Chevmore

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What is deference in the context of the administrative state?

Deference, or judicial deference, is a principle of judicial review in which a federal court yields to an agency's interpretation of a statute or regulation. The U.S. Supreme Court has developed several forms of deference in reviewing federal agency actions, including Chevron deference, Skidmore deference, and Auer deference. Learn about state-level responses to deference here.

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Chevmore is a term coined by law professor Kent Barnett in a 2015 law review article to refer to the judicial deference doctrines known as Chevron and Skidmore. Under Chevron deference, judges accept agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Under Skidmore deference, judges accept agency interpretations if the agency uses reasoning that is persuasive enough. Chevmore entails both deference doctrines.[1]

In his 2015 article, "Codifying Chevmore," professor Barnett argued that Congress recognized Chevron and Skidmore principles in part of the Dodd-Frank financial reform law passed in 2010. He argued that congressional recognition of those judicial doctrines supports the theoretical foundations of judicial deference doctrines and suggests ways to improve administrative law.[1]

Background

See also: Deference (administrative state)

The concept of Chevmore was developed and named by law professor Kent Barnett, who as of April 2019 was an assistant professor at the University of Georgia School of Law.[2] According to Barnett's law review article, "Codifying Chevmore," published by the New York University Law Review in April 2015, the term refers to both Chevron and Skidmore deference in the context of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act:[1]

" Although properly considered one of the most significant statutes governing finance and consumer protection, Dodd-Frank should be noteworthy, too, for its implications as to administrative law. To my knowledge, it is the first time that Congress has codified Skidmore. It is the first time that Congress has indicated in legislative history (and by implication in certain statutory provisions) that it accepts Chevron. It is the first time that Congress has suggested that the judicially crafted Chevmore doctrines and the APA’s statutory review provisions coexist comfortably. It is the first time that Congress has addressed when multiple enforcing agencies should receive Chevron deference. By taking these unprecedented actions, Congress legitimizes the delegation theory that undergirds the Chevmore doctrines, makes its intent as to interpretive primacy better known, and places those doctrines on firmer ground.[3]
—Kent Barnett, "Codifying Chevmore"[1]

Barnett argued that the values that drove Congress to lay out when different deference frameworks applied to provisions of Dodd-Frank might apply across the administrative state.[1] He said the law might "provide insight into congressional intent when Congress fails to state expressly whether agencies" or courts have the primary responsibility to interpret ambiguous statutes.[1] In other words, Congress can use laws to explain "which forms of agency action it intends to receive Chevron deference" and clarify when courts ought to apply hard look review to agency actions.[1] Finally, Congress can use Chevmore provisions to increase congressional oversight and to discourage regulatory capture by weakening deference for suspect agencies, according to Barnett.[1]

See also

External links

Footnotes