Fiji pivots away from China signalling Beijing’s declining influence in South Pacific

Fiji, a key state in the South Pacific, appears to take bold steps to pivot away from China. Last month on the recommendation of the Constitutional Offices Commission, Fijian President Ratu Wiliame Katonivere suspended the country's Police Commissioner Sitiveni Qiliho, who was perceived to be friendly with pro-China politician and former Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama.

Qiliho and Bainimarama had been instrumental in pivoting Fiji towards China in recent years and had established closer security cooperation between the two countries, ET has learnt. Along with dismissing Qiliho, the Fijian government led by new Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka Rabuka also scrapped the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for police training and exchange between the Fiji Police Force and the Ministry of Public Security of China, according to a report in local daily Fiji Times.

China and Fiji had signed this MoU in 2011. It made it easier for Fijian police personnel to receive training in China while also allowing Chinese police officers to serve as attachés in Fiji for a period of three to six months. These police cooperation efforts reached a new level in September 2021 with the confirmation of a senior Chinese police officer as a liaison officer in Fiji. It is believed that Police Commissioner Qiliho was a key player in the implementation of the MoU, according to a report in Solomon Times.

Given current prime minister Rabuka’s political background, the action taken under his government is not surprising. Since the MoU in 2011, he had opposed the joint police cooperation plan. As a matter of fact, during his election campaigning, Rabuka had hinted that if elected, his government would work towards pivoting away from China and enhance the bilateral cooperation with Australia. Now while scrapping the MoU he had argued that Fijian systems were different from China’s, thereby stating his intention to get closer to Australia and New Zealand.

With the scrapping of MoU on police cooperation it is evident that Fiji is trying to move away from Chinese sphere influence. Suva has been drifting from the Chinese sphere for some time. Last year, it became part of the United States-initiated Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Moreover, a Fiji-Australia agreement for improved military cooperation has been in place since October 2022. It is noteworthy that US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken had visited Fiji, which was the first visit by a US official in almost 37 years.

The current Fijian government’s emphasis is on collaborating with like-minded democratic powers. Suva has already geared up to intensify its cooperation with Canberra, Wellington and indeed Washington. An important determinant of Suva’s actions will also be the success or failure of IPEF which can prove decisive in the battle against Chinese influence in the region.

In the past few years, China has tried to penetrate deep into the Pacific region by targeting small island countries. It does so by providing economic support and infrastructure building assistance. In April last year, Beijing signed a security pact with Solomon Islands, a move which triggered widespread concerns in not only Australia and New Zealand but also the United States. This was perceived as a Chinese attempt to expand its military presence in the region. Subsequently, China strived to sign similar kinds of agreements with other Pacific Island Countries, but failed to woo them, according to a report in the South China Morning Post.

The benefits of Beijing’s increased engagement with the region are obvious, even if
Chinese leaders have not officially acknowledged that the Pacific Islands region is a zone of increased strategic interest. The Pacific Islands can provide China with a low-risk, high- reward opportunity to achieve symbolic, strategic, and tactical wins in the pursuit of its global agenda, maybe more so than any other region. China has attempted to fill a geostrategic void caused by the generally low levels of economic development among Pacific nations and the limited engagement, which is frequently viewed in local capitals as neglect, that they have received from other regional powers—including Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States—using the playbook it has perfected elsewhere in the world: foreign assistance, private-sector investment and loans, sustained and high-level diplomacy, and military force. With the use of these tools, China has been able to advance important geostrategic initiatives in the Pacific that have been more challenging to pursue in other, more contentious regions.

China’s trade and other diplomatic activities in the region have been rising in the past decade and half. Reportedly, between 2006 and 2017, China spent almost $ 1.5 billion in the region by means of foreign aid, several grants and infrastructure loans.

Pacific Island Countries remain important for Beijing because the region provides a crucial passage for its ships and where the supplies can be controlled. It is also a naturally diversified and rich region when it comes to various resources. But Pacific Island countries’ participation in the IPEF hints that they are keen to move out of the Chinese ‘umbrella’ to diversify their economic and simultaneously security interests, according to a report in The Financial Times.