Clinton v. City of New York
 | |
| Clinton v. City of New York | |
| Reference: 524 U.S. 417 | |
| Term: 1998 | |
| Important Dates | |
| Argued: April 27, 1998 Decided: June 25, 1998 | |
| Outcome | |
| United States District Court for the District of Columbia affirmed | |
| Majority | |
| William Rehnquist • John Paul Stevens • Anthony Kennedy • David Souter • Clarence Thomas • Ruth Bader Ginsburg | |
| Dissenting | |
| Sandra Day O'Connor • Antonin Scalia • Stephen Breyer | |
Clinton v. City of New York is a case decided on June 25, 1998, by the United States Supreme Court holding that the Presentment Clause of the U.S. Constitution establishes that all changes to existing laws must be initiated by Congress. The case concerned whether the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.[1][2][3]
Why it matters: The Supreme Court's decision in this case established that, according to the Presentment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Congress must initiate all changes to existing laws. To read more about the impact of Clinton v. City of New York click here.
Background
The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 gave the president the authority to repeal spending and tax measures after they had been signed into law. President Bill Clinton acted upon that authority to cancel two tax provisions in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. The cancellation of these provisions brought the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act into question.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the act was unconstitutional because it violated the Presentment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which states that bills must be presented to the president for approval after they have been passed by Congress. At that time, the president may either sign the bill into law or return it to Congress with any objections. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court for review.[1][2]
Oral argument
Oral argument was held on April 27, 1998. The case was decided on June 25, 1998.[1]
Decision
The Supreme Court decided 6-3 to affirm the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the court, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia.[3]
Opinions
Opinion of the court
Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the court, argued that the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly grant authority to the president to enact, amend, and repeal statutes. Stevens contended, however, that the Constitution requires the president to review statutes after they have passed both the House of Representatives and the Senate. At that time, the president may either approve the statute or return it to Congress if the president has objections to the statute.[3]
| " | There is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes. Both Article I and Article II assign responsibilities to the President that directly relate to the lawmaking process, but neither addresses the issue presented by these cases. The President 'shall from time to time give to the Congress Information on the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient .... ' Art. II, § 3. Thus, he may initiate and influence legislative proposals. Moreover, after a bill has passed both Houses of Congress, but 'before it become[s] a Law,' it must be presented to the President. If he approves it, 'he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.' [4] | ” |
| —John Paul Stevens, majority opinion in Clinton v. City of New York[3] | ||
Despite the president's constitutional authority to approve or object statutes passed by Congress, the Constitution does not explicitly authorize the president to enact unilateral actions to repeal or amend enacted statutes. The cancellation efforts that President Bill Clinton made pursuant to the Line Item Veto Act aimed to cancel part of a bill that had already been enacted. Stevens argued that the constitutional silence on this matter can be interpreted to mean that this behavior is prohibited. Pursuant to the Presentment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the president is authorized to approve or reject a bill in total, not in parts.[3]
| " | There are important differences between the President’s 'return' of a bill pursuant to Article I, §7, and the exercise of the President’s cancellation authority pursuant to the Line Item Veto Act. The constitutional return takes place before the bill becomes law; the statutory cancellation occurs after the bill becomes law. The constitutional return is of the entire bill; the statutory cancellation is of only a part. Although the Constitution expressly authorizes the President to play a role in the process of enacting statutes, it is silent on the subject of unilateral Presidential action that either repeals or amends parts of duly enacted statutes.
There are powerful reasons for construing constitutional silence on this profoundly important issue as equivalent to an express prohibition. The procedures governing the enactment of statutes set forth in the text of Article I were the product of the great debates and compromises that produced the Constitution itself. Familiar historical materials provide abundant support for the conclusion that the power to enact statutes may only 'be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.' Chadha, 462 U.S., at 951. Our first President understood the text of the Presentment Clause as requiring that he either 'approve all the parts of a Bill, or reject it in toto.' What has emerged in these cases from the President’s exercise of his statutory cancellation powers, however, are truncated versions of two bills that passed both Houses of Congress. They are not the product of the 'finely wrought' procedure that the Framers designed.[4] |
” |
| —John Paul Stevens, majority opinion in Clinton v. City of New York[5] | ||
Concurring opinion
Justice Anthony Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, argued that allowing the executive and legislative branches of government to readjust their powers would hinder individual liberty. Kennedy posited that the separation of powers is critical to asserting authority and therefore must adhere to the powers that are outlined by the Framers in the Constitution.[3][5]
| " | Separation of powers helps to ensure the ability of each branch to be vigorous in asserting its proper authority. In this respect the device operates on a horizontal axis to secure a proper balance of legislative, executive, and judicial authority. Separation of powers operates on a vertical axis as well, between each branch and the citizens in whose interest powers must be exercised. The citizen has a vital interest in the regularity of the exercise of governmental power. If this point was not clear before Chadha, it should have been so afterwards. Though Chadha involved the deportation of a person, while the case before us involves the expenditure of money or the grant of a tax exemption, this circumstance does not mean that the vertical operation of the separation of powers is irrelevant here. By increasing the power of the President beyond what the Framers envisioned, the statute compromises the political liberty of our citizens, liberty which the separation of powers seeks to secure. [4] | ” |
| —Anthony Kennedy, concurring opinion in Clinton v. City of New York[3] | ||
Dissenting opinion
Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and joined in part by Justice Stephen Breyer, wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Scalia argued that the Line Item Veto Act does not violate the Presentment Clause of the U.S. Constitution and is therefore constitutional.[3][5]
| " | The short of the matter is this: Had the Line Item Veto Act authorized the President to 'decline to spend' any item of spending contained in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, there is not the slightest doubt that authorization would have been constitutional. What the Line Item Veto Act does instead–authorizing the President to 'cancel' an item of spending–is technically different. But the technical difference does not relate to the technicalities of the Presentment Clause, which have been fully complied with; and the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation, which is at issue here, is preeminently not a doctrine of technicalities. The title of the Line Item Veto Act, which was perhaps designed to simplify for public comprehension, or perhaps merely to comply with the terms of a campaign pledge, has succeeded in faking out the Supreme Court. The President’s action it authorizes in fact is not a line-item veto and thus does not offend Art. I, §7; and insofar as the substance of that action is concerned, it is no different from what Congress has permitted the President to do since the formation of the Union. [4] | ” |
| —Antonin Scalia, dissenting opinion in Clinton v. City of New York[5] | ||
Justice Stephen Breyer, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia, also argued that the Line Item Veto Act does not violate the Presentment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Breyer contended that the act does not violate any constitutional commands, including the separation of powers principle.[3][5]
| " | In sum, I recognize that the Act before us is novel. In a sense, it skirts a constitutional edge. But that edge has to do with means, not ends. The means chosen do not amount literally to the enactment, repeal, or amendment of a law. Nor, for that matter, do they amount literally to the 'line item veto' that the Act’s title announces. Those means do not violate any basic Separation of Powers principle. They do not improperly shift the constitutionally foreseen balance of power from Congress to the President. Nor, since they comply with Separation of Powers principles, do they threaten the liberties of individual citizens. They represent an experiment that may, or may not, help representative government work better. The Constitution, in my view, authorizes Congress and the President to try novel methods in this way. [4] | ” |
| —Stephen Breyer, dissenting opinion in Clinton v. City of New York[3] | ||
Impact
| Federalism |
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| •Key terms • Court cases •Major arguments • State responses to federal mandates • Federalism by the numbers • Index of articles about federalism |
- See also: Nondelegation doctrine
Clinton v. City of New York established that the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 was unconstitutional because it allowed the President to amend or repeal parts of statutes without the pre-approval of Congress. The Presentment Clause of Article I of the U.S. Constitution states that:
| " | Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States: If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law. [4] | ” |
According to the clause, Congress must initiate all changes to existing laws. The president does not have the authority to amend or repeal laws, in part or in total, without consent from the legislative branch.[3]
See also
- The Rehnquist Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- History of the Supreme Court
- Federalism
- Nondelegation doctrine
External links
- Full text of case syllabus and opinions (Justia)
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Oyez, "Clinton v. City of New York," accessed July 5, 2022
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 LexisNexis, "Clinton v. City of New York - 524 U.S. 417, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998)," accessed July 5, 2022
- ↑ 3.00 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04 3.05 3.06 3.07 3.08 3.09 3.10 Justia, "Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)," accessed July 5, 2022
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 Legal Information Institute, "Clinton v. City of New York (97-1374)," accessed July 5, 2022
- ↑ Constitution Annotated, "Artl.S7.C2.1 Legislative Enactments and Presentment," accessed July 6, 2022
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