interactionist approach to the topic begins with the assumption
that society (the plurality and interactions of norms, social structures, and
social institutions) is a human creation or social construct. This means that
social subgroups as the family, ethnic/race are neither natural phenomena
nor divinely created entities, but that is human-made and tied to and vary
significantly across time and place. It also means that these phenomena ulti-
mately rest on supra-individual processes of group boundary formation, seg-
regation, and the creation of inter-group hierarchies. As well, it means that
these institutions are not fixed in stone or immutable, or unchangeable; that
since they are human creations, they can be uncreated, dismantled, reformed
or improved.
Symbolic Interactionism: The Basics provides a lucid lesson on the process-
es, logic, dynamics, and complexities of the enigma we call society. Peter Ber-
ger and Thomas Luckman (1966) propose a nuanced and dialectical formula
by suggesting that while individuals deliberately act, their actions do not take
place in a vacuum, but that human actions are circumscribed by social forces
beyond their control. What this also means is that while social forces may
seem all powerful, entrenched, and unalterable, they are social constructions,
human creations and hence can be unconstructed/changed by the same
human beings (Quist-Adade, 2012). The dialectical relationship between so-
cial institutions and human agency has long been acknowledged by Karl Marx
when he made these two observations:
xii Introduction

“Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please;
they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under cir-
cumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.”
(Marx, 1852, p. 7)

“Man is a product of circumstances, but man, in turn, modifies those cir-

cumstances.” In short, Marx proposed that men are influenced by circum-
stances, but can change those same circumstances.
This book takes a decidedly critical constructivist approach and seeks to
show Symbolic Interactionism can atone for its sin of neglect of social ine-
quality, power dynamics, and social change. Critical constructionism breathes
critical life into the field and firmly puts it on the pedestal of an emancipatory
project. By fusing symbolic interactionism and conflict theory, Critical Con-
structivism not to only explicate the dialectical and complex relationship
between human agency and social structure, but also unmasks the power
dynamics of human interactions at both micro and macro levels. The aim is to
address the deficiencies of symbolic interactionism, which either overempha-
sizes human agency to the point of elevating individuals to the pedestal of
omnipotence as demigods and goddesses, if not God itself, while reifying and
in most cases ignoring structural, institutional and systemic inequality and
injustice.
 Chapter One:
Society and the Social Animal

What is Society?
Sociologists define society in a variety of ways. Here a few a few: (1) Society
constitutes relationships among groups: the sum of social relationships
among groups of humans. (2) Society is a structured community of people: a
structured community of people bound together by similar traditions, institu-
tions, or nationality and (3) Society constitutes customs of a community: the
customs of a community and the way it is organized.
Society gives us human qualities. Through socialization (the lifelong pro-
cess of learning social norms and behaviors) we learn to act and become hu-
man. According to Mead (1967), society and institutions represent the orga-
nized and patterned interactions among diverse individuals, this comes from
the capacity of our mind where we can take roles of others and rehearse alter-
native lines of activity while coordinating our activities. Society is dependent
upon the capacities of the self, via evaluating oneself. Society and its institu-
tions are maintained, yet society is constantly in flux and filled with changes.

Briefly

Sociology sees human beings as products of their social, cultural,

and physical environment. As intensely social beings, humans
need others to survive and flourish.

The human being is incomplete, an unfinished animal—families, friends,

peers make possible human nature. We do not have it at birth; we acquire it
from society. Society creates a being who uses symbols; language. Out of soci-
ety arises the self, the remarkable ability to treat themselves as objects in the
environment, to see themselves, to talk to themselves, and to control them-
selves. Finally, society creates the human mind. Mind is more than brain; it is
the ability to think, to manipulate in our heads the physical world we see out
there. Generalization, categorization, deliberation, contemplation, problem-
solving and understanding depend on much more than biology gives us.
2 Chapter One

We are Social Animals

Sociology studies the human being as a social being. What do we mean by
this? Thus, society must create conditions that will make solidarity and coop-
eration among people possible. As Young (2011) notes, human development
must be seen as a process—a human process—and for the success of the
process, society must foster solidarity among its inhabitants. The human
process, Young explains, is important because a person can become fully
human only within the structure of social relations. All forms of human ex-
pression occur within social relationships. It is therefore important to look at
what kinds of relationships are possible within a society. He dismisses the
concept of the solitary individual as nonsensical, because as he writes, “one
cannot be a mother without a child, a teacher without a student, a merchant
without a customer or a judge without an offender.” (Young, p. 2011)
Indeed, no one is an island unto himself or herself, to paraphrase the Eng-
lish poet, John Donne. Even Robinson Crusoe, had his Man Friday! While
some social scientists have tended to overemphasize selfishness and even
narcissism in human relationships and even trace the tendency to aggress to
our genes, it is important to stress that human society is not possible without
cooperation and solidarity. While not dismissing the tendency of people to
pursue their self-interest and fight each other, it is important to stress that
aggression is not a biological condition, but a social construct. We learn to
cooperate with fellow human beings in the same way as we learn to fight each
other. Just as it takes two to tango, it takes two to fight.
Numerous lines of research have shown that human beings need others to
develop, psychosomatically, i.e., cognitively, psychologically and physically. As
Young notes, “studies of feral children, of orphanages, of neglected children,
of maternity wards all demonstrate that infants and children need the stimu-
lation and loving attention of others or they do not develop to their full poten-
tial.” (Young, 2011, p.1) In the same way, he continues, “studies of prisons,
concentration camps, of warfare and of cultural collapse all show that people
can be degraded and become as animals toward each other even when they
have lived in peace and in cooperative relations for most of their lives.”
(Young, 2011, p.1)
We are born dependent on others. We survive because of them; we learn
how to survive from them; we are socialized by them. Through socialization,
we take on the ways of society and become members of society. We learn to
control ourselves through the rules and perspective of society, thus making
society possible. Through socialization, we develop symbols, self, and mind,
qualities that make us both human and to some extent, free. Either because of
socialization or because of our nature, humans come to live their whole lives
around others, subject to the rules that dominate all social life (Charon, 2012).
Society and the Social Animal 3

From the time we are born, we rely on others for survival. We learn how to
survive from others. We end up spending all of our lives in social organiza-
tions. Babbie (1993) has maintained that human beings are into society and
spend their entire lives in it, seldom leaving it. Babbie further notes that hu-
man beings live in an organized community, working and playing in multiple
formal organizations and groups. Each of these social groups “has rules for us
to follow; each socializes us; in many of them, it is where our lives take on
meaning. Nature probably commands that we live our lives in social organiza-
tion or perish, but if nature does not command it, we learn it very early.”
(Babbie, 1993, p.3)
We develop our humanness through a protracted process of socialization,
which begins in the cradle and ends in the grave, as it were. Thus, from the
day we are born until the day we die, we depend on others for our survival. We
need others in much the same way as they need us. The African Ubuntu phil-
osophical precept rightly notes that “I am because we are.” The people we
depend on to survive are not only our significant others— parents, siblings (if
we have any), and other close relatives—but also include our neighbors and
other compatriots, as well as citizens of far-flung countries. Thus, our survival
depends on invisible ties and teamwork that extends beyond our homes,
tribes, and countries. Indeed, our very survival is intertwined and intercon-
nected in a web of mutuality, reciprocity, and dependency (Quist-Adade,
2012).
Socialization — the process by which we learn to be human— makes us
who we are or who we will become. It also makes us flexible and unpredicta-
ble. One basic characteristic of the human being is that we are all capable of
both good and evil. Whether we turn out to be “Good Samaritans” or evil-
minded persons depends very much on a “conspiracy” of factors, the most
important of which is socialization, which involves the internalization of
societal norms and values.
Socialization is no small matter (Babbie, 1993). The twists and turns of the
long and winding process of socialization make a person adequately human,
capable of discerning good and evil, distinguishing between morality and
immorality and ethical and unethical behavior. At birth, the person relies
merely on his or his instincts and imitation of significant others to navigate
his or her “limited” world. With the passage of time and the accumulation of
biological maturation, the individual gradually learns the norms and values of
his or her society. An important and indispensable part of the socialization
process is the learning and the use of symbols in their multiple forms, includ-
ing language, verbal, non-verbal, kinetic, tactile, etc. The use of symbols is the
foundation of micro, interpersonal interactions. Symbols allow for smooth
and effective interpersonal, intergroup, and intercultural communication. But
4 Chapter One

the misuse of symbols could lead to your being shut out, ex-communicated or
shot dead! For example, raising your thumb in North America is an expression
of praise. But the same symbol in Iraq is the equivalence of showing someone
of the middle finger in the U.S.
Fig.1:1 –The Middle Finger and Significant and Non-significant Symbols

Source: Pixabay (https://pixabay.com/en/finger-provocation-rebel-422529), and

Freepik (https://www.freepik.com/free-photo/male-hand-giving-a-thumbs-up-
sign_1327563.htm)
In Ghana, flicking the thumb has the same meaning as showing the middle
finger.
Context—place, time, power dynamics, gender relations, cultural settings,
etc., are equally crucial in how symbol use by interlocutors can be successful
or problematic. Significant symbols or symbols that have shared meanings
for the interlocutors generally make interaction problem-free, while non-
significant symbols—those that elicit confusion, misunderstanding, and
incomprehension—become problematic. Humans are symbol creators and
users. Our ability to create, recreate, manipulate, and change symbols in an
infinite number of ways is what distinguishes us from other higher primates.
The study of how humans create and recreate social reality through interac-
tions and the use of symbols is the focus of symbolic interactionism. Symbolic
interactionism views the individual as an active agent at the center of his or
her world. In joint action with fellow active individuals, the individual shapes
and reshapes his or her lifeworld. But, this does not mean that individuals are
free-floating, masters of their world. Their actions are constrained contextual-
ly. Yet, as rational, thinking, reasoning social actors, they dance according to
tune, as it were, gauging and responding to each situation in line with the
appropriate or corresponding norms and “rules of engagement.” In other
words, the individual actor acts according to his or her definition of the situa-
tion.
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 Index

Durkheim, 10, 11, 12, 13, 22, 37,

A 40, 56, 57, 64, 151
dyads,, 29, 58, 60, 65
Achieved statuses, 47
Agents of secondary socialization,
72
E
Ascribed statuses, 47 emancipatory, 177
epistemology, 181
B epoche, 129
ethnomethodology., 8, 15
back-stage behaviour, 122
Behavior, 23, 45, 46, 183
Behaviorism, 52, 63, 68, 97
F
Berger, 7, 12, 13, 152, 153, 155, 159, Formal Organizations, 48
160, 162, 180 front stage, 122, 123, 125
Blumer, 19, 20, 24, 25, 28, 50, 101, functionalism, 22
102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107,
108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113,
149, 180 G
Breaching, 134
game, 93, 94, 99, 100, 164
Breaching experiments, 134
Garfinkel, 9, 15, 134, 182
generalized other, 72, 92, 93, 94,
C 99, 100, 150
geometry of social relations, 58,
class, 177 65
cognitive, 30, 42, 48, 52, 53, 62, 63 gesture, 69, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83,
Communication, 23, 184 84, 85, 86, 91, 93, 149
Cooley, 9, 15, 54, 68, 115, 116, 118, Giddens, 7, 152, 154, 155, 156, 182
119, 120 Goffman, 49, 54, 62, 117, 121, 122,
counter-hegemony, 164 123, 124, 125, 182
Critical Constructionism, 157, 183 Goffmanian, 124, 126
Gramsci, 163, 164, 183
D Groups, 48, 130, 179

Darwinism, 53, 63, 71, 98

definition of the situation, 4, 8,
H
116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 123 hegemony, 163, 164
determinist, 6, 7, 15 Herbert Blumer, 9, 15, 19, 44, 49,
Dewey, 49, 50, 51, 61, 62, 69, 71, 98, 56, 61, 101, 149
181 Homan, 142
dramaturgy, 121, 125 Human nature, 68, 72
Du Bois, 50 Hurssel, 127, 131
192 Index

I Me, 94, 96, 100

Mead, 1, 9, 15, 24, 49, 50, 51, 54,
I, 94, 96, 100 61, 63, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73,
Idealization, 124, 125 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82,
institutions, 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 15, 19, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91,
23, 33, 42, 45, 55, 59, 72, 115, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100,
121, 124, 139, 144, 150, 152, 101, 115, 121, 125, 149, 151, 185
153, 161, 164 metatheory, 9, 15, 30, 46, 140, 145
interactionism, 4, 8, 9, 15, 19, 21, micro, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15,
22, 28, 30, 42, 45, 49, 53, 54, 56, 19, 21, 29, 36, 40, 41, 54, 58, 59,
63, 133, 147, 150, 157, 185 63, 121, 123, 150, 151, 154
interactionist, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15, Microsociology, 9, 56
22, 26, 27, 29, 33, 45, 52, 71, 98, Mind, 1, 14, 20, 23, 24, 25, 45, 50,
116, 117, 118, 120, 147, 151, 152 51, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 87, 99,
Interlinkage of Action, 111, 112, 150, 181, 183, 185, 186
114 Minimax theory, 140, 145
interpretive, 20, 54, 64, 101, 104, misrepresentation., 124, 125
111, 113, 147 Myers, 155, 156, 157, 182, 185
mystification, 124, 125
J
N
James, 42, 49, 50, 51, 61, 62, 70, 73,
75, 77, 98, 115, 180, 182, 183, Nkrumah, 185
185, 186 non-significant symbols, 4
Jane Addams, 50 norm, 47, 56
joint action, 4, 6, 111, 112, 114,
149
O
K of the generalized other, 92, 93, 95,
96, 99
Knowledge, 41, 130, 180, 187
P
L paradigm, 177
Labelling, 116, 118 Parsons, 10, 11, 12, 151
Language, 23, 46, 69, 97, 130, 158 personality, 11, 37, 42, 48, 59, 61,
looking-glass self, 68, 115 65, 115
Luckman, 7, 12, 152, 153, 155, 160, phenomenological reduction, 128
162 Phenomenological reduction,
128, 129
phenomenology,, 8, 15
M Philosophy of Money, 57, 61, 187
macro, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, play stage, 93, 99
19, 29, 36, 40, 41, 54, 59, 63, 72, Plummer, 27, 28, 185
123, 144, 151, 154 Postmodernism, 177
Macrosociology, 9 power of the situation, 118, 119
Marx, 10, 11, 12, 13, 22, 37, 40, 55, Pragmatism, 49, 50, 62, 69, 71, 98
57, 151, 153, 154, 185 pre-play, 93, 100
material self, 52, 62 pre-symbolic, 93, 100
Index 193

primary groups, 58, 65, 115 social constructionism, 158, 162

Psychological Social Psychology, Social constructionism, 158
30 social experience, 60, 70, 73, 83,
84, 86, 87, 90, 91, 93, 96
social facilitation, 43
Q social intercourse, 20, 24, 27, 69,
Quist-Adade, 3, 7, 13, 23, 55, 128, 91, 98, 122
152, 153, 157, 186 social learning, 42, 48
Social Reality Construction, 157
social self, 27, 52, 62, 87
R social structures, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12,
Rational Choice, 139, 142, 143, 13, 14, 15, 19, 22, 23, 35, 38, 41,
144, 145 45, 47, 55, 57, 58, 150, 152, 154,
Rational Choice Theory, 139, 144 155, 156, 163
reflective, 68, 70, 95, 128, 142 social world, 14, 23, 27, 28, 32, 34,
Reflexivity, 71, 87, 98 41, 46, 47, 50, 54, 60, 63, 70, 72,
Reification, 155, 161 74, 89, 95, 98, 99, 101, 121, 133,
Ritzer, 22, 23, 30, 37, 40, 41, 45, 51, 137, 141, 147, 157
52, 56, 58, 60, 61, 65, 68, 69, 70, socialization, 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 11, 14,
71, 94, 95, 96, 144, 186 25, 32, 33, 36, 46, 72, 95, 99, 163
role, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 42, 47, Society, 1, 5, 6, 8, 14, 22, 25, 26, 72,
52, 54, 56, 63, 64, 72, 87, 93, 94, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 99, 101, 147,
96, 99, 100, 106, 121, 122, 123, 149, 180, 181, 182, 184, 185
125, 128, 130, 135, 144, 147, Sociological Social Psychology, 29,
150, 151, 162 30, 180
Role Taking, 25 Sociological Theory, 101, 115, 179,
Royce, 50, 93, 181, 186 184, 186, 187
Sociology, 2, 14, 31, 41, 47, 102,
106, 150, 153, 180, 186, 187
S Solomon Asch, 32, 46
spiritual self, 52, 62
secondary groups, 48, 58, 65 Stanley Milgram, 32, 46
self, 2, 11, 14, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 27, Status, 47, 189
29, 32, 33, 37, 45, 46, 50, 51, 52,
structural, 5, 10, 13, 15, 19, 22, 35,
58, 60, 62, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 81,
36, 72, 150, 151, 152, 155, 164
83, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93,
structural determinism, 22
94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 105,
structuration, 154, 157
109, 112, 115, 116, 117, 118,
symbolic interactionism, 4, 9, 19,
119, 120, 121, 125, 127, 131,
20, 23, 24, 33, 34, 36, 42, 47, 48,
140, 141, 144, 145, 149, 150,
49, 50, 56, 61, 67, 70, 115, 118,
153, 158, 185
119, 121, 133, 147, 149, 150,
self-fulfilling prophecy, 116, 117,
151, 152, 157
118, 120
symbolic,, 93, 100
self-interest, 2, 68
symbols, 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 11, 14, 20, 21,
Significant symbols, 4, 14, 69, 98
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 45, 52, 69,
Simmel, 40, 49, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59,
70, 72, 74, 77, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86,
60, 61, 64, 65, 140, 142, 187
87, 97, 98, 99, 147, 149, 150
Skinner, 52, 68, 70, 97
social behaviorism, 49, 68, 73, 76,
77, 81, 87, 98, 99
194 Index

T triads, 29, 58, 65, 179

typifications, 130
The aggression-approval
proposition, 142
The deprivation-satiation
U
proposition, 143 Utilitarianism, 68, 97, 139, 140
the self, 1, 10, 11, 14, 21, 25, 29, 37,
50, 51, 52, 62, 70, 71, 80, 87, 88,
89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 99, 100, V
109, 115, 117, 122, 127, 131, value, 10, 33, 47, 61, 65, 75, 118,
147, 149, 150 119, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144,
The Social Construction of Reality, 145, 147
12, 152, 180 Verstehen, 38
The stimulus proposition, 142 voluntarist, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15
The success proposition, 142
The value proposition, 143
theory of action, 36 W
theory of the duality of structure
Wallace and Wolf, 9, 11, 14, 20, 21,
and agency, 12, 152
54, 67, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125,
Though, 78, 87, 89, 92, 101, 102,
126
103, 105, 106, 109, 110
Watson, 52, 68, 70, 74, 76, 97
to the marginal utility theory, 143
Weber, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 22, 37, 38,
transcendental ego., 128, 129
40, 49, 54, 55, 56, 57, 61, 63, 64,
transcendental phenomenology,
87, 118, 119
127, 131