Operation Black Buck 1982: The

Vulcans' Extraordinary Falklands War

Raids 1st Edition Andrew Bird
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 OPERATION
C A M P A I G N

BLACK BUCK 1982

The Vulcans’ extraordinary
Falklands War raids
A I R

A N D R E W D. B I R D | I L LU S T R AT E D B Y A D A M TO O B Y
A I R C A M PA I G N

OPERATION
BLACK BUCK 1982
The Vulcans’ extraordinary Falklands War raids

A N DRE W D. BIRD | I LLU STR ATED BY ADAM TOOBY

CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION4

CHRONOLOGY10

ATTACKER’S CAPABILITIES 12

DEFENDER’S CAPABILITIES 31

CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES 40

THE CAMPAIGN 46

AFTERMATH AND ANALYSIS 90

FURTHER READING 94

INDEX95
4 Introduction

INTRODUCTION
After 30 years of service At the end of the world, a little bit of empire lingers on in the Falkland Islands, an archipelago
as a platform for Britain’s in the South Atlantic over which Britain and Argentina have been at loggerheads for more
nuclear deterrent, the
venerable Avro Vulcan than 300 years, with both claiming sovereignty. The root of the problem over these clumps
would finally see combat of rocks can be traced to the celebrated Inter caetera issued by Pope Alexander VI, who
in the conventional role in guillotined the lands that European navigators were starting to discover into two territories,
the Falklands War.
(Getty Images) one Spanish, one Portuguese.
Lines drawn (and then revised) went straight from north to south through what is now
modern Portuguese-speaking Brazil, leaving land to the west of the line to the Spaniards.
This included most of the South American mainland, whose conquistador armies had not
yet arrived in Mexico or Peru. The 1493 document showed that on the Spanish side of the
line, still undiscovered 400 miles off the future Argentinian coast, lay the cluster of islands
that the British would name after the naval entrepreneur Viscount Falkland, and on which
the French explorer Louis Antoine de Bougainville would name the first settlement Les Îles
Malouines after St Malo, in western France. Spaniards would much later adapt the French
name to give the islands the name Las Malvinas.
It is not entirely clear whether Portuguese or Spanish sailors sighted this archipelago or
any other South Atlantic islands such as South Georgia. The English navigator John Davis,
aboard the Desire, made the first confirmed sighting of the islands in 1592. The first known
landing was by English Captain John Strong in 1690 at Bold Cove, Port Howard on West
Falkland. Strong seemed unimpressed, noting that there was an ‘abundance of geese and
ducks’ but that ‘as for wood, there is none’. He charted the sound between the two principal
islands, which he named ‘Falkland Channel’ (today known as Falkland Sound) after the First
Lord of the Admiralty, Viscount Falkland, and sailed away. Sealers, whalers and penguin
hunters from different corners of the globe became frequent visitors.
Meanwhile, British legislators in Canada systematically cleansed provinces and territories
of Acadian people during the Seven Years’ War, deporting some to France. These displaced
people boarded two frigates at St Malo in the autumn of 1763 under the command of French
 5

An earth mover clearing

soil for the new US
Army Air Force base,
Wideawake, on Ascension
Island that will become
a joint US Air Force and
Royal Air Force base.
(Photo by Ivan Dmitri/
Michael Ochs Archives/
Getty Images)

Admiral Louis-Antoine de Bougainville, and sailed across the South Atlantic to colonize the
‘Îles Malouines’.
Anchoring in Berkeley Sound, they rowed ashore and christened the landing spot Port
Louis after King Louis XV and established the first settlement on north-eastern East Falkland
in February 1764. While Port Louis flourished, the British in January 1765 established
a base off West Falkland at Port Egmont, Saunders Island, with neither party realizing
that a settlement existed on the opposite island. Here the first systematic scientific and
meteorological observations were recorded in the Falklands. Saunders Island continued to Northwood Headquarters
be used by British sealers and whalers until Jacinto de Antolaguirre, one of two Spaniards in Northwest London.
to govern the Falklands (Las Malvinas), in 1781 sent Salvador Medina Y Juan with troops As Headquarters of the
Commander-in-Chief Fleet,
to Port Egmont. Their orders were to ‘destroy every object found in Egmont as part of your the site was the controlling
reconnaissance of that area’. No opposition was evident. All houses were burned to ensure Headquarters for
they would not be re-used, and the name plaque was removed by Salvador and presented Operation Corporate, the
Falklands War, in 1982.
to authorities in Buenos Aires, from where it was recaptured by the British roughly 30 (Andrew D. Bird
years later. Collection)
Almost every year from 1782 an ice breaker from
Buenos Aires arrived at Egmont to prevent the British
from re-establishing their rule. However, as Spain’s empire
crumbled under Napoleon’s occupation and the march
of liberal ideas – encouraged by Britain and the United
States – Spanish domination in Latin America dissipated.
Spring 1810 saw sovereignty over the Viceroyalty of the
Río de la Plata transfer to the successor state, Argentina.
In 1823 Argentina appointed a governor of the Malvinas,
Louis Vernet from Hamburg, Germany, although his
appointment was never officially gazetted – and so was
not strictly legal.
The Falkland Islands became a Crown Colony in
1840. Governor Richard Moody, with the cooperation
of HMS Terror and HMS Erebus captains Francis Crozier
6 Introduction

and James Clark Ross, had them surveyed for a new capital for the islands. Port Jackson was
chosen for the proposed new settlement and wharf. Colonial Secretary Edward Stanley in
London concurred. The little town was officially renamed (Port) Stanley in 1845 with the
capital administration centred at Government House.
A century passed, in which Argentina maintained its claim to the islands. By 1946,
Britain’s Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin could no longer rebuff Argentine claims like
his predecessors. At the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, on 6 December 1946,
Bevin finally gave a response, proposing to take the dispute over the Falkland Island
Dependencies – South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and the area known today
as the British Antarctic Territory – to the International Court of Justice in The Hague
for mediation. On three separate occasions over the following years Argentina declined
this proposal.
Concern in the House of Commons grew during the years 1946–48, over Argentinian
scientific detachments in British territory in the Antarctic, including a known Argentine
weather base at Gamma Island. By 1953, the number of unauthorized foreign settlements
on dependencies of the Falkland Islands stood at 11 at the point when the Argentine
dictator, Juan Domingo Peron, tried to buy the Falkland Islands. This offer was conveyed
to Britain by Alberto Teisaire, at the coronation of Queen Elizabeth. However, Peron was
told that the sale would cause the overthrow of the Churchill government.
Buenos Aires, anxious to recover the islands, now took the dispute to the UN. The UN
decolonization committee C-24 recognized the existence of a dispute and invited both
countries to enter negotiations over the islands’ future. British politicians on a factfinding
mission were baffled by the emotion in Argentina, whose people considered the Malvinas
as an integral part of their national soil. Life and communications on the Falklands had
changed relatively little since the first settlement was created at Port Louis in 1784. The
only means of reaching Port Stanley was still by ship, even if it was now a monthly steamer
from Montevideo, Uruguay.

The airfield at Port Stanley

The passage from Uruguay remained the only viable connection to the South American
mainland. The situation where the Falklands remained unconnected by air was unsustainable,
and, during the 1970s, the question of implementing a commercial air route to Argentina
came to the fore. A dual air and sea service was proposed, and David Scott, Assistant Under
Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, brokered a deal to strengthen
the country’s social and economic viability with essential access to public health, school
facilities and scholarships in Argentina. But with no sustained support through a dedicated
funding stream, after two months first the steamer RMS Darwin, and then the amphibian
Grumman HU-16 Albatross seaplane operated by Líneas Aéreas del Estado (LADE), the
Argentine Air Force airline, ceased operating.
June 1971 in Buenos Aires saw the British Government and the Argentine Republic sign
Communications Agreement Resolution No. 2065 (XX) whereby external communications
would be provided to the Falkland Islands by Argentina. On 3 May 1972, Grup 1
Construcciones boarded an Armada de la República Argentina (ARA, Argentine Navy) naval
transport coal ship, with their machinery, docking in Port Stanley on 9 May. The construction
team built a runway and an airport road over a period of seven months using locally sourced
materials. On 15 November 1972, the runway was inaugurated when the first Fokker F-27
arrived with 44 passengers on board. It was a day when many saw the Argentine and British
flags flying together on the Falkland Islands for the first time. Twice-weekly flights at Stanley
airport allowed islanders to travel directly to mainland Argentina for pleasure, schooling or
university, or to grow their businesses.
 7

An early link to the

Argentine mainland in the
1970s from the Falkland
Islands, a Grumman
HU-16 Albatross seaplane
operated by Líneas Aéreas
del Estado (LADE), the
airline of the Argentine Air
Force. (Andrew D. Bird
Collection)

In 1976 the airport runway was extended by Grup 1 Construcciones. Flights were improved
in 1978 when Johnson’s Construction was awarded the British government build contract
for Stanley airport, with a spur road and a fuel storage capacity enlarged to 50,000 litres
(11,000 gallons). When completed, the permanent runway was 4,000ft long and 150ft wide
and could accommodate Fokker F-28 jets; indeed days before the official opening by explorer
Sir Vivian Fuchs, the Argentinians successfully landed a LADE Fokker F28 Fellowship twin-
engine jet on the new runway. This service, operated by the Argentine Air Force LADE,
was the only air connection to the islands; it was maintained until spring 1982. The airport
also accommodated the Falkland Islands Government Air Service (FIGAS) with its Britten-
Norman Islanders and de Havilland Canada Beavers. Prior to hostilities the Royal Air Force
began to use the airport, to supply and reinforce the British military garrison when necessary.

First conflicts
With the signing of the air communications agreement, David Scott grasped the olive branch
from the Argentinians, with diplomats on both sides hoping to normalize the relationship.
However, by 1975 tensions had resurfaced. Under the command of Captain Philip Warne,
the British Antarctic Survey ship RRS Shackleton had been sent to conduct an economic
survey of the islands, with the expedition as a whole led by Baron Edward Shackleton, the
son of the explorer Sir Ernest Shackleton. The Argentine government reacted by promptly
sending their destroyer ARA Almirante Storni, which on 4 February 1976 intercepted the
Shackleton at sea 87 miles from Port Stanley.
Warne rejected the idea of being escorted to Ushuaia in Tierra del Fuego, and stayed on
course for Stanley, whereupon salvos of 5in shells were fired across the Shackleton’s bow.
Despite Warne signalling ‘explosives on board’, the Argentines fired twice more. Undeterred,
Warne refused to submit, and the Almirante Storni continued to shadow the ship until
it reached ‘the Narrows’, a strait leading to Stanley harbour. His cool-headedness earned
him an OBE.
A month before this incident, the expedition leader, Lord Shackleton, had arrived with
a team of economists to begin the factfinding mission. Forbidden to transit Argentina,
the team flew to Brazil and joined HMS Endurance to reach the islands in January 1976.
Prime Minister Harold Wilson was unaware that Shackleton’s visit coincided with the 143rd
anniversary of Captain Richard Onslow’s repossession of the Falklands in 1833, and Argentina
8 Introduction

withdrew their ambassador in protest. Shackleton’s report of 454 pages embarrassed the
Foreign Office and Prime Minister Jim Callaghan’s government, which had expected it to
conclude that the Falklands had no future except by collaborating with Argentina. Instead,
Shackleton called for the investment of £14m over five years, including, most importantly,
£2m to extend the runway at Stanley airfield. Callaghan appointed Ted Rowlands, a junior
minister, to be responsible for these ‘bloody dots’ on the map. Ted Rowlands was sceptical
of some of Shackleton’s recommendations, but won the islanders’ trust by commissioning
the building of the new runway and spur road at Stanley airport.
Negotiations for a solution saw Callaghan’s resolve tested. Argentina sent scientists and
military personnel to Southern Thule, one of the Falkland Islands Dependencies. The
establishment of a base flying the Argentinian flag, Corbeta Uruguay, provoked a response
from Britain. Captain Hugh Balfour led a British expedition to the Falkland Islands aboard
Leander-class frigate HMS Phoebe, together with frigate HMS Alacrity, nuclear-powered
submarine HMS Dreadnought and auxiliary ships, and set up a 50-mile exclusion zone. In
New York Rowlands met Argentina’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Captain Gualter Allara, at
the UN in an effort to reduce tension and discuss fresh sovereignty arrangements in favour
of Argentina. With mounting chaos in Britain and fear of losing the leadership of the Labour
Party, together with geographic and anti-colonial sentiment at the UN, Callaghan, in a non-
interference pact, let Corbeta Uruguay stay. It would be a prominent jumping-off point for
Argentine Special Forces to land on South Georgia in March 1982.

The road to war

The fall of the Labour government in May 1979 saw Rowlands depart. The election slogan
‘Labour Isn’t Working’ was not lost on the islanders 8,000 miles away. Their whole economy
was on a knife edge, with income from the islands’ principal product, wool from its 600,000
sheep, having plummeted by 20 per cent. Islanders were leaving, as the only future they
could see was Argentina taking over. For children, teenagers and those in their twenties and
thirties there was little to stay for.
The new British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, appointed Rex Hunt, a veteran
diplomat who had been Consul-General in Saigon, to the governorship of the Falklands.
Hunt immediately hauled the Falkland Islands Company, which had held a Royal Charter
since 1852, into the 20th century. He instructed its land agent to sell one of its farms to the
Falkland Islands government in an effort to make the islanders more self-sufficient. Green
Patch was split up into six farms of roughly 15,000 acres and 3,000 sheep apiece. For the
first time, six families had a stake in their own land.
The Fisheries Conservation Zone, another recommendation of Shackleton’s, also gained
Hunt’s backing, but the Foreign Office stonewalled the idea, not wanting to anger Buenos
Aires. Argentina had expanded its Rio del Plata fishery using factory vessels stationed around
the Falkland Islands. Argentinian offshore fleets, with or without factory vessels, caught
230,000 tonnes of fish in 1981 as opposed to 16,615 tonnes by the Falkland islanders. It
was realised this sector, if licensed, would bring the island the equivalent of $28.2 million
a year, but would cause serious tensions with the Argentine Junta.
Unknown to Rex Hunt, Foreign Secretary Nicolas Ridley had already spoken with his
opposite number Carlos Cavandoli and agreed in principle to the transfer of sovereignty
to Argentina, in an arrangement similar to the leasing from China of Hong Kong’s New
Territories.
In January 1981, discussions about sovereignty were curtailed in Stanley’s Town Hall.
Lacking Rowland’s tact, Ridley’s confrontational approach failed to convince the islanders,
and he promptly left aboard an aircraft of LADE, to the sound of furious demonstrators and
the rare sight of normally rather supine Islanders waving banners and fists.
 9

Ridley was lambasted in the House of

Commons about his 99-year leaseback scheme
and responsibility was passed to Richard Luce,
who began a series of challenging discussions
at the UN in New York. The Argentines had
expected for over 20 years that sovereignty would
be negotiated and eventually granted. These talks
in New York under the UN’s decolonization
auspices had been running intermittently since
the 1960s, more recently through the mid- and
late 1970s. There were signs beginning to show
that the military dictator, General Leopoldo
Galtieri, who had seized the presidency in
December, was tiring of the standstill and turning
towards a military solution in imitation of India’s
seizure of Goa in 1961.
Handley Page Victor
XL162 was built in 1961,
Argentina makes a move and served on No. 55
Squadron. It flew on Black
From the mid-1950s to the early 1970s, Argentina was a profoundly undemocratic Buck 1, then 2 and 6, and
country, ruled by a succession of military juntas that declared an all-out campaign known finally on Black Buck 7.
(Brian Armstrong)
as the ‘Dirty War’ when as many as 30,000 Argentinians were ‘disappeared’, many of them
kidnapped from their homes, brutally tortured, then thrown from aircraft into the muddy
waters of the Río de la Plata. In December 1981, General Leopoldo Galtieri took over
as president of the three-man junta, becoming the dictatorship’s third military president.
One of his first actions was to approve the setting up of a commission to prepare for the
capture of the Islas Malvinas in June 1982, codenamed ‘Plan Goa’. This plan was to develop
into Operation Rosario.
An expedition to South Georgia by a scrap-metal merchant had made Galtieri decide
on impulse to invade. As Argentina was a staunch ally of the United States and supplied
military and intelligence aid to its covert war in Central America, Galtieri and most of his
fellow officers were under the illusion that as Britain was losing interest in the area, the
USA would acquiesce in Argentina’s reclamation of the islands. At the time, Argentina’s
economy was suffering a huge financial crisis, with the economy in freefall and large-
scale civil unrest. Operation Rosario presented the military regime with an opportunity
to distract the Argentinian people and gain their support. Except that none of the senior
Argentine military officers on Plan Goa had assessed that Britain would react to the
invasion with military force.
By February 1982, Luce was in talks in New York with Argentina’s Deputy Foreign
Minister Enrique Ros. Both sides were resolved on finding a solution. This was rebuffed
by Galtieri, a fax from whose government made it clear that the only end-point of any
negotiations would be to recognize Argentine sovereignty over the Falklands. Weeks
later, on Friday 19 March, Argentinians were landing on South Georgia. By 29 March
intelligence had been presented to the British government indicating that the invasion
of the Falklands was coming and would take place early on Friday 2 April. The previous
weekend contingency plans by Argentina for the invasion had been made. Argentine forces
landed west of Stanley, the largest settlement on the islands, after sporadic resistance in the
small hours of 2 April and shortly after midday the population of 1,800 saw an Argentine
flag raised above Government House. As the islanders awaited a response from Margaret
Thatcher’s government, Defence Secretary John Nott was one of those reaching for an
atlas to clarify exactly where the Falkland Islands were.
10

CHRONOLOGY
1981 5 April Royal Naval Carrier group sails
31 August Vulcan Operational Conversion from Portsmouth
Unit disbands
6 April British government War Cabinet
22 December Military dictator General Leopoldo set up to provide day-to-day
Galtieri takes office oversight of campaign

RAF No. 617 Squadron US President Ronald Reagan’s

Vulcans disbands administration divided over
the conflict
1982
February British diplomat Richard Luce at 7 April US President Ronald Reagan
the UN in New York holds talks approves peace mission by US
with Argentina’s Deputy Foreign Secretary of State Alexander Haig
Minister Enrique Ros
9 April Alexander Haig arrives in London
RAF No. 35 Squadron and begins five hours of talks
Vulcans disbands
Vulcan B.2s based at RAF
29 March Intelligence reaches London that Waddington chosen,
Argentina’s military may invade modifications begin
Falkland Islands within 48 hours
10 April European Community approves
31 March RAF No. 27 Squadron trade sanctions against Argentina
Vulcans disbands
Argentine Super Étendard pilots
All training abruptly halted for begin air-to-air refuelling training
Argentine Naval Fighter Unit 2da with C-130K
Escuadrilla Aeronaval de Caza
y Ataque to prepare Exocets for 11 April Admiral Sandy Woodward requests
operational use plans for best use of Sea Harrier to
attack targets in Falklands
1 April Rex Hunt, governor of the
Falkland Islands, warns of a Alexander Haig arrives in
possible Argentine invasion Buenos Aires

2 April Argentine invasion of Falklands 11 April Argentine Exocet weapon system

declared ready
British Cabinet approves sending
of a task force to South Atlantic 12 April Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ)
radius 200nm (230 miles) around
Hercules transports deliver vital Falkland Islands
supplies to Gibraltar for Royal Navy
Argentine ARA Veinticinco de Mayo
3 April United Nations passes Resolution aircraft carrier seen as a threat if
502 demanding Argentine Super Étendard are able to launch
withdrawal
Alexander Haig arrives in London
 11

14 April Argentine Navy sails from 28 April Britain declares 200-mile Total
Puerto Belgrano Exclusion Zone

Haig returns to Washington to 30 April Alexander Haig’s peace mission

brief Ronald Reagan talks between London and Buenos
Aires finally collapse
15 April British destroyer group takes up
holding position in mid-Atlantic 30 April–1 May Black Buck 1 bombing mission
against Stanley airport; Sea
Haig flies to Buenos Aires Harriers also conduct attacks;
naval bombardments of the same
17 April Admiral Fieldhouse holds area commence
conference on Ascension Island
with Admiral Woodward 3–4 May Black Buck 2 bombing mission
against Stanley airport
Haig presents Argentine Junta with
a five-point plan 13–14 May Martel-armed Black Buck 3
cancelled. Rescheduled for 15–16
18 April Argentine aircraft carrier has May, then cancelled due to
engine trouble decision to end the Martel option

1st wave of five Victor K2s deploy 21 May British landings on the shores of
direct to Ascension Island San Carlos Water

19 April Argentines land on South Georgia 24–25 May Black Buck mission planned
and aborted
Air Vice Marshal Michael Beetham
outlines benefit of using Vulcan 28–29 May Black Buck 4 launched but aborted
bombers against Stanley airfield
30–31 May Black Buck 5 missile strike
Argentine Junta response to Haig
passed to London 3 June Black Buck 6 raid strikes radar
position in Stanley. Vulcan XM597
2nd wave of four Victor K2s diverts to Brazil
deploy direct to Ascension Island
10 June Vulcan XM597 flies back
20 April Plan for landing on the to Ascension
Falkland Islands (Operation
Sutton) discussed 12 June Black Buck 7 bombing mission
against Stanley airport
1st of three x MRR Missions flown
in support of Operation Paraquet 13 June Vulcan XM597 returns to
Waddington
27 April Cabinet in London gives approval
for Operation Sutton 14 June Argentine forces surrender

Sir Henry Leach notes that it is

vital to deny Port Stanley airfield
to Argentines as soon as possible
12 Attacker’s Capabilities

ATTACKER’S CAPABILITIES
Fighting an unexpected war

Handley Page Victor In 1982 Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF) and Fleet Air Arm were focused on their vital
K-2 tanker XL163, one responsibilities within NATO; consequently, neither were prepared for an independent
of three hastily converted
to carry out maritime expeditionary war in the South Atlantic. Successive Defence Reviews since the end of the
reconnaissance and British Empire had brought reductions in budgets and capability, and there was a limited
photoreconnaissance in number of assets. The RAF had five long range aircraft types: the Victor, the Vulcan, the
addition to their tanker
role. It clocked up Nimrod and the C-130 plus VC10 transport available to conduct Operation Corporate (war
maritime radar in the Falklands). British defence policy had been focused on a potential European and North
reconnaissance (MRR) Atlantic theatre of combat; consequently, a solo British out-of-NATO military operation
missions lasting 14hrs
5mins. (C.J. Pattle) had not been envisaged.
The RAF’s NATO responsibilities were to provide air defence over an extensive area of
500,000 square miles. By April 1982 the fixed-wing aircraft in service for this task and
maritime duties comprised 12 aircraft squadrons on high levels of readiness; four squadrons
of Nimrod long-range maritime patrol aircraft; two squadrons of Buccaneer anti-shipping
strike aircraft, armed with Martel missiles and laser-guided bombs; two squadrons of
Phantom FG.1s; two squadrons of Harrier GR3s for use in the close-air support role; four
C-130 Hercules transport squadrons; and 14 VC-10 C.1 passenger aircraft; two Victor
air-to-air refuelling squadrons; two Canberra PR.9 squadrons; and three low-level tactical
Vulcan squadrons, in the process of being phased out and replaced by multi-role Tornados.
The Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm had three squadrons of Sea Harriers.
Of these types, only a handful were capable of flying missions in the remote and challenging
conditions in the South Atlantic: the RAF’s Hawker-Siddeley Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft;
the Handley-Page Victor and Avro Vulcan, originally designed as nuclear bombers, with the
Victor now serving as a tanker; the Fleet Air Arm’s Sea Harrier carrier-based fighter; and
the RAF’s version, the Harrier GR.3. In addition, the Lockheed C-130 Hercules transport
aircraft served in the South Atlantic. The C-130s ferried personnel and supplies from Britain
to Ascension Island via Gibraltar and Dakar, and as the naval Task Force sailed south beyond
Ascension, they were the only way to airdrop important supplies to the fleet.
 13

Initially Nimrods and C-130s did not have the capability to undertake air-to-air refuelling,
another legacy of operating within NATO. RAF aircraft operating over the South Atlantic
out of Gibraltar relied on the assistance of two West African nations, Gambia and Senegal, for
refuelling en route. During the conflict, air-to-air refuelling solutions were rapidly developed,
as were extended-range fuel tanks for the C-130s.
Key to the whole operation was Ascension Island, 7º 56’ south of the equator in the
Atlantic Ocean. The island had been leased to the United States as part of the ‘Destroyers for
Bases’ package in spring 1940.1 The United States then built an air base on the island, known
as ‘Wideawake’. By the time of the Falklands War, the United States had been operating from
Wideawake for 40 years, and over the years the runway had been extended, widened and
improved to provide an emergency runway for Space Shuttle flights. The RAF and the naval
Task Force would use Ascension Island as a staging post for storage and missions.

Contributions by RAF on Wideawake airfield, Ascension Island to Operation Corporate

Squadron Aircraft Type Number Operational Use
No. 1 Squadron Harrier GR.3 2 Wideawake airfield air defence
No. 10 Squadron VC-10 C.1 14 Brize Norton to Ascension air bridge
No. 47 Squadron C-130 Hercules 3 Lyneham to Ascension Island air bridge /
special ops
No. 70 Squadron C-130 Hercules 3 Lyneham to Ascension Island air bridge /
special ops
No. 55 Squadron Victor K.2 10 Air refuelling RAF and Naval aircraft
No. 57 Squadron Victor K.2 10 Air refuelling RAF and Naval aircraft
No. 42 Squadron Nimrod MR.1 3 Maritime surveillance, co-ordination of air-
refuelling communication hub
No. 51 Squadron Nimrod MR.1 3 Maritime surveillance, co-ordination of air-
refuelling communication hub
No. 206 Squadron Nimrod MR.1 4 Maritime surveillance, co-ordination of air-
refuelling communication hub

Avro Vulcans used in Black Buck raids

Squadron Aircraft type Number Serial no.
No. 44 Squadron Vulcan B.2 2 XM597; XM612
No. 50 Squadron Vulcan B.2 1 XM598
No. 101 Squadron Vulcan B.2 1 XM607

Air defence and close air support from HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible
Squadron Aircraft type Number Aircraft carrier
No. 800 Naval Air Service Sea Harrier FRS.1 12 HMS Hermes
No. 801 Naval Air Service Sea Harrier FRS.1 8 HMS Invincible
No. 809 Naval Air Service Sea Harrier FRS.1 8 HMS Hermes / Invincible
No. 1 (F) Squadron RAF Harrier GR.3 10 HMS Hermes

The British command structure leading up to Operation Corporate saw Chief of the Air Staff,
Air Vice Marshal Michael Beetham, acting as Chief of the Defence Staff on Wednesday,

1 In this agreement, 50 obsolete destroyers were transferred from the US Navy to the
Royal Navy, in exchange for leases on British territory, primarily in the Caribbean,
and basing rights in Newfoundland and Bermuda.
14 Attacker’s Capabilities

31 March 1982, with the overly cautious Admiral

Terence Lewin in New Zealand on an official visit.
Beetham’s naval counterpart, the First Sea Lord
and Chief of the Navy Staff, Admiral Sir Henry
Leach, was at loggerheads with the Defence
Secretary, John Nott, who had just proposed
radical cuts in the navy’s surface fleet and residual
airpower, confining it to its NATO role as an anti-
submarine force.
Tensions between Britain and Argentina over
the disputed Falkland Islands/Malvinas had risen
swiftly after Argentinian scrap-metal merchant
Constantino Davidoff ’s commercial venture on
the 19th March to dismantle a Leith whaling
station on South Georgia Island. Davidoff's
salvage workers had been reinforced with a
detachment of marines masquerading as civilian
scientists commanded by Lieutenant Alfredo
Victor K.2s of No 57 Astiz. A British Antarctic Survey field party also there observed a military-style parade where
Squadron with serial ten Argentinian marines raised the Argentine flag on an electrical tower. In response, on
numbers K.2 XL512 and
Victor K.2 XL160 visible. 21 March, HMS Endurance sailed from Stanley harbour for South Georgia with 13 Royal
XL160 had been Marines reinforced with a detachment of nine from Naval Party 8901, Falklands garrison.
converted to a K.2 tanker Endurance reached South Georgia early on 24 March and anchored at Grytviken, 15 miles
in 1970. Both retired in
1993 and were scrapped. north of Leith.
XL160’s cockpit was With the unease over South Georgia and the Falkland Islands situation, Henry Leach
retained and, by 2018, contacted Commander-in-Chief Fleet Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse to ascertain the fleet’s
it was back at Marham
being showcased in the state of readiness. 18 Royal Navy destroyers and frigates were participating in NATO Exercise
Aviation Heritage Centre. Spring Train off Gibraltar. They were commanded from HMS Antrim by Rear Admiral John
(Courtesy of RAF Museum) ‘Sandy’ Woodward, of the First Flotilla. On the 26th March the first Royal Fleet Auxiliary
(RFA) ship Fort Austin received orders to prepare for deployment to the South Atlantic
with the nuclear-powered submarine HMS Spartan, which docked in Gibraltar to swap
her practice torpedoes for live ones. One of the Royal Navy’s two aircraft carriers, HMS
Invincible, had been sold to the Royal Australian Navy for £175 million and HMS Hermes
was due to be decommissioned in the autumn of 1982, but Fieldhouse confirmed that
Invincible and Hermes would be brought out of maintenance and crews recalled from leave.
On the evening of the 31st, in Margaret Thatcher’s Commons office were people from
Whitehall, in a what-to-do meeting of ministers and officials, presided over by the Prime
Minister. Not unreasonably, Nott believed there was no way of stopping the imminent
Argentinian landing, and that, once made, it would be impossible to reverse it from a starting
line 8,000 miles to the north. He saw diplomacy as the only means of limiting the damage.
As no British government had ever considered what to do if the Argentinians did invade, no
military plans existed for such an eventuality. Discussions continued for three-quarters of an
hour before the First Sea Lord arrived, still in full uniform from a function at Portsmouth.
He pledged that a task force could be mobilized to recapture the islands, despite the distance,
and that it could be ready by the weekend. The British armed forces were put on initial alert.
For Margaret Thatcher, it was a lifeline.
A last-ditch effort saw Ronald Reagan speak with Leopoldo Galtieri over a conference
line from 2034hrs to 2114hrs on 1 April, trying to persuade him not to invade the Falkland
Islands. He got nowhere. When pressed whether Argentine military would take action,
Galtieri stated that it was an opportune moment unless Britain’s government that very night
recognized full Argentine sovereignty over all of the Falkland Islands and their dependencies,
 15

and agreed to provisions for turning over control within

the next few months.2 Reagan sent a personal message to
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at 0645Z on 2 April
that America had solid information that Argentina was to
take military action.
Argentina launched Operation Rosario to capture the
Falklands on Friday 2 April 1982. Ministry of Defence
radio contact with Port Stanley was lost at 0945hrs London
(GMT plus 1). Efforts to re-establish communications
through HMS Endurance began, but by 1300hrs radio
contact had not been successful. In the House of Commons
the next day – a Saturday, the first weekend sitting since
the Suez Crisis of 1956 – the PM was able to galvanize a
sense of national loss into one shared purpose, reclaiming
the Falkland Islands. The Labour leader Michael Foot’s eloquent support in standing up to Tanker-to-tanker refuelling
right-wing military dictators nailed his colours to the flag in backing the Prime Minister. over the South Atlantic.
Crews of the detachment
There was a monumental shift, and she consulted Harold Macmillan and others on how to colloquially known as
conduct herself. Macmillan advised her to establish a war cabinet. ‘112 Multi-Role Victors’
Defying all doubters the British Cabinet approved the military option on 2 April. In overall were flying an average
of 100hrs per month
command of the British Task Force was Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, Commander-in-Chief compared to their normal
of the Royal Navy, at Fleet Headquarters, in the north-west London suburb of Northwood. 25hrs pre-conflict.
Admiral ‘Sandy’ Woodward had tactical, front-line command of Task Force 317 at sea. (Courtesy of Brian
Armstrong)
Woodward selected HMS Antrim, HMS Glamorgan, HMS Coventry, HMS Glasgow, HMS
Sheffield, HMS Brilliant, HMS Plymouth and HMS Arrow to head south on 2 April. In
Britain, at Royal Naval Air Station Yeovilton, 800 Naval Air Squadron left to go onboard
HMS Hermes for an early departure, and 801 prepared to board HMS Invincible, as both
aircraft carriers were being made ready for operational deployment, along with all available
frigates, destroyers and amphibious warships.
Fieldhouse appointed Air Marshal Sir John Curtiss, co-located at Northwood, his air
commander. Initially only a small number of Nimrods and C-130s were viewed as having a
role in Task Force 317’s mission to the South Atlantic, and five Hercules were dispatched from
RAF Lyneham to Gibraltar and Ascension Island with vital supplies for Sandy Woodward’s
task force. Curtiss also brought in staff and their kit from the Maritime Tactical School based
at HMS Dryad to act as contingency planners at Northwood.

Ascension
The nearest British-owned staging location was Ascension Island — a 33.9 square mile
spit of land 3,900 miles away from the Falklands and another remnant of Britain’s empire,
but one now used by the Americans. Ascension Island’s strategic role had begun after the
Napoleonic Wars, when Napoleon was exiled to St Helena to the south-east, and Ascension
was garrisoned by the Royal Navy. Over the 19th century it evolved from a victualling
and coaling station into a mid-Atlantic communication powerhouse. In December 1899,
the Eastern Telegraph Company (ETC) installed the first of an underwater cable network
linking Britain with Cape Town, South Africa (1900), then followed it with connections to
Freetown in Sierra Leone (1901), and Buenos Aires (1910) through roughly 100,000 miles
of cables. ETC merged with Cable & Wireless, and by 1942 its employees were cabling half
a million messages every month.

2 Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diaries, vol. I, p. 121

16 Attacker’s Capabilities

Despite America’s early neutrality in World War II, it

was already negotiating with Britain over military bases
that would stretch its global reach, with the Destroyers for
Bases agreement signed in September 1940. In November
1941, one month before the Japanese attack on the
American naval base at Pearl Harbor, the governor of St
Helena relayed a classified message to Stephen Cardwell,
Cable & Wireless’s general manager, instructing him to
survey Ascension for a site appropriate for building an
airstrip. Already, it was stated that the Americans would
be involved.
Vulcan XM607 on the The airfield at Ascension would be built by the US military, by arrangement with the
apron at Wideawake. British government, for airpower was proving a key weapon in the Battle of the Atlantic.
A cluster of technicians
with ear defenders stand Basing long-range aircraft on Ascension would provide air cover over a section of the central
around a Bronze Green Atlantic, as well as enabling US aircraft to transit via Ascension to North Africa and the
Land Rover with its sticks Mediterranean. A site at Waterloo Plain was proposed for the airfield, which would be
and holes supporting a
rolled soft-top roof. named after the numerous sooty terns that inhabited the area, known as ‘wideawake birds’.
Nearby on the left is a Lieutenant Colonel James Kemp surveyed the site using the Vought OS2U Kingfisher
‘Palouste’ air start unit floatplane from the cruiser USS Omaha, and concluded the site was excellent.
used to start the engines.
On the right-hand side The task of building Wideawake Field was given to the US Army’s 38th Combat Engineer
is a ground power unit Regiment under the codename Operation Agate. The airfield was officially open after 91
(GPU), probably a diesel days of construction. In World War II, Wideawake had a fuel depot with eight steel tanks
electric set. (Andrew D.
Bird Collection) for aviation fuel holding 462,000 gallons each, supplied by offshore tankers via a 1,100ft
pipeline into Clarence Bay. Two radar stations were built, as was a road system to connect
the airfield to Georgetown.
Post-war, in August 1955, President Dwight Eisenhower signed an agreement with Prime
Minister Anthony Eden to re-establish a US Air Force base at Wideawake. The Eastern
Test Range station was erected in 1957, to track and monitor missiles launched from Cape
Canaveral in Florida. A decade later, the Wideawake runway was extended to 10,000ft to
meet the demands of the jet age. NASA established a spaceflight tracking and deep space
station (DSS 72), operated by the Bendix Field Engineering Corporation, based in Maryland,
for the Jet Propulsion Laboratory within the California Institute of Technology at Devil’s
Ashpit, which supported the Apollo spaceflight programme. Apollo missions were monitored
by two 9m AZ-EL-mounted antennae with high angular-tracking rates, while the base’s
deep-space antenna had a nominal communications range of 60,300km. The location of
this installation was separated by Green Mountain, whose peak at 2,819ft meant maximum
protection from noise or interference from Cable & Wireless when using the Intel Sat II for
Apollo missions. The NASA station at Wideawake was the first to receive perhaps the world’s
most famous radio transmission: ‘The Eagle has landed.’
By 1980 there were 800 permanent residents on the island, most of whom were originally
from St Helena. Lieutenant Colonel William Bryden US Air Force (USAF) commanded
Ascension Auxiliary Air Force Base and the US tracking station. Known as ‘Bill’, he was a
master navigator who had flown 105 combat missions in the Vietnam War in AC-119K
gunships. In 1978 he joined the Test and Evaluation section of the Headquarters Air Force
Systems Command at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, and held the position of chief of
test policy until assuming command on Ascension. Technical and support services for the US
air base and tracking station were supplied under contract to the Air Force by 73 Americans
from RCA, 63 from Bendix and 31 from Pan American. Around 25 times a month, Pan Am
Cargo’s Boeing 707-321Cs flew in supplies or rotated contractors monitoring US missile
and satellite tracking missions. This pattern remained unaltered for ‘Bill’ Bryden until a
phone call at 0830hrs on 2 April 1982, when a journalist from London’s Evening Standard
 17

In the foreground there

are two Harrier GR.3s of
No 1 (F) Squadron, sent
to provide air cover for
Ascension Island. In their
first take-off, both took off
vertically rather than use
Wideawake’s runway and
burned a significant hole
in the asphalt. American
Bill Bryden was forced to
limit the runway to 7,000ft
for two days while it was
resurfaced. (Andrew D.
Bird Collection)

queried how many aircraft he expected from the RAF and how far it was from Ascension to
the Falkland Islands. He had no idea what she was talking about.
In response to concerns over neutrality, Dean Fischer, Assistant Secretary of State for
Public Affairs, advised that:

Our view on this is that Ascension Island is a British possession. The United Kingdom has the
legal right to land military aircraft there after notifying you, the U.S. Air Force Commander,
at the airfield. The U.S. Government is obligated under a 1962 agreement governing its
use of the airfield, to cooperate in the United Kingdom’s use of logistic, administrative, or
operating facilities; and therefore, such use of the airfield does not, in any way constitute
U.S. involvement in the United Kingdom–Argentine dispute.

Lord Carrington sent a formal notification of the British government’s intentions on

2 April through the British Embassy in Washington, advising the US authorities that British
forces planned to use Ascension’s facilities to support the British airlift operation that was
getting underway. He requested the airfield operated on a 24-hour basis which would see
Wideawake temporarily becoming the world’s busiest operational airfield. Any equipment
or ammunition that the warships lacked due to their hasty departure had to be flown to
Ascension Island, as did anything the base required to function as the forward logistic support
for Operation Corporate. The increasing operational tempo saw American JP-5 aviation fuel
stocks rapidly diminish: 100,000 gallons of JP-5 had already been consumed by 7 April. The
British estimated JP-5 consumption rate at 660,000 to 800,000 gallons per week to support
air operations at Ascension. A USAF tanker pumped off 1.3 million gallons on 9 April into
US stocks, Washington’s British Air Attaché requesting that this offloading ‘fill the storage
tanks to full capacity for RAF use.’ This would meet logistical needs for three weeks. The
US Embassy in London informed the Thatcher government that if there was urgent need of
JP-5 and, should the US not be able to meet this requirement, they would have no objection
to the British delivering additional fuel by means of their own tankers.
An additional request for fuel support by the British arrived on 13 April. Washington’s
own computations saw a further 900,000 gallons (just over one week’s supply) released by the
United States on the island. Even with access to this fuel, Washington’s British Air Attaché
estimated the RAF would run out on approximately 20 April. 250,000 gallons had been
consumed by Monday 19 April, and just 12,000 gallons remained by the Thursday, meaning
an adjustment to RAF operations to compensate. However, Bryden spoke with the Pentagon,
and US Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, requested the Defense Fuel Supply Center
and the Military Sealift Command pull a tanker out of a US exercise in the Caribbean and
redirect it to Ascension to replenish Wideawake’s fuel tanks with 2.4 million US gallons of
JP-5 jet fuel (nearly Wideawake’s full capacity of 2.5 million). The tanker was to arrive on
18 Attacker’s Capabilities

24–25 April. Bryden received orders meanwhile, to draw

on US war reserve stock to meet the RAF requirements
until the tanker arrived.
The JP-5 was discharged from the tanker at Catherine
Point using a floating pipeline and transferred to the tank
farm at Georgetown, 3 miles from Wideawake. Fuel was
normally pumped into bowsers, but a bottleneck quickly
formed, even with an additional 12 Leyland Hippo
refuellers, each of 2,500-gallon capacity. The road surface
(built from volcanic ash) was abrasive, and soon flat tyres
caused further disruption. This was resolved by 1 Troop,
51 (Construction) Squadron Royal Engineers, who laid
a 4-mile-long pipeline from the farm to Wideawake to
replace the refuelling lorries. An additional 180,000-gallon
bulk tank facility, using fuel bladders, was installed at the
A Victor tanker is dwarfed airfield by the Royal Engineers and operated by 12 Petroleum Operations Section Royal
by a Lockheed Martin Army Ordnance Corps. By the time military operations ceased in mid-1982, Ascension had
Galaxy C-5A (00464)
with a USAF C-141 transferred six million gallons of aviation fuel from US tankers.
Starlifter (700X) behind.
America airlifted crucial
missile stocks, including
105 Sidewinder missiles,
Diplomacy
to the South Atlantic to During the Task Force’s voyage south, Margaret Thatcher had both to maintain pressure on
bolster British air defences. Argentina and keep critics and allies satisfied that she was open to a negotiated withdrawal.
In the foreground is Victor
XL189 on the runway; this This was not easy. The new Reagan administration opposed the war, having cultivated
was Bob Tuxford’s aircraft good relations with the Galtieri Junta in Argentina in the hope that it would prove an
on Black Buck 1. important ally in the battle against Soviet influence in central America. The United States
(Reproduced by kind
permission of Air Mobility feared that the Junta’s fall would bring the return of a left-wing, Peronist government, and
Command Museum and it also had significant financial and personal interests in Argentina. As much as one-fifth
National Museum of the of US banking capital was exposed if Argentina defaulted on its debt and there were as
US Air Force)
many as 16,000 Americans resident in the country.
There was no great understanding on Capitol Hill or the US Embassy in London of
the depth of the crisis the invasion had provoked in the House of Commons, with near-
unanimity across the political spectrum on the need for military action. In America, the
State Department saw the conflict as a throwback to Britain’s imperial past, and Jeane
Kirkpatrick, the US Ambassador to the UN and a Cabinet member, made little or no
effort to disguise her distaste for American diplomatic support of Britain. She thought
a policy of neutrality made sense from the point of view of US interests and would do
Britain no harm, but she was far from passive. Reagan’s Secretary of State, Alexander
Haig, tried unsuccessfully to act as mediator, flying to both London and Buenos Aires.
There was probably little chance of success, but his efforts were seriously undermined by
the undisguised support offered to Argentina by Kirkpatrick, who held regular contacts
with members of the Galtieri government to pass on details of her government’s latest
diplomatic intentions. Kirkpatrick also had grave concerns about the implications of the
Rio Treaty. Latin Americans were lining up behind Argentina and the whole hemisphere
could become involved. Reagan hoped to retain the friendship of all of Latin America,
but it was more important that Britain did not fail. Anglophile Caspar Weinberger’s
Department of Defense began a number of non-public actions of substantial covert
support while outwardly portraying itself as neutral, before America came down politically
on the side of Thatcher and Britain.
Economic sanctions began on 6 April. Embargos on military kit going to Argentina
saw $6–7 million of American spares in the pipeline halted. European sanctions were of
 19

greater military significance: French aircraft and missiles

(underway) were embargoed by President Mitterrand,
but a clear breach saw a French technical team of Dassault
stay in Argentina. 3 In Paris, Ambassador Gerardo
Schamis, Argentine Ambassador to France, spoke with
American Ambassador-at-Large, Vernon Walters, whom
he had known for many years, and indicated a British
Task Force had sailed. Schamis flashed an urgent signal
to the Argentine Foreign Ministry but Nicanor Costa
Méndez ignored his message, believing that the US was
in a position to achieve a satisfactory solution before the
British reached the 50th or 40th parallel. Options for
resolving the Falklands dispute meant Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, continued lengthy Vulcan XM598 touching
and intensive discussions. back down on Ascension’s
Wideawake. (Crown
Haig was seriously concerned that Thatcher had been listening largely to the Ministry Copyright MOD)
of Defence, especially senior naval and air force officers, and might not have adequately
considered non-military options. At the end of April, Haig produced terms of a settlement,
a very reasonable proposal, which safeguarded British sovereignty but left open the possibility
of negotiating at some stage. The Argentinians rejected it, and the PM’s Cabinet never had
to reply to his proposal. Haig took this rejection by Galtieri as a contributing factor to
the Reagan administration coming down on Britain’s side. The failure to avert the conflict
ultimately cost Haig his job as Secretary of State.

The Vulcans
After his initial Commons meeting with the Prime Minister and Henry Leach, Air Chief
Marshal Michael Beetham realized that the conflict would require massive transport and
strategic tanker support immediately and put squadrons on standby. The discussion with
the Air Staff of what the Royal Air Force could do with the resources available was more
challenging. There was speculation in the British and American press that the delta‐wing Avro
Vulcan bomber, conceived in the reign of George VI, might be used to target Argentina and
the Falkland Islands, which was not actively discouraged by the newly formed War Cabinet.
Ironically, one of the first stunts which showed the Vulcan’s ability to fly a great distance
(albeit with refuelling stops) was a flight to Argentina’s capital Buenos Aires in 1958. Dr
Arturo Frondizi had become the first elected Argentine president in 12 years and on 1 May
1958 two B.1 nuclear bombers entered Argentinian airspace for an airborne salute over the
inauguration ceremony.
Just over 20 years later, the RAF’s last three Vulcan squadrons, Nos 44, 50 and 101, were
preparing to be disbanded on 30 June, with the remaining aircraft sent to aviation museums or
scrapyards. Beetham reached back to this technology believing that the Vulcan could contribute to
the retaking of the Islands; however, there was an immediate realization that the RAF simply did
not have the right kit for an adventure in the South Atlantic. The Vulcan was the longest-range
bomber that the RAF possessed, able to fly 2,600 miles at 50,000ft. Unfortunately Ascension
Island, the closest available airfield to the Falklands, was an 8,000-mile round trip away.

3 Team’s leader, Herve Colin, admitted carrying out one Exocet missile test that
proved invaluable to Argentinian forces to determine if the missile launcher was
functioning correctly or not. Three launches failed; the team located the source of
the problem and the Argentinians were able to fire Exocets at the Task Force using
three previously faulty missile launchers which they fitted to under wing pylons.
20 Attacker’s Capabilities

RAF Waddington was the only remaining

Vulcan base, where Group Captain John
Laycock, the base commander, received his
orders on Good Friday, 9 April. He recalled
from Easter leave his next-door neighbour,
Wing Commander Simon Baldwin, the
commanding officer of No. 44 Squadron, to
head up the Vulcan effort in the Falklands. His
remit was to integrate a team drawn from the
Waddington Operations Wing planning staff
and the remaining Vulcan squadrons. The base’s
conference room was utilized as the hub with
extra telephones installed and Baldwin’s team
set about planning what were the longest-range
bombing missions in the history of air warfare,
and would remain so until October 2001 when
Avro Vulcan showing the a USAF B-2 flew a mission of 44.3hrs to Afghanistan and back from Whiteman Air
cockpit pressure dome Force Base in Missouri.
(yellow) with the central
scanner bay hatch from
the cabin, as well as the Selecting and refitting the aircraft
internal refuelling supply Not all of the ageing fleet of Vulcans were fit for the extremes that a Falklands raid would
pipe, mount and the
wiring. The dome would involve. It was deemed essential for Black Buck Vulcans to have the more powerful Rolls-
also house the radar Royce Olympus 301 turbojets, giving 20,000lb (88.96kN) of thrust compared to 17,000lb
mount and HS2 radar unit from the 201 series. From the 36 Vulcans that remained operational, 18 were equipped with
and the rotating radar
scanner. If the HS2 the Olympus 301s, and to extend the lifespan of each engine they had been flown more
scanner toppled or was gently, to a maximum of 97.5 per cent of full thrust. From this shortlist, selecting airframes
unusable in flight, to stop meant checking their fatigue meter, which monitored the g-forces the airframe was subjected
it bumping around, the
radar navigator would to during each sortie. At each predetermined interval on the meter, the aircraft would have
crawl to insert a key and the appropriate maintenance carried out by the manufacturers, and would be then returned
fix it upright fore and aft with an effective zero rating. Those airframes with a high fatigue count were removed from
to stop rotation. (Anthony
Wright) the equation.
The standard of instrumentation also varied among aircraft, and those with the best
analogue bombing computers were selected. Each mechanical device had particular
characteristics, and some performed better than others. Technicians examined the computers’
performance results and reduced the pool of Vulcans from 18 to six: serial XL391; XM597;
XM598; XM607; XM612; and XM654. Waddington then had to add an additional
electronic countermeasures (ECM) device, as although the onboard jamming systems were
effective against legacy Soviet equipment, they were ineffective against emerging threats and
the modern Western-made systems used by Argentina. The solution utilized an AN/ALQ-
101D (or ‘Dash 10’) jamming pod, as fitted on the RAF’s Buccaneer force, integrated onto
the aircraft using the hardpoints originally intended for the Douglas GAM-87A Skybolt air-
launched nuclear ballistic missiles, which were made redundant when Britain signed up for
Polaris in 1962. These Vulcans received a beefed-up outer wing structure with a hardpoint
and necessary wiring for a Skybolt pylon, with updates to the navigation system as the aircraft
was incompatible with the missile. These modifications could be made to Vulcans that were
in production, with 60 existing B.2s being returned to Avro for conversion. The intention
was to have 72 Vulcan B.2 variants for 140 Skybolt missiles.
Not all paper-based aircraft records had been transferred on to the new RAF computer
system by April 1982. Therefore the Waddington engineering team did not know which
of the individual Vulcans that remained in service had the full fore and aft Skybolt missile
attachments and associated ducting that would be required for the new cabling necessary for
 21

RAF Avro Vulcan B.2 possibles for Black Buck operations

Aircraft serial no. Olympus 301s1 Full Skybolt Partial Skybolt Black Buck op
XH557 • •
XJ748 • •
XL386 •
XL3912 • • •
XM575 •
XM594 •
XM597 • • •
XM598 • • •
XM606 •
XM607 • • •
XM612 • • •
XM647 • •
XM648 • •
XM651 • •
XM652 • •
XM6543 • • •
XM655 • •
XM656 • •
Total: 38 18 5 9 6
1. 18 Avro Vulcan B.2s fitted with Olympus 201s were on strength at RAF Waddington: XH558*,
XH560*, XH561*, XH562*, XJ783*, XJ823*, XJ825*, XL319, XL321, XL360, XL426, XL444,
XL445, XM569, XM571, XM527, XM573. Those marked with * had only partial Skybolt Avro Vulcan B.2 assembly
modifications. line at the factory site at
Woodford which had
2. XL391 was not equipped with the X-band jammer normally fitted in front of the ECM bay undergone expansion to
inspection door in the rear fuselage; it stayed at RAF Waddington in reserve. accommodate the Vulcan.
3. XM654 was partially brought up to Black Buck specification, and kept at RAF Waddington as Some 136 aircraft were
a reserve. built (45 to the B.1 design
and 89 B.2 models) with
B.2’s XM597, XM598 and
carrying external stores. In some cases they were totally absent during external checks, while XM607 reaching notoriety
five different permutations for external underwing attachments were recorded. during the Falkland Crisis
Those equipped with the appropriate combination to carry the Skybolt consisted of a twin in 1982, some 26 years
after the first flight.
forward attachment point, a single one to the rear and a small blister or fairing situated immediately (Andrew D. Bird
ahead of the forward attachment points. The blister was originally intended to provide the Collection)
Skybolt with coolant but for Black Buck
it was to be utilized to feed the wiring
loom through the wing to the cockpit.
Inspecting XM654, the appropriate
combination was not seen, while XM606
had a low fatigue life remaining so was
discounted. No manufacturing plans for
the Vulcan pylons were located at either
British Aerospace Systems nor the RAF
Museum in London, so the engineering
team at Waddington had to design and
manufacture the hardpoints. Each was
individually constructed using material
from a hardware store.
The remaining five – XL391,
XM597, XM598, XM607 and XM612
22 Attacker’s Capabilities

– had all the full specifications, but still

required attention. Their Olympus 301s
had to be restored to full thrust, and
the long over-water flight meant that
the Vulcans’ traditional method of radar
navigation using ground features was not an
option. Astronavigation was too inaccurate
for a mission that demanded precision
navigation. Instead, the Delco Carousel
inertial navigation system, sourced from
British Airways supplies or scavenged from
ex-British Airways Super VC-10 jet airliners
awaiting conversion into tankers at RAF
Abingdon and RAF Brize Norton, provided
increased navigation accuracy for both
Vulcans and Victors over the large expanse
of the South Atlantic Ocean.
The Vulcans’ self-defence With the Vulcans limited to an operational range of 2,607 miles, air-to-air refuelling would
was improved by the be essential. However, missions had lapsed in the post-Polaris years and with the contraction
addition of the AN/ALQ-
101 or Dash-10 pod used of deployments globally, no Vulcan pilots were current in air-to-air refuelling – in fact it had
to counter radar-guided been 13 years since a Vulcan had even undertaken this task, which the bomber crews had
weapons, purloined from been led to believe was the strict preserve of intensely trained fighter pilots.
Buccaneers based at RAF
Honington. This ECM It was not merely training that had to be refreshed – the Vulcans’ technical capability to
equipment was critical on conduct air-to-air refuelling had to be renewed. Engineers replaced their 4in non-return
Black Buck sorties when valves, thanks to 20 replacements that were located on a shelf at RAF Stafford. By Easter
penetrating the Argentine
radar defences. (Crown Monday, 11 April, engineers had rebuilt a serviceable in-flight refuelling system after dried-
Copyright MOD) out seals were replaced, pipes checked under pressure for leaks and corrosion on the probe
nozzle remedied, while one crucial component was discovered in the engineers’ mess, serving
as an ashtray! More kit was reclaimed from airframes in Britain and America: the vital bomb
carriers to hitch iron bombs inside the bomb bay. Likewise, the nuclear weapon release
panel had been replaced by the 90-way selector panel for greater accuracy in bombing
competitions, which worked by enabling three offset points to be used during the run. None
could be located on the RAF computer system, but boxes of them were rescued from a skip
at RAF Scampton.
Four Vulcans that had been configured for nuclear missions, XM597, XM598, XM607
and XM612, were thus converted back to the conventional bombing role, then had their
individual squadron markings blanked out and the underside resprayed in Dark Sea
Grey. Calibrated to tolerances specified in the aircraft manual, they were signed off as
up to standard, backed by ample stocks of engines and spares. However, there was also
a major logistical problem in getting an adequate supply of ordnance to Ascension. The
solution would be to load the bombs prior to flying to the islands; although bombers
do not usually fly and land with a full bomb load, these were exceptional circumstances.
Vulcan XM564 was partially brought up to operational level, and XL391 became a second
reserve. As the RAF hastily regenerated its air-to-air refuelling capabilities, other aircraft
required attention – the remaining Vulcans were cannibalized for their fuelling probes
and systems. Curtiss extended mid-air refuelling capability with the conversion of C-130s
and the Nimrods, allowing them to take their Searchwater radar much farther south than
their original 1,800-mile range. So sophisticated was the Nimrods’ radar that they could
distinguish between submarines and whales – a problem that haunted the Task Force as
it steamed south, watching for Argentine attack but coincidentally also following the
mammals’ southward migration.
 23

Aircrews and training

On the morning of Easter Monday four senior officers met at Waddington to select crews.
Flight Lieutenant Martin Withers and Squadron Leader Alastair ‘Monty’ Montgomery were
recently back from Red Flag, a yearly US war game exercise over the deserts of the US
southwest. Both were experienced in flying formation which would be required for air-to-
air refuelling. Squadron Leader Neil McDougall had not been deployed to Nevada with
Montgomery and Withers, but had more experience as he was the only one on base who
had flown on air-refuelling sorties, albeit back in the 1960s when the tanker was a Vickers
Valiant. However, RAF Marham’s stretched tanker resources meant that only three crews
could be supported so McDougall became the reserve and was replaced by Squadron Leader
John Reeve.
Three air-to-air refuelling instructors (AARIs) arrived at Waddington. Flight Lieutenants
Dick Russell, Pete Standing and Ian Clifford, well-practised in the manoeuvre, were to
teach both the Vulcan pilots and co-pilots. After each crew had a brief simulator experience,
airborne refuelling training for real began on 13 April, and each crew was to complete three
mid-air ‘prods’, one by day and two at night. Time constraints meant that only the pilots
and not the co-pilots were trained, and on 27 April Russell and the two other AARIs were
told they would be joining the Vulcan crews on the mission itself. During the work-up to
perform this task, the day and night tanker training was cut short when the assigned Victors
of No. 55 and No. 57 Squadron were redeployed to Ascension.
Air Vice-Marshal Mike Knight’s decision that the AARIs should fly the mission meant
an adjustment to the V-bomber crews’ cohesive units. The AARI would sit in the co-pilot’s
right-hand seat then either fly or supervise ‘prods’ on the flight until the bomb run. The
Vulcan co-pilot sat in a jump seat in the crew compartment. After the final ‘prod’ the air
electronics officer would help them swap places by disarming the co-pilot’s ejector seat, after
which the AARI unstrapped himself, squeezed between the seats and went down the ladder.
The co-pilot would then climb up the ladder onto the flight deck to join his captain. The
reverse took place for the return leg. The arrangement was quickly grasped as it relieved the
strain on the pilot, who needed to focus on the run into the target, and added a reserve if Avro Vulcan B.2 XM607
when back at Waddington
either pilot or co-pilot was incapacitated. with bomb tally markings
The pressure from Air Commander John Curtiss to get them to Ascension and into the for successful missions
theatre of operations was immense. Simon Baldwin ramped up the training schedule, with targeting Port Stanley
airport runway, as
each crew clocking 50hrs in ten days, of which 70 per cent was at night. The refuelling follows: 30 April–1 May
valves had to be modified to achieve connections without fuel leaking over the Vulcans’ Flight Lieutenant Martin
windscreens. After disassembling the valves, the technicians identified a modification that Withers; 3–4 May
Squadron Leader John
had been made on the Victors’ refuelling valves but not implemented on the Vulcans’, as the Reeve; 12 June Flight
system was redundant. The modification did the trick late on 26 April, and Reeve, Withers Lieutenant Martin Withers.
and Montgomery successfully completed their air refuelling
conversion.
The crews flew simulated missions with their bomb bay
holding seven 1,000lb iron bombs armed with nose and tail
fusing; with no delayed fuses they would detonate instantly
on hitting the Ministry of Defence bombing range at Garvie
Island, off Cape Wrath in the far north-west of Scotland. Ewes
were lambing at Balnakeil near Cape Wrath, and the nearby
crofters and farmers received an emergency warning from
the Highland regional authorities that the Vulcans would
be operating during the lambing season. Compensation was
offered by the Ministry of Defence if ewes miscarried.
On 20 April the three Vulcans conducted a low-level
training operation at Cape Wrath. At 350ft the navigation
24 Attacker’s Capabilities

radar operators in the back of the aircraft spoke to the pilots to correct for
drift while the pilots on the flight deck kept the Vulcan straight and level.
The bomb run had to be conducted without any adjustments in speed,
otherwise as the bombs separated from their racks the strike pattern would
be affected, so fine were the margins. When the 1,000lb bombs dropped,
each deployed a small parachute from the tail cone to slow its descent, to
ensure that the Vulcan had enough time to escape from the detonation. It
was challenging for all, and rather disappointing for the navigation radar
operators, who were becoming familiar with conventional arming and
release procedures on the bomber’s old analogue computers, to find that
having released their bomb load they would see it drift downwind and
fall harmlessly into the sea instead of producing a fierce hail of iron and
rock. Before returning to Waddington the trio set off down the Scottish
west coast before tearing over the border into Cumbria to their target –
RAF Spadeadam, or ‘Spadeadam Waste’, a huge electronic warfare range
whose staff had hastily reprogrammed computer systems to replicate the
emissions of the fire-control radars and the surface-to-air missiles known
to be operated by the Argentines. The Dash-10 jamming pod worked
by picking up the detection pulse of the enemy fire-control radar and
electronically altered the radar return of the incoming jet to place it in
airspace four or five miles away.
Avro Vulcan bomb bay
looking towards the rear
of the aircraft showing the
‘Vulcan Seven Store
Target
Carrier’ which was Air Vice-Marshal Ken Hayr, the officer tasked to manage the formidable air operations in the
suspended holding seven South Atlantic, purloined drawings of the Port Stanley airport runway specifications, which
1,000lb conventional high
explosive (HE) bombs. showed that the layers comprised a minimum of 32mm of asphalt surface, then 300mm of
(Andrew D. Bird compacted crushed stone, then white sand underneath. A single airport terminal building
Collection) and parking apron had also been built, in addition to a number of smaller storage buildings.
Hayr’s briefing for Sir Michael Beetham had seen him chew over the difficulties of hitting
mainland Argentina, which was legally questionable, politically provocative and not worth
the fallout. He arrived at the same conclusion as Baldwin: that the Port Stanley runway, on
a spur of land next to the coast and running almost east–west, appeared to be the only viable
military target for the Vulcans’ bombs. The mission would impede Argentina’s ability to wield
air power from Port Stanley airfield, and thus support the Royal Navy’s approach and the
eventual amphibious landings, which would be codenamed Operation Sutton.
Beetham was instrumental in getting the mission approved by the Chiefs of the Defence
Staff and told John Nott that the mission was militarily feasible with a good chance of
success. The bombing runs over the Cape Wrath range showed that seven 1,000lb bombs
were not enough, but a full load of 21 would do the job. If dropped at low level on the
Stanley runway, there would be a 90 per cent probability that this would cause one crater
and a 75 per cent chance of inflicting two. Air Vice-Marshal Mike Knight’s planning team
at No. 1 Group, RAF Bawtry, and Simon Baldwin at RAF Waddington knew that the
enemy had anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) around Stanley,
and air defence radars, so they changed the height of the bomb run. The Roland SAM was
the main threat, effective up to 16,000ft, but intelligence said these had not been deployed.
A bomb run at 8,000ft-plus was an acceptable attack height. It did not completely remove
the dangers, but the plan meant a low-level approach under Argentinian radar; pop up to
8,000ft or above; use the ECMs to blind the Argentine radar; release the free-fall 1,000lb
bombs, with enough spacing, to achieve a 35-degree runway cut. At least one of the bombs
should hit the target, and the element of surprise would give the Argentinians only seconds
 25

to react, meaning that in theory the attacking Vulcans should

be safe from threats based in Port Stanley, including any
Argentinian fighters in the Falklands, and also that they
were unlikely to be intercepted by jets from the mainland.
Waddington’s base commander John Laycock gave it his
approval, and the crews practised the new mission profile
twice, as the political debate over the use of RAF bombers
in the war continued. The Prime Minister and Defence
Secretary John Nott were positive about the deployment of
Vulcans to the Ascension Islands, while Foreign Secretary
Francis Pym and Deputy Prime Minister William Whitelaw
had doubts. Pym had been named Foreign Secretary after
the resignation of Lord Carrington on 5 April. Pym and
Whitelaw were uncomfortable with the implications of military action and were left A still photograph taken
increasingly isolated, with Pym having suggested previously that the recapture of South from a camera mount on
the underside of an Avro
Georgia by Argentine Marines had created a new opportunity for settlement, on a kind of Vulcan showing an open
‘honours even’ basis. Margaret Thatcher did not see things that way, and the deployment bomb bay after dropping
was authorized on 27 April. practice bombs off the
coast of Scotland.
(Andrew D. Bird
Collection)
The Victors and Nimrods
All Black Buck missions were entirely dependent upon the RAF’s support aircraft for their
long-range operations. It had been a good decision for the Ministry of Defence to convert
Handley-Page Victor B.2 bombers into K.2 tankers,4 although the original order for 29 K.2
tankers was reduced in February 1975 to 24 aircraft. In 1982 most of these were on the
strength of either No. 55 or No. 57 Squadron at RAF Marham.
The tanker conversion programme, carried out at British Aerospace Woodford, involved
not only the installation of refuelling equipment but also a renewal of each aircraft’s fatigue
life. Thirty-two separate tanks were fitted, so that the tanker could pump fuel from any one
of them to another to maintain the aircraft’s centre of gravity. The total fuel capacity was
to be 128,000lb, with 67,000lb contained in 16 separate tanks positioned in every space
available in the length of the fuselage, and two massive tanks in the former bomb bay. The
internal wing space contained 32,000lb, spread among 12 tanks, and the large underwing
tanks contained a further 27,000lb. Each wingtip tank provided an additional 1,000lb of fuel
capacity. To give it some perspective, the underground fuel storage below a roadside petrol
station holds fuel in the region of 46,000lb (22,000 litres), depending on the number of
pumps. In-flight fuel was transferred from the port wing group and forward bomb bay tank
which normally supplied the port Mk.20 refuelling pod, while the starboard wing group and
aft bomb bay tank supplied the starboard Mk.20 pod.
Since May 1978, when the final Victor XH672 was delivered and joined No. 57 Squadron
at RAF Marham, the tanker crews had continuously performed in their peacetime role,
refuelling British and allied fighters, predominantly RAF interceptors from the Quick
Reaction Alert (QRA) units. These fighters scrambled from east-coast air bases to intercept
long-range Russian aircraft over the North Sea, and were supported by air-to-air refuelling
aircraft. This role routinely tested the RAF’s reactions, and both fighters and tankers had
to be able to respond to an airborne threat 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. This experience

4 The conversions had been authorized by Edward, Baron Shackleton, who had been
Minister of Defence for the RAF between 1964 and 1967, and who would later
research and write the 1977 Falklands Report.
26 Attacker’s Capabilities

A Victor trailing its centre-

line refuelling hose as the
receiver, a Vulcan, edges
closer. (Courtesy of RAF
Museum)

would be key to the conduct of air offensives during Operation Corporate, although long-
range flights over the unfamiliar South Atlantic Ocean necessitated upgrades to the Victors’
navigational equipment, notably the installation of the Delco Carousel inertial navigation
system and the Omega navigation system.
Air Marshal Sir John Curtiss, Air Officer Commanding the RAF’s maritime group, No.
18 Group, learned that none of the ten Victor K.2 crews of No. 55 Squadron or No. 57
Squadron selected for deployment were trained in night receiver techniques (i.e. capable of
taking on fuel from another tanker in darkness), as it had been deemed unnecessary. However,
K.1 pilots were qualified to do so, so each K.2 had an experienced former K.1 pilot assigned,
after which the crew underwent night air-to-air refuelling training with an instructor over two
nights to qualify ready for deployment on 18 April. Preparations complete, RAF personnel
from Marham deployed in mid-April to Ascension Island. The ground crew technician
and engineers were drawn from the Vulcan squadrons at Waddington to form No. 195 (A)
Squadron, a composite squadron whose task was to maintain the Vulcans used in operations.
The second RAF asset deployed to Ascension was its maritime patrol aircraft, the Hawker-
Siddeley Nimrod. This was a design that dated back to the dawn of the jet era, based on
an extensive modification of the De Havilland Comet, the world’s first jet airliner which
first flew in 1949. The Nimrod was introduced to RAF squadrons in October 1969 and
designated MR.1. By 1975, 35 of the original 45 aircraft had been taken out of service and
modernized with a new electronic suite, and designated MR.2.
Based at either RAF St Mawgan in Cornwall or RAF Kinloss in north-east Scotland,
the Nimrods’ operations varied from hunting Soviet submarines to maritime search-and-
rescue. Shortly before deploying to the South Atlantic, a Nimrod coordinated the rescue
by helicopters of survivors from MV Manchester and MV Victory south-west of Cornwall.
On 5 April, No. 42 Squadron’s Wing Commander Davie Bough received a signal to deploy
MR.1s to Ascension in support of the Task Force. Both versions of the aircraft, which was
designed for anti-submarine duties, with a crew of 14, and equipped with a bomb bay and
wing pylons to mount a variety of weapons, would play a vital role in securing the Falkland
Islands. Nimrods XV244 and XV258 flew out first, but as neither had in-flight refuelling
probes they were routed via Gibraltar to Ascension Island, and arrived on 6 April. It was
imperative for the Nimrod fleet to be modified to support air-to-air refuelling. John Scott-
Wilson at BAe Manchester estimated that it would take one month to design, fit and clear
air-to-air refuelling systems.
 27

An Avro Vulcan at RAF

Waddington prior to
repainting, with a Martel
missile attached on the
port side, and a Dash-10
jammer on the starboard
side. (Crown Copyright
MOD)

By 14 April, John Nott had given clearance for Scott-Wilson to proceed and immediately
moved his team to Woodford where Nimrod XV229 was ready for modification. Nearby was
Vulcan XA603, newly purchased for static display in the proposed Avro Heritage Centre.
Within hours the airframe was minus its probe. A metal pipe was then fed through the
Nimrod’s upper escape hatch, aft of the pilot and co-pilot’s seats, which splayed out into two
standard fuel bowser hoses secured to the floor with jubilee clips. These ran the length of the
aircraft behind the operators’ seats to disappear underneath the cabin floor (the engineers
having dispensed with a pair of flare chutes) for them to join the aircraft’s normal fuel
system. This improvised system affected the aircraft’s directional stability, so a quick fix saw
a wooden keel riveted on under the rear fuselage replacing the standard tail ‘bumper’, while
a vertical avionics antenna, borrowed from the intelligence-gathering Nimrod R.1 variant,
was fitted to the top and bottom surfaces of each tailplane to improve aerodynamic stability.
With the problem solved, a live transfer of fuel with a Marham Victor was successful on 30
April, and the following day Nimrod XV238 was delivered. Further Nimrods were modified
at two sites using fuel probes from Vulcans not selected to participate in Operation Black
Buck, or which were acting as reserve aircraft. Eighteen pilots then completed air-to-air
refuelling instruction for night and day prods and gained rapid qualification. On 7 May a
crew then flew the first R.2 XV227 to Ascension, having been refuelled en route.
Commanders based in Britain and on Ascension Island wore multiple hats. The overall
commander of Operation Corporate, Admiral John Fieldhouse, effectively had control over
aviation elements as well, both naval and RAF. Air Vice-Marshal George Chesworth, a veteran
maritime pilot with extensive experience in the Korean War and strong leadership qualities,
served under Curtiss as the chief of staff of No. 18 Group at Northwood headquarters.
Chesworth would be deployed forward to Ascension, making him one of the most important
figures in the Black Buck missions; he exercised tactical control over air-to-air refuelling and
anti-submarine/surveillance aircraft, though the Victors and Nimrods remained under the
detachment commanders, respectively Wing Commander David Maurice-Jones and his
replacement, Wing Commander Alan Bowman of No. 57 Squadron, and Wing Commander
David Emmerson. Chesworth had completed more than 50 missions during the Korean War,
including some in extreme conditions, and then had a long and distinguished career as a
maritime patrol pilot and commander; he wrote the Air Staff requirement that produced the
Nimrod, and commanded the first Nimrod squadron. No jingoistic war lover, Chesworth
was described by one of his staff as ‘a wise leader and a perfect gentleman’ and had a wide
28 Attacker’s Capabilities

reverence for life, not only for the lives of those serving
on Ascension or with the Task Force but also for
the enemy’s.
Wing Commander David Emmerson, commanding
No. 206 Squadron which flew Nimrod MR.2s out
of RAF Kinloss, had been briefed on 21 April at the
Joint Headquarters at Northwood to take charge of the
Nimrod MR.2 deployment on Ascension Island. They
would be replacing the Nimrod MR.1s from No. 42
Squadron, XV244 and XV258, which had arrived on
6 April and formed the first permanent detachment on
Ascension. The MR.1's deployment coincided with the
request to operate on a 24-hour basis, and involved the
provision by the US to provide additional air controllers
for the two Nimrod aircraft around the clock for an
An unidentified Avro indefinite period (since the missions would be coordinated with naval submarines and the task
Vulcan is lined up to force). Emmerson had been rapidly cleared to use the brand-new and secret Stingray torpedo,
‘prod’ the drogue of a
Victor to receive fuel. having dropped them on the range at Machrihanish off the Scottish coast. The first MR.2 to
(Andrew D. Bird arrive was the non-probe-equipped XV230 on 13 April; then four days later XV255 arrived
Collection) from Kinloss. With the arrival of Nimrod XV227, Emmerson went through a work-up to make
crews ready for missions 300 miles off the Argentinian coast and within range of their fighters
and spy planes. An encounter by one MR.2 crew with a Boeing TC-92 reconnaissance jet on
12 May prompted the quick installation of two pylons under the wings of the Nimrods to carry
AIM 9L air-to-air missiles. The missiles were requested on 14 May by the British Embassy in
Washington, and 50–80 missiles were delivered from Naval Weapons Station Charleston to
Britain within 24 hours. The Nimrods were rotated back for fitting out. In an audacious move
David Emmerson flew Nimrod XV227 to within 60 miles of Argentina, below radar coverage,
The Anglo-French Martel turning to fly north-east parallel to the Argentine coastline, its Searchwater radar surveying an
AS.37 ARM missile area 400 miles wide and 1,000 miles long.
attached to the DIY pylon
made of quarter-inch-thick Nimrod crews could also pick up signals from No. 51 Squadron’s top-secret intelligence-
steel plate welded into a gathering Nimrod R.1. This single jet, XW664 from RAF Wyton, routed out on 5 May, the
box section by the day after HMS Sheffield was hit, via Bermuda and Belize to San Félix Island, a small rock in
technicians at RAF
Waddington. (Crown the Pacific Ocean 600 miles west of the South American coast. On their sorties over the Pacific
Copyright MOD) Ocean, the 29 crew on board harvested valuable intelligence, monitoring activity at Argentina’s
southern radar, air and naval bases. Intercepts were
occasionally communicated to Emmerson’s crews
before 19 May when Operation ACME was closed
down by Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, Ken Hayr,
because of the risk of the XW664 missions being
discovered, despite a request from Woodward for
further missions prior to Operation Sutton.

Ordnance
Missiles
The only weapons available for a runway strike
were British-made conventional unguided ‘iron’
bombs. For raids against the Argentinian radars,
the other high-value target on the Falklands, the
Anglo-French AS.37 Martel missile (already in
service with the RAF) was initially an option.
 29

A Victor tanker was chosen for a trial fit of the AS.37 on its starboard pylon before deployment,
and Vulcan XM597 was trialled with a single AS.37 missile fitted on the port wing pylon for
flight and live-fired once on the Aberporth range in Wales. The trial proved that the Martel was
a fearsome weapon, if not a predictable one. It had been intended that the missile would fall into
the sea short of the target, with the motor firing for only a couple of seconds after launch. It did
not go as intended. Its motor fired for a short duration and the missile was propelled towards
the target – and locked on. It became such a threat that the radar had to be rapidly switched off
and the range hut vacated. The Martel impacted the beach and drove a furrow just short of the
hut where the target radar was located. With civilians in close proximity to the targets, the risk of
collateral damage was uncomfortably high, given that the Martel had a probability kill (pK) of
only 60 per cent, and that its very large 330lb high-explosive warhead would be careering towards
Stanley at a speed of Mach 2.

AS.37 Martel missile. Anglo-French passive radar anti-radiation missile version (not used)
Mass 550kg (1,210lb)
Length 4.18m (13ft 9in)
Diameter 0.4m (16in)
Warhead 150kg (330lb) and fitted with a Misznay-Schardin plate
Detonation proximity fuse
mechanism
Engine two stage solid propellant rocket motors
Wingspan 1.2m (3 ft 11in)
Operational range 60km (37 miles) max (estimated, and depending on the launch conditions)
Maximum speed Mach 0.9 +
Guidance system passive radar homing, video guided

The Martel option would be discontinued by Northwood after Black Buck 3, the first
(cancelled) attempt to use the weapon in combat. The Martel’s role would be taken by the
more capable American AGM-45 Shrike missile when this was offered, and once initial
avionics problems had been overcome.

AGM-45A Shrike missile

Mass 390lb (177.06kg)
Length 10ft (3.05m)
Diameter 8in (203mm)
Warhead 67.5kg (149lb) MK 5 MOD 1 (or MK 86 MOD 1) blast-fragmentation, or
66.6kg (147lb) WAU-9/B blast-fragmentation
Wingspan 3ft (914mm)
Operational range 16km AGM-45A, 0km AGM-45B
Maximum speed Mach 1.5
Guidance system passive radar homing

GBU-16 Paveway II
Mass 1,000lb (453kg)
Length 12ft (3.07m)
Diameter 14in (360mm)
Warhead Mk 83 United States 1,000lb (450kg) HE with Mk 83/BLU-110B/B
warhead used with GBU-16 Paveway II
Operational range 14.8km (9.2 miles)
Guidance system semi-active-laser
30 Attacker’s Capabilities

AGM-45 Shrike missiles

being prepared for
transportation by US Air
Force personnel. (US
National Archives)

1,000lb general-purpose (GP) bomb

Although air power technology had moved into the era of guided weaponry, in January 1982
an estimated 200 1,000lb bombs remained in stock with a manufacturing date of c.1955.
Remarkably, these would be the only weapons available to target the Port Stanley runway.

Specifications
Mass 1,000lb (450kg)
Length 119.49in (3,000mm)
Diameter 14.06in (357mm)
Casing foundry cast or machined
Filling Tritonal (mixture of 80% TNT and 20% aluminium powder) Torpex (42% RDX, (Research
Department explosive) or hexogen) 40% TNT and 18% powdered aluminium)
 31

DEFENDER’S CAPABILITIES
Argentinian forces in the South Atlantic

The Islas Malvinas dispute was not Argentina’s only territorial quarrel. Argentina had almost The French Super Étendard
fought with Chile over the islands and demarcation line in the Beagle Channel, the only 3-A-210 Fighter-Bomber
was used throughout the
inland alternative to the Strait of Magellan for passages between the Atlantic and Pacific Falklands war by
oceans. Argentina had suffered the humiliation of defeat by arbitration in 1977 when the Argentinian forces.
International Committee of Jurists, a body commissioned by the British Crown – the agreed (Luis Rosendo/Heritage
Images via Getty Images)
mediator since 1902 – had found in favour of Chile, whereupon Chile gained a larger stake
in the South Atlantic and Antarctica. Although the rights over the area would be renegotiated
when the Antarctic Treaty expired in 1991, to have an Argentinian administration comfortably
installed in the Islas Malvinas at that point would likely be beneficial. While the national
attachment to the islands was longstanding and heartfelt, a successful outcome to Operation
Rosario would also offer practical advantages.
On 15 December 1981 Vice Admiral Juan Lombardo became Chief of Naval Operations,
based at Puerto Belgrano, south-west of Buenos Aires. He reported to Admiral Jorge Anaya,
the naval member of the three-man military Junta with Galtieri and Brigadier General
Basilio Lami Dozo. During his time as fleet commander, Lombardo had seen 50 Argentinian
‘military scientists’ set up a base on South Thule, with British Prime Minister James Callaghan
agreeing to non-interference. He then began a scheme to restore administration of the islands
to Buenos Aires, to coincide with the 150th anniversary of the day when the captain of HMS
Clio ordered the removal of the Buenos Aires-appointed governor in Port Stanley.
Understandably the Junta thought it a good moment to dust off a plan to seize the
Falklands and its dependency, South Georgia. Keen to cleanse the Junta’s image after the
tortures and killings of the dirty war, Anaya ordered Lombardo to prepare invasion plans to
establish Argentine sovereignty of the Islas Malvinas, and also to include a withdrawal plan
because the prospect of occupying the islands long-term was not attractive. He estimated
it would probably require two weeks to remove the Argentine armed forces. The operation
was to involve the Argentinian Air Force, Army, Navy, Marines and Naval Air Arm; but,
Lombardo was only to consult with Rear Admiral Carlos Büsser of the Marines, Garcia Bol
32 Defender’s Capabilities

OPPOSITE THE ATLANTIC OCEAN THEATRE, 1982

of the Naval Air Arm and Captain Gualter Allara, Deputy Foreign Minister. Lombardo
struggled to bring all the elements together, and eventually Army General Osvaldo Garcia
and Brigadier Sigfrido Plessel of the Air Force joined his planning team; but it nevertheless
became disjointed as none of the services had co-operated operationally before except on
internal counter-insurgency missions.
Elders in Argentine diplomacy were proud of their record as peacemakers. Argentina had
been awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1935 for finding a settlement to the Chaco War
between Paraguay and Bolivia. Now the nation was going to war for the first time since
the Paraguayan War of 1865, and was committed to having the invasion force ready by
15 September 1982, a date close to the British intention to scrap HMS Endurance. It was
also by when Argentina’s 14 new Dassault Super Étendard strike aircraft equipped with 16
AM39 air-launched Exocet missiles should be in service. An initial plan was for the covert
occupation of South Georgia, however, Juan Lombardo insisted if the Falklands were the
main objective, early occupation of South Georgia be cancelled. Galtieri and Anaya agreed
but then, on 20 March, in Uruguay, Lombardo read in the press that Constantino Davidoff,
a scrap merchant, had landed on South Georgia. Learning that he had been reinforced with
a detachment of marines under Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz and furious at being double-crossed
by his own service, he knew that Britain would react. The blue and white national flag raising
by marines led to the passing of Resolution 502 at the UN, upholding British objections
to the use of force and requiring Argentine withdrawal. Fearing a British response, on 25
March, Admiral Anaya gambled, ordering Carlos Büsser to ensure that the amphibious assets
for Operation Rosario were ready to sail in 72 hours. Working intensely, Garcia Bol and
Sigfrido Plessel brought Argentine air assets to operational status to support the invasion:
Four of the seven Black Grumman S-2E Trackers, Lockheed P-2 Neptunes, Sikorsky S-61D-4 Sea Kings, Westland
Buck missions used iron
bombs; the remaining Lynx HAS23s, Fokker F-27s and F-28s, C-130 Hercules, de Havilland Canada DHC-3
missions against Argentine Otters, Bell UH-1 Hueys, Hughes 500Cs, Boeing CH-47C Chinooks, Boeing 737s and
mobile radar sites on the Aérospatiale AS 332 Super Pumas. The war that would follow would be a rare example of a
island used AGM-45A
Shrike anti-radar missiles. Cold War conflict in which both sides used western weaponry, with Argentina’s equipment
The Vulcans were rapidly sourced largely from the United States, Britain, France, Germany and Israel.
modified to carry two Argentine troops landed on the Falkland Islands during the early hours of 2 April. LVTP-7
AGM-45A missiles on
Skybolt wing pylons. assault amphibious vehicles descended into the water from the landing ship ARA Cabo
(Crown Copyright MOD) Sa Antonio (Q42) and were ashore by 0630hrs, one commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
Mohamed Ali Seineldin of the Regimiento de
Infantería Mecanizado 25 (25th Mechanized
Infantry Regiment), with three more LVTP-7s
in support. Port Stanley airport was successfully
taken, the runway littered with concrete
blocks, and the odd vehicle in response to the
invasion was cleared; then a Sea King from
2da Escuadrilla Aeronaval de Helicópteros (2nd
Naval Helicopter Squadron) touched down at
0734hrs. Within half an hour the first Grupo
1 fixed-wing Hercules C-130 transport from
Comodoro Rivadavia landed. Air activity was
high with continuous landings. Two C-130’s
stayed after offloading and obstructed half
of the apron which slowed down the process
 33

CAPE VERDE
NORTH ATLANTIC ISLANDS
OCEAN

VENEZUELA

AM
GUYANA

RIN
FRENCH

SU
COLOMBIA
GUIANA

Ascension Island

BRAZIL
PERU

BOLIVIA

Rio de Janeiro Refuelling 1

PARAGUAY
San Felix

Refuelling 3

Refuelling 2
Refuelling 1
URUGUAY
CHILE

ARGENTINA
Refuelling 3

Refuelling 2 SOUTH ATLANTIC

Trelew
OCEAN
Refuelling 4
Comodoro Rivadavia,
Air Force Southern Command

San Julián
Santa Cruz support base
Argentinian air bases
Río Gallegos
Air bases used by RAF
FALKLAND ISLANDS Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ)
South Georgia
Río Grande N Black Buck flight route
Black Buck 6 diversion to Rio de Janeiro
0 500 miles
Nimrod reconnaissance
off Argentina, 15 May
0 500km
34 Defender’s Capabilities

of unloading other transport aircraft and distributing equipment by VII Brigada Aérea’s
two Chinook helicopters. Major Brigadier Hellmuth Conrado Weber, Commander of Air
Operations, also deployed Grupo 3’s twenty-four FMA IA58 Pucará to Stanley with the
support of the KC.130H Hercules TC-70. The first four arrived at 16.00hrs on 2 April to
form the Pucará Malvinas Airmobile Squadron (Malvinas Escuadrón Aeromóvil), the first
combat aircraft to land on the island. Guiding them down was the Air Surveillance and
Control Group 1 (Grupo de Vigilancia and Control Aéreo 1).
The first casualty at Stanley airport was on 14 April, 1982. Rain and a strong wind
whipped across the runway; the pilots of Fuerza Aérea Argentina (Argentine Air Force)
Fokker F-28 TC-53 tried to touch down in the opposite direction but their excessive speed
meant that the aircraft careered off the runway. Its left tyre burst and broke the nose gear.
When it stopped, it was 50m from going into the sea, with tail raised at 45 degrees. Using
M8A1 matting the runway was extended by 262ft to facilitate the removal of TC-53 coupled
to a bulldozer. It was later repaired and transferred back to the mainland for continued service
carrying military supplies and Exocet missiles.
It was therefore imperative that the focus of the Argentinian Army was the tactical air
defence of the only significant airport in the Malvinas from low-altitude attack. The Argentine
defence system was formidable, combining the best features of British and European systems;
if permitted to function as designed, the air defence array was capable of effective protection
to key targets on the Malvinas. Recognition of this, and of the versatility of the Argentinian
radar systems, surface-to-air missiles, and the possibility of Exocet missiles being deployed
to the islands drove Admiral Sandy Woodward, and planners at Northwood as they strove
to craft plans to dismantle this capability.

Air defence
Prior to Operation Rosario, Argentine Army units for air defence comprised Grupo de Aérea
Defensa 601 and Grupo de Aérea Defensa 602 (GADA 601 and GADA 602, 601st and 602nd
Air Defence Groups). Each was mobilized on 12 April, then deployed to East Falkland
(Soledad Island). There they formed the nucleus of 1º Grupo de Defensa (1st Defence Group)
AAA. Commanded by Major Hugo Maiorano, this group was deployed to garrison the
airfields on the islands. It was made up of 3rd Batería with 35mm Oerlikon GDF-002
35/90 guns, under the command of First Lieutenant Oscar Spath, and 4th Batería under
the command of First Lieutenant Félix Dalves with nine Rheinmetall RH 202 20mm guns,
and 15,000 rounds. Since arriving on 2 April, 4th Batería were stationed at Stanley airfield
(Puerto Argentino) with Dalves installing their AN/TPS43 radar in the airport area, near the
coast. On April 12, there was a change of location for Dalves to the outskirts of Stanley, to
become better camouflaged. 820ft from their radar, located in Government House, was the
Command and Control Centre for the entire air defence of the islands, together with the
anti-aircraft defence command post nearby. Integral to that defence was AN/TPS-43 and
AN/TPS-43F exploration radar with a maximum range radius of 425km (264 miles), and
a Swiss-made Super Fledermaus which provided fire control for the three 35mm Oerlikon
GDF-002 35/90 pieces, and gave a 4km (2.5-mile) umbrella of defence with a 360-degree
coverage. It also had nine 20mm RH 202 twin cannons for close defence. A TPS-43 radar
was used to locate enemy threats, for air traffic control, and for directing fighters against
British forces. The system furnished coverage from low altitude through mid-stratosphere and
its operators were attached from Grupo 2 Vigilancia Aérea y Control de Tráfico Aéreo Militar
(Group 2 of Air Surveillance and Military Air Traffic Control). It was linked to the centre in
Government House to establish engagement priorities. At Goose Green Maiorano deployed
the 7th Batería, with an Israeli ELTA portable scanning radar (purchased in 1980) for target
indication with a 20km (12.4 mile) range with six Rheinmetall RH 202 20mm twin cannons.
 35

The naval element Infanteria de Marina (Marine Infantry)

had shared responsibility for air defence and was integrated
with Maiorano’s 1º Grupo de Defensa AAA to coordinate
Stanley’s AAA, effectively combining to defend against enemy
aircraft or helicopters. Infanteria de Marina came under the
command of Marine Major Hector Silva. They deployed
to the Falkland Islands with three triple SAM Tigercat
launchers (with their trio portable optronics and radio
guidance directions) and 12 single-barrel 30mm Hispano
Suiza HS-831 cannons. The battalion was deployed in three
sectors covering 360-degrees of the airfield. Each sector had
three 30mm cannons and a triple Tigercat launcher.
As of 2 April 1982, the British did not know the operational
strength or capabilities of the Argentine Air Defence on the
Falkland Islands. However, Argentina had deployed 15 Oerlikon GDF-002 25/90s; one Tigercat trailer-mounted
Contraves Super Fledermaus fire-control system; six units of Contraves Skyguard fire-control launcher with an operator
seated at the fire-control
systems (the Super Fledermaus’ replacement); 15 20mm Rheinmetall RH 202 twin-barrel equipment in the early
cannons; one Roland SAM post; seven triple Tigercat SAM posts; 20 30mm Hispano- 1970s in Britain for a
Suiza HS-831 cannons; three Oerlikon 20/120 20mm cannons; one Westinghouse AN/ demonstration. This short-
range surface-to-air missile
TPS-43 radar (3D); one Cardion TPS-44 radar (2D) and two ELTA portable radars; plus (SAM) system equipped
the numerous handheld Blowpipes (60 initially) and SA-7 Strela (170 initially) that were the GADA Mix 602
available to Argentine troops. missile battery jointly with
the Franco-German Roland
Most AAA systems were initially clustered around a defensive point – Port Stanley airfield. SAM system which began
Lieutenant Colonel Héctor Lubin Arias of GADA 601 was then tasked to deploy a Cardion to arrive in early 1982.
TPS-44 Mk II and Contraves Skyguard with 12 Oerlikon 35mm GDF-002 35/90s to A total of seven Tigercat
missile launchers were
Sapper Hill (Cerro Zapador) and Goose Green (Goose Prairie); while Second Lieutenant deployed; there were
Claudio Oscar Braghini of 3a Section Batería B /101 deployed two Oerlikon 35/90 GDF- several near misses, but
002 cannons, with two generator sets, one Skyguard and 280 boxes of 35mm ammunition no confirmed losses.
(Andrew D. Bird
to Goose Green. Collection)

Argentine air defence units on the Malvinas

Grupo de Aerea Defensa 601 | Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Héctor Arias
Cardion AN/TPS-44 Alert Mk II A/O scanning radar, with maximum range of about 400km
(250 miles)
Oerlikon Skyguard Rheinmetall Defense system integrating the Skyguard fire-control system, used to
control 12 Oerlikon Contraves twin 35mm GDF-002 35/90 series towed anti-aircraft guns
A complement of 429 men: 26 officers, 117 non-commissioned officers and 286 soldiers –
operators or technicians
Total number of support vehicles deployed from the mainland was 13: one jeep, five Dodge-type
light trucks and seven trucks. GADA 601 had the most motorized vehicles in the entire deployment
to Malvinas, so supported the other units.
Grupo de Aerea Defensa 602 | Overall command of First Lieutenant Carlos Leónidas Regalini
Towed SAM Roland missile launcher (all-weather version with radar and/or optronic guidance),
commanded by Second Lieutenant Diego Noguer.
Three Oerlikon 20mm anti-aircraft guns, with ammunition stocks comprising 16,000 rounds of
20mm cannon shells, commanded by Second Lieutenant Rodolfo Sánchez with 20 men (operators
or technicians)
Four triple SAM Tigercat missile launchers, with four Dodge-type light trucks, two tow launchers,
with second trailer with fire-control equipment
The staff of 602 unit were included in the GADA 601 nominal roll
36 Defender’s Capabilities

OPPOSITE RAF AIRFIELDS IN BLACK BUCK

Batería B Grupo de Artillería AAA 101 (GADA 101) | Commanded by Major Jorge Alberto
Monge
Eight single-barrel 30mm Hispano Suiza HS-831 cannons
Ten Browning machine guns 12.7mm, ammunition stocks comprising 16,000 rounds
101 GADA deployed to the islands with three officers, 19 non-commissioned officers and 90
soldiers: total 112 men
One jeep, one Dodge-type light truck and five trucks
El Batallón a.a. de La Infantería de Marina | Commanded by Marine Major Hector Silva
Estimated complement of 20 men – operators or technicians
Three triple SAM Tigercat missile launchers, with three Dodge-type light trucks, two tow launchers,
with second trailer with fire-control equipment
12 single-barrel 30mm Hispano Suiza HS-831 cannons
Complement of 250 men including officers, non-commissioned officers and marine gunners or
technicians/operators.

The move to the Malvinas

During the mid-1970s, GADA 601 had confronted the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP)
guerrillas, led by 39-year-old Mario Roberto Santucho. A coup d’état in March 1976 saw the
military Junta overthrow all constitutional, national and provincial authorities, deposing the
country’s president, Maria Estela Martinez. GADA 601 was based at the headquarters of
Subzone 15 from where illegal methods of torture, murder and disappearances were carried
out during the so-called Dirty War.
Two years later, on 12 December 1978, GADA 601 moved to north-western Patagonia
with GADA 602 in the build-up of military forces during the Beagle Channel dispute with
Chile, establishing AAA sites at Black River, Colorado River and Limay River to defend key
bridges. January 1979 saw them quartered in Patagonia. During those four years GADA 601

One of the Argentine

Skyguard cabins blending
in with its surroundings on
the Falkland Islands.
(Andrew D. Bird
Collection)
 IRELAND 37
UK
RNAS Yeovilton
RAF St Mawgan
GERMANY
RNAS Culdrose

FRANCE

NORTH ITALY
ATLANTIC
OCEAN SPAIN
PORTUGAL

Gibraltar

ALGERIA TUNISIA
MOROCCO
1. RAF Kinloss, Morayshire
Nimrod MR.2
Nos. 120; 201; 206 Squadron
2. RAF Waddington, Lincolnshire
Vulcan B.2
Nos: 44; 50; 101 Squadrons
3. RAF Marham, Norfolk
WESTERN 1 Victor K.2
SAHARA Nos: 55; 57 Squadrons
4. RAF Wittering, Lincolnshire
Harrier GR.3s
No. 1 (Fighter) Squadron
5. RAF Brize Norton, Oxfordshire
VC-10 C.1
MAURITANIA MALI No. 10 Squadron
CAPE VERDE 6. RAF Lyneham, Wiltshire
RAF Lyneham Transport Wing
ISLANDS
Hercules C.1, Hercules C.3
Dakar SENEGAL Nos: 24; 30; 47; 70 Squadrons
Banjul THE GAMBIA 7. RNAS Yeovilton, Somerset
UPPER RN Sea Harriers
GUINEA BISSAU VOLTA 8. RAF Wyton
GUINEA Nimrod R.1 No. 51 Squadron

SIERRA IVORY
Freetown
LEONE COAST
GHANA 2
LIBERIA
4 3
8

5
6
7

N
RAF St Mawgan

0 500 miles
Ascension Island
Wideawake 0 500km
38 Defender’s Capabilities

and GADA 602 had received new military hardware, and their men received initial training
in various European countries, becoming technically proficient on weapons and radar; they
then enhanced these skills on programmes and exercises in the United States and South
America, which further honed their readiness.
Nine days after General Leopoldo Galtieri launched Argentina’s invasion on 11 April, at
the end of Holy Week, GADA 601’s commander Lieutenant Colonel Coronel Héctor Arias
was informed that his unit would leave the next day for the Malvinas. Men returning home
to their parents, wives or families from a Sunday out found that the police were waiting for
them at the door.
It was a logistical nightmare at Mar del Plata, so weapons, ammunition, men and vehicles
were airlifted to Comodoro Rivadavia. GADA 602 was then suddenly tasked by Buenos Aires
with homeland air defence, deploying one Roland missile system with Skyguard radar and two
Oerlikon 35mm twin cannons at two international airports: Puerto San Julián base for Dagger
fighters, and Rio Gallegos which had Mirage III, and A-4 Skyhawks. Air defence was provided
at other city airports housing Argentine naval and air force jets. Arias and 2nd Lieutenant
Diego Noguer, commander of GADA 602, with a group of men from both units then flew by
Hercules and arrived on the islands between 12 April and 24 April, and were given defensive
positions near the airport. On 17 April Hercules C-130 CT-64 landed at Stanley airport
(BAM Malvinas). GADA 601’s 35mm AAA and Skyguard was offloaded. Arias met a Spanish
civilian technician from the Oerlikon company, Eusebio Aguiar, who checked the cannons and
Skyguard fire-control system for optimization before being deployed.
The ship Río Carcarañá, berthed in Buenos Aires, was being loaded with equipment and
supplies for Batería B Grupo de Artillería AAA 101 (B/GADA 101): eight Hispano Suiza
30mm cannons and heavy vehicles with crates containing munitions and other logistics,
with corporals Rubén Reynaldo Pardini and Raúl Orlando Barrios in charge of loading. The
merchant ship, with its civilian crew, sailed on 22 April for Port Stanley, dropping anchor
outside the harbour. The cargo ship Formosa was already berthed and unloading heavy
machinery. Hours passed before Lieutenant Primero Alejandro Infantino of 101 B/GADA
offloaded enough from Río Carcarañá to get his section underway before the merchant
ship was shuffled back outside the harbour. The tanker Río Cincel then offloaded pallets
containing 800 drums of JP-1 jet fuel assigned to Stanley airport.1
Earlier, on 5 April, the Grupo 1 de Construcciones (Runway Construction Unit) led by
Major Raúl Oscar Maiorano arrived, accompanied by Senior Petty Officer Gerardo González,
Assistant Petty Officer Ricardo Diax, Petty Officers Alberto Natalino and Miguel Muñoz.
Corporals Erio Moyano, Edgardo Acosta, Victor Gutiérrez and Carlos Monyoya arrived by
Hercules C-130. In order for all Argentine aircraft to be able to operate from Port Stanley, it
was essential to expand the runway at Stanley airport. Machinery was shipped by Empresa
Líneas Marítimas Argentinas (ELMA) Formosa, a 12,762-ton cargo ship. It transported 200
M8A1 metal mats, along with tools, equipment and machines to facilitate an extension.
At the airfield, Maiorano received orders to construct fortifications and participate in the
unloading of Rio Cincel, then utilize dump trucks to transport troops. At the time, BAM
Malvinas commander Commodore Héctor Luis Destri didn’t understand the importance
of extending the runway to increase the operational capacity of the base. The threat of
British submarines, and exclusion zones neutralized ELMA seaborne supply lines. Weber,
Commander of Air Operations in Argentina, now had to build an airbridge in order for
these aircraft to operate. It was essential to expand the small airfield.

1 Tanker Río Cincel was at anchor on 1 May, and strafed by Sea Harriers’ 30mm
cannons. Ship’s captain Edgardo Dell’Ellicine then sailed the tanker to San Carlos,
East Falklands.
 39

Grupo 1 de Construccione:mechanical machinery/equipment Quantity

Caterpillar D-7 bulldozer 2
Astarsa motor grader 120/120 AWD 1
Caterpillar 995-12 front loader 1
Caterpillar 977 track loader 1
Mercedes-Benz 1,114 dump trucks 2
Mercedes-Benz Unimog flatbed truck 1
Koeating 285 KVA generator 2
Jeep 1
M8A1 landing mat (with various fix attachments) 200
22in by 144in (560mm x 3,660mm)
Tar bitumen blocks 75

At a quarry 12.5 miles from Stanley, Grupo I de Construcciones had their two D-7
bulldozers, a 977 track loader, and four dump trucks, which went to work extracting gravel
for foundations for airport extensions. Due to the lack of roads, these machines had to be
airlifted to the quarry suspended from cargo hooks of Chinook helicopters. The building
project would increase airport capacity by 38,750 sq ft near the control tower. Other areas
were repaired or fully replaced using aluminium planking.
With hostilities imminent it was necessary for Raúl Oscar Maiorano’s men to be on
immediate readiness to repair the runway in the event that it was hit by bombing or naval
gunfire. The unit’s numbers were increased in the early hours on 13 April, when an F-28
brought reinforcements. Off stepped Lieutenant Ignacio Galardi, with Corporal Euardo
Aftermath of Black Buck 1
Cubi to work as machinist on the Astarsa, along with two civilians, Carlos Alfonso Corona on 1 May 1982. Aerial
and Carlos Albert Corona. All then began other non-specific tasks, including transporting reconnaissance
medical staff and medical supplies into Stanley to a building considered to be the safest photograph taken using a
Vinten F.95 camera flown
for a surgical centre. Lack of coordination following the loss of the ARA General Belgrano by Lieutenant Commander
on 2 May and the previous days first Black Buck and Sea Harrier raids, meant the idea of Neill Thomas, commander
extending the Stanley airport runway to accommodate a fleet of transports and their fighter of No. 899 Naval Air
Squadron, Fleet Air Arm
jets stalled. Further quantities of M8A1 aluminium planking and tar bitumen blocks were on aboard HMS Hermes.
board an ELMA cargo ship that could not now sail, due to the dangers of submarine attack. (Crown Copyright MOD)
40 Campaign Objectives

CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES
The expedition takes shape

The service chiefs at a The British resolution adopted by the Security Council as Resolution 502 on April 3
conference at Fleet demanded the ‘immediate cessation of hostilities’ and the ‘immediate withdrawal of all
Headquarters,
Northwood. They include Argentine forces’ from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and called upon the Argentine
Field Marshal Edwin and British Governments to ‘seek a diplomatic solution to their differences.’ Resolution
Bramall in the immediate 502 was in Britain’s favour, giving it the option to invoke Article 51 of the UN Charter and
foreground on the right;
Admiral of the Fleet Sir claim the right of self-defence. It was supported by members of the Commonwealth and by
Henry Conyers Leach and the European Union, which later imposed sanctions on Argentina. In Washington, British
Air Chief- Marshal Sir Ambassador Nicholas ‘Nicko’ Henderson was asked if his government had considered
Michael James Beetham
on the left, second and getting the Vatican involved in trying to resolve the dispute. In his opinion the Argentines
third in. (Andrew D. Bird would not listen to the Vatican, if they wouldn’t listen to the President of the United
Collection) States. On Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s orders, a few days earlier the Royal Fleet
Auxiliary Fort Austin in the Mediterranean steamed to support HMS Endurance, with two
nuclear-powered submarines HMS Spartan (from Gibraltar) and HMS Splendid (from
Scotland). On 31 March, serious doubts were raised during a meeting in the House of
Commons, in Margaret Thatcher’s office, by Defence Secretary John Nott and other
senior government advisers arguing that retaking the island was an impossibility because of
logistical difficulties. However, the ‘knight in shining gold braid’, First Sea Lord Sir Henry
Leach, who joined this critical discussion advised that the Falklands not only could be
recaptured, but should be. The ships would take three weeks to reach the South Atlantic,
and the two small carriers, HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible, could provide sufficient air
cover. This was greeted by the Prime Minister with relief and approval, for had Chief of
the Defence Staff Lord Lewin been present, he would probably have counselled caution
and emphasized diplomacy.
In the early hours of 2 April Hermes and Invincible were put on four hours’ alert, as
was Fearless, the amphibious assault ship, the frigates Alacrity and Antelope and the RFA
Resource. At 0300hrs, Admiral Sandy Woodward received the signal from the commander-
in-chief ordering Operation Corporate, the codename for everything that was to follow.
 41

Over the weekend a task force

was prepared, with pandemonium
breaking out at naval bases as 100
ships were pulled together and
some 50 civilian ships requisitioned
for supplies. Leach was terrified
that the Cabinet would get cold
feet and rescind the task force.
On 3 April Margaret Thatcher
spoke in the House of Commons:
‘The House meets this Saturday
to respond to a situation of great
gravity,’ said the Prime Minister,
‘We are here because, for the first
time for many years, British sovereign territory has been invaded by a foreign power.’ The Vulcan XM598 on the
vanguard of the largest British fleet deployed since World War II sailed from Portsmouth apron, with Pan Am pick-
ups in the foreground.
harbour to rapturous applause on the Monday morning. Francis Pym, the leader of the House (Crown Copyright MOD)
of Commons, was chosen to take over immediately at the Foreign Office. The small War
Cabinet consisted of Willie Whitelaw, the Home Secretary; John Nott, the Defence Secretary;
Francis Pym, the Foreign Secretary, and Cecil Parkinson, the Trade and Industry secretary.
Air Chief-Marshal Sir Michael Beetham, the Chief of the Air Staff and acting Chief of the
Defence Staff (for Chief of the Defence Staff Admiral Terence Lewin was in New Zealand),
arrived to give a military briefing with a bleary-eyed Admiral Leach, who like Beetham had
worked through the night with only a 30-minute nap. Although Margaret Thatcher had
emphatically called for ‘the nation to stand and fight’, there were concerns over casualties,
if war really came.
The defence chiefs, led by Lewin, had routinely reviewed the Falkland Islands, and held
the consensus that they were indefensible in modern warfare, given that the nearest airfield
and anchorage was Ascension Island. Therefore no well-formed national war plans stood to
meet such a contingency. That doctrine was abandoned once the Argentines occupied the
islands. Leach turned to Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, Commander-in-Chief of Fleet at the
Northwood headquarters, appointing him commander of Task Force 317 and giving him
responsibility for Operation Corporate with the mission to recover the Falkland Islands.
Co-located with Commander-in-Chief of Fleet was Air Marshal Sir John Curtiss, Air
Officer Commanding No. 18 Group, where he commanded the RAF’s maritime air assets.
The two men had a strong rapport and Curtiss became Fieldhouse’s air commander, an
obvious appointment since his command specialized in maritime air power and his staff
were accustomed to working well alongside the Royal Navy.
Curtiss became part of Flag and Air Officers (FLAIR) with Admiral Sir Peter Herbert, the
Royal Navy’s Flag Officer Submarines; Admiral David Hallifax, the chief of staff to Fieldhouse,
responsible for the day-to-day control of Northwood; Admiral Peter Hammersley, Chief Staff
Officer Engineering; General Jeremy Moore, Royal Marines; then a late addition, Lieutenant
General Richard Trant, who succeeded Moore as an adviser when he flew south to become
overall commander of British land forces for the invasion of the Falkland Islands. Moore
realized that the British Army also faced limitations on what forces could be committed.
Although there was no general mobilization, army units were recalled. Of the 160,000
soldiers in the regular army in 1982, 55,000 were in West Germany, with other garrisons
based in Berlin, Hong Kong, Gibraltar, Belize, Brunei and Cyprus. There were also around
11,000 troops serving in Northern Ireland.
The first of Fieldhouse’s calls to Beetham was to establish an air bridge to Ascension, and
reconnaissance flights ahead of the Task Force during its voyage south. With overseas bases
42 Campaign Objectives

OPPOSITE AIR DEFENCE AT PORT STANLEY

along the route having long since disappeared, Francis Pym enquired about using Sierra
Leone’s facilities. A formal request to support five British aircraft flying into the US military
air base on Ascension over a four-day period was sent by the Ministry of Defence to the
Pentagon. The two Pan Am air traffic controllers guided down the first five C-130 Hercules
from Brize Norton and Lyneham, each with an estimated 45,000lb load. A series of further
Hercules and VC-10 flights established the base as the forward logistic support for British
forces on Operation Corporate.
Nimrod MR.1s operating from St Mawgan and Gibraltar carried out surveillance over
the waters through which the various elements of the Task Groups were transiting. With
such prodigious distances involved, the need for in-flight refuelling became paramount for
extending the range of air assets. John Curtiss quickly received funds to update all the Victor
K.2 tanker force with the latest navigation equipment. However, their first priority was
reconnaissance, and it was necessary to tackle the problems that the Nimrod fleet did not
possess an air-to-air refuelling capability and that No. 27 Squadron, which had been assigned
the task of maritime radar reconnaissance (MRR) with its Vulcan B.2s, had disbanded
on 31 March.
Curtiss conveyed his concerns, and quickly asked for five of the navigation radar operators
from the Vulcan B.2 (MRRs) to be retained. Victor K.2s XL192, XL164 and XL189 were
converted to fly photo-reconnaissance and MRR with an upgraded navigation system for
long-range flights over water from Ascension, which could acquire intelligence on Argentine
naval forces for the Royal Navy. While preparations were made for their deployment, John
Fieldhouse asked Curtiss for them to seek out the Argentinians’ six ships in the region of
South Georgia, including the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo and cruiser General
Belgrano. Intelligence then revealed that nearly every Argentinian warship was equipped
with Exocet missiles. If any got within range the loss of one carrier would have impeded
the British operation. ‘Could their aircraft carrier launch the Super Étendard?’ enquired
Nose of a Vulcan viewed Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Operations) Air Vice-Marshal Ken Hayr, worried about the
through the cockpit while air threat to the Task Force.
ahead are contrails from a
Victor tanker. (Crown With the Task Force getting ever nearer, the Argentines had to be prevented from
Copyright MOD) deploying, or persuaded not to deploy, their high-performance Skyhawks, Mirages and
Super Étendards into Port Stanley
airport. However, Fieldhouse
and Curtiss had overlooked the
potential of their Grumman S-2E
Trackers, not just in their anti-
submarine warfare role but also
as reconnaissance aircraft, with
an ability to fly 1,173nm (1,350
miles) and an endurance of nearly
nine hours. These aircraft were
operated from Veinticinco de Mayo,
off the Argentinian mainland, or
from Stanley airport from where
they could easily detect the Task
Force. Unknown to Northwood,
since 3 April two S-2Es had been
permanently based on the island
 Blanco Bay
43
Port William

Yorke Bay

Super Fledermaus
Península Camber

ws
fire-control radar

ro
Nar
Stanley Airport Cape

The
Pembroke
Stanley Harbour
Port Stanley TPS-44
search radar

Roland SAM Surf Bay

TPS-43 TPS-43 Skyguard
search radar search radar fire-control radar

Eliza
Cove N

0 1 mile

0 1km

and begun anti-submarine warfare patrols over their shipping lanes, while three were
deployed on the aircraft carrier.2

Sea Harriers or Vulcans?

On 11 April Sandy Woodward requested plans for how best to utilize Sea Harriers to attack
targets on the Falklands. This nudged Beetham into examining if and how to use the only
RAF bomber aircraft capable of carrying a conventional payload – the Vulcan. One of the
first issues planning staff had to work out was the feasibility of air attacks against Argentine
cities or ports, launched from Ascension Island. With limited numbers of Victor tankers and
because of the distance involved in the approach, the aircraft would have to land in South
America after an attack, possibly in Montevideo or Santiago in Uruguay. Britain’s ambassador
to Uruguay, Patricia Hutchinson, believed that a request would be denied, for Argentina was
already putting pressure on Uruguay, insisting that no British military aircraft be allowed
to land in the country’s airports or military bases. Planning staff agreed that bombing or
torpedo attacks could, however, be carried out on Argentine shipping in the South Atlantic
within range of Ascension. It was contested as to whether bombing the mainland would be
legal, but in the long term it would be undesirable, losing Britain influence, allies and trade.
However, both Britain and Argentina could calculate that mainland targets could be struck
from Ascension. As soon as it was realized that Vulcans had been deployed to Wideawake,
this implication added pressure to Galtieri and his Junta. There was speculation as to whether

2 During the war Escuadrilla Aeronaval Antisubmarina EA2S S-2E Trackers carried
out 112 missions, completing more than 520 flying hours without any casualties.
44 Campaign Objectives

Avro Vulcan XM607 this was merely public posturing, or a valid military option. Press speculation that the RAF’s
landing at Greenham Vulcan force might be used to attack Argentina was not actively discouraged.
Common, Berkshire for the
annual International Air
Show in June 1977.
(Andrew D. Bird Analysis of the airfield
Collection)
Of the airfields available on the Falklands, it was quickly concluded by Wing Commander
Simon Baldwin’s planning team that only Port Stanley airport with its paved runway was
capable of sustaining major operations; Goose Green and Pebble Island were discounted.
Stanley facilities, although limited, were able to accommodate C-130 Hercules, Lockheed
L-188 Electra and Fokker F-27 and F28 transports; also Boeing 737 commercial jets to bring
supplies, weapons, vehicles, and fuel, for an expanding Argentine garrison.
Port Stanley’s length of runway was a comparative size to Popham grass strip near
Basingstoke in Hampshire, and some Argentinian aircraft were capable of operating from
the existing runway. The Italian-manufactured Aermacchi MB-339 advanced trainer had
a supplementary close-air support role, as did the American propeller-driven Beech T-34
Turbo-Mentor and the FMA Pucarás. These could all prove a threat to the amphibious phase
when reclaiming the Falklands.
Nevertheless, Stanley was assessed as unsuitable for basing the most capable and advanced
jets, such as the Mirage III, A-4 Skyhawk, Dagger and Super Étendard, given the relatively
short runway. There was naivety in this initial assessment, however, as it was assumed that the
Argentines would not make any attempts to extend the runway or the parking aprons. In fact,
this would be given serious consideration by the Argentinian Air Force, as jets based at Stanley
could attack the British Task Force as it approached the islands. A senior officer from one of the
Royal Engineers’ field squadrons supporting the RAF’s Harriers in Germany gave an assessment:
with some forward planning and work by Argentine engineers, it would be entirely possible to
base at least four to six fast jet aircraft at Stanley, giving a limited fighter defence capability to
the islands. The only limiting factor was the availability of fuel storage for the aircraft. But no
doubt Pillow portable fuel tanks that hold 95,000 litres would be ferried in.
Defence Secretary John Nott raised concerns that it would provide the Argentines
with a publicity coup were they to reveal that work had been undertaken to allow fast jet
operations from Stanley. US intelligence reported that Argentina was lengthening the runway
at Stanley by 2,000m in order to accommodate transport and combat aircraft. It was clear
that the runway at Port Stanley would pose a considerable threat to Woodward’s task force,
particularly when the carriers were in the vicinity of the Falklands. Fieldhouse and Curtiss,
in consultation with the Task Force commander, agreed that for Admiral Woodward to
maintain control of the sea and air, it would be vital to deny Argentinian jets the use of Port
Stanley, in conjunction with the Exclusion Zone around the islands.
 45

The beginning of the air war

However, Woodward was soon within range of Argentina’s mainland-based long-range
search aircraft. On 21 April, Hermes radar operators registered a high-altitude unidentified
air contact. Lieutenant Simon Hargreaves on QRF (Quick Reaction Force duty) in Sea
Harrier XZ460 was scrambled to intercept. His quarry, Boeing 707-387C TC-91, had
taken off from El Palomar at 0458hrs, on its first mission of the campaign. Using its Bendix
weather radar on mapping mode, with a range of 240nm, the crew began searching for
the British Task Force. Visual contact was confirmed at 1238hrs when a 707 crew saw
the aircraft carriers HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible, with destroyers and frigates, from
20,000ft. Captain Luis Dupeyron of the Argentine Navy recognized both carriers and
immediately ordered the pilots to rapidly leave the area and climb, noticing that the carriers
were facing into the wind ready for aircraft to launch. At 1247hrs they commenced the
climb, then three minutes later, a technician observed an aircraft streaking towards them.
Hargreaves positioned his Sea Harrier armed with two Sidewinders beneath its wings on
the portside and inspected the 707-387C TC-91. The pursuit above 30,000ft lasted for
12 minutes, after which Hargreaves returned to Hermes. This was the first information
that Argentina had obtained for themselves about the approaching Task Force. Regular
encounters began between Sea Harriers and Boeing TC-91 and TC-92, of Escuadrón V-I
Brigada Aérea.
The Task Force was no longer out of reach. Its use of Sea Harriers in disrupting Argentine
operations out of Port Stanley was brought to the table at Northwood. Both military Chiefs
AGM-45 Shrike missiles
of Staff wanted to preserve the Task Force’s small and outnumbered Sea Harrier force for the on the port wing
vital priority of air defence, confirmed in the concept of air operations agreed on 28 April. hardpoint of Vulcan
Then Woodward was told on 29 April that the Vulcan bombing run was planned for 1 May at XM597 at Waddington.
The photo was taken after
0700hrs: Chiefs of Staff had agreed that the Vulcan had the advantage over the Sea Harrier in its 13 June 1982, as the
blind bombing capability if the weather should close in. Fieldhouse also eased one of Brigadier nose shows two Shrike
Julian Thompson’s, commander of 3 Commando Brigade, preoccupations by declaring firmly mission symbols and the
Brazilian flag for its stay
that any landing on the Falkland Islands would not take place under an Argentine air threat: in Brazil. (Crown
that meant neutralizing Stanley airport first. Copyright MOD)
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Autographic women,

351

Automatism,

228

331-333
 B.

Base of brain, focal lesions of,

91

Baths, use of, in alcoholism,

641

642

643

in chorea,

455

in heat-exhaustion,

388

in the opium habit,

672

673

676

in thermic fever,

396

397

398

in tremor,

432

cold, use of, in spinal sclerosis,

903

hot, use of, in spinal sclerosis,

900

903

sulphur, use of, in chronic lead-poisoning,

691

value of, in hysteria,

281

282

283

warm, use of, in acute myelitis,

823

Bed-sores,

1274
,

1275

in tumors of spinal cord,

1096

1098

malignant, in acute myelitis,

819

Belladonna, use of, in epilepsy,

501

in infantile spinal paralysis,

1155

Bell's palsy,
1202

Biliary catarrh, in chronic alcoholism,

607

Bismuth, use of, in vomiting of the opium habit,

675

Bladder, disorders of, in chronic alcoholism,

614

in tabes dorsalis,

829

834

836
 in tumors of the brain,

1045

of the spinal cord,

1096

Bleeding, in acute myelitis,

823

simple meningitis,

720

in Bell's palsy,

1207

in cerebral hemorrhage and apoplexy,

976
 hyperæmia,

774

in exacerbations of cerebral syphilis,

1015

in hæmatoma of the dura mater,

710

in spinal hyperæmia,

805

in tetanus,

555

in thermic fever,

398

Blindness, hysterical,
248

in cerebral anæmia,

776

word-, in nervous diseases,

31

Blisters, use of, in epilepsy,

502

in hæmatoma of dura mater,

710

in tetanus,

555

in thermic fever,

398
,

400

in writers' cramp,

538

Blood, changes in, in chronic alcoholism,

615

618

in the chloral habit,

662

in thermic fever,

391

392
Blood-vessels, changes in, in chronic alcoholism,

612

Bluish line upon the gums, significance of, in chronic lead-poisoning,

682

Blushing, in hysteria,

253

Bones, atrophy of,

1267

changes in, in alcoholism,

614

state of, in general paralysis of the insane,

196

Brachial neuralgia,

1234

RAIN AND

PINAL

ORD

,A

NÆMIA AND

YPERÆMIA OF THE

763
Abscess

792

Diagnosis,

799

Etiology,

796

Morbid anatomy,

792

Prognosis,

799

Symptomatology,

795
 Treatment,

799

Medical,

800

Derivatives,

800

Mercury,

800

Surgical,

800

Emptying contents,

800

Anæmia
,

774

Diagnosis,

787

Etiology,

776

Morbid anatomy,

781

Appearances of, in cerebral anæmia,

781

Symptomatology,

782

Treatment,

788
 Alcoholic stimulants,

789

Amyl nitrite,

788

Cannabis,

789

Cold pack,

789

Massage,

789

Morphine,

788
Hyperæmia

763

Differential diagnosis,

772

Etiology,

765

Symptomatology,

768

Treatment,

773

Baths,

773

Bleeding,
774

Bromides,

773

Cathartics,

774

Cautery,

774

Chloral,

773

Derivation,

774

Diet,

774
 Ergot,

773

Hypnotics,

773

Pediluvia,

773

Inflammation

790

Abscess in,

791

Acute encephalitis of Strümpell in,

791
 Accompanying endocarditis,

792

Miliary form,

792

of septic origin,

792

Post-paralytic phenomena of,

791

Sequelæ of,

791

RAIN AND

PINAL