Drones across empty quarter: A lot at stake

The seven-year-old Yemeni conflict seems to have reignited across multiple theatres during the past three weeks.

On land, the insertion of the UAE-supported Giant Brigade has turned the tables on the Houthi militia's campaign for the oil-rich Shabwah-Marib region in central Yemen. The militia were forced to withdraw from Shabwah in early January and could now lose ground in the Marib sector.

The Houthis responded on January 3 by capturing Rwabee, a UAE-flagged ship, in the Red Sea alleging arms smuggling. On January 17, they launched a stunning missile and drone attack on an ADNOC facility close to Abu Dhabi - over 1,400 kms away, starting a fire that killed three people and wounded six others. This is the first attack on the UAE since 2018. On January 24, two missiles were intercepted over Abu Dhabi.

The Saudi Arabia-led coalition's retaliatory airstrikes on north Yemeni cities in the following four days have killed nearly 90 people.

With the Gulf region already nervous over the Iran nuclear conundrum, these escalations could spin out of control and reverberate across multiple domains.

The UAE withdrew from a direct military role in the Yemen conflict in 2019 and confined itself to training and arming its proxies in south Yemen. By attacking the ADNOC facility, the Houthis may have intended to raise the cost for the UAE to an unacceptable level, forcing it to withdraw the Giants Brigade from the Shabwah-Marib theatre.

However,, this Houthi overreach may also have a contrarian outcome - of bringing the UAE closer to Saudi Arabia, which faced a attack on its oil facilities in 2019.

It may also make UAE rely more on eco-political alliances than hard power.

The UAE may also see this event through the prism of its complex ties with Iran, which is suspected of using Houthis as proxies.

The attack may trigger greater attention on the Yemeni civil war, currently the world's most serious humanitarian tragedy with over 377,000 dead.

Saudi Arabia is keen to find a political solution to the conflict, but the Houthis have stalled, preferring to first gain Shabwah-Marib to strengthen their hand at negotiations. With their ground slipping, they now have a choice: either to negotiate from a weaker position or wage an asymmetric war - and this attack shows their preference for the latter course, at least tactically.

Unless Houthi attacks persist, Abu Dhabi may prefer discretion to valour.

An important collateral impact of the ADNOC attack was on the oil trade.

It jagged the tightly supplied global oil market, triggering a sharp rise.

Brent crude crossed $87/barrel, a seven-year high, with indications of breaching the $100 level by the end of the year.

Also likely is a higher risk premium for ships using the Red Sea. Any recurrence of such attacks could dent the UAE's image as a safe hub for global business and tourism.

India has well-known stakes in the Red Sea and Gulf regions. These were poignantly driven home in terms of direct human costs: Seven of the eleven Rwabee crew members detained by the Houthis are Indians, as were two dead and four injured in the ADNOC attack.

For each dollar increase in crude price, India loses nearly '11,000 cr annually.

Moreover, nearly 70% of our crude imports come from the Gulf and most of our West-bound maritime trade passes through the Red Sea.

As our vital interests are involved, India should work for peace and stability in this neighbourhood, both regionally and through our membership of the UN Security Council. At the same time, we also need to protect ourselves from the sandstorms gathering in the Empty Quarter.

The writer served as India's ambassador to Nigeria, Algeria and Norway and is the author of "UAE: A Business Manual"