Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Barnett - First Amended Complaint 5-4-21 - Redacted
Barnett - First Amended Complaint 5-4-21 - Redacted
of the Law Office of Robert M. Turkewitz, LLC, and Brian M. Knowles of Knowles Law Firm,
PC, respectfully submits this First Amended Complaint alleging the following:
I. INTRODUCTION
1) This is an action for wrongful retaliation under Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and
Reform Act for the 21st Century (“AIR-21”), in which Complainant, John M. Barnett (“Barnett”),
a long-term Boeing Quality Manager, alleges that throughout his seven-year tenure at Boeing
South Carolina (“BSC”) made numerous ethics complaints about a deep-rooted and persistent
culture of concealment at BSC in which he and other quality personnel were pressured by Boeing
Regulations, as well as Boeing’s processes and procedures by not properly documenting and
remedying defects. Notably, failing to properly document and remedy defects results in an
incomplete build record, which constitutes a criminal felony offense and has the potential to
adversely impact the safety of the flying public. Barnett refused to bend to the pressure and
continually raised issues that needed to be properly documented and addressed. In retaliation for
his complaints and identifying issues that needed to be properly documented and addressed,
Barnett was given low Performance Management (“PM”) scores, he was separated from his team
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and moved to other areas in the plant, and blacklisted and blocked from transferring to other
Boeing divisions outside of BSC. In addition, he was subjected to a gaslighting campaign in which
he was harassed, denigrated, humiliated, and treated with scorn and contempt by upper
management, which was calculated to discourage him and others from raising such issues and
complying with the law. Based on the totality of the circumstances, such conduct amounted to a
2) Barnett worked for Boeing for 32 years, 17 of which he worked as a Quality Manager.
Prior to his transfer to BSC, Barnett worked at Boeing's Everett facilities, where he worked as an
electrician on the 747 program, and as an inspector, planner, auditor, Quality Assurance Inspector
(“QA”), and First Line Quality Assurance Manager in over dozens of programs (including 747,
767, 777 and 787, and included assignments in the Material Review Segregation Area (“MRSA”).
He worked as a Second Level Manager over the Everett Receiving Inspection Organization with
a $10 Million annual budget, supporting the entire Everett, Washington site. He traveled to various
improvement plans with suppliers and assuring they met Boeing's Quality requirements and
delivery schedules. Barnett also traveled around the U.S. representing Boeing Everett Quality in
High Level Executive meetings. He was constantly and consistently recognized as a top performer
regardless of the area or Organization he was in. Barnett took over 1000 hours of specialized off-
1
Because of Boeing’s culture of concealment, there is a mounting list of 787 defects needing to be
addressed. Boeing’s customers and shareholders are now paying that price, which could be in the billions.
See https://www.aerotime.aero/27357-boeing-costs-787-issues#google_vignette Barnett remains
concerned that the concealed issues will result in a catastrophic event.
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communicating across cultures. He has also taken College courses at night working towards a
Management.
Jan, 16, 2017, he filed this AIR-21 wrongful retaliation action with OSHA/FAA. On January 23,
2017, Barnett went on a medical leave of absence at the advice of his treating physician because
of the stress and emotional duress that he was subjected to as a result of Boeing’s retaliatory
conduct. Although he had planned to work at Boeing for at least another ten years, he took an early
retirement on March 1, 2017 due to the employment-related stress. As discussed below, Barnett
was subjected to a hostile work environment that led to his constructive discharge.
4) The FAA’s safety and quality standards and regulations require aircraft manufacturers to
document all work performed, all defects detected and remedial work conducted and trace every
part assembled on an aircraft. As a result, Boeing is required to document and trace every single
part of its aircraft. For the 787 program, Boeing accomplishes this with its proprietary software
system known as Velocity. The documentation contained in Velocity constitutes the build record
5) The basic premise of quality is if it is not documented, it did not happen. Because of that,
FAA’s Standards and Regulations, as well as Boeing’s processes and procedures, require that all
6) As a Quality Assurance manager, Barnett was legally obligated to follow the FAA’s safety
and quality standards, which includes the requirement that all inspections of work performed on
aircraft be properly conducted and documented, and that all defects be properly documented and
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remedied. As a QA manager, Barnett also had an ethical obligation to the flying public to ensure
that the legal obligations set forth above were properly fulfilled.
7) In order to comply with the law and to ensure the safety of the flying public, it is essential
for QA managers at Boeing to require FAA safety and quality standards, as well as Boeing’s own
processes and procedures be strictly followed, that all process and procedure violations and defects
be documented in writing, that any defects be noted and corrected, and that all parts be properly
traced and documented. It is also important to ensure that corners are not cut and that work not be
8) Under FAA regulation 14 CFR §21.146, all Boeing employees who work on or inspect a
787 aircraft are required to log into Velocity and document all work and inspections performed.
Defects in workmanship that require engineering disposition are noted with the use of “non-
conformances,” which are identified by mechanics and entered into Velocity by Quality
Inspectors. Intentionally failing to log into Velocity is a violation of Boeing’s Quality Management
Boeing’s Production Certificate granted by the FAA pursuant to 14 CFR §21.146 (c) and (f).
concealing a material fact or making a materially false writing is in violation of 18 U.S.C §38.2
2 18 U.S.C. §38. Fraud involving aircraft or space vehicle parts in interstate or foreign commerce
(a) Offenses.—Whoever, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly and with the
intent to defraud—
(1)
(A) falsifies or conceals a material fact concerning any aircraft or space vehicle
part;
(B) makes any materially fraudulent representation concerning any aircraft or
space vehicle part; or
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III. BARNETT’S PROTECTED ACTIVITY
9) During his employment at Boeing, Barnett engaged in the following protected activity: a)
continually objected to Boeing creating and maintaining a program not approved by the FAA that
allowed mechanics to inspect and approve their own work, known as the Multi-function Process
Performer (MFPP); b) continually insisted verbally and in writing that BSC’s processes and
procedures be followed and that defects be properly documented in the face of management
pressure to deviate from the rules in order to allow production to meet deadlines; c) sent emails in
2012 to BSC Quality Director complaining about Barnett’s Senior Second Level Quality
refused to pencil whip lost nonconforming parts3; e) objected to Foreign Object Debris (“FOD”)
found in the form of titanium slivers from e-nuts not being fixed and cleaned up; f) objected to the
Control (ARL/SNC) data be corrected on all delivered aircraft; and h) filed an October 2016 Ethics
(C) makes or uses any materially false writing, entry, certification, document,
record, data plate, label, or electronic communication concerning any aircraft or
space vehicle part;
(2) exports from or imports or introduces into the United States, sells, trades, installs on
or in any aircraft or space vehicle any aircraft or space vehicle part using or by means of a
fraudulent representation, document, record, certification, depiction, data plate, label, or
electronic communication; or
(3) attempts or conspires to commit an offense described in paragraph (1) or (2),
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
(b) Penalties.—The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) is as follows:
(1) Aviation quality.—If the offense relates to the aviation quality of a part and the part is
installed in an aircraft or space vehicle, a fine of not more than $500,000, imprisonment for
not more than 15 years, or both.
3 Pencil whipping is a term used to describe the documentation of an inspection or other activity
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Complaint regarding his manager, , and for retaliation, a hostile work environment
10) Barnett first reported to Senior Quality Manager at BSC. pushed his
quality managers to insist that FAA safety and quality standards, as well as Boeing’s own processes
and procedures be strictly followed, and that quality not be sacrificed, or corners cut. Notably,
Boeing management pushed for quality to deviate from the rules in order to allow production to
meet deadlines. In particular, BSC upper management implemented the MFPP program whereby
Boeing mechanics were given authority to inspect and approve their own work. Notably, the MFPP
program was implemented without FAA approval and was in violation of Boeing’s Production
Certificate granted by the FAA pursuant to 14 CFR §21.146 (c) and (f). When objected to
implementation of the MFPP program and insisted that Boeing not deviate from the rules, he was
threatened with termination. He utilized his contacts at Seattle and arranged to be transferred back
11) Notably, Barnett was very vocal in supporting position that the MFPP program
was illegal and that FAA safety and quality standards, as well as Boeing’s own processes and
procedures be strictly followed. Throughout Barnett’s tenure at BSC, he was vocal in his refusal
to deviate from FAA’s safety and quality standards and regulations, as well as Boeing’s processes
and procedures.
12) , who was appointed as Senior Second Level Quality Manager began pushing
Barnett to work outside the proper procedures. In 2012, Barnett emailed the BSC Director
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twice complaining about being pushed to work outside the proper procedures. told
Barnett orally that he did not believe him. No investigation was conducted.
13) Barnett continually insisted on the proper procedures being followed. Barnett complained
about countless instances where parts were being stolen from one airplane and installed on an
incomplete airplane without any documentation, traceability or engineering review. In most cases,
the mechanic would come to work to find that the parts s/he installed the day before were gone.
Upper Management ignored the stolen parts problem and insisted that Barnett stop documenting
them in e-mails and on CA’s (corrective action EPDs). All corrective action EPD’s for stolen parts
were cancelled per Leadership direction without any investigation or corrective action. (Ethics has
the records).
14) In October 2012, denigrated Barnett in front of his team and moved him to 2nd shift
in retaliation for insisting that the proper procedures be followed. Following up on Barnett’s
previous emails to the Quality Director , Barnett’s team submitted an ethics complaint
regarding conduct. In June 2013, was demoted and removed from management
c) Barnett’s Objection to FOD in the Form of Titanium Slivers from E-Nuts Not
Being Fixed and Cleaned up.
15) In August 2014, Barnett discovered that fasteners used to hold down the floorboards
(screws and “e-nuts”) were leaving up to 3” long titanium slivers when they were installed,
allowing the titanium slivers to fall onto wire bundles, electrical boxes and electronic components
located between the floor panels and cargo compartment ceiling panels, as well as above the center
wing tank area and all of the electronic equipment located there. Slivers were found all over the
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16) When Barnett discovered the FOD, ordered him to let it go because it would cost
too much to remove all the ceiling panels to clean and they might get damaged during removal.
Barnett strongly disagreed at the time and insisted the panels be removed and the electrical
components cleaned to eliminate the risk of electrical shorting in service. Barnett was removed
from the project and another manager was put in charge of it. Leadership decided to let the FOD
remain instead of removing the cargo ceiling panels and cleaning the FOD.
Barnett’s quality inspection team in retaliation for them submitting the ethics complaint. Notably,
continued where left off on insisting that quality not document work performed
outside the proper procedures, that process violations be ignored, that parts being stolen from
completed aircraft be ignored, etc. In June 2014, Barnett submitted a complaint to Corporate Ethics
against for violating procedures, ignoring process violations, pushing Barnett to “work in
the grey areas,” and having another manger spy on Barnett. Although Barnett’s complaint was
substantiated by Corporate Ethics, no action was taken to address the complaints. One month later,
in retaliation for his complaints, downgraded Barnett’s performance rating to a 15, and
penalized Barnett for not “working in the grey areas of the procedures,” for documenting process
violations, for not agreeing to allow Manufacturing to violate processes. The downgraded rating
was also based on false rumors started by Leadership that Barnett did not get along with his peers.
18) When learned that Barnett was writing to HR regarding his rating,
19) In September 2014, Barnett learned that had previously placed him on a 60-day
corrective action plan without even notifying Barnett. Barnett met with , the BSC Ethics
Manager, and complained about being placed on a 60-Day Corrective Action Plan without being
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pencil whipped and closed out by another group without investigating them. Barnett strongly
objected and pressed that they be reopened and investigated. He was ordered to let it go, which
would be a violation of FAA regulations which required that lost parts be documented and reported
to the FAA.4
24) In August 2016, Barnett became aware that the squibs in the emergency passenger oxygen
tanks in MRSA were defective and failed to activate and release oxygen as required. Out of a
sample size of 300 PSU emergency oxygen bottles, 75 of them did not fire properly when activated.
Barnett was criticized for documenting this issue and was immediately removed from any
responsibility for investigating this problem. In September 2016, after placing the 75 defective
squibs (that were removed from the oxygen bottles) in quarantine and pushing Leadership to have
them analyzed for defect analysis, Barnett was removed from the investigation. Upon information
and belief, no defect analysis has been performed on the squibs, no root cause has been positively
identified and no actions have been taken to address the defects. Evidence shows 25% of the
emergency passenger oxygen bottles in service on 787s will not operate when activated in an
emergency.5
4 The lost nonconforming parts themselves were evidence of processes and procedures not being
followed since Boeing’s policies and procedures do not allow for parts being lost when those
instructions are followed.
5 BSC Quality Leadership has told 3 different stories in response to Barnett’s AIR-21 Complaint
on why they have failed to perform the failure analysis on the defective squibs. BSC first stated
that Barnett reported that the bottles were already empty, so there was no concern. BSC then
claimed it didn’t perform a defect analysis because there was “damage from handling that caused
the failures. BSC later told the FAA there was a very large investigation ongoing with the squibs
that included the Supplier. However, upon information and belief, no “large investigation” has to
date been conducted.
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g) Barnett’s Insistence that Missing/Incomplete/Incorrect Serial Number Data
and ARL data Be Corrected on All Delivered Aircraft
25) On August 18, 2016, Barnett was assigned to investigate the findings regarding a Serial
Number Control (“SNC”) FAA Audit Finding, and to identify root cause, actions needed to correct
the issues, and complete follow through utilizing Boeing’s BPSM (“Boeing Problem Solving
26) In September 2016, after leading a cross functional team identifying root causes, actions
needed, etc., for the Serial Number FAA Audit Finding, Barnett noticed that all previously
delivered airplanes built at BSC had missing/incomplete/incorrect Serial number data and ARL
data. Barnett urged that they needed to investigate and correct all the records on all
delivered airplanes and notify BSC Customers, so they could address their fleets. Barnett was
27) In September 2016, Barnett’s Manager, took a defective part from the
MRSA scrap bin and gave it to Manufacturing for installation on an airplane without any
own procedures. Barnett’s team tried to stop and reported the violation to Barnett, who
28) Barnett was contacted by Ethics regarding his report to HR and he provided information
and documentation of the violation, which was substantiated. Barnett was subsequently blocked
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i) Barnett’s October 2016 Ethics Complaint Against his Leadership for
Retaliatory Conduct, Including Maintaining a Hostile Work Environment and
for Blacklisting and Blocking Barnett from Other Positions.
29) In October 2016, Barnett filed an Ethics complaint in Chicago, Illinois against his
Leadership for retaliation, a hostile work environment and for being blacklisted and blocked from
other positions. He asked that his complaint be investigated by someone outside of BSC. After
being assured it would be handled outside of BSC, the investigation was turned over to local HR
in BSC.
30) Later that month, Barnett sent an e-mail to (VP of Boeing Corp. Ethics,
Washington, DC) and voiced his concerns about how his complaint was handled. assured
Barnett that his concerns would be properly investigated. However, it was again turned over to
local BSC.
31) BSC failed to conduct an adequate investigation. On January 5, 2017, Barnett was informed
that his Ethics complaint of Oct. 2016 was found to be “unsubstantiated” and determined that the
complaint that he was unlawfully blacklisted and blocked from the propulsion job was found to be
“unsubstantiated.” The other complaints involving the hostile work environment were not even
investigated.
32) On January 13, 2017, Barnett was notified that his name was 1 of 49 listed in an e-mail on
33) On January 16, 2017, Barnett filed a complaint through the AIR21 with OSHA for
Boeing’s retaliation against him for engaging in protected conduct, including maintaining a hostile
work environment and blacklisting and blocking him from transferring to another division. Barnett
was informed that his complaint was left on a community printer for Boeing employees to see.
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IV. BOEING’S ADVERSE ACTIONS AGAINST BARNETT IN RETALIATION FOR
THE PROTECTED ACTIVITIES
34) Because of his ethics complaints and his refusal to compromise on safety and quality (as
discussed previously and herein), Barnett was retaliated against and treated differently in a number
of ways, including, but not limited to the following: a) Barnett’s supervising managers,
against Barnett without cause and without placing him on notice; c) Barnett was removed from
investigations of defects in retaliation for his insistence that the problems be fully investigated and
remedied, including investigations into defective e-Nuts causing titanium slivers to litter the tops
of flight control and other wires and equipment, defective oxygen squibs, and incorrect serial
numbers; d) Barnett was blocked from transferring to QA manager positions, including the third
shift position in final assembly, Boeing’s Aerospace Division in New Orleans, Louisiana, and a
Quality Manager position at the Propulsion Division in North Charleston, South Carolina, and e)
continually harassed, denigrated, humiliated, and treated Barnett with scorn and
contempt.6
35) Performance Management scores and ratings determine yearly raises, bonuses, and
eligibility for participation in special leadership teams, and other perks for top performing
36) After vocally supporting regarding the illegality of the MFPP program,
demanding that Boeing adhere to FAA and Boeing safety standards and procedures, and for not
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approving certain processes and procedures that violated a multitude of Boeing’s Process
Instructions and Procedures, including the illegal removal of parts from one aircraft after being
installed and inspected to another aircraft without properly documenting the transfer, Barnett was
retaliated against with lower performance ratings. Barnett’s rating went from a 40 to 16. Barnett
continued to have his performance ratings downgraded throughout his tenure at BSC.
37) In Barnett’s July 2014 PM, under the heading, “Interim Manager Comments,” Senior
in the way at times when issues arise. John likes to be right and at times rechallenges issues that
38) The round table discussion referenced by was a situation where Manufacturing
was pushing to use a spreadsheet in place of writing Emergent Removals (ERs) for products
removed from an aircraft after it had been installed and inspected. Per Boeing Process Instruction
(“BPI”) 1581, ERs are required for each part being removed from an aircraft after its final Quality
inspection and approval (“buy off”). The ER has specific items that must be reviewed and approved
(known as buying it off) by Quality prior to removing a part.7 In particular, Quality is required to
review whether the part removal will interfere with any FAA conformity inspections that had been
previously completed. If it does, it is required to contact the FAA prior to removing the part so
they are aware and can decide if it will void their conformity inspection or not.
official Boeing form and must have: 1) a form number showing it is in the Boeing system and
7
In the past, Boeing referred to Quality as Quality Control, but stopped using this descriptive title
because it could not control quality. Boeing then referred to it as Quality Assurance, but again,
stopped using this descriptive title because it could not assure quality. As a result, Boeing now
describes the title as simply, “Quality.”
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approved; 2) detailed instructions on how the form is to be completed; and 3) a documented process
describing it’s use. (See Boeing Procedure “PRO” 3019). In the event of a catastrophic failure of
the aircraft, the build record must provide traceability and accountability for all parts.
40) Barnett was asked to approve the use of a spreadsheet for ERs for Line #172,8 and was told
that a spreadsheet had been used in place of ERs on Line #168. Barnett reviewed Line 168’s build
records and discovered that manufacturing had failed to record any of the ERs for the parts
removed and that the spreadsheet that was supposedly used to record part removals was
purposefully left blank. Therefore, the build record did not comply with BPI-1581, nor did it
spreadsheet instead of ERs because they did it on 168… That is not per process…” Id. After being
urged by to make use of the spreadsheet, Barnett noted the problems with the data and
stated, “based on this info, I do not agree that the spreadsheet should be used as it does not meet
our procedural requirements. In addition, Line 168 had issues with the documentation used and
bought off.” Id. Barnett elevated the issue of Line 168 documents being out of compliance, but no
42) Barnett’s PM was downgraded because he continued to object and raise the fact that the
build record was not being properly completed and maintained. Barnett was also penalized on his
43) In Barnett’s July 2014 PM, under the heading, “Delivers Results,” Barnett received a score
8Boeing refers to each aircraft as a line number, so Line 168 is the 168th 787 aircraft being built.
9Barnett had been advised by Manufacturing that at least 25 parts had been removed for Line 168.
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Barnett’s PM stated, “John still needs to learn the art of F2F (“face to face”) engagement to address
44) Further, Barnett was penalized on his PM Reviews for not working in the “grey areas” of
the processes and procedures. In Barnett’s July 2014 PM, under “Interim Manager Comments,”
stated, “I would like to see him use his knowledge and experience to find a way to work
45) In response to the Interim Manager Comments, Barnett explained the need for process
violations to be documented in writing and that there should be no “grey areas” in Boeing’s
processes:
Id. at 4.
46) On September 11, 2014, Senior Quality Manager, sent Barnett an e-mail
chastising him for documenting process issues in writing. In his e-mail, states, “This is
47) continued to pressure Barnett to work in grey areas and to not document
process violations in writing. In addition, Barnett was pressured by other Boeing senior quality
managers to work in grey areas and not document process violations in writing. These managers
included , and .
48) In addition, Boeing management started rumors that Barnett did not get along with my
peers (which was untrue) and used this as a further basis for downgrading his performance
evaluations.
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49) Notably, Barnett continued to be penalized and his PMs wrongfully downgraded
throughout his time at BSC as a result of his refusal to compromise and work in the grey zone and
his insistence that defects be documented in writing as required by FAA Standards and
50) On September 12, 2014, Barnett was advised by that he issued a Corrective
60 Day Action Plan (“AP”) against Barnett, and would send it to him via email. The next day,
September 13, 2014, Barnett received email, attaching the AP issued against him for
documenting process violations in writing. In Item 4, it states, “Use F2F (face-to-face) meetings
and phone calls to resolve issues and stop using e-mail to argue or stress a point or quality
requirement.”
51) Notably, the AP was issued on August 15, 2014 and Barnett was not made aware that the
AP was issued until September 12, 2014 when informed Barnett about it.
52) On September 15, 2014, Barnett submitted his comments and noted that the AP was
provided to him almost one month after being issued, and that it was an example of a “surprise
attack.”10
53) In Barnett’s September 15, 2014 comments, he also stated, “Leadership wants nothing in
e-mail so they maintain plausible deniability,” and he concluded, “It is obvious Leadership is just
looking for items to criticize me on so I stop identifying issues. I will conform!” Id.
10Boeing’srules specifically require that any individual who is the subject of an AP be notified
immediately.
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54) In addition, the AP had several entries with the notation, “September Discussion 9/9/14.”
Since Barnett was not made aware of the AP until September 12, 2014, it was not possible for
55) Shortly after this surprise attack, Barnett began experiencing chest pains, shortness of
breath, nausea and vomiting, which his treating physician attributed to the stress caused by being
pressured to work in grey areas, to not document process and procedure violations, and from the
56) In October 2016, without any explanation, Barnett was removed from the investigation of
the defects in the squibs (firing pins) for emergency oxygen bottles, the BPSM Team and all other
connections with the Corrective Action Plan for the FAA. Barnett was also removed as the
manager of the ARL Team. told him that he was being “benched” and that if they
57) Barnett was removed from investigations of defects in retaliation for his insistence that the
58) At the time Barnett went out on Medical Leave, there had been no action taken to
investigate and/or correct the already delivered build records, which is a violation of FAA
11 Falsifying
records and providing false information to the Company is against Boeing’s processes
and procedures and is subject to corrective action, up to and including discharge. (See PRO-1909
and the ECA guidelines table, BPI-4332).
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d) Barnett was Black Listed and Blocked from Transferring to Various Positions.
59) In September 2014, Barnett applied for a 3rd shift position for which he was determined to
be the most qualified by Senior Manager, . He was then denied the position by
60) During a morning meeting with all First Line Managers, Second Level Manager,
announced that they had a third shift Quality Manager position coming available soon and
were looking for volunteers. When asked how they would decide if more than one Manager
volunteered, stated they would select the individual with the most experience in BSC Final
Assembly and if that was a tie, they would select who had the most time with the Company. At
that time, Barnett immediately volunteered for the position. Another manager spoke up and stated
that Barnett had the most time with the Company and had been in Final Assembly since day one,
so he should have the job and agreed. Notably, gave the position to
, who had been with the company far less time than Barnett and had transferred to Final
61) In March 2016, Barnett applied for a Quality Manager Position at Boeing’s Aerospace
Division in New Orleans, Louisiana. In August 2016, after a structured interview over the phone,
Barnett was notified that he had made it past the first phase and was one of two finalists for the
position, and he was invited by the hiring manager, , to New Orleans for an in-
person interview.
62) During the in-person interview, Barnett interacted with the NASA Director, other Quality
Managers, and the Quality Team. During each conversation, Barnett successfully addressed each
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department’s struggles and offered his expertise in finding solutions for each struggle. At the
conclusion of the interview, the hiring manager, , informed Barnett that his
expertise was a perfect fit for the needs of the position and that he would be a great asset for the
team.
63) Despite the exceptional skill set Barnett presented to the hiring manager and the NASA
team, and despite the fact that the hiring manager indicated that he possessed the exact skill set
they were looking for, Barnett was informed that he did not obtain the job.
64) Barnett informed his manager, , about the results of Barnett’s interview and
indicated that something was not right in the process. Barnett indicated that he believed someone
65) While told Barnett that she was “looking for a different skill set,” she had
previously told Barnett that he had precisely the skills they were looking for. Further, the re-post
for the job was exactly the same as the first post for the skills needed.
66) On October 20, 2016, Barnett filed a complaint with Boeing’s Ethics Department and asked
for it to be handled by an investigator from outside Charleston, South Carolina. Over Claimant’s
objection, it was turned over to Boeing’s local HRG. HR ( ) told Boeing that
67) This explanation was highly questionable since the re-post of the job description did not
change and it failed to state that Government Contract experience was a requirement. In fact, the
job postings were identical, with the exception of the re-posting mentioning that the job would be
68) In Boeing OSHA Position Statement, it gave a third reason than the ones provided by
and as to why Barnett was not hired. said they decided to hire
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out of an extensive list of candidates. The Quality Managers selected Barnett as the first applicant
on the list, indicating their desire to work with Barnett especially because of his expertise and skills
74) A few hours later, stated that he was told that “We will not be getting John
Barnett, they didn’t care how bad I wanted him. They said John Barnett is not going anywhere.”12
e) Barnett was continuously denigrated, humiliated, and treated with scorn and
contempt.
75) In addition to the previously mentioned adverse actions taken by Boeing in retaliation for
Barnett’s refusal to compromise and violate the above standards, regulations, processes, and
procedures, Barnett was subjected to a gaslighting campaign in which he was continually harassed,
denigrated, humiliated, and treated with scorn and contempt by upper management.
76) For example, there were weekly quality meetings scheduled with Barnett’s quality team.
announced in front of the team that Barnett was responsible for a certain production delay, or that
Barnett was responsible for the entire team having to work over-time and being away from their
families. These comments were the result of Barnett’s documentation of processes, procedure
violations, and defects in writing, and Barnett’s refusal to work in grey areas and conceal problems.
77) When Barnett questioned decisions that violated standards, regulations, processes, and
procedures, raised his hands in the air, waving them around in an animated manner
and loudly and aggressively stated, “John, are you just waiving your hands in the air or do you
have an idea”. Barnett never saw this type of reaction displayed towards any other Manager or
employee.
12 This tookplace after Barnett filed his most recent ethics complaint. Notably, one of the witnesses
in Propulsion was warned by their Manager to “stay out of the Barnett thing. Forget it ever
happened.”
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78) These meetings were always very tense, and the comments made about Barnett were
this gaslighting campaign against Barnett was done in order to punish Barnett for identifying
problems, insisting on the rules being followed, and documenting in writing all process and
procedure violations and defects. This gaslighting was also directed against Barnett publicly in
front of his team to discourage Barnett and others from complying with the law.
79) The denigrating comments caused Barnett a tremendous amount of stress, made it very
difficult for Barnett to concentrate and perform his job, and caused him emotional suffering to the
point of taking medical leave of absence and ultimately leaving Boeing, at the advice of Barnett’s
80) These retaliatory attacks were continuing throughout Barnett’s time at BSC and occurred
81) Pursuant to AIR-21, “No air carrier or contractor or subcontractor of an air carrier may
information regarding violations “relating to air carrier safety” to his or her employer or federal
82) In order to establish a prima facie claim of retaliation under the AIR-21, one must allege
the existence of facts and evidence sufficient to show that: (i) the employee engaged in protected
activity; (ii) the employer knew or suspected that the employee engaged in protected activity; (iii)
the employee suffered an adverse action; and (iv) circumstances were sufficient to raise the
inference that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action. 29 C.F.R.
§1979.104(b)(1).
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i) Mr. Barnett engaged in protected activity
83) Barnett’s protected conduct is laid out in Section III. In general, Barnett was continuously
pressured by senior quality management at Boeing to work in grey areas and to avoid documenting
process and procedure violations and defects. This was seen with various issues, including: 1) the
hundreds of defective parts that were missing and that Boeing’s Quality Management insisted be
“bought off” without any investigation; 2) Boeing’s failure to investigate the 25% failure rate with
emergency oxygen bottles; and 3) Boeing knowingly maintaining inaccurate and incomplete build
records. Barnett refused to work in grey areas, cut corners and white wash problems, and vocally
complained that to do so would be unethical and violate Boeing and FAA rules.13 In addition,
Barnett filed numerous ethics complaints against Boeing management for its violations and
retaliatory conduct.
84) Boeing’s retaliatory adverse action is laid out in Section IV. Through Boeing’s adverse
action, Boeing created and maintained hostile work environment that led to Mr. Barnett’s
constructive discharge.
iii) Boeing black listed and/or blocked Barnett’s transfers to other divisions
within Boeing.
85) As discussed in Section IV.d, Barnett sought to transfer to other Boeing divisions and was
86) These positions offered numerous benefits in their conditions, terms and opportunities for
advancement.
13In response to Mr. Barnett’s insistence that Boeing follow the rules, he was denigrated,
humiliated, and treated with scorn and contempt by senior quality managers at Boeing.
24
iv) Boeing created and maintained a hostile work environment.
87) Boeing engaged in a pattern of conduct, which created and maintained a hostile work
environment in retaliation for Barnett’s protected activities (discussed herein a Section III.)
88) The Supreme Court stated in National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, 536
89) In Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 221 (4th Cir. 2016), 14 the Fourth
90) Looking at the totality of the circumstances, including all of the adverse actions taken
against Barnett, the elements set forth by the Fourth Circuit (See Guessous) are satisfied and
14
In Guessous, the Court reversed the lower court’s finding of summary judgment in favor of employer for
the Court’s failure to review the totality of the circumstances of allegations of the employee’s claim of a
hostile work environment.
25
amounted to a hostile work environment. Barnett has made a prima facie showing that he engaged
91) The circumstances also amounted to a hostile work environment per se. It is a criminal
felony offense to not properly document the build record of an aircraft. By pressuring Barnett to
not follow processes and procedures and to not properly document defects in the build records,
Boeing was ordering Barnett to commit a felony offense. Barnett faced a repetitive and systemic
pattern of being requested to violate, circumvent, and ignore the law, and to place profits over
92) Further, in “at will” states like South Carolina, an employer can fire an employee at any
time and for any reason, except where it violates the law or is a violation of “public policy.” For
example, public policy is violated when an employee is terminated for refusing to take unlawful
action. A myriad of cases exist that stand for the proposition (rightfully so) that an employer cannot
wrongfully discharge an employee for refusing to violate the law. For instance, as the District of
Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 32; 1991 D.C. App. LEXIS 258 (citations
omitted, and emphasis added). See e.g. Burton v. Zwicker & Assocs., PSC, 577 Fed. Appx. 555,
93) As mentioned herein, Barnett was given responsibility for documenting lost defective parts
while assigned to the MRSA. Barnett knew that FAA regulations require manufacturers to track
26
all parts, document the disposition of parts deemed to be defective, and to notify the FAA when
the disposition of lost parts went unresolved. Boeing ordered Barnett to merely sign off on the lost
parts without conducting a full investigation to determine the disposition of the parts. Further,
Boeing forbade Barnett from disclosing to the FAA the fact that the disposition of numerous parts
went unresolved.
94) In fact, Boeing created an environment in which Barnett was being harassed, denigrated,
humiliated, and treated with scorn and contempt by quality management in the presence of his
team, all for insisting that regulations and laws be followed. Boeing certainly intended for Barnett
to disregard and violate the law, and Boeing was aware that Barnett had an obligation to fully
95) Barnett resigned because of the stress he experienced as a result of Boeing’s insistence that
he engage in illegal and unethical conduct. Further, such conditions as those imposed on Barnett
are intolerable and actually mandate resignation. Notably, others have resigned because they were
faced with the decision to either violate FAA rules and regulations and be rewarded, or follow the
law, be harassed, and have no future with the company. Boeing’s conduct resulted in the
96) Barnett anticipates that Boeing will claim that his hostile work environment and his
constructive discharge claims are untimely. Barnett’s complaint against Boeing for creating and
maintaining a hostile work environment is not time barred because Boeing’s adverse action took
place within 90-days of filing and the hostile work environment was continuous and systemic. The
law is clear that where such conduct is continuous and systemic, conduct outside the statute of
27
The question whether a court may, for purposes of determining
liability, review all such conduct, including those acts that occur
outside the filing period, turns on the statutory requirement that a
charge be filed within a certain number of days "after the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred.” Because such a claim is
composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute
one "unlawful employment practice," it does not matter that
some of the component acts fall outside the statutory time
period. Provided that an act contributing to the claim occurs
within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile
environment may be considered for the purposes of determining
liability. That act need not be the last act. Subsequent events
may still be part of the one claim, and a charge may be filed at
a later date and still encompass the whole.
National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 103 (S.Ct. 2002) (emphasis
added).
97) Further, Barnett’s claim for constructive discharge is timely since the facts for this claim
arise out of the conduct, transactions, and occurrences set out in Barnett’s Air-21 complaint and to
the extent the claim is not included, it relates back to his filing. In that event, Barnett moves to
amend his complaint to add his claim for constructive discharge. See Feldman v. Law Enforcement
Assocs. Corp., 752 F.3d 339, 346 (4th Cir. 2014)( Under Rule 15(c), an amended pleading relates
back to the date of the original pleading when “the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original
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ii) The Circumstances Are Sufficient To Raise The Inference That Barnett’s
Protected Conduct And Activity Were A Contributing Factor To The
Unfavorable Action.
99) Barnett’s protected conduct was a contributing factor in the unfavorable action taken
against him. First, Barnett's protected activity occurred at or shortly before the adverse action. 15
For example, it was in June 2016 that Barnett was assigned the missing parts in Buildings 88-19
and 88-20, and learned that 176 missing defective parts had been closed out without any
investigation. Barnett insisted that these missing parts be fully investigated. In the face of
opposition, in mid-October Barnett attended Boeing’s Quality Special Attention Meeting (QSAM)
and argued that the parts needed to be fully investigated and that Boeing needed to self-disclose to
the FAA if parts are not located. It was at this meeting that Boeing’s Quality Director stated that
100) Barnett’s discussions and complaints regarding the 176 missing parts took place between
June and October 2016. As in the past, he was treated like he was a troublemaker and gaslighted
following his complaints. It was clear to Barnett that Boeing was isolating him. In addition to being
denigrated and treated with scorn and contempt, he was stripped of responsibilities, including
participation on the serial number ARL team and oxygen bottle investigation. As discussed below,
it was around this same time period that Boeing blocked him from transferring to other positions
in retaliation for his efforts to get the missing parts investigated and documented properly.
15“Normally the burden is satisfied, for example, if the complaint shows that the adverse personnel
action took place shortly after the protected activity, giving rise to the inference that it was a factor
in the adverse action.” 29 C.F.R. §1979.104(b). See also Dye v. Office of the Racing Comm’n, 702
F.3d 286, 306 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing cases in which temporal proximity of three months between
protected conduct and retaliatory discharge was sufficient to show causation). Hochstadt v.
Worcester Found. For Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F.Supp. 318, 324-25 (D.Mass.) (holding
that discharge six months after EEOC settlement and a month after an informal complaint satisfies
causation requirement), aff’d, 545 F.2d 222 (1 st Cir. 1976).
29
101) In addition, Barnett had become aware in September 2016 that his senior manager,
went into the MRSA, removed a scrapped part from the scrap bin and released it to the
production floor for installation on an aircraft without following proper procedures and in violation
of FAA Regulations and Boeing's own procedures. Barnett filed a complaint with HR on
September 17, 2016, and he submitted an ethics complaint against on October 20,
2016.16
102) The following facts and circumstances, when taken separately and together, are more than
sufficient to raise the inference that Barnett’s protected activity was a contributing factor for the
2. Senior quality management at Boeing pressured Barnett to work in grey areas and
to avoid documenting in writing process and procedure violations and defects.
This was most recently seen with the issues involving missing defective parts,
incorrect build records and defective emergency oxygen bottles;
4. Barnett was denied job transfers for which he was qualified and under circumstances
where he had reason to believe that Boeing senior quality management prevented
him from being hired;
16
Once again, it was around this same time period (September and October 2016) that Boeing blocked
Barnett from transferring to other positions.
17
Retaliatory intent may be expressed through “ridicule, openly hostile actions or threatening statements.”
Frady v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 1992-ERA-19 and 34, slip op. at 5 (Sec’y Oct. 23, 1995); Mandell v.
County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 383 (2nd Cir. 2003)(viewing protected activities as a “betrayal of the
department.”
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5. Barnett was denied the transfer positions at the same time he was pushing Boeing to
fully investigate the missing parts, incomplete build records and defective
oxygen bottle issues;
103) As a direct result of Boeing’s retaliatory actions for protected activity, Barnett has incurred
damages including, but not limited to: 1) back pay; 2) front pay for a period of 10 years; 3) lost
bonuses, past and future; 4) lost health and life insurance benefits; 5) medical expenses; 6) loss of
401-K retirement and matching benefits, past and future; 7) emotional distress and mental anguish;
104) Complainant’s counsel has communicated with Respondent’s counsel in a good faith effort
to identify uncontroverted facts and legal issues to which the parties can stipulate. Counsel have
105) On January 16, 2017, Barnett filed an administrative complaint with the Occupational
18 See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2108 (2000) (“Proof that the defendant’s
explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that it is
probative of intentional discrimination and it might be quite persuasive...in appropriate
circumstances, the trier of fact can infer from falsity of the explanation that the employer is
dissembling to cover up the discriminatory purpose.”).
19
Evidence that the whistleblower’s concerns were correct and the magnitude of the problem
identified by the whistleblower is circumstantial evidence that the protected activity was a
contributing factor in the unfavorable action. See Seater v. Southern California Edison Co., 95-
ERA-13, D&O of Remand by ARB, at 4-6 (September 27, 1996).
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LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT M. TURKEWITZ, LLC
/s/Robert M. Turkewitz
Robert M. Turkewitz
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