MFD After-Action Report

COUNTY OF MAUI
D E PA R T M E N T O F F I R E A N D P U B L I C S A F E T Y
A F T E R -AC T I O N
REPORT
MAUI WILDFIRES
AUGUST 7-11, 2023
LAHAINA OLINDA
PULEHU
KULA
P R O D U C E D B Y T H E W E S T E R N F I R E C H I E F S A S S O C I AT I O N APRIL 18, 2024

D E D I C AT I O N
This After-Action Report is dedicated to those who lost their lives, suffered
injuries, the families mourning loved ones, and the people who lost their
homes, businesses, cherished memories, historical values, and livelihoods.
This report acknowledges the courageous efforts of firefighters, law
enforcement, and community members assisting one another. We trust that
this report will contribute to the recovery process, prompting actions and
public policies that enhance preparedness for future major incidents.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
• Dedication .......................................................................................................................................2
• Table of Contents ...........................................................................................................................3
• Executive Summary........................................................................................................................4
• Introduction .....................................................................................................................................5
o County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety .....................................................6
o AAR Methodology & Process .............................................................................................7
• Contributing Factors .......................................................................................................................8
• Sequence of Events .......................................................................................................................10
• Post-Incident Overview..................................................................................................................16
• Challenges, Observations, and Recommendations ......................................................................18
o Preparation .........................................................................................................................19
o Mitigation ............................................................................................................................33
o Response ............................................................................................................................36
o Recovery.............................................................................................................................42
• Conclusions ....................................................................................................................................47
• Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................49
• Appendices
o Appendix A – Overview of the County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety ..51
o Appendix B – Materials Studied .........................................................................................57
o Appendix C – Island Land Use Evolution ..........................................................................62
o Appendix D – Weather .......................................................................................................63
o Appendix E – Wildfire History ............................................................................................65
o Appendix F – Hurricane Dora & Red Flag Warnings .........................................................66
o Appendix G – Call Load Chart............................................................................................68
o Appendix H – Additional EOC Details ................................................................................69
o Appendix I – Previous Studies ...........................................................................................70
o Appendix J – Maui Wildfire Risks ......................................................................................73
o Appendix K – Recommendations Summary ......................................................................74
o Definitions ...........................................................................................................................83
o Acronyms ...........................................................................................................................84
3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This After-Action Report (AAR) focuses on the County of Maui Department of Fire and Public Safety
(MFD) and was commissioned by MFD Fire Chief Bradford Ventura. The primary objective of this
report is to enable future enhancements to mitigate the impacts of the next major event. While this AAR
focuses on the collective Olinda, Kula, Pulehu, and Lahaina fires, the recommendations can apply to
any large-scale incident.
The AAR examines the whole island’s limited resources, which were extremely challenged by the
scope and scale of the collective incidents. The four main wildfires, which ignited on August 8, 2023,
had a catastrophic impact, claiming 101 lives, extensive property damage, and causing numerous
injuries. The fires led to numerous missing persons, burned 6,721 acres, and resulted in the loss of
2,173 structures, with many more damaged. The financial toll is staggering, with property damages
exceeding six billion dollars. Additionally, these fires caused the loss of historic and cultural heritage
sites and led to significant economic, infrastructure, and environmental losses. The aftermath of the
fires also resulted in severe housing shortages. After conducting over 200 interviews and reviewing
numerous data sets, it is clear that the four major wildfires pushed the MFD to an unprecedented level
of strain. Despite this, the collective actions by MFD and law enforcement saved many lives and
property across the island.
There are 111 recommendations in this AAR, which are organized into four main sections: Preparation,
Mitigation, Response, and Recovery. Each section contains the following elements:
• Challenge: A brief statement of the main issue or problem that MFD faced
or needs to address.
• Observations: A description of the current situation, facts, and data related to the challenge.
• Recommendations: A list of specific steps that MFD can consider to improve
its performance and capabilities.
The insights are based upon the foundational elements that MFD, Maui County, the State of Hawaii,
and the Hawaii Wildfire Management Organization have been striving to implement since 2010.
Achieving collective success relies on support from first responders, policy makers and the public. The
insights gained from this AAR should not be confined to Maui alone; instead, they can serve as a guide
for other islands, or isolated communities on the mainland with limited emergency resources.
While nothing can replace the lives lost, or reduce the number of injuries or properties destroyed, the
community will rebuild and can emerge more resilient than ever. As unprecedented and extreme
weather conditions continue to persist, the lessons learned from this experience will pave the way for
MFD to effectively respond to future challenges.
4
INTRODUCTION
The largest and most extensive deployment in the history of the County of Maui Department of Fire and
Public Safety (MFD) occurred during the unprecedented series of wildfires that began on August 8,
2023. The Pulehu Fire was the largest acreage loss at 3,268 acres, followed by the Lahaina Fire at
2,170 acres, then the Olinda Fire at 1,081 acres, and the Kula Fire at 202 acres. Their collective property
loss is estimated at six billion dollars. The Lahaina Fire resulted in the tragic loss of 101 lives, inflicted
numerous injuries on both the public and first responders, and caused unparalleled economic, societal,
historical, and cultural losses.
Nearly every staff member and vehicle resource of MFD on Maui was deployed. The emergency
response system did not break but rather it found itself outmatched by the extreme weather and fire
conditions. Staff members endured shifts of 36 hours or more and risked their lives in a valiant effort to
stop the spread of the fires and save lives. Staff members have been grappling with questions about
what they could have done differently, a reflection that will likely persist throughout the rest of their
careers. It is from these introspective questions that leadership, mentoring, and command
enhancements will emerge over time.
The purpose of this AAR is to identify key facts and lessons learned, laying the groundwork for
forwarding recommendations that will effectively address future challenges. Fire Chief Bradford
Ventura, recognizing the need for an impartial evaluation, engaged the Western Fire Chiefs
Association, an organization that represents the fire service in the 11 western states and Pacific Islands,
to conduct the review and produce this report. MFD staff members are intentionally not named,
allowing the focus to center on the collective nature of the incidents and the lessons learned from the
actions taken. Numerous people were interviewed and the narratives of these incidents are
summarized. Additionally, the AAR does not address the cause or origin of the fires, as these details
are being reviewed by other entities.
The AAR is based upon the latest data available at the time of the final document’s printing, fully
recognizing that specific data may be updated as other investigations and reviews are conducted.
5
DEPARTMENT OF FIRE AND PUBLIC SAFETY
The MFD is under the authority of the County of Maui in Hawaii.1 Maui County consists of four islands:
Maui, Lana’i, Moloka’i, and Kaho’olawe. MFD is governed by the Mayor and nine members of the Fire &
Public Safety Commission.2 MFD consists of a Fire Chief, one Deputy Fire Chief, two Assistant Fire
Chiefs, seven Battalion Chiefs, and 1 Fire Service Officer. The MFD has 282 personnel in Fire
Operations, 63 in Ocean Safety, 11 in Fire Prevention, 3 in Health and Safety, 4 in Training, 5 in
Mechanic Shop, and 20 in Administrative Support.
The department operates 14 fire stations, including one on Lana’i, three on Moloka’i, and 10 on Maui. All
stations function as all-hazard, full-service fire organizations, providing collectively:
14 Engine Companies 9 Mini Pumpers
2 Ladder Companies 1 Helicopter (exclusive use contract)
1 Rescue Company 3 Rescue Boats

11 Rescue Watercrafts (including Ocean
1 Hazmat Company
Safety)
6 Tankers 10 Utility Vehicles
The map below illustrates MFD’s service area on Maui. A complete overview of MFD can be found in
Appendix A.
www.qsl.net Engine Company Districts. Source: MFD.
1
County of Maui. Fire & Public Safety. https://www.mauicounty.gov/1460/Fire-Public-Safety. Accessed February 9, 2024.
2
County of Maui. Fire & Public Safety Commission. https://www.mauicounty.gov/181/Fire-Public-Safety-Commission. Accessed February 9,
2024.
6
AAR METHODOLOGY & PROCESS
The AAR process started by establishing a baseline understanding of MFD, comprehending the unique
characteristics of Maui, reviewing historical major events, and conducting interviews with both internal
and external stakeholders. During December 2-17, 2023, facilitators conducted over 200 in-person
interviews. The interviewees included representatives from the following organizations:
• County of Maui
o Department of Fire and Public Safety (MFD)
o Maui Emergency Management Agency (MEMA)
 Maui County Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
o Maui Police Department (MPD)
 Maui Central Dispatch
• Windward Aviation
• Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR)
• Private heavy equipment contractors
• Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
• California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE)
• Hawaii Wildfire Management Organization (HWMO)
• University of Hawaii
• American Medical Response (AMR)
Facilitators reviewed a considerable number of reference materials before drawing any conclusions. A
complete set of reference citations and materials studied are contained in Appendix B and throughout
the document. The data presented within was accurate as of the time of the report’s construction. It is
recognized that due to the complexity of the incidents, and revised post-fire data, some data may have
slight differences.
Each important point discovered in the research and interview process was used to identify
challenges, observations, and recommendations. The recommendations are intended to serve as a
roadmap for administrators and policymakers, guiding them in establishing priorities for the future.
7
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
The 2023 Maui wildfires were influenced by three main factors:
ISLAND LAND
USE EVOLUTION
The island's land use evolution, dating
back to the early 19th century, saw
missionary settlements converting
wetlands and fishponds into agricultural
operations, leading to the emergence of
sugarcane and pineapple as major crops.
However, the relocation of these

operations in the 1970s to 1990s left
fallow lands covered with buffelgrass
and Guinea grass, creating a volatile fuel
source for wildfires (Appendix C). Hawaii Fire History and Agricultural Decline. Source: Trauernicht, Clay. University
of Hawaii. Hawaii Wildfire Management Organization.
ENVIRONMENT
In examining the evolution
of land use, it becomes
evident that Maui’s
vegetation has undergone
significant transformations.
These alterations, coupled
with prolonged periods of
drought, have resulted in a
volatile fuel bed across the
island. Weather conditions,
including the wind patterns
unique to Maui's
topography, create
challenging conditions for
monitoring and controlling
wildfires (Appendix D). The
distinctive ecosystem of
Maui is less resilient to
Hawaii fire: Maps and before and after images reveal Maui devastation. Source: BBC.
August 13, 2023. Original Source: US Drought Monitor.
wildfires than the mainland,
coupled with prolonged
8
periods of drought, further heightening the wildfire risk. The percentage of Hawaii wildfire acres
burned is much higher than that typically observed on the mainland according to a report by University
of Hawaii researcher Clay Trauernicht, PhD (Appendix E).3
RED FLAG WARNING

The National Weather Service (NWS) first issued a Red Flag Warning on August 5 for August 7 through
August 9 due to lower relative humidity and high winds associated with Hurricane Dora, passing about
600 miles south of Maui.4 With Hurricane Dora being 600 miles away and Maui being the windiest
island in the state, there was not a heightened sense that this Red Flag Warning would be much
different from past events (Appendix F).
3
Hawaii Wildfire Management Organization. July 26, 2018. Wildfire in Hawaii Factsheet. https://www.hawaiiwildfire.org/fire-resource-library-
blog/wildfire-in-hawaii-factsheet. Accessed February 9, 2024.
4
Gutierrez, Ben. Hawaii News Now. August 6, 2023. First Alert Weather Day: Red flag warning extended as Dora tracks west.
https://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/2023/08/06/first-alert-high-wind-fire-watches-issued-ahead-dry-gusty-weather/. Accessed February 9,
2024.
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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
The sequence of events provides a summary of the four major wildfires and actions taken
by MFD. It intentionally does not include minute-by-minute details and individual actions,
but instead focuses on specific key points. While this AAR is associated with the Lahaina
conflagration, the overall MFD system deployment is the core of the discussion and focus.
AUGUST 5-6
On August 5, the NWS first issued alerts about high winds and Red Flag Warnings due to Hurricane
Dora, located about 600 miles south of Maui, and the existing drought conditions on the island,
including the leeward Lahaina side. This NWS news alert was widely covered by the media. The MFD
did transmit this news to the organization via their Battalion Chiefs (BCs). There was no upstaffing or
pre-positioning of additional resources at this time.
AUGUST 7
The day began as a normal call load day (Appendix G). As Maui has trade winds that blow 20-30 mph
NE daily, there was no weather activity that was considered unusual until later. In the afternoon, there
was a small brush fire in Fire Station 2’s district with only 5-7 acres burned.
AUGUST 8
0020 MFD responded to the Olinda Fire in the Upcountry area. The standard dispatch included
HOURS two engines and one water tanker. Upon arrival in the area, firefighters could smell smoke,
but had a difficult time finding the exact fire location. They subsequently found the main
body of fire near the bird sanctuary, reporting two acres burning in heavy fuels.
Crews began an initial attack, only to regroup due to extremely strong winds (50+ mph).
Whole trees snapped off, tree root balls came out of the ground, and power lines came
down. As the winds continued their extreme speed, they became compressed and pushed
the fire downhill following the gulches. Crews took defensive positions performing
structure protection where access and water supplies allowed. MFD committed 40% of its
available resources to battle this first wildfire.
0423 BC-2 initiated a recall procedure to staff up relief engines, ordered evacuations via Maui
HOURS Police Department, and continued to move resources to try and contain the fire and
protect structures. Crews found several structures fully involved and maintained a
structure protection posture. Perimeter control was not possible at this time due to strong
wind conditions, heavy fuels, and the structure threat.
10
0635 The first Lahaina Fire ignition occurred in the area at the top of Lahainaluna Road, near
HOURS power pole #25. Engine 3’s crew noticed the electrical power outage at the time of
dispatch and discovered problems with the fire station’s emergency power generator.
Responding crews found extremely strong winds pushing a one-acre grass fire starting
near the solar farm that was threatening structures. MFD requested an immediate
evacuation order of the Hale Mahaolu and Lahaina Bypass area as well as additional
resources.
0852 Crews on-scene reported 100% containment of the first Lahaina wildfire even as weather
HOURS conditions were deteriorating and high winds were knocking down utility poles and lines,
toppling trees, and blowing debris throughout the Lahaina area.
An aggressive attack with a bulldozer and hose lines was able to contain this fire to about
1.5 acres even though aircraft were grounded. Due to the extreme winds, crews remained
on scene for five hours using copious amounts of water and Class A foam to ensure the
fire did not reignite.
As the Olinda Fire was active and BC-2 had initiated an earlier recall notice, BC-5 began to
upstaff several pieces of equipment anticipating additional west side incidents. The Olinda
Fire was increasing in size and complexity as it traversed the topography downhill. Crews
continued to help evacuate residents and protect structures. They were challenged by
poor access roads and water supplies. They became dependent on MFD’s water tankers,
private water tankers, and had private bulldozers assisting. Radio communications were
operational with some spotty cell service areas. In the early hours, Windward Aviation
dispatched a pilot to evaluate if aerial operations were a possibility. BC-5 was able to get
one aerial observation flight before the helicopter returned to base due to extreme wind
conditions.
1125 The Kula Fire started off of Kualono burning down the gulch, east of the bridge on
HOURS Haleakala Highway, and soon thereafter trees fell across the highway causing delays in
response equipment. The fire’s growth also prompted evacuations of the Kula Lani
Drive/Circle area down into the Kulamanu subdivision. As the day evolved, strong downhill
winds pushed the fire further west down the drainage features, where there were
numerous homes without much defensible space. As the winds began to swirl, the fire
began running back uphill destroying homes. Both the Olinda and Kula Fires reported
losing public water supplies at times and MFD water tankers and private water tankers
were in short supply. The terrain also prevented water tankers from going into limited
access areas which made fire engines stop operations to find a water refill source.
11
Firefighters working both Upcountry fires were accustomed to green vegetation due to the
elevation and lingering rain clouds offering regular precipitation. Firefighters were
commenting that the grass fuels were “crunching” under their feet as they traversed the
terrain. Firefighters also commented that while temperatures may not have risen sharply,
they could sense that the normal 70-80% RH (relative humidity) had dropped, ultimately
hitting 20-30% RH.
1418 As the first Lahaina Fire overhaul operations were being completed, there was another
HOURS wildfire reported near the Kahului Airport. Engine 11 was part of that dispatch and was
canceled en route as the Kahului Airport Fire Department was able to quickly handle it.
Engine 3 completed the Lahaina overhaul operation at 1418 hours and left the scene with
no smoke or other signs of fire showing. Engine 11 also drove past the fire area a few
minutes later and witnessed no smoke showing.
Engine 11 stopped near the Lahaina Cannery Mall area and was dispatched with Engine 3
back to the area of origin at about 1455 hours.
1500 Engine 11 was first on scene and reported flames showing with a running wildfire toward
HOURS Lahainaluna Road with 40-50 mph gusty winds. Additional resources were en route, but at
1522 hours, the ground fire spotted ¼ mile ahead, and established itself burning
neighborhood structures and the urban conflagration/firestorm began.
1526 MFD notified Central Dispatch to initiate evacuations.

HOURS
1529 The spot fire was now a direct threat to the Lahaina community. Crews began performing
HOURS defensive actions to try and limit the spread of the fire, but the fire was spreading faster
than the Incident Commanders (IC) knew due to heavy smoke conditions obscuring
forward visibility. Crews thought that the fire would stop its northerly direction by the
Kahoma Stream, a 100-foot wide concrete flood control swale that ran into the ocean, but
to no avail. At this point, most of the available MFD resources were either committed to the
Lahaina Fire or en route. At one point, only Engine 2, Engine 7, Rescue 10, and Ladder 14
were available for the rest of the island.
1610 The second Lahaina Fire was now well established within the community. The density of
HOURS structures, type of construction, limited access, and downed utility infrastructure greatly
12
contributed to the conflagration. MFD made many heroic attempts to combat the fire, but
once the structures began to burn, the heat output and the extreme winds outmatched
firefighting operations. Large 2 ½ inch fire nozzles were ineffective against such strong
winds and then the worst-case scenario happened, the fire hydrants began to lose water
supply. It is unknown if the sheer number of burning homes caused the water connections
to fail or if the water supply tanks were not filled due to the early morning loss of
electricity. MFD water tankers and private water tankers were sparse in numbers and the
private water tankers were later ordered out of the area due to safety concerns.
Furthermore, crews were dodging sheets of roofing material that had blown off and were
hearing propane tanks popping off. There was complete gridlock as residents were fleeing
through crowded streets with downed power lines, and it was unknown if the lines were
energized or not. Residents who were leaving on foot, or after they could not stay in their
cars, were barefoot and disoriented as the smoke obscured the sunlight into darkness.
Firefighters witnessed fatalities and people walking into hazardous areas, and cautioned
them, but had to focus on those actively being rescued. MFD was at its maximum
deployment level with Ladder 14 (Wailea) being the only available resource for some time.
Life preservation became the primary priority with fire suppression actions as conditions
allowed.
1600- Engine 1 and Engine 6 with utility vehicles entered the Lahainaluna/Pauoa area. They were
1630 looking for a strategic area to stop the forward progress of the second Lahaina Fire, but
HOURS they were directly in line with the fire’s forward path. They were also assisting with
numerous evacuations as many people were still fleeing. Mini 6 became ensnarled in
downed power lines and Engine 6 was able to rescue the operator.
1645 Engine 6 crew was trying to reassemble and found their Captain needed medical help and
HOURS issued a “MAYDAY.” With downed power lines and vehicles blocking egress, personnel
from Engine 1 and Engine 6 were forced to shelter in place. A firefighter from Engine 6
took Mini 1 in search of help and called for MAYDAY. As Mini 1 incurred damage, the
firefighter acquired a police SUV to help evacuate trapped crew members. Meanwhile, the
remaining Engine 1 and Engine 6 crews who were sheltering in the cab needed to relocate
to the lee side of the engine away from the fire due to extreme heat inside the engine.
Once the firefighter in the police SUV arrived, the unresponsive captain and six other crew
members were evacuated. A Personal Accountability Report (PAR) was conducted for all
personnel assigned to the Lahaina incident.
1759 The Pulehu Fire began with limited resources to attack it. Due to the other three fires
HOURS actively burning, there was only Engine 2, Mini 2 & Rescue 10 available. The IC was
13
could with what resources were available. They were assisted by a private water tanker,
limited aerial water drops by helicopter, and some sparse fuels. The limited resources on
the Pulehu Fire took aggressive tactical steps on the southern flank of the fire that was
heading toward Kihei.
At about 0300 hours on August 9, crews noticed the winds shifting, swirling, and going
from the east to the west now. With very limited resources, these crews were able to stop
the forward progress of the largest of the four major wildfires.
1800 Back at Lahaina, water supplies were spotty, and access was greatly impacted due to
HOURS fallen power poles and lines. Crews identified primary access routes that needed to be
maintained for evacuations and rescues. Several engines were driven across downed
power poles and lines so they could evacuate themselves and victims. One victim
remained with the fire crew inside of the ladder truck for some time while crews found a
lost infant being tended by strangers. Crews went into the hazard area in vehicles and on
foot, found people in the water near the seawall and pulled them to safety. They had to
carry some victims on their backs over downed power lines to a medical aid staging area
that AMR Ambulance was assisting with near the Lahaina Cannery Mall. From there,
victims were taken to the Civic Center near Fire Station #3. As evacuations were
happening, the fire made a run above the Civic Center, which prompted the evacuation
shelter to be evacuated and relocated to the Maui Prepatory Academy in Napil’i near Fire
Station #11. The fire passed the Civic Center, but did not burn it. At the same time, fire was
moving through Wahikuli toward the Hawaiian Homes area.
Firefighters continued with rescues, evacuations, and firefighting operations through the
night until sunrise began to display the conflagration’s devastation. Cell sites were down
due to burnt fiber optic lines and loss of power. Radio communications were never lost
due to the repeater on Lana’i, but the radio frequencies were overloaded for a variety of
reasons.
14
AUGUST 9
The MFD Ocean Safety Bureau (OSB) began its activation with the U.S. Coast Guard to check for water
rescue victims. At daybreak, coastal search operations were jointly conducted with MFD in near shore
waters while the Coast Guard was in deeper waters. The Coast Guard and MFD OSB rescued 17 people
from the water.
As the winds began to let up, the uncontrolled fire lines found surrounding vegetation that began
burning northeast and southeast of Lahaina. Available MFD resources and private contractors were
used to create control lines. Crews began to finally get some time to refresh and refuel as active fires
were being extinguished.
AUGUST 10-11
As the days evolved, MFD’s focus became trying to find survivors, regrouping, and assessing
capabilities. They still needed to fully control the four major wildfires and answer new calls for service.
The MFD dive team was utilized to do underwater search and rescue evaluations and the MFD Urban
Search and Rescue (USAR) played a key role during the initial recovery, sharing knowledge of the local
geography, culture, and history with outside USAR teams.
15
POST-INCIDENT OVERVIEW
MFD was committed before, during and post fire. Post fire operations included fire
overhaul, search and rescue, investigations, and water & dive operations. Additional
resources were arriving from the following:
HONOLULU FIRE DEPARTMENT PRIVATE CONTRACTORS
• 9 members for search and rescue AND LAND MANAGERS
• 21 members for firefighting • Bulldozers
• 7 leadership positions for support • Water Tankers
and incident management • Excavators
CAL FIRE HAWAII NATIONAL GUARD

• EOC Incident Management • Provided Chinook support
Team Support & check point security
DEPARTMENT STATE AIRPORT

OF FORESTRY AND WILDLIFE RESCUE FIRE FIGHTERS
• 28 members for firefighting • 12 members for firefighting
• Numerous apparatus and equipment • Airport Crash Rescue Firefighting
including Type I, III, IV, VI Vehicles Apparatus
• Type I Vehicle
NATIONAL USAR TEAMS U.S. ARMY

• Search and rescue operations • Aircraft for fire suppression
Emergency Service Dispatching is performed by a dedicated group of dispatchers within the Maui
Police Department (MPD) at Wailuku. MPD has 39 dispatcher allocations, two dispatch supervisors and
one coordinator. Not unlike other 911 dispatch centers, MPD dispatch center has high attrition, low
recruitment results, and a challenging retention rate, so there are currently only 12 dispatchers. This
staff shortage causes a high level of overtime and related issues.5 During the four major wildfires,
dispatch handled a peak call load on August 8 of 4,529 contacts. They usually average 1,600 calls a
day (Appendix G).6
The Maui Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was mobilized soon after the NWS Red Flag Warning
and ramped up very quickly as the first fire intensified. The EOC still remains in a partial activation role
today. Additional details related to the EOC can be found in Appendix H.
Since the Maui wildfires made national news, there was a huge impact on data gathering and media
requests. The EOC established a Joint Information Center and provided regular media briefings.
5
Jedra, Christina. Honolulu Civil Beat. November 15, 2023. Maui’s Shorthanded and Underpaid 911 Dispatchers Improvised During Lahaina
Fire. https://www.civilbeat.org/2023/11/mauis-shorthanded-and-underpaid-911-dispatchers-improvised-during-lahaina-fire/.
Accessed February 9, 2024.
6
Johnson, et al. Associated Press. October 13, 2023. AP Exclusive: 911 calls from deadly Lahaina wildfire reveal terror and panic in the rush to
escape. https://apnews.com/article/maui-lahaina-hawaii-wildfire-911-calls-ab4aadbe17c604619ce35b454546dd56. Accessed February 20,
2024.
16
Fire Chief Bradford Ventura instituted the MFD Incident Management Team (IMT) to establish the
Department Operations Coordinator (DOC) function in coordination with the EOC. The IMT supported
this mission for three weeks with:
• Apparatus
• Staffing
• Equipment requests
• Meals and rehabilitation
• Daily Documentation
The IMT issued its first Incident Action Plan on August 10, 2023.7
The recovery process also includes working with Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as
the fires qualified for an initial Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG) declaration followed by the
Presidential major disaster declaration (see items MFD is seeking FEMA reimbursements for in
Appendix H). The true costs of these wildfires will be incurred for years and will require a myriad of
public policy changes to address the housing, economic, cultural, infrastructure, response, and
environmental challenges.8
The MFD has active employee wellness and mental health programs that have constantly been
improving. These programs are currently assisting employees, especially the 15 MFD and 4 OSB staff
members who lost homes in Lahaina and 2 MFD staff members whose homes survived but are
uninhabitable at this time. The following reflects the current resources available for employees in need:
• Peer and Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) Support

• Dr. Alicia Rodriguez, Mental Health Counselor
• NIOSH Exposure Reporting
• Cancer Cohort Study
• Numerous Charity efforts for firefighters
• Housing Assistance
• One on one meetings with FEMA
There is also great concern for the public and first responders who were exposed to the smoke in the
environment. Further studies were announced January 3, 2024 by a team of researchers for University
of Hawaii at Mānoa.9
7
Maui Incident Management Team. Hurricane Dora Fires 2023. https://wfca.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Hurricane-Dora-Wildfires-
2023-IAP.pdf. Accessed February 9, 2024.
8
Headwaters Economics. May, 2018. Full Community Costs of Wildfire. https://headwaterseconomics.org/wildfire/homes-risk/full-
community-costs-of-wildfire/. Accessed February 9, 2024.
9
Maui Now. January 3, 2024. UH Mānoa launches Maui wildfire health effects study, seeking 1,000 participants.
https://mauinow.com/2024/01/03/uh-manoa-launches-maui-wildfire-health-effects-study-seeking-1000-participants/. Accessed February 9,
2024.
17
CHALLENGES,
O B S E R VAT I O N S &
R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S
This section of the After-Action Report outlines challenges encountered,
observations made, and recommendations. These are organized into four
categories: Preparation, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery.
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CHALLENGE #1:
HOW TO MAXIMIZE P R E PA R AT I O N
MFD RESERVE & SURGE CAPACITY?
O B S E R VAT I O N R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S
RELIEF ENGINES Create, fund, and provide a standard

1.1 inventory for all response vehicles.
MFD’s relief vehicles (engines, mini-pumpers,
and utility vehicles) do not have a standardized
equipment inventory due to the majority of
equipment being dedicated to their primary first-
Provide secure and enclosed facilities
run vehicles. Excess equipment is stored outside 1.2 for all vehicles.
these relief vehicles, causing response delays and
safety issues. Recalled off-duty crews reported
up to an hour delay as warehouse staff equipped
vehicles, and the inventory still fell short of first-
Conduct a regularly scheduled vehicle
run resources. Previous attempts to fully outfit 1.3 inventory for accountability purposes.
relief resources were hindered by limited space
in current MFD facilities, preventing adequate
security protection.
VEHICLE INVENTORY & TYPES Assess the capabilities of MFD’s

1.4 current fleet to their service demands.
MFD’s current fleet of vehicles meet a high
standard of quality. The variety, including Type
1 engines, mini-pumpers, Type 4-6 engines, and
utility vehicles, poses challenges in training and
Standardize vehicle types in a way
inventory management due to specific training 1.5 that streamlines training and fleet
requirements for each model.
maintenance.
During the peak of the August wildfires, off-duty
staff were available, but insufficient vehicles
hindered full deployment. In some instances,
personal vehicles were utilized, occasionally in
hazardous areas.
19
CHALLENGE #1:
OFF & ON DUTY SITUATIONAL Create an automated system to notify

AWARENESS & CAPABILITY 1.6 all staff of a major deployment to take
the burden off the on-duty BCs.
Calls and text messages serve as the primary
communication methods to staff up vehicles.
Some staff members were not contacted and
remained unaware of ongoing incident activities. Explore the use of First Due or other
Chief Officers and certain MFD staff utilize the 1.7 software to provide timely situational
“WhatsApp” application for situational awareness updates.
updates, but its usage is not universal across the
department.
Implement a take-home policy for
1.8 BC command vehicles so off-duty
BCs can readily respond from their
residence; increasing MFD’s command
and control capability.
STATEWIDE MUTUAL AID Create a statewide certification

1.9 and qualifications system.
There are no formal County inter-island or State
mutual aid agreements among fire departments,
resulting in a cumbersome and slow process for
relocating equipment. However, additional staffing
Create a statewide mutual aid
during adverse times can really make a difference, 1.10 agreement.
especially for supporting firefighting operations.
MFD attempts to adhere to National Wildfire
Coordinating Group (NWCG) certifications and
qualification standards, and/or the State can create
Establish an inter-island engine fleet
their own. This certification facilitates collaboration 1.11 program, where the State procures
among individuals who don’t regularly work
and maintains a specified number of
together, as they are trained to position and duty
Type 3, Type 4-6 engines for shared
standards.
use on each island. Standardizing the
model/type ensures consistency in
training and operations across islands.
Example: CalOES Fleet Program
20
CHALLENGE #1:
O B S E R VAT I O N R E C O M M E N D AT I O N
LOCAL & COUNTY MUTUAL AID Review and provide training on

1.12 agreements involving federal, state,
There appears to be limited mutual aid agreements
within the County. Enhancing clarity through a county, private businesses, and
comprehensive review of related agreements, NGOs to assess the necessity for
coupled with reinforcement and training, would reinforcement or clarification.
ensure that all parties have a clear understanding
of their respective roles and responsibilities.
PRIVATE RESOURCES Create guidelines and procedures

1.13 for hiring private resources, outlining
In many cases, MFD may not have a demonstrated
need to justify new resource or equipment dispatch procedures, performance
allocations. In these cases, private contracts can expectations, and reimbursement
serve as an effective tool for establishing surge schedules.
capacity. For instance, the Windward Aviation
contract exemplifies this approach, with defined
performance standards and corresponding training.
However, the same cannot be said for private Conduct annual training with all
heavy equipment. Water tankers, for example, 1.14 equipment operators and supervisors
may arrive on scene without fittings compatible to enhance operating relationships,
for refilling fire engines. Operators often do not performance, and safety.
have direct communications with fire personnel,
only their supervisors, raising safety concerns.
Additionally, there is an absence of an upfront
contract outlining performance expectations and
reimbursement schedules. Install Automatic Vehicle Locators
1.15 (AVL) on all private resources.
During dynamic incidents using aerial assets, it is
challenging for aircraft to identify ground resources
quickly for safety concerns.
Add a resource ID on top of private
1.16 vehicles and equipment for aerial
identification.
21
CHALLENGE #1:
PRE-POSITIONING Create an intelligence center within

1.17 the EOC or MFD to continually monitor
Following the issuance of the Red Flag Warning by
the National Weather Service, there was minimal current and predicted emergency
upstaffing and pre-positioning of resources. events and facilitate the sharing of
Battalion Chiefs initiated upstaffing for some relevant data.
resources on the morning of August 8.
Utilize new technology to visually

1.18 display potential trouble spots in
electrical service, identifying areas of
concern before the onset of a fire.
Upstaff and preposition appropriate

1.19 resources based upon intelligence
briefings.
As part of the surge capacity, assign

1.20 drivers to accompany the two on-
duty BCs to augment their capacity,
improve incident organizational
management, and enhance safety.
Create an emergency fund dedicated

1.21 to surge capacity and leverage the
provisions outlined in the new FEMA
2022 FIRE Act for effective utilization.
22
CHALLENGE #1:
STAFFING Review and reaffirm the SOC criteria.

1.22 Adjust as needed and subsequently
MFD staffing allocations are higher compared to
the other islands which greatly assisted response implement appropriation and
during the wildfires. Supported by a 2016 management actions to fulfill staffing
study and a 2018 study (Appendix I), there is a expectations.
recognized need to establish a Standards of Cover
(SOC) criteria. Discrepancies exist in the number
of calls and the staffing ratio, creating challenges Explore the possibility of creating
in meeting service delivery expectations (Appendix 1.23 dedicated fire handcrews via an at-
A). Staffing and resource allocations raise specific risk youth development program.
concerns for the west side of Maui due to its
vulnerability to road closures and delays. Example: The C.R.E.W.
Currently, MFD does not have any fire handcrews

that could perform fuels mitigation work. The
introduction of such crews could not only address
this specific task but also contribute to various
year-round support functions. Additionally, this
initiative could pave the way for establishing a
firefighter entry-level orientation program.
FIRE STATIONS In association with the SOC review

1.24 mentioned above, develop a master
The current number and capacity of existing fire
stations pose limitations on adequately housing facility plan to align fire stations with
expensive vehicles, ensuring inventory security, the public’s expectations of serving
providing mixed-gender facilities, and offering as safe refuge areas and then pursue
emergency community shelters. During emergency appropriations.
incidents and anticipated Public Safety Power
Shutoffs (PSPS), fire stations serve as the de facto
community site to assist those who need medical Install diesel exhaust systems at
aid, shelter by leveraging their emergency power 1.25 each work site to enhance workplace
generators. safety.
23
CHALLENGE #1:
“BATTLE STATION” Identify the skill sets required during

ASSIGNMENTS 1.26 major events.
Every member of MFD is well-versed in their
primary responsibilities that are included in their
hiring classification. As members of an emergency
Provide training for staff to acquire the
agency and County employees, each individual 1.27 necessary skill sets ahead of major
should be assigned and trained for an ancillary
events.
function to augment capacity during major events.
This doesn’t imply assigning an administrative clerk
to a firefighter, but rather considering roles such as
a note-taker in the EOC. Explore the reserve capacity of OSB
1.28 personnel for expanded roles during
major events.
COMMUNITY EMERGENCY Establish a process where retirees can

RESPONSE TEAM (CERT) & 1.29 be utilized.
RETIRED EMPLOYEES
During major incidents, there are tasks that could
be efficiently handled with additional staffing. Utilize CERT members to provide
Relief engines were not outfitted with equipment, 1.30 assistance under the direction of MFD
and the time it took to outfit engines during the staff before and during incidents.
four major wildfires depended on the number of
staff members available. Reference: FEMA CERT
If the public requires emergency power for a

medical device and the fire station is vacant,
alternative options must be sought. The CERT
program trains civilians to provide assistance,
and there may be retired MFD members willing
to contribute during major incidents. It is crucial
to establish this capacity beforehand rather than
during an incident.
24
CHALLENGE #1:
PUBLIC POLICY FUNDING Review studies conducted since 2016

1.31 to formulate a base funding plan. Align
The Fire Chief and policymakers are faced with a
conundrum in determining the appropriate level this plan with the MFD strategic plan,
of funding for MFD. The dilemma lies in whether incorporating the identified surge
to allocate funds based on the average of service capacity options.
demands, performance expectations, and/or at the
maximum level required for major incidents in the
future. Revise the MFD strategic plan to
1.32 incorporate the recommendations
outlined in this AAR.
Establish a revenue stream by

1.33 implementing taxes, levees, bonding
increases, or similar measures.
25
CHALLENGE #2:
HOW TO RAISE SITUATIONAL P R E PA R AT I O N

AWARENESS OF THE WILDFIRE PROBLEM?
PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT Engage social scientists to assess and

2.1 evaluate the most effective ways to
Like on the mainland, staff, policymakers, and the
public may not see the escalating wildfire issues communicate with the public about
until an emergency incident unfolds, as observed in preparedness, mitigation, response,
August. A myriad of studies since 2010 have delved and recovery, taking into account
into topics such as climate change, fuel conditions, Maui’s unique cultural context.
and the growing workload demands for firefighters.
Policymakers face the challenge of deciding
whether public education alone will suffice or if Utilize the findings from the social
there’s a necessity for policy and enforcement 2.2 scientists to develop methods
changes to better address the wildfire problem. and options to effectively convey
information to the population on how
to live with the challenges posed by
wildfires.
Enhance the partnership with

2.3 the Hawaii Wildfire Management
Organization.
Adopt a centralized wildfire education

2.4 program, such as Ready, Set, GO!,
and customize it to be accessible in
multiple languages.
TOURIST EVACUATION Collaborate with MEMA to explore

2.5 software options that facilitate multiple
Effectively communicating evacuation information
to a transient tourist population that speaks language evacuation notifications.
multiple languages poses a significant challenge.
26
CHALLENGE #3:
WHAT TYPE OF TRAINING AND TECHNOLOGY P R E PA R AT I O N

IS ESSENTIAL FOR LEADERSHIP
AND OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT?
TRAINING Recommit to and initiate Blue Card

3.1 system training.
MFD opted to implement the Blue Card system
some years ago, but due to attrition and the
impact of COVID-19, training and certifications
experienced a decline. The high attrition rate within
Provide Command and General Staff
MFD has resulted in BC ranks with an average of 3.2 ICS training to all Captains and Chief
2.5 years of experience. As MFD is the Agency
Officers in a common environment.
Having Jurisdiction (AHJ), they are empowered to
design their training curriculum, but MFD needs
to adhere to its own training standards in subject,
frequency, and performance. Conduct complex incident command
3.3 and control training exercises with
Captains and Chief Officers.
27
CHALLENGE #3:
WHAT TYPE OF TRAINING AND TECHNOLOGY P R E PA R AT I O N

IS ESSENTIAL FOR LEADERSHIP
AND OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT?
TECHNOLOGY Explore the utilization of a software

3.4 program as a public-facing platform to
Numerous activities, including recalls, daily
provide alerts and enhance situational
staffing, incident accountability, and management,
awareness among the public with PD
demand significant time from Chief Officers and
and MEMA.
other personnel. While MFD has invested in First
Due software, its underutilization is attributed to
non-direct IT connections. Many resources were
unaccounted for during the wildfire siege, raising Explore the utilization of a software
operational and safety concerns. Investments are 3.5 program for daily staffing and recall
needed to provide better incident intelligence purposes.
capabilities before, during, and after incidents.
Review the First Due software to

3.6 identify areas where it can be better
utilized for organizational management
during incidents.
Clearly identify critical infrastructure

3.7 and priority target hazards, particularly
in situations where PSPS are
anticipated.
Collaborate with DLNR to enhance

3.8 RAWS sites and consider implementing
an automated camera/early detection
system.
28
CHALLENGE #4:
HOW TO PROVIDE BETTER P R E PA R AT I O N

EVACUATION ROUTES?
EVACUATIONS Collaborate with law enforcement and

4.1 MEMA to identify key access routes
On August 8, evacuation routes across the island
were obstructed by downed power poles, trees, and develop contingency plans.
and wires, exacerbating pre-existing challenges
with accessing and leaving areas. MFD requested
law enforcement to facilitate evacuations over Upon identifying key access routes,
the radio. Although law enforcement was part of 4.2 collaborate with the Hawaiian
the ICS structure, lack of co-location at Incident Electric Company to relocate
Command Posts (ICP) was partly attributed to adjacent infrastructure, potentially
the dynamic nature of the incidents and available underground, to enhance the safety of
staffing. evacuation routes.
Before deploying PSPS, thoroughly

4.3 examine consequence management
options.
Collaboratively, MFD, law

4.4 enforcement, and MEMA should
explore new evacuation software
options.
29
CHALLENGE #5:
HOW TO DEVELOP BETTER RELATIONSHIPS P R E PA R AT I O N

AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS WITH
NON-TRADITIONAL AND TRADITIONAL PARTNERS?
PARTNER RELATIONSHIPS Initiate proactive outreach to non-

5.1 traditional partners and develop
Response entities may encounter challenges
agreements, engage in joint training
when facing major incidents that outmatch their
exercises, and maintain relationships.
capabilities. Success is contingent on establishing
relationships with key entities before an incident
occurs. In this case, assistance from the Navy,
Army, National Guard, and U.S. Coast Guard Ensure that each partnering entity
arrived after the first operational period. These 5.2 maintains a full-time presence at the
relationships and agreements are infrequently ICP or EOC once they are activated.
used, but can be instrumental in providing surge
capacity. Success in these partnerships is achieved
by establishing and maintaining them before an
incident and understanding that personnel on Collaborate with law enforcement
5.3 to enhance on-scene command and
all sides may change. All involved parties must
understand their roles within ICS and designate a control operations.
liaison representative to be present at the ICP or
EOC.
Share and instruct law enforcement on
It is crucial for fire and law enforcement to 5.4 the Ready, Set, GO! program.
collaborate closely during incidents. On one
incident, fire can support law enforcement, while
on another, law enforcement can support fire,
depending incident’s nature and complexity. If law Fire and law to cross train on ICS
enforcement is conducting evacuations during a 5.5 structures and ICP best practices.
wildfire, they can either participate in operations
and/or join a unified command structure. In
Lahaina-type incidents, a unified command
structure is likely the most effective organizational
approach, given the significant roles of both fire
and law enforcement. Either structure requires a
shared/co-located ICP so that communications
become a priority.
30
CHALLENGE #6:
HOW TO IMPROVE THE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS P R E PA R AT I O N

CENTER (EOC) AND DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS
COORDINATION (DOC) FUNCTIONS?
FACILITY & TECHNOLOGY Convene an EOC AAR, with a specific

INVESTMENTS 6.1 focus on the August 2023 wildfire
activation, to promptly identify
The current EOC worksite is too small to provide
lessons learned and generate specific
adequate workspace for each agency. Given the
recommendations for improvement.
infrequent use of EOCs, regular training is crucial
to build lasting relationships and enhance skillsets.
The recent implementation of the WebEOC
software, although not fully operational during Clearly identify and delineate the roles
these incidents, holds the potential to be beneficial 6.2 and responsibilities of the EOC, DOC,
once fully deployed. and incident command.
Conduct EOC drills involving the actual

6.3 representatives who will be present
during incidents.
31
C H A L L E N G E #7:
HOW TO ENHANCE BUSINESS P R E PA R AT I O N

AND INCIDENT CONTINUITY?
PREPARATION Conduct a review of every facility to

7.1 ensure the availability of emergency
MFD needs to ensure that fire stations and
personnel can be self-sufficient for at least 48 power backup for a period of 48-96
hours during incidents. Fire Station #3 faced hours.
challenges with its emergency generator, which
failed to provide power to essential functions,
necessitating emergency electrical work. Before Provide water and food for each
the DOC becomes operational for logistical needs, 7.2 response unit to ensure logistical
each crew/facility must be self-sufficient. support for a minimum of 48 hours.
32
CHALLENGE #8:
WHAT PUBLIC POLICIES AND ACTIONS ARE M I T I G AT I O N

NEEDED TO ADDRESS FUTURE WILDFIRES?
NEW & EXISTING ACTIONS Establish and enforce a defensible

8.1 space program of at least 100 feet,
Effectively addressing wildfire issues requires
a comprehensive set of activities. Each activity incorporating fuel reduction zones, to
may have a different priority depending upon the ensure structures can be defended
location, fuels, values at risk, etc. Many of the and have a higher likelihood of
recommendations presented are already in place, surviving a wildfire.
but may need enhancements to be fully effective.
These items also require public education and
voluntary or mandatory compliance. Implement a 0-5 foot clear zone
8.2 between structures and any
vegetation or combustible materials.
Establish joint approval authority

8.3 involving County Planning and MFD
when approving new construction.
Develop water supply standards that

8.4 encompass established fire water flow
requirements and includes emergency
backup power supply.
Enforce a mandate requiring all cell

8.5 tower facilities to establish defensible
space similar to structures and to
implement backup power supplies.
On new developments over a certain

8.6 size, require a secondary access road
that does not require any special
action to access.
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33
CHALLENGE #8:
WHAT PUBLIC POLICIES AND ACTIONS ARE M I T I G AT I O N

NEEDED TO ADDRESS FUTURE WILDFIRES?
R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S CONTINUED
Revise existing hazard maps to create

8.7 true risk parcel-level maps to fully
recognize actions that can lower risks.
Review and adopt modern building

8.8 codes that have a Wildland Urban
Interface (WUI) component.
Streamline the enforcement

8.9 procedures to achieve higher levels of
compliance.
Implement a Ready, Set, GO! public

8.10 education program to enhance
situational awareness and emphasize
the importance of early evacuations.
Promote and support the adoption

8.11 of Firewise USA ® or equivalent
community programs.
Establish a countywide home

8.12 hardening and maintenance program
to reduce ember environment hazards.
Collaborate with County and property

8.13 owners to reduce the fuel load in
Upcountry gulches without causing
excessive erosion.
34
CHALLENGE #9:
HOW TO ADDRESS THE ANNUAL LIGHT, M I T I G AT I O N

FLASHY FUELS?
LAND MANAGEMENT Continue collaboration with HWMO to

9.1 ensure every community in the county
Fallow farmlands, generating annual grasses prone
to rapid and wind-driven wildfires, necessitate has an updated CWPP.
annual mitigation efforts. Various approaches
such as mechanical methods, grazing, chemical
treatments, prescribed burning, or reconversion Harness software tools to
to farming can be employed. There is no one- 9.2 conduct fuel and community risk
size-fits-all solution, the choice depends on evaluations, generating data-driven
the geography and requires evaluation of recommendations.
consequences. Mechanical mowing, while effective
on certain terrain, is labor-intensive. Grazing is
another viable solution if there’s enough contiguous
land for economical herd movement. Chemical
treatments are effective but may have downstream
consequences. Performing prescribed burning is
the most cost effective, but raises concerns about
erosion and escape. The best option overall is
returning fallow land to farming, but will require
copious amounts of water.
35
CHALLENGE #10:
HOW TO IMPROVE OPERATIONS AND RESPONSE

FIREFIGHTER SAFETY ON WILDFIRES?
TRAINING & EQUIPMENT Equip each line personnel with

10.1 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE),
Wildland firefighting mandates the implementation
of numerous safety measures. MFD equips including issued fire shelters and
assigned positions on first-run engines with fire portable radios.
shelters and portable handheld radios. Fire shelters
are stored in an upper fire engine compartment and
are not readily accessible. Crews were not aware Train all line personnel on the proper
that fire shelters can be used inside of vehicles for 10.2 use of fire shelters and ensure they
safe refuge. Communication and radio discipline are well-versed in their correct
is crucial during dynamic situations for command- application.
and-control awareness and safety. The current
portable handheld radios cannot monitor two
frequencies simultaneously. A cross band repeater
is required at incidents due to multiple agency Train all line personnel about portable
10.3 radio features and the value of radio
frequencies.
discipline during dynamic incidents.
Congress enabled the FirstNet system to ensure
cellular capability and broadband coverage during
major incidents. While MFD reviewed this system, Contact the Hawaii FirstNet
the FirstNet infrastructure coverage was not 10.4 representative and request an island-
adequate at that time. As the power grid failed, specific system analysis.
certain field software was not functional as it was
relying on broadband coverage to be operational.
The water tankers are normally staffed with only If AT&T FirstNet can provide a
one operator and often used on uneven terrain
10.5 viable infrastructure, MFD should
for long hours on wildfires. Safe operations can consider converting to this dedicated
be compromised during extended/long duration communications system.
incidents and while backing up.
Ensure that all new technology

10.6 implemented is equipped with
dedicated broadband coverage.
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36
CHALLENGE #10:
HOW TO IMPROVE OPERATIONS AND RESPONSE

FIREFIGHTER SAFETY ON WILDFIRES?
R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S CONTINUED
Evaluate the current communications

10.7 technology to determine if there are
options to address the “Orange” cross
band repeater implementation process
delays.
Explore technology solutions that

10.8 integrate into operational tools,
ensuring their functionality remains
intact even during power outages –
e.g., maps.
Implement the provision of a second

10.9 driver/operator on water tankers
during deployments for safety
and relief purposes.
37
CHALLENGE #11:
HOW TO PRIORITIZE RESOURCES DURING RESPONSE

DYNAMIC MOVING INCIDENTS?
DISPATCH LIAISON Establish a Call When Needed (CWN)

11.1 process where a Chief Officer would
During the initial chaotic phase of evolving
incidents, Battalion 1 and Battalion 2 Chiefs may temporarily go into dispatch to assist
be consumed in directing operations, limiting in covering macro-level MFD decisions
their capacity to handle recalls or contact private until enough command staff are
contractors. Until additional command staff available.
becomes available, there is a risk of losing the
macro view of MFD. This situation tends to resolve
itself as the days progress, the DOC becomes
operational, and more staff becomes available.
However, field units must then place additional
requests to BC or dispatch, creating additional
burdens on dispatch operations.
38
CHALLENGE #12:
HOW TO ENHANCE EFFECTIVENESS RESPONSE

IN SUPPRESSION AND OVERHAUL DURING
DROUGHTS WITH LIMITED WATER SUPPLIES?
CLASS A FOAM Review and provide consistent

12.1 use of Class A foam throughout MFD.
MFD has been a longstanding user of Class A
foam. While they have utilized Compressed Air
Foams System (CAFS), they found that simple
foam proportioning systems are more trouble-
free. These systems have built in eductors and
in-line eductors are available if needed. The use
of Class A foam is effective in lowering water
surface tension and allows water to penetrate into
fuel sources more easily, especially during overall
operations.
39
CHALLENGE #13:
HOW TO CREATE ALTERNATIVE RESPONSE

WATER SOURCES?
IMPROVISE Establish dedicated drafting locations

13.1 in strategic locations, situated
During the Upcountry and Lahaina fires,
water supplies were compromised, with some near bodies of water, and utilizing
underperforming or not functioning at all. While alternative sources such as piped
the exact reasons may remain unknown, factors water from swimming pools and
such as the extensive number of burnt structures dedicated weirs.
with broken water lines and water supply tanks
running empty due to power loss could have
contributed. Anticipating potential failures is Ensure that all pumpers are equipped
integral to contingency planning, and the ability 13.2 with hard suction drafting hose.
to improvise is crucial to the success in managing
such situations.
Review and propose the addition of

13.3 more MFD water tankers or explore
private resource options.
Explore the possibility of obtaining fire

13.4 boat services directly or indirectly,
with fire pump capability.
40
CHALLENGE #14:
HOW TO INCREASE AERIAL FIREFIGHTING RESPONSE

CAPABILITIES?
LIMITED AIRCRAFT Review the existing exclusive use

14.1 contract and explore the possibility
Firefighting aircraft may not be a panacea for
wildfires, especially in extreme wind conditions. of expanding it to enhance aerial
However, when conditions allow, aircraft can be operation capabilities.
instrumental in containing wildfires, especially with
the use of foams and retardants. Windward Aviation
holds an exclusive use contract for Air 1 and a Contact aviation vendors to explore
Call When Needed (CWN) contract for additional 14.2 options for different types of aircraft,
helicopters, assisting with rescues and firefighting including the possibility of unstaffed
regularly. The primary challenge lies in aviation aircraft.
costs and the infrequency of their use, but the need
is real, especially during wildfires.
Initiate a dialogue with the National

14.3 Guard to explore the possibility
of reassigning a Modular Airborne
Firefighting (MAFFs) C-130 unit from
the mainland to Hawaii to provide
wildfire suppression duties across the
entire state.
Introduce and implement a dedicated

14.4 air-to-ground radio frequency to
improve aerial firefighting operations
and enhance safety measures.
41
CHALLENGE #15:
HOW DOES MFD ENSURE THE SAFETY AND RECOVERY

PRODUCTIVITY OF ITS WORKFORCE DURING
AND AFTER MAJOR INCIDENTS?
EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE Maintain MFD’s commitment to these

PROGRAMS 15.1 programs and constantly strive to
enhance them.
MFD has demonstrated its commitment to its
Employee Assistance Program (EAP), Critical
Incident Stress Management (CISM), and Mental
Health programs. Following the tragic Line of Establish and institutionalize a
Duty Death (LODD) and the 2023 wildfires, the 15.2 program for reporting exposures.
workforce has been tested both physically and
emotionally. As the workforce is crucial to effective
service delivery, it is paramount that employee
assistance programs remain a high priority. One Collaborate with Hawaii State
aspect that could use reinforcement is exposure 15.3 organizations to develop presumptive
reporting, where options like the NFORS program coverage for cancer, hernia,
exist. Additionally, MFD does not have a plan in pneumonia, and mental health.
place to conduct wellness checks on both on-
duty and off-duty staff during and after incidents.
Implementing a wellness check program can ease
Contact the University of Hawaii
tensions for on-duty staff, allowing them to better 15.4 or another public health entity to
focus on operations.
conduct a 20-year exposure study on
firefighters and the public, considering
the substantial amount of unknown
smoke particulates from the wildfires.
Improve and implement pre-entry/hire

15.5 psychological screenings.
Establish a wellness check program

15.6 where MFD staff can voluntarily
register at the fire station near their
residence. On-duty staff at the fire
station can then conduct checks on
family members.
42
CHALLENGE #15:
HOW DOES MFD ENSURE THE SAFETY RECOVERY

AND PRODUCTIVITY OF ITS WORKFORCE DURING
AND AFTER MAJOR INCIDENTS?
AFTER-ACTION REPORT Incorporate AARs into MFD’s

15.7 institutional practices to enhance
AARs can be conducted through a straightforward
daily operations, safety, and overall
engine company review, assessing successes and
improvement.
areas for improvement. They can also be utilized
on major incidents. AARs are not meant for fault-
finding, as this impedes self-improvement and
creates barriers to improvement.
SERIOUS ACCIDENT Establish a policy to institutionalize a

REVIEW TEAM (SART) 15.8 SART-type process to perform timely
reviews of significant injuries that
Following any LODD or serious accident, initiate a
result in time loss.
SART process immediately to understand causal
factors, prevent future incidents, and ensure
Example: 2015 Fresno Fire Department
compliance with OSHA standards. Injuries occurred
SART Investigation Report
during the August wildfires, resulting in staff taking
time off, have not yet been reviewed.
43
CHALLENGE #16:
HOW CAN MFD ASSIST RECOVERY

IN THE RECOVERY PROCESS?
TEAMWORK Build relationships within the County

16.1 that can rely on utilizing MFD’s IMT for
In any major incident, the process of bringing order
to chaos requires time and strategic coordination. emergencies and major events.
Chief Ventura requested MFD’s IMT to establish
itself as the DOC. As the days unfolded, the IMT
then assisted with the EOC function, both of which Continuously send MFD staff off-
are founded on the ICS and the NIIMS platform. 16.2 island to participate in other major
MFD’s capabilities extend well beyond fire service incidents as part of a mentoring
responses, they excel at bringing calm to chaotic process for key ICS positions.
and adverse situations through exceptional
organizational management.
Expand MFD’s relationships with

16.3 local, state, and federal cooperators
to enhance the depth and breadth of
their IMT.
Maintain active participation in weekly

16.4 FEMA recovery community meetings
to demonstrate involvement and
leadership from MFD.
Take on the role as public advocate,

16.5 leading mitigation efforts before
Hawaii faces an insurance crisis.
Position MFD as the lead advocate

16.6 for emergency infrastructure needs
on the West side of Maui, i.e., disaster
EMS location and capability.
44
C H A L L E N G E #17:
HOW CAN REPORTS, FIRE CAUSE INVESTIGATIONS, RECOVERY

AND COST RECOVERY BE ENHANCED?
TRAINING & DEDICATED STAFF Establish a team of trained staff

17.1 dedicated to fire cause investigations,
To better understand wildfire issues, incident
evidence preservation, and expert
reports need to include specifics detailing fire
witness testimony.
cause and acreage size. Wildfires caused by
neglect should be able to recover response
costs and offenders should be prosecuted. This
begins with the allocation of dedicated staff, Establish a cost recovery unit to
such as Arson/Fire Cause Investigators, who 17.2 pursue reimbursement for wildfires
have undergone specialized training in evidence caused by neglect.
preservation, cause investigation, and expert
witness testimony. Proper evidence preservation,
crucial for criminal and civil court cases, can be
achieved through various methods. Currently, fire Generate more comprehensive fire
17.3 reports that thoroughly identify fire
prevention staff is handling these responsibilities
as collateral duties. causes and acreage size, facilitating
better problem identification.
45
NOTE
We commend MFD for their swift actions to address the issues identified in
this AAR, rather than waiting for AAR recommendations. These enhancements
demonstrate their commitment to excellence and continuous improvement.
Some of the notable improvements already being implemented are:
01 Upstaffing for Red Flag Warnings.
02 Working with law enforcement to review new evacuation software.
03 Committing to enhancing the Blue Card system and organizational

command and control training.
04 Working to enhance and clarify the MFD’s IMT function.
05 Building a professional development program for all personnel.
06 Committing to the fleet replacement program.
46
CONCLUSIONS
After-Action Reviews take place with historical evidence in a controlled environment, unlike the actual
incident where first responders are faced with a chaotic scene and must use their training and
experience to make the best decisions possible with the facts at hand. Generally speaking, firefighters
view themselves as change agents who can intercede in adverse fire situations and potentially alter the
outcome. Conversely, with other natural emergency incidents such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and
tornadoes, firefighters and other first responders must wait for the situation to stabilize, then take
action. To alter the outcome, those first responders often place their own lives in hazardous situations
that can manifest physical outcomes immediately and many with delayed physical and mental effects.
Since 2010, the region has addressed wildfires through a series of significant studies and policy
initiatives (Appendix I). We can clearly demonstrate that Maui and the State knows about the inherent
dangers of wildfires (Appendix J). Like the mainland, wildfires have increased in scale and damage
since 2015 and that trend will continue in the future.10 The fire was really an urban
conflagration/firestorm started by a wildfire, not a pure wildfire. The core problem remains getting the
public to raise their situational awareness and become part of the solution.11 Maui has the fuel, wind,
temperatures and relative humidity, plus the urban interface to create a public policy conundrum.
These factors, coupled with climate change, indicate the need to change past wildfire practices and
policies.12
The series of wildfires that occurred on August 8, 2023, stressed the MFD and the entire emergency
response system, but the system did not break. This AAR has identified the challenges and makes
recommendations for the future. While the AAR focuses on wildfires, it really addresses the MFD’s
capability to address any major incident.
During the AAR process, we asked interviewees if the overall situation would have resulted in a
different outcome if the Lahaina Fire started first. It was generally agreed that the wind condition that
affected Lahaina far outpaced the response capability of the MFD. Valiant efforts by firefighters to alter
the Lahaina Fire outcome were marginalized due to the speed of the wind driving the fire. It was also
agreed that if the Lahaina Fire had occurred first, the Olinda, Kula and Pulehu fires would have
increased in both scale and loss with the possibility of the Pulehu Fire inflicting tremendous damage to
the Kihei community.
After the fact, firefighters, law enforcement, and EOC staff would probably tell you that they might take
different actions now as they look back on known facts. That revelation is the basis for conducting an
AAR, as lessons learned create recommendations for the future. The challenge for policy makers is
how to determine what level of emergency preparedness they want to maintain and how to fund that
level. This is where surge capacity enhancements should become priorities in conjunction with
baseline operations.
10
Lee, et al. NBC News. February 3, 2024. ‘This is not a Lahaina problem’: Once unthinkable, frequent fires are Hawaii’s new normal.
https://www-nbcnews-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.nbcnews.com/specials/hawaii-fire-scientists-warn-escalating-wildfire-threat/amp-
index.html. Accessed February 21, 2024.
11
Honore, Marcel. Honolulu Civil Beat. November 14, 2023. National Climate Report Lands As Hawaii Grapples with Wildfire Threat.
https://www.civilbeat.org/2023/11/national-climate-report-lands-as-hawaii-grapples-with-wildfire-threat/. Accessed February 9, 2024.
12
Ramirez, Rachel. CNN. August 9, 2023. Why did the Maui fires spread so fast? Drought, nonnative species and climate change among possible reasons.
https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/09/us/climate-change-reason-maui-fire/index.html. Accessed February 9, 2024.
47
The After-Action Report honors those lost, their families, and individuals stripped of homes/businesses,
cherished memories, and livelihoods. It pays tribute to the heroic efforts of firefighters, law
enforcement, and neighbors who rallied together. May this report drive recovery, inspire action, and
shape public policy to better address future major incidents.
48
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Western Fire Chiefs Association would like to convey its sincere gratitude to Maui Fire
Chief Bradford Ventura. Without his invitation, this project would not have been realized.
WFCA would like to thank and acknowledge the following contributors to the completion
of the AAR:
COUNTY OF MAUI DEPARTMENT MAUI POLICE DEPARTMENT

OF FIRE AND PUBLIC SAFETY John Pelletier, Police Chief
Ryan Otsubo, Battalion Chief Davlynn Racadio, Dispatch Coordinator
Chasserae Kaawa, Executive Assistant
All interviewed MFD staff
MAUI EMERGENCY HAWAII DLNR

MANAGEMENT AGENCY Lance De Silva,
Joshua Aquinde, Interim EOC Director Forest Management Supervisor
HAWAII WILDFIRE AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE

MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION Jamie Pagan, Paramedic
Elizabeth Pickett, Co-Executive Director
WINDWARD AVIATION HEAVY EQUIP GOODFELLOW BROS.

Don Shearer, Owner Alan Ostermiller, Safety Manager
CAL FIRE FEDERAL EMERGENCY

Incident Management Team #1 MANAGEMENT AGENCY
Chief Brian Estes, Incident Commander Curtis Brown, Federal Coordinator Officer
Chief Chris Trindade, Incident Commander Coordinating Officer, Region 9
STATE AIRPORT RESCUE FIRE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII

DEPARTMENT Clay Trauernicht, PhD
Colby Hanley, Fire Chief
FIRST DUE ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTORS:

Kevin Collier, Account Representative KITV ABC 4 Honolulu
Windy.com
DTN – weather data
https://www.dtn.com/weather/
49
WFCA STAFF INVOLVED
WITH THE PRODUCTION OF THE AAR:
BOB ROPER WFCA Lead Content Author, Interviewer,

Former Ventura County, CA Fire Chief, Researcher, and Subject Matter Expert
Nevada State Forester, Senior Policy Advisor
for Western Fire Chiefs Association, current
appointee to Congressional Wildland Fire
Mitigation and Management Commission
KIM ZAGARIS WFCA Interviewer and Subject Matter Expert

Former CA Office of Emergency Services
Fire/Rescue Fire Chief and Senior Policy
Advisor for the Western Fire Chiefs
Association
DAVID VAN BALLEGOOIJEN WFCA Content Author and Editor
ANNE RAZO WFCA Content Author and Editor
TEILA LEIGHTON WFCA Content Author and Editor
STEPHANIE WATSON WFCA Content Author and Editor
BRAY DESIGN CO. Content Designer
50
APPENDIX A
OVERVIEW OF THE COUNTY OF MAUI
DEPARTMENT OF FIRE AND PUBLIC SAFETY (MFD)
Below are the Mission, Vision, and Values of MFD, as listed on their website.13
MISSION STATEMENT
To protect and preserve life, environment, and property.
VISION
Building on this mission the department has identified vision statements to establish targets for
excellence in the future. These are to:
• Have personnel recognized as community leaders both on and off duty

• Maintain a high level of professional development for our members
• Maintain a management/labor partnership where decisions are made collaboratively
• Manage resources that reflect the diverse needs of the community
• Be recognized as a leading resource for community relations and public safety education
• Be a progressive organization that embraces change
• Be an organization that promotes the wellness and fitness of its members
• Be a department that is altogether prepared for any emergency
• Become an accredited agency
VALUES
Recognizing that its collective personality and the values of its members enhance the organization, the
Department of Fire and Public Safety has declared a set of values that included such statements as:
• PROFESSIONAL EXCELLENCE
We believe the pursuit of excellence and demonstrating high professional standards are critical
to our work. We will ensure the best possible service for our community. The fire and rescue
department supports continuous training and encourages professional development. We will
respect the diversity of our community by providing compassionate and quality service to all.
• COMMUNITY SERVICE AND INVOLVEMENT

We believe we have a duty to be involved in the community where we work. We are committed
to fulfilling our responsibility by expanding our involvement in the community we serve.
• INTEGRITY
We understand the trust placed in us by the public and our colleagues is integral to the
performance of our duties. We are committed to honest and ethical behavior and will hold
ourselves accountable to these values.
• Effective Communication
We believe effective communication is essential to the cohesiveness and performance of our
organization. We are committed to providing effective and responsive means of communication
throughout the organization and the community.
13
County of Maui. About Us. https://www.mauicounty.gov/1462/About-Us. Accessed February 9, 2024.
51
• HEALTH AND SAFETY
We believe our health and safety are essential to fulfilling the fire and rescue department's
mission. We are committed to providing the best health and safety programs for our members
well-being and operational readiness.
• TEAMWORK AND SHARED LEADERSHIP

We know well-functioning teams of people are more effective than individuals who are working
separately; our lives depend on it! We believe individuals have the capacity to lead, and our
organization values leadership at all levels. Teamwork and shared leadership are integral to our
organization, and we will seek out and value the opinions of our members.
• INNOVATION
We recognize and understand that the constant change in our community and industry impacts
our daily business. We are committed to seeking out and implementing innovative and
progressive thinking to address change effectively, benefiting those we serve.
MFD DIVISIONS:
• Administration and Maintenance14
o Administration
 Provides general oversight, including budgeting, human resource functions,
procurement, and enforcing regulations
o Maintenance
 Has a full-service fleet repair and maintenance facility
• Fire and Rescue Operations15
o Responsible for emergency response in Maui County
• Fire Prevention Bureau16
o Responsible for abating fire and life safety hazards before they can cause injury and
property damage via:
 Code Enforcement
 Fire Investigation
 Plans Review
 Fire Education
 Maui County Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) Program17
In this program, the MFD works with community leaders to reduce the impacts of
wildfires within their community
• Training, Health and Safety18
o Training Bureau
 Provides training and tracking of personnel certifications
o Health and Safety Bureau
 Provides the department with health, safety and wellness support
• Ocean Safety Bureau19
o Consists of Ocean Safety Officers
 Highly skilled water rescue officers used in island-wide emergency response
 Staffs lifeguard towers and provides water safety tips to the public
14
County of Maui. Administration and Maintenance. https://www.mauicounty.gov/1463/Administration-and-Maintenance. Accessed February 9, 2024.
15
County of Maui. Fire and Rescue Operations. https://www.mauicounty.gov/1464/Fire-and-Rescue-Operations. Accessed February 9, 2024.
16
County of Maui. Fire Prevention Bureau. https://www.mauicounty.gov/1465/Fire-Prevention-Bureau. Accessed February 9, 2024.
17
County of Maui. Maui Fire Department Community Risk Reduction Program for Wildland Urban Interface.
https://www.mauicounty.gov/DocumentCenter/View/142946/-Maui-County-Wildland-Urban-Interface-WUI-Program. Accessed February 9, 2024.
18
County of Maui. Training and Health & Safety. https://www.mauicounty.gov/1466/Training-and-Health-Safety. Accessed February 9, 2024.
52
Fire & Public Safety
Commission
Office of the Fire Chief
COUNTY OF MAUI Fire Chief

Department of Fire and Public Safety
FY2024 Organization Chart
Deputy Chief
Support Services Division Operations Division
Assistant Fire Chief Assistant Fire Chief
Administrative Fire Internal Ocean Safety Battalion 1 Battalion 2

Mechanic Shop Battalion Chief
Services Affairs Officer Bureau Chief BCs BCs
Paia Wailuku
Ocean Safety
Training Bureau Station Station
Bureau
#2 #1
Kihei Kaunakakai
Health & Safety
West District Station Station
Bureau
#6 #4
Makawao Lahaina
Fire Prevention
Paia District Station Station
Bureau
#5 #3
Wailea Hoolehua
Kanaha District Station Station
#14 #9
Kula Napili
South District Station Station
#13 #11
Kahului Pukoo
Access the FY2024 Functional and Organization Charts Makena Beach Station Station
#10 #12
Hana Lanai
Station Station
#7 #8
53
NUMBER OF CALLS VS.
NUMBER OF FIREFIGHTERS
The chart below illustrates the historical overall call load ratio of MFD
in comparison to the number of firefighters.
This chart was built using the data on the next page (MFD Service Delivery Statistics).
54
MFD SERVICE
DELIVERY STATISTICS
55
MFD FIRE STATION LOCATIONS
STATION 1 Wailuku Fire Station STATION 2 Paia Fire Station
21 Kinipopo Street 179 Hana Hwy
Wailuku, Maui, HI 96793 Paia, Maui, HI 96779
(808) 270-7569 (808) 876-4545
STATION 3 Lahaina Fire Station STATION 4 Kaunakakai Fire Station

1860 Honoapiilani Hwy 230 Kakalahale Street
Lahaina, Maui, HI 96761 Kaunakakai, Molokai, HI 96748
(808) 661-4065 (808) 553-5601
STATION 5 Makawao Fire Station STATION 6 Kihei Fire Station

134 Makawao Avenue 11 Waimahaihai Street
Makawao, Maui, HI 96768 Kihei, Maui, HI 96753
(808) 876-4570 (808) 879-2741
STATION 7 Hana Fire Station STATION 8 Lanai Fire Station

4655 Hana Hwy 1345 Fraser Avenue
Hana, Maui, HI 96713 Lanai City, Lanai, HI 96763
(808) 876-4595 (808) 565-8390
STATION 9 Hoolehua Fire Station STATION 10 Kahului Fire Station

2190 Farrington Avenue 200 Dairy Road
Hoolehua, Molokai, HI 96729 Kahului, Maui, HI 96732
(808) 567-6525 (808) 270-7911
STATION 11 Napili Fire Station STATION 12 Pukoo Fire Station

4950 Hanawai Street 8735 E. Kamehameha V Hwy
Lahaina, Maui, HI 96761 Kaunakakai, Molokai, HI 96748
(808) 669-4300 (808) 558-8580
STATION 13 Kula Fire Station STATION 14 Wailea Fire Station

50 Calasa Road 300 Kilohana Drive
Kula, Maui, HI 96790 Kihei, Maui, HI 96753
(808) 876-4575 (808) 874-8520
56
APPENDIX B
MATERIALS STUDIED
Below is a collection of pertinent web links not already listed in the AAR body:
DAMAGES
• Carlton, et al. The Wall Street Journal. August 14, 2023. Officials Search for Remains of Maui
Victims – and Answers for How the Wildfire Turned So Deadly.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/maui-hawaii-fire-victims-lahaina-investigation-9db67b14.
• Escobar, et al. The New York Times. August 11, 2023. Mapping the Wildfire Destruction in
Lahaina. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/08/11/us/hawaii-wildfire-lahaina-
damage.html. Accessed February 9, 2024.
• NBC News. December 27, 2023. The battle lost against America’s deadliest fire in over 100
years. https://www.nbcnews.com/video/the-battle-lost-against-america-s-deadliest-fire-in-
over-100-years-200977477694. Accessed February 9, 2024.
• The Visual Journalism Team. BBC News. August 14, 2023. Hawaii fire: Maps and before and
after images reveal Maui devastation. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-66465570.
HISTORICAL FIRES
• Ladao, Mark. The Honolulu Star-Advertiser. January 6, 2020. Maui fires burned 25,000 acres in
2019. https://www.staradvertiser.com/2020/01/06/hawaii-news/maui-fires-burned-25000-
acres-in-2019/. Accessed February 9, 2024.
• Leonard, Matthew, Honolulu Civil Beat. November 24, 2023. Matthew Leonard: How Hamakua
Burn of 1901 Started Hawaii’s Fire Clock. https://www.civilbeat.org/2023/11/matthew-leonard-
how-the-hamakua-burn-of-1901-started-hawaiis-fire-clock/. Accessed February 9, 2024.
PICTURES
• Department of Land and Natural Resources. August 11, 2023. Aerial Photos and Video of All
Four Fires on Maui. https://dlnr.hawaii.gov/blog/2023/08/11/nr23-126/. Accessed February 9,
2024.
POLICY STUDIES
• Arango, et al. The New York Times. August 21, 2023. Maui Knew Dangerous Wildfires Had
Become Inevitable. It Still Wasn’t Ready. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/21/us/maui-
wildfire-response.html. Accessed Feburary 9, 2024.
• Balch, Jennifer. The Washington Post. August 12, 2023. Opinion: Our wildfire problem is
growing beyond our ability to tame it.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/08/12/maui-wildfire-ingredients-climate-
action-plan/. Accessed February 9, 2024.
57
• Blair, Chad. Honolulu Civil Beat. September 6, 2023. Hawaii House to Explore Legislative Action
on Wildfires. https://www.civilbeat.org/2023/09/hawaii-house-to-explore-legislative-action-on-
wildfires/. Accessed February 2, 2024.
• Buck, et al. Honolulu Civil Beat. October 8, 2023. Envision Something New And Different For
The Lands Above Lahaina. https://www.civilbeat.org/2023/10/envision-something-new-and-
different-for-the-lands-above-lahaina/. Accessed February 9, 2024.
• Cal OES, CAL FIRE, USFS, BLM, NPS, FWS, and BIA. May 1, 2020. California Fire Assistance
Agreement. https://www.caloes.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/Fire-Rescue/Documents/May_1_
2020_%E2%80%93_December_31_2024_CFAA_Agreement_with_2020_Exhibits.pdf. Accessed
February 2, 2024.
• Calkin, et al. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. December 13, 2023. Wildland-
urban fire disasters aren’t actually a wildfire problem.
https://www.fs.usda.gov/rm/pubs_journals/2023/rmrs_2023_calkin_d001.pdf. Accessed
February 2, 2024.
• Collins, Terry. USA Today. August 19, 2023. ‘The next Maui could be anywhere’: Hawaii tragedy
points to US wildfire vulnerability.
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2023/08/19/global-warming-and-poor-
emergency-plans-put-wildfire-risk-on-americas-doorstep/70614906007/. Accessed February
2, 2024.
• Gallin, Luke. Reinsurance News. December 7, 2023. Insured losses will once again exceed
$100bn in 2023: Swiss Re. https://www.reinsurancene.ws/insured-losses-will-once-again-
exceed-100bn-in-2023-swiss-re/. Accessed February 9, 2024.
• Heaton, Thomas. Honolulu Civil Beat. October 3, 2023. Lack of Money And Staff Is Hindering
Wildfire Code Enforcement In Hawaii. https://www.civilbeat.org/2023/10/lack-of-money-and-
staff-is-hindering-wildfire-code-enforcement-in-hawaii/. Accessed February 2, 2024.
• Honore, Marcel. Honolulu Civil Beat. October 4, 2023. Could West Maui’s Old Cane Haul Road
Have Helped More People Escape The Fire? https://www.civilbeat.org/2023/10/could-west-
mauis-old-cane-haul-road-have-helped-more-people-escape-the-fire/. Accessed February 9,
2024.
• Hurley, Timothy. The Honolulu Star-Advertiser. September 3, 2023. West Maui firefighters
stretched thin under challenging conditions.
https://www.staradvertiser.com/2023/09/03/hawaii-news/west-maui-firefighters-stretched-
thin-under-challenging-conditions/. Accessed February 21, 2024.
• Hurley, Timothy. The Honolulu Star-Advertiser. September 10, 2023. Communities across
Hawaii wary of becoming ‘the next Lahaina’.
https://www.staradvertiser.com/2023/09/10/hawaii-news/communities-across-hawaii-wary-of-
becoming-the-next-lahaina/. Accessed February 21, 2024.
• Insurance Institute for Business & Home Safety Research. August 2023. IBHS Early Insights:
Lahaina Fire – 2023. https://ibhs.org/wp-content/uploads/IBHSEarlyInsights-LahainaFire.pdf.
• Jedra, Christina. Honolulu Civil Beat. October 22, 2023. Hawaii Officials Learned Little From A
2018 Fire That Foreshadowed Lahaina. https://www.civilbeat.org/2023/10/hawaii-officials-
learned-little-from-a-2018-fire-that-foreshadowed-lahaina/. Accessed February 2, 2024.
58
• Jedra, Christina. Honolulu Civil Beat. October 24, 2023. Maui Report on 2018 Lahaina Fire
Failed to Address Issues That Reappeared Five Years Later.
https://www.civilbeat.org/2023/10/maui-report-on-2018-lahaina-fire-failed-to-address-issues-
that-reappeared-five-years-later/. Accessed February 2, 2024.
• Kew, Allan. Honolulu Civil Beat. December 6, 2023. Maui Fire Department Purchases Show The
Fire’s Heavy Toll On Resources. https://www.civilbeat.org/2023/12/maui-fire-department-
purchases-show-the-fires-heavy-toll-on-resources/. Accessed February 2, 2024.
• Selsky, et al. Associated Press. September 22, 2023. Hawaii economists say Lahaina locals
could be priced out of rebuilt town without zoning changes. https://apnews.com/article/hawaii-
wildfire-lahaina-tourism-unemployment-economy-e71b9020be83e39012bf69dc5cfb0d13.
• U.S. Fire Administration. June 2015. Operational Lessons Learned in Disaster Response.
https://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/operational_lessons_learned_in_
disaster_response.pdf. Accessed February 9, 2024.
• Valera, Madeleine. Honolulu Civil Beat. November 1, 2023. How Recruiting More Women Could
Help Police Solve A ‘Staffing Crisis’. https://www.civilbeat.org/2023/11/how-recruiting-more-
women-could-help-police-solve-a-staffing-crisis/. Accessed February 2, 2024.
• Wallace-Wells, David. The New York Times. August 16, 2023. Opinion: The Age of the Urban
Inferno is Here. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/16/opinion/maui-fire-lahaina-hawaii.html.
• Yerton, Stewart. Honolulu Civil Beat. November 3, 2023. Hawaiian Electric Unveils Wildfire
Mitigation Measures. https://www.civilbeat.org/2023/11/hawaiian-electric-unveils-wildfire-
mitigation-measures/. Accessed February 9, 2024.
ACTIONS
• Alfonsi, et al. CBS News. November 19, 2023. Maui firefighters recount deadly wildfire inferno:
“I knew that we had lost”. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/maui-wildfire-firefighters-stand-in-
lahaina-60-minutes/. Accessed February 2, 2024.
• Heaton, Thomas. Honolulu Civil Beat. October 31, 2023. Lack of Native Seeds Spurs Federal
Plan To Replant Fire-Loving Invasive Grasses. https://www.civilbeat.org/2023/10/lack-of-
native-seeds-spurs-federal-plan-to-replant-fire-loving-invasive-grasses/. Accessed February
2, 2024.
• Jedra, Christina. Honolulu Civil Beat. November 15, 2023. Maui’s Shorthanded And Underpaid
911 Dispatchers Improvised During Lahaina Fire. https://www.civilbeat.org/2023/11/mauis-
shorthanded-and-underpaid-911-dispatchers-improvised-during-lahaina-fire/. Accessed
February 9, 2024.
• Mangieri, Gina. KHON-TV FOX 2 Honolulu. August 20, 2023. Maui fire chief: ‘It’s going to get
heavier’. https://www.khon2.com/top-stories/maui-fire-chief-its-going-to-get-heavier/.
• Reuters. REUTERS®. August 28, 2023. Hawaiian Electric denies Maui lawsuit claims about
cause of wildfire, shares surge. https://www.reuters.com/legal/hawaiian-electric-calls-maui-
countys-wildfire-lawsuit-irresponsible-2023-08-28/. Accessed February 21, 2024.
59
• Sacks, et al. The Washington Post. August 24, 2023. Maui utility may have compromised
evidence in fire probe, lawyers say. https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-
environment/2023/08/24/maui-fires-power-utility-lahaina-investigation/. Accessed February
21, 2024.
• Schuppe, Jon. NBC News. September 19, 2023. Fighting ‘the beast’: Inside the desperate quest
to save Lahaina. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/firefighters-battle-lahaina-maui-
fire-rcna105142. Accessed February 9, 2024.
FIRE BEHAVIOR
• Abatzoglou, et al. May 2, 2023. Earth’s Future.
https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2022EF003471. Accessed February 2,
2024.
• Businger, Steven. Honolulu Civil Beat. August 21, 2023. Understanding The Weather Forecasts
That Preceded The Maui Wildfires. https://www.civilbeat.org/2023/08/understanding-the-
weather-forecasts-that-preceded-the-maui-wildfires/. Accessed February 2, 2024.
• Dickie, et al. REUTERS®. August 21, 2023. Earth, wind and fire.
https://www.reuters.com/graphics/HAWAII-WILDFIRES/DRIVERS/gdvzwwgwrpw/. Accessed
February 21, 2024.
• McAvoy, Audrey. The Star-Advertiser. November 13, 2023. Mililani Mauka blaze signals
troubling change for Hawaii wildfires. https://www.staradvertiser.com/2023/11/13/hawaii-
news/mililani-mauka-blaze-signals-troubling-change-for-hawaii-wildfires/. Accessed February
9, 2024.
• Pacific Fire Exchange (PFX). Wildfire Review Series: Abandoned Agriculture in 2019 is Hawai’i’s
Fire Problem. https://pacificfireexchange.org/resource/wildfire-review-series-abandoned-
agriculture-in-2019-is-hawaiis-fire-problem/. Accessed February 2, 2024.
• Stern, Ben. The Cool Down. September 4, 2023. Scientists Note Surprising Factor That
Contributed To The Ferocity Of The Hawaiian Wildfires: ‘A Disaster Waiting To Happen’.
https://www.thecooldown.com/outdoors/invasive-grass-maui-lahaina-cause-wildfire-hawaii/.
TECHNOLOGY
• Heaton, Thomas. Honolulu Civil Beat. November 30, 2023. Hawaii Should Use Artificial
Intelligence To Improve Fire Forecasts, Researchers Say.
https://www.civilbeat.org/2023/11/hawaii-should-use-artificial-intelligence-to-improve-fire-
forecasts-researchers-say/. Accessed February 2, 2024.
• National Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. NWS Spot
Forecast Calendar.
https://www.weather.gov/spot/php/calendar.php?lat=20.784047711957555&lon=-
156.4487072587523&z=10&wfo=hfo. Accessed February 2, 2024.
• Partyka, et al. Global Modeling and Assimilation Office, NASA. Meteorologic Analysis of the
August 2023 Maui Wildfires.
https://gmao.gsfc.nasa.gov/research/science_snapshots/2023/meterologic-analysis-maui-
wildfires.php. Accessed February 2, 2024.
60
• National Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Summary of Peak
Wind Gusts – August 7-9, 2023. https://www.weather.gov/hfo/windSummary20230809.
• FirstNet Authority. FirstNet for the Fire Service. https://firstnet.gov/public-safety/firstnet-
for/fire-service. Accessed February 2, 2024.
61
APPENDIX C
ISLAND LAND USE EVOLUTION
A historical review of Maui reveals that in the early 19th century, missionary settlements initiated the
conversion of wetlands and fishponds into agricultural operations. Sugarcane and pineapple emerged
as a major crop and prominent markets developed, particularly as the demand for whale oil diminished.
These agriculture endeavors generated employment opportunities and contributed to the region’s
flourishing economy. During this period, wildfires were infrequent and were often handled by the land
use manager’s heavy equipment.
During the 1970s to 1990s, the cost of farming soared, leading to the relocation of sugarcane and
pineapple operations to other global locations. Consequently, the once lush forests, wetlands, and
native shrubland failed to regenerate, and the land soon became fallow. The subsequent vegetation
consisted of a mix of buffelgrass and Guinea grass, primarily used for grazing feedstock, along with
remnants of old agriculture crops. This combination of vegetation, coupled with the Kona and Trade
winds, create a volatile fuel source for wildfires. The fallow lands now have less access, labor, and
private heavy equipment, making them more susceptible to larger and more destructive wildfires, a
situation exacerbated by changes in climate.
This graphic illustrates how these conditions contributed to the Kula and Lahaina fires:
Hawaii and Active Land Use Near Maui Fires August 2023. Source: Trauernicht, Clay. University of Hawaii.
Hawaii Wildfire Management Organization.
62
APPENDIX D
WEATHER
Areas that were once lush at elevations that held moisture are now vulnerable to wildfires. Even in the
Upcountry region, where Haleakala’s 10,000-foot elevation historically retained moisture between
3,000 and 6,000 feet, Maui now faces the risk of wildfires due to a multi-year drought. During late
summer/early fall, historical average temperatures ranging from 70-89 degrees, coupled with relative
humidity at 70-80%, have now shifted to weather conditions more conducive for the spread of
wildfires.
Maui has the reputation of being the windiest island in the state with seasonal trade winds that average
15-30 mph (N-NE direction) and Kona winds that average 10-20 mph (S-SE direction).20
The best way to articulate Maui’s weather and winds is via this citation:21
“The local situations that produce occasional violent winds are not well understood, even though
the general causes of these winds can be surmised. These are local winds, of very limited extent.
They have been observed only in a few areas. They must sometimes reach speeds of 60 to 100
MPH, for they have been known to blow down well-rooted trees as well as power lines designed to
withstand very high wind loads. It is likely that these winds occur infrequently in many sparsely
settled areas on the slopes of the mountains of Hawaii and Maui, or near the mouths of canyons
along the base of these mountains. They are, however, known best in the settled areas of Kula and
Lahaina on Maui.
The Kula winds are strong down slope winds. They occur in the Kula District along a section of the
lower slopes on the west side of Mt. Haleakala. According to observations by inhabitants of the
area, the winds tend to be strongest in the zone that lies between 2,000 and 4,000 feet above
mean sea level. In this zone there may be episodes of down slope winds with speeds of over 40
MPH as often as twice a year. However, winds with speeds in excess of 60 MPH probably occur
only once every four or five years, on the average.
The Lahaina winds seem also to be down slope winds, but of somewhat different character from
those of Kula. In the Lahaina area they have been given the name of "lehua winds" after the lehua
tree which grows in that locality and with whose red blossoms the air is filled when these strong
winds blow. They issue from the canyons at the base of the main mountain mass of western Maui,
where the steeper canyon slopes meet the gentler piedmont slope below. These winds have been
reported from both the western and southern side of the western Maui mountains. They are
evidently quite infrequent, occurring every eight to 12 years on the average. When they do occur,
however, they are extremely violent, with wind speeds whose effects suggest they may reach 80
to 100 MPH or even more. They have been known to demolish buildings, uproot trees and cause
severe lodging throughout whole fields of sugarcane. That they are partly down slope winds is
evident from their being hot and dry. The mountains of western Maui are less than 6,000 feet high
as contrasted with the 10,000-foot height of Haleakala, and it seems likely that these local Lahaina
winds are caused, at least in part, by the funneling of strong trade winds through certain of the
mountain gorges.”
20
Hawaii Ocean Project. March 8, 2018. A Guide to Understanding Maui’s Weather. https://hawaiioceanproject.com/a-guide-to-
understanding-mauis-weather/. Accessed February 9, 2024.
21
Western Regional Climate Center. Climate of Hawaii. https://wrcc.dri.edu/Climate/narrative_hi.php. Accessed February 9, 2024.
63
Role of Terrain and Downslope Winds. Source: DTN. National Weather Service. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
Weather and wind monitoring is difficult on Maui because the topographic features create many
microclimates. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources has recognized this by recently
installing two new Remote Automated Weather Station (RAWS) units near Lahaina with several others
planned.
During the wildfires, reports from firefighters stated that it was hard for firefighters to open vehicle
doors and stand up in certain locations. A Windward Aviation pilot was able to measure wind gusts
around 80 mph at times as one of the most accurate citations available.
64
APPENDIX E
WILDFIRE HISTORY
Maui and the rest of Hawaii have a distinctive ecosystem, setting them apart from the continental
United States. Many of Hawaii’s plant species struggle to recover from wildfires, and downhill runoff
exacerbates issues by causing soil erosion, negatively impacting ocean plant life and coral.
Notable large wildfires seasons in Maui include:
• 2003: 3,001 acres

• 2005: 1,352 acres
• 2006: 7,390 acres
• 2007: 4,218 acres
o Upper Waiohuli Fire (1,800 acres) destroyed 75% of the Forest Reserve
• 2010: 5,535 acres
• 2016: 10,908 acres
• 2018: 4,601 acres
o Hurricane Lane Fire (2,215 acres)
o Kaanapali Fire (294 acres)
o Both Hurricane Lane and Kaanapali fires were fueled by 70 mph winds. Before the 4
major wildfires in August of 2023, these wildfires were the most complex incidents in
MFD history. 21 residences, 27 vehicles, and 150 acres of farmland were lost.
• 2019: 19,316 acres
o Waiko Fire (7,908 acres)
• 2023: 6,721 acres
o Pulehu Fire (3,268 acres)
o Lahaina Fire (2,170 acres)
o Olinda Fire (1,081 acres)
o Kula Fire (202 acres)
Although the annual acreage listed above may not equal the megafire sizes on the mainland, it’s
essential to note that Maui’s ecosystems are far more sensitive and less resilient to wildfires.
65
APPENDIX F
HURRICANE DORA & RED FLAG WARNINGS
A Red Flag Warning generally means warmer temperatures, lower humidity, and stronger winds are
expected to combine to produce an increased risk of fire danger. These factors vary depending upon
geographical area. The relative humidity (RH) may not go as low in Hawaii, but the RH percentage
decrease forms basically the same conditions. For example: Red Flag Warnings in California are
typically, temp @ 80-100+ degrees, RH below 15% and wind speeds above 50 mph with gusts. In
Hawaii, temp @ 80-100 degrees, RH @ 30-60% and wind speeds above 50 mph with gusts.
The National Weather Service (NWS) issued a Red Flag Warning on August 5 for August 7-9 due to
lower relative humidity and high winds associated with Hurricane Dora, passing about 600 miles south
of Maui.22 Many of the people, mostly firefighters, interviewed for the AAR are also fishermen and
surfers who study the weather daily. With Hurricane Dora being 600 miles away and Maui being the
windiest island in the state, there was not a heightened sense that this Red Flag Warning would be
much different from past events.
A review of past Red Flag events since 2020 indicate 14 Red Flag Warnings with 74 wildfire incidents.
A total of 27 wildfires occurred between August 7-11, 2023. Impressively, 85% of those wildfires were
contained at 50 acres or less, with the Olinda, Kula, Pulehu and Lahaina fires being larger.
Date Red Flag Warnings Issued # Wildfires # Wildfires Over 50 Acres

2020/08/30 – 09/01 7
2020/09/05 – 09/07 3
2020/09/10 – 09/11 6
2021/08/25 – 08/27 2
2021/09/03 – 09/05 2
2021/09/17 – 09/19 3
2021/09/20 – 09/22 3
2021/10/06 – 10/10 3
2022/07/31 – 08/02 8
2022/08/10 – 08/12 6
2022/08/27 – 08/28 3
2022/11/21 1
2023/08/07 – 08/10 27 4
2023/08/31 1
22
Gutierrez, Ben. Hawaii News Now. August 6, 2023. First Alert Weather Day: Red flag warning extended as Dora tracks west.
https://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/2023/08/06/first-alert-high-wind-fire-watches-issued-ahead-dry-gusty-weather/. Accessed February 9, 2024.
66
Prediction of actual Red Flag criteria and responsible messaging is paramount to ensure the validity
and credibility of the warnings. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
continues to study the Red Flag process to ensure public acceptance and avoid complacency.23
The exact influence and impact of Hurricane Dora remains unclear today. Most people believed that
Hurricane Dora being 600 miles away would have little effect. The National Weather Service is actively
researching Hurricane Dora’s influence to better understand the future. Further review seems to
indicate that an inversion was in place that strengthened and accelerated the wind due to terrain
features of Maui. This was also supported by Windward Aviation’s pilots.
Red Flag Warning. Source: KITV ABC 4 Honolulu.
Hawaii fire: Maps and before and after images reveal Maui devastation. Source: BBC. August 13, 2023. Original Source: NASA.
23
National Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. CSTAR Projects. https://vlab.noaa.gov/web/nws-osti/cstar.
67
APPENDIX G
CALL LOAD CHART
8/6/23 8/7/23 8/8/23 8/9/23 8/10/23 8/11/23
Total # of Incidents 41 65 71 27 53 57
Wildfires 1 6 11 4 8 5
EMS 14 30 10 3 14 16
Other Fires 11 16 27 14 11 16
Misc. Calls 15 13 23 6 20 20
# Calls Received
983 1,329 4,523 3,388 2,376 2,477
by Dispatchers
Note the high 911 call volume (text and telephone) on August 8. Many of these calls were duplicate
calls reporting the same incidents. Dedicated dispatchers must still answer each call in case there is a
new distinct incident.
68
APPENDIX H
ADDITIONAL EOC DETAILS
• MFD personnel were on standby from August 7 onward, prepared for activation if needed
• MFD provided between 2 and 6 personnel at the EOC after the Olinda Fire called for
evacuations
• MFD provided a presence at the EOC for several weeks
• MFD continued to assist the EOC with the re-entry phase of the recovery
MFD HAS BEEN SEEKING FEMA REIMBURSEMENTS FOR ITEMS SUCH AS:
• Damaged apparatus and equipment
• Overtime
• Helicopter time
• Heavy equipment rental
• Materials they had to purchase, or were taken for use out of the warehouse (i.e., respirators,
water, snacks, decontamination supplies, etc.)
• "Force Account Equipment" = standard FEMA rates by vehicle type to cover use, wear and tear,
fuel, etc., for various vehicles that responded
• Time and costs incurred in managing the FMAG (i.e., accounting for all the above, meetings to
clarify the process, document production and uploading, etc.)
69
APPENDIX I
PREVIOUS STUDIES
The following list categorizes the most pertinent documents and prior studies centered on
the Island of Maui by year, incorporating comments and observations:
2014
WESTERN MAUI COMMUNITY WILDFIRE PROTECTION PLAN
o https://dlnr.hawaii.gov/forestry/files/2023/08/Western-Maui-CWPP14.pdf
o Very comprehensive, but only addresses West Maui
o Consider updating the plan to be inclusive of the whole county since wildfire conditions
have changed
2016
STANDARDS OF COVER REPORT
o http://mauicounty.us/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/MAUI-SOC-4-6-17.pdf
o The Standard of Cover report is very complete but should consider a tiered response
depending upon Red Flag Warning
o There are many recommendations that still need implementation
2017
COMMISSION ON FIRE ACCREDITATION INTERNATIONAL ACCREDITATION REPORT
o http://mauicounty.us/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Maui-Fire-Dept-Accreditation-
Report-February-2017-Final.pdf
o There is little reference to wildfires in the report
2018
PERFORMANCE AND FISCAL AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FIRE AND PUBLIC SAFETY
o https://wfca.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Performance-and-Fiscal-Audit-Final-
Report-03-20-2018.pdf
o Supports the creation of Maui-centric Standards of Cover and a fire station location
study
TROPICAL CYCLONE LANE AFTER ACTION REPORT
o https://wfca.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/AAR-DRAFT-4-Combined.pdf
2020
HAZARD MITIGATION PLAN UPDATE
o https://www.mauicounty.gov/DocumentCenter/View/125977/2020-Maui-County-
Hazard-Mitigation-Plan-Final
o The County’s 2020 Hazard Mitigation plan is excellent and reflects current deficiencies
that should be addressed when updating the Community Wildfire Protection Plan and
the MFD Strategic Plan
70
2021
MAUI FIRE & PUBLIC SAFETY STRATEGIC PLAN, 2021-2025
o https://www.mauicounty.gov/DocumentCenter/View/101890/MFD-Master-Strategic-
Plan-2021---2025?bidId=
o Support “Initiative 4 - Operations Goals 1-5” and the other initiatives
o Consider revisiting Strategic Plan following 2023 wildfires that stressed the overall
system to suggest specific wildfire enhancements
MFD COMMUNITY RISK REDUCTION PROGRAM
o https://www.mauicounty.gov/DocumentCenter/View/142946/-Maui-County-Wildland-
Urban-Interface-WUI-Program
o Support this program, and consider providing adequate staffing for goal achievement
COUNTY OF MAUI, “COST OF GOVERNMENT COMMISSION”
o https://www.mauicounty.gov/DocumentCenter/View/129493/Report-on-Wildfire-
Prevention--Cost-Recovery-on-Maui---Part-1-Report--Exhibits-A-B-33-MB
o This document ranked wildfire risk as "low" despite increasing fire acreage and dangers
from drought and non-native grasses
o The report criticized inadequate funding and lack of fire prevention strategies
o Previous wildfires served as a warning, but risks were not adequately addressed
o Hawaii's fire management budgets have not kept pace with growing threats, according
to the Hawaii Wildfire Management Organization
THREAT AND HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT
o https://dod.hawaii.gov/hiema/files/2023/01/21-1227-Threat-and-Hazard-Identification-
and-Risk-Assessment-1.pdf
o Maui’s geography contains towns hugging the coast between the ocean that sit in the
funnel of compressed terrain driven winds. Populations tend to be clustered and
dependent on single highways, often located on the island edge. This is a double edge
sword where climate change is increasing tide heights against coastal communities and
these dense communities are then prone to inland wildfires catching them in the middle
on Maui.
o Despite these growing dangers, state budgets for fire management have not kept pace
with worsening conditions, according to the Hawaii Wildfire Management Organization
o Within this report, on pages 46-48, two Capability Targets were cited and now should
be acted upon with appropriate steps. Both of these Capability Targets should be
revisited with the Standards of Cover report
 “Within 12 hour(s) of an incident, conduct fire fighting operations to suppress
and extinguish 50 structure fires”.
 “The capability target is based on a real world incident, Hurricane Lane in 2018,
and input from DLNR. During the 2018 incident, a wildland fire was fueled and
caused damage to 50 structures. Response time took more than 12 hours in this
event, but due to feedback from DLNR and chiefs within the county fire
departments, this response time is reachable when additional equipment and
personnel are on hand.
 “Within 72 hours of an incident, conduct firefighting operations to contain 3
wildland fires covering 2300 acres.
71
• Seventy-two hours to contain major wildland fires is a realistic capability
target given the weather conditions described in the hurricane scenario
2022
STATE OF HAWAII COMPREHENSIVE MANAGEMENT PLAN
o https://dod.hawaii.gov/hiema/files/2022/03/Hawaii-State-CEMP-FEB-2022.pdf
o The report’s wildfire rating should be reconsidered by Maui policy makers as the island
recovers and makes long-term policy decisions, i.e., planning, building codes,
evacuation routes and MFD preparedness.
o The vulnerability of the islands to deadly wildfires was gravely underestimated in long
term assessments. A year prior, the State of Hawaii Comprehensive Emergency
Management Plan Report had detailed wildfire risks as one of the lowest threats for the
state.
STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY’S - PUBLIC RESOURCE WEBPAGE
o https://dod.hawaii.gov/hiema/public-resources/types-of-disaster/
o Lays out clear, bullet-point recommendations of what residents should do in the event
of a hurricane, tsunami, flash flood or earthquake. At the bottom of the page, the agency
includes two short paragraphs about wildfires – with no similar advice on ways to stay
safe.
2023
2023 HAWAII POST FIRE TECHNICAL REPORT
o https://wfca.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/2023HawaiiPostFireTechnicalReport_
20230912.pdf
o Burn area technical review to assist with rehabilitation efforts
LATEST CWPP RESOURCES

HWMO WEBPAGE
o https://www.hawaiiwildfire.org/cwpp-resources
o HWMO has helped develop Community Wildfire Protection Plans (CWPP) for most of the
priority fire-prone regions of Hawaii. The plans assesses values at risk such as safety,
natural resource protection, recreation, scenic values, and economic assets. Through a
collaborative process involving input from community members, resource management
and firefighting agencies, and a variety of other interested parties, CWPPs help bring
wildfire hazard information and planning and action opportunities
to all parties.
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APPENDIX J
MAUI WILDFIRE RISKS
Communities at Risk from Wildfires – State of Hawaii Map. Source: Hawaii Wildfire Management Organization. June 30, 2015.
In June 2014, the Hawaii Wildfire Management Organization prepared a Western Maui Community
Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP) that warned that most of the Lahaina area was at extremely high risk
for burning. The County’s 2020 Hazard Mitigation Plan also identified Lahaina as a high-risk wildfire
zone. The County has adopted a modern building code that references NFPA 1, Chapter 17 provision,
but these codes only apply to new development. There are provisions to address defensible space
with enforcement procedures.
Generally, wildfire risks are greatly undervalued by the public and policy makers (see 2020 Hazard
Mitigation Plan in Appendix I). Additionally, wildfires are nationally under-publicized.24 A challenge
exists in the willingness of the public and policymakers to proactively address and finance wildfire
actions upfront in preparation, mitigation and response, as opposed to dealing with the recovery costs
and impacts of wildfires later on.
24
Hawaii Wildfire Management Organization. July 25, 2018. Hawaii Wildfire Impacts Flyer. https://www.hawaiiwildfire.org/fire-resource-
library-blog/hi-wildfire-impacts-flyer. Accessed February 9, 2024.
73
APPENDIX K
Recommendations Summary
Preparation
Challenge #1 - How to maximize MFD reserve and surge capacity?
Observations Recommendations Page
Relief Engines 1.1 Create, fund, and provide a standard inventory for all 19
response vehicles.
1.2 Provide secure and enclosed facilities for all vehicles.
1.3 Conduct a regularly scheduled vehicle inventory for
accountability purposes.
Vehicle Inventory 1.4 Assess the capabilities of MFDʼs current fleet to their 19
& Types service demands.
1.5 Standardize vehicle types in a way that streamlines
training and fleet maintenance.
Off & On Duty 1.6 Create an automated system to notify all staff of a major 20
Situational Awareness deployment to take the burden off the on-duty BCs.
& Capability 1.7 Explore the use of First Due or other software to provide
timely situational updates.
1.8 Implement a take-home policy for BC command vehicles
so off-duty BCs can readily respond from their residence;
increasing MFDʼs command and control capability.
Statewide 1.9 Create a statewide certification and qualifications system. 20

Mutual Aid 1.10 Create a statewide mutual aid agreement.
1.11 Establish an inter-island engine fleet program, where the
State procures and maintains a specified number of Type
3, Type 4-6 engines for shared use on each island.
Standardizing the model/type ensures consistency in
training and operations across islands.
Example: CalOES Fleet Program
Local & County 1.12 Review and provide training on agreements involving 21
Mutual Aid federal, state, county, private businesses, and NGOs to
assess the necessity for reinforcement or clarification.
Private Resources 1.13 Create guidelines and procedures for hiring private 21
resources, outlining dispatch procedures, performance
expectations, and reimbursement schedules.
1.14 Conduct annual training with all equipment operators and
supervisors to enhance operating relationships,
performance, and safety.
1.15 Install Automatic Vehicle Locators (AVL) on all private
resources.
1.16 Add a resource ID on top of private vehicles and
equipment for aerial identification.
74
Pre-Positioning 1.17 Create an intelligence center within the EOC or MFD to 22
continually monitor current and predicted emergency
events and facilitate the sharing of relevant data.
1.18 Utilize new technology to visually display potential trouble
spots in electrical service, identifying areas of concern
before the onset of a fire.
1.19 Upstaff and preposition appropriate resources based upon
intelligence briefings.
1.20 As part of the surge capacity, assign drivers to
accompany the two on-duty BCs to augment their
capacity, improve incident organizational management,
and enhance safety.
1.21 Create an emergency fund dedicated to surge capacity
and leverage the provisions outlined in the new FEMA
2022 FIRE Act for effective utilization.
Staffing 1.22 Review and reaffirm the SOC criteria. Adjust as needed 23
and subsequently implement appropriation and
management actions to fulfill staffing expectations.
1.23 Explore the possibility of creating dedicated fire
handcrews via an at-risk youth development program.
Example: The C.R.E.W
Fire Stations 1.24 In association with the SOC review mentioned above, 23
develop a master facility plan to align fire stations with the
publicʼs expectations of serving as safe refuge areas and
then pursue appropriations.
1.25 Install diesel exhaust systems at each work site to
enhance workplace safety.
“Battle Station” 1.26 Identify the skill sets required during major events. 24
Assignments 1.27 Provide training for staff to acquire the necessary skill sets
ahead of major events.
1.28 Explore the reserve capacity of OSB personnel for
expanded roles during major events.
Community 1.29 Establish a process where retirees can be utilized. 24

Emergency Response 1.30 Utilize CERT members to provide assistance under the
Team (CERT) & Retired direction of MFD staff before and during incidents.
Employees Reference: FEMA CERT
Public Policy Funding 1.31 Review studies conducted since 2016 to formulate a base 25
funding plan. Align this plan with the MFD strategic plan,
incorporating the identified surge capacity options.
1.32 Revise the MFD strategic plan to incorporate the
recommendations outlined in this AAR.
1.33 Establish a revenue stream by implementing taxes, levees,
bonding increases, or similar measures.
75
Preparation
Challenge #2 - How to raise situation awareness of the wildfire problem?
Public Involvement 2.1 Engage social scientists to assess and evaluate the most 26
effective ways to communicate with the public about
preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery, taking
into account Maui’s unique cultural context.
2.2 Utilize the findings from the social scientists to develop
methods and options to effectively convey information to
the population on how to live with the challenges posed by
wildfires.
2.3 Enhance the partnership with the Hawaii Wildfire
Management Organization.
2.4 Adopt a centralized wildfire education program, such as
Ready, Set, GO!, and customize it to be accessible in
multiple languages.
Tourist Evacuation 2.5 Collaborate with MEMA to explore software options that 26
facilitate multiple language evacuation notifications.
Preparation
Challenge #3 – What type of training and technology is essential for effective leadership
and operational management?
Training 3.1 Recommit to and initiate Blue Card system training. 27

3.2 Provide Command and General Staff ICS training to all
Captains and Chief Officers in a common environment.
3.3 Conduct complex incident command and control training
exercises with Captains and Chief Officers
Technology 3.4 Explore the utilization of a software program as a public- 28

facing platform to provide alerts and enhance situational
awareness among the public with PD and MEMA.
3.5 Explore the utilization of a software program for daily
staffing and recall purposes.
3.6 Review the First Due software to identify areas where it
can be better utilized for organizational management
during incidents.
3.7 Clearly identify critical infrastructure and priority target
hazards, particularly in situations where PSPS are
anticipated.
76
3.8 Collaborate with DLNR to enhance RAWS sites and
consider implementing an automated camera/early
detection system.
Preparation
Challenge #4 - How to provide better evacuation routes?
Evacuations 4.1 Collaborate with law enforcement and MEMA to identify 29

key access routes and develop contingency plans.
4.2 Upon identifying key access routes, collaborate with the
Hawaiian Electric Company to relocate adjacent
infrastructure, potentially underground, to enhance the
safety of evacuation routes.
4.3 Before deploying PSPS, thoroughly examine consequence
management options.
4.4 Collaboratively, MFD, law enforcement, and MEMA should
explore new evacuation software options.
Preparation
Challenge #5 – How to develop better relationships
and operational effectiveness with non-traditional and traditional partners?
Partner Relationships 5.1 Initiate proactive outreach to non-traditional partners and 30

develop agreements, engage in joint training exercises,
and maintain relationships.
5.2 Ensure that each partnering entity maintains a full-time
presence at the ICP or EOC once they are activated.
5.3 Collaborate with law enforcement to enhance on-scene
command and control operations.
5.4 Share and instruct law enforcement on the Ready, Set, Go!
program.
5.5 Fire and Law enforcement to cross train on ICS structures
and ICP best practices.
Preparation
Challenge #6 – How to improve the Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
and Department Operations Coordination (DOC) functions?
Facility & Technology 6.1 Convene an EOC AAR, with a specific focus on the August 31
Investments 2023 wildfire activation, to promptly identify lessons
learned and generate specific recommendations for
improvement.
6.2 Clearly identify and delineate the roles and responsibilities
of the EOC, DOC, and incident command.
77
6.3 Conduct EOC drills involving the actual representatives
who will be present during incidents.
Preparation
Challenge #7 - How to enhance business and incident continuity?
Preparation 7.1 Conduct a review of every facility to ensure the availability 32

of emergency power backup for a period of 48-96 hours.
7.2 Provide water and food for each response unit to ensure
logistical support for a minimum of 48 hours
Mitigation
Challenge #8 – What public policies and actions are needed to address future wildfires?
New & Existing Actions 8.1 Establish and enforce a defensible space program of at 33
least 100 feet, incorporating fuel reduction zones, to
ensure structures can be defended and have a higher
likelihood of surviving a wildfire.
8.2 Implement a 0-5 foot clear zone between structures and
any vegetation or combustible materials.
8.3 Establish joint approval authority involving County Planning
and MFD when approving new construction.
8.4 Develop water supply standards that encompass
established fire water flow requirements and includes
emergency backup power supply.
8.5 Enforce a mandate requiring all cell tower facilities to
establish defensible space similar to structures and to
implement backup power supplies.
8.6 On new developments over a certain size, require a
secondary access road that does not require any special
action to access.
8.7 Revise existing hazard maps to create true risk parcel-level
maps to fully recognize actions that can lower risks.
8.8 Review and adopt modern building codes that have a
Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) component.
8.9 Streamline the enforcement procedures to achieve higher
levels of compliance.
8.10 Implement a Ready, Set, GO! public education program to
enhance situational awareness and emphasize the
importance of early evacuations.
8.11 Promote and support the adoption of Firewise USA® or
equivalent community programs.
8.12 Establish a countywide home hardening and maintenance
program to reduce ember environment hazards.
78
8.13 Collaborate with County and property owners to reduce the
fuel load in Upcountry gulches without causing excessive
erosion.
Mitigation
Challenge #9 - How to address the annual light, flashy fuels?
Land Management 9.1 Continue collaboration with HWMO to ensure every 35

community in the county has an updated CWPP.
9.2 Harness software tools to conduct fuel and community risk
evaluations, generating data-driven recommendations.
Response
Challenge #10 - How to improve operations and firefighter safety on wildfires?
Training & Equipment 10.1 Equip each line personnel with Personal Protective 36
Equipment (PPE), including issued fire shelters and
portable radios.
10.2 Train all line personnel on the proper use of fire shelters
and ensure they are well-versed in their correct
application.
10.3 Train all line personnel about portable radio features and
the value of radio discipline during dynamic incidents.
10.4 Contact the Hawaii FirstNet representative and request an
island-specific system analysis.
10.5 If AT&T FirstNet can provide a viable infrastructure, MFD
should consider converting to this dedicated
communications system.
10.6 Ensure that all new technology implemented is equipped
with dedicated broadband coverage.
10.7 Evaluate the current communications technology to
determine if there are options to address the “Orangeˮ
cross band repeater implementation process delays.
10.8 Explore technology solutions that integrate into operational
tools, ensuring their functionality remains intact even
during power outages – i.e., maps.
10.9 Implement the provision of a second driver/operator on
water tankers during deployments for safety and relief
purposes.
Response
Challenge #11 - How to prioritize resources during dynamic moving incidents?
Dispatch Liaison 11.1 Establish a Call When Needed (CWN) process where a 38
Chief Officer would temporarily go into dispatch to assist in
79
covering macro-level MFD decisions until enough
command staff are available.
Response
Challenge #12 - How to enhance effectiveness in suppression and overhaul during
droughts with limited water supplies?
12.1 Review and provide consistent the use of Class A foam 39

Class A Foam throughout MFD.
Response
Challenge #13 – How to create alternative water sources?
Improvise 13.1 Establish dedicated drafting locations in strategic locations, 40

situated near bodies of water, and utilizing alternative
sources such as piped water from swimming pools and
dedicated weirs.
13.2 Ensure that all pumpers are equipped with hard suction
drafting hose.
13.3 Review and propose the addition of more MFD water
tankers or explore private resource options.
13.4 Explore the possibility of obtaining fire boat services
directly or indirectly, with fire pump capability.
Response
Challenge #14 – How to increase aerial firefighting capabilities?
Limited Aircraft 14.1 Review the existing exclusive use contract and explore 41
the possibility of expanding it to enhance aerial operation
capabilities.
14.2 Contact aviation vendors to explore options for different
types of aircraft, including the possibility of unstaffed
aircraft.
14.3 Initiate a dialogue with the National Guard to explore the
possibility of reassigning a Modular Airborne Firefighting
(MAFFs) C-130 unit from the mainland to Hawaii to
provide wildfire suppression duties across the entire state.
14.4 Introduce and implement a dedicated air-to-ground radio
frequency to improve aerial firefighting operations and
enhance safety measures.
80
Recovery
Challenge #15 – How does MFD ensure the safety
and productivity of its workforce during and after major incidents?
Employee Assistance 15.1 Maintain MFDʼs commitment to these programs and 42

Programs constantly strive to enhance them.
15.2 Establish and institutionalize a program for reporting
exposures.
15.3 Collaborate with Hawaii State organizations to develop
presumptive coverage for cancer, hernia, pneumonia, and
mental health.
15.4 Contact the University of Hawaii or another public health
entity to conduct a 20-year exposure study on firefighters
and the public, considering the substantial amount of
unknown smoke particulates from the wildfires.
15.5 Improve and implement pre-entry/hire psychological
screenings.
15.6 Establish a wellness check program where MFD staff can
voluntarily register at the fire station near their residence.
On-duty staff at the fire station can then conduct checks
on family members.
After-Action Report 15.7 Incorporate AARs into MFD's institutional practices to 43

enhance daily operations, safety, and overall
improvement.
Serious Accident 15.8 Establish a policy to institutionalize a SART-type process 43

Review Team (SART) to perform timely reviews of significant injuries that result
in time loss.
Example: 2015 Fresno Fire Department SART Investigation
Report
81
Recovery
Challenge #16 – How can MFD assist in the recovery process?
16.1 Build relationships within the County that can rely on 44

Teamwork utilizing MFDʼs IMT for emergencies and major events.
16.2 Continuously send MFD staff off-island to participate in
other major incidents as part of a mentoring process for
key ICS positions.
16.3 Expand MFDʼs relationships with local, state, and federal
cooperators to enhance the depth and breadth of their
IMT.
16.4 Maintain active participation in weekly FEMA recovery
community meetings to demonstrate involvement and
leadership from MFD.
16.5 Take on the role as public advocate, leading mitigation
efforts before Hawaii faces an insurance crisis.
16.6 Position MFD as the lead advocate for emergency
infrastructure needs on the West side of Maui, i.e.,
disaster EMS location and capability.
Recovery
Challenge #17 – How can reports, fire cause investigations, and cost recovery
be enhanced?
Training 17.1 Establish a team of trained staff dedicated to fire cause 45

& Dedicated Staff investigations, evidence preservation, and expert witness
testimony.
17.2 Establish a cost recovery unit to pursue reimbursement for
wildfires caused by neglect.
17.3 Generate more comprehensive fire reports that thoroughly
identify fire causes and acreage size, facilitating better
problem identification.
82
DEFINITIONS
Blue Card Training program provided to fire departments with a training and certification
system that defines the best standard command practices for common, local,
everyday strategic and tactical emergency operations conducted on NIIMS Type
4 & Type 5 events
Buffelgrass A perennial bunch grass introduced from the African savannah
Call load Volume or frequency of emergency calls or incidents within a given period,
measuring the demand on fire department resources
Class A foam Specially formulated to make water more effective for firefighting
Conflagration A large destructive fire
Defensible The area between a structure and the nearest fuel source, providing firefighters
space enough space to safely defend the structure
Drainage fire A fire in a depressed geographical feature that transmits water downhill
Eductor A piece of equipment that introduces foam concentrate into a water stream
Egress The means of exit or escape from a building, structure, or confined space during
a fire
Fuel Organic materials that can ignite and carry fire
Fully involved Term used to describe the on-scene conditions as to the degree a structure is
involved, 0-100%
Guinea grass A fast-growing perennial grass that is native to Africa and Yemen
Gulch A geographic feature that acts as a drain or unimproved channel for water
Kona winds Opposing winds from the south-southeast, 10-20mph usually in summer
Lee side The sheltered side, the wide away from the wind
Leeward Situated on or toward the side sheltered from the wind
MAYDAY A fire service term to notify all parties on an incident that personnel are in dire
need of assistance
Megafires The classification of wildfires that are not easily controlled, often burning over
100,000 acres
Microclimate Specific weather features in unique geographical areas that produce unique
weather conditions
Overhaul Action taken after a fire is controlled to fully eliminate any reignition
Perimeter Control lines around a wildfire to "box" in the fire
control
Recall notice An alert to off duty personnel to return to work
Red Flag Term used to display when high winds, low humidity, and higher temperatures
Warning occur
Relative A unit measure by % to determine the amount of water vapor in the air relative to
Humidity (RH) the temperature
Spot fire Small incident wildfire started by embers ahead of the main body of fire, usually
caused by wind
Trade winds Prevailing winds from the north-northeast, 5-15mph
Upstaff Action taken to increase staffing based upon a specific need
83
ACRONYMS
Acronym Explanation
AAR After-Action Report
AVL Automatic Vehicle Locator
BC Battalion Chief
CAFS Compressed Air Foam Systems
CERT Community Emergency Response Team
CISM Critical Incident Stress Management
CWN Call When Needed
DLNR Department of Land and Natural Resources
DOC Department Operations Coordinator
EAP Employee Assistance Program
ECO Emergency Operations Center
EMS Emergency Medical Services
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FMAG Fire Management Assistance Grant
HWMO Hawaii Wildfire Management Organization
IC Incident Commanders
ICP Incident Command Posts
ICS Incident Command System
IMT Incident Management Team
LODD Line of Duty Death
MAFFS Modular Airborne Firefighting Systems
MEMA Maui Emergency Management Agency
MFD Maui Fire and Public Safety Department
MPD Maui Police Department
NGO Non-governmental Organization
NIIMS National Interagency Incident Management System
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NWCG National Wildfire Coordination Group
NWS National Weather System
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OSB Ocean Safety Bureau
PSPS Public Safety Power Shutoffs
RH Relative Humidity
RAWS Remote Automated Weather Stations
SART Serious Accident Review Team
USAR Urban Search and Rescue
WUI Wildland Urban Interface
84

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COUNTY OF MAUI

P R O D U C E D B Y T H E W E S T E R N F I R E C H I E F S A S S O C I AT I O N APRIL 18, 2024

14 Engine Companies 9 Mini Pumpers

2 Ladder Companies 1 Helicopter (exclusive use contract)

1 Rescue Company 3 Rescue Boats

www.qsl.net Engine Company Districts. Source: MFD.

However, the relocation of these

RED FLAG WARNING

1526 MFD notified Central Dispatch to initiate evacuations.

CAL FIRE HAWAII NATIONAL GUARD

DEPARTMENT STATE AIRPORT

NATIONAL USAR TEAMS U.S. ARMY

• Peer and Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) Support

RELIEF ENGINES Create, fund, and provide a standard

VEHICLE INVENTORY & TYPES Assess the capabilities of MFD’s

OFF & ON DUTY SITUATIONAL Create an automated system to notify

STATEWIDE MUTUAL AID Create a statewide certification

Example: CalOES Fleet Program

LOCAL & COUNTY MUTUAL AID Review and provide training on

PRIVATE RESOURCES Create guidelines and procedures

PRE-POSITIONING Create an intelligence center within

Utilize new technology to visually

Upstaff and preposition appropriate

As part of the surge capacity, assign

Create an emergency fund dedicated

STAFFING Review and reaffirm the SOC criteria.

Currently, MFD does not have any fire handcrews

FIRE STATIONS In association with the SOC review

“BATTLE STATION” Identify the skill sets required during

COMMUNITY EMERGENCY Establish a process where retirees can

If the public requires emergency power for a

PUBLIC POLICY FUNDING Review studies conducted since 2016

Establish a revenue stream by

HOW TO RAISE SITUATIONAL P R E PA R AT I O N

PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT Engage social scientists to assess and

Enhance the partnership with

Adopt a centralized wildfire education

TOURIST EVACUATION Collaborate with MEMA to explore

WHAT TYPE OF TRAINING AND TECHNOLOGY P R E PA R AT I O N

TRAINING Recommit to and initiate Blue Card

WHAT TYPE OF TRAINING AND TECHNOLOGY P R E PA R AT I O N

TECHNOLOGY Explore the utilization of a software

Review the First Due software to

Clearly identify critical infrastructure

Collaborate with DLNR to enhance

HOW TO PROVIDE BETTER P R E PA R AT I O N

EVACUATIONS Collaborate with law enforcement and

Before deploying PSPS, thoroughly

Collaboratively, MFD, law

HOW TO DEVELOP BETTER RELATIONSHIPS P R E PA R AT I O N

PARTNER RELATIONSHIPS Initiate proactive outreach to non-

HOW TO IMPROVE THE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS P R E PA R AT I O N

FACILITY & TECHNOLOGY Convene an EOC AAR, with a specific

Conduct EOC drills involving the actual

HOW TO ENHANCE BUSINESS P R E PA R AT I O N

PREPARATION Conduct a review of every facility to

WHAT PUBLIC POLICIES AND ACTIONS ARE M I T I G AT I O N

NEW & EXISTING ACTIONS Establish and enforce a defensible

Establish joint approval authority

Develop water supply standards that

Enforce a mandate requiring all cell

On new developments over a certain

RECOMMENDATIONS CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

WHAT PUBLIC POLICIES AND ACTIONS ARE M I T I G AT I O N